TORTS AND DAMAGES DIGEST

VICARIOUS LIABILITY
State

Meritt vs Govt

The facts of the case took place in the 1910s. E. Merritt was a constructor
who was excellent at his work. One day, while he was riding his motorcycle
along Calle Padre Faura, he was bumped by a government ambulance. The
driver of the ambulance was proven to have been negligent. Because of the
incident, Merritt was hospitalized and he was severely injured beyond
rehabilitation so much so that he could never perform his job the way he
used to and that he cannot even earn at least half of what he used to earn.
In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government
which later authorized Merritt to sue the government by virtue of Act 2457
enacted by the legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against
the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the AttorneyGeneral of said Islands to appear in said suit). The lower court then
determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the
same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent act of the
driver of the ambulance.
HELD: No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from
suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of
action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously
recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and
submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose
any lawful defense. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such
provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private
individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the

discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor
even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization
of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents. The State
can only be liable if it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in
the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite
and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his
office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being
bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a
government officer acting as a special agent hence, there can be no liability
from the government. The Government does not undertake to guarantee to
any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that
would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties
and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.

Rosete vs Auditor Gen.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Insular Auditor denying the claim of
Inocencio Rosete and others against the Government in the amount of
P35,376, for damages caused to buildings belonging to the claimant,
which according to the appellant's claim were destroyed by fire that
came from the contiguous warehouse of the Emergency Control
Administration, ECA, located at No. 2262 Azcarraga, due to the
negligence of a certain Jose Frayno y Panlilio in igniting recklessly his
cigarette-lighter near a five gallon drum into which gasoline was being
drained, and of the officers of the said ECA, which is an office or agency
of the Government, in storing gasoline in said warehouse contrary to the
provisions of Ordinances of the City of Manila.
It is not necessary for us to pass upon the facts alleged by the appellant, but
only on the question whether, assuming them to be true, the Insular Auditor
erred in denying or dismissing the appellant's claim.
The claimant contends that the Auditor General erred in not finding that
the government agency or instrumentality known as the Emergency
Control Administration of the officers thereof, were guilty of negligence

in storing a highly combustible and inflammable substance in its

warehouse on bodega in Manila in violation of City Ordinances, and
therefore the government is liable for the damages sustained by the claimant
under article 1903 of the Civil Code, which in its pertinent part reads as
follows:
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is
enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions but also for
those persons for whom another is responsible.

organization of branches of the public service and the appointment of

its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight
humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service
serves the general weal and that of private persons interested in its
operation. Between these latter and the state, therefore, no relations
of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a
case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring
rights and contracting obligations." (Supreme Court of Spain,
January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.).

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

The state is liable in the scene when it acts through a special agent,
but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to
whom it properly pertained to do the act performed, in which case
the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.
In the case of Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (34 Phil., 311),
this Court held the following:
. . . Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
"The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent,
but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to
whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which cast the
provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable."
The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph
said:
"That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person
causes to another by his fault or negligence is based, as is
evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person
obligated, by his own fault or negligence, takes part in the act or
omission of the third party who caused the damage. It follows
therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not
responsible for the damage suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of
the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even
negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the

xxx

xxx

"That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the

case wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in
the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a
definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the
duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation
of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes
the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any
executive agent who is an employee of the active administration and
who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are
inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated
by law and the regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May 18, 1904;
98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.).
"That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and
the principle laid down in a decision, among others, of the 18th of
May, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited
to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered
by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged
with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not
where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public
official charged with some administrative or technical office who can
be held to the proper responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in
not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of
damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has
by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of article 1902
and 1903 of the Civil Code.' (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911;
122 Jur. Civ., 146.)"

There being no showing that whatever negligence may be imputed to

the Emergency Control Administration or its officers, was done by an
special agent, because the officers of the Emergency Control
Administration did not act as special agents of the government within
the above defined meaning of that word in article 1903 of the Civil Code
in storing gasoline in warehouse of the ECA, the government is not
responsible for the damages caused through such negligence.
The case of Marine Trading vs. Government, 39 Phil., 29, cited by the
appellant, is inapplicable, because the plaintiff in that case recovered under
the special provisions of articles 862, 827, 828 and 830 of the Code of
Commerce and the Philippine Marine Regulations of the Collector of
Customs, regarding collision of vessels, and not on the ground of tort in
general provided for in article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Act No. 327, in authorizing the filing of claims against the Government with
the Insular Auditor, and appeal by the private persons or entities from the
latter's decision to the Supreme Court, does not make any and all claims
against the Government allowable, and the latter responsible for all claims
which may be filed with the Insular Auditor under the provisions of said Act.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed.

Fontanillas vs Mailanman
Petitioners: Spouses Jose Fontanilla and Virginia Fontanilla
Respondents: Hon. Inocencio D. Maliaman and National
Administration (NIA)

Irrigation

FACTS
On December 1, 1989, the Court rendered a decision declaring National
Irrigation Administration (NIA), a government agency performing
proprietary functions. Like an ordinary employer, NIA was held liable for
the injuries, resulting in death, of Francisco Fontanilla, son of petitioner
spouses Jose and Virginia Fontanilla, caused by the fault and/or
negligence of NIAs driver employee Hugo Garcia; and NIA was ordered
to pay the petitioners the amounts of P 12,000 for the death of the victim;
P3,389 for hospitalization and burial expenses; P30,000 as moral
damages; P8,000 as exemplary damages, and attorneys fees of 20% of
the total award.
The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) maintains, however, that it does
not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions, but is an agency of
the government tasked with governmental functions, and is therefore not
liable for the tortuous act of its driver Garcia, who was not its special
agent. For this, they have filed a motion for reconsideration on January
26, 1990.
NIA believes this bases this on:
PD 552 amended some provisions
of RA 3601 (the law which created the NIA)
The case of Angat River Irrigation
System v. Angat River Workers Union
Angat Case: Although the majority opinion declares that the Angat System,
like the NIA, exercised a governmental function because the nature of its
powers and functions does not show that it was intended to bring to the
Government any special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit, a strong
dissenting opinion held that Angat River system is a government entity
exercising proprietary functions.
The Angat dissenting opinion:
Alegre protested the announced termination of his employment. He argued
that although his contract did stipulate that the same would terminate on
July 17, 1976, since his services were necessary and desirable in the
usual business of his employer, and his employment had lasted for five
years, he had acquired the status of regular employee and could not be
removed except for valid cause.
The employment contract of 1971 was executed when the Labor Code of the
Philippines had not yet been promulgated, which came into effect some
3
years
after
the
perfection
of
the
contract.
ISSUE

Whether or not NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality

separate and distinct from the government, thereby opening it up to the
possibility that it may be held liable for the damages caused by its driver, who
was
not
its
special
agent
HELD: YES
Reasoning the functions of government have been classified into
governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. The former
involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the latter
connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as
optional.
The National Irrigation Administration was not created for purposes of local
government. While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service
agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public
welfare, such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a
"government-function" corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of
"constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national
irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump
irrigation projects." Certainly, the state and the community as a whole are
largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but these functions are
only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of
lands.
NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate
and distinct from the government, thus is governed by the Corporation Law.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3601 provides:
Sec. 1. Name and Domicile A body corporate is hereby created which
shall be known as the National Irrigation Administration. . . . which shall be
organized immediately after the approval of this Act. It shall have its principal
seat of business in the City of Manila and shall have representatives in all
provinces, for the proper conduct of its business. (Emphasis for emphasis).
Besides, Section 2, subsection b of P.D. 552 provides that:
(b) To charge and collect from the beneficiaries of the water from all irrigation
systems constructed by or under its administration, such fees or
administration charges as may be necessary to cover the cost of operation,
maintenance and insurance, and to recover the cost of construction within a
reasonable period of time to the extent consistent with government policy; to
recover funds or portions thereof expended for the construction and/or
rehabilitation of communal irrigation systems which funds shall accrue to a
special fund for irrigation development under section 2 hereof;
Unpaid irrigation fees or administration charges shall be preferred liens first,
upon the land benefited, and then on the crops raised thereon, which liens
shall have preference over all other liens except for taxes on the land, and
such preferred liens shall not be removed until all fees or administration
charges are paid or the property is levied upon and sold by the National
Irrigation Administration for the satisfaction thereof. . . .

The same section also provides that NIA may sue and be sued in court.
It has its own assets and liabilities. It also has corporate powers to be
exercised by a Board of Directors. Section 2, subsection (f): . . . and to
transact such business, as are directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or
conducive to the attainment of the above powers and objectives, including
the power to establish and maintain subsidiaries, and in general, to exercise
all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as they
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.
DISPOSITION: The court concluded that the National Irrigation
Administration is a government agency with a juridical personality separate
and distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government
but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be
held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was
not its special agent.
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration dated January 26, 1990 is
DENIED WITH FINALITY. The decision of this Court in G.R. No. 55963 and
G.R. No. 61045 dated December 1, 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED.

TEACHERS AND HEADS OF ACADEMIC ESTABLISHMENT

Amadora vs CA
FACTS: Alfredo Amadora was shot by a gun fired by his classmate Daffon
while in the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos Auditorium at a date after the
semester ended. He was there to submit a graduation requirement in
Physics.
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence . Additionally, the
herein petitioners, as the victims parents, filed a civil action for damages
under Article 2180 of the CC against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its
rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher,
together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective
parents.
The complaint against the students was later dropped. After trial, the CFI of
Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs, representing
death compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral
expenses, MD, ED and AF.
On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and
all the defendants were completely absolved. Hence this petition for certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

In its decision the respondent court found that Article 2180 was not
applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts
and trades but an academic institution of learning. It also held that the
students were not in the custody of the school at the time of the incident as
the semester had already ended.
ISSUE: how should Art. 2180 be applied in this case
HELD: the petition is DENIED. The rector, the high school principal and the
dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-incharge as previously defined. Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held
directly liable under the article because only the teacher or the head of the
school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the
student or apprentice
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so
long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage.
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the
conclusion that the provision in question should apply to all schools,
academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather
than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by
the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the
first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of
establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who
shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule.
As stated in the dissent of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the Exconde Case, under
Art. 2180, he said, was imposed on (1) teachers in general; and (2) heads of
schools of arts and trades in particular. The modifying clause of
establishments of arts and trades should apply only to heads and not
teachers.
But of course, as long as the defendant can show that he had taken the
necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate
himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180, as stated in its last
paragraph.
In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held liable
not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that
the offending student be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who wig be liable
only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held answerable by the law for
the act of the student under him regardless of the students age

In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is
supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and
trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature,
may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof
under the general principle of respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate
itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus
paterfamilias.The school can show that it exercised proper measures in
selecting the head or its teachers and the appropriate supervision over them
in the custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to its rules and
regulations for the maintenance of discipline among them.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades over the students. Is
such responsibility co-extensive with the period when the student is actually
undergoing studies during the school term, as contended by the respondents
and impliedly admitted by the petitioners themselves?
This does not necessarily mean that such, custody be co-terminous with the
semester, beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the close
thereof, and excluding the time before or after such period, such as the
period of registration, and in the case of graduating students, the period
before the commencement exercises [During such periods, the student is still
subject to the disciplinary authority of the school and cannot consider himself
released altogether from observance of its rules.]In the view of the Court, the
student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the
control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the
semester has not yet begun or has already ended.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in
pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate
student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and
even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of
the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the student
should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of
his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of
the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the
school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
NOTES:
The reason for the disparity [distinction of who should be responsible for
students between academic and arts and trades schools] can be traced to
the fact that historically the head of the school of arts and trades exercised a
closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of the academic school. The old
schools of arts and trades were engaged in the training of artisans
apprenticed to their master who personally and directly instructed them on
the technique and secrets of their craft. By contrast, the head of the
academic school was not as involved with his students and exercised only
administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons directly dealing
with the students. The head of the academic school had then (as now) only a
vicarious relationship with the students. Consequently, while he could not be

directly faulted for the acts of the students, the head of the school of arts and
trades, because of his closer ties with them, could be so blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the
expansion of the schools of arts and trades, the consequent increase in their
enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of the direct and personal
contract of their heads with the students. Article 2180, however, remains
unchanged. In its present state, the provision must be interpreted by the
Court according to its clear and original mandate until the legislature, taking
into account the charges in the situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to
enact the necessary amendment.

Palisoc vs Brillantes

FACTS: In March 1966, while Dominador Palisoc (16 years old) was
watching Virgilio Daffon and Desiderio Cruz work on a machine in their
laboratory class in the Manila Technical Institute (a school of arts and trades),
Daffon scolded Palisoc for just standing around like a foreman. This caused
Palisoc to slightly slap the face of Daffon and a fistfight ensued between the
two. Daffon delivered blows that eventually killed Palisoc. The parents of
Palisoc sued Daffon, the school president (Teodosio Valenton), the instructor
(Santiago Quibulue), and the owner (Antonio Brillantes). The basis of the suit
against Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes was Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

The lower court, as well as the CA, ruled that only Daffon is liable for
damages and that Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes are not liable because
under Article 2180, they are only liable so long as they [the students] remain
in their custody. And that this means, as per Mercado vs Court of Appeals,
that teachers or heads of establishments are only liable for the tortious acts

of their students if the students are living and boarding with the teacher or
other officials of the school which Daffon was not.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in the Mercado Case still applies.

HELD: No. The SC abandoned the ruling in the Mercado Case as well as the
ruling in the Exconde Case as they adopted Justice JBL Reyes dissenting
opinion in the latter case. Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacherin-charge of the school must be held jointly and severally liable for the quasidelict of Daffon. The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the
students could have been avoided, had said defendants but complied with
their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students
in the school premises to protect their students from harm, whether at the
hands of fellow students or other parties. At any rate, the law holds them
liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the
last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by (proving) that they observed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. In the light of
the factual findings of the lower courts decision, said defendants failed to
prove such exemption from liability.
The SC reiterated that there is nothing
in the law which prescribes that a student must be living and boarding with
his teacher or in the school before heads and teachers of the school may be
held liable for the tortious acts of their students.

St. Mary's Academy vs Carpitranos

FACTS:
Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 19951996 They visited schools from where prospective enrollees were studying.
Sherwin Carpitanos joined the campaign. Along with the other high school
students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their
way to Larayan Elementary School. Such jeep was driven by James Daniel
II, a 15 year old student of the same school. It was alleged that he drove the
jeep in a reckless manner which resulted for it to turned turtle. Sherwin died
due to this accident.
ISSUE: WON petitioner should be held liable for the damages.

HELD:
CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of
the Family Code where it was pointed that they were negligent in allowing a
minor to drive and not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the
jeep. However, for them to be held liable, the act or omission to be
considered negligent must be the proximate cause of the injury caused thus,
negligence needs to have a causal connection to the accident. It must be
direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by any efficient intervening
causes. The parents of the victim failed to show such negligence on the part
of the petitioner. The spouses Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause
of the accident was not the reckless driving of James but the detachment of
the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Futhermore, there was no evidence
that petitioner allowed the minor to drive the jeep of Villanueva. The
mechanical defect was an event over which the school has no control hence
they may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.
The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service,
would primarily be responsible to the public or to 3 rd persons for injuries
caused while it is being driven on the road. It is not the school, but the
registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages
for the death of Sherwin. Case was remanded to the trial court for
determination of the liability of the defendants excluding herein petitioner.

ST.

FRANCIS

HIGH

SCHOOL

VS.

CA

FACTS: Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman student at the St.

Francis High School, wanted to join a school picnic. His
parents, respondents spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia
Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow their son
to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers
for the picnic, with the directive that he should go back home

after doing so. However, because of persuasion of the

teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach. During
the picnic, one of the female teachers was apparently
drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came
to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself
who drowned. He died. Respondent spouses filed a civil case
against petitioner and some of their teachers. Trial court
found teachers liable but dismissed complaint against the
school.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner school and teachers are liable.
RULING:

Petition

granted.

RATIO: Before an employer may be held liable for the

negligence of his employee, the act or omission which
caused damage must have occurred while an employee was
in the performance of his assigned tasks. In the case at bar,
the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance
of their assigned tasks. What was held was a purely private
affair, a picnic, which did not have permit from the school
since it was not a school sanctioned activity. Mere knowledge
by petitioner/principal of the planning of the picnic does not
in any way consent to the holding of the same.
No negligence could be attributable to the petitionersteachers to warrant the award of damages to the
respondents-spouses. The class adviser of the section where
Ferdinand belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or
damages to all the students who joined the picnic.