People of the Philippines vs.

Dujua
Facts:
Ramon Dujua, Rose Dujua (his mother), Editha Singh (his aunt), and Guillermo Samson (his uncle),
were charged of illegal recruitment on a large scale
Only Ramon Dujua was apprehended and thereafter arrested.
Four different witnesses testified against the act of the four accused promising them different
opportunities, but the same never happened.
They were promised work abroad upon payment of placement fees and other incidental expenses;
however, when the time actually came, they were not deployed to their promised location of work.
In his reply, Ramon denied having committed such illegal recruitment, and that he was an illegal
recruiter
Issue:
WON the accused is guilty of Illegal Recruitment in a large scale
Held: Yes. The essential elements of such crime are as follows
1.) The accused engages in acts of recruitment and placement of workers defined under art13(b) or
in any prohibited activities under art34 of the labor code
2.) The accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment as regards to securing a license or an authority to recruit and/or deploy workers locally
or even abroad
3.) The accused commits the unlawful acts against 3 or mo persons, individually or as a group
Such elements have been established beyond reasonable doubt.
The testimonies of the witnesses clearly established that the accused promised them employment
opportunities. The mere denial of such fact by Ramon cannot take precedence over the positive
categorical testimonies of the witnesses
With the presentation of the pieces of evidence, it was also proved that the accused had no license
or a the very least, any authority to recruit and/or deploy workers locally or even abroad. The
company, World Pack Travel and Tours, under the guise of a legitimate employment agency, also
had no such license or authority from Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA).

Lastly, by the number of witnesses that effectively testified against the accused, it is clear that such
ploy was made at the expense of a large number of people.

Salazar v. Achacoso
G.R. No. 81510, 14 March 1990
Sarmiento, J.
Facts:
On 21 October 1987, Rosalie Tesoro, in a sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) charged Hortencia Salazar, allegedly the former's manager,
for withholding the former's PECC Card. On 3 November 1987, Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to
whom said complaint was assigned, sent to Salazar a telegram directing the latter to directly
appear before Ferdie Marquez, POEA Anti-Illegal Recruitment Unit 6/F, POEA Building,
regarding a case filed against Salazar. On the same day, having ascertained that Salazar had no
license to operate a recruitment agency, Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his Closure
and Seizure Order 1205 against Horty Salazar. On 26 January 1988, POEA Director on Licensing
and Regulation Atty. Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order designating Atty. Marquez, Atty.
Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to implement Closure and
Seizure Order 1205. Doing so, the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and media men
Lito Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today proceeded to Salazar's

residence. There it was found that Salazar was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering
the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who
voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs Flora Salazar informed the team that
Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.) However, when
required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced
upon 12 talent performers practicing a dance number and saw about 20 more waiting outside.
The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion
Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar. On 28 January 1988, Flora Salazar filed with
POEA a letter, requesting that the personal properties seized at Horty Salazar's residence be
immediately returned on the ground that said seizure was contrary to law and against the will of
the owner thereof. On 2 February 1988, before POEA could answer the letter, Salazar filed the
petition for prohibition, contesting the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue
warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.
On even date, POEA filed a criminal complaint against her with the Pasig Provincial Fiscal.
Issue:
May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly
issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code?
Ruling:
Under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution:
. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The Court reiterates that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or
arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, The
Court declares Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and
effect.
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, The Court reaffirms the following principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may
issue warrants of arrest and search:
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President
or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation,
for the purpose of deportation.

PEOPLEVSREMULLO
G.R.Nos.12444346.June6,2002
Quisumbing,J
FACTS:
AppellantNimfaRemullowasconvictedofcommittingillegalrecruitmentinlarge
scaleandestafa.Intheinformation,privatecomplainantsJenelynQuinsaat,Rosario
Cadacio,andHonorinaMejiaaverredthattheywenttoappellantshouse,whotold
themshewasrecruitingfactoryworkersforMalaysia.Appellanttoldthemtofillup
applicationformsandtogototheofficeofJamilaandCo.,therecruitmentagency
whereappellantworked.Appellantalsorequiredeachapplicanttosubmitdocuments
andthentoundergoamedicalexamination.TheplacementfeewasP15,000foreach
applicant,whichprivatecomplainantsgavetoappellant.Partofthefeewaspaidin
appellantshouseandpartwaspaidattheJamilaoffice.Appellantdidnotissue
receiptsforanyofthepayments.

AttheJamilaoffice,privatecomplainantsmetacertainStevenMah,thealleged
brokerfromthecompanyinMalaysia.Hejustlookedatthemandtoldthemtheywere
fittowork.
PrivatecomplainantsweresupposedtoleaveforMalaysiaonJune6,1993.OnMay
28,1993,privatecomplainantQuinsaattestifiedthatsheandtheothersmetwith
appellantatthePGHwhereappellantshowedthemtheirplanetickets.Appellantalso
toldthemtofillupdeparturecardsbycheckingthewordholidaythereon.
AttheairportonJune6,1993,animmigrationofficertoldprivatecomplainantsthey
lackedarequirementimposedbyPOEA.Theirpassportswerecancelledandtheir
boardingpassesmarkedoffloaded.Appellanttoldthemtheywerenotabletoleave
becausetheirvisaswerefortouristsonly.
AppellanttoldprivatecomplainantstheywouldbeabletoleaveonJune20,1993but
this,too,didnotpushthrough.
UponinquiryatJamilaandCo.regardingtheirapplicationpapers,thevicepresident
andgeneralmanagertoJamila,deniedanyknowledgeofsuchpapersandcontended
thatappellantdidnotsubmitanydocumenttoJamila.Shefurthercertifiedthat
appellantwasnotauthorizedtoreceivepaymentsonbehalfofJamila.
AppellantNIMFAREMULLOdeniedhavingrecruitedprivatecomplainantsand
receivinganymoneyfromthem.Sheallegedthatshemetprivatecomplainantsatthe
Jamilaofficewhereshewasamarketingconsultant.Theyaskedforherhelpin
obtainingjobsabroad,soshehadthemfillupbiodataformsandtoldthemtowaitfor
jobopenings.SheallegedthatJamilahadanagreementwithWearnessElectronics,
basedinMalaysia,concerningtherecruitmentofworkersforWearness.Private
complainantsweresupposedtohavebeenrecruitedforWearness.Sheinsistedthat
privatecomplainantsdidnothandtheirplacementfeestoherbuttoStevenMahand
toacertainLaniPlaton.Thetrialcourtfoundappellantguiltyofillegalrecruitmenton
alargescaleandofestafa.Hence,thisappeal.
ISSUE:
Whetherornotappellantcommittedthesaidacts.
RULING:
Yes,appellantcommittedillegalrecruitmentinlargescaleandestafa.Inillegal
recruitmentinlargescale,forsuchachargetoprosper,thefollowingelementsmust

concur:(1)theaccusedwasengagedinrecruitmentactivitydefinedunderArticle13
(b),oranyprohibitedpracticeunderArticle34oftheLaborCode;(2)heorshelacks
therequisitelicenseorauthoritytolawfullyengageintherecruitmentandplacement
ofworkers;and(3)heorshecommittedsuchactsagainstthreeormorepersons,
individuallyorasagroup.
Article13(b)oftheLaborCodeprovides:
ART.13.Definitions.xxx
(b)Recruitmentandplacementreferstoanyactofcanvassing,enlisting,
contracting,transporting,utilizing,hiringorprocuringworkers,andincludesreferrals,
contactservices,promisingoradvertisingforemployment,locallyorabroad,whether
forprofitornot:Provided,Thatanypersonorentitywhich,inanymanner,offersor
promisesforafeeemploymenttotwoormorepersonsshallbedeemedengagedin
recruitmentandplacement.
Weareconvincedthatprivatecomplainants,themainwitnessesfortheprosecution,
wereenticedbyappellanttoapplyforjobsabroad.Thethreeprivatecomplainants
filledupapplicationformsatappellantshouse,andeachpaidappellanttheamountof
P15,000asplacementfee.However,sheactedwithoutlicenseorlawfulauthorityto
conductrecruitmentofworkersforoverseasplacement.ThePOEAslicensingbranch
issuedacertificationstatingthatappellant,inherpersonalcapacity,wasnot
authorizedtoengageinrecruitmentactivities.EvelynLandrito,generalmanagerof
theplacementagencywhereappellantusedtowork,deniedthatthescopeof
appellantsworkincludedrecruitingworkersandreceivingplacementfees.Suchlack
ofauthoritytorecruitisalsoapparentfromareadingofthejobdescriptionofa
marketingconsultant,thepostthatappellantoccupiedatJamilaandCo.
Anentappellantsconvictionforestafa,forchargesofestafatoprosper,thefollowing
elementsmustbepresent:(1)thattheaccuseddefraudedanotherbyabuseof
confidenceorbymeansofdeceit,and(2)thatdamageorprejudicecapableof
pecuniaryestimationiscausedtotheoffendedpartyorthirdperson.Inthiscase,
appellantclearlydefraudedprivatecomplainantsbydeceivingthemintobelievingthat
shehadthepowerandauthoritytosendthemonjobsabroad.Byvirtueofappellants
falserepresentations,privatecomplainantseachpartedwiththeirhardearnedmoney.
EachcomplainantpaidP15,000asrecruitmentfeetoappellant,whothenappropriated
themoneyforherownuseandbenefit,butfailedutterlytoprovideoverseasjob
placementstothecomplainants.Inaclassicrigmarole,complainantswereprovided
defectivevisas,broughttotheairportwiththeirpassportsandtickets,onlytobe

offloadedthatday,butwithpromisestobebookedinaplaneflightonanotherday.
Therecruitswaitinvainforweeks,months,evenyears,onlytorealizetheywere
gypped,asnojobsawaitthemabroad.Noclearercasesofestafacouldbeimagined
thanthoseforwhichappellantshouldbeheldcriminallyresponsible.

Peoplev.Angeles
FACTS:
MariaTolosaSardeawasworkinginSaudiArabiawhenshereceivedacallfromher
sister,PriscillaAgoncillo,whowasinParis,France.PriscillaadvisedMariatoreturn
tothePhilippinesandawaitthearrivalofherfriend,accusedappellantSamina
Angeles,whowillassistinprocessinghertravelandemploymentdocumentstoParis,
France.Heedinghersistersadvice,MariaimmediatelyreturnedtothePhilippines.
MarcelianoTolosawhoatthattimewasinthePhilippineslikewisereceived
instructionsfromhissisterPriscillatomeetaccusedappellantwhowillalsoassistin
theprocessingofhisdocumentsforParis,France.MariaandMarcelianoeventually
metaccusedappellant.Duringtheirmeeting,accusedappellantaskediftheyhadthe
moneyrequiredfortheprocessingoftheirdocuments.MariagaveP107,000.00to
accusedappellantatExpertTravelAgency.Subsequently,shegaveanother
P46,000.00andUS$1,500.00asadditionalpaymentstoaccusedappellant.
Marceliano,ontheotherhand,initiallygaveP100,000.00toaccusedappellantandhe

gaveanadditionalP46,000.00andUS$1,500.00attheUnitedCoconutPlantersBank
inMakati.AnalynOlpindometaccusedappellantinBelgium.Atthattime,Analyn
wasworkinginCanadabutshewenttoBelgiumtovisitherinlaws.Aftermeeting
accusedappellant,AnalynOlpindocalleduphersister,PrecilaOlpindo,inthe
Philippinesandtoldhertomeetaccusedappellantuponthelattersarrivalinthe
Philippinesbecauseaccusedappellantcanhelpprocessherdocumentsfor
employmentinCanada.PrecilaOlpindoeventuallymetaccusedappellantatthe
ExpertTravelAgency.Accusedappellantaskedfortheamountof$4,500.00,but
Precilawasonlyabletogive$2,500.00.Noevidencewasadducedinrelationtothe
complaintofVilmaBrinasinceshedidnottestifyincourt.Accusedappellanttold
PrecilaOlpindoandVilmaBrinathatitwaseasiertocompletetheprocessingoftheir
papersiftheystartfromJakarta,IndonesiaratherthanfromManila.Precila
Olpindo,VilmaBrinaandaccusedappellantflewtoJakarta,Indonesia.However,
accusedappellantreturnedtothePhilippinesaftertwodays,leavingbehindPrecila
andVilma.TheywaitedforaccusedappellantinJakartabutthelatterneverreturned.
PrecilaandVilmaeventuallycamehometothePhilippines.Theystartedlookingfor
herbuttheycouldnotreachher.ElisaCampanianosofthePhilippineOverseas
EmploymentAgencypresentedacertificationtotheeffectthataccusedappellantwas
notdulylicensedtorecruitworkershereandabroad.Inherdefense,accusedappellant
averredthatsheneverrepresentedtothecomplainantsthatshecanprovidethemwith
workabroad.Sheinsistedthatshewasamarketingconsultantandaninternational
tradefairorganizer.ShemetPriscillaAgoncilloinFranceandtheybecamefriends.
Priscillaaskedhertoassisthersiblings,MariaandMarceliano,particularlyinthe
processingoftheirtraveldocumentsforFrance.AccusedappellanttoldPriscillathat
shecanonlyhelpintheprocessingoftraveldocumentsandnothingmore.Itwas
PriscillawhopromisedemploymenttoMariaandMarceliano.Shereceivedmoney
fromcomplainantsnotintheformofplacementfeesbutforthecostoftickets,hotel
accommodationsandothertravelrequirements.ShehasthesamedefenseforAnalyn
OlpindowhomshemetinBelgium.Aftertrialonthemerits,thetrialcourtfound
accusedappellantguiltyofillegalrecruitmentandfourcountsofestafa.
ISSUE:WhetherornotAngelesisguiltywithfourcountsofestafaandonecountof
illegalrecruitment
RULING:
Illegalrecruitmentiscommittedwhentwoelementsconcur:1)thattheoffenderhas
novalidlicenseorauthorityrequiredbylawtoenableonetolawfullyengagein
recruitmentandplacementofworkers;

and2)thattheoffenderundertakeseitheranyactivitywithinthemeaningof
recruitmentandplacementdefinedunderArticle13(b),oranyprohibitedpractices
enumeratedunderArticle34.
Toproveillegalrecruitment,itmustbeshownthattheaccusedappellantgave
complainantsthedistinctimpressionthathehadthepowerorabilitytosend
complainantsabroadforworksuchthatthelatterwereconvincedtopartwiththeir
moneyinordertobeemployed.
Tobeengagedinthepracticeofrecruitmentandplacement,itisplainthattheremust
atleastbeapromiseorofferofanemploymentfromthepersonposingasarecruiter
whetherlocallyorabroad.Plainly,thereisnotestimonythataccusedappellant
offeredcomplainantsjobsabroad.Hence,accusedappellantSaminaAngelescannot
belawfullyconvictedofillegalrecruitmentbutcanonlybeguiltyofestafa.

Asia Pacific Chartering, Inc. v. Maria Linda R. Farolan

GR No. 1511370
Carpio-Morales, J:
FACTS: Petitioner was a general sales agent (GSA) which sold passenger and cargo spaces for airlines
operated by Scandinavian Airline System (an offline international airline company). On December 16,
1992, petitioner hired respondent as Sales Manager for its passenger and cargo operations. In a report
given by respondent sometime in September 1993, she expressed that the company was performing
poorly because of several market forces beyond her control. To remedy the situation, petitioner directed
its high-ranking official, Roberto Zozobrado, to conduct an investigation. As a result, Zozobrado
informally took over some of respondents marketing and sales responsibilities because allegedly the
former found out that the respondent did not adopt any sales strategy to develop other sources of revenue
for SAS. However, respondent presented in evidence a message from Soren Jespersen, the General
Manager of SAS in Hongkong, congratulating the respondent for reaching and exceeding the target by
50% for the month of May 1994. On June 18, 1994, respondent received a letter of termination from the
petitioner on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. Respondent then filed a case before the Labor
Arbiter for illegal dismissal against petitioner. She further claims that she was not accorded due process
and was not given an opportunity to be heard and answer claims against her. The Labor Arbiter decided
the case in favor of respondent, finding that she was illegally dismissed. On appeal, the NLRC reversed

the decision of LA, stating that it was the right of petitioner to dismiss employees based on loss of trust,
which was management prerogative. The CA reinstated the decision of the LA, finding that the
respondent was deprived of due process.
(1)ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed
HELD: YES. The requisites for a valid dismissal of an employee are: (1) the employee must be afforded
due process (i.e. he must be given the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself) and (2) dismissal
must be for a valid cause as provided in Art. 282 of the Labor Code, or any of the authorized causes
under Art. 283 and 284 of the same. The Court found that respondent was not afforded the opportunity to
be heard and to present evidence in her defense and was not given any notice constituting the grounds for
her dismissal. As regards the second requisite, the employer bears the onus of proving that the dismissal is
for just cause.
(2)ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of loss of trust and confidence can be applied to the case at bar
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court did not uphold the petitioners defense in averring the application of the
doctrine of loss of trust as management prerogative. With respect to rank and file personnel, loss of trust
and confidence as a ground for valid dismissal requires proof of involvement in the alleged events in
question and that mere uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer will not be sufficient.
But as regards managerial employees, the mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has
breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal. The Court determined that respondent
was not a managerial employee (despite the fact that she was designated as a manager) because it is the
job description that determines the nature of the employment. Furthermore, the Court considered the
requisites for an employee to be a managerial employee, which requires the presence of all of the
following: (1) their primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which they are
employed or a department or a subdivision thereof; (2) they customarily and regularly direct the work of
two or more employees therein; and (3) they have the authority to hire or fire other employees of lower
rank; or their suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring and firing and as to the promotion or any
other change of status of other employees are given particular weight. The Court found that the
respondents function dealt mainly with servicing of existing clientele; hence, she could not be considered
as a managerial employee. As such, her dismissal, to be valid, requires proof that the respondent failed to
observe standards of work or was inefficient. The petitioner was not able to show such evidence. Thus,
the doctrine of loss of trust and confidence cannot be appreciated in favor of the petitioner.

CHARLITOPENARANDAv.BAGANGAPLYWOODCORPORATION
G.R.No.159577,May3,2006
PANGANIBAN,C.J.
FACTS:
CharlitoPenarandawashiredasanemployeeoftheBagangaPlywoodCorporation
(BPC).HefiledacomplaintforillegaldismissalwithmoneyclaimsagainstBPCand
itsGeneralManager,HudsonChuabeforetheNLRC.Heallegesthathewas
employedbyrespondentonMarch1999,withamonthlysalaryofP5,000as
foreman/boilerhead/shiftengineeruntilhewasillegallyterminated.Furthermore,he
wasnotpaidhisovertimepay,premiumpayforworkingduringholidays/restdays,
nightshiftdifferentialsandfinallyclaimsforpaymentofdamagesandattorneysfees.

Ontheotherhand,respondentBPCwhichisadomesticcorporationdulyorganized
andexistingunderPhilippinelaws,andisrepresentedhereinbyitsGeneralManager
HudsonChua.ItallegedthatPenarandasseparationfromserviceswasdonepursuant
toArt.283oftheLaborCode,therespondentwasontemporaryclosureduetorepair
andgeneralmaintenanceanditappliedforclearancewiththeDOLE.Andduetothe
insistenceofPenaranda,hewaspaidhisseparationbenefits.Consequently,whenBPC
partiallyreopenedinJanuary2001,Penarandafailedtoreapply.Hence,hewasnot
terminatedfromemploymentmuchlessillegally.Heoptedtosevereemployment
whenheinsistedpaymentofseparationbenefits.Furthermore,beingamanagerial
employeeheisnotentitledtoovertimepayandifeverherenderedservicesbeyond
thenormalhoursofwork,wasnoofficeorder/orauthorizationforhimtodoso.The
LaborArbiterruledthattherewasnoillegaldismissalandthatPenarandascomplaint
wasprematurebecausehewasstillemployedbyBPC.Thetemporaryclosureof
BPCsplantdidnotterminatehisemployment,hence,heneednotreapplywhenthe
plantreopened.Nevertheless,theLaborArbiterfoundPenarandaentitledtoovertime
pay,premiumpayforworkingonrestdays,andattorneysfees.BPCfiledanappeal
withtheNLRCwhichdeletedtheawardofovertimepayandpremiumpayfor
workingonrestdays.Accordingtothecommission,Penarandawasnotentitledto
theseawardsbecausehewasamanagerialemployee.Penarandaappealedtothe
appellatecourtwhichdismissedtheappealand,subsequentlythemotionfor
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
W/NPenarandaisnotentitledtoovertimepayandpremiumpay.
RULING:
YES.TheCourtdisagreeswiththeNLRCsfindingthatPenarandawasamanagerial
employee.However,Penarandawasamemberofthemanagerialstaff,whichalso
takeshimoutofthecoverageoflaborstandards.Likemanegrialemployees,officers
andmembersofthemanagerialstaffarenotentitledtotheprovisionsoflawonlabor
standards.Hisdutiesandresponsibilitiesconformtothedefinitionofamemberofthe
managerialstaff.Penarandasupervisedtheengineeringsectionofthesteamplant
boiler.Hisworkinvolvedoverseeingtheoperationofthemachinesandthe
performanceoftheworkersintheengineeringsection.Thisworknecessarilyrequired
theuseofdiscretionandindependentjudgmenttoensuretheproperfunctioningofthe
steamplantboiler.Assupervisor(asalsoadmittedbyhimthatheis),heisdeemeda
memberofthemanagerialstaff.

MercidarvsFishingCorp
(LaborStandardsFishermenarenotfieldpersonnels,Article82)
Facts:Privaterespondentemployedasabodegeroorshipsquartermaster
complainedofbeingconstructivelydismissedbypetitionercorporationwhenthe
latterrefusedhimassignmentsaboarditsboatsafterhehadreportedtowork.The
LarborArbiterrenderedadecisionorderingpetitionercorporationtoreinstate
complainantwithbackwages,payhimhis13thmonthpayandincentiveleave.
Petitionerclaimsthatitcannotbeheldliableforserviceincentiveleavepayby
fishermeninitsemployasthelattersupposedlyarefieldpersonnelandthusnot
entitledtosuchpayundertheLaborCode.

Article82oftheLaborCodeprovidesamongothersthatfieldpersonnelshallrefer
tononagriculturalemployeeswhoregularlyperformtheirdutiesawayfromthe
principalplaceofbusinessorbranchofofficeoftheemployerandwhoseactualhours
ofworkinthefieldcannotbedeterminedwithreasonablecertainty.
Issue:WONfishermenareconsideredfieldpersonnel.
Held:No.TheNLRCiscorrect.Althoughfishermenperformnonagriculturalwork
awayfromtheiremployersbusinessoffices,thefactremainsthatthroughoutthe
durationoftheirworktheyareundertheeffectivecontrolandsupervisionofthe
employerthroughthevesselspatronormaster.

AutobusTransportInc.vsAntonioBautista
G.R.No.156367
ChicoNazario,J.
Facts:RespondenthasbeenintheemployofthepetitionesinceMay24,1995asa
driverconductor.Hewaspaidoncommissionbasis,sevenpercentofthetotalgross
incomepertravel,onatwiceamonthbasis.OnJanuary3,2000,whiledriving
AutobusNo.114,heaccidentallybumpedtherearportionofAutobusNo.124.He
averredthattheaccidenthappenedbecausehewascompelledbythemanagementto
gobacktoRoxas,Isabelaalthoughhehadnotsleptforalmost24hours.Healso

allegedthathewasnotallowedtoworkuntilhefullypaidthe30%ofthecostof
repairofthedamagedbuses.Afteramonth,managementsenthimaletterof
termination.Bautistafiledacomplaintforillegaldismissalbutthesamewas
dismissedbythelaborarbiterbuthewasawardedhis13thmonthpayandservice
incentiveleavepay.Petitionerappealedthedecision,andwaspartlygrantedwherein
boththeNLRCandtheCourtofAppealsdeletedthepaymentofthe13thmonthpay.
Hence,thispetition.
Issue:WhetherornotBautistaisentitledtoserviceincentiveleave?
Ruling:Yes.Art.95(a)provides:Everyemployeewhohasrenderedatleastoneyear
ofserviceshallbeentitledtoayearlyserviceincentiveleaveoffivedayswithpay.It
coversallemployeesexceptthoseemployeeswhoareclassifiedasfieldpersonnel.
Asageneralrule,fieldpersonnelarethosewhoseperformanceoftheirjob/serviceis
notsupervisedbytheemployerorhisrepresentative,theworkplacebeingawayfrom
theprincipalofficeandwhosehoursanddaysofworkcannotbedeterminedwith
reasonablecertainty.Ifrequiredtobeatspecificplacesatspecifictimes,employees
includingdriverscannotbesaidtobefieldpersonneldespitethefactthattheyare
performingworkawayfromtheprincipalofficeoftheemployee.
WithrespecttoBautista,theCourttakesjudicialnoticethatalongtheroutesthatare
pliedbuthesebuscompanies,thereareitsinspectorsassignedatstrategicplaceswho
boardthebusandinspectthepassengers,thepunchedtickets,andtheconductors's
reports.Thereisalsothemandatoryonceaweekcarbardorshopday,wherethebus
isregularlycheckedastoitsmechanical,electrical,andhydraulic

Aricavs.NLRC
Facts:PetitionersTeofiloAricaetalfiledacomplaintagainstStandardFruits
Corporation(STANFILCO)Philippinesforallegedlynotpayingtheworkersfortheir
assemblytimewhichtakesplaceeveryworkdayfrom5:30amto6am.
Theassemblytimeconsistsofthefollowingactivities:
1.Rollcalloftheworkers;
2.Gettingtheirassignmentsfromtheforeman;
3.FillingouttheLaborersDailyAccomplishmentReport;
4.Gettingtoolsandequipmentsfromthestockroom;and
5.Goingtothefieldtowork.
Theycontendedthattheseactivitiesarenecessarilyforprivaterespondentsbenefit.
Theprivaterespondentaverredthatthethirtyminuteassemblytimehasbeenalong
timecompanypractice,thus,notconsideredaswaitingtime.
TheLaborArbiterdismissedthecomplaint.TheLAagreedthatthethirtyminute
assemblytimelongpracticedcannotbeconsideredwaitingtimeorworktimeand,
therefore,notcompensable.
TheNLRCupheldthedecisionoftheLAforthesamereason.
Issue:WONthe30minuteactivityofthepetitionersbeforethescheduledworking
timeiscompensableundertheLaborCode.
Held:No.Thethirtyminuteassemblytimelongpracticedandinstitutionalizedby
mutualconsentofthepartiesunderArticleIV,Section3,oftheCollectiveBargaining
AgreementcannotbeconsideredaswaitingtimewithinthepurviewofSection5,
RuleI,BookIIIoftheRulesandRegulationsImplementingtheLaborCode.
Thethirty(30)minuteassemblyisadeeplyrooted,routinarypracticeofthe
employees,andtheproceedingsattendanttheretoarenotinfectedwithcomplexitiesas
todeprivetheworkersthetimetoattendtootherpersonalpursuits.Inshort,theyare
notsubjecttotheabsolutecontrolofthecompanyduringthisperiod,otherwise,their

failuretoreportintheassemblytimewouldjustifythecompanytoimpose
disciplinarymeasures.
Furthermore,theirhousesaresituatedrightontheareawherethefarmarelocated,
suchthataftertherollcall,whichdoesnotnecessarilyrequirethepersonalpresence,
theycangobacktotheirhousestoattendtosomechores.Inshort,theyarenot
subjecttotheabsolutecontrolofthecompanyduringthisperiod.

UNIVERSITYOFPANGASINANFACULTYUNIONv.UNIVERSITYOF
PANGASINANAndNATIONALLABORRELATIONSCOMMISSION
FACTS:Petitionerisalaborunioncomposedoffacultymembersoftherespondent
UniversityofPangasinan,aneducationalinstitutiondulyorganizedandexistingby
virtueofthelawsofthePhilippines.OnDecember18,1981,thepetitioner,through
itsPresident,MissConsueloAbad,filedacomplaintagainsttheprivaterespondent
withtheArbitrationBranchoftheNLRC,DagupanDistrictOffice,DagupanCity.
Thecomplaintseeks:(a)thepaymentofEmergencyCostofLivingAllowances
(ECOLA)forNovember7toDecember5,1981,asemestralbreak;(b)salary
increasesfromthesixty(60%)percentoftheincrementalproceedsofincreased
tuitionfees;and(c)paymentofsalariesforsuspendedextraloads.InNovemberand
December,1981,thepetitionersmemberswerefullypaidtheirregularmonthly
salaries.However,fromNovember7toDecember5,duringthesemestralbreak,they
werenotpaidtheirECOLA.Theprivaterespondentclaimsthattheteachersarenot
entitledtheretobecausethesemestralbreakisnotanintegralpartoftheschoolyear
andtherebeingnoactualservicesrenderedbytheteachersduringsaidperiod,the
principleof"Nowork,nopay"applies.Duringthesameschoolyear(19811982),the
privaterespondentwasauthorizedbytheMinistryofEducationandCulturetocollect,
asitdidcollect,fromitsstudentsafifteen(15%)percentincreaseoftuitionfees.
Petitionersmembersdemandedasalaryincreaseeffectivethefirstsemesterofsaid
schoolyeartobetakenfromthesixty(60%)percentincrementalproceedsofthe
increasedtuitionfeesbutprivaterespondentrefused.Asidefromtheirregularloads,
someofpetitionersmembersweregivenextraloadstohandleduringthesame1981
1982schoolyear.Thosewithextraloadstoteachonsaiddayclaimedtheywerenot
paidtheirsalariesforthoseloads,buttheprivaterespondentclaimsotherwise.
ISSUE:1.WHETHERORNOTPETITIONERSMEMBERSAREENTITLEDTO
ECOLADURINGTHESEMESTRALBREAKFROMNOVEMBER7TO
DECEMBER5,1981OFTHE198182SCHOOLYEAR.
RULING:TheSupremeCourtheldthatvariousPresidentialDecreesonECOLAsto
wit:PDs1614,1634,1678and1713appliesinthecaseatbar.Semestralbreaksare
inthenatureofworkinterruptionsbeyondtheemployeescontrol.Assuch,these
breakscannotbeconsideredasabsenceswithinthemeaningofthelawforwhich
deductionsmaybemadefrommonthlyallowances.The"Nowork,nopay"principle

doesnotapplyintheinstantcase.Thepetitionersmembersreceivedtheirregular
salariesduringthisperiod.Itisclearfromtheprovisionoflawthatitcontemplatesa
"nowork"situationwheretheemployeesvoluntarilyabsentthemselves.Petitioners,
inthecaseatbar,certainlydonot,advoluntatem,absentthemselvesduringsemestral
breaks.Rather,theyareconstrainedtotakemandatoryleavefromwork.Theprinciple
of"Nopay,noECOLA"theconverseofwhichfindsapplicationinthecaseatbar.
Petitionerscannotbeconsideredtobeonleavewithoutpaysoasnottobeentitledto
ECOLA,for,asearlierstated,thepetitionerswerepaidtheirwagesinfullforthe
monthsofNovemberandDecemberof1981,notwithstandingtheintervening
semestralbreak.

HILARIORADAv.NLRCandPHILNORCONSULTANTSANDPLANNERS,
INC.
G.R.No.96078January9,1992
REGALADO,J.:
FACTS:
HilarioRadasinitialemploymentwithPhilnorwasundera"ContractofEmployment
foraDefinitePeriod"datedJuly7,1977,wherebypetitionerwashiredas"Driver"for
theconstructionoftheManilaNorthExpresswayExtension,foratermofabout24
months.Meanwhile,themainprojectwasnotfinishedandrespondentwasinneedof
Driverfortheextendedproject.SincePetitionerhadthenecessaryexperienceandhis
performancewasfoundsatisfactory,thepositionofDriverwasofferedtoPetitioner.
HenceasecondContractofEmploymentforaDefinitePeriodof10months.This
secondcontractofemploymentwassubsequentlyextendedforanumberoftimes
until1985.Atthecompletionoftheproject,Radawasterminatedashisemployment
wascoterminouswiththeproject.
OnMay20,1987,petitionerfiledbeforetheNLRCNCR,DOLE,aComplaintfor
nonpaymentofseparationpayandovertimepayagainstPhilnor.Philnoraversthat
thetimeusedbypetitionertoandfromhisresidencetotheprojectsitefrom5:30a.m.
to7:00a.m.andfrom4:00p.m.to6:00p.m.,oraboutthreehoursdaily,wasnot
overtimeworkashewasmerelyenjoyingthebenefitandconvenienceoffree
transportationprovidedbyPhilnor,otherwisewithoutsuchvehiclehewouldhave
usedatleastfourhoursbyusingpublictransportationandhewasaprojectemployee
andhewasnotentitledtoterminationpayunderPolicyInstructionsNo.20sincehis
employmentwascoterminouswiththecompletionoftheproject.
ISSUES:
a.Whetherornotpetitionerisaregularemployeeentitlinghimtoreceiveseparation
pay.
b.Whetherornotpetitionerisentitledtoovertimecompensation.

HELD:
a.TheCourtruledthatRadawasaprojectemployeewhoseworkwascoterminous
withtheprojectforwhichhewashired.
Projectemployees,asdistinguishedfromregularornonprojectemployees,are
mentionedinSection281oftheLaborCodeasthosewheretheemploymenthas
beenfixedforaspecificprojectorundertakingthecompletionorterminationof
whichhasbeendeterminedatthetimeoftheengagementoftheemployee.Project
employeesarenotentitledtoterminationpayiftheyareterminatedasaresultofthe
completionoftheprojectoranyphasethereofinwhichtheyareemployed,regardless
ofthenumberofprojectsinwhichtheyhavebeenemployedbyaparticular
constructioncompany.Moreover,thecompanyisnotrequiredtoobtainclearance
fromtheSecretaryofLaborinconnectionwithsuchtermination.
b.TheCourtheldthatpetitionerisentitledtotheclaimforovertimecompensation.
ThefactthathepicksupemployeesofPhilnoratcertainspecifiedpointsalongEDSA
ingoingtotheprojectsiteanddropsthemoffatthesamepointsonhiswaybackfrom
thefieldofficegoinghometoMarikina,MetroManilaisnotmerelyincidentalto
petitioner'sjobasadriver.Onthecontrary,saidtransportationarrangementhadbeen
adopted,notsomuchfortheconvenienceoftheemployees,butprimarilyforthe
benefitoftheemployer.Butsincetheassignedtaskoffetchinganddelivering
employeesisindispensableandconsequentlymandatory,thenthetimerequiredof
andusedbypetitioneringoingfromhisresidencetothefieldofficeandback,thatis,
from5:30a.m.to7:00a.m.andfrom4:00p.m.toaround6:00p.m.,shouldbepaidas
overtimework.

TheCase
R.B.MichaelPressandAnnaleneReyesEscobiaagainsttheirformermachine
operator,respondentNicasioC.Galit,
TheFactsRespondentwasemployedbypetitionerR.B.MichaelPressasanoffset
machineoperator,Duringhisemployment,Galitwastardyforatotalof190timesand
wasabsentwithoutleaveforatotalofnineandahalfdays.Respondentwasorderedto
renderovertimeserviceinordertocomplywithajoborderdeadline,butherefusedto
doso.ThefollowingdayrespondentreportedforworkbutpetitionerEscobiatoldhim
nottowork,andtoreturnlaterintheafternoonforahearing.Whenhereturned,a
copyofanOfficeMemorandumwasservedonhimPetitionersaverthatGalitwas
dismissedduetothefollowingoffenses:(1)tardinessconstitutingneglectofduty;(2)
seriousmisconduct;and(3)insubordinationorwillfuldisobedience.respondentwas
terminatedfromemployment,gavehimhistwodaysalaryandaterminationletter.
Respondentsubsequentlyfiledacomplaintforillegaldismissalandmoneyclaims
beforetheNationalLaborRelationsCommission(NLRC)TheCAfoundthatitwas
notthetardinessandabsencescommittedbyrespondent,buthisrefusaltorender
overtimeworkwhichcausedtheterminationofhisemployment.Itruledthatthetime
frameinwhichrespondentwasaffordedproceduraldueprocessisdubitable;hecould
nothavebeenaffordedampleopportunitytoexplainhissideandtoadduceevidence
onhisbehalf.Itfurtherruledthatthebasisforcomputinghisbackwagesshouldbehis
dailysalaryatthetimeofhisdismissalwhichwasPhP230,andthathisbackwages
shouldbecomputedfromthetimeofhisdismissaluptothefinalityoftheCAs
decision.
TheIssues
whethertherewasjustcausetoterminatetheemploymentofrespondentwhetherdue
processwasobservedinthedismissalprocesswhetherrespondentisentitledto
backwagesandotherbenefitsdespitehisrefusaltobereinstated.
TheCourtsRuling

RespondentstardinesscannotbeconsideredcondonedbypetitionersInthecaseat
bar,respondentdidnotadduceanyevidencetoshowwaiverorcondonationonthe
partofpetitioners.ThusthefindingoftheCAthatpetitionerscannotusetheprevious
absencesandtardinessbecauserespondentwasnotsubjectedtoanypenaltyisbereft
oflegalbasis.Thepetitionersdidnotimposeanypunishmentforthenumerous
absencesandtardinessofrespondent.Thus,saidinfractionscanbeusedcollectively
bypetitionersasagroundfordismissal.Respondentisadmittedlyadailywageearner
andhenceispaidbasedonsucharrangement.Forsaiddailypaidworkers,the
principleof"adayspayforadayswork"issquarelyapplicable.Henceitcannotbe
construedinanywisethatsuchnonpaymentofthedailywageonthedayshewas
absentconstitutesapenalty.InsubordinationorwillfuldisobedienceForwillful
disobediencetobeavalidcausefordismissal,thesetwoelementsmustconcur:(1)
theemployeesassailedconductmusthavebeenwillful,thatis,characterizedbya
wrongfulandperverseattitude(2)theorderviolatedmusthavebeenreasonable,
lawful,madeknowntotheemployee,andmustpertaintothedutieswhichhehad
beenengagedtodischarge.

Narag

ShellCompanyvsNationalLaborUnion
G.R.No.L1309
July26,1948
FACTS:NationalLaborUnioninstitutedthisactiontoaskfor50%additional
compensationfortheemployeesofShellCompanywhoworkatnighttoattendtothe
foreignplaneslandingandtakingoff(atnight),tosupplypetrolandlubricants,and
performotherduties.CourtofIndustrialRelationsheldthatTheShellCompanypay
itsworkersworkingatnightanadditionalcompensationof50%overtheirregular
salariesbyworkingduringdaytime.Shellarguesthatthereisnolegalprovision
empoweringCIRtoorderpaymentofadditionalcompensationtoworkerswhowork
atnight,andthatActNo.444relievedtheemployerofsuchobligationasitis
providedintheActwhereitmadecompulsorythe"overtime"(additional
compensation)payforworkrenderedbeyond8hours,andsuchcasesdonotinclude
theworkatnight.NLUarguesdecisionoftheCIRispartofitsbroadandeffective
powersasgrantedbyCommonwealthActNo103thecharteroftheIndustrial
RelationsCourt,andthatActNo.444hasnoApplicationtothiscasebecauseitis
referringonlytoparticularandthemaximumworkingdaypermittedinindustrial
establishmentsthe8hourday.ISSUES:
1.WONCIRhastheauthoritytoorderpaymentofadditionalcompensationto
workerswhoworkatnight
2.WONthosewhoworkatnightareentitledto50%additionalcompensation
RULING:
1.Yes.Articles1,4and13ofCommonwealthActNo.103:Itisevidentfromthe
ComAct.No.103:

SECTION1.(a)thatwhenadisputearisesbetweentheprincipalandtheemployeeor
workeronthequestionofwages,CIRhasjurisdictionthroughoutthePhilippinesto
consider,investigateandresolvethedispute,settingthewages,theydeemfairand
reasonable.
SEC.4.(b)thatforthepurposesofprevention,arbitration,decisionandarrangement,
CIRalsohasjurisdictionoveranydisputeindustryandagricultureresultingfrom
anydifferencesinwages,compensationorparticipation,workinghours,conditionsof
employmentortenancybetweentheemployersandemployeesorbetweenworkers
andownersandthelandownersorfarmworkerssubjecttothefulfillmentofcertain
requirementsandconditionswhenitseesthatthedisputecouldcauseresultsora
strike,
SEC.13.(c)thatinexercisingitspowersspecifiedabove,theCourtIndustrial
Relationsisnotlimited,todecidethedispute,togranttheremedyorremedies
requestedbythepartiestothedispute,butmayincludeinanyorderordecisionor
determinationrelatingtothepurposeofsettlingthedisputeortopreventfurther
agriculturalorindustrialdisputes.
TheargumentofShellismistaken.LawNo.444doesnotapplytothiscase,itis
evidentthatithasaspecificobjective,namely:(a)setat8hoursthemaximum
workingday,(b)atsomeexceptionalcasesemployeescouldbeallowedWorkoffthe
day,(c)provideincrement,whichmustbenotlessthan25%ofregularsalaryforthe
"overtime"orworkinexcessof8hours.TheworkrequiredbyShellisnotcoveredby
theovertimeofComAct.444sincetheworkwhichisthesubjectofcontroversyin
thiscaseisnotovertimebutafulldayofworkfor8hours,doneatnightorinnight
shift.Hence,ifCIRhastheauthoritytofixwagesfortheworkdoneduringtheday,it
alsohastheauthoritytofixwagesdoneatnight.
2.Yes.Thecaseagainstnightwork,then,maybesaidtorestuponseveralgrounds.In
thefirstplace,therearetheremotelyinjuriouseffectsofpermanentnightwork
manifestedinthelateryearsoftheworker'slife.Ofmoreimmediateimportancetothe
averageworkeristhedisarrangementofhissociallife,includingtherecreational
activitiesofhisleisurehoursandtheordinaryassociationsofnormalfamilyrelations.
Fromaneconomicpointofview,nightworkistobediscouragedbecauseofits
adverseeffectuponefficiencyandoutput.Amoralargumentagainstnightworkinthe
caseofwomenisthatthenightshiftforcestheworkerstogotoandfromthefactory
indarkness.Recentexperiencesofindustrialnationshaveaddedmuchtotheevidence
againstthecontinuationofnightwork,exceptinextraordinarycircumstancesand
unavoidableemergencies.Theimmediateprohibitionofnightworkforalllaborersis

hardlypracticable;itsdiscontinuanceinthecaseofwomenemployeesis
unquestionablydesirable.'Thenightwasmadeforrestandsleepandnotforwork'isa
commonsayingamongwageearningpeople,andmanyofthemdreamofan
industrialorderinwhichtherewillbenonightshift.

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY vs LEPANTO LOCAL STAFF UNION

FACTS:
Petitioner Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company is a domestic mining corporation. Respondent
Lepanto Local Staff Union is the duly certified bargaining agent of petitioners employees occupying
staff positions. Petitioner and respondent entered into their fourth Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) which provides:
ARTICLE VIII NIGHT SHIFT DIFFERENTIAL
Section 3. Night Differential pay. - The Company shall continue to pay nightshift differential for work
during the first and third shifts to all covered employees within the bargaining unit as follows:
For the First Shift (11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.), the differential pay will be 20% of the basic rate. For the
Third Shift (3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.), the differential pay will be 15% of the basic rate.
However, for overtime work, which extends beyond the regular day shift (7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.),
there [will] be no night differential pay added before the overtime pay is calculated.
On 23 April 2000, respondent filed a complaint with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board,
Cordillera Administrative Region (NCMB-CAR) alleging that petitioner failed to pay the night shift
differential of respondents members as provided in the 4th CBA. Petitioner and respondent failed to
amicably settle the dispute. Hence, the issue was submitted to the Voluntary Arbitrator for resolution.
The Voluntary Arbitrator ruled in favor of the respondent. On appeal, CA upheld Voluntary Arbitrator's
decision. It was found that during the effectivity of the first three CBAs, petitioner paid night shift
differentials to other workers who were members of respondent for work performed beyond 3:00 p.m.
Moreover, the records of the case revealed that petitioner also paid night shift differential for work
beyond 3:00 p.m. during the effectivity of the 4th CBA. Petitioner alleged that such payment was a
mistake on the part of its accounting department. CA noted that petitioner continued such payment
even after the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator was rendered. Thus, petitioner was estopped from
claiming erroneous payment. Petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N workers are entitled to night shift differential for work performed beyond the regular day
shift, from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.
HELD:
YES. The first paragraph of Section 3 provides that petitioner shall continue to pay night shift
differential to workers of the first and third shifts. It does not provide that workers who performed
work beyond the second shift shall not be entitled to night shift differential. The inclusion of the third
paragraph is not intended to exclude the regular day shift workers from receiving night shift
differential for work performed beyond 3:00 p.m. It only provides that the night shift differential pay
shall be excluded in the computation of the overtime pay. The CA correctly ruled that petitioner failed
to present any convincing evidence to prove that the payment was erroneous. In fact, the CA found
that even after the promulgation of the Voluntary Arbitrators decision and while the case was
pending appeal, petitioner still paid night shift differential for work performed beyond 3:00 p.m. It
affirms the intention of the parties to the CBA to grant night shift differential for work performed
beyond 3:00 p.m.
DOCTRINES:
The terms and conditions of a collective bargaining contract constitute the law between the parties. If
the terms of the CBA are clear and have no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the
literal meaning of its stipulation shall prevail.
In order to ascertain the intention of the contracting parties, the Voluntary Arbitrator shall principally
consider their contemporaneous and subsequent acts as well as their negotiating and contractual
history and evidence of past practices.

CALTEX REGULAR EMPLOYEES (UNION) vs. CALTEX (PHILS), INC. and NLRC
G.R. No. 111359 August 15, 1995
FACTS:
On Dec 12, 1885, petitioner Union and private respondent Caltex entered into a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) which was to be in effect until midnight of Dec 31, 1988. The CBA
included this provision:
The regular work week shall consist of 8 hours per day, 7 days, Monday thru Sunday, during which
regular rates of pay shall be paid in accordance with Annex B and work on the employees one Day
of Rest rates of pay shall be paid as provided in Annex B. Daily working schedules shall be
established by management in accordance with the requirements of efficient operations on the basis
of 8 hours per day for any 5 days. Provided, however employees required to work in excess of 40
hours i any week shall be compensated in accordance with Annex B of this Agreement.
The Annex B of the agreement included the computations of the overtime pay, nightshift differential,
day off pay, holiday premium pay, Sunday premium pay.
Sometime in Aug 1986, the Union called the attention of Caltex for the latters alleged violations of
Annex B (non payment of OT, NSD, etc). The industrial relations manager of Caltex informed the

Union that the differential would be timely implemented. However, no differential payment was made
for the work performed on the first 2.5 hours on a Saturday.

The Union filed a case against Caltex f or unfair labor practice. Petitioner charged Caltex for
shortchanging its employees by paying the work performed on the first 2.5 hours of Saturday
(alleged rest day) and regular rates when it should be paying at rest day rates. Caltex denied the
charge and said that Sunday was their rest day and not Saturday.

Labor Arbiter Valentin Guanio ruled in favor of the Union and stated that according to the CBA the
employees are given 2 rest days (Sat & Sun). On appeal by Caltex, the NLRC set aside the decision
and ruled that under the CBA there is only 1 rest day (Sun). Hence, this petition for certiorari seeking
to annul and set aside the decision of NLRC.

ISSUE:
WON the CBA provides 2 rest days and therefore the first 2.5 hours of Saturday be based on rest
day rates.

HELD:
YES. The Court ruled that it is evident that the intention of the parties to the 1985 CBA was to
provide the employees with only 1 rest day. The plain and ordinary meaning of the language of Art III
is that Caltex and the Union had agreed to pay day of rest rates for work performed on an
employees oneday of rest. The same emphasises the fact that the parties had agreed that only a
single day of rest shall be scheduled and shall be provided to the employee.

In this case, under the 1985 CBA, hours worked on a Saturday do not necessarily constitute
overtime work compensable at premium rates of pay, contrary to petitioners assertion. These are
normal or regular hours of work compensable at regular rates of pay, as provided in the 1985 CBA. It
is only when an employee has been required on a Sunday to render work in excess of the 40 hours
which constitute the regular work week that such employee may be considered as performing

overtime work on that Saturday. We consider that the statutory prohibition against offsetting
undertime one day with overtime another day has no application in the case at bar.

[G.R.No.L48437.September30,1986.]
MANTRADE/FMMCDIVISIONEMPLOYEESANDWORKERSUNION
(representedbyPHILIPPINESOCIALSECURITYLABORUNION,Petitioner,v.
ARBITRATORFROILANM.BACUNGANandMANTRADEDEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,Respondents
FACTS:ThePetitionerMantrade/FMCCDivisionfiledapetitionforCertiorariand
MandamusagainstarbitratorFroilanM.BacunganandMantradeDevelopment
Corporationarisingfromthedecisionofrespondentarbitrator.Thearbitratorruled
thatMantradeDevelopmentCorporationisnotunderlegalobligationtopayholiday
pay(asprovidedforinArticle94oftheLaborCodeinthethirdofficialDepartment
ofLaboredition)toitsmonthlypaidemployeeswhoareuniformlypaidbythemonth,
irrespectiveofthenumberofworkingdaystherein,withasalaryofnotlessthanthe
statutoryorestablishedminimumwage,andthisruleisapplicablenotonlyasof
March2,1976butasofNovember1,1974.Respondentarbitratorfurtheropinedthat
respondentcorporationdoesnothaveanylegalobligationtograntitsmonthlysalaried
employeesholidaypay,unlessitisarguedthattheSec.2,RuleIV,BookIIIofthe
RulesandRegulationsimplementingSection94oftheLaborCodeisnotin
conformitywiththelawsaidprovision.

ISSUE:WhetherornotthepertinentsectionoftheRulesandRegulations
ImplementingtheLaborCodeasamendedonwhichrespondentarbitratorbasedhis
decisionisvalid.
HELD:No.ThecourtagreesthatSection2,RuleIV,BookIIIoftheimplementing
rulesandPolicyInstructionNo.9issuedbythethenSecretaryofLaborwhichstates
that,employeeswhoareuniformlypaidbythemonth,irrespectiveofthenumberof
workingdaystherein,withasalaryofnotlessthanthestatutoryorestablished
minimumwageshallbepresumedtobepaidforalldaysinthemonthwhether
workedornot,arenullandvoid,sinceintheguiseofclarifyingtheLaborCodes
provisionsonholidaypay,theyineffectamendedthembyenlargingthescopeof
theirexclusion.
1.Article94oftheLaborCode,asamendedbyP.D.850,provides:Righttoholiday
pay.(a)Everyworkershallbepaidhisregulardailywageduringregularholidays,
exceptinretailandserviceestablishmentsregularlyemployinglessthanten(10)
workers.
2."ThecoverageandscopeofexclusionoftheLaborCodesholidaypayprovisions
isspelledoutunderArticle82thereofwhichreads:TheprovisionofthisTitleshall
applytoemployeesinallestablishmentsandundertakings,whetherforprofitornot,
butnottogovernmentemployees,managerialemployees,fieldpersonnel,membersof
thefamilyof
theemployerwhoaredependentonhimforsupport,domestichelpers,persons,inthe
personalserviceofanother,andworkerswhoarepaidbyresultsasdeterminedbythe
SecretaryofLaborinappropriateregulations.
Fromtheabovecitedprovisions,itisclearthatmonthlypaidemployeesarenot
excludedfromthebenefitsofholidaypay.However,theimplementingruleson
holidaypaypromulgatedbythethenSecretaryofLaborexcludesmonthlypaid
employeesfromthesaidbenefitsbyinsertingunderRuleIV,BookIIIofthe
implementingrules,Section2,whichprovidesthat:employeeswhoareuniformly
paidbythemonth,irrespectiveofthenumberofworkingdaystherein,withasalary
ofnotlessthanthestatutoryorestablishedminimumwageshallbepresumedtobe
paidforalldaysinthemonthwhetherworkedornot..WHEREFORE,thequestioned
decisionofrespondentarbitratorisSETASIDEandRespondentCorporationis
orderedtoGRANTholidaypaytoitsmonthlysalariedemployees.

Plaza

Aliviadovs.Procter&GamblePhilippines,Inc.
GRNo.160506,March9,2010
Facts:Procter&Gamble(P&G)isprimarilyengagedinmanufactureandproduction
ofvariousconsumerandhealthproducts,whichitsellsonawholesalebasisto
differentsupermarketsanddistributors.P&GenteredintocontractswithPrommGem
andSAPSforthepromotionandmerchandisingofitsproductstoenhanceconsumer
awarenessandacceptanceoftheproducts.Aliviadoandotherpetitionersworkedas
P&Gsmerchandisers,andindividuallysignedemploymentcontractswitheither
PrommGemorSAPSforperiodsofmoreorlessfivemonthsatatime.Theywere
assignedatdifferentoutlets,supermarkets,andstoreswheretheyhandledallthe
productsofP&G,andreceivedtheirwagesfromPrommGemorSAPS.PrommGem
andSAPSimposeddisciplinarymeasuresonerringmerchandisersforreasonssuchas
habitualabsenteeism,dishonestyorchangingdayoffwithoutpriornotice.In
December1991,petitionersfiledacomplaintagainstP&Gforregularization,service
incentiveleavepay,andotherbenefits,withdamages.Thecomplaintwaslater
amendedtoincludethematteroftheirsubsequentdismissal.OnNovember29,1996,
theLaborArbiterdismissedthecaseforlackofmeritandruledthattherewasno
employeremployeerelationshipbetweenthepetitionersandP&G.LaborArbiter
foundthattheselectionandengagementofthepetitioners,thepaymentoftheir
wages,thepowerofdismissalandcontrolwithrespecttothemeansandmethodsby
whichtheirworkwasaccomplished,werealldonebyPrommGemorSAPS.He
furtherfoundthatPrommGemandSAPSwerelegitimateindependentjob
contractors.TheNLRCandtheCAsubsequentlyaffirmedtheLaborArbiters
findings.
Issue:WhetherPrommGemandSAPSarelaboronlycontractors.
Ruling:PrommGemisalegitimatejobcontractor,whileSAPSisalaboronly
contractor.Therefore,theemployeesofSAPSaretheemployeesofP&G,SAPS
beingmerelytheagentofP&G.PrommGemhasshownevidencethatithas
substantialinvestmentwhichrelatestotheworktobeperformed,suchasauthorized
stockofP1,000,000andapaidincapital,orcapitalavailableforoperations,of
P500,000;ithaslongtermassetsworthoverP400,000andcurrentassetsworthover
P700,000;itmaintaineditsownwarehouseandofficespacewithafloorareaof870
squaremeters;ithadunderitsnamethreeregisteredvehicleswhichwereusedforits
promotionalormerchandisingbusiness;andithasclientsasidefromP&G.Promm
Gemalsosupplieditscomplainantworkerswiththerelevantmaterials,suchas
markers,tapes,liners,andcutters,necessaryforthemtoperformtheirwork.Promm

Gemalsoissuedthemuniforms.Also,PrommGemalreadyconsideredthe
complainantsworkingunderitasitsregular,notmerelycontractualorproject,
employees.Thisnegates,onthepartofPrommGem,badfaithandintentto
circumventlaborlawswhichfactorshaveoftenbeentippingpointsthatleadtheCourt
tostrikedowntheemploymentpracticeoragreementconcernedascontrarytopublic
policy,morals,goodcustoms,orpublicorder.Ontheotherhand,SAPSArticlesof
IncorporationshowsthatithasapaidincapitalofonlylittleoverP31k.Thereisno
otherevidencepresentedtoshowhowmuchitsworkingcapitalandassetsare.
Furthermore,thereisnoshowingofsubstantialinvestmentintools,equipment,or
otherassets.Itfailedtoshowthatitspaidincapitalissufficientforits6month
contractperiodwithP&Gtogenerateitsneededrevenuetosustainitsoperations
independently.Instead,itcouldbereadilyseenthatitscapitalisnotevensufficient
foronemonthspayroll,whichispeggedatlittleoverP44,000.
Furthermore,petitionershavebeenchargedwiththemerchandisingandpromotionof
theproductsofP&G,anactivitythathasalreadybeenconsideredbytheCourtas
doubtlesslydirectlyrelatedtothemanufacturingbusiness,whichistheprincipal
businessofP&G.ConsideringthatSAPShasnosubstantialcapitalorinvestmentand
theworkersitrecruitedareperformingactivitieswhicharedirectlyrelatedtothe
principalbusinessofP&G,SAPSisengagedinlaboronlycontracting.

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES V. DELA CRUZ

GR No. 184977
December 7, 2009
Brion, J.
FACTS:
Respondents Dela Cruz, Guasis, Pugal, Hermo, Somero, Jr., Diocares, and Ichapare were route
helpers assigned to work with petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers's trucks. Pursuant to their work,
respondents go from the Coca- Cola sales offices or plants to customer outlets such as sari-sari
stores, restaurants, groceries, supermarkets and the like. They likewise claim that they were
hired either directly by the petitioner or by its contractors, but they do not enjoy the full
remuneration, benefits and privileges granted to the petitioners regular sales force. As a result,
they filed to separate complaints for their regularization with money claims against petitioner.
They argued that the services they rendered were necessary and desirable in the regular
business of the petitioner. On the other hand, petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers contended that it did
not have employer-employee relationship with the respondents on the ground that it entered into
contracts of services with Peerless and Excellent Partners Cooperative, Inc. which entitled the
latter the right to select, hire, dismiss, supervise, control and discipline and pay the salaries of
all personnel they assign to the petitioner. Respondents disclaimed the contention of the
petitioner, claiming that they worked under the control and supervision of the companys
supervisors who prepared their work schedules and assignments and that Peerless was in the
nature of a labor-only contractor because of its insufficient capital to provide services to
petitioner.
LA: Dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction after finding that the respondents were
employees of Peerless and not of Coca-Cola Bottlers.
NLRC: Affirmed LA's ruling.
CA: Reversed the previous decisions and ruled that Peerless was engaged in labor-only
contract based on the respondents assertions and the petitioners admissions that Peerless
simply supplied the company with manpower. Furthermore, the Court found no proof in the
records that Peerless met the required capitalization and tools.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Peerless and Excellent Partners Cooperative, Inc. is a labor-only contractor.
2. Whether or not the respondents are regular employees.
RULING:
1.The Court ruled in affirmative.
Labor-only contracting shall refer to an arrangement where the contractor or subcontractor
merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or service for a principal, and
any of the following elements are present: 1. The contractor or subcontractor does not have
sufficient capital or investment which relates to the job, work or service to be performed and the
employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing
activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal; OR, 2. The contractor
does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the work of the contractualemployee.
By "right to control, it pertains to the prerogative of a party to determine, not only the end result
sought to be achieved, but also the means and manner to be used to achieve this end.
A key consideration in resolving whether either of the two elements of a labor-only contractor is
present in a given case is the contract between the company and the purported contractors.
However, the contract between the principal and the contractor is not the final word on how the
contracted workers relate to the principal and the purported contractor; the relationships must
be tested on the basis of how they actually operate.
The facts of the case show that the respondents, acting as sales route helpers, were only
engaged in the marginal work of helping in the sale and distribution of company products. They
only provided the muscle work that sale and distribution required and were thus necessarily
under the companys control and supervision in doing these tasks. Also, respondents were not
independently selling and distributing company products, using their own equipment, means
and methods of selling and distribution. They only supplied the manpower that helped the
company in the handing of products for sale and distribution. Therefore, Peerless and Excellent
were mere labor-only contractors who had no sufficient capitalization and equipment to
undertake sales and distribution of softdrinks as independent activities separate from the
manufacture of softdrinks, and who had no control and supervision over the contracted
personnel.
2. The Court ruled in affirmative.
It found that respondents, for being engaged in component functions in the main business of the
company under the latters supervision and control, were regular employees who are entitled to
their respective claims.

PhilippineBankofCommunicationsvsNLRC(1986)G.R.L66598
FACTS:
PetitionerPhilippineBankofCommunicationsandtheCorporateExecutiveSearch
Inc.(CESI)enteredintoaletteragreementdatedJanuary1976underwhich(CESI)
undertooktoprovide"TemporaryServices"topetitionerconsistingofthe"temporary
services"ofeleven(11)messengers.Thecontractperiodisdescribedasbeing"from
January1976."Thepetitionerintruthundertooktopaya"dailyservicerateofP18,"

onaperpersonbasis.RicardoOrpiadawasthusassignedtoworkwiththepetitioner
bank.Assuch,herenderedservicestothebank,withinthepremisesofthebankand
alongsideotherpeoplealsorenderingservicestothebank.Therewassomequestion
astowhenRicardoOrpiadacommencedrenderingservicestothebank.Onorabout
October1976,thepetitionerrequested(CESI)towithdrawOrpiada'sassignment
because,intheallegationofthebank,Orpiada'sservices"werenolongerneeded."
OrpiadainstitutedacomplaintintheDepartmentofLaboragainstthepetitionerfor
illegaldismissalandfailuretopaythe13thmonthpayprovidedforinPresidential
DecreeNo.851.TheOfficeoftheRegionalDirector,RegionalOfficeNo.IVofthe
DepartmentofLabor,issuedanorderdismissingOrpiada'scomplaintforfailureof
Mr.Orpiadatoshowtheexistenceofanemployeremployeerelationshipbetweenthe
bankandhimself.TheLaborArbiterDogeliorenderedadecisionorderingthe
reinstatementofcomplainanttothesameorequivalentpositionwithfullbackwages
andtopaythelatter's13thmonthpayfortheyear1976.On26October1977,thebank
appealedthedecisionoftheLaborArbitertotherespondentNLRC.NLRC
promulgateditsdecisionaffirmingtheawardoftheLaborArbiter.
Thepetitionerbankmaintainsthatnoemployeremployeerelationshipwas
establishedbetweenitselfandRicardoOrpiadaandthatRicardoOrpiadawasan
employeeof(CESI)andnotofthebank.
ISSUES:
1.Whatistheappropriatecharacterizationoftherelationshipbetweenthebankand
(CESI)
2.Whetherornotthatrelationshipisoneofemployerandjob(independent)
contractororoneofemployerand"laboronly"contractor;
HELD:
(Hiring)Orpiadawasassignedtoworkinthebankby(CESI)Orpiadacouldnothave
foundhiswaytothebank'sofficeshadhenotbeenfirsthiredby(CESI)butsubjectto
theacceptanceofthebankandthebankdidaccepthimaswillbeseenshortly.
Withrespecttothe(payment)ofOrpiada'swages,thebankremittedtoCESIamounts
correspondingtothe"dailyservicerate"ofOrpiadaandtheotherssimilarlyassigned
by(CESI)tothebank,and(CESI)paidtoOrpiadaandtheothersthewagespertaining
totothem.

(Dismissal)Thebankrequested(CESI)towithdrawOrpiada'sassignmentandthat
(CESI)did,infact,withdrawsuchassignment.
Turningtothepowerto(control)Orpiada'sconduct,itshouldbenotedimmediately
thatOrpiadaperformedhissectionswithinthebank'spremises,andnotwithinthe
officepremisesof(CESI)Assuch,Orpiadamusthavebeensubjecttoatleastthe
samecontrolandsupervisionthatthebankexercisesoveranyotherpersonphysically
withinitspremisesandrenderingservicestoorforthebank,inotherwords,any
employeeorstaffmemberofthebank.
Thesecond("paymentofwages")andthird("powerofdismissal")factorssuggest
thattherelevantrelationshipwasthatsubsistingbetween(CESI)andOrpiada,a
relationshipconcededby(CESI)tobeonebetweenemployerandemployee.Uponthe
otherhand,thefirst("selectionandengagement")andfourth("controlofemployee's
conduct")factorsindicatethatsomedirectrelationshipdidexistbetweenOrpiadaand
thebankandthatsuchrelationshipmaybeassimilatedtoemployment
Articles106and107oftheLaborCodeofthePhilippines(PresidentialDecreeNo.
442,asamended)providesasfollows:
ART.106.Contractororsubcontractor.Wheneveranemployerentersintoacontract
withanotherpersonfortheperformanceoftheformer'swork,theemployeesofthe
contractorandofthelatter'ssubcontractor,ifany,shallbepaidinaccordancewiththe
provisionsinthisCode.
Intheeventthatthecontractororsubcontractorfailstopaythewagesofhis
employeesinaccordancewiththisCode,theemployershallbejointlyandseverally
liablewithhiscontractororsubcontractortosuchemployeestotheextentofthe
workperformedunderthecontractinthesamemannerandextentthatheisliableto
employeesdirectlyemployedbyhim.
TheSecretaryofLabormay,byappropriateregulations,restrictorprohibitthe
contractingoutoflabortoprotecttherightsofworkersestablishedunderthisCode.In
soprohibitingorrestricting,hemaymakeappropriatedistinctionsbetweenlaboronly
contractingandjobcontractingaswellasdifferentiationswithinthesetypesof
contractinganddeterminewhoamongthepartiesinvolvedshallbeconsideredthe
employerforpurposesofthisCode,topreventanyviolationorcircumventionofany
provisionsofthisCode.

Thereis"laboronly"contractingwherethepersonsupplyingworkerstoanemployer
doesnothavesubstantialcapitalorinvestmentintheformoftools,equipment,
machineries,workpremises,amongothers,andtheworkersrecruitedandplacedby
suchpersonareperformingactivitieswhicharedirectlyrelatedtotheprincipal
businessofsuchemployer.Insuchcases,thepersonorintermediaryshallbe
consideredmerelyasanagentoftheemployerwhoshallberesponsibletothe
workersinthesamemannerandextentasifthelatterweredirectlyemployedbyhim.
Inthepresentcase,theundertakingof(CESI)wastoprovideitsclientthebankwith
acertainnumberofpersonsabletocarryouttheworkofmessengers.Such
undertakingofCESIwascompliedwithwhentherequisitenumberofpersonswere
assignedorsecondedtothepetitionerbank.Orpiadautilizedthepremisesandoffice
equipmentofthebankandnotthoseof(CESI)Messengerialworkthedeliveryof
documentstodesignatedpersonswhetherwithinorwithoutthebankpremisesisof
coursedirectlyrelatedtothedaytodayoperationsofthebank.Section9(2)quoted
abovedoesnotrequireforitsapplicabilitythatthepetitionermustbeengagedinthe
deliveryofitemsasadistinctandseparatelineofbusiness.

Sunio

ManilaWaterv.PenaG.R.No.158255.July8,2004
Respondents:HerminioD.Pena,EstebanB.Baldoza,JorgeD.Canonigo,Jr.,IkeS.
Delfin,Rizalinom.Intal,ReyT.Manlegro,JohnL.Marteja,MarlonB.Morada,Allan
D.Espina,EduardoOng,AgnesioD.Quebral,EdmundoB.Victa,VictorC.Zafaralla,
EdilbertoC.PingulAndFedericoM.Rivera
FACTS:
ManilaWaterCompany,Inc.isoneofthetwoprivateconcessionairescontractedby
theMWSStomanagethewaterdistributionsystemintheEastZoneofMM.Under
theConcessionAgreement,petitionerundertooktoabsorbformeremployeesofthe
MWSSwhosenamesandpositionswereinthelistfurnishedbythelatter,whilethe
employmentofthosenotinthelistwasterminated.Privaterespondents,being
contractualcollectorsoftheMWSS,wereamongthe121employeesnotincludedin
thelistbutpetitionerengagedtheirserviceswithoutawrittencontractfor3months.
Beforetheendofthethreemonthcontract,the121collectorsincorporatedthe
AssociationCollectorsGroup,Inc.(ACGI)whichwascontractedbypetitionerto
collectchargesfortheBalaraBranch.Subsequently,mostofthe121collectorswere
askedbythepetitionertotransfertotheFirstClassicCourierServices,anewly
registeredcorporation.OnlyprivaterespondentsremainedwithACGI.
Privaterespondentsfiledacomplaintforillegaldismissalandmoneyclaimsagainst
petitioner,contendingthattheywerepetitionersemployeesasallthemethodsand
proceduresoftheircollectionswerecontrolledbythelatter.MWSSthoughasserts
thatprivaterespondentswereemployeesofACGI,anindependentcontractor.It
maintainedthatithadnocontrolandsupervisionoverprivaterespondentsmannerof
performingtheirworkexceptastotheresults.Thus,petitionerdidnothavean
employeremployeerelationshipwiththeprivaterespondents,butonlyaservice
contractorclientrelationshipwithACGI.

LaborArbiterdismissalofrespondentsillegal,MWSSpayeachseparationpay
becauseallareemployees
NLRCreversed;documentaryevidencepresentednotproofofcontrolbecause
disciplinaryactionsstilllefttoACGItoimpose
CAreversedNLRC;MWSSdeliberatelypreventedthecreationofanemployment
relationshipwiththeprivaterespondents;ACGInotanindependentcontractor
ISSUE:WNACGIisanindependentcontractor.
HELD:YES.ACGIisanindependentcontractorbutalaboronlycontractor.Private
respondentsareconsideredemployeesofMW
I.ACGIdoesnothavesubstantialcapitalizationorinvestmentintheformoftools,
equipment,machineries,workpremises,andothermaterials,toqualifyasan
independentcontractor.
*WhileithasanauthorizedcapitalstockofP1M,onlyP62,500isactuallypaidin,
whichcannotbeconsideredsubstantialcapitalization.
*The121collectorssubscribedto4shareseachandpaidonlytheamountofP625.00
inordertocomplywiththeincorporationrequirements.
*ACGIhasnoofficeorworkpremises.Privaterespondentsreporteddailytothe
branchoffice.Infact,thecorporateaddressofACGIwastheresidenceofits
president,Mr.HerminioD.Pea.
*Indealingwiththeconsumers,privaterespondentsusedthereceiptsandIDsissued
bypetitioner.
II.Theworkoftheprivaterespondentswasdirectlyrelatedtotheprincipalbusiness
oroperationofpetitioner.Beinginthebusinessofprovidingwatertotheconsumers
intheEastZone,thecollectionofchargesbyprivaterespondentsforthepetitioner
canonlybecategorizedasclearlyrelatedto,andinthepursuitofthelattersbusiness.
III.ACGIdidnotcarryonanindependentbusinessorundertaketheperformanceof
itsservicecontractaccordingtoitsownmannerandmethod,freefromthecontroland
supervisionofitsprincipal,petitioner.

*PriortoprivaterespondentsallegedemploymentwithACGI,theywerealready
workingforManilaWater,subjecttoitsrulesandregulationswithregardtothe
mannerandmethodofperformingtheirtasks.Thisformofcontrolandsupervision
neverchangedalthoughtheywerealreadyundertheseemingemployofACGI.
Petitionerissuedmemorandaregardingthebillingmethodsanddistributionof
bookstothecollectors
Itrequiredprivaterespondentstoreportdailyandtoremittheircollectionsonthe
samedaytothebranchofficeortodepositthemwithBPI
Monitoredstrictlytheirattendanceaswhenacollectorcannotperformhisdaily
collection,hemustnotifypetitionerorthebranchofficeinthemorningofthedaythat
hewillbeabsent
AlthoughitwasACGIwhichultimatelydisciplinedprivaterespondents,thepenalty
tobeimposedwasdictatedbypetitionerasshowninthelettersitsenttoACGI
specifyingthepenaltiestobemetedontheerringprivaterespondents.
ACGIwasnotanindependentcontractorsinceitdidnotcarryadistinctbusinessfree
fromthecontrolandsupervisionofpetitioner.ThereisnodoubtthatACGIwas
engagedinlaboronlycontracting,andassuch,isconsideredmerelyanagentofthe
petitioner.
Inlaboronlycontracting,thestatutecreatesanemployeremployeerelationshipfora
comprehensivepurpose:topreventacircumventionoflaborlaws.Thecontractoris
consideredmerelyanagentoftheprincipalemployerandthelatterisresponsibleto
theemployeesofthelaboronlycontractorasifsuchemployeeshadbeendirectly
employedbytheprincipalemployer.