Entry game under opportunistic access in cognitive radio networks: a priority queue model

Entry game under opportunistic access in

cognitive radio networks: a priority queue
model
Luis Guijarro1
1 Universitat

Vicent Pla1

Bruno Tuffin2

`
`
Politecnica
de Valencia,
Spain
2 INRIA,

France

Wireless Days, Valencia, November 2013

TELPOL92

Entry game under opportunistic access in cognitive radio networks: a priority queue model

Contents

Model
Analysis
Results and discussion
Conclusions

Guijarro et al.

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Entry game under opportunistic access in cognitive radio networks: a priority queue model
Model

Contents

Model
Analysis
Results and discussion
Conclusions

Guijarro et al.

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Entry game under opportunistic access in cognitive radio networks: a priority queue model
Model

Scenario
Cognitive radio networks
Primary operator is the incumbent and holds a spectrum
license
Secondary operator is the entrant and does not hold a license
Opportunistic access
I

it is granted by the primary operator to the secondary

operator

Secondary operator coordinates access from its

subscribers. They do not cause a significant impact in the
QoS received by primary, apart from failures due to
sensing limitations and delays

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Entry game under opportunistic access in cognitive radio networks: a priority queue model
Model

Service model
M/M/1 Priority Queue
I

Primary (resp. secondary)

packets arrive according to
a Poisson process at rate
1 (resp. 2 ) and are
queued in the priority
(resp. ordinary) queue

Failures in the
opportunistic access
modeled as
non-preemptive variation

The transmission time of all packets is exponentially distributed

with mean x = 1/
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Entry game under opportunistic access in cognitive radio networks: a priority queue model
Model

Economic model
Per-packet utility
Operator i charges a
per-packet price pi
I

Primary packets pay p1

Secondary packets pay p2

Operator is profits
i = i pi =

Guijarro et al.

i
pi .
x

ui , Qi pi
Qi = c Ti
I

Ti is the mean service time

0<<1

Packet flows will adjust to a

utility maximizing rate i or
traffic i .

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Entry game under opportunistic access in cognitive radio networks: a priority queue model
Model

Game model
Two-stage sequential game. Multi-leader-follower

Second stage: subscription

Given that

< 0 and that packets get

zero utility from not being transmitted

First stage: pricing

Subgame Perfect Nash
equilibrium

Wardrop equilibrium
u1 = 0 and u2 = 0

p1 = arg max 1 (p1 , p2 )

Under the assumption that

1 (p2 ) and p2 < p
2 (p1 )
p1 < p

p2

Guijarro et al.

p1

= arg max 2 (p1 , p2 ).

p2

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Entry game under opportunistic access in cognitive radio networks: a priority queue model
Analysis

Contents

Model
Analysis
Results and discussion
Conclusions

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Entry game under opportunistic access in cognitive radio networks: a priority queue model
Analysis

Monopoly
Equilibrium equations
An M/M/1 queue

Q() = c

x
1

Q() p = 0.

 
=
p = 0.
p
p x

Equilibrium solution
1
1+



.
pm = cx
1+
m =

m = cx (1+)

Guijarro et al.

.
(1 + )1+
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Entry game under opportunistic access in cognitive radio networks: a priority queue model
Analysis

Duopoly
A non-preemptive priority
M/M/1 queue
1 + 2
x
1 1

1 1 (1 (1 + 2 ))
x
(1 1 )(1 (1 + 2 ))

Q1 (1 , 2 ) = c
Q2 (1 , 2 ) = c

Equilibrium equations

Qi (1 , 2 ) pi = 0


i = 1, 2

i
 i 
=
pi = 0 i = 1, 2
pi
pi x

Equilibrium solution
1 =

2 =

1
1+
1 + 21 + 221

1 + 2 41 + 421 + 2

21

Also p1 , p2 , 1 , 2
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Entry game under opportunistic access in cognitive radio networks: a priority queue model
Results and discussion

Contents

Model
Analysis
Results and discussion
Conclusions

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Entry game under opportunistic access in cognitive radio networks: a priority queue model
Results and discussion

Equilibrium traffic
Facts
1

I
I

1 = m
As increases, the
monopolist, and the primary
operator, is able to carry less
traffic. The secondary
operator carries more traffic.
The total traffic decreases

Analysis
I

The entry of the secondary

operator is desirable from an
efficiency perspective

Guijarro et al.

m
1

0.9

+ 2

0.8

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0
0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

x = 1 and c = 1

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Entry game under opportunistic access in cognitive radio networks: a priority queue model
Results and discussion

Equilibrium profits
Facts
1
m

1 m

As increases, the
monopolist, and the primary
operator, obtains less profits.
The secondary operators
profit increases only up to
0.25

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

Analysis

0.1

0
0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

x = 1 and c = 1

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0.7

0.8

0.9

The primary operator suffers

a decrease in profits when a
secondary operator enters
the market
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Entry game under opportunistic access in cognitive radio networks: a priority queue model
Results and discussion

Entry analysis
Lump sum payment m

1
m
1

0.9

0.8

Incentives for primary

operator 1 + m m

Incentives for secondary

operator 2 m 0

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

Or, equivalently, 1 + 2 m
Facts

0.2

0.1

0
0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

x = 1 and c = 1

Guijarro et al.

0.7

0.8

0.9

This condition is fulfilled for a

range of values of up to
0.65.

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Entry game under opportunistic access in cognitive radio networks: a priority queue model
Results and discussion

Capacity leasing
The incumbent leases capacity
2 to the entrant operator, and
keeps 1 = 2
Modelled as two independent
M/M/1 queues
Equilibrium traffic and profits
result in
I

(1 + 2 )x = m

1 + 2 m

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Entry game under opportunistic access in cognitive radio networks: a priority queue model
Conclusions

Contents

Model
Analysis
Results and discussion
Conclusions

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Entry game under opportunistic access in cognitive radio networks: a priority queue model
Conclusions

1. The economic viability of supporting the secondary

operator service using an opportunistic access to the
spectrum owned by the primary operator has been
assessed.
2. Against the benchmark of the primary operator operating
as a monopolist, we conclude that the entry of the
secondary operator is desirable from an efficiency
perspective, since the carried traffic increases.
3. Additionally, for a range of parameter values, a lump sum
payment can be designed so that the incumbent operator
has an incentive to let the secondary operator enter.
4. The opportunistic access setting has been compared
against a leasing-based alternative, and we have
concluded that the former outperforms the latter.
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