Royal Institute of Philosophy

'A Brute to the Brutes?': Descartes' Treatment of Animals

Author(s): John Cottingham
Source: Philosophy, Vol. 53, No. 206 (Oct., 1978), pp. 551-559
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of Philosophy
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'A Bruteto the Brutes?':

Descartes' Treatmentof Animals
JOHN

COTTINGHAM

I
To be able to believe that a dog with a brokenpaw is not reallyin pain
when it whimpersis a quite extraordinary
achievementeven fora philosopher. Yet according to the standard interpretation,
this is just what
Descartes did believe. He held, we are informed,the 'monstrous'thesis
that'animalsare withoutfeelingor awarenessof any kind'.1The standard
view has been reiteratedin a recentcollectionon animal rights,which
casts Descartes as the villainof the piece forhis alleged view thatanimals
merelybehave 'as iftheyfeelpain whentheyare, say,kickedor stabbed'.2
The basis for this widely accepted interpretation
is Descartes' famous
doctrineof the 'animal machine' ('bete-machine');a doctrinethat one
criticcondemnsas 'a grimforetasteof a mechanicallyminded age' which
'brutallyviolatesthe old kindlyfellowshipof livingthings'.3
But if we look at what Descartes actuallysays about animals it is by
no means clear that he holds the monstrousview which all the commentatorsattributeto him. In fact the traditionalrubric 'Descartes'
is vague and ambiguous;it needs to be broken
doctrineofthebete-machine'
down into a number of distinctpropositionsif we are to sort out what
Descartes said, and what he is implicitlycommittedto, fromwhat he
neithersaid nor implied.
Consider,then,the followingassertions:

Animalsaremachines
Animalsareautomata
(3) Animalsdo notthink
(i)

(2)

(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

Animalshave no language
Animalshave no self-consciousness
Animalshave no consciousness
Animalsare totallywithoutfeeling

1 N. Kemp Smith,New Studiesin the Philosophy

of Descartes(London:
Macmillan,I952), I36 and I40.
2 T. ReganandP. Singer(eds),AnimalRights
and HumanObligations
(Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: PrenticeHall, I976), 4.
of Descartes(London: Methuen,I932),
3A. Boyce Gibson,The Philosophy
2I4.

Philosophy
53 I978

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55I

Discussion

Proposition(7) is the 'monstrousthesis' withwhich Descartes is so often

credited.I shall arguethatDescartesheld theses(i) to (5), but thatthereis
no evidence that he held (7), and even some positive evidence that he
regarded(7) as false; however,fuzzinessabout (6) and its distinctionfrom
(5) (togetherwith certaingeneral featuresof his metaphysics)laid him
as committedto (7).
open to be interpreted
II
Thesis (i) is not explicitlyasserted by Descartes in this form,but he
commitshimselfto it in so manywordsin the famouspassage on animals
in Part V of the Discourse, where he says the body may be regarded
'commeune machinequi, ayantetefaitedes mainsde Dieu, estincomparablementmieuxordonnee... qu'aucunede celles. . . inventees
par les hommes'.4
Thesis (i) in factformspart of Descartes' generalscientific'mechanism',
and, roughlytranslated,means that all animal behaviouris subsumable
under physiologicallaws, which, for Descartes, are ultimatelyderivable
frommathematicalprinciples.Essentially,when Descartes says that 'all
the motions of animals originatefrom the corporeal and mechanical
principle',5he is concernedto promulgatea scientificanimal physiology
which seeks explanationsin termsof efficient
ratherthan final causes.6
Now fromnone of all this does it followthatwhen Descartes calls somethinga 'mechanism'or 'machine' he is automaticallyrulingout the presence of sensations or feelings; Boyce Gibson's claim that Descartes
'uses the term [mechanism]explicitlyto exclude . . . feeling'is not supportedby any evidence.7In factit is importantto noticethatthe human
body is, forDescartes,a machinein exactlythe same sense as the animal
body: 'God made our body like a machine,and he wantedit to function
like a universalinstrument,
whichwould alwaysoperatein the same way
in accordance with its own laws'.8 The phrase 'bete-machine'
can thus
be rathermisleading,since the mechanicalphysiologyDescartes has in
mind operatesequally in the case of homosapiens.Of courseit is truethat
in the human,but not the animal,case thereis the extradimensionof a
4AT VI 56; HR I i i6 (references
to 'AT' areto volumeand pagenumberof
Ch. AdamandP. Tannery(eds),Oeuvresde Descartes(Paris: Cerf,i897-19I3);
HR standsforE. S. Haldane and G. T. R. Ross, The Philosophical
Worksof
Descartes
(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
Press,repr.i969)).
5 Letterto More of 5 Februaryi649: AT V 276; K 243 ('K' standsforA.
Kenny,Descartes'
Philosophical
Letters(Oxford:Clarendon,
1970)).
6 Principles,
I, 28 (AT VIII I5; HR I 230). See further
AT V I58 and J. G.
Descartes'Conversation
Cottingham,
withBurman(Oxford:Clarendon,1976),
85f.
7 NordoesGibsonciteany;op. Cit.,
8 AT

I63/4;

2II.

cf.Cottingham,
op. cit.,29.

552

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Discussion

'soul' (I shall come back to this); but this is a separate point. To deny
thatX has a soul is a separateclaim fromthe claim thatX's movements
can be explainedbymechanicalprinciples,and is notstrictly
entailedby it.
Proposition(2) is impliedfrequently
by Descartes,and is statedexplicitly
in a letterto More of 5 Februaryi649:
it seems reasonablesince art copies nature,and men can make various
automatawhich move withoutthought,that natureshould produce its
own automata much more splendid than the artificialones. These
naturalautomataare the animals.9
It is Descartes' use of the term'automaton'more than any otherthat
has led critics to convict him of holding the monstrousthesis (thus,
Kemp Smith speaks of the Cartesianview that animals are 'mere automata ... incapable of experiencingthe feelingsof well-being or the
reverse,hungeror thirst. .. ').10 But the inferencefrom'x is an automaton'to 'X is incapableoffeeling'is a mistakenone. Webster'sdictionary
gives the primarymeaning of 'automaton' as simply 'a machine that is
relativelyself-operating';and neitherthis nor the subsidiarymeaning
('creature who acts in a mechanical fashion') automaticallyimplies the
absence of feeling.11Even today,then,to regardtotalinsensibility
as part
of the meaningof 'automaton'would seem to be an error; and this seems
to have been even more true in the seventeenthcentury,where 'automaton' probablycarriedno more than its strictGreek meaning of 'selfmovingthing'.Thus Leibniz, defendinghis claimthatwe possess 'freedom
of spontaneity'speaksofthe humansoul as 'a kindof spiritualautomaton',
meaning no more than that its action-generating
impulses arise solely
ab interno,and produce their effectswithout the interventionof any
externalcause.12 What fascinatedDescartes' generationabout machines
rangingfromclocksto theelaboratelycontrivedmovingstatuesto be found
in some of the royal fountainswas simplythis: the complex sequences
of movementswhichto primitive(or medieval)man mighthave appeared
as certainproofof some kind of innermotive'force' or 'spirit',could all
be explained quite simplyby referenceto internalmechanicalstructurecogs, levers and the like (Descartes mentionsas an example a statue of
9 'deinde quia rationi consentaneumvidetur, cum ars sit naturae imitatrix,
possintque homines varia fabricareautomata, in quibus sine ulla cogitatione
est motus, ut natura etiam sua automata, sed artefactislonge praestantiora,
nempe bruta omnia, producat' (AT V 277; K 244.) This is a developmentof
materialfoundin Discourse,part V (loc. cit.).
10 Op. Cit-, I35-

11 Webster'sSeventhNew CollegiateDictionary(Springfield,Mass: Merriam,

I963).
12

Theodicy,1, 52.

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Discussion

Neptune whichwould threatenwithhis tridentthe approachingonlooker

who had unwittinglystepped on a button).13The point Descartes is
concernedto makeoverand overagainaboutthebehaviourof'naturalautomata' like dogs and monkeysis that the mere complexityof theirmovementsis no more a bar to explanationin termsof innermechanicalstructure than is the case with the responses of the trident-brandishing
'Neptune'.14

III
So far then, I maintainthat Descartes' characterizationof animals as
to allow us to
'machines' and 'automata' is of itselfquite insufficient
concludethathe thinksthatanimalslack feelings.When we get on to the
remainingpropositionsin our list,thingsare not so simple.
It is, Descartes asserts, in principle possible to mistake a cleverly
contrivedartificialautomatonforan animal. But we could nevermistake
an automaton,howeveringenious,for a man. Why not? Because, says
Descartes, an automatoncould never talk: it could 'never arrange its
speech in various ways in order to reply appropriatelyto everything
that could be said in its presence'.15This for Descartes indicates the
betweenanimals and man-they do not think.Animals
crucial difference
do notpenseror cogitare;theyare not endowedwitha mind(mens,esprit);
they lack reason (raison); they do not have a rationalsoul (adie raisonnable).16
Descartesis thusexplicitlycommittedto thesis(3), and holds,moreover,
that it is entailed by (or at least stronglyevidenced by17) thesis (W).
Descartes was of course aware thatparrotscan be made to 'talk' and that
dogs make noises whichmightbe analogousto speech; but he has strong
and, since Chomsky's updating of them, widely admired arguments
against construingsuch utterancesas genuine speech. The talking of
13

Traite de L'Homme, AT XI

de la Methode(Paris:Vrin,I925),

130-I32.

Cf. E. Gilson,ReneiDescartes
Discours

420ff.

14 Descartes compares the plants in this connection,'que [la nature] remplit

d'une infinitede petits conduits imperceptibles'a la vue': letter to Reneri of
April I638 (AT II 40; K 54).
15

Discourse,
loc. cit.

Ibid. Cf. letterto More of 5 February I649: 'loquela unicum est cogitationisin corporelatentissignum certum'(AT V 278; K 245).
17 Descartes at one point observesthat'quamvis ... pro demonstrato
habeam,
probari non posse aliquam esse in brutis cogitationem,non ideo puto posse
demonstrarinullam esse, quia mens humana illorum corda non pervadit' (AT
V 276-277; K 244).
16

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Discussion

parrotsis dismissed because it is not 'relevantto the topic';18 but the

mostimportantpointDescarteshas to make is thatthe utterancesof dogs,
cats, etc., are never,to use the Chomskianphrase, 'stimulus-free';they
are always,says Descartes,geared to and elicitedby a particular'natural
impulse'.'9
I shall come back to these arguments,but firstan obvious objection
mustbe faced. In admittingthatDescartes held thesis(3) (thatanimalsdo
not think),have I not therebyconceded that he must have held the
'monstrousthesis' (7) (that animalsdo not feel)? For does not Descartes'
special sense of 'think' (cogitare,penser)includefeelingsand sensations?
Well, it is certainlytrue that Descartes deliberatelyextendedthe normal
of Mersenne
use of 'cogitatio'or 'pense'e'.In answerto a misunderstanding
(that if man was purely'res cogitans'he must lack will), Descartes stated
that willing was a fafon de penser; he furtherexplains that la pensee
includes 'non seulementles meditationset les volontes' but 'toutes les
operationsde l'dme'.20This is generallytakento include sensationsand
feelings-indeed, seeing and hearingare explicitlyincluded by Descartes
in the list of 'operationsde l'dme'just mentioned.
Furtheranalysishowevermakesit clearthatthematteris notas straightforwardas this, and that translatorswho render'cogitatio'or 'pensee'as
simply 'experience' are moving much too swiftly.21When discussing
whether'video ergosum' mightnot do as well as 'cogitoergosum', Descartessays that 'I see' is ambiguous.If understood'de visione'it is not a
one's existencebut ifunderstood'concerningthe
good premiseforinferring
videndi)it is
actualsenseor awarenessofseeing'(de ipsosensesiveconscientia
quite certain,since it is in thiscase referredto the mindwhichalone feels
or thinksit sees (quae sola sentitsive cogitatse videre).22From thiswe can
see that it is misleadingto say, toutcourt,that cogitatio'includes' sensations and feelings.The only sense in which a sensationlike seeing is a
true cogitatiois the sense in which it may involvethe reflectivemental
self-conscious
apprehension
awarenesswhichDescartescallsconscientia-the
of the mindthatit is aware of seeing.23
The upshot is that Descartes' assertionof proposition(3) (that animals
To Newcastle,23 Novemberi646 (AT IV 574; K zo6).
19To More,loc. cit.; to Newcastle,loc. cit.; and N. Chomsky:Languageand
Mind(New York:HarcourtBrace& World,i968), Ch. I.
20 To Mersenne,
May i637 (AT I 366; K 32); and to Renari,Aprili638 (AT
II 36; K 51). Cf.A. Kenny,Descartes
(New York:RandomHouse, i968), 68ff.
21 Cf. E. Anscombe
(London:
Writings
Philosophical
and P. Geach,Descartes'
July1978.
andmy'Descarteson Thought',Phil.Quarterly,
Nelson,i969), xlviif.,
22 Principles,
I, 9 (AT VIII 7/8;HR I z22).
23 Conscientia
withBurman:'consciumesse
is definedin the Conversation
(AT V I49; Cottingham,
suprasuamcogitationem'
est ... cogitareet reflectere
op. cit.,7 and 6i).
18

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Discussion

do not think)need not commithim to denyingany feelingor sensation

to animals-for example a level of feelingor sensationthat falls short
of reflective
mentalawareness.
Notice, moreover,how the language argumentfits into all this. In
pointingout that animals have no genuine language, Descartes clearly
thinksthathe has a powerfulcase forconcludingthattheydo not think.
Yet forDescartesto regardthisargument('non loquiturergononcogitat')24
as havingsuch evidentforce,'think'(cogitat)here mustevidentlybe used
in the fairlyrestrictivesense described above. If Descartes were using
us an argu'cogitat' in the alleged verywide sense, he would be offering
mentof the form'nonloquiturergononsentit'(he does not speak therefore
does not feel). It is inconceivablethat Descartes could have proudly
as self-evidently
clinching.
produced thisargumentto his correspondents

IV
Our conclusion so far is that neitherin calling animals machines or
automata,nor in denyingtheyhave thoughtor language,does Descartes
commithimselfto the monstrousthesis that they have no feelingsor
sensations.It is now timeto lookat some positiveevidencethathe actually
regardedthe monstrousthesisas false.
The strongestevidence, which those who credit Descartes with the
monstrousthesis seem strangelyblind to, comes fromthe famousletters
already cited where Descartes denies speech to the animals. Writingto
More, Descartes says thatthe sounds made by horses,dogs, etc., are not
genuinelanguage,but are ways of 'communicatingto us . . . theirnatural
impulses of anger,fear,hungerand so on'.25 Similarly,Descartes wrote
to Newcastlethat:
If you teach a magpie to say good-dayto its mistresswhen it sees her
coming,all you can possiblyhave done is to make the emittingof this
word the expressionof one of its feelings.For instanceit will be an
expressionof the hope of eating,if you have habituallygiven it a titbit when it says the word. Similarly,all the thingswhich dogs, horses,
and monkeysare made to do are merely expressionsof their fear,
24 'He doesnotspeaktherefore
must
theargument
he doesnotthink.'Strictly,
for languageacquisition,
be oftheform'he does not speakand has no capacity
think(AT VII 246;
he doesnotthink';forDescartessaysthatinfants
therefore
(AT V 149/50; Cottingham,
a fashion
8).
HR II II 5)-though onlyafter
25 'impetussuos naturales
ut iras metusfamemet similia... significant'
(AT V 278; K 244).

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Discussion

their hope, or theirjoy; and consequently,they can do these things

withoutany thought... 26
'Impulses of anger, fear, hunger'; 'expression of one of its feelings';
phrases
'expressionsof fear,hope and joy'. These are quite extraordinary
to use fora man who is supposed to believe animals are 'withoutfeeling
or awarenessof any kind'. Is it possible that Descartes is here speaking
This seemsstrangein letterswhichare explicitly
looselyor metaphorically?
the Cartesianpositionon animals.
devotedto clarifying
and painstakingly
If this were not enough, in the letterto More, Descartes specifically
separates cogitatio(thought)fromsensus(sensation), and states that he
denies the former,but not the latter,to animals: 'I should like to stress
thatI am talkingof thought,not of . .. sensation;for. . . I denysensation
to no animal,in so faras it depends on a bodilyorgan'.27
V
The last quotationmightmake a pleasing and neat vindicationof Descartes' kindlyfellowshipwith the beasts: he denied that animals think,
but not that theyfeel. But philosophyis seldom as tidy as this, and we
which has been put off
must conclude by discussinga major difficulty
in a nutshell,is that the monstrousthesis fits
until now. The difficulty,
in with,and the pleasingvindicationclasheswith,Descartes' dualism.
If substance is divided exclusivelyand exhaustivelyinto res cogitans
and resextensa,what room is thereforanimalsensations?Since an animal
is not a res cogitans,has no mind or soul, it followsthat it must belong
whollyin the extendeddivisibleworld of jostling Cartesianshapes. And
Descartes himselfcalled)
this means thatwhat we call (and, evidemment,
'animal hunger' cannot be anythingmore than a set of internalmuscle
contractions
leadingto thejerkingof certainlimbs,or whatever.This then
the
authenticCartesianposition-a position summed up when
must be
Descartes quotes with approval the passage in Deuteronomywhich says
lorsqu'ellela voit
on apprend'a une pie a direbonjour'a sa maitresse,
arriver,
ce ne peutetrequ'en faisantque la prolationde cetteparoledevienne
de quelqu'unede se passions;'a savoir,ce sera un mouvement
le mouvement
qu'ellea de manger,si l'on a toujoursaccoutumede lui donner
de 1'esperance
lorsqu'ellel'a dit; ainsitoutesles chosesqu'on faitfaireaux
quelque friandise
de leurcrainte,
chiens,aux chevauxet aux singesne sontque des mouvements
de leur esperanceou de leurjoie, en sortequ'ils les peuventfairesans aucune
pensee'(AT IV 574; K 207).
27 'velimnotarime loqui de cogitatione,
non de vitavel sensu; vitamenim
statuo;nec
nullianimalidenego,utpotequam in solo cordiscaloreconsistere
denego etiam sensumquatenusab organocorporeodependet'(AT V 278;
K 245).
26 'Si

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Discussion

that the soul of animals is simply their blood; or when he says that
animallifeis no morethan 'the heat of the heart'.28
No doubt thisis wherea pure Cartesian,a consistentCartesian,would
stop. But we have seen that Descartes, dualist or no, undoubtedlyand
explicitlyattributessuch feelingsas anger, hope and joy to animals. I
thinkthe only explanationof this is that Descartes, eitherinadvertently
or wilfully,failedto eradicatea certainfuzzinessfromhis thinkingabout
consciousnessand self-consciousness.To say that X is in pain (angry,
joyful) is certainlyto attributea conscious state to X; but this need not
amount to the full-bloodedreflectiveawarenessof pain that is involved
in the termcogitatio.To be dogmaticfora moment,I should certainlysay
thatcats feelpain, but not thattheyhave thekindoffullmentalawareness
of pain thatis needed forit to count as a cogitatio(i.e. the sortneeded to
supportthe premiseof a cogito-type
argument'patior ergosum'-'I am
in pain thereforeI am'). Descartes is certainlycommittedto thesis(5)
thatanimalsdo not have self-consciousness;but when as a resulthe consignsanimalsto the realmofresextensa,he simplydoes notseem to bother
that termslike pain, anger,etc., which he uses of animals,clearlyimply
some degreeof conscious(thoughperhapsnot 'self-conscious')awareness.
VI
It is importantto notice,in conclusion,thatthis strangefuzzinessis not
simplythe resultof a blind spot which Descartes had when dealingwith
animals, but connects with a fundamentaland unresolveddifficulty
in
Cartesianmetaphysics.There is a fascinatingchapterin Book IV of the
Principlesdealing with human sensations(sensus)and feelings(affectus).
When we hear a piece of good news, says Descartes, we feel 'spiritual
joy' (thisis the sortofpura cogitatiothat,presumably,God and the angels
experience).But whenthe news is graspedby the imagination,the 'animal
spirits'flowfromthe brain to the heartmuscles,which in turntransmit
more (movements'to the brain, with the result that we experience a
feelingof 'laetitiaanimalis'.29It is evidentthat Descartes is in a philosophical mess here. One mightexpect thatjoy would be regardedas a
purelymentalstate and thus confinedfirmlyto the realm of res cogitans.
But here is Descartes distinguishing
betweenthe pure intellectualapprehension of joyful news, on the one hand, and, on the other,a feelingof
joy. This latteris the bizarreentitycalled 'animaljoy', whichis somehow
bound up withheartmuscles and brain commotions.The choice of the
phrase 'laetitia animalis'here is no accident. Descartes clearlywants to
28
29

To Plempius, 3 October i637 (AT I 4I5; K 37); and to More (see note 5).
Principles,IV, i90 (AT VIII 3I7; HR 1 290-291).

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Discussion

say thatthejoy of dogs and cats is analysableintojust such physiological

events.But whathe seems to forgetis thatas a strictdualisthe should not
be usingtheword'laetitia'at all in thiscase. For a truedualist,ifsomething
is 'laetitia' (an inescapably'mental' predicate)it cannot be animalis(part
of res extensa);and conversely,if it is animalisit cannotbe laetitia.
The truth,perhaps,is thatDescartes was nevercompletelycomfortable
it. As the contorwith strictdualism,howeveremphaticallyhe affirmed
tions in the Sixth Meditation show,feelingsor sensations(like those of
hungeror thirst)are an insolubleworryforhim. We do not merely'notice'
thatwe are in pain, as a pilotobservesthathis ship is damaged,we actually
etquasipermixtio'30
between
feelit; and thisshowsthatthereis a 'conjunctio
what
of
are,
remember,
mind and body-a mysterious'intermingling'
logically distinctand incompatiblesubstances. This 'substantialunion'
is the uncuttableknot in the centreof Cartesianmetaphysics.Descartes
once wroteto a correspondentthat if an angel (a pure res cogitans)were
in a human body, he would notfeel like us; he would merelyobservethe
changes in his nervous system. This shows, Descartes observed,that
of a mind distinct
feelingslike that of pain are not the purae cogitationes
frombody, but ratherare the 'confusedperceptionswhich resultfroma
real union withthe body'.31Feelings,in otherwords,are an inexplicable
with
resultof the animal side of our nature,our mysteriousintermingling
res extensa.If this is what Descartes says about human feelings,it is not
surprisingthat he never got animal feelingsproperlysorted out. Strict
dualism makes nonsense of Descartes' common-sense attributionof
feelingslike hungerto the animals; but thenDescartesis unable to extract
fromdualism any clear account of the awkwardlyundeniableexperience
of humanhunger.At the end of the day, Descartes may not have been
completelyconsistent,but at least he was not altogetherbeastlyto the
beasts.32

University
ofReading

30AT VII 8i; HRI I92.

31 'sensusdoloris,
mentisa corpore
aliosqueomnes,nonessepurascogitationes

(to Regius,January
sed confusasilliusrealiterunitaeperceptiones'
distinctas,
i642: AT III 493; K I27-I28).
32 I am indebted
to Prof.A. G. N. Flew, whosequestionsabout Descartes'
me to pursuethislineof enquiry.
positionstimulated
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