From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The UN Operation in Somalia

Author(s): Ramesh Thakur

Source: The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Sep., 1994), pp. 387-410
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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TheJournalof ModernAfricanStudies,32, 3 (1994), pp. 387-4 10

Copyright K) I994 Cambridge University Press

From Peacekeeping to Peace

Enforcement: the UN Operation
in Somalia
by RAMESH

THAKUR*

[Peacekeepers]should not... have the obligation, the soldiers, or the equipment

to engage violators in hostilities. International peacekeeping forces express
and facilitate the erstwhile belligerents' will to live in peace; they cannot
supervise peace in conditions of war. Turning them into a fighting force
erodes international consensus on their function, encourages withdrawals by
contributing contingents, converts them into a factional participant in the
internal power struggle, and turns them into targets of attack from rival
internal factions.1
THE above quotation represents a conclusion reached on the basis of
a study of four decades of peacekeeping operations by the United
Nations, and the thesis of this article is that the muddled UN operation
in Somalia is a triumph of new world order hopes over cold war era
experience, and that this results from the UN ignoring the lessons of its
own institutional memory. I shall argue that peacekeeping based on
consent was an innovative attempt to circumvent the world body's
failure to develop as a collective security system; that attempts to
convert such operations into international exercises for enforcing peace
are fraught with grave risks resulting from conceptual confusion; and
that they will jeopardise the UN's peacekeeping and peacemaking
credentials.
The Somalia operation also highlights both the need for and the risk
of co-operative coexistence between the United States and the United
Nations. After the battle in Mogadishu in October 1993 which left i8
US soldiers dead, the UN Security Council established a commission of
inquiry comprising Matthew Nglube, a former ChiefJustice of Zambia,
and Generals Emmanuel Erskine of Ghana and Gustav Hagglund of
Finland, former commanders of peacekeeping forces. They concluded
that the US and UN had to share blame with General Mohamed Farah
* Professorof International Relations, Department of Political Studies, University of Otago,
Dunedin, New Zealand.
1 Ramesh Thakur, 'From Great Power Collective Security to Middle Power Peacekeeping', in
Hugh Smith (ed.), AustraliaandPeacekeeping
(Canberra, Australian Defence Studies Centre, i990),
p. 20.

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388

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Aidid for the descent of the humanitarian mission in Somalia into a

vicious confrontation in the streets of the capital. The warlord was held
responsible for launching the attack in June I993 which killed 24
Pakistani soldiers. The US was criticised for operating under a separate
military command, and for launching raids inconsistent with the basic
tenets of UN peacekeeping. The report questioned the strategy of
aggressive peacekeeping that had been adopted by the UN, and
recommended financial reparations for Somali civilian victims of the
fighting.2
BACKGROUND

UN intervention in Somalia has its origins in the wish to provide

desperately needed food and other relief supplies to the war-torn,
famine-stricken country. President Mohamed Siyad Barre, the dictatorial leader of Somalia for 2I years, was ousted from power in
January i99i, and since then many of the inhabitants have been
embroiled in clan-based battles. As well, the central regions were hit by
severe droughts, the effects of which were aggravated by the civil war
preventing agricultural activity in the normally productive areas of
southern Somalia. The tragedy was internationalised with the outflow
of some 8oo,ooo refugees into neighbouring countries.
The warring factions agreed to a cease-fire on 3 March I992. The
UN Operation in Somalia (known as Unosom) was established by
Security Council Resolution 75 I on 24 April I 992 to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu, to provide security for UN personnel and supplies,
and to escort humanitarian supplies to distribution centres. On 22 July,
the Secretary-General,Boutros Boutros-Ghali, reported that while the
cease-fire had held reasonably well, Mogadishu was wracked by
banditry and looting. In Resolution 767 of 24 July, the Security
Council approved the establishment of four operational zones in
Somalia with the hope that UN involvement would adapt to the
complexity of the situation in the country and enhance the effectiveness
of humanitarian operations.

Boutros-Ghali reported on 28 August that the main challenge was

not the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies to the ports and airfields
of Somalia, but the protection of convoys transporting these to
warehouses and distribution centres. The deployment of an additional
3,000 security troops for Unosom was immediately authorised by
2 Julia Preston and Daniel Williams, 'Panel Blames U.S., UN and Aidid for Mayhem', in
Herald Tribune(Paris), I April I994.
International

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THE

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Resolution 775 of the Security Council, which agreed that three

specialised units should give logistical, communications, and medical
support. The task of the consolidated, 4,2ig-strong Unosom was to
provide humanitarian relief, to monitor the cease-fire, to provide
security, to carry out demobilization and disarmament, and to assist in
national reconciliation.

COERCIVE

COLLECTIVE

SECURITY

Although the League of Nations was killed by World War II, its
legacy of international organisation lives on in the United Nations,
notably the concept, by now firmly entrenched, yet revolutionary in
that the community of nations has both the moral right and the
i919,
legal competence to discuss and judge the international conduct of
its members. In particular, both the League and the UN embodied
the idea that aggressive war is a crime against humanity, which every
state has the interest, right, and duty to collaborate in preventing and
defeating.
The closeness with which the UN was modelled upon the League was
testimony to the fact that people still had faith in the idea of an
umbrella international organisation to oversee world peace and cooperation. The UN incorporated the League proscription on the use of
force for national objectives, but inserted the additional prescription to
use force in support of international, that is UN, authority. As proof of
the added potency of the new organisation, the Security Council was
given the power to decide whether international peace was threatened,
whether sanctions were to be imposed, and, if so, then their nature.
Force, it was argued, would henceforth be put to the service of law, for
the Security Council was being established as the equivalent of a
supreme war-making organisation of the world community.
The primary purpose of the UN is to maintain international peace
and security. The Charter specifies two chief means to this end:
namely, pacific settlement of disputes in Chapter VI, and collective
enforcement against threats to or breaches of the peace in Chapter VII.
The trend towards narrowing the permissible range of any unilateral
resort to force by nation-states has been matched by the historical
movement to broaden the range of instruments available to states to
settle their disputes by means short of war. Even though the normative
principle of the primacy of peaceful over forceful means has become
firmly entrenched, the Security Council cannot compel member-states
to implement resolutions adopted under Chapter VI.

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RAMESH

390

THAKUR

Efforts to devise an operational system of collective security have

been thwarted by a fundamental tension in the concept. Only the
prospect of war between powerful states directly, or their involvement
on rival sides in a quarrel between minor powers, can pose a challenge
to the international order. Collective security understood as the
maintenance of internationalpeace and security is therefore superfluous
in respect of small states. Equally, however, collective security is
impossible to enforce against major powers, for any attempt to launch
military measures against such a nation would bring about the very
calamity of a world war that the system is designed to avoid.
The United Nations has sought to avoid the latter eventuality by
conferring permanent membership of the Security Council upon the
great powers, and by giving them the opportunity to veto any action
launched by the Council. The practical effect of the clause is that the
extensive decision-making competence of the Security Council,
necessary for the successful operation of a collective security system, is
severely curtailed by the extensive decision-blocking competence of the
permanent members.

COLLECTIVE

SECURITY

AFTER

THE

COLD WAR

If we examine the actual provisions of the Charter instead of the

rhetoric of its founders, then it becomes clear that the UN was
deliberately denied the ability to launch military action against a major
power. The veto was a confirmation, not a negation, of the founders'
conception of the UN role in a divided world. With the end of the cold
war and with co-operation among the five permanent members, the
UN has been relieved of the disability of great-power disagreement.
During the I990- I Gulf war, the Security Council adopted resolutions
by consensus and with urgency. The most important long-term
significance of UN actions in the Gulf lay in the crossing of the
conceptual Rubicon by authorising enforcement of sanctions and then
military eviction of the aggressor by troops not even nominally under
UN command (as they had been in Korea in the I 95os). As in Korea,
the advantage of the procedure was that it allowed the United Nations
to authorise the establishment of a clear chain of command necessary
for large-scale military operations. The cost to the UN was that the war
in the Gulf, like that in Korea, became identified with American policy
over which the organisation exercised little real control.
The end of the cold war does not mean that the idea and possibility
of war have been eliminated from international relations. The

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frequency of war may decline as its cost goes up, and the dangers posed
to humanity as a whole may diminish as the overlay of superpower
rivalry is removed from regional conflicts. Human societies will still be
divided by disputes over beliefs and interests, and as long as there are
organised polities prepared to support rival groups, armed aggression
cannot be ruled out. Indeed, as the shroud of the cold war lifts from the
world, the multitude of national and ethnic fault lines will stand out
with sharper clarity. The need for a collective security system therefore
remains.
Nevertheless, the new promptness and near-unanimity of the
Security Council do not herald a sudden feasibility of collective
security.3 For example, third-world states are not likely to relinquish
their control of the General Assembly and the UN agenda, and return
the organisation to the world of I 945. Far from buttressing the
international status quo, they are intent on challenging it. To them,
equity is as important as order, and the UN is their principal instrument
by which to re-order global relations with new political and economic
legitimizing principles. How relevant will be the concept of collective
security - which elevates order above justice - if the fault lines of
international conflict are going to develop along the ridges of the
world's major civilisations?4
It is only a matter of time before China - committed to the principle
of state sovereignty, and suspicious of foreign encroachments into its
internal affairs - becomes the new champion of the Third World in the
Security Council. There are already signs of China, India, and others
coalescing into a developing 'Asian bloc' to counter Western pressures
on human rights. If the Council's permanent membership is not
changed, then the chief executive organ will progressively lose
legitimacy. If it is changed so that only Germany and Japan are made
permanent members, then three of the seven will be European, with a
fourth being the United States. Then too the lack of representational
legitimacy will become a serious handicap, especially if the Council
commits errors of judgement.
The will to design and construct a collective security system is strong
in the immediate aftermath of a major war. Initially, leaders as well as
people act in the consciousness that appeasement of aggressors is
counter-productive. With the passage of time, they begin to believe
3 See Inis Claude, 'Collective Security After the Cold War', in Gary L. Guertner (ed.),
CollectiveSecurityin EuropeandAsia (Carlisle, PA, U.S. Army War College, I992), pp. 7-28.
4 See Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', in ForeignAffairs(New York), 72,
Summer I993, pp. 22-49.

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that the existing peace should not be lightly risked, that the rigid
requirements of collective security are risk-inviting rather than
problem-solving. According to Inis Claude, 'It may well be that the
termination of the Cold War will produce a similar peak-and-valley
pattern in the graph of support for the notion of collective security'.5
To be successful, collective security must rest on the certainty of
response from the world community to an act of aggression anywhere
by any power. In practice, the individual and collective responses will
rarely be clear-cut. People and governments will differ on the timing in
regard to initiating (were sanctions given enough time to work against
Iraq?) as well as terminating military action (should the Gulf war have
been continued for another one or two weeks?), the choice of means
(was Iraq hammered into submission by a technological bully?), and
interpretations of the outcome (who was the long-term victor in the
Gulf war? should the Kurdish problem have been solved as part of the
campaign? what about human rights in Kuwait?).
Collective security is a system designed to deter and defeat inter-state
aggression, as of Kuwait by Iraq. It fails to match the requirements
of civil strife, which is the more common type of conflict to confront
the UN. Collective security requires multilateralism, and successful
military operations require centralised command and control. Given
that collective security is predicated on decisive leadership, it seems
that this can only come in today's world from the United States. But
Washington has given no indication that its global leadership role will
be free of calculations of national interest. The Gulf war did not
increase the probability, for example, that America would seek to check
any Israeli resort to force by organising a UN-sanctioned military
coalition. Selective opposition to aggression is unpredictable, and so
may promote instability. There is also likely to be a world-wide trend
towards the primacy of the domestic over the international in agendasetting by the public.

CONSENSUAL

PEACEKEEPING

Once collective security was seen to be unattainable, states moved to

guarantee national security by means of collective defence,6 and the
international community groped towards damage-limitation techniques to avoid and contain conflicts. Peacekeeping as an institution
5 Claude, loc. cit. p. I4.
One of the best discussionsof the difference between collective security (one for all and all for
one) and collective defence (us against them) remains Arnold Wolfers, Discordand Collaboration
(Baltimore, i962), ch. I2.
6

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evolved in the grey zone between pacific settlement and military

enforcement. Collective security necessitates three elements that are in
opposition to peacekeeping: a definition and determination of
aggression; identification of the guilty party; and a contribution of
forces by the major powers. Peacekeeping operations are focused on
non-coercive and facilitative activities rather than on repelling
aggression, and hence are more akin to armed police work than to
standard combat.
Success for the military means battlefield victory or surrender by the
enemy. Peacekeeping forces have no military objectives: they are
barred from active combat, located between rather than in opposition
to hostile elements, and negotiate rather than fight. Brian Urquhart
tells the story of the French colonel serving with the UN force in
Lebanon in early I 978 who spoke of 'the enemy' in relation both to the
Christian militias and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO)
when briefing Kurt Waldheim. Afterwards this army officer was taken
aside by Urquhart, who pointed out that UN peacekeeping forces had
no ' enemies . . .just a series of difficult and sometimes homicidal
clients'.7

UN peacekeeping forces have been used essentially as a mechanism

for dealing on an ad hoc basis with crises in which third-party
involvement is viewed as desirable or necessary. Lacking the requisite
mandate and operational capability, they could not enforce world
peace. Yet even while failing to bring this about, they succeeded in
stabilising several potentially dangerous situations.
FORCE

AS A NEGATION

OF UN PEACEKEEPING

The difficulties associated with the organisation, deployment, and

use of military force do not disappear simply because of UN
authorisation. States are reluctant to transfer control over their
national armed forces to the UN because of doubts over its managerial
capacity for military operations,8 scepticism about its institutional
ability to police the world wisely and effectively, and the fear of
creating a military monster that might one day turn against them.
'Operation Desert Storm' was as much an aberration as the Korean
war, and the correlation of circumstances was so exceptional that the
7 Brian Urquhart, A Life in Peaceand War (London,

i987), p. 293.
Major-General Lewis Mackenzie, the former Canadian head of UN forces in Sarajevo, made
the memorable comment that a UN commander in the field should not get into trouble 'after 5 p.m.
in New York, or Saturday and Sunday. There is no one to answer the phone'. In I993 the UN
established a 24-hour, seven days a week Situation Room that provides a direct link to its
peacekeeping operations.
8

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action should not be interpreted as a trend-setter. The inhibitions on

the use of UN force are likely to remain in place, including an
inoperative Military Staff Committee, non-fulfilment of Articles 42 and
43 requiring national troop contingents to be placed at the disposal of
the United Nations, and recurring suspicions of majority coalitions in
the Security Council by important member-states.
Lester Pearson, one of the originators of UN peacekeeping, described
this as 'an intermediate technique between merely passing resolutions
and actually fighting'.9 The constraining effect of the core principles
- non-use
of force because of military neutrality between the
belligerents, and non-intervention in domestic quarrels because of
political neutrality with respect to the conflict - occasionally produced
controversy and frustration in the UN. The organisation refused to
abandon them, however, because they represented a middle way
between abdication of responsibility for management of the international order, and turmoil if the UN attempted to shake off the
Charter shackles on collective military action.
In his Agendafor Peace, Boutros-Ghali defined peacekeeping as 'the
deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hithertowith the
consent of all the parties concerned '. By implication, then, he
believed that future operations could be organised without the consent
of all the parties. In that case, they would need to be prepared for active
opposition from some groups. Such resistance is especially predictable
in situations of deep-seated ethnic conflicts from those who believe their
security and welfare to be under threat by UN intervention.
Facing up to the dilemma in Somalia, Boutros-Ghali outlined five
options on 29 November I 992. The first was to continue to deploy
Unosom under the established principles of consensual, non-forceful
UN peacekeeping. The fear was that this would not be an adequate
response to the scale of the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. The second
option was to abandon Unosom's mission of protecting humanitarian
activities and to withdraw the force. Apart from the fact that an
admission of failure of this magnitude is too costly for a new SecretaryGeneral in his first year in office, it was also unlikely to be acceptable
to a United Nations flushed with success in dealing with Iraqi
aggression. Moreover, coming on top of a policy of inaction in the
former Yugoslavia, it would have called into question the credibility of
the organisation.
9 Lester B. Pearson, 'Force for U.N.', in ForeignA4fairs, 35, April 1957, p. 401.
10 BoutrosBoutros-Ghali,
andpeace-keeping
peace-making
diplomacy,
An Agendafor Peace:preventive
(New York, UN Department of Public Information, i992), para. 2o, my emphasis.

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The remaining three options involved the use of force. Unosom could
become forceful in Mogadishu, hoping that such a show of strength in
the capital would be sufficient to convince lawless elements to stop
abusing international relief efforts. Alternatively, the UN could launch
a country-wide enforcement operation under its own command and
control, albeit almost certainly beyond the world body's existing
logistical capability. Finally, the Security Council could authorise a
group of member-states to carry out such an operation. The United
States had informed Boutros-Ghali that it would be prepared to take
the lead in organising a UN-sanctioned forceful mission to establish a
secure environment for humanitarian operations in Somalia. Whether
the Security Council entrusted the command and control to a UN force
or to an authorised multinational force, the objective of the operation,
Boutros-Ghali said, should be precisely defined and limited in time in
order to prepare the way for a return to peacekeeping and post-conflict
peace-building.
On 3 December I 992 the Security Council, acting under the
collective enforcement Chapter VII, authorised the use of' all necessary
means' to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid to the people of
Somalia. Sanctioning the use of force, for the first time in such a
context, resulted from a growing conviction that the existing course of
Unosom would not be an adequate response to the tragedy. The
uniqueness of the deteriorating and complex challenge of mass
starvation amidst total anarchy required an immediate and exceptional
response. Resolution 794 promised to open up the possibility of joint,
determined, and innovative action by the UN in order to alleviate and
end the hardship of an entire nation.
In a message to the people of Somalia -on 8 December, Boutros-Ghali
said that the Unified Task Force (Unitaf) would 'feed the starving,
protect the defenceless and prepare the way for political, economic and
social reconstruction'.
The following day, 'Operation Restore Hope'
began with the seizure of the airfield and port in Mogadishu by
US marines. The transfer of responsibility to a 2iooo-strong
UN
peacekeeping force drawn from 29 countries was to be achieved as soon
as possible. However, the Secretary-General noted that it would be 'a
tragedy if the premature departure, or remodelling, of the Unified Task
Force were to plunge Somalia back into anarchy and starvation and
destroy the fragile political progress of recent weeks '.2
On 26 March I993 the Security Council adopted Resolution 8I4
11 UN Chronicle (New York), March I993,

p. i6.

12

Ibid. p. I3.

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authorizing 'all necessary measures' against armed attacks on UN

personnel, including the arrest, detention, trial, and punishment of the
perpetrators. Unosom II was accordingly established in April with a
military and 2,800 civilian staff- the largest
strength of 28,ooo
in
UN history, and the first authorised to use force
force
peacekeeping
under Chapter VII of the Charter. After UN troops had replaced the
US-led multinational force (which may have been withdrawn
prematurely) in May I993, it soon became clear that Unosom II could
not command universal obedience. Major-General Lewis Mackenzie,
former UN commander in Sarajevo, argued that the United Nations
had to resort to military action in retaliation for the killings of 24
Pakistanis on 5 June I993 - the biggest single loss ever incurred by a
UN peacekeeping operation. Unlike Bosnia, he argued, Somalia was a
relatively easy military problem. The point about the credibility of the
UN in the emerging new world disorder had to be made somewhere,
and Somalia was the right place to make it."3
The resulting military engagements significantly altered the terms
and raised the stakes of American involvement in Somalia. Traditionally, peacekeepers are neither configured nor equipped for
combat duties. Consequently, if conditions deteriorate so that they are
in danger, it becomes necessary either to add sufficiently to the number
and arms of the troops or to withdraw them. For the former course, a
UN force would have to be transformed from a modest peacekeeping
unit into a major combat force prepared for a full-scale war. Attempts
to enforce peace where the subjective will and the objective conditions
are absent merely create domestic and international divisions.
Converting peacekeepers into fighters dissipated the domestic
consensus on US policy in Somalia. It is a paradox of modern times that
while the sources and nature of contemporary challenges to peace are
uncertain, the response to them must be clear. But an adequate
national will in support of resolute force can only be sustained if the
use of force is subjected to certain conditions. American or allied vital
national interests must be engaged; there must be no qualification to
the use of force; the political and military objectives must be clearly
defined; the size, composition, and disposition of troops must be directlyrelated to the objectives, as well as capable of flexible adaptation to
altered circumstances; congressional and public support must be
assured in advance; and there must be continuing consultation. The
longer that an operation goes on, the more difficult it is to satisfy these
13

Quotedin Maclean's(Toronto),28 June I993, p. i8.

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conditions. These were met in the Gulf war, but proved more difficult
to satisfy in Somalia.
Once the US troops are effectively engaged in hostilities, they
become a prisoner of great/small power asymmetries. US itinerant
stakes in the outcome of the struggle in Somalia were substantially
different from those of the local clans and warlords. The latter's
commitment to victory (or to avoiding defeat) was accordingly greater
than the American capacity for perseverance. This was especially so in
light of the unsuitability of the US national security apparatus to
conduct small wars because of institutional inadequacies, foreign
pressures, and the vagaries of public opinion."4
The use of force also raises questions about the appropriate balance
between an impossibly long chain of command and the operational
flexibility of the field commanders in being able to respond quickly to
swiftly changing circumstances. The permissive environment of I992
had undergone drastic transformation in a year's time, becoming
increasingly hostile to the presence of US and other outside forces in
Mogadishu. The rules of engagement may not correspond to the
realities of the environment in which they are to be implemented. The
chain of command can fail to develop rules of engagement in pace with
the changing threat. Should the guidelines forbid reprisals and punitive
measures? While a 'hostile act' or 'force' can be easily defined, a
'hostile threat' cannot. Confused understandings by different units of
Unosom as to what force was permitted, under what circumstances, and
at which locations, did not help matters either.
From the UN point of view, peacekeeping operations face the danger
that their conception of the international interest can be so abstract as
not to coincide with the interest of any group of UN members. Nations
are unwilling to authorise and arm international soldiers unless assured
that they will fight their battle. In restricting the use of force by
peacekeeping units to a very limited concept of self-defence, the UN
tries to ensure that it is maintaining a neutral stance between the
disputants, not serving the political interest of any faction in the conflict
or at the UN, and not imposing the will of a UN majority upon any
party.
There was sufficient international agreement for a peacekeeping
force to be emplaced in Somalia. But the circle of consensus was narrow
rather than broad, its scope restricted rather than expansive, and its
14
See Eliot A. Cohen, 'Constraints on America's Conduct of Small Wars', in International
Security(Cambridge, MA), 9' Fall i984, PP. I5i-8i.

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strength brittle rather than durable. States are divided by real

differences of interests and perspectives. Other members of the
multinational force were less than happy at American imperiousness,
and took alarm at suggestions of armed reprisals against particular
warlords. Their impulse was to try to strike an equitable balance
between the various Somali communities. The rules of engagement
showed a marked difference in the latitude of intervention. Some units
retaliated precisely and promptly, while others awaited a suitable time
and target. Some took orders from the force commander, others
referred all sensitive orders to their home governments for clearance.
This deepened divisions even further.
The use of retaliatory force by US troops from June I993 onwards
raised widespread fears that the relief operation had been transformed
into a military campaign against General Aidid. After US helicopter
gunships had attacked his command centre on I 2 July, Italy, Ireland,
the Vatican, World Vision, and the Organisation of African Unity
called for a review of UN policy. The attacks intensified anti-foreigner
sentiment among Somalis, led to the death of four foreign journalists at
the hands of angry mobs, and imperilled the humanitarian programme."5 As for the farcical raid by US army rangers on 30 August
on buildings belong to the UN Development Project, this provoked
international ridicule (a UN spokesman, Major David Stockwell,
described it as a textbook operation of how to conduct such a raid) and
resentment in equal measure.
The predicament of peacekeeping soldiers on the ground is that they
are unable to move forward into an unwinnable battle, unable to stay
put taking casualties for no purpose, and unable to withdraw without
repercussions for the US position in the region and in the world. The
dilemma of peacekeeping missions in the midst of escalating violence
confronted Unosom with each fresh incident after the first shots of
June I993: to terminate the mission and withdraw, or to reinforce the
mission by changing the mandate. Any attempt to restore order in the
chaotic circumstances of Somalia would have the effect, even if it
lacked the intention, of the UN force taking sides in the vicious war
between Somali communities. Impartiality is crucial to peacekeeping
and distinguishes it from any other kind of conflict-control activity.
Unosom was inadequate to the task of containing civil war in a country
so deeply divided into armed clans.
15 For background to the transformationof the humanitarian mission into US intervention, see
Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, Somalia:crimesand blunders(London, forthcoming).

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The amount and type of force employed in Somalia fell between

two stools. It was insufficient for purposes of coercive enforcement,
yet extravagant for the task of peacekeeping. Law and order in
Mogadishu could not be restored without compelling the multiple
armies in the capital to cease fire and disarm. The essential difficulty for
the UN from June I993 onwards was that although the peacekeeping
soldiers found it virtually impossible to stay in Mogadishu and be out
of clan controversy, they could not get involved in the politics of
Somali's future without dividing both the United Nations and the
troop-contributing countries. The conjunction of interests which helped
to establish the force was created by the narrow goal of overseeingpeace
and relief operations in Somalia. That consensus could not survive an
effort to transform the mission into keeping peace by force. Haunting
images of skeletal, vacant-eyed Somali children dying by the thousands
were replaced by troubling pictures of shell-shocked civilians venting
their frustration and rage at UN-inspired violence.
Unosom's role began to suffer from confusion in relation to its
mission, to a dynamic environment which was changing for the worse,
and to the appropriate conditions for the use of force in self-defence.
By July I993, the somewhat haphazard and ad hoc employment of
weaponry had already succeeded in converting the US troops into a
hostile force for some Somali factions, to the detriment of Unosom's role
as a neutral peacekeeping presence. The scale, intensity, and frequency
of the use of force by Unosom after June I 993 bore little resemblance
to the rhetoric and expectations of when it was established, nor any
recognisable relationship by then to a peacekeeping operation as defined
in the UN lexicon. Some of the querulous Somali militias stopped
viewing the force as peacekeepers. Mohamed Sahnoun, the former UN
special representative to Somalia, reportedly remarked that Unosom
had gradually become 'a heavy military presence' and was 'perceived
by the Somalis as an occupation' force.16
The use of robust force by UN peacekeeping units also raises the
vexed issue of how the laws of war might be applied to military conduct
by troops acting under UN authorisation. When specific UN actions in
Somalia have been criticised, the defence offered has seldom been
convincing: provocateurs mingled in the crowds and fired the first shots
at UN soldiers; the civilian casualties have been exaggerated; the
terrorists deliberately use women and children as human shields, etc.
The Times of London referred to the persistent pattern of 'evasions by
16

Maclean's, 26 July

I 993,

p.

20.

15

MOA 32

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UN spokesmen in Mogadishu when describing military actions'. In one

attack on Aidid's positions, the International Red Cross claimed that
54 Somalis had been killed, while the UN insisted on the lower figure of
I 7. On another occasion, the UN continued to deny the involvement
of one of its gunships I2 hours after television footage of it had been
broadcast around the world, including the CNN in the United States.
The Times reporter listed four occasions in the three months since
the launching of the punitive campaign against Aidid on which UN
officials 'have appeared to mislead the media or to have failed to
comply with international legal conventions'. The director of one US
agency was quoted as saying that the UN had retreated into the tactic
of the 'big lie - Vietnam style '.17 Such a slide into rationalizations of the
use of force will steadily undermine the authority of the UN as the body
responsible for moderating the use of force in international relations.
The United Nations is also committed to setting, promoting, and
enforcing international human rights standards by state-governments.
Typically, human rights abuses take place in the context of security
operations by national police or military units. The UN operation in
Somalia raises with particular cogency the question of the applicability
of human rights instruments to actions in the name of the organisation
itself. I have argued elsewhere that the UN and Amnesty International
play complementary roles in human rights."8 The former is more
authoritative in setting standards and generating norms, but weak in
monitoring and enforcement of state behaviour, while the latter,
because of its freedom from governments, is a more effective watchdog
against human rights violations. The proliferation of UN peacekeeping
operations has turned attention to the accountability and transparency
of their human rights record, and Amnesty argues that the time is
overdue for the world body to build measures for the promotion and
protection of human rights into its own peacekeeping activities, and
that the troops involved should be trained in those standards and
understand their obligations.19 Their use of force must satisfy the longestablished conditions of necessity with less harmful alternatives not
being available, proportionalityin respect to the threat faced and the goal
sought, and discriminationbetween combatants and non-combatants.
In Somalia specifically, 'Some of the civilians killed by UN or US
17 Sam Kiley, 'UN Gathers Men and Arms for "Final Assault" on Aidid', in The Times
(London), I 7 August I 993. The hunt for the General was finally called off by the Security Council
on i6 November, and he participated in a UN-sponsored humanitarian conference in Addis
Ababa in December I993.
18 Ramesh Thakur, 'Human Rights: Amnesty International and the United Nations', in
Journalof PeaceResearch(London), 3 I, 2, I 994, pp. I 43-60.
andHumanRights (London, I 994).
19 Amnesty International, Peace-keeping

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40I

troops seem to have been victims of the use of lethal force in breach of
human rights and international humanitarian law obligations',
according to Amnesty. In addition, hundreds of Somalis have been
held in 'administrative detention'.20 This has been the result in part of
military units being given essentially civilian law enforcement and
policing tasks. If the UN is to maintain its human rights credibility,
then soldiers committing abuses in its name must face investigation and
prosecution by effective international machinery. A good beginning
would be an unambiguous affirmation by the Secretary-General, the
Security Council, and the General Assembly that forces acting under
UN authority are bound by international human rights standards and
humanitarian law.
Another long-term cost of converting peacekeepers into peace
enforcers, and thence into targets for attack by rival armed groups, is
that countries will become more reluctant to contribute troops for such
missions. National public opinion is unlikely to support high-risk
ventures in far-off lands for the sake of quarrelling foreigners. The
French, Italians, Germans, Belgians, Norwegians, Greeks, and Turks
had decided to pull out from Somalia ahead of, or by, the 3I March
deadline set by Washington for the withdrawal of US troops.21
I994

PEACEMAKING

The resort to overt force also entails certain 'opportunity costs'

including a reduced ability to make the peace. Peacemaking and peace
enforcement are not synonymous. The former refers to the range of
activities designed to create peace: ameliorating the deeper causes of
conflict such as injustice, poverty, and oppression, and extending the
rule of law. Jan Eliasson, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian
Affairs, reportedly criticised the UN for spending ten times more on the
military part of the operation in Somalia than on humanitarian aid.22

A UN official estimated in November

I993

that of the

$I,500

million

being spent on the Unosom compound in Mogadishu, less than $Ioo

million would be for genuine developmental assistance.23 Amnesty has
noted that the conflict which entangled Unosom in the capital
detracted attention from its humanitarian work elsewhere in Somalia
Ibid. p. 20.
Keith Richburg, '6o Die in Somalia as West Pulls Back and Chaos Returns', in International
Herald Tribune,I4 February I994.
22
The Economist(London), 24 July I 993, p. 22.
23 Rick Atkinson, 'UN Oasis Walls Off Mogadishu's Squalor', in International
Herald Tribune,
27-28
November I993.
20
21

15-2

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towards ending famine, improving security, and establishing local

administrative, police, and judicial structures.24
The goal of peacekeeping units is not the creation of peace, but
rather the containment of war, so that others can search for peace in
stable conditions. In the i98os, in both Beirut and Sri Lanka there was
a contradiction between the reality of sectarian war and the peacekeeping principle of non-intervention. In the end the United States
and India failed to reconcile the logical and practical incompatibility
between the roles of peacekeeper, peacemaker, and peace enforcer. The
role of American marines in Beirut was reduced to that of a superpower
militia by i984, and their task had contracted to defending their own
presence. As Washington grew more firmly committed to Amin
Gemayel's regime, so opposing factions identified the marines increasingly as part of enemy forces, and thereafter their presence became
an obstacle to Lebanese reconciliation and peace.25 A similar process of
change took place in Sri Lanka in I 990, when the Indian Peacekeeping
Force had to be withdrawn after the death of around i, ioo soldiers,26
mainly because its continued presence (since I987) would have
obstructed the on-going search for peace.
It can be argued that the UN's credibility has not been enhanced by
military action in Somalia. By October I992, the country was in ruins.
About 300,000 people had died during the preceding year, I-5 million
were at risk because of famine, almost 4-5 of the total population of 6
million were threatened by severe malnutrition and related diseases,
and 700,000
had sought refuge in neighbouring states. More than 6o
per cent of Somalia's basic infrastructure had been destroyed, 8o per
cent of all social services had ceased functioning, and the major cities
in northern areas were reduced to rubble.27 Moreover, in the absence
of an effective government capable of ensuring law and order, the UN
relief effort had itself become a casualty of the anarchy. The different
warlords and their followers competed with arms for anything of
value. International aid provided by the UN and voluntary agencies
had become a major source of income for gangs of bandits. Relief
organizations were therefore subject to theft, extortion, hijacking of
vehicles, and kidnapping of expatriate personnel. In short, relief

24

Amnesty International, op. cit. p. 2I.

See Ramesh Thakur, InternationalPeacekeepingin Lebanon: United Nations Authorityand
MultinationalForce(Boulder, CO, I 987).
of India's ForeignPolicy (London, I994), pp.
26 Ramesh Thakur, The Politics and Economics
25

i87-9I27

The figures were provided by Boutros-Ghali in UN Chronicle,March 1993, p.

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supplies had become the basis of the only functioning economy that
existed in Somalia.
Security issues had to be addressed effectively, Boutros-Ghali argued,
because only so could the UN and voluntary agencies provide the relief
assistance that was still so desperately needed.28 But this is a doubleedged argument. For it acknowledges implicitly that the environment
of banditry was a symptom, with the underlying cause being the lack
of effective government. A solution therefore has to be the establishment
and maintenance of a stable regime. But whose power and authority is
going to be restored in Somalia? The restoration and maintenance of
law and order has to be that of a foreign entity. Will it be that of the
United Nations or America? The state is a Western juridical concept
that bears little resemblance to the reality on the ground since the
country is deeply divided, fragmented on clan and family lines, with no
recognised channels for political action. By targeting only Aidid, but
one of the I4 or so warlords fighting for control of Somalia, the UN
'virtually declared war on the Haber Gedr subclan' which he leads.29
More importantly, there is no assurance that a political order grafted
on Somalia by international forces will not crumble as the country
reverts to pre-intervention clan warfare.
If the tensions and divisions in Somalia are clan and family based,
then no government will endure without genuine national reconciliation. This cannot take place through coercion, but must rest instead
on compromise and give-and-take. Nor will eliminating any individual
warlord bridge clan divisions. Any military 'solution' will reflect the
temporary inability of dissatisfied groups to challenge the status quo. It
will be neither a satisfactory nor an enduring outcome. For all their
known odiousness, the Khmer Rouge had been tolerated as a possible
participant in the reconciliation process in Cambodia precisely on such
an understanding of the politics of peace negotiations.
The United Nations has argued from the start that the Somalis
should assume progressively greater responsibility for establishing
conditions and arrangements for the distribution of humanitarian
assistance. In August I992, for example, Boutros-Ghali said that a
stronger UN role in securing access, transport, and distribution of relief
supplies had to be paralleled by an effort to involve Somali entities fully
in all aspects of that process.30 The United Nations is indeed the
Ibid. p. I5.
Andrew S. Natsios (Vice-President of World Vision), 'Food through Force: humanitarian
intervention and U.S. policy', in WashingtonQuarterly,I7, Winter I994, p. I38.
30 UN Chronicle,
December I 992, p. 8.
28

29

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appropriate channel for national reconciliation and the reconstitution

of government and legitimate authority. The problem is that the
organisation's credentials are tarnished and its peacemaking mission is
imperilled when a peacekeeping operation is transformed into peace
enforcement.
The UN's 'extravagant mission' included promises 'to reconstruct
the country, disarm every Somali, end ancient clan hatreds [and]
create a functioning democracy'.31 Such an assignment may prove to
be a portent of difficulties to come. The disputes clamouring for the
world body's attention are as much domestic as international. The
United Nations was designed to cope with inter-state war. Founded on
the principle of national sovereignty, it is ill-equipped to cope with civil
conflict. Virtually all third-world countries would fear UN intervention
in civil wars. Charles Krauthammer at least has had the honesty to
acknowledge that outside intervention to solve problems like those of
Somalia is tantamount to colonialism.32 While a new colonialism might
be acceptable to some, it will be rejected by the third-world majority
in the United Nations. The elemental force of ethno-nationalism is
more likely to defeat UN efforts than to be tamed by the world body:
'despite the lure of riches and glory, the [old] imperial powers lacked
the will to sustain [their] role; it is not clear why an international force
should fare better, absent any specific national interest'.33
Ethnicity remains a neglected dimension in international relations.34
Humanitarian, peacekeeping, electioneering, and enforcement measures by the UN face distinctive difficulties when they have to be
undertaken with regard to civil rather than international wars.35 Most
civil conflicts have deep historical roots and are characterised by broad
and mutual suspicions based on past traumatic experiences. Objective
analyses and rational solutions are meaningless in such contexts.36
31 Natsios, loc. cit. p. I33.
32 Charles Krauthammer, 'The Immaculate Intervention', in Time(New York), 26July I993,
p. 66.
3 Paul D. Wolfowitz, 'Clinton's First Year', in ForeignAffairs,73, January-February I994,
p. 38.
ethnicityin
3 For an important exception, see Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Pandaemonium:
international
politics (New York, I 993).
3 See Alan James, 'Internal Peace-keeping: a dead end for the UN?', in SecurityDialogue
(London), 24, December I993, pp. 359-68, and Adam Roberts, 'The United Nations and
International Security', in Survival(London), 35, Summer 1993, pp. 9-I I.
36 At a panel discussion held at the UN in April I 993, Charles William Maynes, the editor of
ForeignPolicy,used the analogy of the Los Angeles riots. There was no black or hispanic leader to
go to for stopping the riots, and the people could not be threatened, bribed, or persuaded to end
the rioting. The two 'terrible alternatives' were to allow the riots to burn out, as they did with the
loss of 54 lives, or to impose martial law and risk the death of 53 or 153 lives. United Nations, New
andglobalsecurity(New York, I 993), p. 338.
peace-building
Realities:disarmament,

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SOMALIA

Time is a better solution to historical conflicts. UN intervention in

sectarian strife must accordingly acknowledge the prospects of an
indefinite commitment. To be effective in a peacekeeping role, the
United Nations must negotiate with all significant sectarian leaders,
albeit in the process endowing them with a degree of legitimacy. In
return, however, leaders of ill-disciplined and uncoordinated guerrilla
groups may not be able or willing to honour the agreements made with
the UN representatives. Compared to the relative stability of border
clashes, civil conflicts are characterised by political fluidity. The stakes
are higher too: the entire territory, not just a border readjustment;
and, possibly, life and death, not just victory or defeat in battle.
In most civil wars today, the distinctions between combatants and
civilians have been almost totally eroded. UN intervention therefore
necessitates measures to protect widely dispersed and highly vulnerable
populations that are bitterly hostile towards one another. Not only are
civil wars not fought by large armies; their weapons too are generally
small arms not easily controlled or neutralised by bombings and arms
embargoes. Unlike inter-state wars, there is no territorial status quo ante
which can be restored after international intervention. Cease-fires 'inplace' will legitimise ethnic cleansing by the militarily most powerful;
efforts to delay a cease-fire until territorial gains have been forcibly
reversed will drag the UN into the quagmire of an internal war. Most
importantly, UN intervention in internal conflicts raises the impossible
political question of how the world body, which is committed to
maintaining the territorial integrity of its member-states, will decide
when to support and when to oppose a 'legitimate' government against
attempts at secession. If the use of force is an illegitimate method of
changing international frontiers, then should it be proscribed with
equal conviction as a method of changing the territorial status quo from
within? It is easy to see that the use of force by the United Nations
cannot be politically neutral in so far as the outcomes of civil conflicts
are concerned.

THE

UNITED

NATIONS

AND

THE

UNITED

STATES

Given that there is now only one superpower as well as one general
international organisation, the United Nations cannot embark upon
any substantial venture against the wishes of the United States. The
peace of the world may well depend upon the latter's political wisdom
and military power. Experience suggests that the US would be best
advised to channel its efforts through the authoritative framework of

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the UN, not least because there is wisdom and virtue in imposing the
organisation's international discipline and moderating influence upon
the exercise of American power. The greatest strength of the United
Nations is that it is the only universal forum for international cooperation and management. UN involvement mutes domestic opposition, eases international concern about goals, facilitates political
management of allies, and lessens the risk of counter-intervention by
adversaries.
Nevertheless, there are two problems arising from too close an
identification of US interests with those of the United Nations. There
is danger in permitting American power calculations to be cloaked
uncritically in the UN flag. Collective security under the League was
a conscious substitute for systems of alliances and balance of power
policies that were 'forever discredited' by World War I. Progress
towards a world order based on justice and law requires that American
power be harnessed to UN authority. The mobilization of the world
community under the United Nations in the Gulf crisis was an example
of international propriety; the unilateral missile strikes on Baghdad
in punishment for the alleged Iraqi attempt to assassinate former
President George Bush serves as a counter-example. The latter does
not represent progress towards a world where force is ruled by law.
Instead, it is a reversion to a world where law is put to the service of the
mighty.
Will the General Assembly continue to support using the United
Nations for a Western crusade? Indeed, given the validity of Samuel
Huntington's claim that 'the West in effect is using international
institutions, military power and economic resources to run the world in
ways that will maintain Western predominance, protect Western
interests and promote Western political and economic values', 3 is it
not likely that some member-states, perhaps even a majority, might
decide sooner or later to reimpose checks and limits on UN actions?
From an American point of view, conversely, the case of Somalia
shows yet again that the commitment of a multinational force to UN
peacekeeping is not definable in concrete military or political terms, for
its legitimising principle calls for loyalty to a general conception of
international order. Unosom generated perceptions of a pledge to keep
the peace in Somalia regardless of existing limitations of the capacity,
other commitments, or specific national interests of the contributing
countries. But when the force failed to discharge its perceived
responsibility, then inferences were inevitably drawn about their
37

Huntington, loc. cit. p.

40.

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broader capacities and determinations. Since Unosom was so closely

identified with Washington, this was especially true of American
credibility. That is, the Somali engagement entailed the prestige of the
United States as a superpower. But the commitment had not in act
been conceived in accordance with the resources of power available to
the US for influencing events in Somalia. The operation there was a
fair test only of UN peacekeeping, not of US credibility generally.
Resort to UN multilateralism contains costs as well as benefits.
'Pursuit of global collective security is likely to enmesh the United
States in a myriad of complex and costly operations that have little to
do with its national interest, and that will ultimately fail'." The UN is
not an independent actor in its own right, but an instrument in the
hands of its sovereign member-states.39It may complement unilateral
actions or allied coalitions, but cannot replace them on every occasion.
At times UN involvement will risk internationalizing a local conflict.
If/when Washington has to face another Grenada-type crisis in the
post-cold war climate, unilateral US military action would still be
simpler and more effective than the additional complications of going
through the UN. In each instance, the US Administration will have to
make a political judgement on investing money, troops, and prestige
unilaterally or in a UN effort in which it surrendersa measure of policy
autonomy and military control. To make the choice in favour of the
latter course axiomatic is to abdicate US moral responsibility in world
affairs to an international body whose past history is less than fully
honourable from the standpoint of US values. Only by national
deliberations in each case will Americans be convinced that their
country's vast power and wealth are being used judiciously.
The Somalia operation has reinforcedthe need for separating the US
national security decision-making calculus from the UN peacekeeping
one. There seems to be a divergence of opinion on the nature of the
understanding on the basis of which both sides (the US and the UN)
got into the operation. The Americans believe that they went to
Somalia to achieve precise and limited objectives - clearing the relief
channels in order to avert mass starvation - that would enable them to
leave fairly quickly. But two sets of mistakes were made. On the one
hand, Boutros-Ghali, the UN Secretary-General, allegedly 'moved the
goalposts',40 demanding that the US troops should disarm the Somali
" Jeffrey R. Gerlach, 'A U.N. Army for the New World Order?', in Orbis(Philadelphia),
37,
Spring I993, p. 226.
" Ernest W. Lefever, 'Reining in the U.N.: mistaking the instrument for the actor', in Foreign
AJ/airs,72, Summer 1993, pp. I7-20.
40 Unnamed US official quoted in Time, i8 October
1993, p. 35.

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gangs, fan out from Mogadishu into the countryside, and stay for an
unlimited period. With much less military capability than the
Americans, the UN undertook the far more ambitious task of nationbuilding, a formidably complex challenge even under non-combat
conditions. On the other hand Bill Clinton, the new US President,
endorsed this particular goal as part of his shift to 'assertive
multilateralism'.41 The error was compounded with the corollary goal
of pacifying General Aidid, a combat mission that could be attempted
only at great risk.
Those who were involved in setting up the operation from the UN
end insist that their initial lack of enthusiasm was overcome because of
the prospect of having US forces under UN command. US combat
units had never before formed part of a blue helmet force.42Their
experience in Somalia may ensure that they do not again serve under a
non-American UN commander. Relations were strained even with the
Secretary-General personally. By I994, US officials were expressing
rising irritation with Boutros-Ghali, describing him as egocentric,
lacking in political and management skills, effective neither as a leader
nor as a bureaucrat.43For their part, UN officials were irritated that
when i8 US army rangers were killed in Somalia in October I993,
Clinton, without consulting Boutros-Ghali, announced that American
troops would be withdrawn by 31 March I994.
Again, the broader, more important argument here is that in the
post-cold war order, the UN and the US need each other too much to
risk their relationship becoming a predictable casualty of a resort to
muscular force by American units wearing blue helmets. There is a
further consideration which reinforcesthis caution. If the UN moves to
institute mechanisms and procedures to monitor, investigate, and
prosecute human rights violations by troops under its authority, and
they happen to be American soldiers, then the relationship between the
UN and the US will be strained to beyond breaking point. The
Pentagon is unlikely to permit its troops serving in the cause of global
peace to be investigated by international machinery.
41 For a good account of the deliberate shift from the Bush to the Clinton Administration, see
John R. Bolton (Assistant Secretary of State for International Organisation in the Bush
Administration), 'Wrong Turn in Somalia', in ForeignAffairs,73, January-February 1994, pp.
56-66.
42 Based on confidential discussions with officials who were involved in the decision to set up
the UN Operation in Somalia.
(Bombay), 3 February 1994.
4 Peter Pringle, 'Ghali: wrong man at the top', in Independent

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CONCLUSION

International peacekeeping has proved to be remarkably resilient. If

a military solution proves illusory but peaceful settlement remains
elusive, then peacekeeping forces are needed, wanted, and a useful
instrument of conflict management. But they risk being mistaken as an
adequate substitute for conflict resolution. In the past, the United
Nations has emphasised abortion to the neglect of prophylaxis. It needs
to sharpen its skills at identifying potential conflicts before they break
into war so that parties to disputes can be brought together during the
period of infancy. The UN also needs to become involved in postconflict peace-building by identifying, supporting, and deepening the
structures which will consolidate peace and enhance people's sense of
confidence and well-being.44
On the cautionary side, the United Nations will have to address the
problem of overload given the calls that continue to be made for an
international peacekeeping force to act as a buffer between internally
fighting groups in a number of countries. Imperial overreach may come
to afflict the world body just as it has destroyed great powers
throughout history. The zeal to intervene everywhere will have to be
tempered with caution about entering into entangling commitments.
The UN's dilemma is that it must avoid deploying peacekeeping forces
into situations where the risk of failure is high, and yet not be so timid
as to transform every difficulty into an alibi for inaction.
One possible reason why Boutros-Ghali and others prefer to use the
euphemism 'peacemaking' may be that they realise that the concept of
'peace enforcement' is an oxymoron. One is reminded of a statement
by a former head of government that 'a world where disputes are
settled by law and reason ... is a very old dream. But we have the

power, and now we have the opportunity to make it come true'.45The

speaker was President Lyndon B. Johnson, the time was April I 965, the
context was Vietnam. Just as the self-contradictoryirony of his remarks
had escaped Johnson in I965, so some world leaders in I993 seemed to
find it difficult to grasp the oxymoronic nature of peace enforcement.
The point is that this does not work essentially within a consensus of all
the parties to a conflict, and moves beyond a minimalist to a muscular
conception of self-defence.
Withdrawal of UN peacekeeping machinery in the face of armed
44

This was recognised by Boutros-Ghali on op. cit. paras 55-9. See also various contributions

in RameshThakurand CarlyleA. Thayer (eds.), UN Peacekeeping

in the1990S (Boulder,I995).
45 Quotedin RameshThakur,Peacekeeping
in Vietnam:Canada,India,PolandandtheInternational
Commission (Edmonton, i984),

p.

200.

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41O

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challenges can of course be cruel in human terms. But it is better in the

long run for the organisation to leave with its reputation intact and
capable of intervention elsewhere with the consent of all parties, than
to turn into a factional participant, part of the problem instead of a
solution, the object of armed reprisals and street demonstrations. The
second approach is better left to major powers like the United States.
Traditional peacekeeping may lack coercive or protective power, but it
is also low-risk. The new burst of vigour multiplies the probability of
casualties and failure. That is why it will stretch the conceptual fabric
of UN peacekeeping beyond the point of sustainability.

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