Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 6323

April 13, 2007

PABLO R. OLIVARES and/or OLIVARES REALTY CORPORATION, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint1 for disbarment and suspension2 against respondent Atty. Arsenio C.
Villalon, Jr. by Pablo R. Olivares and/or Olivares Realty Corporation for violation of Rule
12.02, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the rule on forum
shopping.
In his complaint, Olivares alleged that respondents client, Sarah Divina Morales AlRasheed, repeatedly sued him for violations of the lease contract which they executed
over a commercial apartment in Olivares Building in Paraaque.3
In 1993, Al-Rasheed filed an action for damages and prohibition with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.4 The case was dismissed for
improper venue.5
Six years later, on July 1, 1999, Al-Rasheed filed an action for breach of contract with
damages in the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274. 6 The case, docketed as
Civil Case No. 99-0233, was dismissed for failure to prosecute.7 Al-Rasheed, through
counsel Atty. Villalon, sought a review of the order dismissing Civil Case No. 99-0233 but
the Court of Appeals did not give due course to her appeal.8 The subsequent petition for
review on certiorari filed in the Supreme Court was likewise denied. 9
On January 29, 2004, Al-Rasheed re-filed the 1999 suit in the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque, Branch 27410where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 0J-04-009.11 It was
dismissed on the grounds of res judicata and prescription.12
Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that he was only performing his legal obligation as
a lawyer to protect and prosecute the interests of his client.13 He denied that he was forum

shopping as his client, in her certificate of non-forum shopping,14 disclosed the two
previous cases involving the same cause of action which had been filed and
dismissed.15 Respondent further claims he could not refuse his clients request to file a
new case because Al-Rasheed was the "oppressed party" in the transaction.16
This Court referred the complaint, together with respondents comment, to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.17
The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP found that respondent assisted AlRasheed in repeatedly suing Olivares for the same cause of action and subject matter.18 It
opined that respondent should have noted that the 1999 case was dismissed for lack of
interest to prosecute.19 Under Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, such dismissal had
the effect of an adjudication on the merits.20 The CBD recommended the suspension of
respondent for six months with a warning that any similar infraction in the future would be
dealt with moreseverely.21
The IBP adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that respondent violated Rule
12.02, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the proscription on
forum shopping. It, however, modified the recommended penalty to reprimand.22
We adopt the findings of the IBP except its recommendation as to the penalty.

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All lawyers must bear in mind that their oaths are neither mere words nor an empty
formality. When they take their oath as lawyers, they dedicate their lives to the pursuit of
justice. They accept the sacred trust to uphold the laws of the land. 23 As the first Canon of
the Code of Professional Responsibility states, "[a] lawyer shall uphold the constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes."24 Moreover,
according to the lawyers oath they took, lawyers should "not wittingly or willingly promote
or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same."25
With all this in mind, respondent should have refrained from filing the second complaint
against Olivares. He ought to have known that the previous dismissal was with prejudice
since it had the effect of an adjudication on the merits. There was no excuse not to know
this elementary principle of procedural law.
The facts of this case reveal that Atty. Villalon purposely filed the second complaint.
Respondent appealed the 1999 case to the Court of Appeals and subsequently to this
Court. Both actions were dismissed for lack of merit, not on mere technicality. The
certificate of non-forum shopping attached to the 2004 complaint disclosed that AlRasheed previously sued Olivares for violating their lease contract. As if such disclosure
was a sufficient justification, Atty. Villalon unapologetically reproduced his

199926 arguments and assertions in the 200427complaint. Respondent obviously knew the
law and tried to go around it. This Court therefore concludes that respondent willfully
violated Rule 12.02, Canon 12 which provides that:
A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
Furthermore, he violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice.
A lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and
justice.28 Lawyers have the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice. Filing multiple actions constitutes an abuse of the Courts processes. It constitutes
improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade justice. Those who file
multiple or repetitive actions subject themselves to disciplinary action for incompetence or
willful violation of their duties as attorneys to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to
maintain only such actions that appear to be just and consistent with truth and honor.29
Everything considered, this Court finds that a reprimand is insufficient and rules instead
that CBDs recommendation for a six-month suspension from the practice of law to be
more commensurate to the violation committed. However, in view of respondents death
on September 27, 2006,30 the penalty can no longer be imposed on him. This development
has, in effect, rendered this disciplinary case moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7815

July 23, 2009

DOLORES C. BELLEZA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ALAN S. MACASA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
Per Curiam:
This treats of the complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Dolores C. Belleza against
respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa for unprofessional and unethical conduct in connection
with the handling of a criminal case involving complainants son.
On November 10, 2004, complainant went to see respondent on referral of their mutual
friend, Joe Chua. Complainant wanted to avail of respondents legal services in
connection with the case of her son, Francis John Belleza, who was arrested by
policemen of Bacolod City earlier that day for alleged violation of Republic Act (RA)
9165.1 Respondent agreed to handle the case for P30,000.
The following day, complainant made a partial payment of P15,000 to respondent thru
their mutual friend Chua. On November 17, 2004, she gave him an additional P10,000.
She paid the P5,000 balance on November 18, 2004. Both payments were also made thru
Chua. On all three occasions, respondent did not issue any receipt.
On November 21, 2004, respondent received P18,000 from complainant for the purpose
of posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of her (complainants) son. Again,

respondent did not issue any receipt. When complainant went to the court the next day,
she found out that respondent did not remit the amount to the court.
Complainant demanded the return of the P18,000 from respondent on several occasions
but respondent ignored her. Moreover, respondent failed to act on the case of
complainants son and complainant was forced to avail of the services of the Public
Attorneys Office for her sons defense.
Thereafter, complainant filed a verified complaint2 for disbarment against respondent in the
Negros Occidental chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Attached to the
verified complaint was the affidavit3 of Chua which read:
I, JOE CHUA, of legal age, Filipino and resident of Purok Sawmill, Brgy. Bata, Bacolod
City, after having been sworn to in accordance with law, hereby depose and state:
1. That I am the one who introduce[d] Mrs. Dolores C. Belleza [to] Atty. Alan
Macasa when she looked for a lawyer to help her son in the case that the
latter is facing sometime [i]n [the] first week of November 2004;
2. That by reason of my mutual closeness to both of them, I am the one who
facilitated the payment of Mrs. DOLORES C. BELLEZA to Atty. Alan Macasa;
3. That as far as I know, I received the following amount from Mrs. Dolores
Belleza as payment for Atty. Alan Macasa:
Date

Amount

November 11, 2004

P15,00

A week after

10,00

November 18, 2004

5,00

4. That the above-mentioned amounts which I supposed as Attorneys Fees

were immediately forwarded by me to Atty. [Macasa];
5. That I am executing this affidavit in order to attest to the truth of all the
foregoing statements.
xxx

xxx

x x x4

In a letter dated May 23, 2005,5 the IBP Negros Occidental chapter transmitted the
complaint to the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).6
In an order dated July 13, 2005,7 the CBD required respondent to submit his answer within
15 days from receipt thereof. Respondent, in an urgent motion for extension of time to file
an answer dated August 10, 2005,8 simply brushed aside the complaint for being

"baseless, groundless and malicious" without, however, offering any explanation. He also
prayed that he be given until September 4, 2005 to submit his answer.
Respondent subsequently filed urgent motions9 for second and third extensions of time
praying to be given until November 4, 2005 to submit his answer. He never did.
When both parties failed to attend the mandatory conference on April 19, 2006, they were
ordered to submit their respective position papers.10
In its report and recommendation dated October 2, 2007,11 the CBD ruled that respondent
failed to rebut the charges against him. He never answered the complaint despite several
chances to do so.
The CBD found respondent guilty of violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct.
It also found him guilty of violation of Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.
Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own
and those others kept by him.
The CBD ruled that respondent lacked good moral character and that he was unfit and
unworthy of the privileges conferred by law on him as a member of the bar. The CBD
recommended a suspension of six months with a stern warning that repetition of similar
acts would merit a more severe sanction. It also recommended that respondent be
ordered to return to complainant the P18,000 intended for the provisional liberty of the
complainants son and theP30,000 attorneys fees.
The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the report and recommendation
of the CBD with the modification that respondent be ordered to return to complainant only
the amount of P30,000 which he received as attorneys fees.12
We affirm the CBDs finding of guilt as affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors but we
modify the IBPs recommendation as to the liability of respondent.
Respondent Disrespected
Legal Processes
Respondent was given more than enough opportunity to answer the charges against him.
Yet, he showed indifference to the orders of the CBD for him to answer and refute the

accusations of professional misconductagainst him. In doing so, he failed to observe Rule

12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so.
Respondent also ignored the CBDs directive for him to file his position paper. His
propensity to flout the orders of the CBD showed his lack of concern and disrespect for
the proceedings of the CBD. He disregarded the oath he took when he was accepted to
the legal profession "to obey the laws and the legal orders of the duly constituted legal
authorities." He displayed insolence not only to the CBD but also to this Court which is the
source of the CBDs authority.
Respondents unjustified disregard of the lawful orders of the CBD was not only
irresponsible but also constituted utter disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow
lawyers.13 His conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is called upon to obey court
orders and processes and is expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives
as an officer of the court.14 Respondent should have known that the orders of the CBD (as
the investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases against lawyers) were not mere
requests but directives which should have been complied with promptly and completely.15
1avvph!1

Respondent Grossly Neglected

The Cause of His Client
Respondent undertook to defend the criminal case against complainants son. Such
undertaking imposed upon him the following duties:
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE
SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable.
xxx

xxx

xxx

CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE
BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
A lawyer who accepts the cause of a client commits to devote himself (particularly his
time, knowledge, skills and effort) to such cause. He must be ever mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him, constantly striving to be worthy thereof. Accordingly, he owes

full devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
clients rights and the exertion of his utmost learning, skill and ability to ensure that nothing
shall be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law legally applied.16
A lawyer who accepts professional employment from a client undertakes to serve his client
with competence and diligence.17 He must conscientiously perform his duty arising from
such relationship. He must bear in mind that by accepting a retainer, he impliedly makes
the following representations: that he possesses the requisite degree of learning, skill and
ability other lawyers similarly situated possess; that he will exert his best judgment in the
prosecution or defense of the litigation entrusted to him; that he will exercise reasonable
care and diligence in the use of his skill and in the application of his knowledge to his
clients cause; and that he will take all steps necessary to adequately safeguard his
clients interest.18
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A lawyers negligence in the discharge of his obligations arising from the relationship of
counsel and client may cause delay in the administration of justice and prejudice the rights
of a litigant, particularly his client. Thus, from the perspective of the ethics of the legal
profession, a lawyers lethargy in carrying out his duties to his client is both unprofessional
and unethical.19
If his clients case is already pending in court, a lawyer must actively represent his client
by promptly filing the necessary pleading or motion and assiduously attending the
scheduled hearings. This is specially significant for a lawyer who represents an accused in
a criminal case.
The accused is guaranteed the right to counsel under the Constitution.20 However, this
right can only be meaningful if the accused is accorded ample legal assistance by his
lawyer:
... The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which
basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process
requirement is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be
dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.
The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or
the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means
that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits
himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active
involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his
bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the
case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing
jurisprudence.21

[T]he right of an accused to counsel is beyond question a fundamental right. Without

counsel, the right to a fair trial itself would be of little consequence, for it is through

counsel that the accused secures his other rights. In other words, the right to counsel is
the right to effective assistance of counsel.22
The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his
sworn duty of fidelity to his client.23 Tersely put, it means an effective, efficient and truly
decisive legal assistance, not a simply perfunctory representation.24
In this case, after accepting the criminal case against complainants son and receiving his
attorneys fees, respondent did nothing that could be considered as effective and efficient
legal assistance. For all intents and purposes, respondent abandoned the cause of his
client. Indeed, on account of respondents continued inaction, complainant was compelled
to seek the services of the Public Attorneys Office. Respondents lackadaisical attitude
towards the case of complainants son was reprehensible. Not only did it prejudice
complainants son, it also deprived him of his constitutional right to counsel. Furthermore,
in failing to use the amount entrusted to him for posting a bond to secure the provisional
liberty of his client, respondent unduly impeded the latters constitutional right to bail.
Respondent Failed to Return
His Clients Money
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a lawyer
the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from the client.25
When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as
for filing fees, registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should promptly
account to the client how the money was spent. If he does not use the money for its
intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client.26 His failure either to render
an accounting or to return the money (if the intended purpose of the money does not
materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.27
Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his clients funds or properties as they fall due
or upon demand.28 His failure to return the clients money upon demand gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in
violation of the trust reposed in him by the client.29 It is a gross violation of general morality
as well as of professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and
deserves punishment.30 Indeed, it may border on the criminal as it may constitute a prima
facie case of swindling or estafa.
Respondent never denied receiving P18,000 from complainant for the purpose of posting
a bond to secure the provisional liberty of her son. He never used the money for its
intended purpose yet also never returned it to the client. Worse, he unjustifiably refused to
turn over the amount to complainant despite the latters repeated demands.
Moreover, respondent rendered no service that would have entitled him to the P30,000
attorneys fees. As a rule, the right of a lawyer to a reasonable compensation for his
services is subject to two requisites: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship and

(2) the rendition by the lawyer of services to the client.31 Thus, a lawyer who does not
render legal services is not entitled to attorneys fees. Otherwise, not only would he be
unjustly enriched at the expense of the client, he would also be rewarded for his
negligence and irresponsibility.
Respondent Failed to Uphold the Integrity and Dignity of the Legal Profession
For his failure to comply with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession,
respondent failed to obey Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)
Indeed, a lawyer who fails to abide by the Canons and Rules of the Code of Professional
Responsibility disrespects the said Code and everything that it stands for. In so doing, he
disregards the ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.
Lawyers should always live up to the ethical standards of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Public confidence in law and in
lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the
bar.32 Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that would promote
public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.33
Respondent was undeserving of the trust reposed in him. Instead of using the money for
the bond of the complainants son, he pocketed it. He failed to observe candor, fairness
and loyalty in his dealings with his client.34 He failed to live up to his fiduciary duties. By
keeping the money for himself despite his undertaking that he would facilitate the release
of complainants son, respondent showed lack of moral principles. His transgression
showed him to be a swindler, a deceitful person and a shame to the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa is hereby found GUILTY not only of
dishonesty but also of professional misconduct for prejudicing Francis John Bellezas right
to counsel and to bail under Sections 13 and 14(2), Article III of the Constitution, and for
violating Canons 1, 7, 17, 18 and 19 and Rules 12.03, 16.01, 16.02, 16.03 and 18.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore DISBARRED from the practice of
law effective immediately.
Respondent is hereby ORDERED to return to complainant Dolores C. Belleza the
amounts of P30,000 andP18,000 with interest at 12% per annum from the date of
promulgation of this decision until full payment. Respondent is further DIRECTED to
submit to the Court proof of payment of the amount within ten days from payment. Failure
to do so will subject him to criminal prosecution.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into
the records of respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa and the Office of the Court Administrator to
be furnished to the courts of the land for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7054

December 4, 2009

CONRADO QUE, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, JR. Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In a complaint for disbarment,1 Conrado Que (complainant) accused Atty. Anastacio
Revilla, Jr. (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar
Discipline (IBP Committee on Bar Discipline or CBD) of committing the following violations
of the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court:
(1) The respondents abuse of court remedies and processes by filing a petition for
certiorari before theCourt of Appeals (CA), two petitions for annulment of title before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a petition for annulment of judgment before the RTC
and lastly, a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC (collectively, subject cases)
to assail and overturn the final judgments of the Metropolitan Trial Court2(MeTC) and

RTC3 in the unlawful detainer case rendered against the respondents clients. The
respondent in this regard, repeatedly raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction by the
MeTC and RTC knowing fully-well that these courts have jurisdiction over the
unlawful detainer case. The respondent also repeatedly attacked the complainants
and his siblings titles over the property subject of the unlawful detainer case;
(2) The respondents commission of forum-shopping by filing the subject cases in
order to impede, obstruct, and frustrate the efficient administration of justice for his
own personal gain and to defeat the right of the complainant and his siblings to
execute the MeTC and RTC judgments in the unlawful detainer case;
(3) The respondents lack of candor and respect towards his adversary and the
courts by resorting to falsehood and deception to misguide, obstruct and impede the
due administration of justice. The respondent asserted falsehood in the motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment by
fabricating an imaginary order issued by the presiding judge in open court which
allegedly denied the motion to dismiss filed by the respondents in the said case. The
complainant alleged that the respondent did this to cover up his lack of preparation;
the respondent also deceived his clients (who were all squatters) in supporting the
above falsehood.4
(4) The respondents willful and revolting falsehood that unjustly maligned and
defamed the good name and reputation of the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico (Atty.
Catolico), the previous counsel of the respondents clients.
(5) The respondents deliberate, fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court
in the petition for annulment of judgment for 15 litigants, three of whom are already
deceased;
(6) The respondents willful and fraudulent appearance in the second petition for
annulment of title as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines without being
authorized to do so.
Additionally, the complaint accused the respondent of representing fifty-two (52) litigants in
Civil Case No. Q-03-48762 when no such authority was ever given to him.
The CBD required the respondent to answer the complaint.
In his Answer,5 the respondent declared that he is a member of the Kalayaan
Development Cooperative (KDC) that handles pro bono cases for the underprivileged, the
less fortunate, the homeless and those in the marginalized sector in Metro Manila. He
agreed to take over the cases formerly handled by other KDC members. One of these

cases was the unlawful detainer case handled by the late Atty. Catolico where the
complainant and his siblings were the plaintiffs and the respondents present clients were
the defendants.
With respect to paragraph 1 of the disbarment complaint, the respondent professed his
sincerity, honesty andgood faith in filing the petitions complained of; he filed these
petitions to protect the interests of his clients in their property. The respondent asserted
that these petitions were all based on valid grounds the lack of jurisdiction of the MeTC
and the RTC over the underlying unlawful detainer case, the extrinsic fraud committed by
the late Atty. Catolico, and the extrinsic fraud committed by the complainant and his family
against his clients; he discovered that the allegedly detained property did not really belong
to the complainant and his family but is a forest land. The respondent also asserted that
his resort to a petition for annulment of judgment and a petition for declaratory relief to
contest the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC were all parts of his legal strategy to
protect the interests of his clients.
On the allegations of falsehood in the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal
of the petition for annulment of judgment (covered by paragraph 3 of the disbarment
complaint), the respondent maintained that his allegations were based on his observations
and the notes he had taken during the proceedings on what the presiding judge dictated in
open court.
The respondent denied that he had made any unauthorized appearance in court (with
respect to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the disbarment complaint). He claimed that the 52
litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762 were impleaded by inadvertence; he immediately
rectified his error by dropping them from the case. On the petition for annulment of
judgment, the respondent claimed that a majority (31 out of 49) of the litigants who signed
the certification constituted sufficient compliance with the rules on forum-shopping. The
respondent likewise denied having represented the Republic of the Philippines in the
second petition for annulment of title. The respondent pointed out that there was no
allegation whatsoever that he was the sole representative of both the complainants (his
clients) and the Republic of the Philippines. The respondent pointed out that the petition
embodied a request to the Office of the Solicitor General to represent his clients in the
case.6
The respondent submitted that he did not commit any illegal, unlawful, unjust, wrongful or
immoral acts towards the complainant and his siblings. He stressed that he acted in good
faith in his dealings with them and his conduct was consistent with his sworn duty as
a lawyer to uphold justice and the law and to defend the interests of his clients. The
respondent additionally claimed that the disbarment case was filed because the
complainants counsel, Atty. Cesar P. Uy (Atty. Uy), had an axe to grind against him.

Lastly, the respondent posited in his pleadings7 before the IBP that the present complaint
violated the rule on forum shopping considering that the subject cases were also the ones
on which a complaint was filed against him in CBD Case No. 03-1099 filed by Atty. Uy
before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline. The respondent also posited that the present
complaint was filed to harass, ridicule and defame his good name and reputation and,
indirectly, to harass his clients who are marginalized members of the KDC.
The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner
Except for the last charge of unauthorized appearance on behalf of 52 litigants in Civil
Case No. Q-03-48762, Investigating Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan8 (Investigating
Commissioner Cunanan) found all the charges against the respondent meritorious. In his
Report and Recommendation, he stated:
While an attorney admittedly has the solemn duty to defend and protect the cause and
rights of his client with all the fervor and energy within his command, yet, it is equally true
that it is the primary duty of the lawyer to defend the dignity, authority and majesty of the
law and the courts which enforce it. A lawyer is not at liberty to maintain and defend the
cause of his clients thru means, inconsistent with truth and honor. He may not and must
not encourage multiplicity of suits or brazenly engage in forum-shopping.9
On the first charge on abuse of court processes, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan
noted the unnecessary use by the respondent of legal remedies to forestall the execution
of the final decisions of the MTC and the RTC in the unlawful detainer case against his
clients.10
On the second charge, the Investigating Commissioner ruled that the act of the
respondent in filing two petitions for annulment of title, a petition for annulment of
judgment and later on a petition for declaratory relief were all done to prevent the
execution of the final judgment in the unlawful detainer case and constituted prohibited
forum-shopping.11
On the third and fourth charges, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found ample
evidence showing that the respondent was dishonest in dealing with the court as shown in
his petition for annulment of judgment; he resorted to falsities and attributed acts to Atty.
Catolico and to the presiding judge, all of which were untrue. 12
On the fifth and sixth charges, the Investigating Commissioner disregarded the
respondents explanation that he had no intention to represent without authority 15 of the
litigants (three of whom were already deceased) in the petition for annulment of judgment
(Civil Case No. Q-01-45556). To the Investigating Commissioner, the respondent merely

glossed over the representation issue by claiming that the authority given by a majority of
the litigants complied with the certification of non-forum shopping requirement. The
Investigating Commissioner likewise brushed aside the respondents argument regarding
his misrepresentation in the second complaint for annulment of title since he knew very
well that only the Solicitor General can institute an action for reversion on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines. Despite this knowledge, the respondent solely signed the
amended complaint for and on behalf of his clients and of the Republic.
The Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, through its Resolution
No. XVII-2005-164 on CBD Case No. 03-1100, adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Cunanan and recommended that the
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.13 On reconsideration,
the Board of Governors reduced the respondents suspension from the practice of law to
one (1) year.14
The Issue
The case poses to us the core issues of whether the respondent can be held liable for the
imputed unethical infractions and professional misconduct, and the penalty these
transgressions should carry.
The Courts Ruling
Except for the penalty, we agree with the Report and Recommendation of Investigating
Commissioner Cunanan and the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline.
We take judicial notice that this disbarment complaint is not the only one so far filed
involving the respondent; another complaint invoking similar grounds has previously been
filed. In Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia v. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr., 15 we
suspended the respondent from the practice of law for his willful and intentional falsehood
before the court; for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a
judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We initially
imposed a suspension of two (2) years, but in an act of leniency subsequently reduced the
suspension to six (6) months.16
Abuse of court procedures and processes
The following undisputed facts fully support the conclusion that the respondent is guilty of
serious misconduct for abusing court procedures and processes to shield his clients from
the execution of the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC in the unlawful detainer case
against these clients:

First, the respondent filed a petition for certiorari (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53892)
with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order to
question the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC for lack of jurisdiction. In dismissing
the respondents petition, the CA held:
Even for the sake of argument considering that the petition case be the proper remedy,
still it must be rejected for failure of petitioners to satisfactorily demonstrate lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City over the ejectment
case.17
Second, notwithstanding the CAs dismissal of the petition for certiorari, the respondent
again questioned the MeTCs and the RTCs lack of jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer
case in a petition for annulment of judgment (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-45556)
before the RTC with an ancillary prayer for the grant of a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction. The RTC dismissed this petition on the basis of the motion to
dismiss filed.18
Third, the respondent successively filed two petitions (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-9938780 and Civil Case No. Q-02-46885) for annulment of the complainants title to the
property involved in the unlawful detainer case. The records show that these petitions
were both dismissed "for lack of legal personality on the part of the plaintiffs" to file the
petition.19
Fourth, after the dismissals of the petition for annulment of judgment and the petitions for
annulment of title, the respondent this time filed a petition for declaratory relief with prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the complainant and his siblings from
exercising their rights over the same property subject of the unlawful detainer case. The
respondent based the petition on the alleged nullity of the complainants title because the
property is a part of forest land.
Fifth, the persistent applications by the respondent for injunctive relief in the four petitions
he had filed in several courts the petition for certiorari, the petition for annulment of
judgment, the second petition for annulment of complainants title and the petition for
declaratory relief reveal the respondents persistence in preventing and avoiding the
execution of the final decisions of the MeTC and RTC against his clients in the unlawful
detainer case.
Under the circumstances, the respondents repeated attempts go beyond the legitimate
means allowed by professional ethical rules in defending the interests of his client. These
are already uncalled for measures to avoid the enforcement of final judgments of the
MeTC and RTC. In these attempts, the respondent violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility which makes it obligatory for a lawyer to "observe the
rules of procedure and. . . not [to] misuse them to defeat the ends of justice." By his
actions, the respondent used procedural rules to thwart and obstruct the speedy and
efficient administration of justice, resulting in prejudice to the winning parties in that case.20
Filing of multiple actions and forum shopping
The respondent likewise violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility,21 as well as the rule against forum shopping, both of which are
directed against the filing of multiple actions to attain the same objective. Both violations
constitute abuse of court processes; they tend to degrade the administration of justice;
wreak havoc on orderly judicial procedure;22 and add to the congestion of the heavily
burdened dockets of the courts.23
While the filing of a petition for certiorari to question the lower courts jurisdiction may be a
procedurally legitimate (but substantively erroneous) move, the respondents subsequent
petitions involving the same property and the same parties not only demonstrate his
attempts to secure favorable ruling using different fora, but his obvious objective as well of
preventing the execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case
against his clients. This intent is most obvious with respect to the petitions for annulment
of judgment and declaratory relief, both geared towards preventing the execution of the
unlawful detainer decision, long after this decision had become final.
Willful, intentional and deliberate
falsehood before the courts
The records also reveal that the respondent committed willful, intentional and deliberate
falsehood in the pleadings he filed with the lower courts.
First, in the petition for annulment of judgment filed before the RTC, Branch 101, Quezon
City, the respondent cited extrinsic fraud as one of the grounds for the annulment sought.
The extrinsic fraud was alleged in the last paragraph of the petition, as follows:
In here, counsel for the petitioners (defendants therein), deliberately neglected to file the
proper remedy then available after receipt of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration
thus corruptly sold out the interest of the petitioners (defendants therein) by keeping
them away to the Court and in complete ignorance of the suit by a false pretense of
compromise and fraudulent acts of alleging representing them when in truth and in fact,
have connived with the attorney of the prevailing party at his defeat to the prejudice of the
petitioner (defendants therein) 24

Yet, in paragraph 35 of the same petition, the respondent alleged that no second motion
for reconsideration or for new trial, or no other petition with the CA had been filed, as he
believed "that the decisions rendered both by the MeTC and the RTC are null and
void."25 These conflicting claims, no doubt, involve a fabrication made for the purpose of
supporting the petition for annulment. Worse, it involved a direct and unsubstantiated
attack on the reputation of a law office colleague, another violation we shall separately
discuss below.
Second, the respondent employed another obvious subterfuge when he filed his second
petition for annulment of title, which was an unsuccessful attempt to circumvent the rule
that only the Solicitor General may commence reversion proceedings of public lands26 on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. This second petition, filed by a private party and
not by the Republic, showed that: (a) the respondent and his clients requested that they
be represented by the Solicitor General in the proceedings; (b) the Republic of the
Philippines was simply impleaded in the amended petition without its consent as a plaintiff;
and (c) the respondent signed the amended petition where he alone stood as counsel for
the "plaintiffs." In this underhanded manner, the respondent sought to compel the Republic
to litigate and waste its resources on an unauthorized and unwanted suit.
Third, the respondent also committed falsehood in his motion for reconsideration of the
order dismissing his petition for annulment of judgment where he misrepresented to the
court and his clients what actually transpired in the hearing of June 28, 2002 in this wise:
Likewise, the proceedings on said date of hearing (June 28, 2002) show, that after both
counsel have argued on the aforesaid pending incident, the Honorable Presiding Judge, in
open court, and in the presence and within the hearing distance of all the plaintiffs and
their counsel as well as the counsel of the defendants resolved: TO DENY THE MOTION
TO DISMISS FILED AND DIRECTED DEFENDANTS COUNSEL TO FILE AN ANSWER
TO THE COMPLAINT WITHIN THE REMAINING PERIOD.27[Underscoring and emphasis
theirs]
The records, however, disclose that the scheduled hearing for June 28, 2002 was actually
for the respondents application for temporary restraining order and was not a hearing on
the adverse partys motion to dismiss.28 The records also show that RTC-Branch 101 held
in abeyance the respondents application for injunctive relief pending the resolution of the
motion to dismiss filed by the adverse party.29 As stated in the order of the Presiding Judge
of RTC-Branch 101:
Browsing over the records of this case specifically the transcripts of stenographic notes as
transcribed by the Stenographer, the same will indicate that the allegations in the Motion
for Reconsideration are not true.

 how can this Court make a ruling on the matter even without stating the factual and
legal bases as required/mandated by the Rules. Moreover, there are no indications or iota
of irregularity in the preparation by Stenographer of the transcripts, and by the Court
interpreter of the Minutes of the open Court session.[Underscoring theirs]
The records further disclose that despite knowledge of the falsity of his allegations, the
respondent took advantage of his position and the trust reposed in him by his clients (who
are all squatters) to convince them to support, through their affidavits, his false claims on
what allegedly transpired in the June 28, 2002 hearing. 30
For these acts, we find the respondent liable under Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 the Code of
Professional Responsibility for violating the lawyers duty to observe candor and fairness
in his dealings with the court. This provision states:
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court,
nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be mislead by an artifice.
Likewise, the respondent violated his duty as an attorney and his oath as a lawyer "never
to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or
law."31 The respondent failed to remember that his duty as an officer of the court makes
him an indispensable participant in the administration of justice,32 and that he is expected
to act candidly, fairly and truthfully in his work.33 His duty as a lawyer obligates him not to
conceal the truth from the court, or to mislead the court in any manner, no matter how
demanding his duties to his clients may be.34 In case of conflict, his duties to his client
yield to his duty to deal candidly with the court.35
In defending his clients interest, the respondent also failed to observe Rule 19.01, Canon
19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which reads:
CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE
BOUNDS OF LAW
Rule 19.01 A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his clients x x x
This Canon obligates a lawyer, in defending his client, to employ only such means as are
consistent with truth and honor.36 He should not prosecute patently frivolous and
meritless appeals or institute clearly groundless actions.37 The recital of what the

respondent did to prevent the execution of the judgment against his clients shows that he
actually committed what the above rule expressly prohibits.
Maligning the name of his fellow lawyers
To support the charge of extrinsic fraud in his petition for annulment of judgment, the
respondent attacked (as quoted above) the name and reputation of the late Atty. Catolico
and accused him of deliberate neglect, corrupt motives and connivance with the counsel
for the adverse party.
We find it significant that the respondent failed to demonstrate how he came upon his
accusation against Atty. Catolico. The respondent, by his own admission, only participated
in the cases previously assigned to Atty. Catolico after the latter died. At the same time,
the respondents petition for annulment of judgment also represented that no second
motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed to contest the MeTC and RTC decisions in
the unlawful detainer case for the reason that the respondent believed the said decisions
were null and void ab initio.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the respondent has been less than fair in his
professional relationship with Atty. Catolico and is thus liable for violating Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which obligates a lawyer to "conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professional colleagues." He was unfair because
he imputed wrongdoing to Atty. Catolico without showing any factual basis therefor; he
effectively maligned Atty. Catolico, who is now dead and unable to defend himself.
Unauthorized appearances
We support Investigating Commissioner Cunanans finding that the respondent twice
represented parties without proper authorization: first, in the petition for annulment of
judgment; and second, in the second petition for annulment of title.38
In the first instance, the records show that the respondent filed the petition for annulment
of judgment on behalf of 49 individuals, 31 of whom gave their consent while the other 15
individuals did not. We cannot agree with the respondents off-hand explanation that he
truly believed that a majority of the litigants who signed the certification of non-forum
shopping in the petition already gave him the necessary authority to sign for the others.
We find it highly improbable that this kind of lapse could have been committed by a
seasoned lawyer like the respondent, who has been engaged in the practice of law for
more than 30 years and who received rigid and strict training as he so proudly declares,
from the University of the Philippines College of Law and in the two law firms with which
he was previously associated.39 As Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found, the

respondents explanation of compliance with the rule on the certification of non-forum

shopping glossed over the real charge of appearing in court without the proper
authorization of the parties he allegedly represented.
In the second instance, which occurred in the second complaint for annulment of title, the
respondent knew that only the Solicitor General can legally represent the Republic of the
Philippines in actions for reversion of land. Nevertheless, he filed an amended petition
where he impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as plaintiff without its authority and
consent, as a surreptitious way of forcing the Republic to litigate. Notably, he signed the
amended complaint on behalf of all the plaintiffs his clients and the Republic.
In both instances, the respondent violated Sections 21 and 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court when he undertook the unauthorized appearances. The settled rule is that a lawyer
may not represent a litigant without authority from the latter or from the latters
representative or, in the absence thereof, without leave of court.40 The willful unauthorized
appearance by a lawyer for a party in a given case constitutes contumacious conduct and
also warrants disciplinary measures against the erring lawyer for professional
misconduct.41
The Respondents Defenses
We find no merit in the respondents defenses.
"Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking unconscientious
advantage of another. Accordingly, in University of the East v. Jader we said that "[g]ood
faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another,
even though the forms and technicalities of law, together with the absence of all
information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious."42 Bad faith, on
the other hand, is a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some
motive of self-interest, ill will or for an ulterior purpose.43 As both concepts are states of
mind, they may be deduced from the attendant circumstances and, more particularly, from
the acts and statements of the person whose state of mind is the subject of inquiry.
In this case, we find that the respondent acted in bad faith in defending the interests of his
clients. We draw this conclusion from the misrepresentations and the dubious recourses
he made, all obviously geared towards forestalling the execution of the final judgments of
the MeTC and RTC. That he took advantage of his legal knowledge and experience and
misread the Rules immeasurably strengthen the presence of bad faith.
We find neither sincerity nor honest belief on the part of the respondent in pleading the
soundness and merit of the cases that he filed in court to prevent the execution of the

MeTC and RTC decisions, considering his own conduct of presenting conflicting theories
in his petitions. The succession of cases he filed shows a desperation that negates the
sincere and honest belief he claims; these are simply scattershot means to achieve his
objective of avoiding the execution of the unlawful detainer judgment against his clients.
On the respondents allegations regarding his discretion to determine legal strategy, it is
not amiss to note that this was the same defense he raised in the first disbarment
case.44 As we explained in Plus Builders, the exercise of a lawyers discretion in acting for
his client can never be at the expense of truth and justice. In the words of this cited case:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine
interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law.
He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his
clients case with the end in view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes,
and counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and
such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. He must
always remind himself of the oath he took upon admission to the Bar that he will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor
consent to the same; and that he will conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best
of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his]
clients. Needless to state, the lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the
expense of truth and the administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds
of reason and common sense. A lawyers responsibility to protect and advance the
interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and
malicious intentions against the other party.45
We cannot give credence to the respondents claim that the disbarment case was filed
because the counsel of the complainant, Atty. Uy, had an axe to grind against him. We
reject this argument, considering that it was not Atty. Uy who filed the present disbarment
case against him; Atty. Uy is only the counsel in this case. In fact, Atty. Uy has filed his
own separate disbarment case against the respondent.
The sui generis nature of a disbarment case renders the underlying motives of the
complainants unimportant and with very little relevance. The purpose of a disbarment
proceeding is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of
the court and a participant in the dispensation of justice an issue where the
complainants personal motives have little relevance. For this reason, disbarment
proceedings may be initiated by the Court motu proprio upon information of an alleged
wrongdoing. As we also explained in the case In re: Almacen:

. . .disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, this proceeding is not - and does not involve - a trial of an action or a suit, but is
rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
xxx
It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and
the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of-the
Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be
no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.46
1avvphi1

Hence, we give little or no weight to the alleged personal motivation that drove the
complainant Que and his counsel to file the present disbarment case.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of
professional misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards
imposed on members of the Bar. We cannot agree, however, that only a penalty of oneyear suspension from the practice of law should be imposed. Neither should we limit
ourselves to the originally recommended penalty of suspension for two (2) years.
Given the respondents multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed, and
the nature of these violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to
gloss over concerns for the orderly administration of justice, we believe and so hold that
the appropriate action of this Court is to disbar the respondent to keep him away from the
law profession and from any significant role in the administration of justice which he has
disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal profession serves. Not
even his ardor and overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can save him.
Such traits at the expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of the profession
and the orderly administration of justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.
Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondents first ethical
infraction of the same nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia
versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court;

for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and
for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We showed leniency then
by reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6) months. We cannot similarly treat the
respondent this time; it is clear that he did not learn any lesson from his past experience
and since then has exhibited traits of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the
respondents professional legal career for the sake of the public, the profession and the
interest of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164
dated December 17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of
the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline insofar as respondent Atty.
Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable for professional misconduct for violations of the
Lawyers Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04,
Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and Sections
20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, we modify the penalty the
IBP imposed, and hold that the respondent should beDISBARRED from the practice of
law.
SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 5054. May 29, 2002]

SOLEDAD NUEZ, Represented by ANANIAS B. CO, Attorney-in-Fact

Complainant, petitioner, vs. ATTY. ROMULO RICAFORT, respondent.
R E S O LUTIO N
PER CURIAM:

for

This is an administrative complaint filed on 21 April 1999 by Soledad Nuez, a septuagenarian

represented by her attorney-in-fact Ananias B. Co, Jr., seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty.
Romulo Ricafort on the ground of grave misconduct.
From the documents submitted by the complainant, it appears that sometime in October 1982
she authorized respondent to sell her two parcels of land located in Legazpi City for P40,000. She
agreed to give respondent 10 percent of the price as commission. Respondent succeeded in selling
the lots, but despite complainants repeated demands, he did not turn over to her the proceeds of the
sale. This forced complainant to file against respondent and his wife an action for a sum of money
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-9315052.
For his failure to file an answer, respondent was declared in default and complainant was
required to present ex-parte her evidence. On 29 September 1993, the court rendered its decision
(Annex C of the Complaint) ordering respondent herein to pay complainant the sum of P16,000
as principal obligation, with interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of the commencement of
the action, i.e., 8 March 1993, until it is fully paid, and to pay the costs of suit.
Respondent and his wife appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals. However, the
appeal was dismissed for failure to pay the required docket fee within the reglementary period
despite notice.
On 23 October 1995 complainant filed in Civil Case No. Q-93-15052 a motion for the issuance
of an alias writ of execution, which the court granted on 30 October 1995. The next day, the alias
writ of execution was issued (Annex B of Complaint). It appears that only a partial satisfaction of
the P16,000 judgment was made, leaving P13,800 thereof unsatisfied. In payment for the latter,
respondent issued four postdated checks drawn against his account in China Banking Corporation,
Legazpi City.
Upon presentment, however, the checks were dishonored because the account against which
they were drawn was closed (Annexes D and E of Complaint). Demands for respondent to
make good the checks fell on deaf ears, thus forcing complainant to file four criminal complaints
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (Annexes F, G,
H and I of the Complaint).
In the Joint Affidavit of respondent and his wife filed with the Office of the Prosecutor,
Quezon City, respondent admitted having drawn and issued said four postdated checks in favor of
complainant. Allegedly believing in good faith that said checks had already been encashed by
complainant, he subsequently closed his checking account in China Banking Corporation, Legazpi
City, from which said four checks were drawn. He was not notified that the checks were
dishonored. Had he been notified, he would have made the necessary arrangements with the bank.

We required respondent to comment on the complaint. But he never did despite our favorable
action on his three motions for extension of time to file the comment. His failure to do so
compelled complainant to file on 10 March 2000 a motion to cite respondent in contempt on the
ground that his strategy to file piecemeal motions for extension of time to submit the comment
smacks of a delaying tactic scheme that is unworthy of a member of the bar and a law dean.
In our resolution of 14 June 2000, we noted the motion for contempt; considered respondent to
have waived the filing of a comment; and referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippine
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation or decision within ninety days from notice of
the resolution.
In her Report and Recommendation dated 12 September 2000, Investigating Commissioner
Atty. Milagros V. San Juan concluded that respondent had no intention to honor the money
judgment against him in Civil Case No. Q-93-15052 as can be gleaned from his (1) issuance of
postdated checks; (2) closing of the account against which said checks were drawn; and (3)
continued failure to make good the amounts of the checks. She then recommends that respondent
be declared guilty of misconduct in his dealings with complainant and be suspended from the
practice of law for at least one year and pay the amount of the checks issued to the complainant.
In its Resolution No. XV-2001-244 of 27 October 2001, the Board of Governors of the IBP
approved and adopted Atty. San Juans Report and Recommendation.
We concur with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as adopted and approved by
the Board of Governors of the IBP, that respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave
misconduct in his dealings with complainant. Indeed, the record shows respondents grave
misconduct and notorious dishonesty.
There is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that
respondent gravely abused the confidence that complainant reposed in him and committed
dishonesty when he did not turn over the proceeds of the sale of her property. Worse, with palpable
bad faith, he compelled the complainant to go to court for the recovery of the proceeds of the sale
and, in the process, to spend money, time and energy therefor. Then, despite his deliberate failure to
answer the complaint resulting in his having been declared in default, he appealed from the
judgment to the Court of Appeals. Again, bad faith attended such a step because he did not pay the
docket fee despite notice. Needless to state, respondent wanted to prolong the travails and agony of
the complainant and to enjoy the fruits of what rightfully belongs to the latter. Unsatisfied with
what he had already unjustly and unlawfully done to complainant, respondent issued checks to
satisfy the alias writ of execution. But, remaining unrepentant of what he had done and in continued
pursuit of a clearly malicious plan not to pay complainant of what had been validly and lawfully
adjudged by the court against him, respondent closed the account against which the checks were
drawn. There was deceit in this. Respondent never had the intention of paying his obligation as

proved by the fact that despite the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, he did not pay the
obligation.
All the foregoing constituted grave and gross misconduct in blatant violation of Rule 1:01 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
Respondents claim of good faith in closing his account because he thought complainant has
already encashed all checks is preposterous. The account was closed on or before 26 February
1996. He knew that there were still other checks due on 29 February 1996 and 15 March 1996
which could not be encashed before their maturity dates.
By violating Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent
diminished public confidence in the law and the lawyers (Busios v. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407
[1997]; Ducat v. Villalon, 337 SCRA 622 [2000]). Instead of promoting such confidence and
respect, he miserably failed to live up to the standards of the legal profession (Gonato v. Adaza, 328
SCRA 694 [2000]; Ducat v. Villalon, supra).
Respondents act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the alias writ of execution for money
judgment rendered by the trial court was a clear attempt to defeat the ends of justice. His failure to
make good the checks despite demands and the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 showed
his continued defiance of judicial processes, which he, as an officer of the court, was under
continuing duty to uphold.
To further demonstrate his very low regard for the courts and judicial processes, respondent
even had the temerity of making a mockery of our generosity to him. We granted his three motions
for extension of time to file his comment on the complaint in this case. Yet, not only did he fail to
file the comment, he as well did not even bother to explain such failure notwithstanding our
resolution declaring him as having waived the filing of the comment. To the Highest Court of the
land, respondent openly showed a high degree of irresponsibility amounting to willful disobedience
to its lawful orders (Thermochem Incorporated v. Naval, 344 SCRA 76, 82 [2000]; Sipin-Nabor v.
Atty. Baterina, Adm. Case No. 4073, 28 June 2001).
Respondent then knowingly and willfully violated Rules 12.04 and 12:03 of Canon 12 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide that lawyers should avoid any
action that would unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court
processes; and that lawyers, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, should not let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for
their failure to do so.

The penalty of suspension for at least one (1) year imposed by the Board of Governors of the
IBP is both vague and inadequate. A suspension may either be indefinite or for a specific duration.
Besides, under the circumstances of this case a suspension for a year is plainly very light and
inadequate. For his deliberate violation or defiance of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 12:03 and
12:04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, coupled with his palpable bad faith
and dishonesty in his dealings with the complainant, respondent deserves a graver penalty. That
graver penalty is indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is hereby
INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED from the practice of law, and is directed to pay complainant
Soledad Nuez the amount of P13,800 within ten (10) days from notice of this resolution.
This resolution shall take effect immediately. Copies thereof shall be furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record; the Office of the President; the
Department of Justice; the Court of Appeals; the Sandiganbayan; and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. The Court Administrator shall also furnish all lower courts with copies of this
Resolution.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132826

September 3, 2009

ROLANDO SAA, Petitioner,

vs.
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE,
BOARD OF GOVERNORS, PASIG CITY and ATTY. FREDDIE A. VENIDA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Petitioner Rolanda Saa filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Freddie
A. Venida on December 27, 1991 in this Court. In his complaint, Saa stated that Atty.
Venidas act of filing two cases1 against him was oppressive and constituted unethical
practice.2
In a resolution dated February 17, 1992,3 Atty. Venida was required to comment on the
complaint against him. In his belated and partial compliance4 with the February 17, 1992
resolution, Atty. Venida averred that Saa did not specifically allege his supposed

infractions. He asked to be furnished a copy of the complaint. He also prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint.
Despite receipt of a copy of the complaint,5 Atty. Venida still did not file his complete
comment within 10 days as required in the February 17, 1992 resolution. Consequently,
we issued the June 14, 1995 resolution6 requiring Atty. Venida to show cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with the
February 17, 1992 resolution.
Finally, Atty. Venida filed his full comment7 on September 4, 1995 which, without doubt,
was a mere reiteration of his partial comment. Atty. Venida also added that he was merely
performing his duty as counsel of Saas adversaries.8
The matter was thereafter referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. In a report dated August 14, 1997,
Commissioner George S. Briones recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of
merit.9 It found no evidence that the two cases filed by Atty. Venida against Saa were acts
of oppression or unethical practice.10
The Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve the investigating
commissioners report and dismissed the complaint.11 Saa filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied.12
Saa now questions the resolution of the IBP in this petition for certiorari.13 He ascribes
grave abuse of discretion to the IBP when it adopted and affirmed the report of the
investigating commissioner dismissing his complaint. According to him, the investigating
commissioners report did not at all mention the dismissal of OMB 1-90-1118 and A.C. P90-513, even if the existence of both cases was admitted by the parties. The dismissal of
his complaint for disbarment was therefore grounded entirely on speculations, surmises
and conjectures.
We disagree.
Grave abuse of discretion refers to a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic exercise
of judgment by reason of passion or personal hostility as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.14 It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.15 A decision is not deemed
tainted with grave abuse of discretion simply because a party affected disagrees with it.
There was no grave abuse of discretion in this case. There was in fact a dearth of
evidence showing oppressive orunethical behavior on the part of Atty. Venida. Without

convincing proof that Atty. Venida was motivated by a desire to file baseless legal actions,
the findings of the IBP stand.
Nonetheless, we strongly disapprove of Atty. Venidas blatant refusal to comply with
various court directives. As alawyer, he had the responsibility to follow legal orders and
processes.16 Yet, he disregarded this very important canon of legal ethics when he filed
only a partial comment on January 26, 1993 or 11 months after being directed to do so in
the February 17, 1992 resolution. Worse, he filed his complete comment only on June 14,
1995 or a little over three years after due date. In both instances, he managed to delay the
resolution of the case, a clear violation of Canon 1217 and Rules 1.0318 and 12.0419 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Yet again, Atty. Venida failed to file a memorandum within the period required in our May
17, 2004 resolution.20Despite the 30-day deadline to file his memorandum,21 he still did not
comply. As if taunting authority, he continually ignored our directives for him to show cause
and comply with the May 17, 2004 resolution.22
Atty. Venida apologized for the late filing of both his partial and full comments. But tried to
exculpate himself by saying he inadvertently misplaced the complaint and had a heavy
workload (for his partial comment). He even had the temerity to blame a strong typhoon
for the loss of all his files, the complaint included (for his full comment). His
excuses tax the imagination. Nevertheless, his apologies notwithstanding, we find his
conduct utterly unacceptable for a member of the legal profession. He must not be
allowed to evade accountability for his omissions.
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for
violation of the lawyers oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.23 We reiterate our ruling in Catu v.
Atty. Rellosa:24
Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal
ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.
1avvphi1

Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of a member of the bar. Every lawyer should act and comport himself in
a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The charge of oppressive or
unethical behavior against respondent is dismissed. However, for violation of Canons 1
and 12 and Rules 1.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as
the lawyers oath, Atty. Freddie A. Venida is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law

for one (1) year, effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is
further STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt
with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into
the records of respondent Atty. Freddie A. Venida. The Office of the Court Administrator
shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 8481
August 3, 2010
[Formerly B.M. No. 1524]
ATTY. JOSABETH V. ALONSO and SHALIMAR P. LAZATIN, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. IBARO B. RELAMIDA, JR., Respondent.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Complaint1 dated October 13, 2005 for disciplinary action against
respondent Atty. Ibaro B. Relamida, Jr. filed by Attys. Josabeth V. Alonso and Shalimar P.
Lazatin, counsel of Servier Philippines, Incorporated for violating the rules on forum
shopping and res judicata.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
In March 2001, Jennifer Ebanen filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against Servier
Philippines, Incorporated (Servier) docketed as NLRC-NCR-Case No. 30-03-01583-01,
alleging constructive dismissal with prayer for reinstatement or payment of separation pay,
backwages, moral and exemplary damages.
On July 5, 2002, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Servier.2 It held that Ebanen voluntarily
resigned from Servier and was, therefore, not illegally dismissed.
Ebanen appealed at the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On March 31,
2003, the NLRC-Third Division affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.3
Thus, Ebanen moved for reconsideration. However, the NLRC denied the same in a
Resolution4 dated May 5, 2003.
Unsatisfied, Ebanen filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals which was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 77968. In a Decision5 dated January 16, 2004, the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the findings of the NLRC that Ebanen voluntarily resigned and that
there was no constructive dismissal. Ebanen moved anew for reconsideration, but was
denied in a Resolution6 dated April 30, 2004.
Unrelenting, Ebanen filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court. However, in a
Resolution7 dated August 4, 2004, the Court found no reversible error on the part of the
CA, thus, denied said petition. Ebanen filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied
with finality in a Resolution8 dated October 11, 2004.
Ebanen filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolutions dated August 4, 2004 and October 11, 2004, respectively. On January 19,
2005, the Court denied her motion.9
Persistent, Ebanen filed a Motion to Admit a Third Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated January 19, 2005. On April 20, 2005, the Court denied her motion for

being a prohibited pleading and noted without action Ebanens third motion for
reconsideration.10
On July 27, 2005, the Second Division of the Supreme Court noted without action
Ebanens Motion for Leave to Admit Supplemental Third Motion for Reconsideration dated
June 1, 2005, in view of the entry of judgment on February 17, 2005.11
On February 17, 2005, the Courts Resolution dated August 4, 2004 has already become
final and executory; thus, a corresponding Entry of Judgment12 has been issued.
However, despite said entry of judgment, Ebanen, thru her counsel, Atty. Relamida, filed a
second complaint on August 5, 2005 for illegal dismissal based on the same cause of
action of constructive dismissal against Servier, now docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No.
00-08-07222-05.
Thus, on October 13, 2005, Servier, thru counsel, filed a letter-complaint addressed to the
then Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., praying that respondents be disciplinary sanctioned
for violation of the rules on forum shopping and res judicata.
Subsequently, in a Resolution13 dated November 15, 2005, the Court required both
Ebanen and Atty. Relamida to comment on the letter-complaint against them.
On January 16, 2006, respondents filed their Comments.14 Both respondents admitted the
filing of the second complaint against Servier. They claimed that the judgment rendered by
the Labor Arbiter was null and void for want of due process, since the motion for the
issuance of subpoena duces tecum for the production of vital documents filed by the
complainant was ignored by the Labor Arbiter. They opined that the dismissal did not
amount to res judicata, since the decision was null and void for lack of due process. As a
result, they claimed that there was also no violation of the rule on forum shopping.15
On February 7, 2006, the Court referred the instant bar matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.16
On January 22, 2007, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the second complaint on the grounds
of res judicata and forum shopping. It further reiterated that Ebanen voluntarily resigned
from employment and was not constructively dismissed.
On March 14, 2008, during the mandatory conference before the IBP, complainants failed
to appear. Ebanen manifested that she is not a lawyer.
Both parties were required to submit their respective position papers.

Atty. Relamida reiterated that Ebanen is not a lawyer and that she is the daughter of Atty.
Leonardo Aurelio (Atty. Aurelio), the senior partner of A.M. Sison Jr. and Partners Law
Offices where he is employed as associate lawyer.
He narrated that on March 28, 2001, Ebanen filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against
Servier. He claimed that in the beginning, Atty. Aurelio was the one who prepared and
reviewed all the pleadings and it was Atty. Lapulapu Osoteo who stood as counsel for
Ebanen in the said labor case. Atty. Relamida admitted, however, that during the filing of
the second complaint he took over as counsel of Ebanen, as requested by Atty.
Aurelio.17 He also admitted that during the pendency of the first complaint, he occasionally
examined pleadings and signed as counsel for Ebanen.18
Atty. Relamida reasoned out that as a courtesy to Atty. Aurelio and Ebanen, he had no
choice but to represent the latter. Moreover, he stressed that his client was denied of her
right to due process due to the denial of her motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum. He then argued that the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void; thus, there
was no res judicata.19 He maintained that he did not violate the lawyers oath by serving
the interest of his client.
Servier, on the other hand, argued that the filing of the second complaint is a violation of
the rights of Servier, since the issue has already attained finality. It contended that Atty.
Relamida violated the rules on forum shopping for the same act of filing a second
complaint. As a consequence, they are being made to defend themselves in a case that
has been settled before the labor tribunals and courts. Likewise, Servier insisted that the
filing of the second complaint was also a blatant violation of the rule on res
judicata. Hence, Servier prayed that Atty. Relamida be disciplinary dealt with due to his
abuse of the processes of the courts.
On April 19, 2008, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) recommended that
respondent Atty. Relamida be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. It
imposed no sanction on Ebanen for being a non-lawyer.
In its Report, the IBP found that by filing the second complaint, Atty. Relamida was guilty
of violating the rules onres judicata and forum shopping. It concluded that Atty. Relamida
abused his right of recourse to the courts by filing a complaint for a cause that had been
previously rejected by the courts.
On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with
modification as to penalty the report of the IBP-CBD. Instead, it recommended that Atty.
Relamida be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) month for his violation of the
rules on res judicata and forum shopping.

On December 7, 2009, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant
complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative case against Atty. Relamida.
We sustain the findings of the IBP-CBD.
All lawyers must bear in mind that their oaths are neither mere words nor an empty
formality. When they take their oath as lawyers, they dedicate their lives to the pursuit of
justice. They accept the sacred trust to uphold the laws of the land. As the first Canon of
the Code of Professional Responsibility states, "[a] lawyer shall uphold the Constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes." Moreover,
according to the lawyers oath they took, lawyers should "not wittingly or willingly promote
or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same."20
In the instant case, it is clear that Atty. Relamida is guilty of forum shopping and violation
of the rule on res judicata. Atty. Relamida should have refrained from filing the second
complaint against Servier. He ought to have known that the previous dismissal was with
prejudice, since it had the effect of an adjudication on the merits. He was aware of all the
proceedings which the first complaint went through as by his own admission, he
participated in the preparation of the pleadings and even signed as counsel of Ebanen
occasionally.21 He knew that the decision in the subject case had already attained finality.
Atty. Relamida was well aware that when he filed the second complaint, it involved the
same parties and same cause of action, albeit, he justified the same on the ground of
nullity of the previous dismissal.
His allegation that he was not the original counsel of Ebanen and that his intention was
only to protect the rights of his clients whom he believed were not properly addressed in
the prior complaint deserves scant consideration. He should know that once a case is
decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest. The prevailing
party is entitled to enjoy the fruits of his victory, while the other party is obliged to respect
the courts verdict and to comply with it.22
The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for
the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of
obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one
forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another, or when he institutes two or more
actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause to increase the chances of obtaining
a favorable decision. An important factor in determining its existence is the vexation
caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim
substantially the same reliefs. Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in another. Thus, the following requisites should concur:23

x x x (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both
actions, (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts, and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, but not at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice. The filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the courts
processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the
administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to state, the
lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the
execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for
incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an
attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions as
appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor.24
The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the doctrine
of res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which requires a lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice. By his actuations, respondent also violated Rule
12.02 and Rule 12.04 of the Code, as well as a lawyers mandate "to delay no man for
money or malice."25
The Court has, time and again, warned lawyers not to resort to forum shopping for this
practice clogs the court dockets. Their primary duty is to assist the courts in the
administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the
administration of justice contravenes such lawyers duty.26 This we will not tolerate.
1avvphi1

In cases of similar nature,27 the penalty imposed by this Court was six (6) months
suspension from the practice of law. Thus, consistent with the existing jurisprudence, we
find that, in this case, the suspension of six (6) months from practice of law is proper.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-286, dated June 5, 2008, of the IBP, which
found respondent Atty. Ibaro B. Relamida, Jr. guilty of violating the Rules on Res Judicata
and Forum Shopping, is AFFIRMED. Atty. Relaminda is hereby SUSPENDED for six (6)
months from the practice of law, effective upon the receipt of this Decision. He is warned
that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended
to the personal record of Atty. Relamida as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator, for circulation to all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.