G.R. No.

120270 June 16, 1999

MANOLITO BARLES, PATRICIO ELOMINA, and JUAN SAYO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BENEDICTO ERNESTO BITONIO Director, Bureau of Labor Relations, JORESTY OQUENDO, LUIS BERNALES, J. OCENA and
JUANITO RAGASA, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

This special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court originated from a petition for audit of
union funds filed by petitioners with the Bureau of Labor and Relations (BLR) and appealed to the Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment (hereafter the Secretary of Labor) who subsequently endorsed the appeal to
the BLR. Petitioners now assail BLR Resolutions 1 of 25 April 1995 and 14 March 1995 of the BLR upholding
the Bureau's jurisdiction over appeals on decisions involving the examination of union accounts endorsed
to it by the Secretary of Labor.1wphi1.nt
In February 1991, petitioners Manolito Barles, Patricio Elomina and Juan Sayo were elected president,
treasurer and auditor, respectively, of Ilaw buklod ng Manggagawa's IBM Local Chapter No. 15 Private
respondents Joresty Oquendo and Juanito Ragasa also ran for the positions of president and secretary in
the same election but they lost to petitioners.
On 24 June 1992, the new Executive Board passed a Resolution increasing union dues from P16.00 to
P40.00 a month. This was ratified by the members. On 3 August 1992, private respondents filed with the
BLR a petition for the immediate audit and examination of union funds.
Subsequent events were summarized by the BLR as follows:
On 10 November 1992, this Office issued an order directing one of its staff, Ms. Dorisa
Geluz, to "proceed with the conduct of audit."
The order was appealed to the Office of the Secretary, with the appeal being docketed as
OS-MA-A-1-11-93 (BLR-AE No. 8-11-92). On 8 February 1993, through Undersecretary
Laguesma, the Office of the Secretary set aside the order and dismissed the petition on
the ground that it " . . . is a duplication of the complaint earlier filed by the [private
respondents] with the Office of the Regional Director."
On 05 April 1993, upon motion for reconsideration of the [private respondents], the Office
of the Secretary reconsidered its 08 February 1993 order. It thus reinstated the earlier
order issued by this Office on 10 November 1992.
On 13 August 1993, upon motion of [petitioner], the Office of the Secretary modified its 08
February 1993 order and ruled that:
While we sustain the Order for the holding of an account examination of
the union, we have deemed it proper to take valid cognizance of the
argument that the Bureau of Labor and Relations is an improper venue
for the same. To give substance to Administrative Order 186
decentralizing line functions, the matter of the conduct for the union
account examination is hereby endorsed to the Regional Office. Let the
account examiner of DOLE Regional Office No. IV, perform his task.
Wherefore, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is
hereby denie. The Order for the conduct of union account examination is

affirmed, but modified to the extent that the same shall be conducted by
DOLE Regional Office No. IV through its competent personnel.
Let the records of the case be forwarded to the Regional Office for the
appropriate proceedings therein.
Pursuant to this order, the account examiner, Regional Office No. IV initiated the conduct
of audit by calling for a pre-audit conference. [Petitioners], however, filed a petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 111671, seeking to annul and set
aside the order of the Office of the Secretary. In the conference of 30 September 1993,
the audit was supposed to have been held in abeyance "until the petition for certiorari
filed by the [petitioners] is resolved."
Subsequently, the Regional Office sent notices to both parties setting pre-audit
conferences on 26 November 1993, 10 December 1993, and 23 December 1993.
[Petitioners] did not appear in any of conferences. On record, the formally filed a request
dated 03 December 1993 to hold in abeyance the pre-audit conference because of the
pendency of their petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Parenthetically, the
Supreme Court had earlier dismissed the petition on 22 November 1993; the Court would
later on dismiss the petition with finality on 24 January 1994.
In the meantime, on 01 December 1993, the Regional Office sent a letter to the employer
of [petitioners] asking for ". . . a certification as to the amount of union dues checked-off
and other deductions made from the salaries of union members" On 28 of December
1993, the Regional Office also sent a subpoena duces tecum to [petitioners], directing
them to bring " . . . all the financial documents of the union for the period from July 1989
to July 1992."
On 05 April 1994, [petitioners'] employer sent the Regional Office a summary of union
collections and remittances from July 1989 to July 1992. On 18 April 1994, the Regional
Office again sent [petitioner's] employer another request, this time asking for ". . . a
certification as to the amount other than union dues deducted from the salaries of union
members and as (well as) non-union members." On 11 May 1994 [petitioners'] employer,
through Mr. Antonio de las Alas, issued a certification complying with his request.
On 02 June 1994, the Regional Director issued an order based on the recommendations
of the account examiner. The pertinent portion of the order states:
Since it is obvious that the incumbent officers do not want this Office to
conduct the examination of the book of account . . ., the undersigned (the
account examiner) shall have the certification furnished to us by Mr.
Antonio De las Alas, Jr., as basis for the audit and no other way except to
resolve this case, once and for all, the undersigned recommends the
following:
1. That the incumbent officers hold a general membership meeting and
likewise explain the amount of P352,496.00 to the general membership
and open the book of accounts to any member as well as the
complainants and furnish this Office the minutes of the particular
meeting.
2. The incumbent officers are given 20 days to submit compliance report
of the said meeting.

xxx xxx xxx

This Office finds the above-findings and recommendations in order,
hence it is hereby adopted.
WHEREFORE, the responsible officers particularly, the union president,
union treasurer the retired former union treasurer, the former union
auditor and the union are ordered to comply with foregoing
recommendations.. . .
Consequently, the responsible officers are given twenty (20) days from
receipt of this ORDER to convene a general meeting for the purpose of
putting into effect the mandate of the ORDER and to make a report of
compliance thereon. 2
In their appeal to the Secretary of Labor, petitioners asserted that the Regional Director denied them due
process, and that the audit was not only barred by prescription but also proscribed by Article 274 of the
Labor Code in that union accounts cannot be examined during the sixty-day freedom period or within
thirty days immediately preceding the date of election of union members.
On 28 October 1994, Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma endorsed the appeal and the entire
records of the case back to the BLR pursuant to Administrative Order No. 186 and the Rules of Procedure
on Mediation-Arbitration, both of which embodied the government's decentralization policy.
In its resolution of 14 March 1995, the BLR found the appeal unmeritorious, as the Secretary of Labor's
Order of 13 August 1993 authorizing the Regional Director to proceed with the audit of union funds and
our Resolution of 24 January 1994 in G.R. No. 111671 establish res judicata. The BLR noted however,
that the "report submitted by the account examiner and adopted by the Regional Director is incomplete,"
and it is "not clear whether the account examiner actually conducted an audit;" thus, the BLR ordered the
Regional Office No. IV to conduct a more exhaustive re-audit. 3
On 3 April 1995, petitioner moved to strike out or reconsider the aforesaid resolution challenging the
jurisdiction of the BLR over appeals from orders, resolutions and decisions of the Regional Director on
petitions for union accounts examination.
Petitioners' arguments were alter condensed by the BLR in its Resolution of 25 April 1995 in this wise:
The instant case allegedly is an internal dispute covered by Article 241 (p) of the Labor
Code. Thus, the appellate procedure establish in Article 259 of the Labor Code and
Section 5, Rule VIII of the implementing rules should apply. Accordingly, the decision of
the Regional Director should have been appealed to the Office of the Secretary, not to
this office. Respondent further argue that Republic Act No. 6715 stripped this office of
adjudicatory powers and transferred the same to the Office of the Secretary.
Consequently, Administrative Order No. 186, which was issued by the Office of the
Secretary itself and which served as basis for it to endorse the case to this Office,
constitutes an unauthorized amendment of the law. 4
The BLR, however, denied the motion explaining that its appellate authority over complaints of union
accounts examinations is explicit under the Rules of Procedure on Med-Arbitration issued on 10 April
1992. In addition, the BLR has the power to examine the financial records of the legitimate labor
organizations. This power is either (1) primary, inherent and expressed under Book IV, Title VII, Chapter
4, Section 16 of the Administrative Code of 1987 or (2) delegated upon the DOLE Secretary under Article
274 of the Labor Code, La Tondea Workers Union v. Secretary of Labor, and Administrative Order No.
189 insofar as it is consistent with the latter case. The BLR also has original and exclusive authority to

hear intra-union disputes (such as petition to examine union accounts) under Articles 226 and 241 of the
Labor Code. The BLR added that R.A. No. 6715 never stripped it of its quasi-adjudicatory powers
particularly over internal union disputes, and Administrative Order No. 186 did not amend but precisely
implemented Article 274 of the Labor Code.
Before the Court, petitioners now assail the aforementioned Resolution and reiterate the arguments
adduced in their motion to strike out or reconsider the 14 March 1995 Resolution of the BLR. They assert
that the BLR Director, in taking cognizance of the appeal from the Order of the Regional Director upon the
Secretary of Labor's endorsement, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
or excess in the exercise thereof because the latter can "neither delegate nor abdicate his appellate
jurisdiction to a subordinate body or entity" like the BLR. Petitioners argue that R.A. No. 6715 removed
the adjudicatory functions of the BLR. Hence, Administrative Order No. 186 and the Rules of Procedure
on Mediation Arbitration which restored said power to the BLR under the "guise of decentralization policy"
consequently amended Articles 259 and 274 of the Labor Code in violation of the principle that
administrative law as enunciated by the Court in the Philippines Apparel Workers Union vs. NLRC.
Petitioners also question the validity and constitutionality of Administrative Order 186 and the Rules of
Procedure on Mediation Arbitration.
Public respondent through the Solicitor General insists on its appellate jurisdiction over revisions, etc.
relative to complaints for union accounts examination. Citing La Tondea v. Secretary of Labor, the
Solicitor General points that by endorsing the case to the BLR, the Secretary of Labor, actually authorized
the BLR to act on his behalf. Apart from any endorsement, the power of the BLR to examine union
accounts is clear under the Administrative Code and Article 226 of the Labor Code. Moreover, public
respondent asserts that petitioners' reliance on Article 259 of the Labor Code is misplaced since this case
involves an internal union dispute while the former is concerned with disputes between unions in a
certification election.
The only issue under consideration is whether the BLR has jurisdiction to review decision of the DOLE
Regional Director endorsed to it (BLR) by the Secretary of Labor. No constitutional issue is involved and
the attempt to introduce the same here is nothing but a ruse to confuse the issues.
We resolve the issue in the affirmative and approve the BLR ruling on the matter.
Appellate authority over decisions of the Regional Directors involving examinations of union accounts is
expressly conferred on the BLR under the Rules of Procedure on Mediation-Arbitration, and we quote:
RULE II
MED-ARBITRATION
Sec. 3. Jurisdiction of the Regional Director. The Regional Director shall exercise
original and exclusive jurisdiction over application for union registration, petitions for
cancellation of union registration and complaints for examination of union's books of
accounts (emphasis supplied).
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction of the Bureau.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The Bureau shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases originating from the
Regional Director involving union registration or cancellation of certificates of union
registration and complaints for examination of union books of accounts (Emphasis
supplied).

The language of the law is categorical. Any additional explanation on the matter is superfluous.
It is clear then that the DOLE Secretary has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions of Regional Directors
involving petitions for examinations of union accounts. Petitioners arguments that the DOLE Secretary
delegated or even abdicated his appellate powers deserves scant consideration. He does not posses
such power hence he cannot delegate, much more, abdicate powers which he does not own. The fallacy
in petitioners' arguments arose from their equally erroneous proposition that since this case stemmed
from a petition to audit union funds/accounts an internal union dispute the procedure for appeals
outlined in Article 259 5 and Section 5 of Rule VIII of the Implementing Rules apply. 6 Under these
provisions, it is the DOLE Secretary who has appellate jurisdiction. Article 259 however governs appeals
on petitions for certification elections. As the Solicitor General correctly assessed, a certification election
is a dispute between unions; it is not an internal union dispute. Article 259 is clearly inapplicable.
Section 5 of Rule VIII of the Implementing Rules on the other hand, admittedly applies to internal union
conflicts, but again it is not apropos to the case at bar as the relief granted under a complaint averring an
intra-union dispute involves an order for the cancellation of the registration certificate of the erring union
or the expulsion of the guilty party. 7 The case at bar originated from a petition for an audit of union
accounts. In La Tondea Workers Union vs. Secretary of Labor, 8 the Court classified such a petition as
an intra-union conflict. The obvious relief that may be granted in a petition for audit as an order for the
examinations of the books of accounts. Section 5 of Rule VIII of the implementing Rules is likewise
inappropriate.
The DOLE Secretary, however, can properly delegate to the BLR his visitorial power under Article 274
which includes the power to examine the financial accounts of legitimate labor organizations. The
provision reads as follows:
Art. 274. Visitorial Power. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly
authorized representative is hereby empowered to inquire into the financial activities of
legitimate labor organizations upon the filling of a complaint under oath and duly
supported by the written consent of at least twenty (20%) percent of the total membership
of the labor organization concerned and to examine their books of accounts and other
records to determine the compliance or non-compliance with the law and to prosecute
any violators of the law and the union constitution and by-law; Provided, That such inquiry
or examination shall not be conducted during the sixty (60)-day freedom period nor within
the thirty (30) days immediately preceding the date of election of union officers.
While the provision did not explicitly mention the BLR, and only made a cryptic reference to the
DOLE Secretary's "duly authorized representative", the latter was identified by the Court as the
BLR in La Tondea Workers Union vs. Secretary of Labor when it ruled that "union accounts
examiners of the Bureau mentioned in Rule 1, Sec. 1 (ff) of "Book V of) the implementing rules as
having the power to audit the books of accounts of unions are actually officials of the BLR
because the word "Bureau" is defined in Rule 1, Sec. 1 (b) of the same rules as the Bureau of
Labor Relations." The Court additionally declared therein that the DOLE Secretary authorized the
BLR to examine union accounts for and in his behalf when he endorse the case to the latter, thus:
[T]he delegation of authority to union accounts examiners in Rule 1, sec. 1 (ff) is not
exclusive. By indorsing the case to the BLR, the Secretary of Labor and Employment
must be presumed to have authorized the BLR to act on his behalf. . . . . , the Secretary
made two endorsements: first, when he referred to the BLR the letter dated July 27, 1989
of Ramon de la Cruz and Norma Marin seeking the annulment of the audit report of the
DOLE NCR, and second, on September 4, 1990 when, instead of acting on the petition
for review of the union, he endorsed it to the BLR. 9

The DOLE Secretary can also delegate his other functions and duties pursuant to Section 40, Chapter 8,
Book IV of the Administrative Code provided that the delegation is in writing, indicating the officer or class
of officers or employees to whom the delegation is made and only insofar as the delegation is necessary
for the latter to implement plans and programs adequately.
In any case, the endorsement of the DOLE Secretary is consistent with Article 226 of the Code, thus:
Art. 226. Bureau of Labor Relations. The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor
Relations Divisions in the regional offices of the Department of Labor shall have original
and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both
parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, . . . . . (emphasis supplied)
As already held by the Court in La Tondea Workers Union vs. Secretary of Labor, intra-union conflicts
such examinations of accounts are under the jurisdiction of the BLR. However, the Rules of Procedure on
Mediation-Arbitration purposely and expressly separated or distinguished examinations of union accounts
from the genus of intra-union conflicts and provided a different procedure for the resolution of the same.
Original jurisdiction over complaints for examinations of union accounts is vested on the Regional Director
and appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the former is lodged with the BLR. This is apparent from
Section 3 and 4 of the Med-Arbitration Rules as already mentioned. Contrast these two sections from
Section 2 and Section 56 of the same rules. Section 2 expressly vests upon Med-Arbiters original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide inter alia "all other inter-union or internal union disputes." Section
5 states that the decisions of the Med-Arbiter shall be appealable to the DOLE Secretary. These are the
provisions consistent with Section 5 of Rule VIII of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code but as
already explained inapplicable to the same at bar.
Without doubt, the rules of Procedure on Mediation-Arbitration did not amend or supplant substantive law
but implemented and filled in details of procedure left vacuous or ambiguous by the Labor Code and its
Implementing Rules. Petitioners' reliance on the Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs.
NLRC, 10 in support of their "amendment theory" is therefore misplaced. In said case, the Court nullified
the rules issued by the DOLE Secretary supposed to implement but in effect supplanted P.D. No. 1123.
The Mediation-Arbitration Rules do not suffer from the same legal infirmity.
Administrative Order No. 189 is a different matter but completely irrelevant here. True, the DOLE
Secretary ostensibly endorsed the appeal to the BLR on the basis of said administrative order, but it was
already established herein that the endorsement was procedurally tenable under the Rules of Procedure
on Med-Arbitration and consistent with the authority of the BLR to inquire into the financial accounts of
legitimate labor organizations. In other words, irrespective and independent of any endorsement, it is the
BLR which has jurisdiction over complaints for examinations of union accounts. It is worth mentioning at
this point that the BLR, independent or any delegation, can moto propio or upon its own authority inspect
a union's financial status under Book IV, Title VII, Chapter 4, Section 16 of the Administrative Code of
1987, Thus:
Sec. 16. Bureau of Labor Relations The Bureau of Labor Relations shall set policies,
standards, and procedures on the registration and supervision of ligitimate labor union
activities including denial, cancellation and revocation of labor union permits. It shall also
set policies, standards, and procedure relating to collective bargaining agreements, and
examination of financial records of accounts of labor organizations to determine
compliance with relevant laws. (emphasis supplied)
In sum, the BLR did not exceed its jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion in taking
cognizance of petitioners' appeal. At any rate, this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 111671 dismissing
the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners in their quest to nullify the 13 August 1993 order of the
Office of the DOLE Secretary requiring the Regional office to proceed with the audit constitutes
res judicata. This should put an end to this litigation already prolonged by procedural ploys which

this Court will no longer tolerate. This case involves a simple matter of auditing union accounts
which should have been conducted with dispatch eons ago.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The resolutions of the Bureau of Labor
Relations promulgated on 25 March 1995 and 14 March 1995 dismissing petitioners' appeal are hereby
affirmed in toto. The Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor and Employment is hereby
ordered to proceed immediately with the audit and examination of the Ilaw Buklod ng Manggagawa IBM
Local Chapter No. 15.
Cost against petitioners.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-62306 January 21, 1985

KAPISANAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PINAGYAKAP (KMP), ISAGANI GUTIERREZ,
FLORENCIA CARREON, JOSE FLORES, DENNIS ALINEA, ELADIO DE LUNA and
CRISANTO DE VILLA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CRESENCIANO TRAJANO, DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF
LABOR RELATIONS, CATALINO SILVESTRE, and CESAR ALFARO, respondents.
Jose C. Espinas for petitioners.
Balagtas P. Ilagan for private respondents.

RELOVA, J.:
Petitioners seek to annul the resolution and order, dated August 13 and October 19,
1982, respectively, of public respondent Director Cresenciano B. Trajano of the Bureau
of Labor Relations, Ministry of Labor and Employment, in BLR Case No. A-0100-82
(RO4-A-LRD-M-9-35-81), entitled: "Catalino Silvestre, et al., vs. Kapisanan ng
Manggagawang Pinagyakap (KMP) Labor Union and its Officers" affirming Med-Arbiter
Antonio D. Cabibihan's order dated April 28, 1982, directing the said Union to hold and
conduct, pursuant to its constitution and by-laws and under the supervision of the
Bureau of Labor Relations, a general membership meeting, to vote for or against the
expulsion or suspension of the herein petitioner union officers.
Records show that on June 30, 1981 a written request for accounts examination of the
financial status of the Kapisanan ng Manggagawang Pinagyakap (KMP) Labor Union
(Union for brevity), the existing labor union at Franklin Baker Company in San Pablo
City, was filed by private respondent Catalino Silvestre and thirteen (13) other
employees, who are also members of the said Union. Acting on said request, Union
Account Examiner Florencio R. Vicedo of the Ministry of Labor and Employment
conducted the necessary investigation and, thereafter, submitted a report, with the
following findings:
A. Disallowed expenditures P1,278.00, as reflected in the following
breakdown:
1. January 9, 1980 Excess claim for refund P1.00
2. March 13, 1980 Payment for sound system P90.00

3. March 12, 1980 Picture taking, entrance fee in Manila Zoo with Atty.
Delos Santos P75.00
4. March 24, 1980 Payment for sound System P90.00
5. July 16, 1980 Jeep hired P264.00
6. August 30, 1980 Partial payment of traveling expenses disallowed
P68.00
7. October 30, 1980 Representation expenses P180.00
8. May 31, 1981 Payment for long distance call P10.00
9. May 31, 1981 Payment for legal expenses P500.00
TOTAL............................................................. P1,278.00
B. Respondent union officers failed to keep, maintain and submit for
verification the records of union accounts for the years 1977, and 1978,
1979, or purposely suppressed the same;
C. Respondent union officers failed to maintain segregated disbursement
receipts in accordance with the five (5) segregated union funds (general
fund, educational funds, mutual aid fund, burial assistance fund and union
building fund) for which they maintained a distinct and separate bank
accounts for each.
D. The Union's constitution and by-laws is not ratified by the general
membership hence, illegal. (pp. 27-28, Rollo)
Based on the foregoing revelations, private respondents filed with the Regional Office
No. IV-A, Quezon City, Ministry of Labor and Employment, a petition docketed as R04ALRD-M- 9-35-81, for the expulsion of the union officers on the ground that they
committed gross violation of the Labor Code, specifically paragraphs (a), (b), (g), (h), (j)
and (k) of Article 242; and, the constitution and by-laws of the Union, particularly the
provisions of Sections 6 and 7 thereof.
In their Answer, the union officers denied the imputation and argued that the disallowed
expenditures were made in good faith; that the same conduced to the benefit of the
members; and, that they are willing to reimburse the same from their own personal
funds. They likewise asserted that they should not be held accountable for the nonproduction of the books of accounts of the Union for the years 1977, 1978 and 1979
because they were not the officers then and not one of the former officers of the Union
had turned over to them the records in question. Further, they averred that the nonratification of the constitution and by-laws of the Union and the non-segregation of the

Union funds occurred before they became officers and that they have already been
correcting the same.
On April 28, 1982, Med-Arbiter Antonio D. Cabibihan ordered the holding of a
referendum, to be conducted under the supervision of the Bureau of Labor Relations, to
decide on the issue of whether to expel or suspend the union officers from their
respective positions.
Petitioners appealed the said order of Med-Arbiter Cabibihan to herein public
respondent Director Trajano of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Ministry of Labor, Manila,
claiming that the same is not in accordance with the facts contained in the records and
is contrary to law. They pointed out that the disallowed expenditures of P1,278.00 were
made in good faith and not used for the personal benefit of herein union officers but,
instead, contributed to the benefit of the members. On the alleged failure to maintain
and submitted the books of accounts for the years 1977, 1978 and 1979, they argued
that they were elected in 1980 only and, therefore, they could not be made responsible
for the omissions of their predecessors who failed to turn over union records for the
questioned period. Anent their alleged failure to maintain segregated disbursement
receipts in accordance with the five (5) segregated funds, petitioners maintained that
the same did not result to any loss of funds and such error in procedure had already
been corrected. They also demonstrated that there would be a general election on
October 4, 1982, at which time, both the election and the desired referendum could be
undertaken to determine the membership at minimum expense. They prayed that the
resolution on the issue be held in abeyance.
Private respondents, on the other hand, claimed that the Med-Arbiter erred in calling a
referendum to decide the issue. They reiterated that the appropriate action should be
the expulsion of the herein union officers.
On August 13, 1982, public respondent Director Trajano dismissed both appeals of
petitioners and private respondents and affirmed in toto the order of Med-Arbiter
Cabibihan.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of August 13, 1982 of
Public respondent Director Trajano, reiterating their arguments in their appeal and
further clarifying that what the Union Account Officer Florencio R. Vicedo found was that
the amount of P1,278.00 was not supported by official receipts and therefore should not
be allowed as disbursement from the union funds; and that he did not say that the
amount was converted by them for their own personal benefit. They, likewise, informed
public respondent Director Trajano that in the general election held on October 4, 1982,
all of them, except petitioners Ambrocio dela Cruz and Eliseo Celerio, who ran for the
positions of Vice-President and member of the Board of Directors, respectively, were
elected by the overwhelming majority of the members, while private respondents
Catalino Silvestre and Cesar Alfaro who also ran for the position of Auditor, lost.
Thereafter, they moved for the dismissal of the appeal for having been rendered moot
and academic by their re-election.

On October 19, 1982, public respondent Director Trajano issued the second questioned
order denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this petition which We find meritorious for the following reasons:
1. If herein union officers (also petitioners) were guilty of the alleged acts imputed
against them, said public respondent pursuant to Article 242 of the New Labor Code
and in the light of Our ruling in Duyag vs. Inciong, 98 SCRA 522, should have meted out
the appropriate penalty on them, i.e., to expel them from the Union, as prayed for, and
not call for a referendum to decide the issue;
2. The alleged falsification and misrepresentation of herein union officers were not
supported by substantial evidence. The fact that they disbursed the amount of
P1,278.00 from Union funds and later on was disallowed for failure to attach supporting
papers thereon did not of itself constitute falsification and/or misrepresentation. The
expenditures appeared to have been made in good faith and the amount spent for the
purpose mentioned in the report, if concurred in or accepted by the members, are
reasonable; and
3. The repudiation of both private respondents to the highly sensitive position of auditor
at the October 4, 1982 election, is a convincing manifestation and demonstration of the
union membership's faith in the herein officers' leadership on one hand and a clear
condonation of an act they had allegedly committed.
By and large, the holding of the referendum in question has become moot and
academic. This is in line with Our ruling in Pascual vs. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija,
106 Phil. 471, which We quote:
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his
present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of
their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to
office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and
character, and that they disregarded or forgave Ms faults or misconduct, if
he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or
misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people.
ACCORDINGLY, the resolution and order, dated August 13 and October 19, 1982,
respectively, of public respondent Director Cresenciano B. Trajano of the Bureau of
Labor Relations, Ministry of Labor, Manila in BLR Case No. A-0100-82 (RO4-A-LRD-M9-35-81) are SET ASIDE and, the petition for expulsion of herein union officers in R04A-LRD-M-9-35-81 is hereby DISMISSED for having been rendered moot and academic
by the election of herein union officers in the general membership meeting/election held
on October 4, 1982.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-48007 December 15, 1982

PLUM FEDERATION OF INDUSTRIAL AND AGRARIAN WORKERS, petitioner,
vs.
DIRECTOR CARMELO C. NORIEL, of the Bureau of Labor Relations; MANILA
JOCKEY CLUB RACE DAY OPERATION EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION-PTGWO and
MANILA JOCKEY CLUB, INC., respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Pedro A. Lopez for respondent MJCRDOELU-PTGWO.
Armando V. Ampil for respondent Manila Jockey Club.

DE CASTRO, J.:
Petitioner seeks to set aside the Order and Resolutions dated May 6, 1977, September
17, 1977 and March 14, 1978 of the Bureau of Labor Relations for having been issued
in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. It, likewise, prays for an
order directing respondent director to hold a certification election so that the employees
in the company can elect a union representative to negotiate an improved connective
bargaining agreement to replace the agreement which has expired on February 1, 1976.
On May 5, 1976, Plum Federation of Industrial and Agrarian Workers filed a petition,
praying that it be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
workers of Manila Jockey Club, Inc.
On June 18, 1976, the Manila Jockey Club Race Day Operation Employees Labor
Union-PTGWO filed a motion to intervene and opposition to said petition and alleged
among other things, that it is the recognized collective bargaining representative of all
the employees of the company and that it is in the process of negotiating a modification
of the collective bargaining agreement.
On August 30, 1976, another supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by intervenor
PTGWO, this time invoking the "No Union Raiding Clause" of the "Code of Ethics"
adopted by the members of the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (T.U.C.P.)
wherein both petitioner and intervenor are members, and claiming that the petition failed
to satisfy the 30% requirement of the law. The entire record of the case was forwarded
to the Office of the President of the T.U.C.P. for the purpose of submitting the matter to
the Congress for decision.

On March 16, 1977, the entire record of the case was returned by the T.U.C.P. President
to the Office of then Secretary of Labor which in turn transmitted the same to the
Bureau of Labor Relations Office with a forwarding letter signed by the late Roberto S.
Oca in his capacity as President of the Congress, stating, among other things, the
following: 1
In a National Executive Board meeting of the Katipunang Manggagawang Pilipino
(TUCP) held last March 7, 1977 at the Army & Navy Club, it was duly approved that the
above-captioned case be referred back to the BLR and that MJCR-OELU-PTGWO be
declared as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent, thus dismissing the petition of
PLUM.
On March 22, 1977, the BLR endorsed the case to Officer-in-Charge Vicente Leodegardo, Jr., of Region
IV for appropriate action.
On May 5, 1977, Atty. Luna C. Piezas, Chief, Med-Arbiter Section of Region IV, Department of Labor,
promulgated an order 2 dismissing the case pursuant to the letter of the President of the T.U.C.P.
Petitioner PLUM filed an appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations predicated on the ground that TUCP
has no authority in law to grant or deny election under the Labor Code which mandated the secret ballot
to elect the true union representative.
On September 17, 1977, the Bureau Director issued a resolution' dismissing the appeal. Pertinent
portions 3 of said resolution read thus:
While it may be true that the facts of the case may warrant the holding of a certification
election in the bargaining unit concerned, to sustain first the decision arrived at by the
National Executive Board of TUCP appears of indispensable importance. Contenders in
the case at bar are both members of TUCP. Undeniably, there are internal rules including
their Code of Ethics to keep them intact, to govern their actions and finally to preserve the
Congress. It is therefore, a matter of utmost necessity that a decision arrived at by the
National Executive Board be respected and enforced not only by the members of the
Congress themselves but also by this Bureau and the Department if necessity arises,
The appealed order has the letter of Roberto Oca as its basis. It is worthy to note that the
letter sent said communication in his capacity as President of the TUCP and nothing else.
Whether or not he happens also to be the president of intervenor union is of no legal
significance since the decision of the TUCP was handed down by its National Executive
Board and not by him alone.
Other recourse could have been taken by appellant. Very much aware of the Decision of
the National Executive Board on March 7, 1977, it could have asked for a reconsideration
of the same. As shown by the records, the first decision of the National Board was for the
holding of a certification election. But intervenor asked for a reconsideration hence the
March 7, decision. Appellant's failure however could unequivocably be interpreted as
satisfaction of the Decision. For this Office now, to sustain appellant's stand and re-open
the case again by giving due course to the instant appeal is not only an open
manifestation of non-recognition of the existence of TUCP but a further obstruction to the
goal of the Department to establish one-union in one industry; thus at the end, to attain
industrial peace.
xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied by public respondent for being pro-forma, hence
the present recourse by way of a petition for certiorari and mandamus.
It was asserted by petition that nowhere in the Labor Code or in the new Constitution has TUCP been
granted any authority to supersede or impair the holding of a certification election or deny the majority
employees of their right to elect their own union; that public respondent and the PTGWO acted without
jurisdiction in defiance of the rule of law and popular democracy, that it, is not within the Code of Ethics to
suppress the employees' freedom to choose their own union; and that the TUCP, while asserting itself to
be a Labor Center did not call the parties involved for conference, to submit evidence or to make a fair
judicious and rational evaluation of the dispute.
The Solicitor General in his manifestation and motion prayed that he be relieved from filing the required
answer to the instant petition for the reason that he was unable to sustain respondent bureau director's
questioned orders and resolution. The records of the case were returned to said public respondent and he
was granted an extension of time within which to submit his own answer to the petition.
Respondent Noriel in his comment (answer) made it clear that he is not opposed to the conduct of a
certification election, and in fact he is ready to hold such election if the case is returned to the jurisdiction
of his office. However, he stressed that the TUCP Code of Ethics and General Council Resolution No. 762 are clear expressions of consent by the signatory members, including their locals or affiliates, to settle
their disputes among themselves in accordance with the decision of the National Executive Board and the
decision he made was made pursuant to such an agreement.
On the other hand, private respondent union maintained its stand that no certification election should be
held because the petition was not supported by the written consent of at least 30% of all the employees in
the bargaining unit, and that this requirement is mandatory.
A letter from the president of respondent union reveals the present state of affairs of the employees
wherein they are deprived of the benefits of a collective bargaining agreement, for management refused
to bargain with the union. If this situation continues, the employees would stand to lose a long-line of
cases that the workers' welfare can be promoted through the bargaining process. Certification election is
the fairest and most effective way of determining which labor organization can truly represent the working
force. It is a fundamental postulate that the win of the maj rity if given expression in an honest election
with freedom on the part of the voters to make their choice, is controlling. 4 Protection to labor and
freedom of peaceful assembly and association are guaranteed by the Constitution.
As to the issue of whether or not the 30% minimum subscription requirement was met, it was held that the
Director is still empowered to call for a certification election provided there was no abuse of discretion.
However, in the case at bar, instead of ordering an election, respondent Director dismissed the appeal of
PLUM based on the decision of the TUCP, which the Court considers an impairment of the freedom of the
workers to voice out their choice of the union to represent them. If there is any doubt as to the required
number having met, there would be no better way than the holding of a certification election to ascertain
which union really commands the allegiance of the rank-and-file employees. 5 If the desired goal is for the
execution of a collective bargaining contract to protect the workers, then certification election is the most
appropriate means to attain said end.
Since there has been no certification election for the past three (3) years as well as a certified collective
bargaining agreement which should govern the economic and working conditions of the workers, a
certification election should immediately be ordered. This Court had repeatedly made it clear that in labor
controversies, time is of the essence. 6
Accordingly, the questioned order and resolutions dated May 5, 1977, September 17, 1977 and March 14,
1978 are nullified and set aside. Respondent Director is hereby ordered to hold a certification election
forthwith. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-41106 September 22, 1977

LITEX EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
GEORGE A. EDUVALA, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge, BUREAU OF LABOR
RELATIONS Departmentof Labor and FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS (F.F.W.),
respondents.
Esteban M. Mendoza for petitioner.
F. F. Bonifacio, Jr. for respondent FFW.
Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S.
Puno and Solicitor Romeo C. de la Cruz for respondent George A. Eduvala, etc.

FERNANDO, J.:
In this and certiorari and prohibition proceeding, what is sought to be nullified is an
Order of respondent George A. Eduvala, the then Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of
Labor Relations, requiring that a memorandumm election be held among the members
of the Litex Employees Association, petioner labor union, to ascertain their wishes as to
their wishes as to their affiliation with respondent Federation of Free Workers. It is the
contention of petitioner Union that there is no statutory authorization for the holding of
such a referendum election. That is the decisive issue in this comtroversy. In support of
the competence of respondent public official, Article 226 of the Present Labor Code is
cited. It reads thus: "The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Division in
the the regional offices of the Labor shall have and exclusive authority to act, at their
own initiation or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union
conflicts, and disputes, grievances of probe arising from or affecting labor-management
relations in all workplaces, whether natural or non-agricultural, except those arising from
the implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be
the subject of grievance Procedure and/or voluntary arbitration." 1 The comment of the then
Acting Solicitor General, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., treated as
the answer, 2 maintained that the wording of the above provision sustains the authority thus challenged.
There is considerable persuasiveness to such a view. It would be an unduly restrictive interpretation them
if a negative answer were Seven to the question posed. It would be oblivious to the basic end and aim of
the pant Labor Code to confer on the Department of Labor and its bereaus the competence to pass upon
and decide labor controversies and thus minimize judicial intervention. There is no legal basis for
nullifying such order.
This later dispute originated from a petition of respondent Federation of Free Workers filed with the
Bureau of labor Relations against petitioner labor Union to hold a referendum among the members of the
union for the of determining whether they desired to be affiliated with such Federation. It was alleged that
a "great majority" of the members of the union desired such affiliaion, but that its President, a certain

Johnny de Leon, was opposed. The contention of petitioner Union acting through its counsel was that
only about 700 out of more than 2,200 employees of the company had manifested their desire to affliate
with the Federation and that a substantial number of such had since then repudiated their signatures. It
also raised the point that what was sought was a certification election which was not proper as there was
a certified collective bargaining agreement between the union and the company. The Compulsory
Arbitrator, after a careful study of the pleadings, reached the conclusion that the truth of the matter could
best be assertained by a referendum election. Respondent as Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of labor
Relations affirmed. Hence this petition directed to this Court, as a jurisdictional question is raised.
The petition, as noted at the outset, lacks merit.
1. Article 226 of the New Labor Code cannot be misread to signify that the authority conferred on the
Secretary of labor and the officials of the Department is limited in character. On the contrary, even a
cursory reading thereof readily yields the conclusion that in the interest of industrial peace and for the
promotion of the salutary constitutional objectives of social justice and protection to labor, the competence
of the governmental entrusted with supervision over disputes involving employers and employees as well
as "inter-union and intra-union conflicts," is broad and expensive. Thereby its purpose becomes crystalclear. As is quite readily discernible where it concerns the promotion of social and economy rights, the
active participation in the implementation of the codal objective is entrusted to the executive department.
There is no support for any allegation of jurisdictional infirmity, considering that the language employed is
well-nigh inclusive with the stress on its "and exclusive authority to act." If it were otherwise, its policy
might be rendered futile. That is to run counter to a basic postulate in the canons of statutory
interpretation. Learned Hand referred to it as the proliferation of purpose. As was emphatecally asserted
by Justice Frankfurter: "The generating consideration is that legislation is more than composition. It is an
active instrument of government which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to be
achieved. It is in this connection that Holmes said, 'words are flexible.' Again it was Holmes, the last judge
to give quarter to loose thinking or vague yearning, who said that 'the general purpose is a more is a more
important aid to the meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down.' And it was
Holmes who chided courts for being apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law when those
words import a policy that goes beyond them." 3 What is intended by the framers of code or statute is not
to be frustrated. Even on the assumption that by some strained or literal reading of the employed, a doubt
can be raised as to its scope, the 'immitation should not be at war with the end sought to be attained. It
cannot be denied that if through an ingenious argumentation, limits may be set on a statutory power
which should not be there, there would be a failure to effectuate the statutory purpose and policy. That
kind of approach in statutory construction has never recommended itself. 4
2. Nor has petitioner made out a case of grave abuse of since the matter involved is a dispute as to
whether or not the members of petitioner labor union had decided, contrary to the wishes of its president,
to join respondent Federation. What better way could there be of ascertaining the truth there than to hold
the referendum election. The guarantee of fairness as to whether there is accuracy depends on the
impartiality and neutrality of the Bureau of Labor Relations. There is nothing in petitioner's submission to
indicate that such would not be the case. Under such circumstances then, petitioner labor union could not
be held to allege that there was an abuse, much less a grave abuse, of the discretionary authority vested
in such office. It suffices to take note of how often this Court, after a careful consideration of the issue
involved, had rejected such a contention in certification cases, analogous, if not similar in character.
Invariably, the imputation that the holding of an election for the purpose of determining with exactitude the
wishes of the employees concerned as amounting to arbitrary exercise exercise of a power had been
rejected. 5
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. This decision is immediately executory.

G.R. No. L-69188 September 23, 1986

MIGUEL J. VILLAOR and CECILIO V. BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Labor Relations of the Ministry of
Labor and Employment; OCTAVIO A. PINEDA, RAFAEL SAMSON, EDUARDO C. FLORA, MARIO S. SANTOS
and CARLOS BANDALAN, respondents.
Wenceslao C. Laureta for petitioners.
Bernardino Julve for private respondents.
Porter Puguon for public respondent.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition to review on certiorari the November 14, 1984 decision of respondent BLR Director Cresenciano B.
Trajano in BLR Case No. A-182-84, entitled "Miguel J. Villaor, et al., Petitioners vs. Octavio Pineda, et al.,
Respondents, and Mario S. Santos, et al., Intervenors," setting aside the Med-Arbiters Orders of June 27, 1984 and
August 1, 1984.
The Philippine Air Lines Employees' Association (PALEA) is the bargaining agent of the workers in the Philippine Air
Lines (PAL). The union has a Board of Directors composed of the president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer and
17 directors elected for a term of three (3) years by members in "good standing" on the last Thursday of February of
the election year. It has also a Commission on Election (COMELEC) whose members sit for a term of three (3) years.
At present, the COMELEC is composed of herein respondents Octavio Pineda, as chairman, and Rafael Samson and
Edwardo Flora, as members. The then incumbent president and vice-president were herein respondents Mario S.
Santos and Carlos Bandalan, respectively,
On February 17-23, 1984, in Metro Manila and on February 20, 1984 in Cebu/Mactan area, PALEA held its election
for National Officers. Herein petitioner Miguel J. Villaor won the election over respondent Mario S. Santos for the
presidency, Villaor obtaining 1,954 votes to Santos' 1,809 votes, or a difference of 145 votes. Likewise, herein
petitioner Cecilio V. Bautista won against Carlos V. Bandalan for the position of vice-president, Bautista garnering
1,264 votes as against Bandalan's 1,220 votes, or a difference of 44 votes, They were proclaimed on February 25,
1984.
Subsequently, the defeated candidates-respondent Mario S. Santos, for president; respondent Carlos V. Bandalan,
for vice-president; and Antonio Josue, for secretary, filed their election protests with the PALEA COMELEC within the
30 day reglementary period, as provided under the Constitution and By-Laws of the Association, on the grounds that
(1) a number of votes in precincts 1, 4 and 4-A were segregated and not counted; and (2) a substantial number of
PALEA members in Cebu/Mactan area were not able to vote on February 20, 1984 by reason of the voting days
having been reduced from two (February 20-21, 1984) to just one day (February 20, 1984). Respondent Mario S.
Santos filed his protest on March 12, 1984; respondent Carlos Bandalan filed his protest on February 27, 1984; and
Antonio Josue on March 14, 1984, before PALEA COMELEC composed of the herein other respondents.
Meanwhile, on March 6, 1984, respondent Mario S. Santos sent petitioner Miguel J. Villaor a letter, the body of which
reads
We formally turnover to you PALEA's CBA proposals in the ongoing PAL-PALEA CBA negotiations.
Other pertinent records are either accompanying these proposals or on file with the office.
Other PALEA properties, including the President's car and another vehicle, shall also be turned
over to you at the appropriate time.

On the CBA negotiation, we would like to inform you that we are filing a manifestation with the
Director-Bureau of Labor Relations in order to withdraw PALEA's declaration of deadlock. This will
give you and the other officers-elect a free hand to continue with the PAL-PALEA CBA negotiation.
As we have the common objective of protecting and promoting the interests of our members, we
wish you all the luck and best of everything for our members and our union.
On April 17, 1984, petitioners filed their joint Comment/Answer to the election protests cases, and two (2) basic
issues were joined, to wit:
1. Whether or not the more than 40 to 47 ballots cast by alleged qualified PALEA members in
Precincts 1, 4 and 4-A which were segregated and invalidated actually resulted in the
disenfranchisement of said PALEA voters; and
2. Whether or not the qualified PALEA voters in the Cebu/Mactan areas were deprived of their right
to vote as a result of the sudden change from the two day traditional election days in previous
years to just one day.
On the basis of the election protests and the Comment/Answer thereto, respondent PALEA COMELEC members, in a
letter dated April 25, 1984, informed the parties that the ballot boxes in the questioned precincts would be opened
and their voters list retrieved on April 25, 1984 at 10:00 in the morning.
On April 24, 1984, herein petitioners Miguel J. Villaor and Cecilio V. Bautista, and Ernesto P. Galang filed a
complaint/petition with the Regional Office of the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) against the PALEA
COMELEC members, seeking their disqualification from their positions as such on the ground of alleged partiality for
the protestants. The Regional Office summoned the parties to appear before Med-Arbiter Renato D. Parungao "on
the 25th of April at 9:30 a. m."
On April 25, 1984, herein petitioners Miguel J. Villaor and Cecilio V. Bautista, and respondent PALEA COMELEC
member Edwardo C. Flora appeared before the Med-Arbiter who issued an Order "enjoining the respondents from
opening the ballot boxes subject of the controversy." On the same day, at 10:30 a.m., respondents Octavio Pineda
and Rafael Samson proceeded to open the ballot boxes.
On April 27, 1984, respondents, sitting en banc, resolved the election protests, the dispositive portion of which readsWHEREFORE, AND IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, THE PALEA COMELEC HEREBY
RESOLVES, AS IT HEREBY RESOLVED1. To set aside the proclamation dated February 25, 1984 of Miguel J. Villaor as PALEA President,
Cecilio V. Bautista as Vice-President and Ernesto P. Galang as Secretary;
2. To count the segregated votes of qualified PALEA members, as verified, in Precincts 1, 4 and 4A. The counting shall be held on May 4, 1984 at 1300 H at the PALEA COMELEC Office;
3. To hold a special election on May 4, 1984 from 0500 H to 1700 H, in Cebu/Mactan to allow
PALEA members, not able to vote on February 20, 1984, to cast their votes for the positions of
President, Vice-President and Secretary; and
4. To proclaim the winning candidates for PALEA President Vice-President and Secretary
immediately after the election, counting and canvassing of votes as hereinabove indicated.
SO RESOLVED.
On May 3, 1984, petitioners filed a motion with the Med-Arbiter to cite COMELEC members for contempt, to suspend
them from office, and to annul their Resolution of April 27, 1984 "for being issued without jurisdiction." On the same
day, a notice was issued directing the parties and the petitioners' counsel to appear for hearing at 1:30 p.m. on May 3

and 4, 1984, On the May 3, 1984 scheduled hearing, none of the parties appeared, and on the May 4, 1984
scheduled hearing, only the petitioners' counsel appeared.
In conformity with the Resolution of April 27, 1984, respondents PALEA COMELEC members counted the segregated
ballots in precincts 1, 4 and 4-A on May 4, 1984 and likewise held on said date a special election in Cebu/Mactan
area. As a result of the election of May 4, 1984, Mario S. Santos, Carlos V. Bandalan and Ernesto Galang, were
proclaimed on May 5, 1984 as the duly elected President, Vice-President and Secretary respectively by PALEA
COMELEC.
On May 8, 1984, Petitioner Miguel J. Villaor filed a motion to annul the May 4, 1984 election and the proclamation of
the winners contending that these were "premature" as no action had yet been taken on the motion to declare the
April 27, 1984 Resolution void.
On May 31, 1984, the respondents filed their omnibus answer to the petition and the subsequent motions filed by the
petitioners.
On the same date, May 31, 1984, herein respondents Mario S. Santos and Carlos V. Bandalan filed their Notice To
Admit Intervention (Record, p. 128) in the case filed by Villaor, et al. against the PALEA COMELEC members. The
intervention was allowed when therein petitioners withdrew their opposition thereto. The intervenors likewise
manifested that they were adopting the position paper filed by the respondents therein as their own.
On June 5, 1984, petitioners filed a motion for injunction alleging that Mario S. Santos and "his cohorts" had inveigled
the Board of Directors to adopt a resolution including Santos in the union panel and that as a result thereof, the PAL
refused to continue negotiating with the union.
On June 8, 1984, herein respondents Mario S. Santos and Carlos V. Bandalan filed their answer in intervention
alleging that they were duly proclaimed officers of the union and the ones recognized by the Board of Directors.
On the same day, June 8, 1984, the Med-Arbiter issued a temporary restraining order "enjoining the respondents and
the intervenors to cease and desist from acting as PALEA President, Vice-President and Secretary in order to
maintain the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of the instant petition." The Med-Arbiter furthermore directed them
to show cause why injunction should not be granted in favor of the petitioners. The intervenors filed an opposition on
June 19, 1984.
On June 27, 1984, the Med-Arbiter issued a writ of preliminary injunction (Ibid., pp. 116-117) "enjoining both the
respondents and intervenors to cease and desist from further committing the acts complained of until the intra-union
conflict and all its attendant incidents are finally resolved." Moreover, the Med-Arbiter declared that "Miguel J. Villaor
remains as President of the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) unless ordered otherwise."
The Med-Arbiter, after hearing, issued an Order dated August 1, 1984, (Ibid, pp. 119-127) the dispositive portion of
which readsWHEREFORE, premises considered the petition is hereby granted and let an order issue, as it is
hereby issued:
a) Declaring respondents Octavio Pineda, Rafael Samson and Edwardo Flora as disqualified from
their office as chairman and members, respectively, of the PALEA Commission on Elections and
ordering them to desist from further performing their functions as Comelec officers;
b) Declaring as null and void Resolution dated 27 April 1984, promulgated ex-parte in complete
violation of Sec. 6, Article XIX of the PALEA Constitution and By-laws;
c) Declaring the special election conducted by the respondents (PALEA Comelec) on 4 May 1984
as invalid and that the results thereof, proclaiming Mario S. Santos, Carlos V. Bandalan, as
President and Vice-President, respectively, as likewise declared null and void;

d) The writ of preliminary injunction dated 27 June 1984, enjoining intervenors Mario S. Santos and
Carlos V. Bandalan as President and Vice- President, of PALEA, but, also from interfering with the
on-going CBA negotiations between the PAL Management and PALEA and also from interfering in
any manner with the operation of the activities of PALEA, shall continue to remain binding and
effective until this intra-union conflict and its attendant aspects are finally resolved and terminated,
in which case the said injunctive writ shall likewise be dissolved.
Therein respondent PALEA COMELEC members and intervenors Mario S. Santos and Carlos V. Bandalan appealed
the said Order of the Med-Arbiter to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR).
BLR Director Cresenciano B. Trajano, in a decision dated November 14, 1984, (Ibid., pp. 33-42) set aside the MedArbiter's Orders of June 27, 1984 and August 1, 1984, and at the same time dismissed the petition of Miguel J. Villaor
and Cecilio V. Bautista for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition (Ibid., pp. 56-115).
The First Division of this Court, in a Resolution dated January 16, 1985, resolved without giving due course to the
petition to require the respondents to comment within ten (10) days from notice thereof (Ibid., p. 203).
In compliance with the said Resolution, private respondents filed their comment (Ibid., pp. 237-247) on March 18,
1985.
On March 28, 1985, petitioners filed their "Reply" to the comment filed by the private respondents.
On March 29, 1985, the Solicitor General filed his comment. In the same, the Solicitor General concluded that it is his
opinion that respondent BLR Director committed reversible error in setting aside the Med-Arbiter's Orders, and
recommended that the instant petition be given due course.
Petitioners, in compliance with the Resolution of the First Division of this Court dated April 22, 1985 (Ibid., p. 273)
filed on May 17, 1985 their "Reply" to the "Comment" filed by the Solicitor General.
Public respondent, in compliance with the June 16, 1985 Resolution of the First Division of this Court, filed his
comment (Ibid., pp. 327-374) on August 8, 1985.
The First Division of this Court, in a Resolution dated August 26,1985 (lbid., p. 374-a) resolved (a) to give due course
to the petition; and (b) to require the parties to submit simultaneous memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice.
Petitioners filed their memorandum (Ibid., pp. 391-435) on October 28, 1985; Private respondents filed their
memorandum (Ibid., pp. 438-464) on November 5, 1985; and public respondent, in a "Motion" dated November
19,1985 (Ibid., pp. 462-464), respectfully moved that the comment he has filed be treated and considered as
memorandum, Said motion was granted by the First Division of this Court in its Resolution of January 13,1986 (Ibid.,
p. 476).
The sole issue in this case is
Whether or not the decision of public respondent Bureau of Labor Relations Director issued on
November 14, 1984 was promulgated with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
In his Decision of November 14, 1984 (p. 7, Ibid., p. 39), Public respondent BLR Director Cresenciano B. Trajano, in
reversing Med-Arbiter Renato D. Parungos ruling disqualifying therein respondents as members of the PALEA
COMELEC stressed that the Philippine Constitution assures the right of workers to self-organization and this right
implies the freedom of unions from interference by employers and the government; that it includes the right of unions
to elect their officers in full freedom and guarantee that the government refrains from any interference which would
restrict this right or impede its lawful exercise; and that "It shall be unlawful for any person," Article 247 of the Labor
Code states, "to unduly interfere with employees and workers in their exercise of the right to self-organization." With
the foregoing as his premise, he opined that the right of self-organization is impaired when the government dissolves
a union COMELEC and proceeds to resolve an election protest pending before it.

In this connection, attention is invited to Article 226 of the Labor Code, which readsART. 226. Bureau of Labor Standards.-The Bureau of labor Relations and the Labor Code relations
divisions of the regional offices of the Department of Labor (now the Ministry of Labor and
Employment) shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon
request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts and all disputes arising
from or affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or nonagricultural, except those arising from the implementation of collective bargaining agreements
which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration.
as supplemented by Policy Instruction No. 6-relating to the distribution of jurisdiction over labor casesxxx xxx xxx
3. The following cases are under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Med-Arbiter Section of the
Regional Office:
xxx xxx xxx
b) Intra-union cases.
From the aforequoted provisions, it is safe to conclude that the freedom of the unions from interference from the
government presupposes that there is no inter-union or intra-union conflict. In the instant case, there is no question
that there is an intra-union conflict.
Public respondent further opined that the COMELEC should have been allowed to discharge its functions without
prejudice to the right of petitioners to apply for relief from the Board of Directors, He averred that under the union
constitution, the Board has the power to remove or discipline, by three-fourths' votes, any union officer including the
president himself or the members of the COMELEC, and accordingly concluded that only after the remedy failed
could the petitioners be allowed to bring their case to the Med-Arbiter. In short, the petitioners should first exhaust
administrative remedies before bringing their case to the Med-Arbiter.
Anent this opinion of public respondent, petitioners averred that pursuant to Section 4 of Article VII of the PALEA
Constitution and By-Laws, which reads:
Section 4-As a fact-finding body, the Chairman and members of the Board of Inquiry (created by
the President) shall have the sole power to conduct investigation on involving an act specified
under Article 18, Section of this Constitution committed by any officer, member of the board or
members of the Association and submit thereto reports and recommendations based on their
findings to the Board of Directors who shall have the sole power to render decisions and impose
penalty to whoever is guilty.
The Board of Inquiry, created by the President, has the sole power to investigate cases involving acts committed by
any officer, member of the Board or member of the Association that the power of the Board to remove or discipline
any union officer, including the President himself or the COMELEC members cannot be exercised until the Board of
Inquiry submits its report and recommendation based on their findings on the acts complained of after due
investigation. With this as a premise, petitioners claim that in their Reply and Opposition dated September 14, 1984,
in connection with the three (3) consolidated cases before Med-Arbiter Napoleon V. Fernando, Nos. NLR-LRD-M-6185-184, NLR-LRD-M6-156-84 and NLR-LRD-N-6-204-84, they called attention to the fact that they have exhausted
administrative remedies provided in the PALEA Charter-On May 17, 1984, PALEA President Miguel J. Villaor created
the Special Board of Inquiry and appointed Rey Taggueg, as chairman, Ildefonso Medina and Rodolfo de Guzman, as
members, however, the Board refused to approve the newly created Special Board of Inquiry for fear that they
themselves may be the first to be subjected to investigation for the acts complained of in Case No. NCR-LRD M-6156-84. This claim of petitioners was never denied by the private respondents.
Accordingly, there is no question that the Med-Arbiter rightly exercised jurisdiction over the case.
Section 6 of Article XIX of the PALEA Constitution provides:

Sec. 6. In cases where a situation arises, whereby the losing candidate does not concede to the
result of the election he may, if he so desires, submit in writing, his protest to the Commission on
Election within 30 days after the proclamation of the winning candidates and the Commission on
Election, sitting en banc, shall hear and decide such protest. ...
From the aforequoted provision, as opined by the Solicitor General, "once a candidate concedes the election, he is
precluded from filing a protest." Private respondent Mario S. Santos, prior to filing his election protest, in his letter of
March 6, 1984 to herein petitioner Miguel J. Villaor, had already unequivocably conceded the position of president to
the latter.
Likewise, from the aforequoted provision, it is mandatory for the PALEA COMELEC to set the election protest for
appropriate hearing on the issues raised before it could finally resolve the case. In the instant case, it is undisputed
that the PALEA COMELEC, without conducting any formal hearing on the issues raised, on the basis of the pleadings
of the parties, informed the parties in a letter dated April 23, 1984 that the ballot boxes in the questioned precincts
would be opened and their voters' list retrieved on April 25, 1984 at 10:00 in the morning. Likewise, on April 27, 1984,
the PALEA COMELEC, without the benefit of formal hearing, resolved the election protest by setting aside the
proclamation dated February 25, 1984 of Miguel J. Villaor as PALEA President, Cecilio V. Bautista as Vice-President,
and Ernesto P. Galang as Secretary; directing the canvassing of the segregated ballots in precincts 1, 4, and 4-A; and
directing the holding of a special election in Cebu and Mactan on May 4, 1984.
Besides, it appears that respondents Octavio Pineda and Rafael Samson intentionally disregarded the summons of
Med-Arbiter Renato D. Parungo to appear before him at 9:00 a.m. on April 25, 1984 so that they can carry out their
plan to open the ballot boxes. Please note that the herein petitioners alleged that Med-Arbiter Parungo issued a
restraining order enjoining the respondents, as PALEA COMELEC members, to refrain from proceeding with their
plan to open the ballot boxes. Said restraining order was personally served on respondent Edwardo Flora who
immediately called the PALEA office and after respondent Octavio Pineda was on the phone, Flora informed him, in
the presence of Med-Arbiter Parungo, about the restraining order served upon them. Notwithstanding said
information, respondents Pineda and Samson went ahead and opened the ballot boxes as planned. This allegation of
petitioners was never denied by the respondents. Respondent PALEA COMELEC members, likewise disregarded
Med-Arbiter Renato D. Parungos notice for them to appear for hearing at 1:30 p.m. on May 3 and 4, 1984.
The May 4, 1984 special election in Cebu and Mactan is without factual and legal justification As aptly observed by
the Solicitor General, the same was resorted to only to accommodate the herein other private respondentsThere is absolutely no justification for calling the said May 4, 1984 election. There is no law which
allows "piece meal" elections. Obviously, such move was resorted to by the PALEA Comelec to
accommodate defeated candidates for president and vice-president in the February 20, 1984
election, Mario and Carlos Bandalan (respondent herein), and enable them to overcome the
winning margin of winning candidates therein, Villaor and Bautista (herein petitioners), who won by
only 145 and 44 votes, respectively,
It is the contention of the protestants that a great number of PALEA members were deprived of their right to vote
because it had been the tradition since 1969 to hold election in Cebu and Mactan for two days; and that the holding of
elections for only one day was done without notice to all PALEA members in said station. On the other hand, it is the
contention of the petitioners that the change was agreed upon by all the candidates concerned in a conference held
at SMCD Office, Nichols Field, on February 20, 1982. On said controversy, while public respondent found for the
protestants, the Solicitor General is for the petitioners. Be that as it may, it is a fact that the PALEA COMELEC issued
on February 15, 1984 a bulletin announcing that the elections in that area would be only on February 20, 1984.
Hence, it cannot be said that the voters therein were not duly notified. In addition to this, worth mentioning is the
comment of the Solicitor General, which reads:
... Besides, we do not see how these 103 members could have failed to know about the one-day
election. It was held within the office premises, and, surely, they must have been told of such fact
by the other members who voted in the election. It would appear that these 193 members simply
did not bother to vote for one reason or another. And we do not see the necessity of holding a twoday election in said areas with only 500 members, and hold a one day election in Metro Manila
area which has about 4,000 members. That it is the tradition to hold a two-day election in said
areas is not a valid argument. Tradition can always be overturned, as what happened in the instant
case.

The holding of the May 4, 1984 special election, when its legality is still pending determination by the Med-Arbiter,
therefore, further shows the partiality of the respondent PALEA COMELEC members.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of respondent BLR Director is hereby SET ASIDE and the Orders of June 27,
1984 and August 1, 1984 of Med-Arbiter Renato D. Parungo are hereby REVIVED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 96821 December 9, 1994

LA TONDEA WORKERS UNION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, and HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, in her
capacity as Director, Bureau of Labor Relations, respondents.
Amorito V. Canete for petitioner.

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside orders and the decision of respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR) and Secretary of Labor and Employment in BLR-AE-8-18-89, finding Ramon de la Cruz and Norma
Marin, president and treasurer respectively of petitioner La Tondea Worker's Union (LTWU), accountable for union
funds in the amount of P367,553.00.
Petitioner LTWU is a duly registered labor organization. For more that thirty years it was bargaining agent of the rankand-file workers of La Tondea Inc. at its Tondo Plant. On May 31, 1989 it lost in a certification election to the Ilaw at
Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM).
It appears that, on March 14, 1989, about 200, out of 1,015 members of petitioner, petitioned the National Capital
Region Office of the Department of Labor and Employment (hereafter referred to as DOLE-NCR) for an audit or
examination of the funds and financial records of the union. Accordingly an audit was ordered and, on April 17, 1989,
the acting auditing examiner of the DOLE-NCR, Nepomuceno Leao II, submitted a report finding Ramon de la Cruz
and Norma Marin accountable for P367,553.00 for union dues remitted by La Tondea Inc. to LTWU.
De la Cruz and Marin appealed to then DOLE Secretary Franklin Drilon, complaining that they had not been heard
before the report was made. The case was indorsed to the respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations,
who, on August 7, 1989, directed the DOLE-NCR to forward to the BLR the records of the case.
In her order dated September 29, 1989, the respondent BLR Director found that indeed De la Cruz and Marin had not
been heard before they were held liable for union funds. For this reason she set aside the findings and
recommendations of the DOLE-NCR and ordered another audit/examination to be conducted. The dispositive portion
of her order stated:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the findings/recommendations of the National Capital Region
contained in the letter of NCR Director Luna C. Piezas to Teodoro Monleon, et al. petitioners, dated
11 May 1989 are hereby set aside.
Accordingly, the Labor Relations and Reporting Division (LRRD), this Bureau is hereby directed to
conduct an audit/examination of the books of accounts and other financial records of La Tondea
Workers Union (LTWU) for the period of 1986 to February 1989.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order insofar as it ordered an audit/examination of books of accounts
and financial records. It argued that certain requirements of Art. 274 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 6715,
must first be complied with before an audit/examination could be ordered, to wit: (1) there must be a sworn written
complaint, (2) it must be supported by at least 20% of the total membership of the union and (3) it must not have
been conducted during the freedom period nor within the 30 days immediately preceding the date of election of union
officials.

Petitioner's motion was denied by the BLR in a resolution dated December 1, 1989. Ramon de la Cruz, Danilo
Manrique, Arturo Bautista and Norma Marin were ordered to submit "all financial records and related documents of
the union for the period 1986 to February 1989 within ten (10) days from receipt of this order."
The union, through its new president, Danilo Manrique, again moved for a reconsideration, this time raising a
jurisdictional question: That under Art. 274 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715, the power to
order an examination of the books of accounts and financial activities of a union is vested in the Secretary of Labor
and Employment or his representative and the BLR can not be considered the Secretary's representative. In its order
of January 22, 1990, however, the BLR denied petitioner's motion, even as it reiterated its previous order of
December 1, 1989, with warning that if the records and documents required were not produced within five days
petitioner would be deemed to have waived the right to present its evidence.
The union filed a petition for review of the orders of December 1, 1989 and January 22, 1990 to the DOLE Secretary.
But the BLR proceeded with its examination, and, as the union officers refused to comply with its orders, the BLR
based the audit/examination on the certification of the company. In an order dated July 5, 1990, the BLR found the
union officers personally accountable and liable for the total amount of P367,553.00, which La Tondea Inc. certified
it had remitted to LTWU as union dues.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment did not act on the petition for review of the union. Instead, he referred the
petition to the BLR which denied the petition for having become moot and academic. The dispositive portion of its
order, dated November 21, 1990, states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit. The Order of
this Bureau dated 5 July 1990 issued in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over
audit/examination case heard before the Regional Office, this Department, is hereby affirmed in
toto.
Hence this petition, alleging grave abuse of discretion by respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment and
Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations. Petitioner alleges several grounds which raise the following issues:
1. Whether under the law the power to examine the books of accounts of petitioner is vested in the
Secretary of Labor and Employment or in the Bureau of Labor Relations.
2. If it is vested in the Secretary of Labor and Employment, whether the power was not delegated
by him in this case to the Bureau of Labor Relations.
3. Whether the examination of petitioner's books was validly ordered despite the fact that the
requirements of Art. 274 of the Labor Code had not been complied with.
4. Whether the union officers were properly held accountable for union funds.
With regard to the first issue, the petitioner cites Art. 274 of the Labor Code and Rule VIII-A of the implementing rules,
in support of its contention that the BLR had no authority to conduct an examination of the books of the LTWU and
that such authority is vested solely in the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representative. These provision
state:
Art. 274. Visitorial Powers. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized
representative is hereby empowered to inquire into the financial activities of legitimate labor
organizations upon the filing of a complaint under oath and duly supported by the written consent of
at least twenty (20%) percent of the total membership of the labor organization concerned and to
examine their books of accounts and other records to determine compliance or non-compliance
with the law and to prosecute any violations of the law and the union constitutions and
by-laws; Provided, that such inquiry or examination shall not be conducted during the sixty (60) day
freedom period nor within the thirty (30) days immediately preceding the date of election of union
officials.
Rule VIII-A

VISITORIAL POWER
Sec. 1. Exercise of visitorial power. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly
authorized representative shall inquire into the financial activities of any legitimate labor
organization and examine their books of accounts and other records to determine compliance with
the law and the organization, constitution and by-laws, upon the filing of a complaint under oath
and duly supported by the written consent of at least 20% of the total membership of the labor
organization concerned.
Sec. 2. Period of inquiry or examination. No inquiry or examination of the financial activities and
books of accounts as well as other records of any legitimate labor organization mentioned in the
preceding section shall be conducted during the 60 day freedom period nor within 30 days
immediately preceding the date of election of union officials.
The petitioner argues that although Art. 274 authorizes the Secretary to delegate the examination of accounts to a
representative, the BLR Director cannot be considered a duly authorized representative because the power to
examine the books of accounts of a union has already been delegated to union account officers pursuant to the
implementing rules, Rule 1, sec. 1(ff) which provides:
"Union Accounts Examiners" are officials of the Bureau or the Industrial Relations Division in the
Regional Office empowered to audit books of accounts of the union.
On the other hand, the public respondents contend that union accounts examiners are actually officials of the BLR
because the word "Bureau" in sec.
1(ff) refers to the Bureau of Labor Relations. At any rate, they contend that by endorsing the case to the BLR, the
Secretary of Labor and Employment clearly designated the BLR to act on his behalf.
Respondent's contention is well taken. The "union accounts examiners of the Bureau" mentioned in Rule 1, sec. 1(ff)
of the implementing rules as having the power to audit the books of accounts of unions are actually officials of the
BLR because the word "Bureau" is defined in Rule 1, sec. 1(b) of the same rules as the Bureau of Labor Relations.
Anyway, the delegation of authority to union accounts examiners in Rule 1, sec. 1(ff) is not exclusive. By indorsing the
case to the BLR, the Secretary of Labor and Employment must be presumed to have authorized the BLR to act on his
behalf. As already stated, the Secretary made two indorsements: first, when he referred to the BLR the letter dated
July 27, 1989 of Ramon de la Cruz and Norma Marin seeking the annulment of the audit report of the DOLE NCR,
and second, on September 4, 1990 when, instead of acting on the petition for review of the union, he indorsed it to
the BLR.
Independently of any delegation, the BLR had power of its own to conduct the examination of accounts in this case.
Book IV, Title VII, Chapter 4, sec. 16 of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides:
Sec. 16. Bureau of Labor Relations. The Bureau of Labor Relations shall set policies, standards,
and procedures on the registration and supervision of legitimate labor union activities including
denial, cancellation and revocation of labor union permits. It shall also set policies, standards, and
procedure relating to collective bargaining agreements, and the examination of financial records of
accounts of labor organizations to determine compliance with relevant laws.
The Bureau shall also provide proper orientation to workers on their rights and privileges under
existing laws and regulations, and develop schemes and project for the improvement of the
standards of living of workers and their families.
The Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715, likewise authorizes the BLR to decide intra-union disputes. This includes
the examinations of accounts. Thus, Art. 226 of the Code provides:
Art. 226. Bureau of Labor Relations. The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations
Divisions in the regional offices of the Department of Labor shall have original and exclusive
authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on all
inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or

affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or non-agricultural,

except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements
which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration.
The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) working days to act on labor cases before it, subject to extension
by agreement of the parties.
Petitioner's contention that the intra-union dispute mentioned in this provision does not include the examination of
accounts of the union because it contemplates intra-union conflicts affecting labor-management relations is
untenable. Conflicts affecting labor-management relations are apart from
intra-union conflicts, as is apparent from the text of Art. 226.
This brings us to the second question, whether the examination of accounts in this case is valid considering that it
was not initiated through a sworn written complaint by at least 20% of the total membership of the LTWU. As already
stated, the case arose from a letter written by 200, out of a total membership force of 1,015 of the LTWU. These
represented 19.70% of the total membership of the union, just a little less than the required number.
The requirements referred to were inserted in Art. 274 by way of an amendment by R.A. 6715 which took effect on
March 21, 1989. On the other hand, the letter of the union members petitioning for an examination of the financial
records of the union was made on March 14, 1989, i.e., seven days before the effectivity of the amendments. At the
time the letter was made, Art. 274 merely provided:
Art. 274. Visitorial power. The Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representative is hereby
empowered to inquire, from time to time, into the financial activities of legitimate labor organizations
and to examine their books of accounts and other records to determine compliance or noncompliance with the law and to prosecute any violations of the law and the union constitution and
by-laws.
The validity of the request for examination of union accounts must be determined as of the time of its filing. Hence we
hold that the request of the 200 union members in this case was validly made and conferred jurisdiction on the
DOLE-NCR to conduct the examination of the books of accounts of the petitioners.
It is indeed true that, in setting aside the audit report of the DOLE-NCR, the BLR cited the fact that the examination of
accounts had been made within the so-called "freedom period." But as the BLR pointed out in its order dated
September 29, 1989, the ban on examination or audit of union funds within 60 days of the expiration of the collective
bargaining agreement had been a policy of the Department of Labor and Employment even before R.A. 6715 took
effect. There is, therefore, nothing inconsistent in holding that the examination of accounts by the DOLE-NCR as void
for having been conducted within the freedom period and saying now that since the letter requesting such an
examination was made before the effectivity of R.A. 6715, the requirements of sworn written complaint and support of
at least 20% of the total membership of the union do not apply.
The examination subsequently ordered by the BLR, although made after the effectivity of R.A. 6715, was validly
conducted because it was simply a continuation of proceedings already began in the DOLE-NCR. As a matter of fact
the petitioners, in elevating the matter to the Secretary of Labor, specifically requested that their letter be treated as a
motion for reconsideration or as an appeal from the audit report of the DOLE-NCR.
Finally, it is claimed that petitioners Ramon de la Cruz and Norma Marin were denied due process by the BLR. As
already shown, however, they were given every opportunity to defend themselves, including a warning that if they
persisted in their refusal to submit the books of accounts of the union they would be considered to have waived the
right to present their evidence. As they did not heed the warning, we think the BLR was justified in using, as basis of
its examination, the certification of La Tondea, Inc. as to the amount remitted by it to the LTWU as union dues. This,
at any rate, is a factual matter and the rule is that the findings of facts of administrative agencies, when supported by
substantial evidence, will not be disturbed.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.