Traditionalizing Philosophical Hermeneutics: Gadamer and Ricoeur

on Textual Interpretation

Despite its long history and numerous shifts in meaning, today the term
hermeneutics is often associated with Hans-Georg Gadamer and his seminal work
Truth and Method. Indeed, outside specialist circles, there is little awareness of
those who preceded him in the history of hermeneutics or those who came after him.
Nonetheless, for the history of hermeneutics, Gadamers contributions proved to be a
double-edged sword: for, as important as Gadamers work has been in keeping
hermeneutics alive as a discipline in the 20th century, his powerful (albeit at times
undue) criticism of the hermeneutic tradition left the latter in disarray in the eyes of
many, and his counter-project of an ontology of understanding broadened the scope of
hermeneutics so considerably that its traditional focus on textual interpretation faded
into the background, thus leaving the field open for alternative approaches.1
Whereas traditional hermeneuts such as Schleiermacher and Dilthey considered
hermeneutics in methodological terms, either as an approach to textual interpretation
or as method for the human sciences,2 Gadamers philosophical hermeneutics is the
attempt to uncover phenomenologically what is happening in the process of human
understanding.3 Impressed as he was by Heideggers ontological turn, whose
implications he sought to spell out, Gadamers project might thus seem far removed
1

For instance, Gadamers idiosyncratic interpretations of Schleiermacher (in which Gadamer heavily
relied on Dilthey) focused exclusively on the psychological and subjectivist dimension of
Schleiermachers method, which in turn came to be seen as outdated. Manfred Franks edition of
Schleiermachers lectures on hermeneutics and his commentary on the latter are a notable exception to
this one-sided reception, see Schleiermacher, F.D.E. (1977).
2
For the focus on a method of textual interpretation, see Schleiermacher, F.D.E. (1977) Hermeneutik
und Kritik. Manfred Frank (ed.). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp; for the focus on hermeneutics as a method for
the human sciences over against the natural sciences, see Dilthey, W. (1979): Der Aufbau der
geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften in: Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 7, Stuttgart,
Gttingen, pp. 77-188.
3
Gadamer, H.-G. (2004) Truth and Method. London: continuum, p. 263.

from hermeneutics in the Schleiermacherian sense, which raises the question of

whether it has anything to contribute to a study on textual interpretation. Put
differently, can Gadamers hermeneutics be read in the traditional sense of the word?
If so, what (if anything) are the drawbacks of such a reading?
As we shall see, there are two instances in which Gadamers hermeneutics can
offer us some insights into textual interpretation. The first is that his ontological
reflections on the nature of human understanding might be seen as providing the
framework within which methodological reflections are carried out, addressing
broader epistemological issues with which methodologists rarely engage. Still, one
might object that ontological analyses, by their very nature, are fairly abstract and
thus of little practical use in the interpretation of texts. This is not so in the case of
Gadamer, who in Truth and Method vacillates between ontological analyses and
normative suggestions. Unintentionally perhaps, Gadamer offers us recommendations
regarding the aims of textual interpretation and he gives us some guidelines we ought
to follow in the execution of our interpretive task. Such suggestions and regulative
principles creep into his text in numerous places. That they do should not surprise us
because, as Paul Ricoeur put it, an ontological endeavour, free at the outset from any
methodological requirements and consequently outside the circle of interpretation
whose theory this ontology formulates would amount to a performative
contradiction.4
Thus, there is nothing in Gadamers hermeneutics that prohibits the reading here
suggested. On the contrary, as the Wirkungsgeschichte of Truth and Method shows,
Gadamers hermeneutics has been treated as an approach to literary theory, as a

Ricoeur, P. (2004a) The Conflict of Interpretations. Essays in Hermeneutics. London, continuum, p. 6.

corrective to dogmatic elements in other approaches, and it has inspired other

methods.5
Before we can begin, two caveats must be removed, however. Gadamers Truth
and Method is often read as advocating an outright rejection of methods in the
human sciences.6 To be sure, Gadamer dismissed the natural sciences and its
disinterested, pseudo-objective account of method as a role model for the arts and
humanities, particularly with regard to studies in interpretation, but Gadamer never
rejected methodological reflections tout court. Rather, he considered them secondary
to his ontological enquiry into the nature of understanding. 7 According to Gadamer,
interpretation presupposes pre-reflective understanding, that is, understanding which
precedes any methodological discussion.8 But this is just to say that there is something
in the interpretive process that raises questions that transcend the scope of
methodological reflection, which in no way undermines such projects. 9 In short,
Gadamer does not reject methodological reflection per se but considers it as
subsidiary to his ontology of understanding, with textual interpretation being one of
its many concrete manifestations.
The second caveat is that an orientation occasioned in the manner sketched out
here comes at a certain price; for in trying to deduce what is methodologically
relevant from Gadamers Truth and Method we are confronted with the problem of
5

For the reception of his hermeneutics within literary theory, see, for example, Becker, S. (2007)
Literatur- und Kulturwissenschaften. Ihre Theorien und Methoden. Reinbeck: Rowohlts Enzyklopdie,
p. 28-32. For other approaches Gadamer has inspired, see, for instance, Iser, W. (1984) Der Akt des
Lesers. Theorie sthetischer Wirkung. Second edition. Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink; Jau, H.R. (1982)
sthetische Erfahrung und literarische Hermeneutik. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Gadamer, H.-G. (2004) Truth and Method, p. 275, 279. Henceforth cited as TM.
6
Tugendhat provided such a reading of Gadamers philosophical hermeneutics in his review for the
Times Literay Supplement (May 19 1978). He suggested that the title of his book should be interpreted
as Truth versus Method (1978: 165).
7
Gadamer, TM, p. 2.
8
Ibid., p. 275, 279.
9
Cf. Outhwaite, W. (2000) Hans-Georg Gadamer, in: Quentin Skinner (ed.) The Return of Grand
Theory in the Human Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 32.

having to translate what Gadamer says about interpretation as an event to the level of
interpretation as an act performed by an interpreter.10 Fortunately, Gadamer himself
vacillates between the two levels, as we noted above, and he placed the principle of
application at the center of his hermeneuticsa principle which, as its name indicates,
recommends the application of the text to ones own interpretive situation and
problem, regardless of whatever the author may have intended.
Whilst the bulk of this chapter will deal with Gadamers hermeneutics, in section V
we will also consider Ricoeurs hermeneutics, although no attempt will be made to do
justice to the details of Ricoeurs position, as this would require a separate study. Two
reasons might, nonetheless, justify his inclusion. First of all, Ricoeur sought to
combine the ontological with the methodological dimension, as we do in this chapter.
Secondly, Ricoeur, who developed his hermeneutics in part as a critical response to
Gadamer, may be read as offering a corrective to issues that Gadamers hermeneutics
left unresolved.
Throughout, I shall argue that Gadamers hermeneutics gets caught up between
two incompatible interpretive aims. On the one hand, Gadamer emphasizes the
applicative manner in which we understand text, which recommends the assimilation
of the text to the interpreters situation; on the other he claims that we ought to
recognize the otherness of the text and the truth it conveys about the subject matter.
The chapter is structured in the following way. In the two subsequent sections, I
will critically assess core concepts of Gadamers hermeneutics, moving from the more
ontological aspects (in section II) to the practical side of his approach (in III). I then
go on to draw some interpretive lessons from Gadamers hermeneutics (in IV). This
requires that I shall bracket out the more ontological aspects of his position. I then
10

For the distinction, see Vandevelde, P. (2005) The Task of the Interpreter. Text, Meaning, and
Negotation. Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press, p. 15.

attempt to show where Ricoeur distances himself from Gadamer and what solutions
he offers to the problems Gadamers hermeneutics failed to solve.