Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 180046

April 2, 2009

REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA and COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION
represented by its Chairman ROMULO L. NERI, Respondents.
CPA REVIEW SCHOOL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (CPAR), PROFESSIONAL REVIEW AND
TRAINING CENTER, INC. (PRTC), ReSA REVIEW SCHOOL, INC. (ReSA), CRC-ACE REVIEW
SCHOOL, INC. (CRC-ACE)Petitioners-Intervenors.
PIMSAT COLLEGES, Respondent-Intervenor.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for prohibition and mandamus assailing Executive Order No. 566 (EO
566)1 and Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Memorandum Order No. 30, series of 2007
(RIRR).2
The Antecedent Facts
On 11 and 12 June 2006, the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) conducted the Nursing
Board Examinations nationwide. In June 2006, licensure applicants wrote the PRC to report that
handwritten copies of two sets of examinations were circulated during the examination period among
the examinees reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz Review Center and Inress Review Center. George
Cordero, Inress Review Centers President, was then the incumbent President of the Philippine
Nurses Association. The examinees were provided with a list of 500 questions and answers in two of
the examinations five subjects, particularly Tests III (Psychiatric Nursing) and V (Medical-Surgical
Nursing). The PRC later admitted the leakage and traced it to two Board of Nursing members. 3 On
19 June 2006, the PRC released the results of the Nursing Board Examinations. On 18 August 2006,
the Court of Appeals restrained the PRC from proceeding with the oath-taking of the successful
examinees set on 22 August 2006.
Consequently, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo) replaced all the members of
the PRCs Board of Nursing. President Arroyo also ordered the examinees to re-take the Nursing
Board Examinations.
On 8 September 2006, President Arroyo issued EO 566 which authorized the CHED to supervise the
establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines.
On 3 November 2006, the CHED, through its then Chairman Carlito S. Puno (Chairman Puno),
approved CHED Memorandum Order No. 49, series of 2006 (IRR).4

In a letter dated 24 November 2006,5 the Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner),
an organization of independent review centers, asked the CHED to "amend, if not withdraw" the IRR
arguing, among other things, that giving permits to operate a review center to Higher Education
Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will effectively abolish
independent review centers.
In a letter dated 3 January 2007,6 Chairman Puno wrote petitioner, through its President Jose
Antonio Fudolig (Fudolig), that to suspend the implementation of the IRR would be inconsistent with
the mandate of EO 566. Chairman Puno wrote that the IRR was presented to the stakeholders
during a consultation process prior to its finalization and publication on 13 November 2006.
Chairman Puno also wrote that petitioners comments and suggestions would be considered in the
event of revisions to the IRR.
In view of petitioners continuing request to suspend and re-evaluate the IRR, Chairman Puno, in a
letter dated 9 February 2007,7 invited petitioners representatives to a dialogue on 14 March 2007. In
accordance with what was agreed upon during the dialogue, petitioner submitted to the CHED its
position paper on the IRR. Petitioner also requested the CHED to confirm in writing Chairman Punos
statements during the dialogue, particularly on lowering of the registration fee from P400,000
to P20,000 and the requirement for reviewers to have five years teaching experience instead of five
years administrative experience. Petitioner likewise requested for a categorical answer to their
request for the suspension of the IRR. The CHED did not reply to the letter.
On 7 May 2007, the CHED approved the RIRR. On 22 August 2007, petitioner filed before the CHED
a Petition to Clarify/Amend Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations 8 praying for a ruling:
1. Amending the RIRR by excluding independent review centers from the coverage of the
CHED;
2. Clarifying the meaning of the requirement for existing review centers to tie-up or be
integrated with HEIs, consortium or HEIs and PRC-recognized professional associations with
recognized programs, or in the alternative, to convert into schools; and
3. Revising the rules to make it conform with Republic Act No. 7722 (RA 7722) 9 limiting the
CHEDs coverage to public and private institutions of higher education as well as degreegranting programs in post-secondary educational institutions.
On 8 October 2007, the CHED issued Resolution No. 718-200710 referring petitioners request to
exclude independent review centers from CHEDs supervision and regulation to the Office of the
President as the matter requires the amendment of EO 566. In a letter dated 17 October 2007, 11 then
CHED Chairman Romulo L. Neri (Chairman Neri) wrote petitioner regarding its petition to be
excluded from the coverage of the CHED in the RIRR. Chairman Neri stated:
While it may be true that regulation of review centers is not one of the mandates of CHED under
Republic Act 7722, however, on September 8, 2006, Her Excellency, President Gloria MacapagalArroyo, issued Executive Order No. 566 directing the Commission on Higher Education to regulate
the establishment and operation of review centers and similar entities in the entire country.
With the issuance of the aforesaid Executive Order, the CHED now is the agency that is mandated
to regulate the establishment and operation of all review centers as provided for under Section 4 of
the Executive Order which provides that "No review center or similar entities shall be
established and/or operate review classes without the favorable expressed indorsement of

the CHED and without the issuance of the necessary permits or authorizations to conduct
review classes. x x x"
To exclude the operation of independent review centers from the coverage of CHED would
clearly contradict the intention of the said Executive Order No. 566.
Considering that the requests requires the amendment of Executive Order No. 566, the Commission,
during its 305th Commission Meeting, resolved that the said request be directly referred to the Office
of the President for appropriate action.
As to the request to clarify what is meant by tie-up/be integrated with an HEI, as required under the
Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations, tie-up/be integrated simply means, to be in partner
with an HEI.12(Boldfacing and underscoring in the original)
On 26 October 2007, petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before this Court
praying for the annulment of the RIRR, the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and unconstitutional,
and the prohibition against CHED from implementing the RIRR.
Dr. Freddie T. Bernal, Director III, Officer-In-Charge, Office of the Director IV of CHED, sent a
letter13 to the President of Northcap Review Center, Inc., a member of petitioner, that it had until 27
November 2007 to comply with the RIRR.
1avvphi1.zw+

On 15 February 2008,14 PIMSAT Colleges (respondent-intervenor) filed a Motion For Leave to

Intervene and To Admit Comment-in-Intervention and a Comment-in-Intervention praying for the
dismissal of the petition. Respondent-intervenor alleges that the Office of the President and the
CHED did not commit any act of grave abuse of discretion in issuing EO 566 and the RIRR.
Respondent-intervenor alleges that the requirements of the RIRR are reasonable, doable, and are
not designed to deprive existing review centers of their review business. The Court granted the
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Comment-in-Intervention in its 11 March 2008
Resolution.15
On 23 April 2008, a Motion for Leave of Court for Intervention In Support of the Petition and a
Petition In Intervention were filed by CPA Review School of the Philippines, Inc. (CPAR),
Professional Review and Training Center, Inc. (PRTC), ReSA Review School, Inc. (ReSA), CRCACE Review School, Inc. (CRC-ACE), all independent CPA review centers operating in Manila
(collectively, petitioners-intervenors). Petitioners-intervenors pray for the declaration of EO 566 and
the RIRR as invalid on the ground that both constitute an unconstitutional exercise of legislative
power. The Court granted the intervention in its 29 April 2008 Resolution. 16
On 21 May 2008, the CHED issued CHED Memorandum Order No. 21, Series of 2008 (CMO 21, s.
2008)17extending the deadline for six months from 27 May 2008 for all existing independent review
centers to tie-up or be integrated with HEIs in accordance with the RIRR.
In its 25 November 2008 Resolution, this Court resolved to require the parties to observe the status
quo prevailing before the issuance of EO 566, the RIRR, and CMO 21, s. 2008.
The Assailed Executive Order and the RIRR
Executive Order No. 566 states in full:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 566

DIRECTING THE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION TO REGULATE THE

ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF REVIEW CENTERS AND SIMILAR ENTITIES
WHEREAS, the State is mandated to protect the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels
and shall take appropriate steps to make education accessible to all, pursuant to Section 1, Article
XIV of the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, the State has the obligation to ensure and promote quality education through the proper
supervision and regulation of the licensure examinations given through the various Boards of
Examiners under the Professional Regulation Commission;
WHEREAS, the lack of regulatory framework for the establishment and operation of review centers
and similar entities, as shown in recent events, have adverse consequences and affect public
interest and welfare;
WHEREAS, the overriding necessity to protect the public against substandard review centers and
unethical practices committed by some review centers demand that a regulatory framework for the
establishment and operation of review centers and similar entities be immediately instituted;
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7722, otherwise known as the Higher Education Act of 1994, created
the Commission on Higher Education, which is best equipped to carry out the provisions pertaining
to the regulation of the establishment and operation of review centers and similar entities.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, the President of the Republic of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. Establishment of a System of Regulation for Review Centers and
Similar Entities. The Commission on Higher Education (CHED), in consultation with
other concerned government agencies, is hereby directed to formulate a framework
for the regulation of review centers and similar entities, including but not limited to the
development and institutionalization of policies, standards, guidelines for the
establishment, operation and accreditation of review centers and similar entities;
maintenance of a mechanism to monitor the adequacy, transparency and propriety of
their operations; and reporting mechanisms to review performance and ethical
practice.
SEC. 2. Coordination and Support. The Professional Regulation Commission (PRC),
Technical Skills Development Authority (TESDA), Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), the various Boards of Examiners under the PRC, as well as
other concerned non-government organizations life professional societies, and
various government agencies, such as the Department of Justice (DOJ), National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and others that
may be tapped later, shall provide the necessary assistance and technical support to
the CHED in the successful operationalization of the System of Regulation
envisioned by this Executive Order.
SEC. 3. Permanent Office and Staff. To ensure the effective implementation of the
System of Regulation, the CHED shall organize a permanent office under its
supervision to be headed by an official with the rank of Director and to be composed
of highly competent individuals with expertise in educational assessment, evaluation
and testing; policies and standards development, monitoring, legal and enforcement;
and statistics as well as curriculum and instructional materials development. The

CHED shall submit the staffing pattern and budgetary requirements to the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) for approval.
SEC. 4. Indorsement Requirement. No review center or similar entities shall be
established and/or operate review classes without the favorable expressed
indorsement of the CHED and without the issuance of the necessary permits or
authorizations to conduct review classes. After due consultation with the
stakeholders, the concerned review centers and similar entities shall be given a
reasonable period, at the discretion of the CHED, to comply with the policies and
standards, within a period not exceeding three (3) years, after due publication of this
Executive Order. The CHED shall see to it that the System of Regulation including
the implementing mechanisms, policies, guidelines and other necessary procedures
and documentation for the effective implementation of the System, are completed
within sixty days (60) upon effectivity of this Executive Order.
SEC. 5. Funding. The initial amount necessary for the development and
implementation of the System of Regulation shall be sourced from the CHED Higher
Education Development Fund (HEDF), subject to the usual government accounting
and auditing practices, or from any applicable funding source identified by the DBM.
For the succeeding fiscal year, such amounts as may be necessary for the budgetary
requirement of implementing the System of Regulation and the provisions of this
Executive Order shall be provided for in the annual General Appropriations Act in the
budget of the CHED. Whenever necessary, the CHED may tap its Development
Funds as supplemental source of funding for the effective implementation of the
regulatory system. In this connection, the CHED is hereby authorized to create
special accounts in the HEDF exclusively for the purpose of implementing the
provisions of this Executive Order.
SEC. 6. Review and Reporting. The CHED shall provide for the periodic review
performance of review centers and similar entities and shall make a report to the
Office of the President of the results of such review, evaluation and monitoring.
SEC. 7. Separability. Any portion or provision of this Executive Order that may be
declared unconstitutional shall not have the effect of nullifying other provisions
hereof, as long as such remaining provisions can still subsist and be given effect in
their entirely.
SEC. 8. Repeal. All rules and regulations, other issuances or parts thereof, which are
inconsistent with this Executive Order, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
SEC. 9. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately upon its
publication in a national newspaper of general circulation.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 8th day of September, in the year of Our Lord, Two Thousand and
Six.
(Sgd.) Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
By the President:

(Sgd.) Eduardo R. Ermita

Executive Secretary
The pertinent provisions of the RIRR affecting independent review centers are as follows:
Rule VII
IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES
Section 1. Authority to Establish and Operate Only CHED recognized, accredited
and reputable HEIs may be authorized to establish and operate review center/course
by the CHED upon full compliance with the conditions and requirements provided
herein and in other pertinent laws, rules and regulations. In addition, a consortium or
consortia of qualified schools and/or entities may establish and operate review
centers or conduct review classes upon compliance with the provisions of these
Rules.
Rule XIV
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
Section 1. Review centers that are existing upon the approval of Executive Order No.
566 shall be given a grace period of up to one (1) year, to tie-up/be integrated with
existing HEIs[,] consortium of HEIs and PRC recognized Professional Associations
with recognized programs under the conditions set forth in this Order and upon
mutually acceptable covenants by the contracting parties. In the alternative, they may
convert as a school and apply for the course covered by the review subject to rules
and regulations of the CHED and the SEC with respect to the establishment of
schools. In the meantime, no permit shall be issued if there is non-compliance with
these conditions or non-compliance with the requirements set forth in these rules.
Section 2. Only after full compliance with the requirements shall a Permit be given by
the CHED to review centers contemplated under this Rule.
Section 3. Failure of existing review centers to fully comply with the above shall bar
them from existing as review centers and they shall be deemed as operating illegally
as such. In addition, appropriate administrative and legal proceedings shall be
commence[d] against the erring entities that continue to operate and appropriate
sanctions shall be imposed after due process.
The Issues
The issues raised in this case are the following:
1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative
power as it expands the CHEDs jurisdiction; and
2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executives rule-making power.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.

Violation of Judicial Hierarchy

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the dismissal of the petition. Among other
grounds, the OSG alleges that petitioner violated the rule on judicial hierarchy in filing the petition
directly with this Court.
This Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus, and injunction is not exclusive but is concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and
the Court of Appeals in certain cases.18 The Court has explained:
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of
the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will
be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of
appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions
for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an]
established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and
attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent
further over-crowding of the Courts docket.19
The Court has further explained:
The propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by
seeking relief directly from this Court must be put to a halt for two reasons: (1) it would be an
imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and (2) it would cause an inevitable and resultant
delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be
remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as
better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts. 20
The rule, however, is not absolute, as when exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the
exercise of this Court of its primary jurisdiction. In this case, petitioner alleges that EO 566 expands
the coverage of RA 7722 and in doing so, the Executive Department usurps the legislative powers of
Congress. The issue in this case is not only the validity of the RIRR. Otherwise, the proper remedy
of petitioner and petitioners-intervenors would have been an ordinary action for the nullification of the
RIRR before the Regional Trial Court.21 The alleged violation of the Constitution by the Executive
Department when it issued EO 566 justifies the exercise by the Court of its primary jurisdiction over
the case. The Court is not precluded from brushing aside technicalities and taking cognizance of an
action due to its importance to the public and in keeping with its duty to determine whether the other
branches of the Government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution. 22
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OSGs Technical Objections

The OSG alleges that the petition should be dismissed because the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping were signed only by Fudolig without the express authority of any board
resolution or power of attorney. However, the records show that Fudolig was authorized under Board
Resolution No. 3, series of 200723 to file a petition before this Court on behalf of petitioner and to
execute any and all documents necessary to implement the resolution.

The OSG also alleges that the petition should be dismissed for violation of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice because Fudolig only presented his community tax certificate as competent proof
of identity before the notary public. The Court would have required Fudolig to comply with the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice except that Fudolig already presented his Philippine passport before the
notary public when petitioner submitted its reply to the OSGs comment.
EO 566 Expands the Coverage of RA 7722
The OSG alleges that Section 3 of RA 7722 should be read in conjunction with Section 8,
enumerating the CHEDs powers and functions. In particular, the OSG alleges that the CHED has
the power under paragraphs (e) and (n) of Section 8 to:
(e) monitor and evaluate the performance of programs and institutions of higher learning for
appropriate incentives as well as the imposition of sanctions such as, but not limited to, diminution or
withdrawal of subsidy, recommendation on the downgrading or withdrawal of accreditation, program
termination or school closure;
(n) promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise such other powers and functions as may be
necessary to carry out effectively the purpose and objectives of this Act[.]
The OSG justifies its stand by claiming that the term "programs x x x of higher learning" is broad
enough to include programs offered by review centers.
We do not agree.
Section 3 of RA 7722 provides:
Sec. 3. Creation of Commission on Higher Education. - In pursuance of the abovementioned
policies, the Commission on Higher Education is hereby created, hereinafter referred to as the
Commission.
The Commission shall be independent and separate from the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS), and attached to the Office of the President for administrative purposes only. Its
coverage shall be both public and private institutions of higher education as well as degreegranting programs in all post-secondary educational institutions, public and private.
(Emphasis supplied)
Neither RA 7722 nor CHED Order No. 3, series of 1994 (Implementing Rules of RA 7722) 24 defines
an institution of higher learning or a program of higher learning.
"Higher education," however, is defined as "education beyond the secondary level" 25 or "education
provided by a college or university."26 Under the "plain meaning" or verba legis rule in statutory
construction, if the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without interpretation.27 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words,
to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by use of such words as are found in
the statute.28 Hence, the term "higher education" should be taken in its ordinary sense and should be
read and interpreted together with the phrase "degree-granting programs in all post-secondary
educational institutions, public and private." Higher education should be taken to mean tertiary
education or that which grants a degree after its completion.
Further, Articles 6 and 7 of the Implementing Rules provide:

Article 6. Scope of Application. - The coverage of the Commission shall be both public and private
institutions of higher education as well as degree granting programs in all post-secondary
educational institutions, public and private.
These Rules shall apply to all public and private educational institutions offering tertiary degree
programs.
The establishment, conversion, or elevation of degree-granting institutions shall be within the
responsibility of the Commission.
Article 7. Jurisdiction. - Jurisdiction over institutions of higher learning primarily offering tertiary
degree programsshall belong to the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, HEIs refer to degree-granting institutions, or those offering tertiary degree or post-secondary
programs. In fact, Republic Act No. 8292 or the Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997 covers
chartered state universities and colleges. State universities and colleges primarily offer degree
courses and programs.
Sections 1 and 8, Rule IV of the RIRR define a review center and similar entities as follows:
Section 1. REVIEW CENTER. - refers to a center operated and owned by a duly authorized entity
pursuant to these Rules intending to offer to the public and/or to specialized groups whether for a fee
or for free a program or course of study that is intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge and
competencies and skills of reviewees obtained in the formal school setting in preparation for the
licensure examinations given by the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC). The term review
center as understood in these rules shall also embrace the operation or conduct of review classes or
courses provided by individuals whether for a fee or not in preparation for the licensure examinations
given by the Professional Regulations Commission.
xxx
Section 8. SIMILAR ENTITIES the term refer to other review centers providing review or tutorial
services in areas not covered by licensure examinations given by the Professional Regulations
Commission including but not limited to college entrance examinations, Civil Service examinations,
tutorial services in specific fields like English, Mathematics and the like.
The same Rule defines a review course as follows:
Section 3. REVIEW COURSE refers to the set of non-degree instructional program of study and/or
instructional materials/module, offered by a school with a recognized course/program requiring
licensure examination, that are intended merely to refresh and enhance the knowledge or
competencies and skills of reviewees.
The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the CHEDs coverage under RA 7722. The
CHEDs coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private institutions of higher education
and degree-granting programs in all public and private post-secondary educational
institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of review
centers and similar entities.
The definition of a review center under EO 566 shows that it refers to one which offers "a program
or course of study that is intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies

and skills of reviewees obtained in the formal school setting in preparation for the licensure
examinations" given by the PRC. It also covers the operation or conduct of review classes or
courses provided by individuals whether for a fee or not in preparation for the licensure examinations
given by the PRC.
A review center is not an institution of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722. It does not offer
a degree-granting program that would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED. A review course is
only intended to "refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees." A
reviewee is not even required to enroll in a review center or to take a review course prior to taking an
examination given by the PRC. Even if a reviewee enrolls in a review center, attendance in a review
course is not mandatory. The reviewee is not required to attend each review class. He is not required
to take or pass an examination, and neither is he given a grade. He is also not required to submit
any thesis or dissertation. Thus, programs given by review centers could not be considered
"programs x x x of higher learning" that would put them under the jurisdiction of the CHED.
Further, the "similar entities" in EO 566 cover centers providing "review or tutorial services" in areas
not covered by licensure examinations given by the PRC, which include, although not limited to,
college entrance examinations, Civil Services examinations, and tutorial services. These review and
tutorial services hardly qualify as programs of higher learning.
Usurpation of Legislative Power
The OSG argues that President Arroyo was merely exercising her executive power to ensure that
the laws are faithfully executed. The OSG further argues that President Arroyo was exercising her
residual powers under Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292),29 particularly Section 20, Title I of Book III,
thus:
Section 20. Residual Powers. - Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise
such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the
laws and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the President
in accordance with law. (Emphasis supplied)
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Section 20, Title I of Book III of EO 292 speaks of other powers vested in the President under the
law.30 The exercise of the Presidents residual powers under this provision requires legislation, 31 as
the provision clearly states that the exercise of the Presidents other powers and functions has to be
"provided for under the law." There is no law granting the President the power to amend the
functions of the CHED. The President may not amend RA 7722 through an Executive Order without
a prior legislation granting her such power.
The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED
under RA 7722. Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them, 32 and this
power is vested with the Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states:
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by
the provision on initiative and referendum.
In Ople v. Torres,33 the Court declared void, as a usurpation of legislative power, Administrative Order
No. 308 (AO 308) issued by the President to create a national identification system. AO 308
mandates the adoption of a national identification system even in the absence of an enabling
legislation. The Court distinguished between Legislative and Executive powers, as follows:

The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the
authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." The Constitution, as
the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the
Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and
comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government.
Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress,
unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either
expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general
concern or common interest.
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. The
executive power is vested in the President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce and
administer laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due
observance.
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the
government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his
department. He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he
has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or
interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the President also has
the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public
order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable
him to discharge his duties effectively.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of
administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations.
x x x. An administrative order is:
"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of
governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in
administrative orders."
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in
the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the
sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. x x x.34
Just like AO 308 in Ople v. Torres, EO 566 in this case is not supported by any enabling law. The
Court further stated in Ople:
x x x. As well stated by Fisher: "x x x Many regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is here
that administrative legislation must be restricted in its scope and application. Regulations are not
supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a
public law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules
and regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws."35
Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power, the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the
CHEDs quasi-legislative power.

Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through the

promulgation of rules and regulations.36 The CHED may only exercise its rule-making power within
the confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722. The RIRR covers review centers and similar entities
which are neither institutions of higher education nor institutions offering degree-granting programs.
Exercise of Police Power
Police power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order or safety,
and the general welfare of the people flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex
the welfare of the people is the supreme law.37 Police power primarily rests with the legislature
although it may be exercised by the President and administrative boards by virtue of a valid
delegation.38 Here, no delegation of police power exists under RA 7722 authorizing the President to
regulate the operations of non-degree granting review centers.
Republic Act No. 8981 is Not the Appropriate Law
It is argued that the President of the Philippines has adequate powers under the law to regulate
review centers and this could have been done under an existing validly delegated authority, and that
the appropriate law is Republic Act No. 898139 (RA 8981). Under Section 5 of RA 8981, the PRC is
mandated to "establish and maintain a high standard of admission to the practice of all professions
and at all times ensure and safeguard the integrity of all licensure examinations." Section 7 of RA
8981 further states that the PRC shall adopt "measures to preserve the integrity and inviolability of
licensure examinations."
There is no doubt that a principal mandate of the PRC is to preserve the integrity of licensure
examinations. The PRC has the power to adopt measures to preserve the integrity and inviolability
of licensure examinations. However, this power should properly be interpreted to refer to the conduct
of the examinations. The enumeration of PRCs powers under Section 7(e) includes among others,
the fixing of dates and places of the examinations and the appointment of supervisors and watchers.
The power to preserve the integrity and inviolability of licensure examinations should be read
together with these functions. These powers of the PRC have nothing to do at all with the
regulation of review centers.
The PRC has the power to investigate any of the members of the Professional Regulatory Boards
(PRB) for "commission of any irregularities in the licensure examinations which taint or impugn the
integrity and authenticity of the results of the said examinations." 40 This is an administrative power
which the PRC exercises over members of the PRB. However, this power has nothing to do with the
regulation of review centers. The PRC has the power to bar PRB members from conducting review
classes in review centers. However, to interpret this power to extend to the power to regulate
review centers is clearly an unwarranted interpretation of RA 8981. The PRC may prohibit the
members of the PRB from conducting review classes at review centers because the PRC has
administrative supervision over the members of the PRB. However, such power does not extend to
the regulation of review centers.
Section 7(y) of RA 8981 giving the PRC the power to perform "such other functions and duties as
may be necessary to carry out the provisions" of RA 8981 does not extend to the regulation of review
centers. There is absolutely nothing in RA 8981 that mentions regulation by the PRC of review
centers.
The Court cannot likewise interpret the fact that RA 8981 penalizes "any person who manipulates or
rigs licensure examination results, secretly informs or makes known licensure examination questions
prior to the conduct of the examination or tampers with the grades in the professional licensure

examinations"41 as a grant of power to regulate review centers. The provision simply provides for the
penalties for manipulation and other corrupt practices in the conduct of the professional
examinations.
The assailed EO 566 seeks to regulate not only review centers but also "similar entities." The
questioned CHED RIRR defines "similar entities" as referring to "other review centers providing
review or tutorial services in areas not covered by licensure examinations given by the PRC
including but not limited to college entrance examinations, Civil Service examinations, tutorial
services in specific fields like English, Mathematics and the like." 42 The PRC has no mandate to
supervise review centers that give courses or lectures intended to prepare examinees for licensure
examinations given by the PRC. It is like the Court regulating bar review centers just because the
Court conducts the bar examinations. Similarly, the PRC has no mandate to regulate similar
entities whose reviewees will not even take any licensure examination given by the PRC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and the petition-in-intervention. We DECLARE Executive
Order No. 566 and Commission on Higher Education Memorandum Order No. 30, series of
2007 VOID for being unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
BRION, J.:
I concur with the ponencia that EO 566 and the instruments derived from this EO should be declared
invalid. At the same time, I maintain that the President of the Philippines has adequate powers under
the law to regulate review centers. EO 566 is invalid as a regulatory measure over review centers
because an executive order of this tenor cannot be issued under R.A. 7722 (The Higher Education
Act of 1994). The appropriate existing law to regulate review centers is R.A. 8981, otherwise known
as The PRC Modernization Act of 2000.
A holistic reading of R.A. 8981 shows that it attempts to provide the blue print for a credible and
effective Philippine licensure examination system and process. Under this law, the Professional
Regulation Commission (an entity under the Executive Department together with the Commission on
Higher Education) was given among other powers related with its primary mandate to establish
and maintain a high standard of admission to the practice of all professions and at all times ensure
and safeguard the integrity of all licensure examinations the full authority to promulgate rules and
regulation to implement its mandate. To be sure, R.A.8981 does not narrowly or restrictively concern
itself with the conduct of actual examinations alone as the ponencia discussed; it covers and relates
as well to the various integral and/or institutional components of the licensure examination process
or system.
I find it unfortunate that R.A. 7722 was made the basis for the regulation of review centers, when
R.A. 8981 could have provided opportunities, appropriate to the PRC, to achieve the same end. This
is unfortunate under the circumstances since the invalidity of using R.A. 7722 as the legal basis,
without saying more on what can be a viable alternative, can leave a major player in the Philippine

licensure examination process immune, even for a time, from regulation. It is for this compelling
reason that I have tackled in this Separate Concurring Opinion the alternative and (while not fully
determinative of the issue of the validity of EO 566) the related issues of: (1) whether the business of
review centers can be the subject of regulation; (2) if so, on what legal basis; and (3) again, if so,
which governmental authority has been vested with jurisdiction by law.
The Background Facts
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) objects to the filing of the present petition directly with this
Court, based on the principle of hierarchy of courts. The principle, as a rule, can be invoked where
no compelling reason exists for a direct resort to this Court. 1 However, a compelling reason does
exist as the ponencia properly noted. Likewise, there are no major issues of fact that are essentially
for the trial or lower courts to handle as triers of facts;2 hence, direct resort to this Court is justified. In
this regard, at the petitioners urging and based on the implicit stance of all other parties to take
judicial notice of the background facts,3 I am providing a fuller account of the background of the case
based on parallel official developments, all of them related to the root of the present issue the
nursing exam scandal of 2006. This background albeit footnoted because they do not all directly
affect the present case may lead to a fuller appreciation of the case and the view I am putting
forward, and is offered in the spirit of George Santayanas advice to remember the past to avoid
being condemned to its repetition.4
The President Has Legal Basis to Regulate,
but under R.A. 8981, not R.A. 7722
I hold the view that the President has sufficient legal basis to regulate review centers and could have
done so under an existing validly delegated authority. This authority, however, is not based on the
charter of the CHED, R.A. 7722; hence, the issuance of EO 566 on the basis of R.A. 7722 was an
illegal act of subordinate legislation undertaken without statutory basis.
The law dealing with leakage and manipulation of licensure examinations is Republic Act No. 8981
(the PRC Law).5 Section 5 of this law defines the PRCs primary mandate, which is to establish and
maintain a high standard of admission to the practice of all professions and at all times ensure and
safeguard the integrity of all licensure examinations. Some of the PRCs powers, functions and
responsibilities under Section 7 of the law include:
Section 7. Powers, Functions and Responsibilities of the Commission. The powers, functions, and
responsibilities of the Commission are as follows:
xxxx
(d) To administer and conduct the licensure examinations of the various regulatory boards in
accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission; determine and fix the
places and dates of examinations; use publicly or privately-owned buildings and facilities for
examination purposes; conduct more than one (1) licensure examination: Provided, That, when there
are two (2) or more examinations given in a year, at least one (1) examination shall be held on
weekdays (Monday to Friday): Provided, further, That, if only one (1) examination is given in a year,

this shall be held only on weekdays: Provided, finally, That, the Commission is also authorized to
require the completion of a refresher course where the examinee has failed to pass three (3) times,
except as otherwise provided by law; approve the results of examinations and the release of the
same; adopt measures to preserve the integrity and inviolability of licensure examinations; appoint
supervisors and room watchers from among the employees of the government and/or private
individuals with baccalaureate degrees, who have been trained by the Commission for the purpose
and who shall be entitled to a reasonable daily allowance for every examination day actually
attended, to be determined and fixed by the Commission; publish the list of successful examinees;
provide schools, colleges and universities, public and private, offering courses for licensure
examinations, with copies of sample test questions on examinations recently conducted by the
Commission and copies of the syllabi or terms of specifications of subjects for licensure
examinations; and impose the penalty of suspension or prohibition from taking licensure
examinations to any examinee charged and found guilty of violating the rules and regulations
governing the conduct of licensure examinations promulgated by the Commission;
xxxx
(s) To investigate motu proprio or upon the filing of a verified complaint, any member of the
Professional Regulatory Boards for neglect of duty, incompetence, unprofessional, unethical,
immoral or dishonorable conduct, commission of irregularities in the licensure examinations which
taint or impugn the integrity and authenticity of the results of the said examinations and, if found
guilty, to revoke or suspend their certificates of registration and professional licenses/identification
cards and to recommend to the President of the Philippines their suspension or removal from office
as the case may be;
xxxx
(y) To perform such other functions and duties as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of
this Act, the various professional regulatory laws, decrees, executive orders and other administrative
issuance
Complementing these mandates are the penal provisions giving teeth to the PRCs regulatory
powers. Section 15 of the PRC Law provides:
Section 15. Penalties for Manipulation and Other Corrupt Practices in the Conduct of Professional
Examinations.
(a) Any person who manipulates or rigs licensure examination results, secretly informs or makes
known licensure examination questions prior to the conduct of the examination or tampers with the
grades in professional licensure examinations shall, upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment
of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day to not more than twelve (12) years or a fine of not less
than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to not more than One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or both such imprisonment and fine at the discretion of the court.
Another critical power under Section 17 of the law is the authority to promulgate the necessary rules
and regulations needed to implement its provisions.

Section 17. Implementing rules and Regulations. Within ninety (90) days after the approval of this
Act, the Professional Regulation Commission, together with the representatives of the various
Professional Regulatory Boards and accredited professional organizations, the DBM, and the CHED
shall prepare and promulgate the necessary rules and regulations needed to implement the
provisions of this Act.
To be valid, this authority must be exercised on the basis of a policy that the law wishes to enforce
and of sufficient standards that mark the limits of the legislatures delegation of authority. The
completeness of this delegation is evidenced by the PRC Laws policy statement which provides:
Section 2. Statement of Policy. The State recognizes the important role of professionals in nationbuilding and, towards this end, promotes the sustained development of a sustained reservoir of
professionals whose competence has been determined by honest and credible licensure
examinations and whose standards of professional service and practice are internationally
recognized and considered world-class brought by the regulatory measures, programs and activities
that foster professional growth and advancement.
Read together with the grant of powers and functions under Section 5 (particularly the statement that
"the Commission shall establish and maintain a high standard of admission to the practice of all
professions and at all times ensure and safeguard the integrity of all licensure examinations"), both
policy and standards are therefore present as required by law and jurisprudence. 6
Whether review centers can be the legitimate subjects of PRC regulation, given the above-described
experience with the nursing board examination leakage and the terms of the PRC Law, is not a hard
question to answer. Review centers, because of the role they have assumed and the reliance on
them by examinees, have become active participants in the licensure examination process, and their
involvement can neither be downplayed nor ignored. Board examinees now undergo review
preparatory to licensure examinations as a matter of accepted practice, and pay considerable sums
to avail themselves of the services review centers offer. These services include the provision of
review materials; lectures on examination methods; practice examinations to simulate the actual
exam environment; and final coaching just before the actual examination date. To some exam
candidates, these services have become security blankets that, whether true or not, boost their
confidence come examination time. Not the least of the considerations, of course, is that the review
center industry has now become a billion-peso industry with sufficient means and resources for the
corrupt elements of the industry to subvert the integrity and reputation of the licensure examinations.
PRC experiences in the last few years attest to this reality.7 Thus, the integrity and effectiveness of
review centers are now basic considerations in ensuring an honest and credible licensure
examination system. In these lights, the regulation of review centers is a must for the PRC, given its
duty to adopt measures that will preserve the integrity and inviolability of licensure examinations.
Thus, unlike the CHED, the PRC has the requisite authority or mandate under the PRC
Modernization Law to regulate the establishment and operation of review centers.
Can the President transfer the power of
regulation granted the PRC to CHED?

This question essentially arises under the premise that review centers fall under the PRC's mandate
so that there is no gap in the law, and the President, in the exercise of her power of control, can
regulate review centers. Can this presidential authority be now cited as basis to argue for the validity
of EO 566?
The short and quick answer is no, because the disputed EO does not even invoke the PRC Law as
its legal basis. Nor can the EO be revived by simply re-issuing it, citing the PRC Law and the
authority of the President of the Philippines to issue regulations. To regulate review centers under
the PRC law, another EO appropriate to the PRC and its structure under the PRC law will have
to be prepared and issued.
The President, as Chief Executive, has the power of control over all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices.8 The power of control refers to the power of an officer to alter, modify, nullify, or
set aside what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties, and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter.9 Under this power, the President may directly exercise a
power statutorily given to any of his subordinates, as what happened in the old case of Araneta v.
Gatmaitan,10 where President Ramon Magsaysay himself directly exercised the authority granted by
Congress to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to promulgate rules and regulations
concerning trawl fishing. We similarly ruled in Bermudez v. Torres when we said that the President,
being the head of the Executive Department, can very well disregard or do away with the action of
the departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise of discretionary authority; in so opting, he
cannot be said to be acting beyond the scope of his authority.11
The statutory support for this authority is provided under Section 31 (2), Chapter 10, Title III, Book III
of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292), which
states:
Sec. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. - The President, subject to
the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall
have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For
this purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the
immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common
staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring
functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or
Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other
Departments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency
as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other departments or
agencies.

The Presidents direct exercise of the power of subordinate legislation is done via the issuance of an
executive or administrative order, defined under Section 2, Chapter 2, Book III of EO 292, as an
ordinance issued by the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in the
implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers.
The valid grant of the authority to issue subordinate legislation to the PRC and the exercise of this
power by the President as the head of the executive department of government, however, do not
extend to the authority of the President to take control of the PRCs powers under the PRC Law, and
to assign these to another agency within the executive branch.
Effectively, this was what happened in the present case; the President, through EO 566, took control
of the PRCs authority to issue subordinate legislation to regulate review centers, and transferred this
power to the CHED. This is an illegal sub-delegation of delegated power. What has once been
delegated by Congress can no longer be further delegated by the original delegate to another,
expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegare potest. 12 When the PRC Law
granted the power of subordinate legislation to the PRC, the mandate was given to this agency (and
under the control powers of the President, to the President by necessary implication) as the original
delegate; the faithful fulfillment of this mandate is a duty that the PRC itself, as the delegate, must
perform using its own judgment and not the intervening mind of another.13
Additionally, EO 566 placed entities subject to the jurisdiction of a particular agency (in this case, the
PRC) under the jurisdiction of another (the CHED). As the cited reorganization powers of the
President show, the statutorily-allowed transfer of functions refers to those from the Office of the
President to the departments and agencies, or from the departments and agencies to the Office of
the President. This proceeds from the power of control the Constitution grants to the President. No
general statutory nor constitutional authority exists, however, allowing the President to transfer the
functions of one department or agency to another. The reason for this is obvious the jurisdiction of
a particular department or agency is provided for by law and this jurisdiction may not be modified,
reduced or increased, via a mere executive order except to the extent that the law allows. Thus, only
the President, based on her constitutionally-provided control powers, can assume the functions of
any of the departments or agencies under the Executive Department. Even then, the President
cannot transfer these functions to another agency without transgressing the legislative prerogatives
of Congress. This conclusion necessarily impacts on the validity of the CHEDs issuance of the RIRR
and other instruments which must similarly be invalid since they sprang from an invalid and
impermissible sub-delegation of power.
I therefore vote to invalidate EO 566 and the issuances arising from this EO.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30783

August 27, 1929

JUAN B. ALEGRE, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, respondents-appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellant.
Camus & Delgado and Jose M. Casal for appellee.
STATEMENT
The petitioner for a number of years has been and is now engaged in the production of abaca and its
exportation to foreign markets. November 8, 1927, he applied to the respondent for a permit to
export one hundred bales ofabaca to England, which was denied, and advised that he would not be
permitted to export the abaca in question without a certificate of the Fiber Standardization Board. He
then filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the
provisions of the Administrative Code for the grading, inspection and certification of fibers and, in
particular, sections 1772 and 1244 of that Code, are unconstitutional and void.
For answer the defendant admits the allegations of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the amended petition
and denies all other allegations, and as a special defense, alleges:
1. That on November 8, 1927, the petitioner addressed to the respondent a letter of the
following tenor:
The COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS
Manila
SIR: I desire to export to England one hundred (100) bales of abaca which are not
supported by any certificate of the Fiber Standardization Board recently created by
law.
I do not desire to submit to the decision of the inspectors of said Board, and want to
ship theabaca referred to without any certificate of inspection.
I would request you to inform me if I can obtain the permission of that office for the
exportation of the aforementioned one hundred (100) bales of abaca.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) JUAN B. ALEGRE
2. That on the same day the respondent, through the Insular Deputy Collector of Customs,
answered the above letter of the petitioner informing him that he would not be permitted to
export the said one hundred bales of abaca unless the export entry covering the exportation

is accompanied by a certificate of the Fiber Standardization Board, or a notation is written on

the face of the triplicate of the export entry signed by the fiber inspector who made the
inspection indicating that the abaca covered thereby has complied with the provisions of the
law relative to the shipment of such product. Copies of the said letter and its enclosure are
attached to, and made a part of, this answer marked as Exhibits A, B, and C.
3. That the provisions of the law relating to the classification, grading, and inspection of fibers
were designed to remedy, and did remedy the dangerously unsatisfactory conditions of the
Philippine fiber industry obtaining at the time of their enactment.
4. That the petitioner has secured fiber grading permits from the Fiber Standardization Board
has otherwise enjoyed the benefits of the law providing for the grading and inspection of
fibers as amended.
Wherefore, the respondent prays that the amended petition for the writ of mandamus be
denied with costs against the petitioner.
As the result of a trial on such issues judgment was rendered as prayed for in the petition, form
which the defendant appeals and assigns the following errors:
1. The lower court erred in not holding that the petitioner was estopped from questioning the
constitution of Act No. 3263 amending section 1772 et seq. of the Administrative Code.
2. The lower court erred in holding that sections 1722 and 1783 of the Administrative Code,
as amended, are unconstitutional and void.
3. The lower court erred in ordering the respondent to permit the exportation of petitioner's
hemp without the certificate of the Fiber Standardization Board.
JOHNS, J.:
Act No. 2380 is entitled "An Act providing for the inspection, grading, and baling of abaca (Manila
hemp), maguey(cantala), sisal, and other fibers," and was enacted by the Philippine Legislature,
February 28, 1914.
Section 1 specifically defies the meaning of the words "fiber," "abaca," "maguey," "sisal," "strand,"
"string," "tow," "waste," "grading station," and "grading establishment."
Section 2 is as follows:
(a) The Director of Agriculture is hereby enjoined and directed to establish, define, and
designate standards for the commercial grades of abaca, maguey, and sisal, which shall
become the official standards of classification throughout the Philippine Islands, calling to his
assistance the agencies of his Bureau, those of any other Bureau or branch of this
Government, or such other agencies as he may deem necessary.
(b) The Director of Agriculture shall prepare in suitable form the official standard of each
grade of the fibers covered by this Act and furnish the same upon request to all authorized
grading establishments, provincial governments, chambers of commerce, planters'
associations, and other institutions directly interested in the trade, the actual cost of such
specimen to be paid in advance by the party requesting the same.

(c) The designation and mark of each grade of the official standard, together with the basis
upon which each grade is determined, shall be defined and published by the Director of
Agriculture in a Bureau of Agriculture General Order not less than six months prior to the
date when this Act goes into effect; the Director of Agriculture shall furnish a sufficient
number of copies of this order and of any other or others hereafter issue on this subject to
the foreign markets, municipal presidents, provincial governors, and to such other persons
and corporations as he may deem advisable, for general information and guidance.
(d) To preserve the official standards as originally prepared, the Director of Agriculture shall
stipulate the manner in which they shall be kept and shall define the period at the expiration
of which they shall be renewed.
(e) Any grading establishment shall have the right to prepare or renew the set of official
standards of grades for its use, providing that such a set shall be an exact copy of the official
set of standards and that it shall have been approved and certified to by the Director of
Agriculture or his authorized agent.
(f) The Director of Agriculture shall establish one or several standards for abaca which may
have been partially cleaned or prepared in the form of tow, waste, or strings, at the request
of a party concerned, if such standards are required by the market. He shall also likewise
establish a standard or standards for the fiber of any species of Musa other than abaca for
which there shall be a demand in the market. Such standards, if established, shall be
designated and defined in the general order deferred to in section two (c) of this Act.
Subsection (b), of section 3, provides:
No person, association, or corporation shall engage in grading abaca, maguey, or sisal,
unless a permit shall have previously been obtained, which shall be signed by the Director of
Agriculture, such permits to be known as 'grading permits.'
Subsection (e) says:
In grading fiber for export, each grade prepared shall correspond to one of the official
standards, and it shall also bear the same designation and mark as the latter. The set of
official standards shall be placed in a prominent position in the grading shed for reference.
Section 5 provides:
(a) All fibers included in this Act which are intended for export shall be pressed in bales
approximately of the following dimensions and weight: Length, one meter; width, fifty
centimeters; height, fifty-five centimeters; and weight, one hundred and twenty-five kilos, net.
In any grade of abaca in which the quality of the fiber may be injured by excessive pressure,
the approximate dimensions and weight of each bale of such fiber shall be determined in a
general order by the Director of Agriculture.
(b) The limit of size of diameter of each hank contained in the bale of abaca, the manner in
which these hanks shall be arranged in the bale, and the manner of labeling and tying of
each entire bale shall be designated by the Director of Agriculture not later than six months
prior to the date on which this Act goes into effect.

(c) Each and all hanks of fiber contained in a bale shall be uniform in quality, and each hank
shall also be securely tied by a strand to hold the hank together, and which shall be identical
with the fiber which constitutes the bale.
(d) Every bale of fiber shall be free from strings, waste, tow, damaged fiber, fiber not identical
with that which constitutes the bale, or any extraneous matter, and the fiber shall be
thoroughly dry.
Subsection (g), of section 6, provides:
All fiber of which the official standard shall have been established as provided in section two
hereof shall be graded, baled, inspected and approved as provided in this Act.
And the last paragraph of subsection (i) says:
The object of such inspection shall be to determine whether or not the grade inspected
conforms with the official standard for the same, whether or not the private mark (if any) used
is correct, and whether the bailing and labeling is in conformity with the provisions of this Act
and the authorized instructions of the Director of Agriculture.
Subsection (k) provides:
Every shipment of graded and baled abaca, maguey, or sisal, which has been inspected and
approved, shall be accompanied by a certificate or certificates of inspection attached to the
bill of lading and duly signed by the fiber inspector who made the inspection. All certificates
of grading shall be prepared in quadruplicate, the original and one copy to be given the
owner, one copy to be forwarded to the Director of Agriculture, and one copy to be filed in the
inspector's office.
Section 7 says:
(a) No person shall change, obliterate, or counterfeit, wholly or in part, or cause to be
changed, obliterated, or counterfeited, the official or private mark or brand on any bale of
fiber which has been inspected, graded, and stamped as provided in this Act, nor shall any
person use any tag or mark which is not in accordance with the provisions of this Act or the
authorized orders of the Director of Agriculture; nor shall any person tamper with or alter the
quantity or quality of any bale of fiber which has been inspected, graded, and stamped as
provided in this Act.
(b) Any person, associations, or corporation violating any of the provisions of this Act shall,
upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, be defined not more than two
hundred and fifty pesos.
(c) Upon conviction of any person, association, or corporation of a violation of any of the
provisions of this Act, the Director of Agriculture may withdraw and cancel the grading permit
theretofore issued to such person, association, or corporation.
It will thus be noted that the purpose and intent of the original law was to provide in detail for the
inspection grading and baling of abaca, maguey, sisal and other fibers, and for a uniform scale for
grading, and to issue official certificates as to the kind and quality of the hemp, so that an intending

purchaser from an examination of the certificates might be assured and know the grade and quality
of the hemp offered for sale.
The original law, as enacted, was later amended and carried into, and made a part of, the
Administrative Code, section 1244 of which is as follows:
A collector of customs shall not permit abaca, maguey, or sisal or other fibrous products for
which standard grades have been established by the Director of Agriculture to be laden
aboard a vessel clearing for a foreign port, unless the shipment conforms to the
requirements of law relative to the shipment of such fibers.
Section 1783 of the Administrative Code, which corresponds to section 5 of the original act, now
reads as follows:
All fibers within the purview of this law which are intended for export shall be pressed in
bales approximately of the following dimensions and weight: Length, one meter; width, fifty
centimeters; height, fifty-five centimeters; and weight, one hundred and twenty-five kilos, net.
Every bale of fiber shall be free from strings, waste, tow, damaged fiber, fiber not identical
with that which constitutes the bale, or any extraneous matter, and the fiber shall be
thoroughly dry.
All hanks of fiber contained in a bale shall be uniform in quality, and each hank also be
securely tied by a strand to hold the hank together, and which shall be identical with the fiber
which constitutes the bale.
In any grade of abaca in which the quality of the fiber may be injured by excessive pressure,
the approximate dimensions and weight of each bale of such fiber shall be determined in a
general order by the Director of Agriculture. He shall in like manner determine the limit of the
diameter of hanks contained in bales, the manner in which these hanks shall be arranged in
the bale, and the manner of labeling and trying of each entire bale.
Section 2 of Act No. 3263, which was approved December 7, 1925, among their things, provides:
The following new sections are hereby inserted between sections seventeen hundred and seventyone and seventeen hundred and seventy-two of the same Act:
SEC. 1771-A. Philippine fiber inspection service. There is hereby created an office which
shall have charge of the classification, baling, and inspection of Philippine fibers and shall be
designated and known as "Philippines Fiber Inspection Service" and he governed by a
standardization board.
SEC. 1771-B. Standardization Board. There is hereby created a board which shall be
designated and known as "Fiber Standardization Board" and shall be vested with the powers
and duties hereinafter specified. Said Board shall consist of seven members, with the
Director of Agriculture as its permanent chairman and executive officer, and the other
members shall be appointed by the Governor-General, with the advice and consent of the
Senate: Provided, That one member shall represents the fiber exporters; one member shall
represent the dealers or middlemen and two members shall represent the fiber producers.
Section 1772 of the Administrative Code, as amended, reads as follows:

The Fiber Standardization Board shall determine the official standards for the various
commercial grades of Philippine fibers that are or may hereafter be produced on the
Philippine Islands for shipment abroad. Each grade shall have its proper name and
designation which, together with the basis upon which the several grades are determined,
shall be defined by the said Board in a general order. Such order shall have the approval of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and for the dissemination of information,
copies of the same shall be supplied gratis to the foreign markets, provincial governors,
municipal presidents, and to such other persons and agencies as shall make request
therefor.
If it is considered expedient to change these standards at any time, notice shall be given in
the local and foreign markets for a period of at least six months before the new standards
shall go into effect.
Section 1788 of the Administrative Code was amended to reads as follows:
No fiber within the purview of this law shall be exported from the Philippine Islands in
quantity greater than the amount sufficient to make one bale, without being graded, baled,
inspected, and certified as in this law provided.
Section 2748 of the Administrative Code now reads:
Any person who shall change, obliterate, or counterfeit, wholly, or in part, or cause to be
changed, obliterated, or counterfeit, the official of private mark and brand on any bale of fiber
which has been inspected, graded, and stamped as provided in this law, or who shall use
any tag or mark which is not in accordance with the provisions of this Act or the authorized
orders of the Fiber Standardization Board, or who shall tamper with or alter the quantity or
quality of any bale of fiber which has been so inspected, graded, and stamped or who shall
otherwise violate any of the provisions of this Act, shall be punished by a fine of not more
than three hundred pesos; and upon conviction hereunder of any person holding a grading
permit, the Fiber Standardization Board may, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, withdraw and cancel such permit.
The Legislature having enacted the law which provides for the inspection, grading and baling of
fibers and the creation of a board to carry the law into effect, the question is squarely presented as
to whether or not the authority vested in the board is a delegation of legislative power.
Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, a standard authority all over the world, vol. I, 8th ed., pp. 228232, says:
The maxim that power conferred upon Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to any
other authority does not preclude the Legislature from delegating any power not legislative
which it may itself rightfully exercise. It may confer an authority in relation to the execution of
a law which may involve discretion, but such authority must be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The Legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal
principles which are to control in given cases; but an administrative officer or body may be
invested with the power to principles apply. If this could not be done there would be infinite
confusion in the laws, and in an effort to detail and to particularize, they would miss
sufficiency both in provision and execution.
Boards and commissions now play an important part in the administration of our laws. The
great social and industrial evolution of the past century, and the many demands made upon

our legislatures by the increasing complexity of human activities, have made essential the
creation of these administrative bodies and the delegation to them of certain powers. Though
legislative power cannot be delegated to boards and commissions, the Legislature may
delegate to them administrative functions in carrying out the purposes of a statute and
various governmental power for the more efficient administration of the laws.
Hence, the question here is whether or not the law in question delegates to the Fiber Board
legislative powers or administrative functions to carry out the purpose and intent of the law for its
more efficient administration. It must be conceded that the details, spirit and intent of the law could
only be carried into effect through a board of commission.
The case of Buttfield vs. Stranahan, 192 U. S., 470, is square in point. The law there construed is as
follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representation of the United States of America in
Congress assembled, That from and after May first, eighteen hundred and ninety-seven, it
shall be unlawful for any person or persons or corporation to import or bring into the United
States any merchandise as tea which is inferior in purity, quality, and fitness for consumption
to the standards provided in section three of this Act, and the importation of all such
merchandise is hereby prohibited.
SEC. 2. That immediately after the passage of this Act, and or before February fifteenth of each year
thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury shall appoint a board, to consist of seven members, each of
whom shall be an expert in teas, and who shall prepare and submit to him standard samples of tea; .
..
SEC. 3. That the Secretary of the Treasurer, upon the recommendation of the said board, shall fix
and establish uniform standards of purity, quality, and fitness for consumption of all kinds of teas
imported into the United States, and shall procure and deposit in the customhouses of the ports of
New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and such other ports as he may determine, duplicate samples of
such standards; that said Secretary shall procure a sufficient number of other duplicate samples of
such standards to supply the importers and dealers in tea at all ports desiring the same, at costs. All
teas, or merchandise described as tea, of inferior purity, quality, and fitness for consumption to such
standards shall be deemed within the prohibition of the first section hereof . . . .
Construing which that court said:
We may say of the legislation in this case, as was said of the legislation considered in
Marshall Field & Co. vs. Clark, that it does not, in any real sense, invest administrative
officials with the power of legislation. Congress legislated on the subject as far as was
reasonably practicable, and from the necessities of the case was compelled to leave to
executive officials the duty of bringing about the result pointed out by the statute. To deny the
power of Congress to delegate such a duty would, in effect, amount but to declaring that the
penalty power vested in Congress to regulate foreign commerce could not be efficaciously
exerted.
And
The claim that the statute commits to the arbitrary discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury
the determination of what teas may be imported, and therefore in effect vests that official with
legislative power, is without merit. We are of opinion that the statute, when properly
construed, as said by the Circuit Court of Appeals, but express the purpose to exclude the

lowest grades of tea, whether demonstrably of inferior purity, or unfit for consumption, or
presumably so because of their inferior quality. This, in effect, was the fixing of a primary
standard, and devolved upon the Secretary of the Treasury the mere executive duty to
effectuate the legislative policy declared in the statute.
The St. Louis vs. Taylor (210 U. S., 281), construed the validity of an Act of Congress, which is as
follows:
Within ninety days from the passage of this Act the American Railway Association is
authorized hereby to designate to the Interstate Commerce Commission the standard height
of drawbars for freight cars, measured perpendicular from the level of the tops of the trials to
the centers of the drawbars, for each of the several gauges of railroads in use in the United
States, and shall fix a maximum variation from such standard height to be allowed between
the drawers of empty and located cars. Upon their determination being certified to the
Interstate Commerce Commission, said Commission shall at once give notice of the
standard fixed upon to all common carriers, owners. . . . And after July first, eighteen
hundred and ninety-five, no cars, either loaded or unloaded, shall be used in interstate traffic
which do comply with the standard above provided for.
And in its opinion said:
"It is contended that there is here an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the railway
association and to the Interstate Commerce Commission. This is clearly a Federal question. Briefly
stated, the statute enacted that after a date named only cars with drawbars of uniform height should
be fixed by the association and declared by the Commission. Nothing need be said upon this
question except that it was settled adversely o the contention of the plaintiff in error in Buttfield vs.
Stranahan, 192 U. S., 470; 48 Law. ed., 525; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep., 349, a case which, in principle, is
completely in point. And see Union Bridge Co. vs. United States, 204 U. S., 364; 51 Law. ed., 523;
27 Sup. Ct. Rep., 367, where the cases were reviewed." (28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 617.)
It will be noted that section 1772 of the Administrative Code, as amended, provides:
The Fiber Standardization Board shall determine the official standards for the various
commercial grades of Philippine fibers that are or may hereafter be produced in the
Philippine Islands for shipment abroad. Each grade shall have its proper name and
designation which, together with the basis upon which the several grades are determined,
shall be defined by the said Board in a general order. Such order shall have the approval of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and for the dissemination of information,
copies of the same shall be supplied gratis to the foreign markets, provincial governors,
municipal presidents, and to such other persons and agencies as shall make request
therefor.
If it is considered expedient to change these standards at any time, notice shall be given in
the local and foreign markets for a period of at least six months before the new standard
shall go into effect.
That is to say, the Legislature has specifically provided for the creation of "official standards for
commercial grades of fibers," and that "the Fiber Standardization Board shall determine the official
standards for the various commercial grades of Philippine fibers," and that:
All fibers within the purview of this law which are intended for export shall be pressed in
uniform bales. The approximate volume and net weight of each bale, together with the

manner of binding, marking, wrapping, and stamping of the same, shall be defined in a
general order by the Fiber Standardization Board.
And section 1788, as amended, provides that no fiber shall be exported in quality greater than the
amount sufficient to make one bale, without being graded, baled, inspected, and certified as in this
law provided. That is to say, the law provides in detail for the inspection, grading and bailing of hemp
the Fiber Board with the power and authority to devise ways and means for its execution. In legal
effect, the Legislature has said that before any hemp is exported from the Philippine Islands it must
be inspected, graded and baled, and has created a board or that purpose and vested it with the
power and authority to do the actual work. That is not a delegation o legislative power. It is nothing
more than a delegation of administrative power in the Fiber Board, to carry out the purpose and
intent of the law. In the very nature of things, the Legislature could not inspect, grade and bale the
hemp, and from necessity, the power to do that would have to be vested in a board of commission.
The petitioner's contention would leave the law, which provides for the inspection, grading and baling
of hemp, without any means of its enforcement. If the law cannot be enforced by such a board or
commission, how and by whom could it be enforced? The criticism that there is partiality or even
fraud in the administration of the law is not an argument against its constitutionality.
The appellee has cited authorities of similar laws, which have been enacted by different States of the
United States, that have been declared unconstitutional in violation of section 8 of article 1 of the
United States Constitution which confers upon Congress the authority "to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
It must be conceded that within the meaning of the Constitution, the Philippine Islands is not a State
of the United States, that it is not a Tribe of Indians, and that it is not a foreign nation.
We have given this case the careful consideration which its importance deserves, and are clearly of
the opinion that the act in question, is not a delegation of legislative power to the Fiber Board, and
that the powers given by the Legislature to the board are for an administrative purposes, to enforce
and carry out the intent of the law.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the petition is dismissed, without costs to either
party. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Street, Villamor, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
JOHNSON, J., concurring:
The reason for my dissent in the case of Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Herstein and Rafferty (32 Phil.,
520), is the very reason for my concurrence herewith.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 179431-32

June 22, 2010

LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION
(CIBAC),Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 180443
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, CINCHONA C.
GONZALES and ARMI JANE R. BORJE, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The principal question posed in these consolidated special civil actions for certiorari and mandamus
is whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) can issue implementing rules and regulations
(IRRs) that provide a ground for the substitution of a party-list nominee not written in Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7941,1 otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, the law that the COMELEC thereby
implements.
Common Antecedents
The Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly registered
under the party-list system of representation that manifested their intent to participate in the May 14,
2007 synchronized national and local elections. Together with its manifestation of intent to
participate,2 CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five
nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number
of qualifying votes. The nominees, in the order that their names appeared in the certificate of
nomination dated March 29, 2007,3 were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis
K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang. The
nominees certificates of acceptance were attached to the certificate of nomination filed by CIBAC.
The list of nominees was later published in two newspapers of general circulation, The Philippine
Star News4 (sic) and The Philippine Daily Inquirer.5
Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination,
substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007, 6 whereby it withdrew the
nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the
nominees. The amended list of nominees of CIBAC thus included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales,
and (3) Borje.

Following the close of the polls, or on June 20, 2007, Villanueva sent a letter to COMELEC
Chairperson Benjamin Abalos,7 transmitting therewith the signed petitions of more than 81% of the
CIBAC members, in order to confirm the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang
and the substitution of Borje. In their petitions, the members of CIBAC averred that Lokin and Tugna
were not among the nominees presented and proclaimed by CIBAC in its proclamation rally held in
May 2007; and that Galang had signified his desire to focus on his family life.
On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the COMELEC en banc sitting
as the National Board of Canvassers a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second
nominee.8 The right of CIBAC to a second seat as well as the right of Lokin to be thus proclaimed
were purportedly based on Party-List Canvass Report No. 26, which showed CIBAC to have
garnered a grand total of 744,674 votes. Using all relevant formulas, the motion asserted that CIBAC
was clearly entitled to a second seat and Lokin to a proclamation.
The motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.
Notwithstanding Villanuevas filing of the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the
list of nominees and the petitions of more than 81% of CIBAC members, the COMELEC failed to act
on the matter, prompting Villanueva to file a petition to confirm the certificate of nomination,
substitution and amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC on June 28, 2007. 9
On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8219,10 whereby it resolved to set the matter
pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the
substitution of Borje for proper disposition and hearing. The case was docketed as E.M. No. 07-054.
In the meantime, the COMELEC en banc, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, issued
National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 2007 11 to partially proclaim
the following parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List System as
having won in the May 14, 2007 elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong, Bayan Muna, CIBAC,
Gabriela Women's Party, Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives, Advocacy for Teacher
Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms, Inc.,
Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party, Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party, Cooperative-Natco Network Party,
Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns and Abono; and to defer the proclamation of the nominees
of the parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes until final resolution of their
respective cases.
The COMELEC en banc issued another resolution, NBC Resolution No. 07-72 dated July 18,
2007,12 proclaiming Buhay Hayaan Yumabong as entitled to 2 additional seats and Bayan Muna,
CIBAC, Gabriela Women's Party, and Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives to an additional
seat each; and holding in abeyance the proclamation of the nominees of said parties, organizations
and coalitions with pending disputes until the final resolution of their respective cases.
With the formal declaration that CIBAC was entitled to an additional seat, Ricardo de los Santos,
purportedly as secretary general of CIBAC, informed Roberto P. Nazareno, Secretary General of the
House of Representatives, of the promulgation of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 and requested that
Lokin be formally sworn in by Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. to enable him to assume office.
Nazareno replied, however, that the request of Delos Santos could not be granted because
COMELEC Law Director Alioden D. Dalaig had notified him of the pendency of E.M. 07-054.
On September 14, 2007, the COMELEC en banc resolved E.M. No. 07-05413 thuswise:

WHEREFORE, considering the above discussion, the Commission hereby approves the withdrawal
of the nomination of Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Sherwin N. Tugna and Emil Galang as second, third and
fourth nominees respectively and the substitution thereby with Atty. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as
second nominee and Atty. Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee for the party list CIBAC. The new
order of CIBAC's nominees therefore shall be:
1. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva
2. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales
3. Armi Jane R. Borje
SO ORDERED.
The COMELEC en banc explained that the actions of Villanueva in his capacity as the president of
CIBAC were presumed to be within the scope of his authority as such; that the president was
charged by Section 1 of Article IV of the CIBAC By-Laws to oversee and direct the corporate
activities, which included the act of submitting the party's manifestation of intent to participate in the
May 14, 2007 elections as well as its certificate of nominees; that from all indications, Villanueva as
the president of CIBAC had always been provided the leeway to act as the party's representative
and that his actions had always been considered as valid; that the act of withdrawal, although done
without any written Board approval, was accomplished with the Boards acquiescence or at least
understanding; and that the intent of the party should be given paramount consideration in the
selection of the nominees.
As a result, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of
CIBAC.14 Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office
as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC on September 17, 2007.15
Precs of the Consolidated Cases
In G.R. No. 179431 and G.R. No. 179432, Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel respondent
COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC.
In G.R. No. 180443, Lokin assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 promulgated on January 12,
2007;16 and the resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E.M. No. 07-054 (approving CIBACs
withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang as CIBACs second, third and fourth
nominees, respectively, and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales and Borje in their stead, based on the
right of CIBAC to change its nominees under Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804). 17 He alleges that
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941. 18 the law that the
COMELEC seeks to thereby implement.
In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that a petition for certiorari is an inappropriate recourse in
law due to the proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as Representative and her assumption of that office;
that Lokins proper recourse was an electoral protest filed in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET); and that, therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction over the matter being raised by
Lokin.

For its part, CIBAC posits that Lokin is guilty of forum shopping for filing a petition for mandamus and
a petition for certiorari, considering that both petitions ultimately seek to have him proclaimed as the
second nominee of CIBAC.
Issues
The issues are the following:
(a) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy;
(b) Whether or not Lokin is guilty of forum shopping;
(c) Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the
Party-List System Act; and
(d) Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC and allowing the
amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC without any basis in fact or law and after the
close of the polls, and in ruling on matters that were intra-corporate in nature.
Ruling
The petitions are granted.
A
The Court has jurisdiction over the case
The COMELEC posits that once the proclamation of the winning party-list organization has been
done and its nominee has assumed office, any question relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the candidates to the House of Representatives falls under the jurisdiction of the
HRET pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, Lokin should raise the
question he poses herein either in an election protest or in a special civil action for quo warranto in
the HRET, not in a special civil action for certiorari in this Court.
We do not agree.
An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between
the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities,
to determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is
entitled to hold the office. It can only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of
candidacy and has been voted for in the preceding elections.
A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of
the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible person from the office,
but not to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly
speaking, not a contest where the parties strive for supremacy because the petitioner will not be
seated even if the respondent may be unseated.
The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto, for it
concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second nominee of
CIBAC. Although an election protest may properly be available to one party-list organization seeking

to unseat another party-list organization to determine which between the defeated and the winning
party-list organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal votes, Lokins case is not one in
which a nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of
the same party-list organization. Neither does an action for quo warranto lie, considering that the
case does not involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of the
Philippines, or some other cause of disqualification for her.
Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the
review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of
Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by CruzGonzales. The constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the
COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a petition for
certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30
days. Undoubtedly, the Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokins petitions for
certiorari and for mandamus against the COMELEC.
B
Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping
Forum shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause
of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.
Thus, forum shopping may arise: (a) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a
party seeks a favorable decision (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another; or (b) if, after having
filed a petition in the Supreme Court, a party files another petition in the Court of Appeals, because
he thereby deliberately splits appeals "in the hope that even as one case in which a particular
remedy is sought is dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open"; or (c)
where a party attempts to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction from a court after failing to obtain the
writ from another court.19
What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the
vexation caused to the courts and the litigants by a party who accesses different courts and
administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes or to grant the same or substantially
the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the
different fora upon the same issue.20
The filing of identical petitions in different courts is prohibited, because such act constitutes forum
shopping, a malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and as abusing
their processes. Forum shopping is an improper conduct that degrades the administration of
justice.21
Nonetheless, the mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not necessarily
constitute forum shopping. The test is whether the several actions filed involve the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances.22 The actions must also raise identical
causes of action, subject matter, and issues.23Elsewise stated, forum shopping exists where the
elements of litis pendentia are present, or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in the other.24
Lokin has filed the petition for mandamus to compel the COMELEC to proclaim him as the second
nominee of CIBAC upon the issuance of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 (announcing CIBACs
entitlement to an additional seat in the House of Representatives), and to strike down the provision
in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 and NBC Resolution No. 07-72 holding in abeyance "all proclamation

of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall
likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases." He has insisted that the
COMELEC had the ministerial duty to proclaim him due to his being CIBACs second nominee; and
that the COMELEC had no authority to exercise discretion and to suspend or defer the proclamation
of winning party-list organizations with pending disputes.
On the other hand, Lokin has resorted to the petition for certiorari to assail the September 14, 2007
resolution of the COMELEC (approving the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang
and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales as the second nominee and Borje as the third nominee); and
to challenge the validity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804, the COMELECs basis for allowing
CIBACs withdrawal of Lokins nomination.
Applying the test for forum shopping, the consecutive filing of the action for certiorari and the action
for mandamus did not violate the rule against forum shopping even if the actions involved the same
parties, because they were based on different causes of action and the reliefs they sought were
different.
C
Invalidity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804
The legislative power of the Government is vested exclusively in the Legislature in accordance with
the doctrine of separation of powers. As a general rule, the Legislature cannot surrender or abdicate
its legislative power, for doing so will be unconstitutional. Although the power to make laws cannot
be delegated by the Legislature to any other authority, a power that is not legislative in character
may be delegated.25
Under certain circumstances, the Legislature can delegate to executive officers and administrative
boards the authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs. To render such delegation lawful, the Legislature
must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles that are to control in given cases. The
Legislature should set a definite or primary standard to guide those empowered to execute the law.
For as long as the policy is laid down and a proper standard is established by statute, there can be
no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power when the Legislature leaves to selected
instrumentalities the duty of making subordinate rules within the prescribed limits, although there is
conferred upon the executive officer or administrative board a large measure of discretion. There is a
distinction between the delegation of power to make a law and the conferment of an authority or a
discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, for the power to make laws necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be.26
The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express legislative purpose, or to effect the
operation and enforcement of a law is not a power exclusively legislative in character, but is rather
administrative in nature. The rules and regulations adopted and promulgated must not, however,
subvert or be contrary to existing statutes. The function of promulgating IRRs may be legitimately
exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of a law. The power of administrative
agencies is confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that
administrative regulation cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment. It is axiomatic
that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule
issued for its implementation. Indeed, administrative or executive acts shall be valid only when they
are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.27
To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites to be valid: 28
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;

2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature;

3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and
4. It must be reasonable.
The COMELEC is constitutionally mandated to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, a plebiscite, an initiative, a referendum, and a recall. 29 In
addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the COMELEC is also
charged to promulgate IRRs implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other
laws that the COMELEC enforces and administers.30
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 pursuant to its powers under the Constitution, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, and the Party-List System Act.31 Hence, the COMELEC met the first requisite.
The COMELEC also met the third requisite. There is no question that Resolution No. 7804
underwent the procedural necessities of publication and dissemination in accordance with the
procedure prescribed in the resolution itself.
Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was valid or not is thus to be tested on the basis of
whether the second and fourth requisites were met. It is in this respect that the challenge of Lokin
against Section 13 succeeds.
As earlier said, the delegated authority must be properly exercised. This simply means that the
resulting IRRs must not be ultra vires as to be issued beyond the limits of the authority conferred. It
is basic that an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress, 32 for administrative IRRs
are solely intended to carry out, not to supplant or to modify, the law. The administrative agency
issuing the IRRs may not enlarge, alter, or restrict the provisions of the law it administers and
enforces, and cannot engraft additional non-contradictory requirements not contemplated by the
Legislature.33
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives.-Each registered party, organization or coalition
shall submit to the COMELEC not later that forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names,
not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the
required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing
may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any elective office or a person
who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names
or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to
the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination,
becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the
list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the
party-list system shall not be considered resigned.
The provision is daylight clear. The Legislature thereby deprived the party-list organization of the
right to change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the
COMELEC, except when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination;
or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated. The provision must be read literally because its language

is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning. Such
meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature has intended to convey.
Even where the courts should be convinced that the Legislature really intended some other
meaning, and even where the literal interpretation should defeat the very purposes of the enactment,
the explicit declaration of the Legislature is still the law, from which the courts must not
depart.34When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation
or construction, but only for application.35 Accordingly, an administrative agency tasked to implement
a statute may not construe it by expanding its meaning where its provisions are clear and
unambiguous.36
The legislative intent to deprive the party-list organization of the right to change the nominees or to
alter the order of the nominees was also expressed during the deliberations of the Congress, viz:
MR. LAGMAN: And again on Section 5, on the nomination of party list representatives, I do not see
any provision here which prohibits or for that matter allows the nominating party to change the
nominees or to alter the order of prioritization of names of nominees. Is the implication correct that at
any time after submission the names could still be changed or the listing altered?
MR. ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, that is a good issue brought out by the distinguished Gentleman from
Albay and perhaps a perfecting amendment may be introduced therein. The sponsoring committee
will gladly consider the same.
MR. LAGMAN: In other words, what I would like to see is that after the list is submitted to the
COMELEC officially, no more changes should be made in the names or in the order of listing.
MR. ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, there may be a situation wherein the name of a particular nominee has
been submitted to the Commission on Elections but before election day the nominee changed his
political party affiliation. The nominee is therefore no longer qualified to be included in the party list
and the political party has a perfect right to change the name of that nominee who changed his
political party affiliation.
MR. LAGMAN: Yes of course. In that particular case, the change can be effected but will be the
exception rather than the rule. Another exception most probably is the nominee dies, then there has
to be a change but any change for that matter should always be at the last part of the list so that the
prioritization made by the party will not be adversely affected. 37
The usage of "No" in Section 8 "No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall
be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the
nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, or becomes incapacitated, in which case the
name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list" renders Section 8 a negative law,
and is indicative of the legislative intent to make the statute mandatory. Prohibitive or negative words
can rarely, if ever, be directory, for there is but one way to obey the command "thou shall not," and
that is to completely refrain from doing the forbidden act, 38 subject to certain exceptions stated in the
law itself, like in this case.
Section 8 does not unduly deprive the party-list organization of its right to choose its nominees, but
merely divests it of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order in the list of its nominees
names after submission of the list to the COMELEC.
The prohibition is not arbitrary or capricious; neither is it without reason on the part of lawmakers.
The COMELEC can rightly presume from the submission of the list that the list reflects the true will of
the party-list organization. The COMELEC will not concern itself with whether or not the list contains

the real intended nominees of the party-list organization, but will only determine whether the
nominees pass all the requirements prescribed by the law and whether or not the nominees possess
all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Thereafter, the names of the nominees will be
published in newspapers of general circulation. Although the people vote for the party-list
organization itself in a party-list system of election, not for the individual nominees, they still have the
right to know who the nominees of any particular party-list organization are. The publication of the
list of the party-list nominees in newspapers of general circulation serves that right of the people,
enabling the voters to make intelligent and informed choices. In contrast, allowing the party-list
organization to change its nominees through withdrawal of their nominations, or to alter the order of
the nominations after the submission of the list of nominees circumvents the voters demand for
transparency. The lawmakers exclusion of such arbitrary withdrawal has eliminated the possibility of
such circumvention.
D
Exceptions in Section 8 of R.A. 7941 are exclusive
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 enumerates only three instances in which the party-list organization can
substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name has been submitted to the
COMELEC, namely: (a) when the nominee dies; (b) when the nominee withdraws in writing his
nomination; and (c) when the nominee becomes incapacitated.
The enumeration is exclusive, for, necessarily, the general rule applies to all cases not falling under
any of the three exceptions.
When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general rule, the
exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed. The exceptions extend only as far as their language
fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the
exceptions. Where the general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, none but the
enacting authority can curtail the former. Not even the courts may add to the latter by implication,
and it is a rule that an express exception excludes all others, although it is always proper in
determining the applicability of the rule to inquire whether, in a particular case, it accords with reason
and justice.39
1avvphi1

The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something from the scope of the
general words of a statute, which is otherwise within the scope and meaning of such general words.
Consequently, the existence of an exception in a statute clarifies the intent that the statute shall
apply to all cases not excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict construction; hence, any
doubt will be resolved in favor of the general provision and against the exception. Indeed, the liberal
construction of a statute will seem to require in many circumstances that the exception, by which the
operation of the statute is limited or abridged, should receive a restricted construction.
E
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded
the exceptions under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 states:
Section 13. Substitution of nominees. A party-list nominee may be substituted only when he
dies, or his nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he becomes incapacitated to continue as
such, or he withdraws his acceptance to a nomination. In any of these cases, the name of the
substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list of nominees.

No substitution shall be allowed by reason of withdrawal after the polls.

Unlike Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, the foregoing regulation provides four instances, the fourth being
when the "nomination is withdrawn by the party."
Lokin insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in expanding to four the three
statutory grounds for substituting a nominee.
We agree with Lokin.
The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, 40 has neither the
authority nor the license to expand, extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to implement thereby.
The IRRs the COMELEC issues for that purpose should always accord with the law to be
implemented, and should not override, supplant, or modify the law. It is basic that the IRRs should
remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out.41
Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government under legislative
authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying the laws general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be expanded by such IRRs,
because an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. 42
The COMELEC explains that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 has added nothing to Section 8 of
R.A. No. 7941,43 because it has merely reworded and rephrased the statutory provisions
phraseology.
The explanation does not persuade.
To reword means to alter the wording of or to restate in other words; to rephrase is to phrase anew
or in a new form.44 Both terms signify that the meaning of the original word or phrase is not altered.
However, the COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941,
because it established an entirely new ground not found in the text of the provision. The new ground
granted to the party-list organization the unilateral right to withdraw its nomination already submitted
to the COMELEC, which Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 did not allow to be done. Neither was the grant
of the unilateral right contemplated by the drafters of the law, who precisely denied the right to
withdraw the nomination (as the quoted record of the deliberations of the House of Representatives
has indicated). The grant thus conflicted with the statutory intent to save the nominee from falling
under the whim of the party-list organization once his name has been submitted to the COMELEC,
and to spare the electorate from the capriciousness of the party-list organizations.
We further note that the new ground would not secure the object of R.A. No. 7941 of developing and
guaranteeing a full, free and open party-list electoral system. The success of the system could only
be ensured by avoiding any arbitrariness on the part of the party-list organizations, by seeing to the
transparency of the system, and by guaranteeing that the electorate would be afforded the chance of
making intelligent and informed choices of their party-list representatives.
The insertion of the new ground was invalid. An axiom in administrative law postulates that
administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of their IRRs, but
must ensure that their IRRs are reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If the IRRs

are shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they were authorized to be
issued, they must be held to be invalid and should be struck down. 45
F
Effect of partial nullity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804
An IRR adopted pursuant to the law is itself law.46 In case of conflict between the law and the IRR,
the law prevails. There can be no question that an IRR or any of its parts not adopted pursuant to
the law is no law at all and has neither the force nor the effect of law.47 The invalid rule, regulation, or
part thereof cannot be a valid source of any right, obligation, or power.
Considering that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 to the extent that it allows the party-list
organization to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC was invalid, CIBACs
withdrawal of its nomination of Lokin and the others and its substitution of them with new nominees
were also invalid and ineffectual. It is clear enough that any substitution of Lokin and the others
could only be for any of the grounds expressly stated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941. Resultantly, the
COMELECs approval of CIBACs petition of withdrawal of the nominations and its recognition of
CIBACs substitution, both through its assailed September 14, 2007 resolution, should be struck
down for lack of legal basis. Thereby, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction, having relied on the
invalidly issued Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 to support its action.
WHEREFORE, we grant the petitions for certiorari and mandamus.
We declare Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes
a party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the
nomination to the Commission on Elections.
Accordingly, we annul and set aside:
(a) The resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E. M. No. 07-054 approving Citizens
Battle Against Corruptions withdrawal of the nominations of Luis K. Lokin, Jr., Sherwin N.
Tugna, and Emil Galang as its second, third, and fourth nominees, respectively, and ordering
their substitution by Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as second nominee and Armi Jane R. Borje
as third nominee; and
(b) The proclamation by the Commission on Elections of Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as a
Party-List Representative representing Citizens Battle Against Corruption in the House of
Representatives.
We order the Commission on Elections to forthwith proclaim petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr. as a PartyList Representative representing Citizens Battle Against Corruption in the House of Representatives.
We make no pronouncements on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

(On Leave)
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice