PASAY CITY GOVERNMENT V.

CFI OF MANILA 132 SCRA 156 (1984)

NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari of the order rendered by CFI Manila br-10 denying
the MR and ordering the writ of execution and garnishment of P613,096 from the deposits of the
Pasay City government in PNB
FACTS: Respondent-appellee VD Isip, Sons & Associates entered into a contract with the city
of Pasay for the construction of a new Pasay City Hall. Pursuant to the contract, respondentappellee proceeded with the construction of the new Pasay City Hall building as per duly
approved plans and specifications
1. Appellant Pasay City Government paid only a total of P1.1 million to respondentappellee leaving a balance of P613,096. Despite demands for payment thereof, petitioner
failed to remit the said amount
2. Respondent, then, filed an action for specific performance with damages against
petitioner City Government of Pasay
3. Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for the amendment of the complaint and for bill of
particulars. This was denied by CFI Manila. MR (denied)
4. The parties arrived at a draft of amicable agreement which was submitted to the
Municipal Board of Pasay for its consideration. CFI advised that under the principle of
quantum meruit, respondent is entitled to at least that which is due to him for the contract
and public interest require the continuity of the construction of the project, instead of
delaying its immediate completion by litigating upon technical grounds which results to
public detriment. Thereafter, CFI approved the compromise agreement of both parties
5. The City Government of Pasay filed an urgent motion seeking a declaration of legality of
the original contract. CFI declared the original contract legal and valid
6. Thereafter, CFI Manila issued a writ of execution in favor of respondent. Subsequently, a
notice of garnishment was made and effected upon the funds of petition with PNB
7. As a result, petitioner filed an urgent motion to set aside CFI Manilas order and to quash
the writ of execution on the following grounds:
a. The execution sough was then still premature since the 90 days stipulated in the
compromise agreement has not yet elapsed
b. The obligations of the parties under the compromise agreement were reciprocal and
since respondent has not yet complied with the performance bond set in the
agreement, petitioner cannot be obliged to pay the sum due to the respondent
c. The sheriff has no power or authority to levy or garnish on execution the general
funds of Pasay City
8. CFI Manila denied the petitioners MR and subsequently ordered the enforcement of the
garnishment already issued to the city sheriff by taking possession of the amount from the
deposits of Pasay City Government with PNB
9. Afterwards, private respondent Isip filed an urgent motion for permit to serve a
supplemental complaint seeking rescission of the original contract and calim for damages
amounting to P672,653,91 alleging the violations of the petitioner Pasay City
Government in the compromise agreement and in view of the rights granted to Isip in par
5 of the resolutory clause of the compromise agreement
10. Pasay City Government filed their cautionary answer to the supplemental complaint
alleging that

a.
b.
c.
d.

The court has no jurisdiction over the subject of the supplemental

The cause of action is already barred by prior judgment
That the principal of res judicata applies
That the supplemental complaint states no cause of action and that the present claim
has been paid, waived, abandoned and extinguished
11. CFI Manila set for pre-trial the supplemental complaint.
ISSUE: WON the respondent court erred in entertaining the supplemental complaint
HELD: Yes. Having established that the compromise agreement was final and immediately
executory, and in fact was already enforced, the respondent Court was in error when it still
entertained the supplemental complaint filed by the respondent-appellee for by then the
respondent Court had no more jurisdiction over the subject matter. When a decision has
become final and executory, the court no longer has the power and jurisdiction to alter, amend or
revoke, and its only power thereof is to order its execution. After the perfection of an appeal, the
trial court loses jurisdiction over its judgment and cannot vacate the same.
Moreover, supplemental pleadings are meant to supply deficiencies in aid of original
pleading, not to entirely substitute the latter Here, the respondent-appellee originally asked
for specific performance which was later settled through a compromise agreement. After
this, the respondent-appellee asked for rescission of both the contract and agreement and
the compromise agreement using a supplemental complaint. It is clear that the
supplemental is not only to "supply deficiencies in aid of original pleading but is also meant
as an entirely new "substitute" to the latter. A supplemental complaint must be consistent
with and in aid of, the cause of action set forth in the original complaint and a new and
independent cause of action cannot be set up by such complaint, especially where judgment
has already been obtained by him in the original action

DELBROS HOTEL CORP V. IAC, HILTON INTL CO, RICHARD CHAPMAN AND
FLAVIANO MOSQUERA JR 159 SCRA 533 (1988)
NATURE: Petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance of TRO and/writ of
preliminary injunction to nullify the resolutions issued by IAC dated September 5, 11 and 24,
195
FACTS: Petitioner Delbros Hotel Corp filed before RTC Manila a complaint for termination of
agreement and damages against Hilton Hotels Intl.
1. Petitioner alleged Hilton violated the terms of their agreement when it refused , despite
repeated demands, to remit Delbros share in the gross operating profits (GOP)
2. Hilton filed an answer with a compulsory counterclaim alleging that:
a. Delbros has no valid and sufficient cause of action for failure to give a five-day notice
of termination of the management agreement
b. Delbros cause/s of action, if any, were barred by estoppels or laches
c. Delbros claims have been waived or abandoned
d. The alleged violations of the management were too trivial or insignificant to warrant
the termination of the management agreement
3. RTC judge issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Hilton and Chapman (Hilton
GM) from disposing or tampering the hotels records etc. Hilton and Chapman appealed
to IAC
4. Meanwhile, Delbros filed a motion to admit supplemental complaint to implead as an
additional defendant Hiltons comptroller, Mosquera. Subsequently, RTC judge issued an
order on June 14, 1985, admitting the supplemental complaint, and required Hilton and
Chapman to answer the supplemental complaint within 5 days from notice. Said orders
were received by Hiltons counsels on June 21, 1985
5. Hilton, then, filed an ex-parte motion for an extension of 12 days to answer the
supplemental; this was not received by the trial court until July 16, 1985
6. On July 9, 1985, Delbros filed a motion to declare Hilton and Chapman in default with
respect to the supplemental complaint. RTC granted the motion and allowed Delbros to
present its evidence ex-parte in support of the supplemental complaint
7. On July 15, 1985, RTC held, by default, in favor of Delbros and confirmed the
termination of the contract legal and valid. Delbros moved for the execution of the
judgment pending appeal. Despite opposition by Hilton, a special order granting a writ of
execution as issued and served upon Hilton on September 3, 1985
8. As such, Hilton filed before IAC a petition for certiorari with prayer for TRO/preliminary
injunction to assail the special order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. IAC issued a TRO enjoining the enforcement of the
writ of execution
9. IAC issued a resolution confirming the continuing efficacy of the TRO and granted
Hiltons motion to deputize Manila authorities to enforce the restraining order. Delbros
filed MR but it was not acted upon. Delbros, then, filed this petition arguing that the
order was null and void
ISSUE: WON RTC erred in declaring Hilton and Chapman in default for failing to answer the
supplemental complaint filed by Delbros

HELD: Yes. RTC erred in declaring Hilton in default for failure to answer the supplemental
complaint filed by Delbros.
Fundamentally, default orders are taken on the legal presumption that in failing to file an
answer, the defendant does not oppose the allegations and relief demanded in the
complaint. In the case at bar, however, no such presumption can arise vis-a-vis the Answer filed
by Hilton and Chapman to the original complaint; their institution of the certiorari in opposition
to petitioner's attempt to interfere with and/or take over the control and management of the hotel
pendente lite; and their vigorous opposition to the admission of the supplemental complaint
under consideration. These factors, of which the trial judge had full knowledge and notice,
should have cautioned him from precipitately rendering the default order as well as the default
judgment.
"A supplemental pleading is not like an amended pleading substitute for the original
one. It does not supersede the original, but assumes that the original pleading is to stand,
and the issues joined under the original pleading remain as issues to be tried in the action."
While it is conceded that there is authority in support of a default judgment being predicated
upon defendant's failure to answer a supplemental complaint, the same cannot apply here. The
reason is that although in the supplemental complaint, the relief prayed for was altered from
termination of the management contract to judicial confirmation of its termination, the basic and
principal issue of whether or not petitioner was entitled to terminate the management contract,
remained. As this basic issue had been previously covered by the Answer filed by Hilton and
Chapman, there was no necessity for requiring them to plead further to the Supplemental
Complaint. Consequently, the trial judge did not have a legal ground for declaring them in
default for such failure to plead.
It would have been more prudent under the liberal construction rule provided in Section 2,
Rule 1 ROC, for the trial court to have treated the supplemental complaint as an amended
complaint, and the original answer thereto as sufficient; or otherwise to have waited for the
answer of the newly-impleaded defendant before acting on the motion to declare the
original defendants in default and rendering the default judgment, considering that a
common cause of action has been asserted against the three defendants, so that the answer of
Mosquera could inure to the benefit of the original defendants. As it turned out, the Answer filed
on July 18, 1985 was for and in behalf of all the defendants. Hence, under Sec. 4 of Rule 18, the
court shall try the case against all upon the answer filed and render judgment upon the evidence
presented.
Indeed, no prejudice would result to petitioner had the trial judge taken a more prudent and
judicious course of action as above suggested. Acting as the trial judge did, grave, irreparable
and serious damage caused to private respondents.
DISPOSITIVE: Dismissed. The orders issued by RTC Manila dated July 9, 15 and September
3, 1985 were annulled and set aside.

QUELNAN V. VHF PHILS INC G.R. NO 138500 (2005)

NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari to nullify and set aside the decision dated September
17, 1997 by CA and its resolution dated April 27, 1999 which denied petitioners MR
FACTS: Respondent VHF Phils Inc filed an ejectment suit against petitioner Quelnan which the
latter claimer to have leased from VHF. Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) held in
favor of VHF Inc citing that petitioner Quelnan failed to file his answer within the reglementary
period
1. A copy of the said decision was served on petitioner by registered mail but was returned
unclaimed on the account of petitioners failure to claim the same despite 3 successive
notices from the postmaster
2. Since no appeal was filed by the petitioner, the MeTC decision became final and
executory
3. On May 18, 1993, a writ of execution, notice of levy and notice to vacate was served on
the petitioners wife who acknowledged receipt thereof
4. Subsequently, petitioner Quelnan filed with RTC Manila a petition for relief from
judgment with preliminary injunction and/or TRO, alleging that he was never served the
summons and was completely unaware of the proceedings in the ejectment suit and that
he only learned of the judgment on May 18, 1993 when the notice of levy on execution
was received by his wife
5. On June 3, 1996, RTC granted Quelnans petition and set aside the MeTC decision.
According to the RTC, petitioner Quelnan had been deprived of a hearing and had been
prevented from taking an appeal since his wife tore up the summons and complaint
6. Respondent VHF filed MR but was denied by RTC on July 5, 1996
7. Upon appeal, CA held that Quelnans petition for relief was filed beyond the 60-day
mandatory period pursuant to Sec 3, Rule 38 ROC. As such, CA reversed and set aside
the RTC decision and reinstated that of the MeTC. Petitioner Quelnan filed an MR
(denied)
8. Petitioner claimed that the 60-day period for filing a petition for relief from judgment
must be reckoned from the time a party acquired knowledge of the judgment. He argued
that since he only became aware of the MeTC decision on May 18, 1993, his petition for
relief from judgment was timely filed on May 24, 1993
ISSUES:
1. If a party fails to claim his copy of the adverse decision which was sent through
registered mail, when is he deemed to have knowledge of said decision
2. Will the presumption of completeness of service of a registered mail matter under Rule
13 Sec 10 ROC apply in relation to the 60-day period for filing a petition for relief from
judgment under Rule 38 Sec 3
HELD:
1. Relief from judgment under Rule 38 is a legal remedy whereby a party seeks to set aside
a judgment rendered against him by a court whenever he was unjustly deprived of a
hearing or was prevented from taking an appeal, in either case, because of fraud,

accident, mistake or excusable neglect. Based on Rule 38 Sec 3 a petition for relief
from judgment must be filed within: (a) 60 days from knowledge of judgment, order
or other proceedings to be set aside; and (b) six (6) months from entry of such
judgment, order or other proceeding. These two periods must concur. Both periods
are also not extendible and never interrupted. Though it is clear that the said provision
states that the 60-day period should be reckoned from the time the aggrieved party had
knowledge of the judgment, the SC held that disagreed with Quelnan. The records
clearly reveal that a copy of the MeTC decision was sent to petitioner through registered
mail at his given address on November 25, 1992. A certification that the registered mail
was unclaimed by the petitioner and thus returned to the sender after three successive
notices was issued by the postmaster. Hence, service of said MeTC decision became
effective five (5) days after November 25, 1992, or on November 30, 1992.
2. Under the Rules, service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the
addressee. However, if the addressee fails to claim his mail from the post office
within five (5) days from the date of the first notice, service becomes effective upon
the expiration of five (5) days there from. In such a case, there arises a presumption
that the service was complete at the end of the said five-day period. This means that
the period to appeal or to file the necessary pleading begins to run after five days from
the first notice given by the postmaster. This is because a party is deemed to have
received and to have been notified of the judgment at that point.
Necessarily, the 60-day period for filing a petition for relief must be reckoned from such
date (November 30, 1992) as this was the day when actual receipt by petitioner is
presumed. In short, petitioner was deemed to have knowledge of the MeTC decision on
November 30, 1992. The 60-day period for filing a petition for relief thus expired on
January 29, 1993. Unfortunately, it was only on May 24, 1993, or 175 days after
petitioner was deemed to have learned of the judgment that he filed his petition for relief
with the RTC. Indubitably, the petition was filed way beyond the 60-day period provided
by law.The failure to claim a registered mail matter of which notice had been duly given
by the postmaster is not an excusable neglect that would warrant the reopening of a
decided case.
Rule 13 is intended to embrace and govern the filing of all pleadings, judgments,
orders, notices and other papers, as well as the service thereof. Whenever necessary
and expedient, the presumption of completeness of service ought to be applied, as in this
case. While it is true that the rule on completeness of service by registered mail only
provides for a disputable presumption, the burden is on petitioner to show that the
postmasters notice never reached him and that he did not acquire knowledge of the
judgment. Sadly, petitioner failed to discharge his burden.
DISPOSITIVE: Denied and CA decision was affirmed

BOTICANO V. CHU 148 SCRA 541 (1987)

NATURE: Petition for certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside CA decision which held that
respondent Chu was not properly served with summons
FACTS: Petitioner Boticano was the registered owner of a truck which was used for hauling logs
for a certain fee. Said truck was properly parked by its driver at the shoulder of the national
highway in Bougabon when it was hit and bumped at the rear portion by another truck owned by
respondent Chu. Chu agreed to should the expenses of the repair of the damaged truck.
1. When Chu failed to comply with their agreement as well as to pay damages, Boticano
filed a complaint on November 24, 1977 with CFI Nueva Ecija against Chua and his
driver, Sigua.
2. Summons were issued on December 12, 1977 but were returned unserved for Sigua
because he was no longer connected with his employer (San Pedro Saw Mill) while
another copy of the summons for Chu was returned through his wife
3. Petitioner Boticano moved to dismiss the case against Sigua and to declare Chu in default
for failure to file responsive pleadings within the reglementary period. This was granted
by the lower court and allowed Boticano to present his evidence ex parte
4. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court found Chu responsible for the fault and
negligence of his driver (Sigua) under Art 2180 NCC, whose negligence and lack of due
care was the immediate and proximate cause of the damage to petitioners truck
5. Chu filed with the trial court a notice of appeal and urgent motion for extension of time to
file record on appeal which was granted by the trial court.
6. Boticano filed a motion to dismiss appeal and for execution. Chu opposed the motion.
The court subsequently issued an order approving Chus record on appeal
7. Upon appeal, CA reversed the trial courts decision and ordered the case to be remanded
for retrial. CA also issued an order that Chu be properly served with summons and a copy
of the complaint. Boticano, then, filed an MR (denied)
8. Petitioner argued in favor of the validity of such service while Chu maintained that the
sheriff resorted to substituted service under Sec 8, Rule 14 ROC without first complying
with the mode of personal service required under Sec 7 Rule 14
ISSUE: WON the question of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be raised for the
first time on appeal
HELD: No, this has been settled in a long line of decisions. One of the circumstances considered
by the Court as indicative of waiver by the defendant-appellant of any alleged defect of
jurisdiction over his person arising from defective or even want of process, is his failure to raise
the question of jurisdiction in the Court of First Instance and at the first opportunity. It has been
held that upon general principles, defects in jurisdiction arising from irregularities in the
commencement of the proceedings, defective process or even absence of process may be waived
by a failure to make seasonable objections.
In the case at bar, Chu could have questioned the jurisdiction of the lower court but he did not.

However, under Section 23, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the defendant's voluntary
appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service. The defect of summons is cured by
the voluntary appearance of the defendant.
Private respondent voluntarily appeared thru counsel in the trial court. He filed a Notice of
Appeal, Appeal Bond, Motion for Extension of Time to File Record on Appeal, Record on
Appeal, Motion for Withdrawal of Appearance, Notice of Appearance and Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Appeal and for Issuance of a Writ of Execution. Not only did he
submit pleadings and motions, but he likewise appeared in person, thru counsel in the hearing
held on May 14, 1979 at 8:30 a.m. and orally argued in open court on the pending incident.
Jurisdiction was properly acquired by the trial court over the person of respondent thru
both service of summons and voluntary appearance in court; he was therefore properly
declared in default for not having filed any answer; despite respondent's failure to file a
motion to set aside the declaration of default, he has the right to appeal the default
judgment but in the appeal only the evidence of the petitioner may be considered,
respondent not having adduced any defense evidence.
DISPOSITIVE: The assailed decision and resolution of CA were reversed and set aside; the
decision of CFI Nueva Ecija was reinstated

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS V. SPOUSES SANTIAGO G.R. NO 169116 (2007)

NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside the CA decision
affirming the order of RTC Laguna in enjoining the extrajudicial foreclosure sale by BPI over a
parcel of land registered under the name of Spouses Santiago
FACTS: Private respondent Centrogen Inc is a domestic corporation engaged in pharmaceutical
business, represented by Edwin Santiago as president (son of Spouses Santiago). On several
occasions, Centrogen obtained loans with FEBTC totaling P4.65 million
1. As security for a fraction of the loan, spouses Santiago executed a real estate mortgage
over a parcel of land. The mortgage initially covered the loan amount of P490,000 but
later covered another loan obligation in the amount of P1,504,280. Subsequently,
Centrogen incurred default and the loan obligation became due and demandable.
2. Meanwhile, FEBTC merged with petitioner bank BPI and as a result, BPI assumed all
rights, privileges and obligations of FEBTC. BPI, then, filed an extrajudicial foreclosure
over the subject property.
3. Upon receipt of the notice of sale, Spouses Santiago and Centrogen filed a petition for the
issuance of TRO and preliminary and final injunction, or an annulment of the real estate
mortgage. Spouses Santiago alleged that the initial loan obligation of P490,000 was fully
paid as evidenced by Union Bank check in the amount of P648,521.51. Moreover,
FEBTC violated the terms of their agreement when it refused to release the balance of P3
million of the P5 million loan
4. On February 27, 2003, BPI was summoned to file and serve its answer to the complaint;
the sheriff also served a copy of the summons to the branch manager of BPI Sta. Cruz
Laguna
5. Instead of filing an answer, BPI filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. BPI claimed that the branch manager of BPI
was not one of those authorized by Rule 14 Sec 11 ROC to receive summons on behalf of
the corporation. As such, the summons served upon its branch manager did not bind the
corporation
6. RTC denied the motion to dismiss and emphasized the nature of the case merited its
removal from the scope of Rule 14 Sec 11 ROC. Based on Rule 58 Sec 5 ROC, RTC
declared the order valid despite its non-compliance with Rule 14 Sec 11
7. After summary hearing on the application for TRO, RTC issued an order enjoining the
provincial sheriff from proceeding with the extrajudicial foreclosure sale
8. On March 6, 2003, RTC ordered the service of new summons to BPI in accordance with
the provisions of ROC which was received by the office of the Corporate Secretary dated
March 11, 2003
9. RTC granted the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction filed by
Santiago. It enjoined the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the subject property pending
resolution of the main action for annulment of real estate mortgage or until further orders
of the trial court. BPI filed MR (denied)
10. BPI, then, filed a petition for certiorari with CA seeking the reversal of the adverse orders
of RTC. CA affirmed the RTC decision and dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by
BPI. CA declared that jurisdiction was acquired upon service of new summons

ISSUE: WON RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of BPI when the original summons was
served upon the branch manager of BPI
HELD: No, Rule 14 Sec 11 ROC provides: When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or
association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality service may
be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer or
in-house counsel.
Strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a
corporation. The officer upon whom service is made must be one who is named in the
statute; otherwise, the service is insufficient. The purpose is to render it reasonably certain
that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to
insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation
that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served on him.
In the case at bar, service of summons on BPIs Branch Manager did not bind the corporation for
the branch manager is not included in the enumeration of the statute of the persons upon whom
service of summons can be validly made in behalf of the corporation. Such service is therefore
void and ineffectual.
However, upon the issuance and the proper service of new summons on 11 March 2003,
before the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued, whatever defect attended the service
of the original summons, was promptly and accordingly cured. The subsequent service of
summons was neither disputed nor was it mentioned by BPI except in a fleeting narration of facts
and therefore enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
In Philippine American Life and General Insurance Co v. Brevea, the SC held that case should
not be dismissed simply because an original summons was wrongfully served. An alias
summons can be actually served on said defendant. It is not pertinent whether the
summons is designated as an "original" or an "alias" summons as long as it has adequately
served its purpose. What is essential is that the summons complies with the requirements
under the Rules of Court and it has been duly served on the defendant together with the
prevailing complaint. Moreover, the second summons was technically not an alias summons but
more of a new summons on the amended complaint. It was not a continuation of the first
summons considering that it particularly referred to the amended complaint and not to the
original complaint.
The ultimate test on the validity and sufficiency on service of summons is whether the same and
the attachments thereto where ultimately received by the corporation under such circumstances
that no undue prejudice is sustained by it from the procedural lapse and it was afforded full
opportunity to present its responsive pleadings. This is but in accord with the entrenched rule that
the ends of substantial justice should not be subordinated to technicalities and, for which
purpose, each case should be examined within the factual milieu peculiar to it.
WON RTC ERRED IN GRANTING SANTIAGOS APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

No, an injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of ones substantive right or
interest; it is not a cause of action by itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to
the main suit. The purpose of injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable
injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and educated. Its sole
aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case is heard fully.
The issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction as an ancillary or preventive remedy to
secure the rights of a party in a pending case is entirely within the discretion of the court
taking cognizance of the case, the only limitation being that the discretion should be
exercised based upon the grounds and in a manner provided by law. Before a writ of
preliminary injunction may be issued, the following requisites must be complied with: (1) a right
in esse or a clear or unmistakable right to be protected; (2) violation of that right; and (3) that
there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
The requisites for the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction have been fully
complied with. The right of Spouses Santiago over the property clearly exists since they are the
registered owners thereof, and the existence of a Real Estate Mortgage does not undermine the
right of the absolute owner over the property. The violation of such right is manifest in the
threatened foreclosure proceedings commenced by BPI amidst the claim that the principal
obligation has been fully paid. Finally, to allow the foreclosure of the subject property without
first calibrating the evidence of opposing parties pertaining to the action for the annulment of
mortgage would cause irreparable damage to the registered owner.
DISPOSITIVE: Denied; CA decision is affirmed

BUSUEGO V. CA, JOSE LAZARO, ROMEO LAZARO AND VIVENCIO LOOPEZ 151
SCRA 376 (1987)
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the decision of CA in
declaring null and void the judgment by default and orders issued by CFI Pasig
FACTS: Petitioner Busuego filed a complaint with CFI Pasig against defendants Jose Lazaro,
Romeo Lazaro, Ernesto Lazaro and Vivencio Lopez for the recovery of possession of a parcel of
land. Immediately, thereafter, summonses were issued in the name of the 4 defendants and per
sheriffs return, was personally served upon Ernesto Lazaro
1. On February 13, 1974, defendants, through Atty. Roldan, filed a motion for extension of
15 days, claiming that Roldans services were acquired late. The motion was granted by
the lower court
2. On February 28, 1974, Roldan sought for another extension of 10 days to file an answer
as he had not yet conferred with all 4 defendants which was granted by the lower court
3. Despite this, no answer was filed by the defendants and upon motion of Busuego, the
lower court declared the defendants in default. Subsequently, the lower court held in
favor of Busuego
4. Almost 2 years later, Busuego filed an ex parte motion for execution of the default
judgment which was granted by the lower court
5. Thereafter, Romeo Lazaro filed a motion to hold execution in abeyance and prayed for an
extension of 30 days within which to vacate the premises. The lower court granted the
motion
6. Subsequently, Roldan filed an MR of the judgment by default and/or to dissolve the writ
of execution on the ground that the defendants were never furnished a copy of the
judgment by default. Upon opposition of petitioner, the lower court denied the motion
7. The defendants, then, through their new counsel Atty. Lozano, filed an omnibus motion
which included a motion to lift the order of default, a second MR, and a motion to quash
the writ of execution, alleging for the first time their failure to answer was due to lack of
notice. Petitioner opposed the motion, contending that the defendants cannot claim lack
of notice since they had already filed several motions for extension of time
8. The lower court denied the omnibus motion citing that the motion for extension of time
was equivalent to waiver of service of summons
9. Lozano filed a 3rd MR alleging that the lower court never acquired jurisdiction over their
persons for lack of proper service of summons (denied by lower court)
10. Upon appeal, CA reversed the CFI decision and held in favor of private respondents
ISSUE: WON jurisdiction was lawfully acquired by the court a quo over the persons of the
respondents Jose Lazaro, Romeo Lazaro and Vivencio Lopez
HELD: Yes.
There are two ways by which a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or
respondent: (a) by service of summons upon the defendant; and (b) by voluntary appearance of
the defendant in court and his submission to its authority.

With respect to service of summons, ROC prescribe that a copy of the summons be served
personally upon the defendant by "handing him a copy thereof in person or if he refuses to
receive it, by tendering it to him. Personal service, however, may be dispensed with and
substituted service may be availed of if the defendant cannot be served personally "within
a reasonable time."
In the present case, it appears that the sheriff had availed of substituted service in seeking to
serve the summons upon all the defendants by serving a copy thereof "through Ernesto Lazaro
personally." Perusal, however, of the sheriff's return reveals that the sheriff failed to specify
therein what prior efforts, if any, had been exerted to serve summons upon the other defendants
personally within a reasonable period of time, and the lack of success of such efforts, before
proceeding to substituted service. Such specification in the sheriff's return is essential for
enforcement of the rule under ROC that substituted service may be resorted to only where it is
not possible to serve the defendant or defendants promptly in person.
While Ernesto Lazaro was validly served, with respect to respondents Jose Lazaro, Romeo
Lazaro and Vivencio Lopez, there was no valid service of summons effected. However, it is
incorrect to say that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the said
respondents.
A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal notice. An appearance in
whatever form, without explicitly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person
is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person . While the formal method of
entering an appearance in a cause pending in the courts is to deliver to the clerk a written
direction ordering him to enter the appearance of the person who subscribes it, an appearance
may be made by simply filing a formal motion, or plea or answer. This formal method of
appearance is not necessary. He may appear without such formal appearance and thus
submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court. He may appear by presenting a motion, for
example, and unless by such appearance he specifically objects to the jurisdiction of the
court, he thereby gives his assent to the jurisdiction of the court over his person. When the
appearance is by motion objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, it must
be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. If his
motion is for any other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person he thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
In the case at bar, the defendants appeared before the trial court a number of times without
raising any objection to the improper service of summons.
DISPOSITIVE: CA decision is reversed and set in so far as it concerns respondents Romeo
Lazaro, Jose Lazaro and Vivencio Lopez. With respect to Ernesto Lazaro, the same decision is
affirmed

VITANGCOL V. NEW VISTA PROPERTIES INC G.R. NO 176014 (2009)

NATURE: Petition for review under Rule 45 ROC assailing the decision of CA in reversing the
order of RTC dated December 21, 2004 involving the civil case for quieting of title
FACTS: Spouses Alipit executed an SPA authorizing De Guzman to sell their property covered
by TCT 2538 with Lot no 1735. Purusuant to the SPA, De Guzman executed a deed of absolute
sale in favor of New Vista Properties Inc. However the deed of sale indicated Lot no 1702 as the
lot number of the subject property. Following the sale, New Vista constructed a fence
surrounding the subject property
1. More than a decade later, New Vista learned that the parcel of land it occupied, Lot no
1702, was being claimed by petitioner Vitangcol through a deed of absolute sale entered
into by Vitangcol and Alipit
2. New Vista, then, filed a notice of adverse claim over Lot 1702 covered by TCT no T482731 with a suit for quieting of title. New Vista prayed for the cancellation of
Vitangcols TCT and that it be declare the absolute owner of the lot
3. Vitangcol moved to dismissed the complaint filed by New Vista
4. Before Alipit or Vitangcol filed an answer, New Vista filed an amended complaint
attaching a copy of the deed of absolute executed by De Guzman as Alipits authorized
agent. Therafter, Vitangcol filed a motion to dismiss
5. RTC denied Vitangcols motion to dismiss the amended complaint citing that the
amended complaint stated a cause of action
6. Vitangcol filed an MR and this time, RTC granted the MR and dismissed the amended
complaint on the account that the complaint stated no cause of action and that the claim
in the present action is unenforceable under the provisions of the Statute of Frauds. In
reversing itself, RTC emphasized the the failure of New Vista to attach the SPA was fatal
to its cause of action
7. Upon appeal, CA reinstated New Vistas amended complaint for quieting of title and
directed Vitangcol and Alipit to file their respective answers. According to CA, RTC
erred in dismissing the complaint as it was absurd for RTC to require a copy of the SPA
which was not even mentioned in the amended complaint. The amended complaint,
superseded the original complaint and as such, the SPA may no longer be required in
determining whether the amended complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action
ISSUE: WON CA erred in reversing the RTC decision which dismissed the amended complaint
HELD: No. New Vistas threshold contention that De Guzmans SPA to sell should not be
considered for not having been incorporated as part of its amended complaint is incorrect since
Vitangcol duly submitted that piece of document in court in the course of the June 7, 2004
hearing on the motion to dismiss. Thus, the trial court acted within its discretion in
considering said SPA relative to the motion to dismiss the amended complaint.
In a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the material
allegations of the ultimate facts contained in the plaintiffs complaint. When a motion to
dismiss is grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, a ruling thereon should, as
rule, be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint. However, this principle of

hypothetical admission admits of exceptions. Among others, there is no hypothetical admission

of conclusions or interpretations of law which are false; legally impossible facts; facts
inadmissible in evidence; facts which appear by record or document included in the pleadings to
be unfounded; allegations which the court will take judicial notice are not true; and where the
motion to dismiss was heard with submission of evidence which discloses facts sufficient to
defeat the claim.
In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the focus is on the sufficiency,
not the veracity, of the material allegations. The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the
complaint constituting a cause of action lies on whether or not the court, admitting the facts
alleged, could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. And to
sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, it must be shown that the claim for relief
in the complaint does not exist, rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, or is
ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain.
WON THE AMENDED COMPLAINT SUFFICIENTLY STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION
The Rules of Court defines cause of action as the act or omission by which a party violates a
right of another. It contains three elements:
(1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff;
(2) a correlative duty on the part of the defendant to respect that right; and
(3) a breach of the defendants duty
It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises, giving the
plaintiff a right to file an action in court for recovery of damages or other relief.
Lack of cause of action is, however, not a ground for a dismissal of the complaint through a
motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, for the determination of a lack of
cause of action can only be made during and/or after trial. What is dismissible via that
mode is failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court provides that a motion may be made on the ground that the pleading asserting the claim
states no cause of action. Indeed, upon a consideration of the amended complaint, its annexes,
with the June 18, 1989 SPA thus submitted, CA was correct in ruling that the amended complaint
sufficiently states a cause of action.
DISPOSITIVE: Denied for lack of merit.

BANCO DE ORO-EPCI INC V. JOHN TANSIPEK G.R. NO 181235 (2009)

NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA decision dated August 18, 2006
FACTS: J.O. Construction Inc (JOCI), domestic corporation engaged in construction business,
entered into contract with Duty Free Phils for the construction of a Duty Free Shop in Mandaue
city. Payments were received by JOCI through its authorized collector, respondent John
Tansipek. Said payment were initially remitted to JOCI but a check payment in the amount of
P4.05 million was not turned over to JOCI. Instead, Tansipek deposited the same to his PCIB
account
1. JOCI filed a complaint with RTC Makati against PCIB, alleging that the bank allowed the
deposit despite the fact that the check was crossed for deposit to JOCI only and despite
the alleged lack of authority of Tansipek to endorse said check.
2. PCIB filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that: an indispensable party
was not impleaded and, JOCI has no cause of action against PCIB. RTC denied the
motion to dismiss
3. Thereafter PCIB filed its answer claiming that:
a. JOCI had authorized Tansipek as its agent and as such, it is stopped from denying the
same
b. JOCI had no cause of action against PCIB
c. Failure to implead Tansipek rendered the proceedings taken after the filing of the
complaint void
d. PCIBs act of accepting the deposit was fully justified by established bank practices
4. PCIB likewise moved for leave for the court to admit its third-party complaint against
respondent Tansipek. Upon motion, Tansipek was granted time to file his answer. He was,
however, declared in default for failure to do so. MR filed by Tansipek (denied)
5. Tansipek, then, filed a petition for certiorari with CA. CA dismissed the petition for
failure to attach the assailed orders. MR (denied)
6. Subsequently, RTC held in favor of JOCI and ordered PCIB to pay. On the third-party
complaint, Tansipek was ordered to pay PCIB the amount PCIB was required to pay
JOCI
7. Upon appeal, CA held that the RTC erred in declaring Tansipek to be in default. MR
(denied)
8. Petitioner Banco de Oro-EPCI, as successor in interest to PCIB, filed the instant petition
for certiorari
ISSUE: WON CA can reverse its decision handed down 8 years before
HELD: No, A decision that has attained finality becomes the law of the case regardless of
any claim that it is erroneous.
Respondent Tansipeks remedy against the Order of Default was erroneous from the very
beginning. Respondent Tansipek should have filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default, and not a
Motion for Reconsideration, pursuant to Section 3(b), Rule 9 ROC. Motion to Lift Order of
Default is different from an ordinary motion in that the Motion should be verified; and must
show fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and meritorious defenses. The allegations of
(1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and (2) of meritorious defenses must concur.

Assuming that respondent Tansipeks Motion for Reconsideration may be treated as a

Motion to Lift Order of Default, his Petition for Certiorari on the denial thereof has already
been dismissed with finality by CA. Respondent Tansipek did not appeal said ruling of the
CA to SC. The dismissal of the Petition for Certiorari assailing the denial of respondent
Tansipeks Motion constitutes a bar to the retrial of the same issue of default under the
doctrine of the law of the case.
The issue of the propriety of the Order of Default had already been adjudicated in Tansipeks
Petition for Certiorari with CA. As such, this issue cannot be re-adjudicated in Tansipeks
appeal of the decision of the RTC on the main case. Once a decision attains finality, it
becomes the law of the case, whether or not said decision is erroneous. Having been
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction acting within its authority, the judgment may
no longer be altered even at the risk of legal infirmities and errors it may contain.
DISPOSITIVE: CA decision is reversed and set aside. RTC decision is hereby reinstated.