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Art Education and a

Democratic Citizenry
Richard Siegesmund

Abstract
The first purpose of Art Education in public
schools, articulated in the eighteenth century,
was the ability to shape an imaginatively responsible, empathetic, democratic citizenry; this
remains an aim for today, which is hard to
achieve. This article explores the continuing
tension between this original goal and other
versions of Art Education, particularly Artistic
Education, focusing on professional skills and
techniques, and Aesthetic Education that
focuses on appreciation of objects. After
reviewing Friedrich Schillers historic contribution to theorising aesthetics as empathy and as
experienced through play, and Johan Pestalozzis practical application in a first curriculum, the
article demonstrates Schillers influence on
contemporary theorists Jacques Rancire and
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak who also insist that
art must remain unproductive in order to defy
cultural commodification. In their view, Art
Education must be deviant to utility and retain an
essential uselessness. A current case study
demonstrates the difficulties in facilitating

authentic democratic action within the utilitarian

demands on todays schools. By developing
wide-awakeness in students, spaces develop
where silenced individuals might be heard. Art
Education curricula should form the mindful
habit of an informed citizenry that fashions an art
of living by constructively re-imagining new
possibilities of democratic community and
empathetic understanding.
Keywords
art in education, teaching methods, aesthetics,
art study and teaching

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The discipline of Art Education has a variety of

curricular frameworks, each with a differing
conception of necessary and appropriate
content (Efland 1990; Eisner 2002; Hickman
2010). Each separate version allows the emergence of particular learning objectives. No
single curriculum can cover all possible content,
and every way of seeing is also a way of not
seeing (Eisner 2002, 25). One desired learning
objective in visual art might occlude another.
This article revisits a continuing 200-year-old
debate between the view of Art Education as
the construction and the appreciation of form
and the opposing standpoint of Art Education as
a formless discipline of personal and social, relational consciousness. To examine this curricular
issue, this article distinguishes between three
possible ways of framing study in the visual art.
The first is Artistic Education, defined here as
the technical training of artists in the production
of form. The second is Art Education, defined as
teaching for formless sensory cognitive
outcomes through art, that is, ways of empathetic thinking and being that emerge through
engagement with art making. The third is
Aesthetic Education, defined as the appreciation of inscriptions of meaning in a variety of
cultural forms.
These three heuristic categories with
slippery, shifting and oftentimes overlapping
lines of demarcation provide a means for
conceptualising thematic streams of what
we hope students will learn through the study
of visual materials. There are no standard
definitions for Artistic Education, Art Education
and Aesthetic Education. Different philosophers
and curricular theorists freely exchange
both terms of Art and Aesthetic Education to
encompass a broad array of practice [1]. Artistic
Education is introduced here as a means
of clarifying learning objectives. However,
while specific nomenclature is ambiguous,
these three streams of focus emerged in
the late eighteenth century in the German
Enlightenment and gained importance through
curricular debates surrounding the educational
innovation of public schooling (Efland 1990;
Macdonald 1970).

Best curricular practices for teaching the visual

arts readily draw from all three currents; nevertheless, an understanding of how these streams
move apart or work together is worth reconsideration, particularly regarding the dichotomies
of form/formlessness, production/unproductiveness, utility/non-utility and usefulness/
uselessness. For example, both Artistic Education and Aesthetic Education curricula centre on
the creation and interpretation of form. The first
assures the continuing production of artefacts
of economic or personal value. The second
addresses interpretation and appreciation of
culturally or personally significant artefacts. In
contrast to these two streams, Art Education is
fundamentally different by regarding form as a
means rather than an end to fostering a responsible democratic imagination. Thus, it seeks
formless conceptual what Dewey (1934)
admiringly called ethereal educational
outcomes. This stream often becomes a guerrilla curriculum within formal bureaucratic structures of academic standards and assessment.

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The emergence of Art Education

All cultures have Artistic Education: the means
of training individuals in traditions that assure
continuity of community values while prizing
individual invention. Royal patronage or religious
orders sometimes maintained these processes.
With the Renaissance in the West and the rise of
capitalism, secular guilds also policed Artistic
Education. Through culturally honoured practices, artists sustained a living from social elites,
held status through their contributions to religious observance, and joined in a bourgeois
capitalistic exchange of goods. Artistic Education provided a means to participate in all of
these levels of activities.
The discipline of Art Education appeared at
the vortex of a revolutionary moment in the
history of the West. The eighteenth-century
Enlightenment heralded a new direction in the
development of human potential beyond learning the skills that might provide an adequate livelihood. This new direction is succinctly summarised in Immanuel Kants (1959, 1) famous credo,
Have the courage to think for yourself! For Kant,

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individuals in this new epoch should do more

than follow the rules that church and state
established; they should shape their own
authentic understandings. This signalled a
change in how we conceptualised the individual. Persons were not well-honed cogs in a fixed
society. Neither were they empty vessels to be
moulded in the continuity of traditions. Thinking
was not learning rules, first strictly transmitted
through authority and then faithfully adhered.
Kant affirmed that the Enlightenment was to
question patterns of transmittal. Instead of
working within set designs, individuals
re-formed possibilities into new ways of being.
This privileging of the imagination had a special
significance for the arts.
An individual who responded to Kants challenge to dare to know (1959, 1) was an individual who could make full use of what Kant (1929)
called the transcendental aesthetic imagination
a place where one was capable of shaping
sense, experience and prior knowledge into
unique ideas and representations. Thus,
aesthetics, as Kant interpreted the philosophy,
was not a field of Artistic Education, but a field of
Political Science. Aesthetics was a cognitive
skill a means of thinking that prepared individuals to participate in a new political order.
This daring to know, based on an inherent ability
to construct personal understanding, marks the
birth of the modern self-governing citizen.
However at the close of the eighteenth century,
the Terror of the French Revolution became an
unsettling prospect for a society unmoored
from the constraints of church and state. Consequently, the education of a responsible democratic citizenry became a new challenge. Universal public education was one response (Efland
1990; Macdonald 1970), but the question of
what should be taught remained unanswered.
There was no curriculum for this new paradigm
of aesthetic imagination to produce a responsible citizen.
The contribution of Schiller
The German Idealist poet and philosopher Friedrich Schiller the great populariser of the
philosophy of Immanuel Kant was the first to

advocate a distinct discipline of Aesthetic

Education to shape an imaginatively responsible
democratic citizenry. Schiller argued that great
works of art modelled autonomous thinking.
The way artists prompted viewers to think dovetailed with the new articulated political conception of a citizen. Schillers goal was not the
production of artists; he was interested in new
forms of participatory democracy.
Schillers (2004) On the Aesthetic Education
of Man, published in 1795 in the wake of the
French Revolution, spoke to the problem of how
successfully to shape new democratic societies. The French philosopher Jacques Rancire,
who considers Schillers ideas in contemporary
context, describes him as breaking with a
conception of education as skill training and
replacing it with the development of a new
consciousness that all members of society
could share: Schillers aesthetic state, by
suspending the opposition between active
understanding and passive sensibility, aims at
breaking down with an idea of art an idea of
society based in the opposition between those
who think and decide and those who are
doomed to material tasks (Rancire 2004, 44).
Schiller spoke to the need for collective social
values. One of his educational objectives was a
perception of Anschauung a phenomenological awareness of interconnectedness (similar to
what Maxine Greene (1995) calls aesthetic
wide-awakeness). Training in Anschauung
resulted in sensed empathetic relationships.
Aesthetic learning was an intellectual attentiveness to how we are in the world and how we are
in relation to others around us: a capacity for
empathy as demonstrated through caring
behaviour. This was a necessary skill to be a
competent citizen charged with the responsibility of maintaining self-governance.
Significantly, Schiller suggested that this
state of empathetic attentiveness could not be
concisely taught through linear transmission
pedagogy. Instead, an individual came to this
awareness via a circuitous path of authentic
play. Schiller claimed that play will, I promise
you, support the whole fabric of aesthetic art,
and the still more difficult art of living (as quoted

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in Rancire 2004, 80, emphasis added). Through

aesthetic play, one opens to Anschauung and
comes to an understanding of how one lives in
relation to the world. This art of living is the birth
of an educational project in the visual arts
distinct from Artistic Education.
Here, it is important to note that the term
Aesthetic Education splits into two different
streams of interpretation. Schillers active
aesthetics of consciousness follows a course
that this article refers to as Art Education. In
tandem to this current, the identification and
appreciation of culturally significant meaningful
objects becomes the stream that today is
commonly understood as Aesthetic Education
(see, for example, Smith 1987). Art Education
follows an unproductive, formless wide-awakeness and felt relationship to the world.
The concept of play
For Schiller, coming to aesthetic understanding
through authentic play did not mean the strict,
rule-governed play of sport, but an open and
fluid imagining in which delight is a possible
outcome, but can never be a goal. In the pursuit
of this aesthetic delight, a dynamic re-imagination of experiencing a phenomenon occurs.
Because there is no purpose for this is play,
and therefore purposeless these terms of
engagement can freely morph, alter and reconstruct to the ephemerally emergent ends of
delight. As Rancire (2010, 176) states regarding
Schiller: Aesthetic experience is that of an
unprecedented sensorium in which hierarchies
are abolished that structured sensory experience. This is why it bears within it the promise of
a new art of living of individuals and the
community, the promise of a new humanity.
Rancire goes on to observe that Schillers playful aesthetic engagement is fundamentally
useless in the sense that aesthetic play transforms without concern for an outcome.
Aesthetic play skips categories; it thwarts
recognition and invites us to recalibrate,
readjust and reconsider.
The refusal of art to be what we expect, to
follow the rubric, and delight in surprise is a
possible challenge to Artistic Education. If Artis-

tic Education becomes obsessively concerned

with imparting a skill set in forming artefacts,
such a curriculum could be anaesthetic [2] by
negating arts ability to be play. Greene (2001)
echoes this point as well, insisting on aesthetics
as engaging a democratic imagination. She
expresses concern that Artistic Education is
overly concerned with the transfer of mechanical technique and skill. In such a view, the role of
Art Education is not to enable the production of
objects intended for exhibition in reified cultural
institutions such as galleries and museums.
Instead, Art Education is the empowerment of
individuals to spin visions of worlds as worlds
otherwise might be (Greene 2001). For Rancire,
these multiple worlds exist in states of unresolved competitive tension. There is no such
thing as best practice, no hope of consensus.
We live in dissensus (Rancire 2010) where the
strains of competing ideas constantly push and
probe against each other. Here, Art Education
eschews the creation of purposeful form and,
instead, focuses on training for Schillers
ephemeral art of living, a necessary skill for a
functional democratic society.

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The uselessness and ab-use of art

Schiller focused on an independent, empathetic
consciousness. In a curriculum based on his
ideas, felt educational outcomes remain
unseen. These outcomes cannot be put on
display. They cannot enter into economic
exchange. In the capitalist world, they are fundamentally use-less: impossible to adapt to utilitarian objectives.
The post-colonial theorist Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (2012) also reaches back to Schillers aesthetics to discuss how Art Education
teaches an unbridled consciousness that
refuses to submit to pre-existing categories and
purpose. Drawing on the Latin prefix of ab,
which indicates outside, deviant, or other,
Spivak calls her conception of aesthetics a
curriculum of ab-use. By placing a hyphen,
Spivak contends that aesthetics must unfold in
Schillers state of authentic play, in a place deviant to utility deviant even to the utility of an art
object. Only in allowing individuals to play, only

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in allowing them an aesthetic experience of

autonomous non-utility can, in Spivaks view,
individuals emerge who are capable of resisting
the homogenising hypnotic influence of capital
and the controlling conflation of data.
Spivak concludes that an aesthetics of
ab-use is the only recourse open to maintaining
an authentically autonomous individual capable
of maintaining an empathetic stance. Only an
individual who is free from rules and strictures
can fully relate to the humanity of another. This
holds the promise of an authentic democratic
society instead of our now existing neo-liberal
societies that are simulacra of democracies but
exist through the exercise of power and control.
An aesthetics of empathy is a necessary condition to the possibility of creating new, more
open and just social relationships.
Theory to practice: Pestalozzi
At the beginning of the nineteenth century,
Johann Pestalozzi (17481827) (see Pestalozzi
1898) developed Schillers aesthetic theory of
Anschauung into a formal curriculum. Working
with orphans, Pestalozzi argued that the practice of drawing connected the individual to
an experience of authentic perception, which
was pedagogically useful in bringing children
toward the potentially transformative and
redemptive practice of education. Pestalozzi
claimed his visual exercises could lead the child
from vague perceptions to clear ideas. To
do this, he created an Alphabet of Form, through
which students trained their hands in order
to enlarge their perception, and thus set a
platform for growth. Today, these exercises
appear to our contemporary eyes just as rulegoverned as the study of language and mathematics. However, Pestalozzis work marks a
new specific curriculum of using art to train
general habits of mind, rather than teaching
Artistic Education. Pestalozzi is the curricular
point of transfer where Schillers aesthetic
theory becomes Art Education. He lays the
educational foundation of a new discipline as
focusing on training individuals to think for
themselves, rather than about producing good
art or design.

Pestalozzis drawing methods for the development of Schillers concept of Anschauung soon
attracted international attention. First, the new
Prussian public school system applied Pestalozzis methods on a general programmatic level
across multiple institutions (Efland 1990;
Macdonald 1970). In Pestalozzis curriculum,
Prussian educational authorities saw an instructional approach for creating a sensed shared
cultural character. For political reasons of Prussian power and control, individuals had to see
themselves as belonging to a national identity.
Drawing helped to shape this national
consciousness a critical political objective for
the new government.
However, different educators projected
different educational outcomes on to Pestalozzis approach. The British educational inspector
William Dyce saw in the Prussian drawing
curriculum a system for the early identification
of textile designers. His report became the
backbone of nineteenth-century British Art
Education: utilitarian in the service of national
industry (Macdonald 1970).
Shortly after Dyces evaluation of the Prussian drawing method as a design curriculum,
the American Transcendentalists, Horace Mann
(commonly regarded as the father of public
education in the United States) and his wife
Mary Peabody, specifically travelled to Germany
for their honeymoon to observe the curriculum.
They saw in this drawing curriculum a realisation
of developing Schillers call for an aesthetic
sensibility critical to a self-aware individual who
was capable of discharging the duties of republican government. Mann and Peabody returned
to the United States advocating the inclusion of
Art Education in American schools for the development of responsible democratic practice
(Efland 1990). However, this Transcendentalist
view of Art Education was ultimately replaced in
the latter part of the nineteenth century by a British model of Artistic Education based on training
industrial designers the effects of Dyces initial
assessment (Efland 1990) of the Prussian drawing curriculum. The triumph of the useful British
instructional model, with the clear application of
preparing designers for work in textile mills, was

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an example of Artistic Education superseding

the supposedly useless democratic consciousness, lacking an immediate utilitarian application, of Transcendentalist Art Education.
The useful demands of education
By the end of the nineteenth century, state
educational systems were modelled on industry, with the metaphor of the assembly line,
embodying efficient mass production, held
forth as the standard for best educational practice. Artistic Education, which sought to
produce individuals who could produce culturally significant objects, could readily adapt to
this model. Aesthetic Education, which prized
object identification, could also thrive.
To be efficient and cost-effective, the industrial-educational system defined discrete forms
of knowledge shaped by praxis that supported
each discipline. Academic Artistic Education
became compartmentalised and began with
learning the properties of media paint, clay,
charcoal, papier-mch, fibres, to just begin a
list. Then the tools that effected change to
media allowed enumeration of techniques for
generating visual qualities (e.g. processes like
scumbling, glazing, or braising and methods like
sgraffito or intaglio). Aesthetic Education flourished by drawing on the content of 40,000 years
of human art making for identification and
appreciation. Fine-grained sub-divisions
provided traction for articulated learning objectives and for the building of scope and sequence
of curriculum. The massive amounts of content
knowledge allowed for sanctioned forms of
accountability and assessment. The institution
of school celebrated these forms of categorisation as knowledge management. Holding
students responsible to this content provided
clear guidance in how we trained our pre-service
art teachers and in what we expected our
in-service art teachers to do.
However, all of these structures of curriculum in Artistic and Aesthetic Education are in
direct contradiction to arts refusal to submit to
categories and definitions (Rancire 2010).
Through our present system of education, how
we teach art risks the loss of arts character as

art belongs to our epoch of self-determining

individualism in the service of sustaining
authentic dialogue with democratic community. Educating a democratic consciousness
was arts original intended contribution to the
project of public school. The play, the unpurposefulness, of art is critical. Yet, in serving the
ends of education, we may drain art of this
essential role.

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A useful useless curriculum

Even educators who attempt to sustain the
legacy of Art Education as a form of empathetic
felt relationships to others can reduce aesthetics to utility. For example, in the United States an
art education lesson that currently enjoys
widespread interest is Empty Bowls (Taylor
2002). Empty Bowls requires students to make
ceramic bowls that they give away as a part of a
fundraising event in support of local food banks.
With that, they demonstrate empathy for
members of the community who are in need.
However, most children do not voluntarily
give away their beautifully glazed pot. They want
to give their treasures to a loved one; they do
not want to give their bowls in support of a
good cause. Empty Bowls can engage
students in lessons of what it means to give and
what it means to socially care: lessons
of aesthetics. Reflecting on the act of making
a bowl that will be given away to a stranger
which may be seen as unproductive studio
time opens a possibility for an authentic insight
into caring. This can be a valuable addition to
an art curriculum. Experiencing what it means
to give in order to sustain a responsible
society aligns to Schillers conception of
aesthetic understanding.
However, the structure of the institution of
school has ways of subverting the best of curricular intentions. As Empty Bowls garners
community support, principals have begun to
mandate that the art teacher lead the schools
participation. There is no longer anything voluntary about the event. It is simply a task to be
fulfilled a utilitarian form to be produced.
The democratic agency of students is removed
from the lesson.

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This became evident to an elementary art

educator, Lauren Phillips, when during her
impassioned introduction on the empathy and
caring that students would experience through
their Empty Bowls unit, she discovered she had
a democratic insurrection on her hands (Phillips
& Siegesmund 2013). The students did not want
to support the community food bank; they
wanted to do something for the victims of the
2011 Japanese tsunami whom they had been
learning about in their social studies curriculum.
The students had begun to play with and
re-imagine Laurens lesson. She was the one
who made a commitment to raise funds for the
food bank; Empty Bowls was an imposition of
her idea of empathy. The students wanted to
demonstrate their empathetic connectedness
in other ways.
On reflection, Lauren realised that, for the
best of Art Education curricular intentions, she
had strong-armed her students, by prescribing
a template that would render laudatory social
outcomes yet at the same time excluded them
from democratic participation in aesthetic practice. Her role and commitments as a teacher
were now at odds with the educational
outcomes she sought to teach.
To solve this problem, she continued with the
annual school-wide Empty Bowls event she had
committed to, but for her class that wanted to
help with Japanese tsunami relief, the students
decided in their own group discussions that, in
addition to their obligations to make ceramic
bowls for the school event, they would also
make and sell paper origami cranes for the
benefit of people who were suffering in Japan.
Lauren arranged for these children to gather
in origami workshops that she led before school,
during lunch and after school. At the evening of
the Empty Bowls, her students manned a table
for Japanese relief, selling their paper cranes.
They raised $50, a meaningful amount to
impress on these children the power of their
autonomy to question a teacher, to propose an
alternative curriculum, take action and present
their results to the community.
To successfully complete this project in Art
Education, the students mastered skills of Artis-

tic Education: learning to fold origami paper

properly to create an object of value that could
be presented in the world. In their initial planning, the students drew from their Aesthetic
Education, recognising that folding origami was
an appropriate form within Japanese culture for
materialising their concern. Thus, this Art Education a lesson in becoming a responsible citizen
also built on the streams of Artistic and
Aesthetic Education [3].
Utility and non-utility: toward democratic
practice
A curriculum is shaped by a disciplines way of
knowing. In the visual arts, that method includes
learning to dare: dare to know, dare to say what
is not known, dare to dream a possibility that we
might, in turn some day, dare to know. Daring
and risk-taking are methods for inquiry in the
visual arts that can take the form of doing and
pausing.
Baldacchino (2012, 13) claims that the arts
power of pausing [is the] most effective way by
which aesthetics comes to effect in its autonomous and radical essence. In short, the power
of art is more than the form of objects, but also
comes in giving space to the formless possibility of what might be: to stop and pause and
allow consideration of other outcomes from
those that might have originally been intended,
and to risk that this new path might be useless.
Rancire (2004, 37) observes, while words and
symbols inscribe meaning, there still is all of the
potential of meaning inherent in everything
silent. We disassemble and deconstruct the
useful to render it useless, and in that, pause
and reassemble an enlarged democratic imagination of the possible guided by our empathetic
sense of being in relation to the animate and
inanimate contexts in which we live. Art Education has the potential to create spaces where
silenced individuals might be heard as we
develop an empathetic capacity to attend to
their stillness.
Baldacchino calls for Art Education to reassert its origins as a field of re-imaginings.
Re-imaginings cannot be taught through curricular innovations like Backward Design (Wiggins

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& McTighe 2005), when destinations are

declared at the beginning of instruction, and
then scope and sequence are carefully aligned
to assure that everyone reaches the destination.
As Baldacchino (2012, 166) tells us, Art Education cannot be limited to predefined skills transmission and curricular objectives. It needs to be
a field of folds, contiguity and ruptures where
aesthetic undertakings begin to inhabit other
spaces.
Art Education should unapologetically
embrace its roots in empathetic social relationships and ask how to best harness the content
knowledge within Artistic and Aesthetic Education into a coherent curriculum for democratic
outcomes grounded in wide-awakeness. It
must also question how the content knowledge
of Artistic and Aesthetic Education might
impede the ends of Art Education.
Art can restrict or open dialogue and possibility. Art Education curricula cannot be held to
preordained designs; they need to risk. They
need to pause and play; they need to take the
chance that time spent in instruction may be
useless. For only in that risk, can Art Education
curricula hold a promise of being useful to
democratic ends through an aesthetics of
empathy and care.

Richard Siegesmund is Professor and Division

Head of Art and Design Education at Northern
Illinois University. In addition, he serves as a
Visiting Fellow to the Research Institute of the
National College of Art and Design in Dublin,
Ireland. He holds a PhD in Art Education from
Stanford University where he studied under
Elliot Eisner. He is also the former President of
Integrative Teaching International, an organisation that seeks to reimagine the first-year learning outcomes of post-secondary art and design
education. He is a recipient of the National Art
Education Associations Manuel Barkan Memorial Award for significance of published research.
He was a Fulbright Scholar and received fellowship awards from the Getty Education Institute
for the Arts and the National Endowment for the
Arts. His publications include Arts-Based
Research in Education: Foundations for Practice.
Contact address: Northern Illinois University,
School of Art, DeKalb, Illinois 60115, USA. Email:
rsiegesmund@niu.edu

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Richard Siegesmund

Notes
1. For example, Maxine Greene uses a broad
definition of Aesthetic Education that this article parses into Art Education and Aesthetic
Education. Thus, Greene is cited here in
support of Art Education, although other
portions of her writing address contemporary
Aesthetic Education.
2. Dewey (1934) claims that the opposite of the
aesthetic is the anaesthetic: that which lacks
sense and feeling, and is no more than inert
form.
3. For another example of tensions between a
utilitarian Artistic Education programme and
non-utilitarian Art Education, see Touching
Eternity (Barone 2001), a longitudinal study of
the learning outcomes in a rural secondary
school.

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Phillips, L. & Siegesmund, R. (2013) Teaching

what we value: care as an outcome of aesthetic
education, in T. Costantino & B. White [Eds]
Aesthetics, Empathy, and Education. New York:
Peter Lang, pp. 22134

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