Digests

Ppl vs Solayao
Facts:
Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Naval,
Biliran, Branch 16, with the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition [1] defined and
penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1866.
Police Officer Nio seized the dried coconut leaves which Solayao was carrying and found
wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade firearm locally known as "latong." Solayao was not
issued a license to carry said firearm nor he was not connected with the military or any
intelligence group - Solayao had no permission to possess the same. SPO3 Nio confiscated
the firearm and turned him over to the custody of the policeman of Caibiran who subsequently
investigated him and charged him with illegal possession of firearm.
Accused-appellant, in his defense, did not contest the confiscation of the shotgun but
averred that this was only given to him by one of his companions, Hermogenes Cenining, when
it was still wrapped in coconut leaves.
Issue:
WoN the accused-appellant (Solayao) admission that he had no permission to possess a
firearm prove reasonable doubt.
Held:
No.
Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court which states:
"An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the trial or other proceedings
in the same case does not require proof."
Not being a judicial admission, said statement by accused-appellant does not prove beyond
reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession of firearm. It does not even
establish a prima facie case. It merely bolsters the case for the prosecution but does not stand
as proof of the fact of absence or lack of a license.
This Court agrees with the argument of the Solicitor General that "while the prosecution
was able to establish the fact that the subject firearm was seized by the police from the
possession of appellant, without the latter being able to present any license or permit to possess
the same, such fact alone is not conclusive proof that he was not lawfully authorized to carry
such firearm. In other words, such fact does not relieve the prosecution from its duty to
establish the lack of a license or permit to carry the firearm by clear and convincing evidence,
like a certification from the government agency concerned.

Alvarez vs Ramirex
Facts:
Respondent Susan Ramirez was the complaining witness in a criminal case or arson pending
before the RTC. The accused was petitioner Maximo Alvarez, stranged husband of Esperanza
Alvarez, sister of respondent. On June 21, 1999, Esperanza Alvarez was called to the witness
stand as the first witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify
Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on
marital disqualification.
Respondent filed an opposition to the motion. Pending resolution of the motion, the trial court
directed the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of the other witnesses. On September
2, 1999, the trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez from further
testifying and deleting her testimony from the records. The prosecution filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied in the other assailed Order dated October 19, 1999. This
prompted respondent to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with application for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. On May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court
rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside the assailed Orders issued by the trial court.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
WoN Esperanza can testify over the objection of her estranged husband on the ground of
marital privilege.
Held:
Yes.
Esperanza may testify over the objection of her husband. The disqualification of a witness by
reason of marriage under Sec. 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court has its exceptions as
where the marital relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved. The
acts of the petitioner stamp out all major aspects of marital life. On the other hand, the State has
an interest in punishing the guilty and exonerating the innocent, and must have the right to offer
the testimony of Esperanza over the objection of her husband.

Ppl vs Bernal
Facts:
Accused-appellant Theodore Bernal, together with two other persons whose identities and
whereabouts are still unknown, were charged with the crime of kidnapping in Criminal Case No.
26658-92 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 10, under an information[1] dated
July 13, 1992.
It appears that on August 5, 1991, around 11:30 in the morning, while Roberto Racasa and
Openda, Jr. were engaged in a drinking spree, they invited Bernal, who was passing by, to join
them.
After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave both men, apparently because he was going to
fetch his child. Thereafter, two men arrived, approached Openda, Jr., and asked the latter if he
was Payat.[3] When he said yes, one of them suddenly pulled out a handgun while the other
handcuffed him and told him not to run because they were policemen and because he had an
atraso or a score to settle with them. They then hastily took him away. Racasa immediately
went to the house of Openda, Jr. and informed the latters mother of the abduction.
Issue:
WoN the TC is correct in giving credence to the testimonies of the witnesses.
Held:
Yes.
The trial court correctly appreciated the testimony of Sagarino, it being free from any illmotive against Bernal. If the latters allegations were true, then Sagarino should have been
arrested by the police at the time he gave his testimony in court. No such arrest was, however,
made.
The court a quo committed no error in finding the testimonies of Enriquez, Racasa and
Sagarino sufficient to convict Bernal. The court said that Sagarinos forthright answers to the
questions of the prosecutor and defense counsel clearly establish the participation of Bernal in
the abduction or kidnapping of Openda, Jr. Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed
from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself. [21] This Court once again
finds occasion to reiterate the established rule that the findings of fact of a trial court carry great
weight and are entitled to respect on appeal, absent any strong and cogent reason to the
contrary, since it is in a better position to decide the question of credibility of witnesses.[22]
We note that after a lapse of a considerable length of time, the victim has yet to
resurface. Considering the circumstances, it is safe to assume that Openda, Jr. is already dead.

Gardiner vs Magsalin
Facts:
This is an original petition for writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge to admit
the testimony of Catalino Fernandez, one of the accused in criminal case No. 6598, to prove the
alleged conspiracy between him and his five coaccused, respondents herein.
Catalino Fernandez pleaded guilty and his five coaccused, not guilty. At the trial of the
latter, the former was called by the fiscal as his first witness, to testify to the alleged conspiracy.
Upon objection of counsel for the defense, the respondent judge did no permit the witness
Catalino Fernandez to testify against his coaccused, on the ground that he being a conspirator,
his act or declaration is not admissible against his coconspirators until the conspiracy is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration, under section 12, rule 123 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
WoN the contention of the accused is correct.
Held:
No.
SEC. 12. Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to
the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the
coconspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.
That is not a new rule of evidence. It is a re-enactment of paragraph 6, section 298 of the old
Code of Civil Procedure, which provided that after proof of a conspiracy, the act or declaration of
a conspirator relating to the conspiracy may be given in evidence. This rule has a well-settled
meaning in jurisprudence, but apparently the respondents completely missed it. It is one of the
exceptions to the "res inter alios" rule. It refers to an extrajudicial declaration of a conspirator
not to his testimony by way of direct evidence.

Pppl vs Galleno
Facts:
Accused-appellant Joeral Galleno seeks reversal of the judgment of Branch 14 of the
Regional Trial Court of the 6th Judicial Region stationed in Roxas City, relying on the defense of
denial. Since the case involves the death penalty, the matter has been elevated to this Court for
automatic review.
Accused-appellant was charged in an Information docketed as Criminal Case No. C-4629
for the crime of Statutory Rape, reading as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, upon prior authority and approval of the
Provincial Prosecutor, and the original complaint filed by the guardian of the offended party,
accuses Joeral Galleno of the crime of STATUTORY RAPE
The Trial Court had given full weight to the testimonies of the witnesses even in the
absence of spermatozoa.
Issue:
WoN the TC erred in giving full weight to the testimonies of the witnesses.
Held:
No.
As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions or give opinions. It
is the court's duty to draw conclusions from the evidence and form opinions upon the facts
proved (Francisco, Pleadings and Trial Practice, Vol. I. 1989 ed., pp. 889-890). However,
conclusions and opinions of witnesses are received in many cases, and are not confined to
expert testimony, based on the principle that either because of the special skill or expert
knowledge of the witness, or because of the nature of the subject matter under observation, of
for other reasons, the testimony will aid the court in reaching a judgment. (Ibid., p.886).

In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the aid of the expert
testimony of doctors who gave their opinions as to the possible cause of the victim's laceration,
but also the testimony of the other prosecution witness, especially the victim herself. In other
words, the trial court did not rely solely on the testimony of the expert witnesses. Such expert
testimony merely aided the trial court in the exercise of its judgment on the facts. Hence, the
fact that the experts enumerated various possible causes of the victim's laceration does not
mean the trial court's interference is wrong.
The absence of spermatozoa in the victim's vagina does not negate the conclusion that it
was his penis which was inserted in the victim's vagina (People vs. Caada, 253 SCRA 277
[1996]). In rape, the important consideration is not the emission of semen but the penetration of
the female genitalia by the male organ (People vs. Dadles, 254 SCRA 696 [1996]). Verily, it is
entirely probable that climax on the part of accused-appellant was not reached due to the cries
of pain of the victim and the profuse bleeding of her vagina.

Manila Mining vs Tan

Facts:
Manila Mining Corporation (MMC) ordered and received various electrical materials from Tan
valued at P2,347,880. MMC agreed to pay the purchase price within 30 days from delivery, or
be charged interest of 18% per annum, and in case of suit to collect the same, to pay attorneys
fees equal to 25% of the claim.
MMC made partial payments in the amount of P464,636. But despite repeated demands, it
failed to give the remaining balance of P1,883,244, which was covered by nine invoices.
Tan filed a collection suit against MMC at the Manila RTC. After Tan completed presenting
evidence, MMC filed a Demurrer to Evidence, which the RTC denied. RTC further directed MMC
to present evidence.
MMC offered as sole witness Rainier Ibarrola, its accountant from year 2000 to 2002. Ibarrola
confirmed that it was standard office procedure for a supplier to present the original sales
invoice and purchase order when claiming to be paid. He testified that the absence of stamp
marks on the invoices and purchase orders negated receipt of said documents by MMCs
representatives.
On rebuttal, Tan presented Wally de los Santos, his sales representative in charge of MMCs
account. De los Santos testified that he delivered the originals of the invoices and purchase
orders to MMCs accounting department. As proof, he showed three customers
acknowledgment receipts bearing the notation:
I/We signed below to signify my/our receipt of your statement of account with you for the period
and the amount stated below, together with the corresponding original copies of the invoices,
purchase order and requisition slip attached for purpose of verification, bearing
acknowledgment of my/our receipt of goods.

The RTC ruled for Tan and ordered defendant to pay the principal amount with interest and
liquidated damages. MMC moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the RTC.
Petitioner also assails the probative value of the documentary evidence presented during trial,
claiming that the unauthenticated photocopies of invoices and purchase orders did not satisfy
the Best Evidence Rule and that by Tans failure to yield the original documents, he was
presumed to have suppressed evidence under Section 3 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
WoN MMC should pay for the electrical materials despite its allegation that Tan failed to comply
with certain requisites for payment
Held:
Yes. Petition denied for lack of merit. Petitioner poses a question of fact which is beyond this
Courts power to review. This Courts jurisdiction is generally limited to reviewing errors of law
that may have been committed by the Court of Appeals. We reiterate the oft-repeated and fully
established rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, especially when they are in
agreement with those of the trial court, are accorded not only respect but even finality, and are
binding on this Court.
In this case, the purchase orders constituted accepted offers when Tan supplied the electrical
materials to MMC. Hence, petitioner cannot evade its obligation to pay by claiming lack of
consent to the perfected contracts of sale. The invoices furnished the details of the transactions.
As regards respondents failure to present the original documents, suffice it to say that the best
evidence rule applies only if the contents of the writing are directly in issue. Where the existence
of the writing or its general purport is all that is in issue, secondary evidence may be introduced
in proof. MMC did not deny the contents of the invoices and purchase orders. Its lone contention
was that Tan did not submit the original copies to facilitate payment. But we are in agreement
that photocopies of the documents were admissible in evidence to prove the contract of sale
between the parties.

Maulini vs Serrano
Facts:
A certain Promissory Note (PN) with an amount of 3k was made in favour of SERRANO. This
was indorsed in the back by SERRANO to MAULINO. Come payment time, SERRANO does
not want to pay MAULINO. MAULINO files a case against SERRANO to collect the amount in
thePN. SERRANO submits parole evidence to prove that the indorsement made by him to
MAULINO was wholly without consideration.
Issue:
WON Serrano as indorser can prove by parole evidence that the indorsement in the PN was
without consideration?
Held:
Yes.
SERRANO CAN PROVE BY PAROLE EVIDENCE.
Parol evidence is admissible to show that an indorsement was made wholly without
consideration and, that in making it, the indorser acted as agent for the indorsee and as a mere
vehicle for the transfer of the naked title from the maker to the indorsee. The prohibition against
the introduction of parol evidence contained in section 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure was
designed to prevent alteration, change, modification, variation or contraction of the terms of a
written instrument admittedly existing except in cases specifically named therein. The prohibition
does not apply where the purpose of the parol evidence is to show that no written contract ever
existed, that the minds of the parties nevermet on the terms of such a contract, that they never
mutually agreed to enter into such a contract, and that there never existed any consideration
upon which such an agreement could be founded. The contention has some of the appearances
of a case in which an indorser seeks prove forgery. Where an indorser claims that his name was

forged, it is clear that parol evidence is admissible to prove that fact, and, if he proves it, it is a
complete defense. In the case before us we have a condition somewhat similar. While the
indorser does not claim that his name was forged, he does claim that it was obtained from him
in a manner which, between the parties themselves, renders, the contract as completely
inoperative as if it had been forged.

Tijam vs Sibonghanoy
Facts:
The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of money in the sum of exactly P
1,908.00, exclusive of interest filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses
Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was originally instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. A month prior to the filing of the complaint, the Judiciary Act
of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over
cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c] and
86[b], R.A. 296.)
The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire
proceeding the appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court of
Appeals' adverse decision.
Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases in
which jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the
Supreme Court along with the records of the case.
Issue:
WoN the Suretys action was correct.
Held:
No
Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against the counter-bond the Surety not only filed
a written opposition thereto praying for its denial but also asked for an additional affirmative

relief that it be relieved of its liability under the counter-bond upon the grounds relied upon in
support of its opposition lack of jurisdiction of the court a quo not being one of them.
Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution against the counter-bond, the Surety
appeared, through counsel, to ask for time within which to file an answer or opposition thereto.
This motion was granted, but instead of such answer or opposition, the Surety filed the motion
to dismiss mentioned heretofore.
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel
by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of
limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way
of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction
either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases
because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is
valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be
tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.

Ppl vs Sala
Facts: (To follow)