Torts and Damages

TORTS & DAMAGES 1
1st Batch Cases LJC NOTES
G.R. No. 84458 November 6, 1989

ABOITIZ
SHIPPING
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION, LUCILA C. VIANA, SPS. ANTONIO VIANA and
GORGONIA VIANA, and PIONEER STEVEDORING CORPORATION, respondents.
Herenio E. Martinez for petitioner.
M.R. Villaluz Law Office for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
In this appeal by certiorari, petitioner Aboitiz Shipping Corporation seeks a review of the decision 1 of
respondent Court of Appeals, dated July 29, 1988, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from as modified by the order of October 27,
1982, is hereby affirmed with the modification that appellant Aboitiz Shipping is
hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-appellees the amount of P30,000.00 for the death of
Anacleto Viana; actual damages of P9,800.00; P150,000.00 for unearned income;
P7,200.00 as support for deceased's parents; P20,000.00 as moral damages;
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and to pay the costs.
The undisputed facts of the case, as found by the court a quo and adopted by respondent court, are as
follows: .
The evidence disclosed that on May 11, 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel
M/V Antonia, owned by defendant, at the port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro,
bound for Manila, having purchased a ticket (No. 117392) in the sum of P23.10 (Exh.
'B'). On May 12, 1975, said vessel arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila, and the
passengers therein disembarked, a gangplank having been provided connecting the
side of the vessel to the pier. Instead of using said gangplank Anacleto Viana
disembarked on the third deck which was on the level with the pier. After said vessel
had landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation took over the exclusive control of
the cargoes loaded on said vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement dated
July 26, 1975 (Exh. '2') between the third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring
Corporation and defendant Aboitiz Shipping Corporation.
The crane owned by the third party defendant and operated by its crane operator
Alejo Figueroa was placed alongside the vessel and one (1) hour after the
passengers of said vessel had disembarked, it started operation by unloading the
cargoes from said vessel. While the crane was being operated, Anacleto Viana who
had already disembarked from said vessel obviously remembering that some of his
cargoes were still loaded in the vessel, went back to the vessel, and it was while he
was pointing to the crew of the said vessel to the place where his cargoes were
loaded that the crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the vessel and the
crane. He was thereafter brought to the hospital where he later expired three (3) days
thereafter, on May 15, 1975, the cause of his death according to the Death Certificate
(Exh. "C") being "hypostatic pneumonia secondary to traumatic fracture of the pubic
bone lacerating the urinary bladder" (See also Exh. "B"). For his hospitalization,
medical, burial and other miscellaneous expenses, Anacleto's wife, herein plaintiff,
spent a total of P9,800.00 (Exhibits "E", "E-1", to "E-5"). Anacleto Viana who was only
forty (40) years old when he met said fateful accident (Exh. 'E') was in good health.
His average annual income as a farmer or a farm supervisor was 400 cavans of palay
annually. His parents, herein plaintiffs Antonio and Gorgonia Viana, prior to his death
had been recipient of twenty (20) cavans of palay as support or P120.00 monthly.
Because of Anacleto's death, plaintiffs suffered mental anguish and extreme worry or
moral damages. For the filing of the instant case, they had to hire a lawyer for an
agreed fee of ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos. 2
Private respondents Vianas filed a complaint 3 for damages against petitioner corporation (Aboitiz, for
brevity) for breach of contract of carriage.
In its answer. 4 Aboitiz denied responsibility contending that at the time of the accident, the vessel was
completely under the control of respondent Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation (Pioneer, for short) as the
exclusive stevedoring contractor of Aboitiz, which handled the unloading of cargoes from the vessel of
Aboitiz. It is also averred that since the crane operator was not an employee of Aboitiz, the latter cannot
be held liable under the fellow-servant rule.
Thereafter, Aboitiz, as third-party plaintiff, filed a third-party complaint 5 against Pioneer imputing liability
thereto for Anacleto Viana's death as having been allegedly caused by the negligence of the crane
operator who was an employee of Pioneer under its exclusive control and supervision.
Pioneer, in its answer to the third-party complaint, 6 raised the defenses that Aboitiz had no cause of
action against Pioneer considering that Aboitiz is being sued by the Vianas for breach of contract of
carriage to which Pioneer is not a party; that Pioneer had observed the diligence of a good father of a
family both in the selection and supervision of its employees as well as in the prevention of damage or
injury to anyone including the victim Anacleto Viana; that Anacleto Viana's gross negligence was the
direct and proximate cause of his death; and that the filing of the third-party complaint was premature by
reason of the pendency of the criminal case for homicide through reckless imprudence filed against the
crane operator, Alejo Figueroa.
In a decision rendered on April 17, 1980 by the trial court, 7 Aboitiz was ordered to pay the Vianas for
damages incurred, and Pioneer was ordered to reimburse Aboitiz for whatever amount the latter paid
the Vianas. The dispositive portion of said decision provides:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plantiffs:
(1) ordering defendant Aboitiz Shipping Corporation to pay to plaintiffs the sum of
P12,000.00 for the death of Anacleto Viana P9,800.00 as actual damages;
P533,200.00 value of the 10,664 cavans of palay computed at P50.00 per cavan;
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; F 5,000.00, value of the 100 cavans of palay as
support for five (5) years for deceased (sic) parents, herein plaintiffs Antonio and
Gorgonia Viana computed at P50.00 per cavan; P7,200.00 as support for deceased's
parents computed at P120.00 a month for five years pursuant to Art. 2206, Par. 2, of
the Civil Code; P20,000.00 as moral damages, and costs; and
(2) ordering the third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation to reimburse
defendant and third party plaintiff Aboitiz Shipping Corporation the said amounts that
it is ordered to pay to herein plaintiffs.
Both Aboitiz and Pioneer filed separate motions for reconsideration wherein they similarly raised the trial
court's failure to declare that Anacleto Viana acted with gross negligence despite the overwhelming
evidence presented in support thereof. In addition, Aboitiz alleged, in opposition to Pioneer's motion,
that under the memorandum of agreement the liability of Pioneer as contractor is automatic for any
damages or losses whatsoever occasioned by and arising from the operation of its arrastre and
stevedoring service.
In an order dated October 27, 1982, 8 the trial court absolved Pioneer from liability for failure of the
Vianas and Aboitiz to preponderantly establish a case of negligence against the crane operator which
the court a quo ruled is never presumed, aside from the fact that the memorandum of agreement
supposedly refers only to Pioneer's liability in case of loss or damage to goods handled by it but not in
the case of personal injuries, and, finally that Aboitiz cannot properly invoke the fellow-servant rule
simply because its liability stems from a breach of contract of carriage. The dispositive portion of said
order reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby modified insofar as third party defendant Pioneer
Stevedoring Corporation is concerned rendered in favor of the plaintiffs-,:
(1) Ordering defendant Aboitiz Shipping Corporation to pay the plaintiffs the sum of
P12,000.00 for the death of Anacleto Viana; P9,000.00 (sic) as actual damages;
P533,200.00 value of the 10,664 cavans of palay computed at P50.00 per cavan;
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; P5,000.00 value of the 100 cavans of palay as support
for five (5) years for deceased's parents, herein plaintiffs Antonio and Gorgonia
Viana,computed at P50.00 per cavan; P7,200.00 as support for deceased's parents
computed at P120.00 a month for five years pursuant to Art. 2206, Par. 2, of the Civil
Code; P20,000.00 as moral damages, and costs; and
(2) Absolving third-party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation for (sic) any
liability for the death of Anacleto Viana the passenger of M/V Antonia owned by
TORTS & DAMAGES 3

defendant third party plaintiff Aboitiz Shipping Corporation it appearing that the
negligence of its crane operator has not been established therein.
Not satisfied with the modified judgment of the trial court, Aboitiz appealed the same to respondent
Court of Appeals which affirmed the findings of of the trial court except as to the amount of damages
awarded to the Vianas.
Hence, this petition wherein petitioner Aboitiz postulates that respondent court erred:
(A) In holding that the doctrine laid down by this honorable Court in La Mallorca vs.
Court of Appeals, et al. (17 SCRA 739, July 27, 1966) is applicable to the case in the
face of the undisputable fact that the factual situation under the La Mallorca case is
radically different from the facts obtaining in this case;
(B) In holding petitioner liable for damages in the face of the finding of the court a quo
and confirmed by the Honorable respondent court of Appeals that the deceased,
Anacleto Viana was guilty of contributory negligence, which, We respectfully submit
contributory negligence was the proximate cause of his death; specifically the
honorable respondent Court of Appeals failed to apply Art. 1762 of the New Civil
Code;
(C) In the alternative assuming the holding of the Honorable respondent Court of
Appears that petitioner may be legally condemned to pay damages to the private
respondents we respectfully submit that it committed a reversible error when it
dismissed petitioner's third party complaint against private respondent Pioneer
Stevedoring Corporation instead of compelling the latter to reimburse the petitioner for
whatever damages it may be compelled to pay to the private respondents Vianas. 9
At threshold, it is to be observed that both the trial court and respondent Court of Appeals found the
victim Anacleto Viana guilty of contributory negligence, but holding that it was the negligence of Aboitiz
in prematurely turning over the vessel to the arrastre operator for the unloading of cargoes which was
the direct, immediate and proximate cause of the victim's death.
I. Petitioner contends that since one (1) hour had already elapsed from the time Anacleto Viana
disembarked from the vessel and that he was given more than ample opportunity to unload his cargoes
prior to the operation of the crane, his presence on the vessel was no longer reasonable e and he
consequently ceased to be a passenger. Corollarily, it insists that the doctrine in La Mallorca vs. Court
of Appeals, et al. 10 is not applicable to the case at bar.
The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at
the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises. 11 Once created, the
relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely
alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises.
All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be
deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be
determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and
prepare for his departure. 12 The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that
the person transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the
carrier's premises to claim his baggage. 13
It was in accordance with this rationale that the doctrine in the aforesaid case of La Mallorca was
enunciated, to wit:
It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not
cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place
selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the passenger
has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's
premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to
be determined from all the circumstances. Thus, a person who, after alighting from a
train, walks along the station platform is considered still a passenger. So also, where
a passenger has alighted at his destination and is proceeding by the usual way to
leave the company's premises, but before actually doing so is halted by the report that
his brother, a fellow passenger, has been shot, and he in good faith and without intent
of engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve his brother, he is deemed reasonably
and necessarily delayed and thus continues to be a passenger entitled as such to the
protection of the railroad company and its agents.
In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which
was not unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Racquel, the child that she was,
must have followed the father. However, although the father was still on the running
board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus
started to run, so that even he (the father) had to jump down from the moving vehicle.
It was at this instance that the child, who must be near the bus, was run over and
killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had
exercised the 'utmost diligence' of a 'very cautious person' required by Article 1755 of
the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to
transport safely its passengers. ... The presence of said passengers near the bus was
not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the
carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage. 14
It is apparent from the foregoing that what prompted the Court to rule as it did in said case is the fact of
the passenger's reasonable presence within the carrier's premises. That reasonableness of time should
be made to depend on the attending circumstances of the case, such as the kind of common carrier, the
nature of its business, the customs of the place, and so forth, and therefore precludes a consideration of
the time element per se without taking into account such other factors. It is thus of no moment whether
in the cited case of La Mallorca there was no appreciable interregnum for the passenger therein to leave
the carrier's premises whereas in the case at bar, an interval of one (1) hour had elapsed before the
victim met the accident. The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as
will justify the presence of the victim on or near the petitioner's vessel. We believe there exists such a
justifiable cause.
It is of common knowledge that, by the very nature of petitioner's business as a shipper, the passengers
of vessels are allotted a longer period of time to disembark from the ship than other common carriers
such as a passenger bus. With respect to the bulk of cargoes and the number of passengers it can load,
such vessels are capable of accommodating a bigger volume of both as compared to the capacity of a
regular commuter bus. Consequently, a ship passenger will need at least an hour as is the usual
practice, to disembark from the vessel and claim his baggage whereas a bus passenger can easily get
off the bus and retrieve his luggage in a very short period of time. Verily, petitioner cannot categorically
claim, through the bare expedient of comparing the period of time entailed in getting the passenger's
cargoes, that the ruling in La Mallorca is inapplicable to the case at bar. On the contrary, if we are to
apply the doctrine enunciated therein to the instant petition, we cannot in reason doubt that the victim
Anacleto Viana was still a passenger at the time of the incident. When the accident occurred, the victim
was in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from petitioner's vessel. As
earlier stated, a carrier is duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to their destination but also
to afford them a reasonable time to claim their baggage.
It is not definitely shown that one (1) hour prior to the incident, the victim had already disembarked from
the vessel. Petitioner failed to prove this. What is clear to us is that at the time the victim was taking his
cargoes, the vessel had already docked an hour earlier. In consonance with common shipping
procedure as to the minimum time of one (1) hour allowed for the passengers to disembark, it may be
presumed that the victim had just gotten off the vessel when he went to retrieve his baggage. Yet, even
if he had already disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in petitioner's premises was not without
cause. The victim had to claim his baggage which was possible only one (1) hour after the vessel
arrived since it was admittedly standard procedure in the case of petitioner's vessels that the unloading
operations shall start only after that time. Consequently, under the foregoing circumstances, the victim
Anacleto Viana is still deemed a passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic death.
II. Under the law, common carriers are, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. 15 More particularly, a
common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. 16 Thus,
where a passenger dies or is injured, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently. 17 This gives rise to an action for breach of contract of carriage where all that is
required of plaintiff is to prove the existence of the contract of carriage and its non-performance by the
carrier, that is, the failure of the carrier to carry the passenger safely to his destination, 18 which, in the
instant case, necessarily includes its failure to safeguard its passenger with extraordinary diligence
while such relation subsists.
The presumption is, therefore, established by law that in case of a passenger's death or injury the
operator of the vessel was at fault or negligent, having failed to exercise extraordinary diligence, and it is
incumbent upon it to rebut the same. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to afford
full protection to the passengers of common carriers which can be carried out only by imposing a
stringent statutory obligation upon the latter. Concomitantly, this Court has likewise adopted a rigid
posture in the application of the law by exacting the highest degree of care and diligence from common
TORTS & DAMAGES 5

carriers, bearing utmost in mind the welfare of the passengers who often become hapless victims of
indifferent and profit-oriented carriers. We cannot in reason deny that petitioner failed to rebut the
presumption against it. Under the facts obtaining in the present case, it cannot be gainsaid that
petitioner had inadequately complied with the required degree of diligence to prevent the accident from
happening.
As found by the Court of Appeals, the evidence does not show that there was a cordon of drums around
the perimeter of the crane, as claimed by petitioner. It also adverted to the fact that the alleged presence
of visible warning signs in the vicinity was disputable and not indubitably established. Thus, we are not
inclined to accept petitioner's explanation that the victim and other passengers were sufficiently warned
that merely venturing into the area in question was fraught with serious peril. Definitely, even assuming
the existence of the supposed cordon of drums loosely placed around the unloading area and the
guard's admonitions against entry therein, these were at most insufficient precautions which pale into
insignificance if considered vis-a-vis the gravity of the danger to which the deceased was exposed.
There is no showing that petitioner was extraordinarily diligent in requiring or seeing to it that said
precautionary measures were strictly and actually enforced to subserve their purpose of preventing
entry into the forbidden area. By no stretch of liberal evaluation can such perfunctory acts approximate
the "utmost diligence of very cautious persons" to be exercised "as far as human care and foresight can
provide" which is required by law of common carriers with respect to their passengers.
While the victim was admittedly contributorily negligent, still petitioner's aforesaid failure to exercise
extraordinary diligence was the proximate and direct cause of, because it could definitely have
prevented, the former's death. Moreover, in paragraph 5.6 of its petition, at bar, 19 petitioner has
expressly conceded the factual finding of respondent Court of Appeals that petitioner did not present
sufficient evidence in support of its submission that the deceased Anacleto Viana was guilty of gross
negligence. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim otherwise.
No excepting circumstance being present, we are likewise bound by respondent court's declaration that
there was no negligence on the part of Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation, a confirmation of the trial
court's finding to that effect, hence our conformity to Pioneer's being absolved of any liability.
As correctly observed by both courts, Aboitiz joined Pioneer in proving the alleged gross negligence of
the victim, hence its present contention that the death of the passenger was due to the negligence of the
crane operator cannot be sustained both on grounds, of estoppel and for lack of evidence on its present
theory. Even in its answer filed in the court below it readily alleged that Pioneer had taken the necessary
safeguards insofar as its unloading operations were concerned, a fact which appears to have been
accepted by the plaintiff therein by not impleading Pioneer as a defendant, and likewise inceptively by
Aboitiz by filing its third-party complaint only after ten (10) months from the institution of the suit against
it. Parenthetically, Pioneer is not within the ambit of the rule on extraordinary diligence required of, and
the corresponding presumption of negligence foisted on, common carriers like Aboitiz. This, of course,
does not detract from what we have said that no negligence can be imputed to Pioneer but, that on the
contrary, the failure of Aboitiz to exercise extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passenger is the
rationale for our finding on its liability.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
======
G.R. No. 95582 October 7, 1991

DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and THEODORE LARDIZABAL y MALECDAN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, INOCENCIA CUDIAMAT, EMILIA CUDIAMAT BANDOY, FERNANDO
CUDLAMAT, MARRIETA CUDIAMAT, NORMA CUDIAMAT, DANTE CUDIAMAT, SAMUEL
CUDIAMAT and LIGAYA CUDIAMAT, all Heirs of the late Pedrito Cudiamat represented by
Inocencia Cudiamat, respondents.
Francisco S. Reyes Law Office for petitioners.
Antonio C. de Guzman for private respondents.
REGALADO, J.:p
Not satisfied therewith, private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which, in a decision 3 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 19504 promulgated on August 14, 1990, set aside the decision of the lower court, and
ordered petitioners to pay private respondents:
On May 13, 1985, private respondents filed a complaint 1 for damages against petitioners for the death
of Pedrito Cudiamat as a result of a vehicular accident which occurred on March 25, 1985 at Marivic,
Sapid, Mankayan, Benguet. Among others, it was alleged that on said date, while petitioner Theodore
M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to petitioner corporation in a reckless and
imprudent manner and without due regard to traffic rules and regulations and safety to persons and
property, it ran over its passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat. However, instead of bringing Pedrito immediately
to the nearest hospital, the said driver, in utter bad faith and without regard to the welfare of the victim,
first brought his other passengers and cargo to their respective destinations before banging said victim
to the Lepanto Hospital where he expired.
1. The sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos by way of indemnity for death of
the victim Pedrito Cudiamat;
On the other hand, petitioners alleged that they had observed and continued to observe the
extraordinary diligence required in the operation of the transportation company and the supervision of
the employees, even as they add that they are not absolute insurers of the safety of the public at large.
Further, it was alleged that it was the victim's own carelessness and negligence which gave rise to the
subject incident, hence they prayed for the dismissal of the complaint plus an award of damages in their
favor by way of a counterclaim.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated
October 4, 1990, 5hence this petition with the central issue herein being whether respondent court erred
in reversing the decision of the trial court and in finding petitioners negligent and liable for the damages
claimed.
On July 29, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision, effectively in favor of petitioners, with this decretal
portion:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby pronounced that Pedrito
Cudiamat was negligent, which negligence was the proximate cause of his death.
Nonetheless, defendants in equity, are hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Pedrito
Cudiamat the sum of P10,000.00 which approximates the amount defendants initially
offered said heirs for the amicable settlement of the case. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 2
2. The sum of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) by way of moral damages;

3. The sum of Two Hundred Eighty Eight Thousand (P288,000.00) Pesos as actual
and compensatory damages;
4. The costs of this suit. 4
It is an established principle that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals as a rule are final and may
not be reviewed by this Court on appeal. However, this is subject to settled exceptions, one of which is
when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court, in which case a
reexamination of the facts and evidence may be undertaken. 6
In the case at bar, the trial court and the Court of Appeal have discordant positions as to who between
the petitioners an the victim is guilty of negligence. Perforce, we have had to conduct an evaluation of
the evidence in this case for the prope calibration of their conflicting factual findings and legal
conclusions.
The lower court, in declaring that the victim was negligent, made the following findings:
This Court is satisfied that Pedrito Cudiamat was negligent in trying to board a moving
vehicle, especially with one of his hands holding an umbrella. And, without having
TORTS & DAMAGES 7

given the driver or the conductor any indication that he wishes to board the bus. But
defendants can also be found wanting of the necessary diligence. In this connection,
it is safe to assume that when the deceased Cudiamat attempted to board defendants'
bus, the vehicle's door was open instead of being closed. This should be so, for it is
hard to believe that one would even attempt to board a vehicle (i)n motion if the door
of said vehicle is closed. Here lies the defendant's lack of diligence. Under such
circumstances, equity demands that there must be something given to the heirs of the
victim to assuage their feelings. This, also considering that initially, defendant
common carrier had made overtures to amicably settle the case. It did offer a certain
monetary consideration to the victim's heirs. 7
However, respondent court, in arriving at a different opinion, declares that:
From the testimony of appellees'own witness in the person of Vitaliano Safarita, it is
evident that the subject bus was at full stop when the victim Pedrito Cudiamat
boarded the same as it was precisely on this instance where a certain Miss Abenoja
alighted from the bus. Moreover, contrary to the assertion of the appellees, the victim
did indicate his intention to board the bus as can be seen from the testimony of the
said witness when he declared that Pedrito Cudiamat was no longer walking and
made a sign to board the bus when the latter was still at a distance from him. It was at
the instance when Pedrito Cudiamat was closing his umbrella at the platform of the
bus when the latter made a sudden jerk movement (as) the driver commenced to
accelerate the bus.
Evidently, the incident took place due to the gross negligence of the appellee-driver in
prematurely stepping on the accelerator and in not waiting for the passenger to first
secure his seat especially so when we take into account that the platform of the bus
was at the time slippery and wet because of a drizzle. The defendants-appellees
utterly failed to observe their duty and obligation as common carrier to the end that
they should observe extra-ordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for
the safety of the passengers transported by them according to the circumstances of
each case (Article 1733, New Civil Code). 8
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no reason to disturb the above holding of the
Court of Appeals. Its aforesaid findings are supported by the testimony of petitioners' own witnesses.
One of them, Virginia Abalos, testified on cross-examination as follows:
Q It is not a fact Madam witness, that at bunkhouse 54, that is
before the place of the incident, there is a crossing?
A The way going to the mines but it is not being pass(ed) by the
bus.
Q And the incident happened before bunkhouse 56, is that not
correct?
A It happened between 54 and 53 bunkhouses. 9
The bus conductor, Martin Anglog, also declared:
Q When you arrived at Lepanto on March 25, 1985, will you please
inform this Honorable Court if there was anv unusual incident that
occurred?
A When we delivered a baggage at Marivic because a person
alighted there between Bunkhouse 53 and 54.
Q What happened when you delivered this passenger at this
particular place in Lepanto?
A When we reached the place, a passenger alighted and I signalled
my driver. When we stopped we went out because I saw an
umbrella about a split second and I signalled again the driver, so
the driver stopped and we went down and we saw Pedrito Cudiamat
asking for help because he was lying down.
Q How far away was this certain person, Pedrito Cudiamat, when
you saw him lying down from the bus how far was he?
A It is about two to three meters.
Q On what direction of the bus was he found about three meters
from the bus, was it at the front or at the back?
A At the back, sir. 10 (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing testimonies show that the place of the accident and the place where one of the
passengers alighted were both between Bunkhouses 53 and 54, hence the finding of the Court of
Appeals that the bus was at full stop when the victim boarded the same is correct. They further confirm
the conclusion that the victim fell from the platform of the bus when it suddenly accelerated forward and
was run over by the rear right tires of the vehicle, as shown by the physical evidence on where he was
thereafter found in relation to the bus when it stopped. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that
the deceased was guilty of negligence.
The contention of petitioners that the driver and the conductor had no knowledge that the victim would
ride on the bus, since the latter had supposedly not manifested his intention to board the same, does not
merit consideration. When the bus is not in motion there is no necessity for a person who wants to ride
the same to signal his intention to board. A public utility bus, once it stops, is in effect making a
continuous offer to bus riders. Hence, it becomes the duty of the driver and the conductor, every time
the bus stops, to do no act that would have the effect of increasing the peril to a passenger while he was
attempting to board the same. The premature acceleration of the bus in this case was a breach of such
duty. 11
It is the duty of common carriers of passengers, including common carriers by railroad train, streetcar, or
motorbus, to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time in order to afford passengers an
opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting
from the sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances while they are doing so. 12
Further, even assuming that the bus was moving, the act of the victim in boarding the same cannot be
considered negligent under the circumstances. As clearly explained in the testimony of the aforestated
witness for petitioners, Virginia Abalos, th bus had "just started" and "was still in slow motion" at the
point where the victim had boarded and was on its platform. 13
It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one attempt to board a train or streetcar which is
moving slowly.14 An ordinarily prudent person would have made the attempt board the moving
conveyance under the same or similar circumstances. The fact that passengers board and alight from
slowly moving vehicle is a matter of common experience both the driver and conductor in this case
could not have been unaware of such an ordinary practice.
The victim herein, by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already considered a
passenger and is entitled all the rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual relation. Hence, it
has been held that the duty which the carrier passengers owes to its patrons extends to persons
boarding cars as well as to those alighting therefrom. 15
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and reasons of public policy, are bound to observe
extraordina diligence for the safety of the passengers transported by the according to all the
circumstances of each case. 16 A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence very cautious persons, with a due
regard for all the circumstances. 17
It has also been repeatedly held that in an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not
make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to
pay the damages sought by the passenger. By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express
obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and observe extraordinary diligence with a
due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right
away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier. This is an exception to the general rule that
negligence must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code. 18
Moreover, the circumstances under which the driver and the conductor failed to bring the gravely injured
victim immediately to the hospital for medical treatment is a patent and incontrovertible proof of their
negligence. It defies understanding and can even be stigmatized as callous indifference. The evidence
TORTS & DAMAGES 9

shows that after the accident the bus could have forthwith turned at Bunk 56 and thence to the hospital,
but its driver instead opted to first proceed to Bunk 70 to allow a passenger to alight and to deliver a
refrigerator, despite the serious condition of the victim. The vacuous reason given by petitioners that it
was the wife of the deceased who caused the delay was tersely and correctly confuted by respondent
court:
... The pretension of the appellees that the delay was due to the fact that they had to
wait for about twenty minutes for Inocencia Cudiamat to get dressed deserves scant
consideration. It is rather scandalous and deplorable for a wife whose husband is at
the verge of dying to have the luxury of dressing herself up for about twenty minutes
before attending to help her distressed and helpless husband. 19
Further, it cannot be said that the main intention of petitioner Lardizabal in going to Bunk 70 was to
inform the victim's family of the mishap, since it was not said bus driver nor the conductor but the
companion of the victim who informed his family thereof. 20 In fact, it was only after the refrigerator was
unloaded that one of the passengers thought of sending somebody to the house of the victim, as shown
by the testimony of Virginia Abalos again, to wit:
A No sir. 21
With respect to the award of damages, an oversight was, however, committed by respondent Court of
Appeals in computing the actual damages based on the gross income of the victim. The rule is that the
amount recoverable by the heirs of a victim of a tort is not the loss of the entire earnings, but rather the
loss of that portion of the earnings which the beneficiary would have received. In other words, only net
earnings, not gross earnings, are to be considered, that is, the total of the earnings less expenses
necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and minus living and other incidental
expenses. 22
We are of the opinion that the deductible living and other expense of the deceased may fairly and
reasonably be fixed at P500.00 a month or P6,000.00 a year. In adjudicating the actual or compensatory
damages, respondent court found that the deceased was 48 years old, in good health with a remaining
productive life expectancy of 12 years, and then earning P24,000.00 a year. Using the gross annual
income as the basis, and multiplying the same by 12 years, it accordingly awarded P288,000. Applying
the aforestated rule on computation based on the net earnings, said award must be, as it hereby is,
rectified and reduced to P216,000.00. However, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, the death
indemnity is hereby increased to P50,000.00. 23
Q Why, what happened to your refrigerator at that particular time?

A I asked them to bring it down because that is the nearest place to
our house and when I went down and asked somebody to bring
down the refrigerator, I also asked somebody to call the family of
Mr. Cudiamat.
WHEREFORE, subject to the above modifications, the challenged judgment and resolution of
respondent Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
COURT:
Q Why did you ask somebody to call the family of Mr. Cudiamat?
A Because Mr. Cudiamat met an accident, so I ask somebody to
call for the family of Mr. Cudiamat.
Q But nobody ask(ed) you to call for the family of Mr. Cudiamat?
G.R. No. 108533 December 20, 1994

LOU
A.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANTONIO G. SIA, respondents.
ATIENZA, petitioner,
Pimentel, Apostol, Layosa & Sibayan Law Office for petitioner.

V. L. Legaspi for private respondent.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Private respondent Antonio G. Sia was elected mayor of the Municipality of Madrilejos, Cebu in the 1988
local elections obtaining a plurality of 126 votes over his nearest rival, herein petitioner Lou A.
Atienza. 1 Following Sia's proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioner filed an election
protest docketed as Election Case No. EC-5 with the Regional Trial Court questioning the results of the
elections in a number of precincts in the municipality. 2Consequently, in the revision ordered by the lower
court, petitioner obtained a total of 2,826 votes, a plurality of 12 votes over the private respondent. On
April 12, 1989 the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision declaring petitioner the winner of the
municipal elections and ordering the private respondent to reimburse petitioner the amount of
P300,856.19 representing petitioner's expenses in the election protest. Private respondent appealed the
trial court's decision to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) raising as errors 1) the computation
of the number of votes received by the candidates; and 2) the alleged award of "excessive damages" in
favor of the petitioner. 3 The case was docketed as EAC No. 20-89 and assigned to the COMELEC's
Second Division.
Meanwhile, the Regional Trial Court granted petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal. However,
private respondent filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, docketed as SPC No. 19-91 questioning
the order of execution pending appeal. Acting thereon, the COMELEC issued a preliminary injunction
stopping the enforcement of the order of execution.
The COMELEC, en banc, on April 7, 1992 issued an Order setting aside the preliminary injunction and
thereby allowing petitioner to assume as mayor of the Municipality of Madrilejos pending resolution of
his appeal. 4 However, following the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992, the Presiding
Commissioner of the COMELEC's Second Division issued an Order dated July 18, 1992 dismissing
petitioner's appeal for being moot and academic pursuant to the Commission's decision in Resolution
No. 2494 declaring the election protest and appeal cases as well as petitions for special relief
arising out of the January 18, 1988 elections dismissed and terminated as of June 30,
1992. 5 Thereupon, private respondent sought clarification of the order of dismissal of EAC No. 20-89
referred to the protest case in the Regional Trial Court or to the appeal case in COMELEC. In response,
the Second Division of COMELEC stated in its Order dated September 16, 1992 that "(t)he election
protest cases mentioned in the aforecited order are those protest cases over which the Commission has
original jurisdiction. Hence, it is only the appeal case that was dismissed for being moot and academic."
On the private respondent's Motion for Reconsideration and/or Appeal to the Commission En banc,
wherein he pointed out that the appeal could not be simply dismissed because it would result to the
affirmance of the monetary judgment of the trial court without considering its merits on appeal,
respondent COMELEC issued an Order, dated 15 October 1992, certifying the case to the
Commission en banc pursuant to Section 5, Rule 19 of the COMELEC's Rules of Procedure.
On January 28, 1993, respondent Commission en banc released its questioned resolution, the
dispositive portion of which states:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
that the dismissal of the appeal by the Commission (Second Division) for being moot
and academic because of the expiration of the term of office of the contested position
did not thereby revive the vacated judgment of the Regional Trial Court, said appealed
judgment to remain vacated, not having been resolved on the merits by the
Commission for or against any of the parties; and the judgment directing the
protestee-appellant to reimburse the protestant-appellee the amount of P300,856.19
representing his expenses in the election protest, is hereby REVERSED, said
judgment not being in accordance with law in the absence of any evidence of any
wrongful, or negligent act or omission on the part of the protestee appellant to justify
the award.
Since the principal issue elevated to the Commission on Elections by the private respondent has been
rendered moot and academic by the election of new municipal officials in the May 11, 1992 elections,
the sole question for our determination is whether or not the Commission on Elections acted with grave
abuse of discretion when it issued its Resolution of January 28, 1993 reversing the lower court's
judgment awarding damages to herein petitioner after it had earlier dismissed EAC No. 20-89 for being
moot and academic. Petitioner argues that when the appeal from the trial court's decision was
dismissed for being moot and academic, it was as if "no appeal had ever been taken" and that the trial
court's decision thereby remained "untouched," valid and subsisting. 6
10
TORTS & DAMAGES 11

We disagree.
Immediately after the Commission on Elections issued its July 18, 1992 Order dismissing EAC No. 2089, the private respondent filed a Motion for Clarification asking whether what was dismissed by the
COMELEC
in
EAC
No. 20-89 was the Election Protest Case No. EC-5 or just the appeal. In clarification, the COMELEC's
Second Division immediately issued an order stating that the protest cases mentioned in its earlier order
only included those cases in which the body possessed original jurisdiction, and hence it was only the
appeal case which was dismissed for being moot and academic. 7 Moreover, in its assailed decision, the
Commission stressed that its dismissal of the appeal obviously referred only to that part of the appealed
judgment which was affected by the elections of May 11, 1992, i.e., the portion which adjudged
petitioner as the winner in the election protest. Since the question relating to the lower court's award of
P300,856.19 could not have been rendered moot and academic by the May 11, 1992 elections, the
COMELEC pointed out that the second part of the lower court's decision was a matter which had
nothing to do with the expiration of the term of office and could not have been dismissed by the said
body. 8
In support of his averments, however, petitioner cites Yorac vs. Magalona 9 as authority for his claim that
"when the appeal is dismissed, 'the decision of the lower court shall stand,'" 10 and further contends that
the following provision of the Rules of Court should be given suppletory effect, the Omnibus Election
Code and the Comelec Rules of Procedure being bereft of any provision defining the effect of dismissal
of cases before the said body. Section 2, Rule 50 of the said Rules states:
Sec. 2. Effect of Dismissal. Fifteen days after the dismissal of an appeal, the clerk
shall return to the court below the record on appeal with a certificate under the seal of
the Court showing that the appeal had been dismissed. Upon receipt of such
certificate in the lower court the case shall stand there as though no appeal had been
taken, and the judgment of the said court may be enforced with additional costs
allowed by the court upon dismissal of the appeal.
We cannot accept the petitioner's theory. First, because the term of the disputed office had expired,
there was virtually nothing to enforce except the monetary judgment awarded by the trial court. The
COMELEC immediately clarified that said monetary judgment, not having been mooted by the May,
1992 elections, was not and could not have been part of its earlier order. Under the circumstances,
therefore, it would have been absolutely illogical to assume that the case stood originally as though no
appeal had been taken to the Commission plainly because the decision on the main issue the
electoral protest could not be enforced. On the other hand, had the case been dismissed for lack of
merit, the lower court would have been duty-bound, at the very least, to enforce its original decision
finding herein petitioner winner of the mayoralty post in the 1988 municipal elections in Madrilejos,
Cebu.
Second, petitioner's citation of Yorac vs. Magalona 11 as authority for his main proposition is grossly
inappropriate and misses the point in issue. The sole question in that case centered on an election
protest involving the mayoralty post in Saravia, Negros Occidental in the general elections of 1955,
which was rendered moot and academic by the expiration of the term of office in December, 1959. 12 It
did not involve a monetary award for damages and other expenses incurred as a result of the election
protest. In responding to the petitioner's contention that the issues presented before the court were
novel and important and that the appeal should not be dismissed, the Court held citing the same
provision of the Rules of Court upon which petitioner staunchly places reliance that a decision on the
merits in the case would have no practical value at all, and forthwith dismissed the case for being moot.
That is not the case here. In contradistinction to Yorac, a decision on the merits in the case at bench
would clearly have the practical value of either sustaining the monetary award for damages or relieving
the private respondent from having to pay the amount thus awarded.
This brings us to the substantive issue: Did the COMELEC abuse its discretion in reversing that portion
of the trial court's decision awarding election expenses in the amount of P300,856.19?
The Omnibus Election Code provides:
Actual or compensatory damages may be granted in all election contests or in quo
warrantoproceedings in accordance with law. 13
Provisions for actual or compensatory damages under the law are embodied in various Civil Code
articles allowing claims for damages under specific circumstances. Thus, Article 2176 provides:
11
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or

negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi delict, and is
governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Specifically, Article 2199 of the Civil Code mandates that:
Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.
Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
Thus, in addition to specific provisions of law allowing actual or compensatory damages in certain
situations, the Civil Code elaborates that the proper setting for allowance of actual or compensatory
damages occurs in breaches of obligations, i.e., in cases of contracts and quasi-contracts, 14 and in
crimes and quasi-delicts, where the defendant may be held liable for all damages which are the natural
and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of.15 Given this setting, it would appear
virtually impossible for a party in an election protest case to recover actual or compensatory damages in
the absence of the conditions specified under Articles 2201 and 2202 of the Civil Code, or in the
absence of a law expressly providing for situations allowing for the recovery of the same. It follows,
naturally, that in most election protest cases where the monetary claim does not hinge on either a
contract or quasi-contract or a tortious act or omission, the claimant must be able to point out to a
specific provision of law authorizing a money claim for election protest expenses against the losing
party. This, petitioner has been unable to do.
The country's early election laws contained provisions requiring the furnishing of a bond or cash deposit
for purposes of payment of expenses and costs incidental to election contests and appeals. 16 The
Administrative Code of 1917 for instance provides:
Sec. 482. Bond or Cash Deposit Required of Contestants. Before the Court shall
entertain any such contest or counter-contest or admit an appeal, the party filing the
contest, counter-contest or appeal shall give bond in an amount fixed by the court with
two sureties satisfactory to it, conditioned that he will pay all expenses and costs
incident to such motion or appeal, or shall deposit cash in court in lieu of such bond. If
the party paying such expenses and costs shall be successful, they shall be taxed by
the court and entered and be collectible as a judgment against the defeated party.
The Election Law of 1938 (Commonwealth Act No. 357) contained the same provision with a minor
modification providing for increasing or decreasing the bond or cash deposit "as the course of the
contest may require." This provision was repeated in toto in the Revised Election Code of
1947. 17 Republic Act No. 6388, and the Election Code of 1971, 18 P.D. No. 1296, and the 1978 Election
Code contained provisions allowing awards for moral and exemplary damages "as the Commission may
deem just if the aggrieved party has included (such) in his pleadings," 19 but left out the provision for
bond and cash deposits found in the earlier election codes. The provisions for moral and exemplary
damages as well as the early provisions requiring the furnishing of a bond to cover expenses related to
election contests have all but disappeared in the current Omnibus Election Code.
It may be argued that the provisions for the furnishing of a bond or cash deposit which were deleted
from the 1981 Omnibus Election Code, nonetheless, appear in the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
Section 1 of Rule 42 of the said rules for instance provides:
Sec. 1. Filing fees for election contests, quo warranto, and petitions for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Cash Deposits. In any protest or counter protest or protest-in-intervention not
requiring ballot revision the following cash deposits shall be paid by the interested
party:
(1)
For
each
election
(2)
For
each
or protest-in-intervention P1,000.00
contest
counter
P1,000.00;
protest
(c) In any protest, counter-protest or protest-in-intervention requiring ballot revision the

following cash deposits shall be paid by the interested party:
12
TORTS & DAMAGES 13

(1)
For
each
election
(2)
For
each
or protest-in-intervention P5,000.00
contest
counter
P5,000.00;
protest
fees provision of its Comelec Rules of Procedure and explained that the bond or cash deposit provisions
of previous election laws were abrogated by their non-inclusion in the current law.
The cash deposits prescribed above shall be applied to the payment of all expenses
incidental to such protest, counter-protest or protest-in-intervention. When
circumstances so demand, additional cash deposits may be required. Any unused
balance thereof shall be returned to the protestant, counter-protestant or protestant-inintervention, as the case may be.
In fine, Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code merely provides for the granting of actual and
compensatory damages in accordance with law. That it was the intent of the legislature to do away with
provisions indemnifying the victorious party for expenses incurred in an election contest in the absence
of a wrongful act or omission clearly attributable to the losing party cannot be gainsaid. The intent,
moreover, to do away with such provisions merely recognizes the maxim, settled in law that a wrong
without damage or damage without wrong neither constitutes a cause of action nor creates a civil
obligation.
(d) In case of revision of ballots, there shall be deposited the sum of P350.00 for
every ballot box for the compensation of the revisors at the rate of P100.00 each and
as reserve for expenses.
Finding no reversible error in the assailed resolution, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
(e) If a claim for damages and attorney's fees are set forth in a protest, counter-protest
or protest-in-intervention, an additional filing fee shall be paid at the rate of P300.00
for the first one hundred fifty thousand pesos and P4.00 for every one thousand
pesos over the first P150,000.00.
An examination of the above quoted provision, however, reveals that the bonds or cash deposits
required by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are in the nature of filing fees, not damages. These filing
fees obviously refer to the expenses incurred by the COMELEC in the course of administering election
cases and are species different from the bond or cash deposit required by previous election laws which
are clearly in the nature of actual and compensatory damages. 20 Plainly then, the deposit requirements
under previous election laws which were obviously compensatory damages, were repealed or abrogated
as a result of their non-inclusion both in the Election Code of 1978 and the Omnibus Election Code of
1981. If their non-inclusion in the 1978 statute was a mere legislative lapse, then the previous provisions
on bonds or cash deposits would have been included in the Omnibus Election Code. Their noninclusion, and the omission of provisions allowing for moral and exemplary damages in the Omnibus
Election Code, furthermore clearly underscores the legislative intent to do away with provisions for
damages other than those specified in Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code. In fact, the
COMELEC, in justifying its deletion of actual damages in its assailed en banc resolution, ignored the
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano,
deceased,plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said
minor, defendants-appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil
Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of
13
defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor,
married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living
and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of
which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not
criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which
is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution the
following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE
CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF
SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT,
AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;
II
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he
was relieved as guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage.
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR

RES-ADJUDICTA;
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])

III
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants of such
denial, reiterating the above grounds that the following order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14,
1965 and after thoroughly examining the arguments therein contained, the Court finds
the same to be meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered
by ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL

CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT
MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER
DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald
Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City.
After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to
kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us with a copy of the
decision of acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis
14
TORTS & DAMAGES 15

stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their complaint against appellees Reginald
and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to
dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our resolution
are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein
the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a
minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification of the
dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly
established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on
the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation
to culpa criminal or delito and mere culpaor fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same
given act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus,
the opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come
under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent
killeth unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a
criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not
the employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in
a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable
by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence
being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil
liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for
fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the
separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has
been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the
wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for
which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising
from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article
1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally
prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made
civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded
damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of
the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be
sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that
have been little understood, in the past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their
foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also
simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer
only to fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of
article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution ofculpa aquiliana would have very
little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to
property- through any degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to be
Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a
state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are
loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and
anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter
that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of
the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
15
such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved

and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be
proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should
be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus
Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and
the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence
of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and
efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to
seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting
that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil
Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has nevertheless
rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy
based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are
asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed
out to the harms done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for
fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is
high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own
natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under
the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding or private
rights because it realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason
that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results
of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is
more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the
opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to
contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal
that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually extends to fault
or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of
Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed,
Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that
obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by
law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)"
And it is precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized
could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the
spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother
and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa
aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish
Civil Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the
original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the
Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the
concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law,
whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code,
which is Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the
provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a
new provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight
startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil
negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasidelict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal
negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito"
has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and
perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177,
acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a
16
TORTS & DAMAGES 17

bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages
due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the
Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same
argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that
which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes
the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles
29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same
separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with
modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co.,
7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not
only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not
he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed,
if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in
such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability
for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.4
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil
Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full
or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were
of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his
father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father,
mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of
his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." In
the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and
getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald
was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability
for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of
presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise
their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand,
the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not,
nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not
carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See
Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action.
Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that
the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or
encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent.
(Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the
possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of
appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation
by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of
equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
17
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in
accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Misamis Oriental, Br. 20, and
ERIBERTA VILLEGAS, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
The Case
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative, Inc. (DMPIECCI) seeks the annulment of the order1 of the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 20,
granting the motion for reconsideration of respondent Eriberta Villegas, and thus reversing the previous
dismissal of Civil Case No. CV-94-214.
The Facts
On February 18, 1994, the prosecuting attorney filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental,
Branch 37, an information for estafa2 against Carmen Mandawe for alleged failure to account to
respondent Eriberta Villegas the amount of P608,532.46. Respondent Villegas entrusted this amount to
Carmen Mandawe, an employee of petitioner DMPI-ECCI, for deposit with the teller of petitioner.
Subsequently, on March 29, 1994, respondent Eriberta Villegas filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, a complaint 3 against Carmen Mandawe and petitioner DMPI-ECCI for a
sum of money and damages with preliminary attachment arising out of the same transaction. In time,
petitioner sought the dismissal of the civil case on the following grounds: (1) that there is a pending
criminal case in RTC Branch 37, arising from the same facts, and (2) that the complaint failed to contain
a certification against forum shopping as required by Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91.4
On December 12, 1996, the trial court issued an order 5 dismissing Civil Case No. CV-94-214. On
January 21, 1997, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration6 of the order.
G.R. No. 129282

DMPI
vs.
On February 21, 1997, the trial court issued an order 7 granting respondent's motion for reconsideration,
thereby recalling the dismissal of the case.
November 29, 2001
EMPLOYEES
CREDIT
COOPERATIVE,
INC.,
(DMPI-ECCI), petitioner,
Hence, this petition.8
18
TORTS & DAMAGES 19

The Issues
The issues raised are: (1) whether the plaintiff's failure to attach a certification against forum shopping in
the complaint is a ground to dismiss the case; 9 and, (2) whether the civil case could proceed
independently of the criminal case for estafa without having reserved the filing of the civil action.
The Court's Ruling
On the first issue, Circular No. 28-9110 of the Supreme Court requires a certificate of non-forum
shopping to be attached to petitions filed before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. This
circular was revised on February 8, 199411 by extending the requirement to all initiatory pleadings filed in
all courts and quasi-judicial agencies other than the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Villegas' failure to attach a certificate of non-forum shopping in her complaint did not violate
Circular No. 28-91, because at the time of filing, the requirement applied only to petitions filed with the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. 12 Likewise, Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is inapplicable
for the reason that the complaint was filed on March 29, 1994, three days before April 1, 1994, the date
of effectivity of the circular.13
On the second issue, as a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the
social injury produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired thru the imposition of the
corresponding penalty, and the second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which
injury is sought to be compensated through indemnity which is civil in nature.14
Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." 15 This is the law governing the
recovery of civil liability arising from the commission of an offense. Civil liability includes restitution,
reparation for damage caused, and indemnification of consequential damages.16
The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the commission of the offense
in the criminal case since the civil action is either deemed instituted with the criminal action or is
separately instituted.
Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective on December
1, 2000, provides that:
"(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action." [Emphasis supplied]
Rule 111, Section 2 further provides that
"After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom
cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action." [Emphasis
supplied]
However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission, the rule has been changed.
Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with
the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.17
There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil actions under Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. "The reservation and waiver referred to refers
only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does not
include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately even without a
reservation."18
Rule 111, Section 3 reads:
"Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be
brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall
19
require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action."
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil actions which
became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this case.
Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure.19
Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-214, an independent civil action for damages on account of the fraud
committed against respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceed independently
even if there was no reservation as to its filing.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the order dated February 21,
1997.20
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984
ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES,
BEDENIA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
Sisenando Villaluz, Sr. for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
ISMAEL
GONZALGO
and
JOSE
FARLEY
This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals' decision which reversed the trial court's
judgment of conviction and acquitted the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion on the ground of
reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittal ordered them to pay jointly and severally the amount of
P9,000.00 to the complainants as actual damages.
The petitioners were charged under the following information:
The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, PEPITO
BEDENIA, YOLLY RICO, DAVID BERMUNDO, VILLANOAC, ROBERTO ROSALES,
VILLANIA, ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE ORTEGA, JR., RICARDO CELESTINO,
REALINGO alias "KAMLON", JOHN DOE alias TATO, and FOURTEEN (14)
RICARDO DOES of the crime of GRAVE COERCION, committed as follows:
That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, in the
municipality of Jose Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, Roy
Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo, Villanoac,
Roberto Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo Celestino,
Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, by
confederating and mutually helping one another, and acting without any authority of
law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats, force
and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall located at the
Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by
subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally demolishing
and destroying said stall and the furnitures therein by axes and other massive
instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise, to the damage
and prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and his family in the amount of P30,000.00
in concept of actual or compensatory and moral damages, and further the sum of
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
20
TORTS & DAMAGES 21

That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their public positions:
Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being
policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident premeditation.
The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth Judicial District rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which states that:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael
Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and
hereby imposes upon them to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine
of P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P10,000.00; moral
damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly and
severally, and all the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the proportionate costs of this
proceedings.
The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon', David Bermundo, Christopher
Villanoac, Godofredo Villania, Romeo Garrido, Roberto Rosales, Ricardo Celestino
and Jose Ortega, are hereby ordered acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for
their criminal participation in the crime charged.
The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. They contended that the
trial court's finding of grave coercion was not supported by the evidence. According to the petitioners,
the town mayor had the power to order the clearance of market premises and the removal of the
complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to which the
market stall was a nuisance per se. The petitioners stated that the lower court erred in finding that the
demolition of the complainants' stall was a violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which
gave the stall owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate the market premises. The petitioners questioned
the imposition of prison terms of five months and one day and of accessory penalties provided by law.
They also challenged the order to pay fines of P500.00 each, P10,000.00 actual and compensatory
damages, P30,000.00 moral damages, P10,000.00 exemplary damages, and the costs of the suit.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment appealed from in the sense that the
appellants are acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt. but they are ordered to pay
jointly and severally to complainants the amount of P9,600.00, as actual damages.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the defendantsappellants as to criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil liability. The Court of Appeals
denied the motion holding that:
xxx xxx xxx
... appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt whether the crime of coercion
was committed, not on facts that no unlawful act was committed; as their taking the
law into their hands, destructing (sic) complainants' properties is unlawful, and, as
evidence on record established that complainants suffered actual damages, the
imposition of actual damages is correct.
Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil action, contending that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW OR GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONERS PAYMENT OF
DAMAGES TO COMPLAINANTS AFTER ACQUITTING PETITIONERS OF THE
CRIME CHARGED FROM WHICH SAID LIABILITY AROSE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED
DECEMBER 26, 1974 THAT SINCE APPELLANTS' ACQUITTAL WAS BASED ON
REASONABLE DOUBT, NOT ON FACTS THAT NO UNLAWFUL ACT WAS
COMMITTED, THE IMPOSITION OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IS CORRECT.
III
21
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL INCONSISTENCY, IF NOT

PLAIN JUDICIAL ERROR, IN HOLDING IN ITS APPEALED RESOLUTION THAT
PETITIONERS COMMITTED AN UNLAWFUL ACT, THAT IS TAKING THE LAW
INTO THEIR HANDS, DESTRUCTING (sic) 'COMPLAINANTS' PROPERTIES',
AFTER HOLDING IN ITS MAIN DECISION OF NOVEMBER 6,1974 THAT THE ACTS
FOR WHICH THEY WERE CHARGED DID NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE COERCION
AND THEY WERE NOT CHARGED OF ANY OTHER CRIME.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS HEREIN,
APPELLANTS IN CA-G.R. NO. 13456CR, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, TO PAY
COMPLAINANTS P9,600.00 IN SUPPOSED ACTUAL DAMAGES.
The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible
error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the
criminal charge.
For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing provision, the violence must be
employed against the person, not against property as what happened in the case at
bar. ...
xxx xxx xxx
The next problem is: May the accused be convicted of an offense other than
coercion?
From all appearances, they should have been prosecuted either for threats or
malicious mischief. But the law does not allow us to render judgment of conviction for
either of these offenses for the reason that they were not indicted for, these offenses.
The information under which they were prosecuted does not allege the elements of
either threats or malicious mischief. Although the information mentions that the act
was by means of threats', it does not allege the particular threat made. An accused
person is entitled to be informed of the nature of the acts imputed to him before he
can be made to enter into trial upon a valid information.
Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is included in the criminal action is that
arising from and as a consequence of the criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted in the criminal
case, (no civil liability arising from the criminal case), no civil liability arising from the criminal charge
could be imposed upon him. They cite precedents to the effect that the liability of the defendant for the
return of the amount received by him may not be enforced in the criminal case but must be raised in a
separate civil action for the recovery of the said amount (People v. Pantig, 97 Phil. 748; following the
doctrine laid down in Manila Railroad Co. v. Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar, 49 O.G. 3874; Pueblo contra
Abellera, 69 Phil. 623; People v. Maniago 69 Phil. 496; People v. Miranda, 5 SCRA 1067; Aldaba v.
Elepafio 116 Phil. 457). In the case before us, the petitioners were acquitted not because they did not
commit the acts stated in the charge against them. There is no dispute over the forcible opening of the
market stall, its demolition with axes and other instruments, and the carting away of the merchandize.
The petitioners were acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion when they properly
constituted some other offense such as threat or malicious mischief.
We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been proved in accordance with law.
The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:
xxx xxx xxx
While appellants are entitled to acquittal they nevertheless are liable for the actual
damages suffered by the complainants by reason of the demolition of the stall and
loss of some of their properties. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with
it that of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 3 (c), Rev.
Rules of Court; Laperal v. Aliza, 51 OG.R. 1311, People v. Velez, 44 OG. 1811). In the
instant case, the fact from which the civil might arise, namely, the demolition of the
stall and loss of the properties contained therein; exists, and this is not denied by the
accused. And since there is no showing that the complainants have reserved or
waived their right to institute a separate civil action, the civil aspect therein is deemed
instituted with the criminal action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rev. Rules of Court).
22
TORTS & DAMAGES 23

Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that when a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is
impliedly instituted with it. There is no implied institution when the offended party expressly waives the
civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately. (Morte Sr. v. Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221).
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil
liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Virata
v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words, the civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of
the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime.
As easily as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo v. Garcia, et
at. 73 Phil. 607 laid down the rule that the same punishable act or omission can create two kinds of civil
liabilities against the accused and, where provided by law, his employer. 'There is the civil liability arising
from the act as a crime and the liability arising from the same act as a quasi-delict. Either one of these
two types of civil liability may be enforced against the accused, However, the offended party cannot
recover damages under both types of liability. For instance, in cases of criminal negligence or crimes
due to reckless imprudence, Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But
the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.
Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included in the
preceding section the following rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may
institute it in the Jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person
who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the
damage suffered.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not
extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil.
286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares
that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558;
People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief
committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code);
and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the
accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623). Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that:
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the
same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of
evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a
bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the
court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be
inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case would not constitute an
obstacle to the filing of a civil case based on the same acts which led to the criminal prosecution:
... The finding by the respondent court that he spent said sum for and in the interest of
the Capiz Agricultural and Fishery School and for his personal benefit is not a
23
declaration that the fact upon which Civil Case No. V-3339 is based does not exist.
The civil action barred by such a declaration is the civil liability arising from the
offense charged, which is the one impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Section
1, Rule III, Rules of Court.) Such a declaration would not bar a civil action filed against
an accused who had been acquitted in the criminal case if the criminal action is
predicated on factual or legal considerations other than the commission of the offense
charged. A person may be acquitted of malversation where, as in the case at bar, he
could show that he did not misappropriate the public funds in his possession, but he
could be rendered liable to restore said funds or at least to make a proper accounting
thereof if he shall spend the same for purposes which are not authorized nor
intended, and in a manner not permitted by applicable rules and regulations.
(Republic v. Bello, 120 SCRA 203)
There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that
the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where
the accused was acquitted. Due process has been accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated
of the criminal charged. The constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on
the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the
serious implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration by the judge of the entire records and
of applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused
was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation
with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.
The trial court found the following facts clearly established by the evidence adduced by both the
prosecution and the defense:
xxx xxx xxx
(9) In the morning of February 8, 1964, then Chief Galdones, complying with the
instructions contained in said Memorandum No. 32 of the Mayor, and upon seeing
that Antonio Vergara had not vacated the premises in question, with the aid of his
policemen, forced upon the store or stall and ordered the removal of the goods inside
the store of Vergara, at the same time taking inventory of the goods taken out, piled
them outside in front of the store and had it cordoned with a rope, and after all the
goods were taken out from the store, ordered the demolition of said stall of Antonio
Vergara. Since then up to the trial of this case, the whereabouts of the goods taken
out from the store nor the materials of the demolished stall have not been made
known.
The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that:
On the morning of February 8th, because the said Vergaras had not up to that time
complied with the order to vacate, the co-accused Chief of Police Galdones and some
members of his police force, went to the market and, using ax, crowbars and
hammers, demolished the stall of the Vergaras who were not present or around, and
after having first inventoried the goods and merchandise found therein, they had them
brought to the municipal building for safekeeping. Inspite of notice served upon the
Vergaras to take possession of the goods and merchandise thus taken away, the latter
refused to do so.
The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated them were:
Cost of stall construction P1,300.00
Value
of
furniture
judgment destroyed 300.00
and
equipment
Value of goods and equipment taken 8,000.00

P9,600.00
It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall of the complainants
Vergaras and carted away its contents. The defense that they did so in order to abate
what they considered a nuisance per se is untenable, This finds no support in law and
in fact. The couple has been paying rentals for the premises to the government which
allowed them to lease the stall. It is, therefore, farfetched to say that the stall was a
nuisance per se which could be summarily abated.
24
TORTS & DAMAGES 25

The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that they caused the destruction of the complainant's
market stall and had its contents carted away. They state:
On February 8, 1964, despite personal pleas on Vergaras by the Mayor to vacate the
passageways of Market Building No. 3, the Vergaras were still in the premises, so the
petitioners Chief of Police and members of the Police Force of Jose Panganiban,
pursuant to the Mayor' 6 directives, demolished the store of the Vergaras, made an
inventory of the goods found in said store, and brought these goods to the municipal
building under the custody of the Municipal Treasurer, ...
The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited, that "when the
accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted." According
to some scholars, this provision of substantive law calls for a separate civil action and cannot be
modified by a rule of remedial law even in the interests of economy and simplicity and following the
dictates of logic and common sense.
As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco:
... if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil action but inadequate to
justify a conviction in the criminal action, may it render judgment acquitting the
accused on reasonable doubt, but hold him civilly liable nonetheless? An affirmative
answer to this question would be consistent with the doctrine that the two are distinct
and separate actions, and win (a) dispense with the reinstituting of the same civil
action, or one based on quasi-delict or other independent civil action, and of
presenting the same evidence: (b) save the injured party unnecessary expenses in
the prosecution of the civil action or enable him to take advantage of the free services
of the fiscal; and (c) otherwise resolve the unsettling implications of permitting the
reinstitution of a separate civil action whether based on delict, or quasi-delict, or other
independent civil actions.
civil action based on the same act or omission may only be instituted in a separate
action, and therefore, may not inferentially be resolved in the same criminal action. To
dismiss the civil action upon acquittal of the accused and disallow the reinstitution of
any other civil action, would likewise render, unjustifiably, the acquittal on reasonable
doubt without any significance, and would violate the doctrine that the two actions are
distinct and separate.
In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seems evident that there is much sophistry
and no pragmatism in the doctrine that it is inconsistent to award in the same
proceedings damages against the accused after acquitting him on reasonable doubt.
Such doctrine must recognize the distinct and separate character of the two actions,
the nature of an acquittal on reasonable doubt, the vexatious and oppressive effects
of a reservation or institution of a separate civil action, and that the injured party is
entitled to damages not because the act or omission is punishable but because he
was damaged or injured thereby (Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, pp.
288-289).
We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to grant damages despite
a judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt. What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a
remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground
that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for
damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. The Civil Code
provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate civil
case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive
permissible mode of recovering damages.
There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a
judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment of
acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability
unless there is clear showing that the act from which civil liability might arise did not exist.
... But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the manner here suggested, Art. 29 of
the Civil Code should be amended because it clearly and expressly provides that the
25
A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a trivial requirement, a provision which
imposes an uncalled for burden before one who has already been the victim of a condemnable, yet noncriminal, act may be accorded the justice which he seeks.
We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at the intent of the legislator that
they could not possibly have intended to make it more difficult for the aggrieved party to recover just
compensation by making a separate civil action mandatory and exclusive:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from
civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given
rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to
a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The
reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the the
criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and
deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation
between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of
the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or
correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the
aggrieved party... it is just and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or
fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But
for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be
proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right
to be proved only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person
any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?
(Code Commission, pp. 45-46).
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or more
evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate
complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court
where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The offended
party may, of course, choose to file a separate action. These do not exist in this case. Considering
moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to
the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be filed.
With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in awarding
damages despite a judgment of acquittal.
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and dismiss the
petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 147703. April 14, 2004]
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes final and
executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own
behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability of
the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are carried in one single decision
that has become final and executory.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review [1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
March 29, 2000[2] and the March 27, 2001[3] Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
59390. Petitioners appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La
Union in Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed in the first Resolution as follows:
26
TORTS & DAMAGES 27

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the appeal is ordered
DISMISSED.[4]
The second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.[5]
The Facts
e.
to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of P3,561.46 as medical expenses, P2,000.00 as loss of

income, and P25,000.00 as moral damages;
f.
to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of P19,800.47 as medical expenses, P800.00

for loss of income, and P25,000.00 as moral damages;
g.
to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of P580.81 as medical expenses, P4,600.00 as

actual damages and her loss earnings of P1,400.00 as well as moral damages in the
amount of P10,000.00;
h.
to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of P12,473.82 as hospital expenses, P14,530.00 as

doctors fees, P1,000.00 for medicines andP50,000.00 as moral damages;
i.
to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of P155.00 for medical expenses, P87.00 for
medicines, P1,710.00 as actual damages andP5,000.00 as moral damages;
j.
to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of P1,395.00 for hospital bills, P500.00 for
medicine, P2,100.00 as actual damages, P1,200.00 for loss of income and P5,000.00
as moral damages;
k.
to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner of the Toyota Hi-Ace Van, the
amount of P250,000.00 as actual damages for the cost of the totally wrecked vehicle;
to the owner of the jeepney, the amount of P22,698.38 as actual damages;
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:

On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was found guilty and convicted of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to
property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days
to six (6) years, and to pay damages as follows:
a.
to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his
death, plus the sum of P25,383.00, for funeral expenses, his unearned income for one
year at P2,500.00 a month, P50,000.00 as indemnity for the support of Renato Torres,
and the further sum of P300,000.00 as moral damages;
b.
to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death,
the sum of P237,323.75 for funeral expenses, her unearned income for three years
at P45,000.00 per annum, and the further sum of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages
andP200,000.00 as attorneys fees[;]
c.
to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death,
the sum of P22,838.00 as funeral expenses, the sum of P20,544.94 as medical
expenses and her loss of income for 30 years at P1,000.00 per month, and the further
sum ofP100,000.00 for moral damages;
d.
to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of P229,654.00 as hospital expenses, doctors fees

of P170,000.00 for the orthopedic surgeon,P22,500.00 for the [n]eurologist, an
additional indemnity [of] at least P150,000.00 to cover future correction of deformity of
her limbs, and moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00;
The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall be liable for the
civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mention[ing] that Section 8,
Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel
for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by [petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was denied
by the trial court. We affirmed the denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf of accused.
27
Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial
court. On April 29, 1997, the trial court gave due course to [petitioners] notice of appeal. On December
8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its brief. On December 9, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General received [a]
copy of [petitioners] brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved to be excused from filing [respondents]
brief on the ground that the OSGs authority to represent People is confined to criminal cases on
appeal. The motion was however denied per Our resolution of May 31, 1999. On March 2, 1999,
[respondent]/private prosecutor filed the instant motion to dismiss.[6] (Citations omitted)
There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an adjunct to Item A.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Propriety of Appeal by the Employer
The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action
arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the
employers subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes
conclusive and enforceable.
Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC Decision, petitioner
contends that the judgment of conviction against the accused-employee has not attained finality. The
former insists that its appeal stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had jumped
bail. In effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of that of the accused-employee.
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute independently the civil liability
fixed in the criminal case against the accused-employee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final
judgment. Since the notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been dismissed by the CA, then
the judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became final and executory. Included in the
civil liability of the accused was the employers subsidiary liability.
Hence, this Petition.[7]
The Issues
Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:
A.
Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accusedemployee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.
B.
Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of Appeals (158 SCRA 57) and Yusay v.
Adil (164 SCRA 494) apply to the instant case.[8]
We are not persuaded.

Appeals in Criminal Cases
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states thus:
Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double
jeopardy.
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but the government
may do so only if the accused would not thereby be placed in double jeopardy. [9] Furthermore, the
prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that the accused should have been given a more severe
penalty.[10] On the other hand, the offended parties may also appeal the judgment with respect to their
right to civil liability. If the accused has the right to appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended
parties should have the same right to appeal as much of the judgment as is prejudicial to them.[11]
Appeal by the Accused
28
TORTS & DAMAGES 29

Who Jumps Bail

Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court may, upon motion
or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. The second
paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal.[12]
This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they
abscond. Unless they surrender or submit to the courts jurisdiction, they are deemed to have waived
their right to seek judicial relief.[13]
Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail during the appeal, but also
to one who does so during the trial. Justice Florenz D. Regalado succinctly explains the principle in this
wise:
x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his arraignment and during the trial, but the
trial in absentia proceeded resulting in the promulgation of a judgment against him and his counsel
appealed, since he nonetheless remained at large his appeal must be dismissed by analogy with the
aforesaid provision of this Rule [Rule 124, 8 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure]. x x x[14]
The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to the
jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment against
them.[15] While at large, they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to have waived the
appeal.[16]
Finality of a Decision
in a Criminal Case
As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7 of Rule 120 of the
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:
A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes
final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes
final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or
totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied
for probation.
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper
authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him
has become final and executory.[17]
Liability of an Employer
in a Finding of Guilt
Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers, as
follows:
In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or
corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a
violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been
committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their
houses from guests lodging therein, or for payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall
have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such
goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his
representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability
shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the
innkeepers employees.
29
Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to Article 103 which
reads:
The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers,
persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants,
pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now address the main issue raised by
petitioner.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same act or
omission.[24]
in the Criminal Prosecution

At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil
actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
xxx
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the
criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the crime
charged does not extinguish the right to bring such action.
Civil Liability Deemed Instituted
x x x
It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions and
allowed these to proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles
32,[20] 33,[21]34[22] and 2176[23] of the Civil Code shall remain separate, distinct and independent of any
criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct consequences of such revision and
omission:
x x x
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted
in a criminal action, that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. [18] Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of
the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of
the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.[19]
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or
delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or
quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal
prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still
intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.[25]
This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which states that [e]very
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.[26]
Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal case and is
conclusively bound by the outcome thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be accorded the right to
pursue the case to its logical conclusion -- including the appeal.
The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal case,
which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee.
In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing with the subsidiary
liability of employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can be applied to it, because in all th[o]se cases,
30
TORTS & DAMAGES 31

the accuseds employer did not interpose an appeal. [27] Indeed, petitioner cannot cite any single case in
which the employer appealed, precisely because an appeal in such circumstances is not possible.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly
speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. [28] Although in
substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their
subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latters lawyers,
as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the
accused.
Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard
Against Double Jeopardy
Petitioners appeal obviously aims to have the accused-employee absolved of his criminal
responsibility and the judgment reviewed as a whole. These intentions are apparent from its Appellants
Brief[29] filed with the CA and from its Petition[30] before us, both of which claim that the trial courts finding
of guilt is not supported by competent evidence.[31]
An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the constitutional safeguard
against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to a review by the appellate court. The latter
is then called upon to render judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to
the appellant.[32] This is the risk involved when the accused decides to appeal a sentence of conviction.
[33]
Indeed, appellate courts have the power to reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lower court
and to increase or reduce the penalty it imposed.[34]
If the present appeal is given course, the whole case against the accused-employee becomes
open to review. It thus follows that a penalty higher than that which has already been imposed by the
trial court may be meted out to him. Petitioners appeal would thus violate his right against double
jeopardy, since the judgment against him could become subject to modification without his consent.
We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why the accused effectively waived his right
to appeal by jumping bail. It is clear, though, that petitioner may not appeal without violating his right
against double jeopardy.
Effect of Absconding
on the Appeal Process
Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure, the
accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of the court
below final.[35] Having been a fugitive from justice for a long period of time, he is deemed to have waived
his right to appeal. Thus, his conviction is now final and executory. The Court in People v. Ang
Gioc[36] ruled:
There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but the right
of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of
it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees
after the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right
to appeal from the judgment rendered against him. x x x.[37]
By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the court and placed himself
in a position to speculate on his chances for a reversal. In the process, he kept himself out of the reach
of justice, but hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his option.[38] Such conduct is intolerable and
does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court.[39]
Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who refuses to surrender to
the proper authorities becomes final and executory.[40]
Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the criminal case against the
accused-employee; that by jumping bail, he has waived his right to appeal; and that the judgment in the
criminal case against him is now final.
Subsidiary Liability
31
Upon Finality of Judgment

As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Petitioner argues that the
rulings of this Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc.,[41] Alvarez v. CA[42] and Yusay v.
Adil[43] do not apply to the present case, because it has followed the Courts directive to the employers in
these cases to take part in the criminal cases against their employees. By participating in the defense
of its employee, herein petitioner tries to shield itself from the undisputed rulings laid down in these
leading cases.
Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary liability, petitioner lost track
of the most basic tenet they have laid down -- that an employers liability in a finding of guilt against its
accused-employee is subsidiary.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated
civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latters insolvency. [44] The provisions of the Revised
Penal Code on subsidiary liability -- Articles 102 and 103 -- are deemed written into the judgments in the
cases to which they are applicable.[45] Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need
not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.
In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended party, the
judgment of conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable. [46] In effect and implication, the
stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.[47]
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to
amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. [48] By the same token, to allow
them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the latters consent would also
result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the
employer not only with regard to the formers civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability
of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.[49]
Before the employers subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be adequate evidence
establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees; (2) that the former are
engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the employees in the discharge
of their duties; and (4) that the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency.[50]
The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil action. But the determination
must be based on the evidence that the offended party and the employer may fully and freely
present. Such determination may be done in the same criminal action in which the employees liability,
criminal and civil, has been pronounced;[51] and in a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due notice
to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of the judgment.
Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its accused-employee does not
mean that its liability has transformed its nature; its liability remains subsidiary. Neither will its
participation erase its subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since the accused-employees conviction
has attained finality, then the subsidiary liability of the employer ipso facto attaches.
According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the finality of conviction could
be the proper sanction to be imposed upon the accused for jumping bail, the same sanction should not
affect it. In effect, petitioner-employer splits this case into two: first, for itself; and second, for its
accused-employee.
The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one criminal case against the
accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both criminal and civil aspects. It is the height of absurdity for
this single case to be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity whose liability is
dependent upon the conviction of the former.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of
the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by reason
of his flight, then the formers subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately
enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent
on the imposition of the primary civil liability.
No Deprivation
of Due Process
32
TORTS & DAMAGES 33

As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we reiterate that what is sought to
be enforced is the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon the employees criminal
negligence. In other words, the employer becomes ipso factosubsidiarily liable upon the conviction of
the employee and upon proof of the latters insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only
his primary civil liability, but also his employers subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence.[52]
It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process.
It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin, a remedy that may be exercised only in the
manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing such exercise. [54]Hence, the legal requirements
must be strictly complied with.[55]
[53]
It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the rules on appeal as merely harmless and
trivial technicalities that can be discarded.[56] Indeed, deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated. [57] In
these times when court dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, such rules have to be followed by
parties with greater fidelity, so as to facilitate the orderly disposition of those cases.[58]
After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. If the proper
losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, then the former has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.[59]
In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it participated in the proceedings
before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the employer was deprived of due process. It might have
lost its right to appeal, but it was not denied its day in court. [60] In fact, it can be said that by jumping bail,
the accused-employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of the right to appeal.
All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the accused. It should be
clear that only after proof of his insolvency may the subsidiary liability of petitioner be enforced. It has
been sufficiently proven that there exists an employer-employee relationship; that the employer is
engaged in some kind of industry; and that the employee has been adjudged guilty of the wrongful act
and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. The proof is clear from the
admissions of petitioner that [o]n 26 August 1990, while on its regular trip from Laoag to Manila,
a passenger bus owned by petitioner, being then operated by petitioners driver, Napoleon
Roman, figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union x x x.[61] Neither does petitioner dispute that there
was already a finding of guilt against the accused while he was in the discharge of his duties.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150157
January 25, 2007
MAURICIO
MANLICLIC
and
PHILIPPINE
vs.
MODESTO CALAUNAN, Respondent.
RABBIT
BUS
LINES,
INC., Petitioners,
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 which affirmed in
toto the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 42, in Civil Case No. D10086, finding petitioners Mauricio Manliclic and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) solidarily
liable to pay damages and attorneys fees to respondent Modesto Calaunan.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate number CVD-478,
owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep with
plate number PER-290, owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza.
33
At around 6:00 to 7:00 oclock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan, together with
Marcelo Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-type jeep. The
Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for Manila from Concepcion, Tarlac. At approximately
Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles
collided. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the
latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further extensive
damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of collision.
Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was first brought for treatment to the
Manila Central University Hospital in Kalookan City by Oscar Buan, the conductor of the Philippine
Rabbit Bus, and was later transferred to the Veterans Memorial Medical Center.
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, charging
petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries,
docketed as Crim. Case No. 684-M-89. Subsequently on 2 December 1991, respondent filed a
complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI before the RTC of Dagupan City,
docketed as Civil Case No. D-10086. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case. Among those
who testified in the criminal case were respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos.
In the civil case (now before this Court), the parties admitted the following:
1. The parties agreed on the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued as well as the venue
and the identities of the vehicles involved;
2. The identity of the drivers and the fact that they are duly licensed;
3. The date and place of the vehicular collision;
4. The extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiff Modesto Calaunan and the existence of the
medical certificate;
5. That both vehicles were going towards the south; the private jeep being ahead of the bus;
6. That the weather was fair and the road was well paved and straight, although there was a
ditch on the right side where the jeep fell into.3
When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic notes
(TSNs)4 of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the
criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as much as these witnesses are not available
to testify in the civil case.
Francisco Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent Calaunan, left for abroad sometime in
November, 1989 and has not returned since then. Rogelio Ramos took the stand and said that his
brother, Fernando Ramos, left for Amman, Jordan, to work. Rosalia Mendoza testified that her husband,
Marcelo Mendoza, left their residence to look for a job. She narrated that she thought her husband went
to his hometown in Panique, Tarlac, when he did not return after one month. She went to her husbands
hometown to look for him but she was informed that he did not go there.1awphil.net
The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch 8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, the court where
Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was tried, to bring the TSNs of the testimonies of respondent
Calaunan,5 Marcelo Mendoza6 and Fernando Ramos7 in said case, together with other documentary
evidence marked therein. Instead of the Branch Clerk of Court, it was Enrique Santos Guevara, Court
Interpreter, who appeared before the court and identified the TSNs of the three afore-named witnesses
and other pertinent documents he had brought.8 Counsel for respondent wanted to mark other TSNs
and documents from the said criminal case to be adopted in the instant case, but since the same were
not brought to the trial court, counsel for petitioners compromised that said TSNs and documents could
be offered by counsel for respondent as rebuttal evidence.
For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus conductor Oscar Buan testified. The TSN 9 of the
testimony of Donato Ganiban, investigator of the PRBLI, in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was marked
and allowed to be adopted in the civil case on the ground that he was already dead.
Respondent further marked, among other documents, as rebuttal evidence, the TSNs 10 of the
testimonies of Donato Ganiban, Oscar Buan and petitioner Manliclic in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89.
The disagreement arises from the question: Who is to be held liable for the collision?
34
TORTS & DAMAGES 35

Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic who should be liable while the latter is resolute in saying it
was the former who caused the smash up.
The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:
The parties differed only on the manner the collision between the two (2) vehicles took place. According
to the plaintiff and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per hour on the
slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of
overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side. At the time the
Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other words, the Philippine
Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit. Fernando Ramos corroborated the
testimony of the plaintiff and Marcelo Mendoza. He said that he was on another jeep following the
Philippine Rabbit Bus and the jeep of plaintiff when the incident took place. He said, the jeep of the
plaintiff overtook them and the said jeep of the plaintiff was followed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus which
was running very fast. The bus also overtook the jeep in which he was riding. After that, he heard a loud
sound. He saw the jeep of the plaintiff swerved to the right on a grassy portion of the road. The
Philippine Rabbit Bus stopped and they overtook the Philippine Rabbit Bus so that it could not moved
(sic), meaning they stopped in front of the Philippine Rabbit Bus. He testified that the jeep of plaintiff
swerved to the right because it was bumped by the Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.
Both Mauricio Manliclic and his driver, Oscar Buan admitted that the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the
jeep in question. However, they explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to the left
lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it was to overtake another jeep in
front of it. Such was their testimony before the RTC in Malolos in the criminal case and before this Court
in the instant case. [Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place was
correct, would be determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent in the operation of their
respective vehicles.]11
Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of its employee, specifically petitioner Manliclic.
On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent Calaunan and against
petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the
said defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and solidarily the amount of P40,838.00 as actual damages for the
towing as well as the repair and the materials used for the repair of the jeep in question; P100,000.00 as
moral damages and another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and P15,000.00 as attorneys fees,
including appearance fees of the lawyer. In addition, the defendants are also to pay costs.12
Petitioners appealed the decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals.13
In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the Court of Appeals, finding no reversible error in the decision
of the trial court, affirmed it in all respects.14
Petitioners are now before us by way of petition for review assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals.
They assign as errors the following:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS
QUESTIONABLE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF THE TSNs AND OTHER DOCUMENTS
PRESENTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
II
RELIANCE ON THE VERSION OF THE RESPONDENT ON HOW THE ACCIDENT SUPPOSEDLY
OCCURRED.
III
UNFAIR DISREGARD OF HEREIN PETITIONER PRBLs DEFENSE OF EXERCISE OF DUE
DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS EMPLOYEES.
IV
35
QUESTIONABLE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEE.
With the passing away of respondent Calaunan during the pendency of this appeal with this Court, we
granted the Motion for the Substitution of Respondent filed by his wife, Mrs. Precila Zarate Vda. De
Calaunan, and children, Virgilio Calaunan, Carmelita Honeycomb, Evelyn Calaunan, Marko Calaunan
and Liwayway Calaunan.15
In their Reply to respondents Comment, petitioners informed this Court of a Decision 16 of the Court of
Appeals acquitting petitioner Manliclic of the charge17 of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property with Physical Injuries attaching thereto a photocopy thereof.
On the first assigned error, petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent
Calaunan,18Marcelo Mendoza19 and Fernando Ramos20 should not be admitted in evidence for failure of
respondent to comply with the requisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
For Section 47, Rule 13021 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or
unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the former case
involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the
issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case; and (e)
the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case.22
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the Rules for a
testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had no opportunity to crossexamine the three witnesses in said case. The criminal case was filed exclusively against petitioner
Manliclic, petitioner PRBLIs employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers
uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their
employees.23
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, the testimonies of
the three witnesses are still admissible on the ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their
admissibility.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is
offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is
merely a privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does
not conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti
that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of failure to object thereto, the
same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted. 24 Hearsay
evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is made thereto, it
is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it deserves.25
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent
Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case when the same were offered in
evidence in the trial court. In fact, the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were admitted
by both petitioners.26 Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in evidence the TSN containing the
testimony of Donato Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI argues that the TSNs of the
testimonies of plaintiffs witnesses in the criminal case should not be admitted in the instant case, why
then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban which was given in the criminal case? It appears
that petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat it too. It cannot argue that the TSNs of the
testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse party in the criminal case should not be admitted and at the
same time insist that the TSN of the testimony of the witness for the accused be admitted in its favor. To
disallow admission in evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and
Fernando Ramos in the criminal case and to admit the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban would be unfair.
We do not subscribe to petitioner PRBLIs argument that it will be denied due process when the TSNs of
the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case are to be
admitted in the civil case. It is too late for petitioner PRBLI to raise denial of due process in relation to
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSNs.
For failure to object at the proper time, it waived its right to object that the TSNs did not comply with
Section 47.
In Mangio v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court, through Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno,28 admitted in
evidence a TSN of the testimony of a witness in another case despite therein petitioners assertion that
he would be denied due process. In admitting the TSN, the Court ruled that the raising of denial of due
process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the
36
TORTS & DAMAGES 37

admissibility of the TSN was belatedly done. In so doing, therein petitioner waived his right to object
based on said ground.
Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal case should not have been admitted in the instant
civil case because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to "testimony or deposition." We find such
contention to be untenable. Though said section speaks only of testimony and deposition, it does not
mean that documents from a former case or proceeding cannot be admitted. Said documents can be
admitted they being part of the testimonies of witnesses that have been admitted. Accordingly, they shall
be given the same weight as that to which the testimony may be entitled.29
On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that the version of petitioner Manliclic as to how the
accident occurred is more credible than respondents version. They anchor their contention on the fact
that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted by the Court of Appeals of the charge of Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.
"6. That as a result of the impact of the collision the above-described motor vehicle was forced
off the North Luzon Express Way towards the rightside where it fell on its drivers side on a
ditch, and that as a consequence, the above-described motor vehicle which maybe valued at
EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS (P80,000) was rendered a total wreck as shown by pictures to
be presented during the pre-trial and trial of this case;
"7. That also as a result of said incident, plaintiff sustained bodily injuries which compounded
plaintiffs frail physical condition and required his hospitalization from July 12, 1988 up to and
until July 22, 1988, copy of the medical certificate is hereto attached as Annex "A" and made
an integral part hereof;
"8. That the vehicular collision resulting in the total wreckage of the above-described motor
vehicle as well as bodily (sic) sustained by plaintiff, was solely due to the reckless imprudence
of the defendant driver Mauricio Manliclic who drove his Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 at a fast
speed without due regard or observance of existing traffic rules and regulations;
To be resolved by the Court is the effect of petitioner Manliclics acquittal in the civil case.
From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one arising from, or based
on, quasi-delict.30 Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence or reckless imprudence in causing the
collision, while petitioner PRBLI was sued for its failure to exercise the diligence of a good father in the
selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. The allegations read:
"4. That sometime on July 12, 1988 at around 6:20 A.M. plaintiff was on board the abovedescribed motor vehicle travelling at a moderate speed along the North Luzon Expressway
heading South towards Manila together with MARCELO MENDOZA, who was then driving the
same;
"5. That approximately at kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Express Way, the above-described
motor vehicle was suddenly bumped from behind by a Philippine Rabbit Bus with Body No. 353
and with plate No. CVD 478 then being driven by one Mauricio Manliclic of San Jose,
Concepcion, Tarlac, who was then travelling recklessly at a very fast speed and had apparently
lost control of his vehicle;
"9. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Line Corporation failed to exercise the diligence of a
good father of (sic) family in the selection and supervision of its drivers; x x x"31
Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be found negligent notwithstanding the declaration
of the Court of Appeals that there was an absence of negligence on his part?
In exonerating petitioner Manliclic in the criminal case, the Court of Appeals said:
To the following findings of the court a quo, to wit: that accused-appellant was negligent "when the bus
he was driving bumped the jeep from behind"; that "the proximate cause of the accident was his having
driven the bus at a great speed while closely following the jeep"; x x x
We do not agree.
The swerving of Calaunans jeep when it tried to overtake the vehicle in front of it was beyond the
control of accused-appellant.
37
xxxx
Absent evidence of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant cannot be held liable for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries as defined in Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code.32
From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted
not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not the author of the act complained of which is
based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The afore-quoted section
applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action arising from quasidelict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111 [now
Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is
not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused.33
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity
all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction
exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa
extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime
under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil
Code.34 It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty,
does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.35
In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising
from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted
on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration
in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the
door to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or
delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if
any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an
acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or
omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.36 An
acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case 37 based on quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana.
Petitioners ask us to give credence to their version of how the collision occurred and to disregard that of
respondents. Petitioners insist that while the PRBLI bus was in the process of overtaking respondents
jeep, the latter, without warning, suddenly swerved to the left (fast) lane in order to overtake another
jeep ahead of it, thus causing the collision.
As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for review. The factual findings of the
trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive on the Supreme
Court.38 Not being a trier of facts, this Court will not allow a review thereof unless:
(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based
on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.39
After going over the evidence on record, we do not find any of the exceptions that would warrant our
departure from the general rule. We fully agree in the finding of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, that it was petitioner Manliclic who was negligent in driving the PRBLI bus which was the
cause of the collision. In giving credence to the version of the respondent, the trial court has this say:
38
TORTS & DAMAGES 39

x x x Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place was correct, would be
determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent in the operation of their respective vehicle.
In this regard, it should be noted that in the statement of Mauricio Manliclic (Exh. 15) given to the
Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading no mention was made by him about the fact that the driver
of the jeep was overtaking another jeep when the collision took place. The allegation that another jeep
was being overtaken by the jeep of Calaunan was testified to by him only in Crim. Case No. 684-M-89
before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan and before this Court. Evidently, it was a product of
an afterthought on the part of Mauricio Manliclic so that he could explain why he should not be held
responsible for the incident. His attempt to veer away from the truth was also apparent when it would be
considered that in his statement given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading (Exh. 15), he
alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep of Calaunan while the Philippine Rabbit Bus was
behind the said jeep. In his testimony before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan as well as in
this Court, he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already on the left side of the jeep when the
collision took place. For this inconsistency between his statement and testimony, his explanation
regarding the manner of how the collision between the jeep and the bus took place should be taken with
caution. It might be true that in the statement of Oscar Buan given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator
CV Cabading, it was mentioned by the former that the jeep of plaintiff was in the act of overtaking
another jeep when the collision between the latter jeep and the Philippine Rabbit Bus took place. But the
fact, however, that his statement was given on July 15, 1988, one day after Mauricio Manliclic gave his
statement should not escape attention. The one-day difference between the giving of the two statements
would be significant enough to entertain the possibility of Oscar Buan having received legal advise
before giving his statement. Apart from that, as between his statement and the statement of Manliclic
himself, the statement of the latter should prevail. Besides, in his Affidavit of March 10, 1989, (Exh. 14),
the unreliability of the statement of Oscar Buan (Exh. 13) given to CV Cabading rear its "ugly head"
when he did not mention in said affidavit that the jeep of Calaunan was trying to overtake another jeep
when the collision between the jeep in question and the Philippine Rabbit bus took place.
rear. Furthermore, the jeep should have fallen on the road itself rather than having been forced off the
road. Useless, likewise to emphasize that the Philippine Rabbit was running very fast as testified to by
Ramos which was not controverted by the defendants.40
Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclics negligence that caused the smash up, there arises the juris
tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the
diligence of a good father of a family.41 Under Article 218042 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is
caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and
immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing
of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove
that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employee.43
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the required diligence in
the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. In the matter of
selection, it showed the screening process that petitioner Manliclic underwent before he became a
regular driver. As to the exercise of due diligence in the supervision of its employees, it argues that
presence of ready investigators (Ganiban and Cabading) is sufficient proof that it exercised the required
due diligence in the supervision of its employees.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of employees, the employer must
formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary
measures for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof,
including documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that was incumbent on them.44
xxxx
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,45 it was explained that:
If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic, and his conductor, Oscar Buan,
that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already somewhat parallel to the jeep when the collision took place,
the point of collision on the jeep should have been somewhat on the left side thereof rather than on its
Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the formulation of suitable
rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for
the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its
39
employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or
as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial
to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance
with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors
who should regularly report on their supervisory functions.
In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed
sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and
policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of
negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not
only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation of
the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without anything more, is decidedly not
sufficient to overcome such presumption.
We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that "the formulation of various
company policies on safety without showing that they were being complied with is not sufficient to
exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence of its employees. It is incumbent upon petitioner
to show that in recruiting and employing the erring driver the recruitment procedures and company
policies on efficiency and safety were followed." x x x.
The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection but not in the supervision of its employees. It expounded as follows:
From the evidence of the defendants, it seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines has a very good
procedure of recruiting its driver as well as in the maintenance of its vehicles. There is no evidence
though that it is as good in the supervision of its personnel. There has been no iota of evidence
introduced by it that there are rules promulgated by the bus company regarding the safe operation of its
vehicle and in the way its driver should manage and operate the vehicles assigned to them. There is no
showing that somebody in the bus company has been employed to oversee how its driver should
behave while operating their vehicles without courting incidents similar to the herein case. In regard to
supervision, it is not difficult to observe that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. has been negligent as
an employer and it should be made responsible for the acts of its employees, particularly the driver
involved in this case.
We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident is not enough to
exempt petitioner PRBLI from liability arising from the negligence of petitioner Manliclic. Same does not
comply with the guidelines set forth in the cases above-mentioned. The presence of the investigators
after the accident is not enough supervision. Regular supervision of employees, that is, prior to any
accident, should have been shown and established. This, petitioner failed to do. The lack of supervision
can further be seen by the fact that there is only one set of manual containing the rules and regulations
for all the drivers of PRBLI. 46 How then can all the drivers of petitioner PRBLI know and be continually
informed of the rules and regulations when only one manual is being lent to all the drivers?
For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the damages caused by
petitioner Manliclics negligence.
We now go to the award of damages. The trial court correctly awarded the amount of P40,838.00 as
actual damages representing the amount paid by respondent for the towing and repair of his jeep. 47 As
regards the awards for moral and exemplary damages, same, under the circumstances, must be
modified. The P100,000.00 awarded by the trial court as moral damages must be reduced
to P50,000.00.48 Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public
good.49 The amount awarded by the trial court must, likewise, be lowered toP50,000.00.50 The award
of P15,000.00 for attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is in order and authorized by law.51
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1) the award of
moral damages shall be reduced to P50,000.00; and (2) the award of exemplary damages shall be
lowered to P50,000.00. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-21438
September 28, 1966
AIR
FRANCE, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
40
TORTS & DAMAGES 41

Lichauco,
Picazo
and
Agcaoili
Bengzon Villegas and Zarraga for respondent R. Carrascoso.
for
petitioner.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso
P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the
difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these
various amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus
P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket
from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs
against petitioner.
The case is now before us for review on certiorari.
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported by the evidence of record", are:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for
Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air
Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From
Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the
defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because,
in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager
alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff,
as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken
over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of
the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr.
Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to
Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" (Transcript, p.
12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.3
1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the findings" 4 of respondent Court of
Appeals. Petitioner charges that respondent court failed to make complete findings of fact on all the
issues properly laid before it. We are asked to consider facts favorable to petitioner, and then, to
overturn the appellate court's decision.
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be rendered by any court of
record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based". 5 This
is echoed in the statutory demand that a judgment determining the merits of the case shall state "clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based"; 6 and that "Every decision of the Court of
Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before it". 7
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct attack. 8 The law, however,
solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is
drawn. 9 A court of justice is not hidebound to write in its decision every bit and piece of
evidence 10 presented by one party and the other upon the issues raised. Neither is it to be burdened
with the obligation "to specify in the sentence the facts"which a party "considered as proved". 11 This is
but a part of the mental process from which the Court draws the essential ultimate facts. A decision is
not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long as the decision
of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is no error for said
court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the defense".
Because as this Court well observed, "There is no law that so requires". 12 Indeed, "the mere failure to
specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them is
not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and the
Constitution". It is in this setting that inManigque, it was held that the mere fact that the findings "were
based entirely on the evidence for the prosecution without taking into consideration or even mentioning
the appellant's side in the controversy as shown by his own testimony", would not vitiate the
judgment. 13 If the court did not recite in the decision the testimony of each witness for, or each item of
evidence presented by, the defeated party, it does not mean that the court has overlooked such
testimony or such item of evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal presumptions are that official duty has been
41
regularly performed, and that all the matters within an issue in a case were laid before the court and
passed upon by it. 15
Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class ticket was no
guarantee that the passenger to whom the same had been issued, would be accommodated in
the first-class compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to make arrangements
upon arrival at every station for the necessary first-class reservation. We are not impressed by
such a reasoning. We cannot understand how a reputable firm like defendant airplane
company could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It
received the corresponding amount in payment of first-class tickets and yet it allowed the
passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of
business that the company should know whether or riot the tickets it issues are to be honored
or not.22
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe defined as "the written
statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court ... and essential to support the decision and
judgment rendered thereon". 16They consist of the court's "conclusions" with respect to the
determinative facts in issue". 17 A question of law, upon the other hand, has been declared as "one
which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties." 18
2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the
Court of Appeals. 19 That judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It is not appropriately the business of
this Court to alter the facts or to review the questions of fact. 20
With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
support its judgment.
Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of petitioner's contention, thus:
On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class" ticket, there can be no question. Apart
from his testimony, see plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-1", "B", "B-1," "B-2", "C" and "C-1", and defendant's
own witness, Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's testimony and testified as follows:
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what you know, what does this OK mean?
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a first class
ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and
agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first
class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a
first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend
upon the availability of first class seats.
A. That the space is confirmed.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in its brief before the Court
of Appeals under its third assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff
had confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first class seats on the "definite" segments of his journey,
particularly that from Saigon to Beirut". 21
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:
Q. Confirmed for first class?

A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169)
xxx
xxx
xxx
Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that
although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to
confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the testimony of said witnesses. Oral
evidence cannot prevail over written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l", "B", "B-l", "C" and "C-1"
belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first
class ticket without any reservation whatever.
42
TORTS & DAMAGES 43

Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the
reservation for a "first class" accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot believe
that after such confirmation defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff that the "first class" ticket
issued to him by defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong. 23
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of a few pesos in the amount
refunded on Carrascoso's ticket, the decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that such a judgment of affirmance has merged the
judgment of the lower court. 24Implicit in that affirmance is a determination by the Court of Appeals that
the proceeding in the Court of First Instance was free from prejudicial error and "all questions raised by
the assignments of error and all questions that might have been raised are to be regarded as finally
adjudicated against the appellant". So also, the judgment affirmed "must be regarded as free from all
error". 25 We reached this policy construction because nothing in the decision of the Court of Appeals on
this point would suggest that its findings of fact are in any way at war with those of the trial court. Nor
was said affirmance by the Court of Appeals upon a ground or grounds different from those which were
made the basis of the conclusions of the trial court. 26
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding
the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the
hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can a passenger have? It will always be an easy
matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say that
there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have
long learned that, as a rule, a written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be
notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier,
adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the case here. The lower courts refused to
believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket.
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there are facts upon which the
Court of Appeals predicated the finding that respondent Carrascoso had a first class ticket and was
entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg of the flight. 27 We
perceive no "welter of distortions by the Court of Appeals of petitioner's statement of its position", as
charged by petitioner. 28 Nor do we subscribe to petitioner's accusation that respondent Carrascoso
"surreptitiously took a first class seat to provoke an issue". 29And this because, as petitioner states,
Carrascoso went to see the Manager at his office in Bangkok "to confirm my seat and because from
Saigon I was told again to see the Manager". 30 Why, then, was he allowed to take a first class seat in
the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if another had a better right to the seat?
4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages. Petitioner's trenchant claim is that
Carrascoso's action is planted upon breach of contract; that to authorize an award for moral damages
there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith; 31 and that the decision of the Court of Appeals fails to
make a finding of bad faith. The pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing on this issue are:
3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the Philippine Air Lines for a
valuable consideration, the latter acting as general agents for and in behalf of the defendant,
under which said contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff, First
Class passage on defendant's plane during the entire duration of plaintiff's tour of Europe with
Hongkong as starting point up to and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila, ... .
4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon and from Saigon to
Bangkok, defendant furnished to the plaintiff First Class accommodation but only after
protestations, arguments and/or insistence were made by the plaintiff with defendant's
employees.
5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but instead furnished plaintiff
only TouristClass accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca, ... the plaintiff
has been compelled by defendant's employees to leave the First Class accommodation berths
at Bangkok after he was already seated.
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the inconvenience and
embarrassments brought by defendant's breach of contract was forced to take a Pan American
World Airways plane on his return trip from Madrid to Manila.32
xxx
xxx
xxx
2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class accommodations aforesaid,
plaintiff suffered inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff mental
43
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like injury, resulting in moral
damages in the amount of P30,000.00. 33
xxx
xxx
xxx
The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first
class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract was
breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was
bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation
berth "after he was already, seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he
suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that there
is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there, it
may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. 34 The contract was averred to
establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion.
Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial, respondent's counsel placed
petitioner on guard on what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in Bangkok,
Carrascoso was ousted by petitioner's manager who gave his seat to a white man; 35 and (b) evidence
of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection on the part of the petitioner.
It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint
to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence.
An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required. 36 On the question of bad faith,
the Court of Appeals declared:
That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane
belonging to the defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist
class not only without his consent but against his will, has been sufficiently established by
plaintiff in his testimony before the court, corroborated by the corresponding entry made by the
purser of the plane in his notebook which notation reads as follows:
"First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that
the captain refused to intervene",
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a co-passenger. The
captain of the plane who was asked by the manager of defendant company at Bangkok to
intervene even refused to do so. It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of defendant ever
contradicted or denied this evidence for the plaintiff. It could have been easy for defendant to
present its manager at Bangkok to testify at the trial of the case, or yet to secure his
disposition; but defendant did neither. 37
The Court of appeals further stated
Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white man.
Hence, if the employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him when all
the seats had already been taken, surely the plaintiff should not have been picked out as the
one to suffer the consequences and to be subjected to the humiliation and indignity of being
ejected from his seat in the presence of others. Instead of explaining to the white man the
improvidence committed by defendant's employees, the manager adopted the more drastic
step of ousting the plaintiff who was then safely ensconsced in his rightful seat. We are
strengthened in our belief that this probably was what happened there, by the testimony of
defendant's witness Rafael Altonaga who, when asked to explain the meaning of the letters
"O.K." appearing on the tickets of plaintiff, said "that the space is confirmed for first class.
Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another witness for defendant, who was the chief of the
Reservation Office of defendant, testified as follows:
"Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what reservation the
passenger has arranged with you?
A They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation." (t.s.n., p. 247, June 19,
1959)
In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has said on this point:
Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, "white man" have a
"better right" to the seat occupied by Mr. Carrascoso? The record is silent. The
defendant airline did not prove "any better", nay, any right on the part of the "white
44
TORTS & DAMAGES 45

man" to the "First class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying and for which he paid
and was issued a corresponding "first class" ticket.
seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for which the corresponding
"first class" ticket was issued by the defendant to him.40
If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant's Manager in Bangkok,
the defendant could have easily proven it by having taken the testimony of the said
Manager by deposition, but defendant did not do so; the presumption is that evidence
willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par (e), Rules of Court];
and, under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to find, as it does find, that the
Manager of the defendant airline in Bangkok not merely asked but threatened the
plaintiff to throw him out of the plane if he did not give up his "first class" seat because
the said Manager wanted to accommodate, using the words of the witness Ernesto G.
Cuento, the "white man".38
5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well
settled in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must
answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted portion first transcribed did not
use the term "bad faith". But can it be doubted that the recital of facts therein points to bad
faith? The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat;
worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the
humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to another
passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of
course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law. For, "bad
faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some
motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose." 39
6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation. 43 And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is
mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The
contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express finding of bad faith in the
judgment of the Court of First Instance, thus:
The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of transportation with
plaintiff in bad faith, with the aggravating circumstances that defendant's Manager in
Bangkok went to the extent of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many
passengers to have him thrown out of the airplane to give the "first class" seat that he
was occupying to, again using the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a "white
man" whom he (defendant's Manager) wished to accommodate, and the defendant
has not proven that this "white man" had any "better right" to occupy the "first class"
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the provisions
of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable. 42
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected
against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is,
that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an
action for damages against the carrier. 44
Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's check, it was a breach of contract
and a tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely notify her that
the check was worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection, though the language used was
not insulting and she was not ejected." 46 And this, because, although the relation of passenger and
carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be
also a tort". 47 And in another case, "Where a passenger on a railroad train, when the conductor came to
collect his fare tendered him the cash fare to a point where the train was scheduled not to stop, and told
him that as soon as the train reached such point he would pay the cash fare from that point to
45
destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger which justified the conductor in using
insulting language to him, as by calling him a lunatic," 48 and the Supreme Court of South Carolina there
held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said passenger.1awphl.nt
I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because the best evidence
would be the notes. Your Honor.
COURT
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action
as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner
air carrier a case ofquasi-delict. Damages are proper.
7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony, thus
Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser?
A When we left already that was already in the trip I could not help it. So one of the flight
attendants approached me and requested from me my ticket and I said, What for? and she
said, "We will note that you transferred to the tourist class". I said, "Nothing of that kind. That is
tantamount to accepting my transfer." And I also said, "You are not going to note anything there
because I am protesting to this transfer".
Q Was she able to note it?
A No, because I did not give my ticket.
Q About that purser?
A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you don't have enough leg
room, I stood up and I went to the pantry that was next to me and the purser was there. He told
me, "I have recorded the incident in my notebook." He read it and translated it to me
because it was recorded in French "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist
class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene."
Mr. VALTE
I will allow that as part of his testimony. 49

Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in his notebook
reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain
refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's testimony above] which is incompetent.
We do not think so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the
entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. 49a
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the
startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down.
Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. 50 For, they grow "out of
the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant". 51 The utterance of the
purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the
ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed.52 It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay
rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner. It would
have been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true
that no such entry was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant
exemplary damages in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that defendant should
have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." 53 The manner of
ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in
addition to moral damages.54
46
TORTS & DAMAGES 47

9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar
judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and
equitable that attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do not intend to break faith with the tradition that discretion
well exercised as it was here should not be disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals,
thus: P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and P3,000.00 as
attorneys' fees. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court. 56 The Court of Appeals
did not interfere with the same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto.
Because, the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof.57
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible error. We
accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, J.P., J., took no part.
G.R. No. 145804
February 6, 2003
LIGHT
RAIL
TRANSIT
AUTHORITY
&
RODOLFO
ROMAN, petitioners,
vs.
MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY
AGENCY, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The case before the Court is an appeal from the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals,
promulgated on 27 April 2000 and 10 October 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 60720, entitled
"Marjorie Navidad and Heirs of the Late Nicanor Navidad vs. Rodolfo Roman, et. al.," which has
modified the decision of 11 August 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 266, Pasig City, exonerating
Prudent Security Agency (Prudent) from liability and finding Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and
Rodolfo Roman liable for damages on account of the death of Nicanor Navidad.
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven oclock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk,
entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the fare). While
Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard
assigned to the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two
apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight
started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At
the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in.
Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.
On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with her
children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro
Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA and Roman
filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its
answer, denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision
of its security guards.
The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead of presenting
evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his
assigned task. On 11 August 1998, the trial court rendered its decision; it adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants
Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the
following:
"a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00;
2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00;
3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00;
47
"b) Moral damages of P50,000.00;

"c) Attorneys fees of P20,000;
"d) Costs of suit.
the death of Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim
and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the
train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman. The appellate court faulted
petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of
emergency brakes could not have stopped the train.
"The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are dismissed for lack of merit.
The appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000.
"The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are likewise dismissed."1
In their present recourse, petitioners recite alleged errors on the part of the appellate court; viz:
Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the appellate court promulgated its now
assailed decision exonerating Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead,
holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable thusly:
"I.
"WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby MODIFIED, by exonerating the appellants from any
liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad, Jr. Instead, appellees Rodolfo Roman and the Light Rail
Transit Authority (LRTA) are held liable for his death and are hereby directed to pay jointly and severally
to the plaintiffs-appellees, the following amounts:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED BY DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS OF

FACTS BY THE TRIAL COURT
"II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE
LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD, JR.
a) P44,830.00 as actual damages;

"III.
b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages;
c) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased; and
e) P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees."2
The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train, a
contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where
passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor. In
exempting Prudent from liability, the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN
IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA."3
Petitioners would contend that the appellate court ignored the evidence and the factual findings of the
trial court by holding them liable on the basis of a sweeping conclusion that the presumption of
negligence on the part of a common carrier was not overcome. Petitioners would insist that Escartins
assault upon Navidad, which caused the latter to fall on the tracks, was an act of a stranger that could
not have been foreseen or prevented. The LRTA would add that the appellate courts conclusion on the
existence of an employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA lacked basis because
Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA.
48
TORTS & DAMAGES 49

Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended that a contract of carriage was
deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of
the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation, and that the
appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise
extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier.
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for
reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety
of passengers.4 The Civil Code, governing the liability of a common carrier for death of or injury to its
passengers, provides:
"Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances.
"Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence
as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."
"Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the formers employees, although such employees may have acted beyond
the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
"This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees."
"Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the
willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carriers employees
through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the
act or omission."
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances.5 Such duty of a common carrier to provide
safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the
passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of
carriage.6 The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers
(a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of
other passengers or of strangers if the common carriers employees through the exercise of due
diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.7 In case of such death or injury, a carrier
is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and8 by simple proof of injury, the passenger is
relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the
burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force
majeure.9 In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which
petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has
been at fault,10 an exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved.11
The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim
arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of
the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier
may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm
to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the
contract of carriage.
Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the provisions
of Article 217612 and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180,13 of the Civil Code. The
premise, however, for the employers liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once
such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris
tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision
of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the
selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been shown. Absent such a
showing, one might ask further, how then must the liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and
an independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual
obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting
in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 219414 of the Civil Code can well apply.15 In
fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the
contract.16 Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself
49
constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the
contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.17
Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the late Nicanor Navidad, this
Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that "there is nothing to link (Prudent)
to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not
been duly proven x x x." This finding of the appellate court is not without substantial justification in our
own review of the records of the case.
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or
omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT
and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made
liable only for his own fault or negligence.
The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal damages are
adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant,
may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered by him.18 It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory
damages.19
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but only
in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved
from liability. No costs.
VITUG, J.:
Some time in October 1986, private respondent Luis A. Luna applied for, and was accorded, a
FAREASTCARD issued by petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Company ("FEBTC") at its Pasig Branch.
Upon his request, the bank also issued a supplemental card to private respondent Clarita S. Luna.
In August 1988, Clarita lost her credit card. FEBTC was forthwith informed. In order to replace the lost
card, Clarita submitted an affidavit of loss. In cases of this nature, the bank's internal security
procedures and policy would appear to be to meanwhile so record the lost card, along with the principal
card, as a "Hot Card" or "Cancelled Card" in its master file.
On 06 October 1988, Luis tendered a despedida lunch for a close friend, a Filipino-American, and
another guest at the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant of the Hotel Intercontinental Manila. To pay for the lunch,
Luis presented his FAREASTCARD to the attending waiter who promptly had it verified through a
telephone call to the bank's Credit Card Department. Since the card was not honored, Luis was forced
to pay in cash the bill amounting to P588.13. Naturally, Luis felt embarrassed by this incident.
In a letter, dated 11 October 1988, private respondent Luis Luna, through counsel, demanded from
FEBTC the payment of damages. Adrian V. Festejo, a vice-president of the bank, expressed the bank's
apologies to Luis. In his letter, dated 03 November 1988, Festejo, in part, said:
In cases when a card is reported to our office as lost, FAREASTCARD undertakes the
necessary action to avert its unauthorized use (such as tagging the card as hotlisted), as it is
always our intention to protect our cardholders.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108164 February 23, 1995
FAR
EAST
BANK
AND
TRUST
COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, LUIS A. LUNA and CLARITA S. LUNA, respondents.
An investigation of your case however, revealed that FAREASTCARD failed to inform you about
its security policy. Furthermore, an overzealous employee of the Bank's Credit Card
Department did not consider the possibility that it may have been you who was presenting the
card at that time (for which reason, the unfortunate incident occurred). 1
Festejo also sent a letter to the Manager of the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant to assure the latter that
private respondents were "very valued clients" of FEBTC. William Anthony King, Food and Beverage
Manager of the Intercontinental Hotel, wrote back to say that the credibility of private respondent had
never been "in question." A copy of this reply was sent to Luis by Festejo.
50
TORTS & DAMAGES 51

Still evidently feeling aggrieved, private respondents, on 05 December 1988, filed a complaint for
damages with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Pasig against FEBTC.
On 30 March 1990, the RTC of Pasig, given the foregoing factual settings, rendered a decision ordering
FEBTC to pay private respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 exemplary
damages; and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's fees.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, FEBTC has come to this Court
with this petition for review.
There is merit in this appeal.
In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in
bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract. 2 The Civil Code provides:
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the
court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule
applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
(Emphasis supplied)
Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence. 3 Exceptionally, in a contract
of carriage, moral damages are also allowed in case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault
(which is presumed 4) of the common carrier. 5
Concededly, the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own card's
cancellation. Nothing in the findings of the trial court and the appellate court, however, can sufficiently
indicate any deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to private respondents. Neither could
FEBTC's negligence in failing to give personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to
malice or bad faith.
Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest
purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. 6
We are not unaware of the previous rulings of this Court, such as in American Express International,
Inc., vs.Intermediate Appellate Court (167 SCRA 209) and Bank of Philippine Islands vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court (206 SCRA 408), sanctioning the application of Article 21, in relation to Article 2217 and
Article 2219 7 of the Civil Code to a contractual breach similar to the case at bench. Article 21 states:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 21 of the Code, it should be observed, contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. Thus, even
if we are to assume that the provision could properly relate to a breach of contract, its application can be
warranted only when the defendant's disregard of his contractual obligation is so deliberate as to
approximate a degree of misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or bad faith. Most importantly,
Article 21 is a mere declaration of a general principle in human relations that clearly must, in any case,
give way to the specific provision of Article 2220 of the Civil Code authorizing the grant of moral
damages in culpa contractual solely when the breach is due to fraud or bad faith.
Mr. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, in his ponencia in Fores vs. Miranda 8 explained with great clarity the
predominance that we should give to Article 2220 in contractual relations; we quote:
Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent, the same must be discarded.
We have repeatedly ruled (Cachero vs. Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. Inc., 101 Phil. 523; 54 Off.
Gaz., [26], 6599; Necesito, et al. vs. Paras, 104 Phil., 75; 56 Off. Gaz., [23] 4023), that moral
damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of the contract of
transportation, in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code, which provide as
follows:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
cases:
51
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 2220. Wilful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral
damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such
damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract
where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
the deceased" (Necesito vs. Paras, 104 Phil. 84, Resolution on motion to reconsider,
September 11, 1958). But the exceptional rule of Art. 1764 makes it all the more evident that
where the injured passenger does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it is
proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. We think it is clear that the mere
carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute or justify an inference of malice
or bad faith on the part of the carrier; and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of such
malice to support the award of moral damages by the Court of Appeals. To award moral
damages for breach of contract, therefore, without proof of bad faith or malice on the part of the
defendant, as required by Art. 2220, would be to violate the clear provisions of the law, and
constitute unwarranted judicial legislation.
By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it immediately becomes apparent that:
xxx xxx xxx
(a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud
(dolus), i.e., wanton or deliberately injurious conduct, is essential to justify an award of moral
damages; and
The distinction between fraud, bad faith or malice in the sense of deliberate or wanton wrong
doing and negligence (as mere carelessness) is too fundamental in our law to be ignored (Arts.
1170-1172); their consequences being clearly differentiated by the Code.
(b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the descriptive term "analogous
cases" used in Art. 2219; not only because Art. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that
are caused contractual breach, but because the definition of quasi-delict in Art. 2176 of the
Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a "preexisitng contractual relations between
the parties."
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the
obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural
and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the
parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the
obligation was constituted.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there

being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be
responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the nonperformance of the obligation.
The exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration is a mishap resulting in
the death of a passenger, in which case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly
subject to the rule of Art. 2206, that entitles the spouse, descendants and ascendants of the
deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of
It is to be presumed, in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, that this difference
was in the mind of the lawmakers when in Art. 2220 they limited recovery of moral damages to
breaches of contract in bad faith. It is true that negligence may be occasionally so gross as to
amount to malice; but the fact must be shown in evidence, and a carrier's bad faith is not to be
lightly inferred from a mere finding that the contract was breached through negligence of the
carrier's employees.
52
TORTS & DAMAGES 53

The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause for
breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort 9 even
where there is a pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant (Phil. Airlines vs. Court of
Appeals, 106 SCRA 143; Singson vs. Bank of Phil. Islands, 23 SCRA 1117; and Air France vs.
Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155). This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot improve private respondents' case for it
can aptly govern only where the act or omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort
independently of the contract. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of
a contract) can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act or
omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the parties are
contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private
respondents' damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship; without such
agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of
action or as an independent actionable tort.
The Court finds, therefore, the award of moral damages made by the court a quo, affirmed by the
appellate court, to be inordinate and substantially devoid of legal basis.
Nevertheless, the bank's failure, even perhaps inadvertent, to honor its credit card issued to private
respondent Luis should entitle him to recover a measure of damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of
the Civil Code providing thusly:
Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has
been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
Reasonable attorney's fees may be recovered where the court deems such recovery to be just and
equitable (Art. 2208, Civil Code). We see no issue of sound discretion on the part of the appellate court
in allowing the award thereof by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is given due course. The appealed decision is MODIFIED by
deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages to private respondents; in its stead, petitioner is
ordered to pay private respondent Luis A. Luna an amount of P5,000.00 by way of nominal damages. In
all other respects, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.
Exemplary or corrective damages, in turn, are intended to serve as an example or as correction for the
public good in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages (Art. 2229, Civil
Code; see Prudenciado vs. Alliance Transport System, 148 SCRA 440; Lopez vs. Pan American World
Airways, 16 SCRA 431). In criminal offenses, exemplary damages are imposed when the crime is
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances (Art. 2230, Civil Code). In quasi-delicts, such
damages are granted if the defendant is shown to have been so guilty of gross negligence as to
approximate malice (See Art. 2231, Civil Code; CLLC E.G. Gochangco Workers Union vs. NLRC, 161
SCRA 655; Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. vs. CA, 176 SCRA 778). Incontracts and quasicontracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant is found to have acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner (Art. 2232, Civil Code; PNB vs. Gen.
Acceptance and Finance Corp., 161 SCRA 449).
SO ORDERED.
Given the above premises and the factual circumstances here obtaining, it would also be just as
arduous to sustain the exemplary damages granted by the courts below (see De Leon vs. Court of
Appeals, 165 SCRA 166).
Padilla Law Office for private respondent.
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990

NATIVIDAD
V.
ANDAMO
and
EMMANUEL
R.
ANDAMO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and MISSIONARIES OF OUR
LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.
Lope E. Adriano for petitioners.
FERNAN, C.J.:
53
The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is whether a corporation, which
has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby
causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed
independently of the criminal case.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga
(Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La
Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were
constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown,
damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners
and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to
destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal Case No. TG-907-82, before
the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City), against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and
Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction by means of
inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against respondent corporation,
this time a civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748, for damages with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction before the same court. 1
On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and opposition to the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on the
land. However, on April 26, 1984, the trial court, acting on respondent corporation's motion to dismiss or
suspend the civil action, issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case No, TG-748 until
after judgment in the related Criminal Case No. TG-907-82.
Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 1984, the trial court issued on
August 27, 1984 the disputed order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 for lack of jurisdiction, as the
criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. Said order was anchored
on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil
actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has
been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the
criminal action." 2
Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court. 3
On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division, promulgated a
decision 4 affirming the questioned order of the trial court. 5 A motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated May 19, 1986. 6
Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748 in accordance with Section 3
(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend that the trial court and the Appellate Court
erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 since it is predicated on a quasi-delict. Petitioners have
raised a valid point.
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting the cause of action. 7 The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it,
including the period of prescription, is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action,
made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for
relief. 8 The nature of an action is not necessarily determined or controlled by its title or heading but the
body of the pleading or complaint itself. To avoid possible denial of substantial justice due to legal
technicalities, pleadings as well as remedial laws should be liberally construed so that the litigants may
have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims. 9
Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. TG-748:
4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso), Silang, Cavite,
adjacent on the right side of the aforesaid land of plaintiffs, defendant constructed
waterpaths starting from the middle-right portion thereof leading to a big hole or
opening, also constructed by defendant, thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-
54
TORTS & DAMAGES 55

blocks fence situated on the right side of its cemented gate fronting the provincial
highway, and connected by defendant to a man height inter-connected cement
culverts which were also constructed and lain by defendant cross-wise beneath the tip
of the said cemented gate, the left-end of the said inter-connected culverts again
connected by defendant to a big hole or opening thru the lower portion of the same
concrete hollowblocks fence on the left side of the said cemented gate, which hole or
opening is likewise connected by defendant to the cemented mouth of a big canal,
also constructed by defendant, which runs northward towards a big hole or opening
which was also built by defendant thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks
fence which separates the land of plaintiffs from that of defendant (and which serves
as the exit-point of the floodwater coming from the land of defendant, and at the same
time, the entrance-point of the same floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year after year,
during rainy or stormy seasons.
5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside the land of plaintiffs,
defendant also constructed an artificial lake, the base of which is soil, which utilizes
the water being channeled thereto from its water system thru inter-connected
galvanized iron pipes (No. 2) and complimented by rain water during rainy or stormy
seasons, so much so that the water below it seeps into, and the excess water above it
inundates, portions of the adjoining land of plaintiffs.
6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendant's aforementioned
water conductors, contrivances and manipulators, a young man was drowned to
death, while herein plaintiffs suffered and will continue to suffer, as follows:
a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded and converted to
deep, wide and long canals, such that the same can no longer be
planted to any crop or plant.
b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on several
occasions, washed away.
c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs and their
laborers are always in danger.
d) Plants and other improvements on other portions of the land of
plaintiffs are exposed to destruction. ... 10
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176
and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a)
damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are
alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection
between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if
proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code
and held that "any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or
communication between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing loss and damages to a third party
who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be
liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject of
the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that
petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances
built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to
the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or
negligence, and the causal connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing
contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code
provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a
55
third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have
mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so
as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to
build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all
reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual
and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a
third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or
omission constituting fault or negligence, thus:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but
also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate
civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and
found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually
charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality
only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. 13
The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and
"culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of
Spain ... 14
In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a
separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil liability
arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same
negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or
create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the
acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the
event of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not
exist, in which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil
liability.
In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely
independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no
logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the
result of the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless
the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court
affirming the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18 (Tagaytay City) dated
August 17, 1984 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to reinstate Civil
Case No. TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and Emmanuel R. Andamo vs. Missionaries of Our
Lady of La Salette Inc." and to proceed with the hearing of the case with dispatch. This decision is
immediately executory. Costs against respondent corporation.
SO ORDERED.
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight startling,
is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The
former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which
is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and
56
TORTS & DAMAGES 57

Mandaluyong City, Branch 212 is REINSTATED. Petitioner Jerome Castro is ACQUITTED of slight oral
Because the OSG did not raise errors of jurisdiction, the CA erred in taking cognizance of its petition
defamation as defined and penalized in Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code.
and, worse, in reviewing the factual findings of the RTC.[20] We therefore reinstate the RTC decision so
No pronouncement as to costs.
as not to offend the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

At most, petitioner could have been liable for damages under Article 26 of the Civil Code[21]:
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they
may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief:
xxx
xxx
G.R. No. 111127 July 26, 1996
xxx
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

xxx
xxx
SO ORDERED.
xxx
Petitioner is reminded that, as an educator, he is supposed to be a role model for the youth. As
such, he should always act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.[22]
MR.
&
MRS.
ENGRACIO
FABRE,
JR.
and
PORFIRIO
CABIL, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, THE WORD FOR THE WORLD CHRISTIAN FELLOWSHIP, INC., AMYLINE
ANTONIO, JOHN RICHARDS, GONZALO GONZALES, VICENTE V. QUE, JR., ICLI CORDOVA,
ARLENE GOJOCCO, ALBERTO ROXAS CORDERO, RICHARD BAUTISTA, JOCELYN GARCIA,
YOLANDA CORDOVA, NOEL ROQUE, EDWARD TAN, ERNESTO NARCISO, ENRIQUETA LOCSIN,
FRANCIS NORMAN O. LOPES, JULIUS CAESAR, GARCIA, ROSARIO MA. V. ORTIZ, MARIETTA C.
CLAVO, ELVIE SENIEL, ROSARIO MARA-MARA, TERESITA REGALA, MELINDA TORRES,
MARELLA MIJARES, JOSEFA CABATINGAN, MARA NADOC, DIANE MAYO, TESS PLATA,
MAYETTE JOCSON, ARLENE Y. MORTIZ, LIZA MAYO, CARLOS RANARIO, ROSAMARIA T.
RADOC and BERNADETTE FERRER, respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The August 29, 2007 decision and
December
5,
2007
resolution
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
in
CA-G.R.
SP
No.
98649
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The November 20, 2006 decision of the Regional Trial Court of
MENDOZA, J.:p
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 in CA-GR No. 28245,
dated September 30, 1992, which affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
57
Makati, Branch 58, ordering petitioners jointly and severally to pay damages to private respondent
Amyline Antonio, and its resolution which denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a 1982 model Mazda minibus. They used
the bus principally in connection with a bus service for school children which they operated in Manila.
The couple had a driver, Porfirio J. Cabil, whom they hired in 1981, after trying him out for two weeks,
His job was to take school children to and from the St. Scholastica's College in Malate, Manila.
On November 2, 1984 private respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc. (WWCF)
arranged with petitioners for the transportation of 33 members of its Young Adults Ministry from Manila
to La Union and back in consideration of which private respondent paid petitioners the amount of
P3,000.00.
The group was scheduled to leave on November 2, 1984, at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. However, as
several members of the party were late, the bus did not leave the Tropical Hut at the corner of Ortigas
Avenue and EDSA until 8:00 o'clock in the evening. Petitioner Porfirio Cabil drove the minibus.
The usual route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the bridge at Carmen
was under repair, sot hat petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area (it being his first trip to La
Union), was forced to take a detour through the town of Baay in Lingayen, Pangasinan. At 11:30 that
night, petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on the highway, running on a south to east direction,
which he described as "siete." The road was slippery because it was raining, causing the bus, which
was running at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road shoulder. The bus hit the left
traffic steel brace and sign along the road and rammed the fence of one Jesus Escano, then turned over
and landed on its left side, coming to a full stop only after a series of impacts. The bus came to rest off
the road. A coconut tree which it had hit fell on it and smashed its front portion.
Several passengers were injured. Private respondent Amyline Antonio was thrown on the floor of the
bus and pinned down by a wooden seat which came down by a wooden seat which came off after being
unscrewed. It took three persons to safely remove her from this portion. She was in great pain and could
not move.
because it was dark and there was no sign on the road. He said that he saw the curve when he was
already within 15 to 30 meters of it. He allegedly slowed down to 30 kilometers per hour, but it was too
late.
The Lingayen police investigated the incident the next day, November 3, 1984. On the basis of their
finding they filed a criminal complaint against the driver, Porfirio Cabil. The case was later filed with the
Lingayen Regional Trial Court. Petitioners Fabre paid Jesus Escano P1,500.00 for the damage to the
latter's fence. On the basis of Escano's affidavit of desistance the case against petitioners Fabre was
dismissed.
Amyline Antonio, who was seriously injured, brought this case in the RTC of Makati, Metro Manila. As a
result of the accident, she is now suffering from paraplegia and is permanently paralyzed from the waist
down. During the trial she described the operations she underwent and adduced evidence regarding the
cost of her treatment and therapy. Immediately after the accident, she was taken to the Nazareth
Hospital in Baay, Lingayen. As this hospital was not adequately equipped, she was transferred to the
Sto. Nio Hospital, also in the town of Ba-ay, where she was given sedatives. An x-ray was taken and
the damage to her spine was determined to be too severe to be treated there. She was therefore
brought to Manila, first to the Philippine General Hospital and later to the Makati Medical Center where
she underwent an operation to correct the dislocation of her spine.
In its decision dated April 17, 1989, the trial court found that:
No convincing evidence was shown that the minibus was properly checked for travel to a long distance
trip and that the driver was properly screened and tested before being admitted for employment. Indeed,
all the evidence presented have shown the negligent act of the defendants which ultimately resulted to
the accident subject of this case.
Accordingly, it gave judgment for private respondents holding:
Considering that plaintiffs Word for the World Christian Fellowship, Inc. and Ms. Amyline Antonio were
the only ones who adduced evidence in support of their claim for damages, the Court is therefore not in
a position to award damages to the other plaintiffs.
The driver, petitioner Cabil, claimed he did not see the curve until it was too late. He said he was not
familiar with the area and he could not have seen the curve despite the care he took in driving the bus,
58
TORTS & DAMAGES 59

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment against defendants Mr. & Mrs.
Engracio Fabre, Jr. and Porfirio Cabil y Jamil pursuant to articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines and said defendants are ordered to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs the following
amount:
1) P93,657.11 as compensatory and actual damages;
2) P500,000.00 as the reasonable amount of loss of earning capacity of plaintiff
Amyline Antonio;
3) P20,000.00 as moral damages;
4) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
6) Costs of suit.
The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner Cabil failed to exercise due care
and precaution in the operation of his vehicle considering the time and the place of the accident. The
Court of Appeals held that the Fabres were themselves presumptively negligent. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners raise the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS WERE NEGLIGENT.
II. WHETHER OF NOT PETITIONERS WERE LIABLE FOR THE
INJURIES SUFFERED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
III WHETHER OR NOT DAMAGES CAN BE AWARDED AND IN
THE POSITIVE, UP TO WHAT EXTENT.
5) 25% of the recoverable amount as attorney's fees;

6) Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with respect to Amyline Antonio but
dismissed it with respect to the other plaintiffs on the ground that they failed to prove their respective
claims. The Court of Appeals modified the award of damages as follows:
1) P93,657.11 as actual damages;
2) P600,000.00 as compensatory damages;
4) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
Petitioners challenge the propriety of the award of compensatory damages in the amount of
P600,000.00. It is insisted that, on the assumption that petitioners are liable an award of P600,000.00 is
unconscionable and highly speculative. Amyline Antonio testified that she was a casual employee of a
company called "Suaco," earning P1,650.00 a month, and a dealer of Avon products, earning an
average of P1,000.00 monthly. Petitioners contend that as casual employees do not have security of
tenure, the award of P600,000.00, considering Amyline Antonio's earnings, is without factual basis as
there is no assurance that she would be regularly earning these amounts.
With the exception of the award of damages, the petition is devoid of merit.
First, it is unnecessary for our purpose to determine whether to decide this case on the theory that
petitioners are liable for breach of contract of carriage or culpa contractual or on the theory of quasi
delict or culpa aquiliana as both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals held, for although the
relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature," nevertheless "the act that
breaks the contract may be also a tort." 2 In either case, the question is whether the bus driver, petitioner
Porfirio Cabil, was negligent.
5) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
59
The finding that Cabil drove his bus negligently, while his employer, the Fabres, who owned the bus,
failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their
employee is fully supported by the evidence on record. These factual findings of the two courts we
regard as final and conclusive, supported as they are by the evidence. Indeed, it was admitted by Cabil
that on the night in question, it was raining, and as a consequence, the road was slippery, and it was
dark. He averred these facts to justify his failure to see that there lay a sharp curve ahead. However, it is
undisputed that Cabil drove his bus at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour and only slowed down when
he noticed the curve some 15 to 30 meters ahead. 3 By then it was too late for him to avoid falling off the
road. Given the conditions of the road and considering that the trip was Cabil's first one outside of
Manila, Cabil should have driven his vehicle at a moderate speed. There is testimony 4 that the vehicles
passing on that portion of the road should only be running 20 kilometers per hour, so that at 50
kilometers per hour, Cabil was running at a very high speed.
Considering the foregoing the fact that it was raining and the road was slippery, that it was dark, that
he drove his bus at 50 kilometers an hour when even on a good day the normal speed was only 20
kilometers an hour, and that he was unfamiliar with the terrain, Cabil was grossly negligent and should
be held liable for the injuries suffered by private respondent Amyline Antonio.
Pursuant to Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code his negligence gave rise to the presumption that his
employers, the Fabres, were themselves negligent in the selection and supervisions of their employee.
Due diligence in selection of employees is not satisfied by finding that the applicant possessed a
professional driver's license. The employer should also examine the applicant for his qualifications,
experience and record of service. 5 Due diligence in supervision, on the other hand, requires the
formulation of rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and issuance of proper instructions
as well as actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with the rules. 6
In the case at bar, the Fabres, in allowing Cabil to drive the bus to La Union, apparently did not consider
the fact that Cabil had been driving for school children only, from their homes to the St. Scholastica's
College in Metro Manila. 7They had hired him only after a two-week apprenticeship. They had hired him
only after a two-week apprenticeship. They had tested him for certain matters, such as whether he could
remember the names of the children he would be taking to school, which were irrelevant to his
qualification to drive on a long distance travel, especially considering that the trip to La Union was his
first. The existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies cannot be casually invoked to overturn
the presumption of negligence on the part of an employer. 8
Petitioners argue that they are not liable because (1) an earlier departure (made impossible by the
congregation's delayed meeting) could have a averted the mishap and (2) under the contract, the
WWCF was directly responsible for the conduct of the trip. Neither of these contentions hold water. The
hour of departure had not been fixed. Even if it had been, the delay did not bear directly on the cause of
the accident. With respect to the second contention, it was held in an early case that:
[A] person who hires a public automobile and gives the driver directions as to the place to which he
wishes to be conveyed, but exercises no other control over the conduct of the driver, is not responsible
for acts of negligence of the latter or prevented from recovering for injuries suffered from a collision
between the automobile and a train, caused by the negligence or the automobile driver. 9
As already stated, this case actually involves a contract of carriage. Petitioners, the Fabres, did not have
to be engaged in the business of public transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code on common
carriers to apply to them. As this Court has held: 10
Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged
in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land,
water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.
The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity
is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as
an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as "a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids
making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service
on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional,
episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a
60
TORTS & DAMAGES 61

carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or
population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow
segment of the general population. We think that Article 1732 deliberately refrained
from making such distinctions.
As common carriers, the Fabres were found to exercise "extraordinary diligence" for
the safe transportation of the passengers to their destination. This duty of care is not
excused by proof that they exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of their employee. As Art. 1759 of the Code provides:
Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former's employees although such employees may
have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the
common carriers.
evidence in the records of this case. Viewed as an action for quasi delict, this case falls squarely within
the purview of Art. 2219(2) providing for the payment of moral damages in cases of quasi delict. On the
theory that petitioners are liable for breach of contract of carriage, the award of moral damages is
authorized by Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2220, since Cabil's gross negligence amounted to bad
faith. 12 Amyline Antonio's testimony, as well as the testimonies of her father and copassengers, fully
establish the physical suffering and mental anguish she endured as a result of the injuries caused by
petitioners' negligence.
The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees was also properly made. However, for the same
reason that it was error for the appellate court to increase the award of compensatory damages, we hold
that it was also error for it to increase the award of moral damages and reduce the award of attorney's
fees, inasmuch as private respondents, in whose favor the awards were made, have not appealed. 13
The same circumstances detailed above, supporting the finding of the trial court and of the appellate
court that petitioners are liable under Arts. 2176 and 2180 for quasi delict, fully justify findings them
guilty of breach of contract of carriage under Arts. 1733, 1755 and 1759 of the Civil Code.
As above stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals can be sustained either on the theory of quasi
delict or on that of breach of contract. The question is whether, as the two courts below held, petitioners,
who are the owners and driver of the bus, may be made to respond jointly and severally to private
respondent. We hold that they may be. InDangwa Trans. Co. Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 14 on facts similar
to those in this case, this Court held the bus company and the driver jointly and severally liable for
damages for injuries suffered by a passenger. Again, in Bachelor Express, Inc. v.Court of
Appeals 15 a driver found negligent in failing to stop the bus in order to let off passengers when a fellow
passenger ran amuck, as a result of which the passengers jumped out of the speeding bus and suffered
injuries, was held also jointly and severally liable with the bus company to the injured passengers.
Secondly, we sustain the award of damages in favor of Amyline Antonio. However, we think the Court of
Appeals erred in increasing the amount of compensatory damages because private respondents did not
question this award as inadequate. 11 To the contrary, the award of P500,000.00 for compensatory
damages which the Regional Trial Court made is reasonable considering the contingent nature of her
income as a casual employee of a company and as distributor of beauty products and the fact that the
possibility that she might be able to work again has not been foreclosed. In fact she testified that one of
her previous employers had expressed willingness to employ her again.
The same rule of liability was applied in situations where the negligence of the driver of the bus on
which plaintiff was riding concurred with the negligence of a third party who was the driver of another
vehicle, thus causing an accident. In Anuran v. Buo, 16 Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus
Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 17 and Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 18 the
bus company, its driver, the operator of the other vehicle and the driver of the vehicle were jointly and
severally held liable to the injured passenger or the latters' heirs. The basis of this allocation of liability
was explained in Viluan v. Court of Appeals, 19 thus:
With respect to the other awards, while the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals do not
sufficiently indicate the factual and legal basis for them, we find that they are nevertheless supported by
Nor should it make any difference that the liability of petitioner [bus owner] springs
from contract while that of respondents [owner and driver of other vehicle] arises
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employees.
61
from quasi-delict. As early as 1913, we already ruled in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56

Phil. 177, that in case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of
the bus on which he was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well
as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages. Some
members of the Court, though, are of the view that under the circumstances they are
liable on quasi-delict. 20
It is true that in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 21 this Court exonerated the
jeepney driver from liability to the injured passengers and their families while holding the owners of the
jeepney jointly and severally liable, but that is because that case was expressly tried and decided
exclusively on the theory of culpa contractual. As this Court there explained:
The trial court was therefore right in finding that Manalo (the driver) and spouses Mangune and Carreon
(the jeepney owners) were negligent. However, its ruling that spouses Mangune and Carreon are jointly
and severally liable with Manalo is erroneous. The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with
carrier in case of breach of the contract of carriage. The rationale behind this is readily discernible.
Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the
passenger, even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver (see Viluan v. The Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. L-21477-81, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 742). 22
As in the case of BLTB, private respondents in this case and her coplaintiffs did not stake out their claim
against the carrier and the driver exclusively on one theory, much less on that of breach of contract
alone. After all, it was permitted for them to allege alternative causes of action and join as many parties
as may be liable on such causes of action 23 so long as private respondent and her coplaintiffs do not
recover twice for the same injury. What is clear from the cases is the intent of the plaintiff there to
recover from both the carrier and the driver, thus, justifying the holding that the carrier and the driver
were jointly and severally liable because their separate and distinct acts concurred to produce the same
injury.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to award of
damages. Petitioners are ORDERED to PAY jointly and severally the private respondent Amyline
Antonio the following amounts:
1) P93,657.11 as actual damages;
2) P500,000.00 as the reasonable amount of loss of earning capacity of plaintiff Amyline Antonio;
4) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
5) 25% of the recoverable amount as attorney's fees; and
6) costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 122039 May 31, 2000
VICENTE
CALALAS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1991,
reversing the contrary decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Dumaguete City, and awarding
damages instead to private respondent Eliza Jujeurche Sunga as plaintiff in an action for breach of
contract of carriage.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a
college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney
owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24
62
TORTS & DAMAGES 63

passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the
door at the rear end of the vehicle.
(1) P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;

(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she
was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing
so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear
portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She sustained a fracture of the "distal third of the
left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the underlying skin." Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg
circular casting, and case wedging were done under sedation. Her confinement in the hospital lasted
from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her attending physician, Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic
surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a period of three months and would have to ambulate
in crutches during said period.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the
contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common
carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of
the Isuzu truck.
The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved Calalas of
liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. It took
cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasidelict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for
the damage to his jeepney.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was reversed on the ground that
Sunga's cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common
carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed the
third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. The dispositive
portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and another one is entered ordering defendant-appellee Vicente Calalas to pay
plaintiff-appellant:
(3) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

(4) P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and
(5) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 that the negligence of
Verena was the proximate cause of the accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be
to make the common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers. He contends that the bumping of
the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was a caso fortuito. Petitioner further assails the award of
moral damages to Sunga on the ground that it is not supported by evidence.
The petition has no merit.
The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner
of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was never a party to that case and, therefore,
the principle of res judicata does not apply.
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The issue in Civil Case No.
3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to
petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his
contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has
as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. Thesecond, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is
premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the
basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the
63
existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport
his passenger safely to his destination.2 In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil
Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the
Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof.
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490, finding Salva and his
driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioner's jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial
that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the
truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions
involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no
relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But,
where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who
create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar
as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting
the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the
presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers. It provides:
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in
articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for
the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with due regard for all the circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose,
and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in the care
of his passengers.
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care and foresight could provide,
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances" as
required by Art. 1755? We do not think so. Several factors militate against petitioner's contention.
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being
exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the
highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides:
Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. No person shall drive his motor vehicle in such a
manner as to obstruct or impede the passage of any vehicle, nor, while discharging or
taking on passengers or loading or unloading freight, obstruct the free passage of
other vehicles on the highway.
Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating
capacity of the jeepney, a violation of 32(a) of the same law. It provides:
Exceeding registered capacity. No person operating any motor vehicle shall allow
more passengers or more freight or cargo in his vehicle than its registered capacity.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which
the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the
presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence
shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers.
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking an "extension seat"
amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of
the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a
greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioner's contention that
the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an
64
TORTS & DAMAGES 65

event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. 3 This requires that the
following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the debtor's will; (b) the
event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to
fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the
creditor.4 Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two
meters into the highway.
Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral damages alleging that it is excessive and without basis
in law. We find this contention well taken.
In awarding moral damages, the Court of Appeals stated:
Plaintiff-appellant at the time of the accident was a first-year college student in that
school year 1989-1990 at the Silliman University, majoring in Physical Education.
Because of the injury, she was not able to enroll in the second semester of that school
year. She testified that she had no more intention of continuing with her schooling,
because she could not walk and decided not to pursue her degree, major in Physical
Education "because of my leg which has a defect already."
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of
contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. 5 As an exception,
such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as
provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the
carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220.6
In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding by
the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage.
Sunga's contention that petitioner's admission in open court that the driver of the jeepney failed to assist
her in going to a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith. The fact that it was
the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to the hospital does not imply that petitioner was utterly
indifferent to the plight of his injured passenger. If at all, it is merely implied recognition by Verena that
he was the one at fault for the accident.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1995, and its resolution, dated
September 11, 1995, are AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is
DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Plaintiff-appellant likewise testified that even while she was under confinement, she
cried in pain because of her injured left foot. As a result of her injury, the Orthopedic
Surgeon also certified that she has "residual bowing of the fracture side." She likewise
decided not to further pursue Physical Education as her major subject, because "my
left leg . . . has a defect already."
Those are her physical pains and moral sufferings, the inevitable bedfellows of the
injuries that she suffered. Under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, she is entitled to
recover moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00, which is fair, just and reasonable.
G.R. No. L-40486 August 29, 1975

PAULINO
PADUA
and
LUCENA
BEBIN
vs.
GREGORIO N. ROBLES and BAY TAXI CAB, defendants-appellees.
PADUA, plaintiffs-appellants,
Alberto R. de Joya for plaintiffs-appellants.

Cardenas & Peralta Law Office for defendants-appellees.
CASTRO, J.:
65
Resolving this appeal by the spouses Paulino and Lucena Bebin Padua, we set aside the order dated
October 25, 1972 of the Court of First Instance of Zambales dismissing their complaint, in civil case
1079-O, and remand this case for further proceedings.
In the early morning of New Year's Day of 1969 a taxicab (bearing 1968 plate no. TX-9395 and driven by
Romeo N. Punzalan but operated by the Bay Taxi Cab owned by Gregorio N. Robles) struck ten-year
old Normandy Padua on the national road in barrio Barretto, Olongapo City. The impact hurled
Normandy about forty meters away from the point where the taxicab struck him, as a result of which he
died.
Subsequently, Normandy's parents (Paulino and Lucena Bebin Padua), by complaint filed with the Court
of First Instance of Zambales (civil case 427-O), sought damages from Punzalan and the Bay Taxi Cab;
likewise, the city Fiscal of Olongapo, by information filed with the same court (criminal case 1158-O),
charged Punzalan with homicide through reckless imprudence.
On October 27, 1969 the court a quo, in civil case 427-O, adjudged for the Paduas as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant Romeo Punzalan
to pay the plaintiffs the sums of P12,000.00 as actual damages, P5,000.00 as moral
and exemplary damages, and P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and dismissing the
complaint insofar as the Bay Taxicab Company is concerned. With costs against the
defendant Romeo Punzalan. (Emphasis supplied)
Almost a year later, on October 5, 1970, the court a quo, in criminal case 1158-O, convicted Punzalan,
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Romeo Punzalan y Narciso guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence, as defined
and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and hereby sentences him to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision correccional, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor, as maximum, and to pay the cost. The civil liability of the accused has already
been determined and assessed in Civil Case No. 427-O, entitled Paulino Padua, et al.
vs. Romeo Punzalan, et al.' (Emphasis supplied)
After the judgment in civil case 427-O became final, the Paduas sought execution thereof. This proved
futile; the corresponding court officer returned the writ of execution unsatisfied.
Unable to collect the amount of P27,000 awarded in their favor, the Paduas instituted action in the same
court against Gregorio N. Robles to enforce the latter's subsidiary responsibility under the provisions of
article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Robles filed a motion to dismiss based on (1) bar of the cause of
action by a prior judgment and (2) failure of the complaint to state a cause of action.
Thereafter, the court a quo, in an order dated October 25, 1972, granted Robles' motion to dismiss on
the ground that the Paduas' complaint states no cause of action. This order the Paduas questioned in
the Court of Appeals which, by resolution dated March 5, 1975, certified the case to this Court for the
reason that the appeal involves only questions of law.
The Paduas predicate their appeal on eighteen errors allegedly committed by the court a quo. These
assigned errors, however, raise only one substantial issue: whether the judgment dated October 5, 1970
in criminal case 1158-O includes a and adjudication of Punzalan's civil liability arising from his criminal
act upon which Robles' subsidiary civil responsibility may be based.
The sufficiency and efficacy of a judgment must be tested by its substance rather than its form. In
construing a judgment, its legal effects including such effects that necessarily follow because of legal
implications, rather than the language used govern. Also, its meaning, operation, and consequences
must be ascertained like any other written instrument. Thus, a judgment rests on the intention of the
court as gathered from every part thereof, including the situation to which it applies and the attendant
circumstances.
66
TORTS & DAMAGES 67

It would appear that a plain reading, on its face, of the judgment in criminal case 1158-O, particularly its
decretal portion, easily results in the same conclusion reached by the court a quo: that the said
judgment no civil liability arising from the offense charged against Punzalan. However, a careful study of
the judgment in question, the situation to which it applies, and the attendant circumstances, would yield
the conclusion that the court a quo, on the contrary, recognized the enforceable right of the Paduas to
the civil liability arising from the offense committed by Punzalan and awarded the corresponding
indemnity therefor.
Civil liability coexists with criminal responsibility. In negligence cases the offended party (or his heirs)
has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under article
100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under
article 2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal section
1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court deems simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless
expressly waived or reserved for a separate application by the offended party. Article 2177 of the Civil
Code, however, precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligent act or omission.
In the case at bar, the Court finds it immaterial that the Paduas chose, in the first instance, an action for
recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under articles 2176, 2177, and 2180 of the Civil Code,
which action proved ineffectual. The Court also takes note of the absence of any inconsistency between
the aforementioned action priorly availed of by the Paduas and their subsequent application for
enforcement of civil liability arising from the offense committed by Punzalan and consequently, for
exaction of Robles' subsidiary responsibility. Allowance of the latter application involves no violation of
the proscription against double recovery of damages for the same negligent act or omission. For, as
hereinbefore stated, the corresponding officer of the court a quo returned unsatisfied the writ of
execution issued against Punzalan to satisfy the amount of indemnity awarded to the Paduas in civil
case 427-O. Article 2177 of the Civil Code forbids actual double recovery of damages for the same
negligent act or omission. Finally, the Court notes that the same judge * tried, heard, and determined
both civil case 427-O and criminal case 115-O. Knowledge of an familiarity with all the facts and
circumstances relevant and relative to the civil liability of Punzalan may thus be readily attributed to the
judge when he rendered judgment in the criminal action.
In view of the above considerations, it cannot reasonably be contended that the court a quo intended, in
its judgment in criminal case 1158-O, to omit recognition of the right of the Paduas to the civil liability
arising from the offense of which Punzalan was adjudged guilty and the corollary award of the
corresponding indemnity therefor. Surely, it cannot be said that the court intended the statement in the
decretal portion of the judgment in criminal case 1158-O referring to the determination and assessment
of Punzalan's civil liability in civil case 427-O to be pure jargon or "gobbledygook" and to be absolutely
of no meaning and effect whatever. The substance of such statement, taken in the light of the situation
to which it applies and the attendant circumstances, makes unmistakably clear the intention of the court
to accord affirmation to the Paduas' right to the civil liability arising from the judgment against Punzalan
in criminal case 1158-O. Indeed, by including such statement in the decretal portion of the said
judgment, the court intended to adopt the same adjudication and award it made in civil case 427-O as
Punzalan's civil liability in criminal case 1158-O.
There is indeed much to be desired in the formulation by Judge Amores of that part of the decretal
portion of the judgment in criminal case 1158-O referring to the civil liability of Punzalan resulting from
his criminal conviction. The judge could have been forthright and direct instead of circuitous and
ambiguous. But, as we have explained, the statement on the civil liability of Punzalan must surely have
a meaning and even if the statement were reasonably susceptible of two or more interpretations, that
which achieves moral justice should be adopted, eschewing the other interpretations which in effect
would negate moral justice.
It is not amiss at this juncture to emphasize to all magistrates in all levels of the judicial hierarchy that
extreme degree of care should be exercise in the formulation of the dispositive portion of a decision,
because it is this portion that is to be executed once the decision becomes final. The adjudication of the
rights and obligations of the parties, and the dispositions made as well as the directions and instructions
given by the court in the premises in conformity with the body of the decision, must all be spelled out
clearly, distinctly and unequivocally, leaving absolutely no room for dispute, debate or interpretation.
We therefore hold that the Paduas' complaint in civil case 1079-O states a cause of action against
Robles whose concommitant subsidiary responsibility, per the judgment in criminal case 1158-O,
subsists.
ACCORDINGLY, the order a quo dated October 25, 1972 dismissing the complaint in civil case 1079-O
is set aside, and this case is hereby remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings conformably
with this decision and with law. No pronouncement as to costs.
67
Makalintal, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.
G.R. Nos. 114841-42 August 23, 1995

ATLANTIC
GULF
AND
PACIFIC
COMPANY
OF
MANILA,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CARLITO D. CASTILLO, HEIRS OF CRISTETA CASTILLO and CORNELIO
CASTILLO,respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Assailed in this appeal by certiorari is the judgment 1 of respondent appellate court rendered in CA-G.R
CV Nos. 29976-77, which affirmed with modifications the judgment of the trial court by increasing the
award of damages to herein private respondents. While the increased awards could arguably have been
justified, it was the inaction of private respondents that now militate against the same.
Sometime in 1982, petitioner company commenced the construction of a steel fabrication plant in the
Municipality of Bauan, Batangas, necessitating dredging operations at the Batangas Bay in an area
adjacent to the real property of private respondents.
As an offshoot of said dredging operations, an action for damages against herein petitioner Atlantic Gulf
and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. was filed by Carlito D. Castillo which was docketed as Civil Case
No. 10276, and another action by Cristeta Castillo for herself and as guardian of Cornelio Castillo,
docketed as Civil Case No. 10696.
On August 19, 1985, the above-mentioned cases were consolidated, as the plaintiffs therein intended to
present common evidence against defendant, 2 by reason of the virtual identity of the issues involved in
both cases.
Private respondents alleged that during the on-going construction of its steel and fabrication yard,
petitioner's personnel and heavy equipment trespassed into the adjacent parcels of land belonging to
private respondents without their consent. These heavy equipment damaged big portions of private
respondents' property which were further used by petitioner as a depot or parking lots without paying
any rent therefor, nor does it appear from the records that such use of their land was with the former's
conformity.
Private respondents further alleged that as a result of the dredging operation of petitioner company, the
sea silt and water overflowed and were deposited upon their land. Consequently, the said property
which used to be agricultural lands principally devoted to rice production and each averaging an annual
net harvest of 75 cavans, could no longer be planted with palay as the soil became infertile, salty,
unproductive and unsuitable for agriculture. 3
Petitioner company denied all the allegations of private respondents and contended that its personnel
and equipment had neither intruded upon nor occupied any portion of private respondents' landholdings.
The alleged sea silt with water, according to petitioner was due to the flood brought by the heavy rains
when typhoon "Ruping" hit and lashed the province of Batangas in 1982. 4
On September 6, 1990, the trial court promulgated its decision with this fallo:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant:
1) To pay Carlito Castillo the sum of P65,240.00 plus legal interest from the time of the filing of
his complaint;
2) To pay the heirs of Cristeta Castillo the sum of P32,630.00 plus legal interest from the time
of the filing of her complaint;
3) To pay Cornelio Castillo the sum of P47,490.00 with legal interest from the time of the filing
of his complaint;
4) To pay plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 each as exemplary damages;
68
TORTS & DAMAGES 69

5) To pay plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 each as attorney's fees;
3. Cristeta Castillo the following amount(s):
6) To pay the costs of suit. 5
a) Compensatory damages of P249,815.62 with legal

interest from the time this decision becomes final until the
amount is fully paid;
Dissatisfied with said judgment, petitioner company appealed to the Court of Appeals. On March 29,
1994, respondent court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with the following modifications:
b) Exemplary damages of P10,000.00;
Ordering defendant-appellant to pay:
c) Attorney's fees of P10,000.00; and
1. Carlito Castillo the following amounts:

a) Compensatory damages in the amount of P56,290.00
with legal interest from the time of the finality of this
decision until the same shall have been fully paid;
d) Costs of suit. 6
Petitioner company is now before us, arguing for nullification or, at least, partial modification of
respondent court's judgment on the bases of the following assignment of errors:
b) Exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000.00;
That the respondent Honorable Court of Appeals exercised its judicial power and discretion in
a most arbitrary, capricious and whimsical manner by awarding against the petitioner,
unconscionable, unreasonable and excessive damages clearly not warranted under Articles 20
and 2176 of the Civil Code.
d) Costs of this suit.

2. Cornelio Castillo the following sums:
II
a) Compensatory damages in the amount of P255,401.25

with legal interest from the time of the finality of this
decision up to the time the amount is fully paid;
That grave and patent abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial power constitute a ground
for the issuance of the writ of certiorari . . .
b) Exemplary damages of P10,000.00;
III
That the respondent Honorable Court of Appeals violated Article 2177 of the Civil Code which
states that: "the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant" when it condemned the petitioner as a result of its dredging operations, to pay
private respondents not only the expected total amount of profits the latter would have derived
d) Costs of this suit;
69
from the expected sale of their palay harvest for 135 months or over 11 years, from the half
hectare agricultural land, but also rentals on the basis of P5.00 per square meter of their said
entire landholdings. 7
The evidence on record indubitably support the findings of the trial and appellate courts that petitioner
company is liable for the destruction of the property of herein private respondents and consequently
entitle the latter to an award of the damages prayed for. Such conclusions and findings of fact by the
lower courts are entitled to great weight on appeal and will not be disturbed except for strong and cogent
reasons, none of which, however, obtain in the case at bar. The fact that the appellate court adopted the
findings of the trial court, as in this case, makes the same binding upon the Supreme Court, for the
factual findings of said appellate court are generally binding on the latter. For that matter the findings of
the Court of Appeals by itself, and which are supported by substantial evidence, are almost beyond the
power of review by the Supreme Court. 8
Hence, on this aspect of its recourse, petitioner cannot expect a reversal since it is a basic rule that only
questions of law may be raised in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases thus brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to
reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it. 9 It is not the function of this Court to analyze or
weigh such evidence all over again. Its jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law that might have
been committed by the lower court. Barring a showing that the factual findings complained of are totally
devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of
discretion, such findings must stand, for the Supreme Court is not expected or required to examine or
contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties. 10
an appeal therefrom. This being the case, they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication made
by the lower court. As to them, the judgment of the court below may be said to have attained finality.
The entrenched procedural rule in this jurisdiction is that a party who has not himself appealed cannot
obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the lower
court. The appellee can only advance any argument that he may deem necessary to defeat the
appellant's claim or to uphold the decision that is being disputed. He can assign errors on appeal if such
are required to strengthen the views expressed by the court a quo. Such assigned errors, in turn, may
be considered by the appellate court solely to maintain the appealed decision on other grounds, but not
for the purpose of modifying the judgment in the appellee's favor and giving him other affirmative
reliefs. 11
WHEREFORE, the challenged judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED with
regard to the amount of damages awarded to private respondents and the awards of the trial court on
this matter are hereby reinstated for that purpose. In all other respects, the decision of respondent court
is AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
-END-
However, this Court finds that respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law in
increasing the amount of damages awarded to private respondents by the court a quo.
Respondent appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it modified the judgment of the trial court by
increasing the award of damages in favor of private respondents who, in the first place, did not interpose
70

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TORTS & DAMAGES 1

1st Batch Cases LJC NOTES

G.R. No. 84458 November 6, 1989

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TORTS & DAMAGES 5

G.R. No. 95582 October 7, 1991

2. The sum of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) by way of moral damages;

TORTS & DAMAGES 7

TORTS & DAMAGES 9

Q Why, what happened to your refrigerator at that particular time?

G.R. No. 108533 December 20, 1994

Pimentel, Apostol, Layosa & Sibayan Law Office for petitioner.

TORTS & DAMAGES 11

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or

(c) In any protest, counter-protest or protest-in-intervention requiring ballot revision the

TORTS & DAMAGES 13

G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977

THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR

(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])

THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL

TORTS & DAMAGES 15

such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved

TORTS & DAMAGES 17

G.R. No. 129282

November 29, 2001

Hence, this petition.8

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THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL INCONSISTENCY, IF NOT

The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:

xxx xxx xxx

TORTS & DAMAGES 23

Value of goods and equipment taken 8,000.00

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to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of P3,561.46 as medical expenses, P2,000.00 as loss of

to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of P19,800.47 as medical expenses, P800.00

to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of P580.81 as medical expenses, P4,600.00 as

to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of P12,473.82 as hospital expenses, P14,530.00 as

The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:

to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of P229,654.00 as hospital expenses, doctors fees

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Propriety of Appeal by the Employer

We are not persuaded.

TORTS & DAMAGES 29

Who Jumps Bail

in the Criminal Prosecution

Civil Liability Deemed Instituted

TORTS & DAMAGES 31

Upon Finality of Judgment

TORTS & DAMAGES 33

G.R. No. 150157

January 25, 2007

TORTS & DAMAGES 35

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In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,45 it was explained that:

September 28, 1966

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3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?

A. That the space is confirmed.

Q. Confirmed for first class?

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