UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Sustainable Alternative Developments

for Narcotics Control in Afghanistan

Ahmad Javid Ahmadi

6/21/2012

Executive Summary
The ever-increasing nexus between drugs and terrorism is pretty well documented.
Afghanistan is one of the worlds largest producers of opium. The Afghan Drugs
Industry is steadily fueling insurgency and financing domestic and global terrorism.
While the Government of Afghanistan (GoIRA) is struggling to stem the unabated flow
of opium, the Taliban is going all out to maintain its cultivation. It facilitates drug
trafficking as it derives income by levying taxes on cultivation as well as its trade across
the border. The warlord and the Taliban use revenues from this cultivation and trade to
gain access to sophisticated weapons and communication systems and thereby thwart
any attempts to usher in peace and stability by the Afghani Government and the
NATO. Moreover, Afghanistan is a land locked country with a mix of stable and
volatile neighbors. Opium easily permeates through its porous borders and funds
global terror networks as well.
The Karzais Government has taken some concrete measures to contain this menace. It
has established a specialized Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN), formulated policies
and laws for counter narcotics. It has adopted several strategic and tactical measures
that have led to several provinces achieving the Poppy Free statuses. It has also
effectively utilized Public Awareness, Demand Reduction, Enforcement, and Alternate
Livelihood steps to alleviate the burden of narcotics on Afghanistan. This paper
attempts to critically evaluate the drugs trade of Afghanistan and provides
recommendations to improve.

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Table of Contents
Executive Summary .................................................................................................................0
Situational analysis ..................................................................................................................3
Historical Background .........................................................................................................3
Afghanistan drug profile (demographics) ......................................................................3
History of narcotics in Afghanistan.................................................................................7
Involvement of neighboring countries in Afghan drugs ...............................................9
Current efforts by the Karzais government..................................................................... 10
Strategic............................................................................................................................ 10
Tactical ............................................................................................................................. 10
Achievements ...................................................................................................................... 13
Recommendations Sustainable Alternative Development .............................................. 15
Government ..................................................................................................................... 15
Farmers ............................................................................................................................ 16
Consumers ....................................................................................................................... 17
References /bibliography .................................................................................................. 19

Table of figures
Figure 1 Factsheet Afghanistan Opium 2011 ...........................................................................4
Figure 2 Major Poppy Cultivating Provinces of Afghanistan ......................................................5
Figure 3: Opium poppy cultivation map of Afghanistan..............................................................6
Figure 4: Trafficking routes .........................................................................................................7
Figure 5: Ministries and Agencies Segregation ......................................................................... 12

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Situational analysis
Historical Background
Afghanistan drug profile (demographics)

Afghanistan is the opium capital of the world. It produces over 90% of the worlds
opium, powering the global heroin trade and funding both the insurgents and
government-linked warlords. Afghan opium trade generates billions of dollars of
revenue per year into the countrys informal, illegal economy.
Currently, 131,000 hectare of agricultural land is cultivated for opium poppy. The
number of households / individuals involved in opium poppy cultivation reached
191,500 / 1,490,000 or 5% of the Afghanistan population in 2011. According to the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimate, the monetary value of
the drug industry is around $1.4 billion (or 9% of GDP).

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Figure 1 Factsheet Afghanistan Opium 2011

Component

2010

Net opium poppy cultivation (after eradication)

123,000 ha

Changes
+7%

(104,000-145,000)
Number of poppy free provinces

2011
131,000 ha
(109,000-155,000)

20

-3

17

Number of provinces affected by poppy cultivation 14

+3

17

Eradication (Governor led)

2316 ha

+65%

3810 ha

Weighted average opium yield

29.2 kg/ha

+52%

44.5 kg/ha

Potential production of opium

3,600 mt

+61%

5,800 mt

(3,000-4,200)
Number

of

household

involved

in

opium 248,700

ccultivation.

(4,800-6,800)
-23%

6%

191,500
5%

In % of total population
Average farm-gate price (weighted by production) US$ 128/kg

+41%

US$ 180/kg

+43%

US$ 241/kg

of fresh opium at harvest time

Average farm-gate price (weighted by production) US$ 169/kg

of dry opium at harvest time
Current GDP

US$ 12.7 billion

Total farm-gate value of opium production

US$ 605 million

In % of GDP

5%

Gross income from opium per ha

US$ 4,900

US$ 16.34 billion

+133%

US$ 1,407 million

9%

+118%

US 10,700

Contribution of global narcotics trade

According to UNODC 2011 report, Afghanistan produces 90% of the world opium.
Only an insignificant quantity of this opium is consumed in Afghanistan, while the rest
is smuggled out of the country. Afghan heroin is channeled through Islamic Republic of
Iran, Pakistan and Central Asia, to other continents. In 2009 UNODC estimated that 150
tons of Afghan Heroin reaches Europe, 120 tons Asia and 45 tons Africa.

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Geographical locations of poppy fields, opium labs and trafficking routes

i.

Poppy cultivation & opium production

Ninety five per cent (95%) of poppy cultivation takes place in Southern and Western
regions of Afghanistan. Statistics indicate that in 2011 Southern region produced 2701
ton (78%), Western 529 ton (17%), North-Eastern 367 ton (9.6%), Eastern 89 ton (2.3%),
Central 80 ton (2%) and Northern 34 ton (.89%) of opium.
The production of opium is widely spread across the country. As outlined below, there
are six major opium-producing provinces that produce 3422 tons of opium annually:
Figure 2 Major Poppy Cultivating Provinces of Afghanistan
Region

Province

Opium Production (tons)

Southern

Helmand

1940

Northern

Badakhshan

367

Southern

Kandahar

287

Southern

Daikundi

235

Western

Hirat

227

Western

Farah

212

Southern

Uruzgan

154

Total
ii.

3422

Processing Laboratories

Afghanistan has approximately 300-500 laboratories in operation with an output of

approximately 380 tons of heroin per year. The Southern region of the country accounts
for 50 per cent of national Heroin manufacturing in the last few years.

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iii.

Trafficking

Almost all opiates trafficked from Afghanistan enter Pakistan, Iran and Central Asia.
According to UNODC report, 365 tons of heroin was trafficked out of Afghanistan in
2009: 160 tons to Pakistan, 115 tons to Iran, and 90 tons to Central Asia (Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). In addition, Afghan opium export was accounted for
1200 1400 tons, almost 80% of which was trafficked to Iran. Only a small percentage of
Afghan opiate is consumed in these neighboring countries, but the rest reaches
international markets in Europe, Africa and other Asian countries. In 2009, UNODC
estimated that 150 tons of Afghan Heroin reaches Europe, 120 tons Asian and 45 tons
African markets. All chemical precursors are smuggled in to Afghanistan from
Pakistan, Iran and relatively smaller quantities from Russia and China.
Figure 3: Opium poppy cultivation map of Afghanistan

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Figure 4: Trafficking routes

History of narcotics in Afghanistan

Initiation
Afghanistan has a long history of producing narcotics. The opium poppies cultivation
began, when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) invaded Afghanistan in
year 1979. This struggle consequently resulted in less or no control of Afghan
government of the time over its provinces. The invasion and lack of government control
over provinces resulted in growing strength of warlords. These warlords needed money
to fund their resistance operations against the Soviet-funded Afghan government. The
insurgents primarily used drugs industry to finance their operations, and then received
more financial support from the United States and a number of other western countries.

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Following to collapse of the Soviet Union and withdrawal of their troops from
Afghanistan in 1989, the western support discontinued. This discontinuation resulted in
a significant increase in poppy cultivation, because the insurgents were using drugs as
the only financial means for their operations. The opium production continued to
increase markedly in 1990s. In year 2000 Taliban leader, Mulla Mohammad Omar
issued a decree that announced poppy production against Islamic practices. This decree
resulted in 90% reduction in poppy cultivation in year 2001.
Linkage to terrorism opium ecosystem
Poppy cultivation takes place in areas under control of insurgents (insecure
provinces)

Providing security to farmers who grow opium poppy

Insurgents / drug traffickers lend (provide informal loans) to farmers before

cultivation season for their poppy harvest

Insurgents tax the opium production at the farm gate (10% of production)

Insurgents work in poppy fields during harvest to augment their pay

Insurgents collect tax from local/ small drug traders who collect opium from
farms

Insurgents facilitate trafficking of narcotics by securing trafficking routes and

collect transit tariff per kilo of opium / heroin

Insurgents also receive payment for providing security to narcotics processing

labs

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Insurgents also receive regular payment from drug traffickers that makes the
largest proportion of their income

UNODC has estimated that insurgents collect an annual income of $ 125 million from
taxes and protection payments from the drug trade. All of this money is used to finance
insurgents operations in the country.

CULTIVATION
Traffickers provide loans to farmers
Insurgents provide security against fee to
poppy fields and growers
Collects 10% tax on harvest

FINANCING INSURGENCY
Access to sohphisticated weapons and
communication equipment via
revenue collected from tax and tariff
direct regular payments by traffickers

PRODUCTON
Insurgents tax production (double
tax)
Provide security to processing labs
against fee

TRAFFICKING
Secure trafficking routes
Collect tariff on each killo of drugs
shipped

Involvement of neighboring countries in Afghan drugs

Afghanistans neighboring countries play an important role in the growing Afghan
narcotics / drugs industry. The neighboring countries such as Pakistan, Iran and
Central Asian Countries (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) supply chemical
precursors used in Heroin processing labs, and provide primary market for Afghan
opiates. As illustrated in the trafficking map, these countries service as a hub between
Afghan opiates and drug markets in Asia, Europe and Africa.
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Current efforts by the Karzais government

Go-IRA appreciated the implications of Afghanistans opium trade and adopted eight
pillars under the Afghanistans National Development Strategy (ANDS). The Ministry
of Counter Narcotics (MCN) was established post this to make these pillars more
comprehensible and achievable. The purpose of each pillar is briefly outlined below:
Strategic
Institution Building
Build CN institutions that provide for effective governance at the center and in the
provinces

International & Regional Cooperation

Improve International and Regional Cooperation to disrupt the flow of illicit drugs and
precursor materials across borders.

Criminal Justice

Establish an effective criminal justice system that can support drug law enforcement.
Tactical
Public Awareness
Inform, educate, deter and dissuade the population from involvement in the illicit
drugs trade, cultivation of opium and abuse of opiates.

Demand Reduction

Reduce Afghan demand for drugs and offer treatment to addicts.

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Law enforcement

Establish Institutional capacity to increase drug trafficking risk through law

enforcement.

Eradication

Build the capacity to conduct targeted and verified ground-based eradication of opium
poppy farms.

Alternative livelihood

Strengthen and diversify Alternative Livelihoods (AL) that free farmers and other
rural workers from dependence on opium cultivation and encourages growth of the licit
economy.
Since CN is a crosscutting function that requires multi-agency efforts, the government
mainstreamed CN objectives in all Implementing Line Ministries (ILMs) and relevant
agencies programs. It also established Counter Narcotics Inter-ministerial Committee
(CN-IMC), consisted of deputy ministers and/ or director generals of line ministries
and agencies. This high level CN-IMC coordinates CN efforts across the government.
The following table illustrates the formation of CN working groups under each pillar:

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Figure 5: Ministries and Agencies Segregation

Objective

Pillar Ministries and Agencies

Law Enforcement

Ministry of Interior (MoI), Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan

(CNPA), MCN, Border Police, Afghan National Police (ANP),

Criminal Justice

Ministry of Justice (MoJ), Attorney-Generals Office, Criminal Justice

Task Force (CJTF), MCN

International

& Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), Ministry of Defense (MoD),

Regional

National Directorate for Security (NDS), Office of National Security

Cooperation

Adviser, MCN

Institution-Building

All line ministries and provincial administration

Public Awareness

MCN, Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE), Ministry of Public Health

(MoPH), Ministry of Information, Culture & Tourism (MoIC&T),
Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs (MoH&RA), Ministry of Womens
Affairs

(MoWA),

Ministry

of

Education

(MoEd),

Independent

Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG)

Demand Reduction

MCN, MoHE, MoPH, MoIC&T, MoH&RA, MoWA, MoEd

Eradication

MCN, MoI, Afghan Eradication Force (AEF), IDLG (Provincial

Administration)

Alternative

Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), Ministry of

Livelihoods

Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL), MCN, Ministry of Energy

and Water (MoEW), Ministry of Finance (MoF), Ministry of Public
Works (MoPW), Provincial Administration (IDLG)

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Achievements
MCN has been instrumental in adopting both demand reduction and supply
constriction strategies. This two-pronged approach has had some teething troubles but
has been effective nonetheless. As demonstrated in Figure 1 Factsheet Afghanistan
Opium 2011, while MCN has successfully managed to reduce the number of
households involved in opium cultivation, it has lost ground on achieving poppy free
provinces.

National database

One of the biggest accomplishments of MCN was the compilation and creation of a
national database of narcotics. This is turning out of immense value to the Afghani
government, UNODC, international agencies because previously there was absolutely
no account of the opium economy including opium production, opium exports,
families/ individuals involved, number of addicts, percentage of the GDP, percentage
contributing to warlords, etc.

Drug Demand Reduction

MCN along with MoI raised their law enforcement and eradication drives. This led to
increased seizures and arrest, more Poppy Free provinces. Apart from this, MCN,
UNODC and MoPH launched an Addicts Survey in 2005 that kept track of local
addiction numbers and created 50 Treatment Centers that have been providing
deaddiction and counseling to addicts.

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Alternate livelihood

MCN in accordance with MAIL and MRRD created alternative livelihood programs
that incentivized farmers to quit opium cultivation and seek alternate cyclical cash
crops. This resulted in the Helmand province achieving the status of a Poppy free
Green Zone. MCN also ensured that the farmers who had quit opium cultivation were
provided adequate protection from the warlords.

Public Awareness

MCN sought cooperation from the MoHE, MoPH, MoIC&T and MoEd in raising the
public awareness levels by running a media program on national television and radio,
creating a helpline for answering queries on alternative livelihood and deaddiction and
most importantly utilized the religious leaders and priests as the mouthpiece of the CN
initiative.

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Recommendations Sustainable Alternative Development

The GoIRA has been persistently adhering to its CN pillars. However, most of the CN
initiatives have been rolled out in isolation and are successful in disparate areas. What I
would like to suggest here is that that the GoIRA should pursue a nationwide CN
initiative that targets all stakeholders. I have tried to encompass recommendations for
Government, Farmers and Consumer below:
Government
Autonomy to MCN
MCN is the specialty ministry created solely for counter narcotics. Therefore, it ought to
be allowed autonomously to not just create policy but also to implement it. It should not
be subjected to pressures from international advisors. The transient international
advisors should neither formulate policy based on their limited knowledge nor should
they interfere in the policy formulation. They should just guide MCN in policy
formulation.

Centralize CN

Unless MCN is given pan-Afghanistan powers and prerogatives, it will continue to be

affected by IDLGs. Because narcotics are a menace affecting the entire country, it is
imperative that it is targeted by a central structure. Eliminating IDLGs or taking CN
control away from them is the only way MCN will retain control over the entire
country.

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Human resource investment

Unless the MCN invests in training, hiring and retaining home grown expertise, it will
have to continue relying on international experts. In order to be self-reliant and
autonomous, it has to get local people on board who are in turn willing to invest their
time and careers in MCN.

Commitment

Often times because of lack of resources and manpower, MCN withdraws support once
the province achieves Poppy Free status. This has resulted in provinces not staying
Poppy Free permanently. Liaising, funding and implementation in a particular
province is a resource and time intensive process. The MCN ought to commit itself to a
province and not abandon it once the status is achieved.
Farmers
Incentivize legal crops
MCN needs to figure out how to motivate farmers to dissociate themselves from the
opium ecosystem and opt legal crops? The MCN obviously has to incentivize this by
providing better value proposition to the farmers.

Security

In the current ecosystem, the warlords and extremists provide protection to the farmers
and their families in exchange for cultivating opium. This extortion ensures the
wellbeing of the farmers families. Unless the farmers feel secure about pursuing legal
crops, no amount of incentivizing can persuade them to switch to legal crops. The

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GoIRA ought to provide security to the farmers, their families and on access routes to
markets.

Quality inputs

Afghanistan has a genuine dearth of farm inputs. The opium that the farmers currently
grow is also at the mercy of natural forces. In order to convert farmers to legal crops,
GoIRA will have to provide quality seeds, fertilizers and most importantly irrigation.

Improved access to markets

Currently, the warlords and extremists are buying opium from the farmers directly at a
high price. It is as if the markets come to the farmers doorsteps. Now, unless the GoIRA
creates markets that value the farmers legal crops at a fair price and provides them
their dues on time, farmers will not get motivated to switch to legal crops.

Better infrastructure (roads, transport, storage and processing facilities)

There is no semblance of any modern day infrastructure in Afghanistan. Unless the

government creates good quality storage and processing facilities for the farmers, their
harvest is bound to rot and get destroyed before it reaches the markets. The GoIRA
needs to create quality and secure roads and transport so that farmers can make their
legal crops available at markets to receive fair prices.
Consumers
GoIRA and its ministries have scaled some impressive ground in addressing the
demand of opium and its derivatives. However, as mentioned above, they need to
continue
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Raising the decibel on public awareness using national television, radio,

publications

Utilizing religious figureheads as spokespersons for counter narcotics

Identifying addicts using national database and by conducting periodic surveys

Providing deaddiction treatment and counseling

Providing vocational training and employment opportunities

Following up on their progress

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References
1. Afghanistans National Development Strategy (ANDS) _ 2008-2013
2. Afghanistans National Drugs Control Strategy (NDCS) _ 2006
3. UNODC_ Global_Afghan_Opium_Trade_2011-web
4. UNODC_ Opium Rapid Assessment Survey_Report_2011_phase_II_20110415
5. Adam Smith International Need Assessment Survey _ 2008
6. AREU_CN in Afghanistan_ the failure of success _ Dec 2008
7. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/afghanistan-pakistan/opiumbrides/afghanistans-opium-profits-soared-in-2011/ accessed June 22, 2012

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