Professional Documents
Culture Documents
by:
Pre-Bar Reviewer
Chapter 1
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
(Police Power)
1. Define:
1. police power---is the power vested in the legislature by the Constitution to make, ordain,
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws for the good and welfare of the
State and its people. (ERMITA MALATE HOTEL VS. CITY MAYOR, July 31, 1967)
Facts:
successful examinees were unusually and exceptionally high in the two (2) most
difficult subjects of the exam, i.e., Biochemistry and Obstetrics and Gynecology.
Held:
But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, their exercise
may be regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health,
morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. As
such, mandamus will not lie to compel the Board of Medicine to issue licenses for
the respondents to practice medicine.
3. to promote and protect public safety; (AGUSTIN VS. EDU, 88 SCRA 195;
TAXICAB OPERATORS VS. JUINIO, 119 SCRA 897 )
5. to protect public morals; (CITY OF MANILA VS. JUDGE LAGUIO, JR., 455
SCRA 308; WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION VS. CITY OF MANILA, January 20,
2009; DE LA CRUZ VS. PARAS, 123 SCRA 569; ERMITA MALATE HOTEL VS.
CITY MAYOR, July 31, 1967; VILLAVICENCIO VS. MAYOR LUKBAN OF
MANILA, 39 Phil. 778; JMM PROMOTIONS VS. CA, 260 SCRA 319; VELASCO
VS. VILLEGAS, February 13, 1983)
With another city ordinance of Manila also principally involving the tourist
district as subject, the Court is confronted anew with the incessant clash between
government power and individual liberty in tandem with the archetypal
tension between law and morality.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr, the Court affirmed the nullification of a city
ordinance barring the operation of motels and inns, among other establishments,
within the Ermita-Malate area. The petition at bar assails a similarly-motivated
city ordinance that prohibits those same establishments from offering short-time
admission, as well as pro-rated or wash up rates for such abbreviated stays. Our
earlier decision tested the city ordinance against our sacred constitutional rights to
liberty, due process and equal protection of law. The same parameters apply to the
present petition.
This Petition challenges the validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled,
An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates,
and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension
Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila (the Ordinance).
The facts are as follows:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law
the Ordinance. The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:
SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up
rate or other similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels,
inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of
Manila.
SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any
provision of this ordinance shall upon conviction thereof be punished by a fine of
Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not exceeding
one (1) year or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court;
Provided, That in case of [a] juridical person, the president, the manager, or the
persons in charge of the operation thereof shall be liable: Provided, further, That
in case of subsequent conviction for the same offense, the business license of the
guilty party shall automatically be cancelled.
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time basis as
well as to charge customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours.
They contend that the assailed Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police
power.
II.
To students of jurisprudence, the facts of this case will recall to mind not only the
recent City of Manila ruling, but our 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and
Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. Ermita-Malate
concerned the City ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a prescribed form stating
personal information such as name, gender, nationality, age, address and
occupation before they could be admitted to a motel, hotel or lodging house. This
earlier ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices deemed
harmful to public morals. A purpose similar to the annulled ordinance in City of
Manila which sought a blanket ban on motels, inns and similar establishments in
the Ermita-Malate area. However, the constitutionality of the ordinance in
Ermita-Malate was sustained by the Court.
The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes
beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances.
All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals
including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This could
be described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and
hotels but the services offered by these establishments have been severely
restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can
intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens.
A.
B.
The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two
related but distinct restrictions on government, "procedural due process" and
"substantive due process." Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the
government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.
Procedural due process concerns itself with government action adhering to the
established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere. Examples
range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing.
Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the due process
clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for
depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.
The question of substantive due process, more so than most other fields of
law, has reflected dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded
acceptance of fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as it
may be, is now confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before it can be
upheld. The vitality though of constitutional due process has not been predicated
on the frequency with which it has been utilized to achieve a liberal result for,
after all, the libertarian ends should sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the
State. Instead, the due process clause has acquired potency because of the
sophisticated methodology that has emerged to determine the proper metes and
bounds for its application.
C.
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis
of equal protection challenges. Using the rational basis examination, laws or
D.
It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the
curtailment of sexual behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the subject
establishments have gained notoriety as venue of prostitution, adultery and
fornications in Manila since they provide the necessary atmosphere for
clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became the ideal haven for
prostitutes and thrill-seekers. Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene
of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among
willing married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally protected will
be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of Manila case. Our holding therein
retains significance for our purposes:
E.
To be candid about it, the oft-quoted American maxim that you cannot
legislate morality is ultimately illegitimate as a matter of law, since as explained
by Calabresi, that phrase is more accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts to
legislate morality will fail if they are widely at variance with public attitudes
about right and wrong. Our penal laws, for one, are founded on age-old moral
traditions, and as long as there are widely accepted distinctions between right and
wrong, they will remain so oriented.
*********************************
An Ordinance requiring the motels in Ermita-Malate area to transfer to another place in the City
of Manila as well as prohibiting THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES
PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND
FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA was held unconstitutional
TINGA, J.:
FACTS:
The City Council of Manila enacted on 9 March 1993 and approved by
petitioner City Mayor on 30 March 1993 an Ordinance is entitled
2. Massage Parlors
3. Karaoke Bars
4. Beerhouses
5. Night Clubs
6. Day Clubs
7. Super Clubs
8. Discotheques
9. Cabarets
10. Dance Halls
11. Motels
12. Inns
SEC. 2 The City Mayor, the City Treasurer or any person acting in behalf
of the said officials are prohibited from issuing permits, temporary or
otherwise, or from granting licenses and accepting payments for the
operation of business enumerated in the preceding section.
SEC. 3. Owners and/or operator of establishments engaged in, or devoted
to, the businesses enumerated in Section 1 hereof are hereby given three (3)
months from the date of approval of this ordinance within which to wind up
business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate
area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within
the area, such as but not limited to:
1. Curio or antique shop
2. Souvenir Shops
3. Handicrafts display centers
4. Art galleries
5. Records and music shops
6. Restaurants
7. Coffee shops
8. Flower shops
9. Music lounge and sing-along restaurants, with well-defined activities for wholesome
family entertainment that cater to both local and foreign clientele.
10. Theaters engaged in the exhibition, not only of motion pictures but also of cultural shows,
stage and theatrical plays, art exhibitions, concerts and the like.
11. Businesses allowable within the law and medium intensity districts as provided for in the
zoning ordinances for Metropolitan Manila, except new warehouse or open-storage depot, dock
or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery, or funeral
establishments.
The Ordinance was questioned as an invalid exercise of police power and violative of the due
process and equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD:
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions
has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2)
must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance contravenes
the Constitution
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is
subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the
limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case
at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power
as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
The relevant constitutional provisions are the following:
SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and
property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment
by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
SEC. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.
Sec. 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
A. The Ordinance infringes
the Due Process Clause
The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat (N)o
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law. . . . There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It
furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in
order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be
valid. This standard is aptly described as a responsiveness to the supremacy of
reason, obedience to the dictates of justice, and as such it is a limitation upon the
exercise of the police power. The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent
governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals;
to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the
government, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and
distributive justice; to protect property from confiscation by legislative
enactments, from seizure, forfeiture, and destruction without a trial and conviction
by the ordinary mode of judicial procedure; and to secure to all persons equal and
impartial justice and the benefit of the general law. The guaranty serves as a
protection against arbitrary regulation, and private corporations and partnerships
are persons within the scope of the guaranty insofar as their property is
concerned. This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on
government, usually called procedural due process and substantive due
process.
Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that
the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or
property. Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with what kind of
notice and what form of hearing the government must provide when it takes a
particular action.
Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the
government has an adequate reason for taking away a persons life, liberty, or
property. In other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is a
sufficient justification for the governments action. Case law in the United States
(U.S.) tells us that whether there is such a justification depends very much on the
level of scrutiny used. For example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis
review is applied, substantive due process is met so long as the law is rationally
related to a legitimate government purpose. But if it is an area where strict
scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then the government
will meet substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary to
achieve a compelling government purpose. The police power granted to local
government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights
of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot
can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be
recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation.[78] It is intrusive
and violative of the private property rights of individuals.
The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9, that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The
provision is the most important protection of property rights in the Constitution.
This is a restriction on the general power of the government to take property. The
constitutional provision is about ensuring that the government does not confiscate
the property of some to give it to others. In part too, it is about loss spreading. If
the government takes away a persons property to benefit society, then society
should pay. The principal purpose of the guarantee is to bar the Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.[79]
The second option instructs the owners to abandon their property and build
another one outside the Ermita-Malate area. In every sense, it qualifies as a
taking without just compensation with an additional burden imposed on the owner
to build another establishment solely from his coffers. The proffered solution does
not put an end to the problem, it merely relocates it. Not only is this impractical,
it is unreasonable, onerous and oppressive. The conversion into allowed
enterprises is just as ridiculous. How may the respondent convert a motel into a
restaurant or a coffee shop, art gallery or music lounge without essentially
destroying its property? This is a taking of private property without due process of
law, nay, even without compensation.
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated
establishments without infringing the due process clause. These lawful
establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their
business. This is a sweeping exercise of police power that is a result of a lack of
imagination on the part of the City Council and which amounts to an interference
into personal and private rights which the Court will not countenance. In this
regard, we take a resolute stand to uphold the constitutional guarantee of the right
to liberty and property.
The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is an unwarranted and
unlawful curtailment of property and personal rights of citizens. For being
unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, even under the guise of
exercising police power, be upheld as valid.
B. The Ordinance violates Equal
Protection Clause
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar
subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue
favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.[98] The guarantee means
that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws
In the Courts view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension
houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial
establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason
exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other
similar establishments. The classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not
rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of
motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not
become any less noxious if located outside the area.
6. to promote the economic security of the people. (ichong vs. hernandez, 101 Phil. 11155)
2. YNOT VS. IAC, 148 SCRA 659; the Director of Animal Industry or the Chairman if the
National Meat Commission may dispose of the carabaos or carabeef confiscated for
violating the executive order prohibiting the inter-provincial transport of said animals
without prior permit issued by the government to charitable agencies as he may deem
fit. This is oppressive and unreasonable since the owner of the animals is denied due
process of law and the Director of Animal Industry or Chairman of the National Meat
Commission is given so much discretion as the law is not complete in itself nor is there a
standard to guide the official.
2.
power of taxation
Didipio earth savers multi purpose association vs. denr sec. Elisea gozu, et
al., 485 scra 586
Chico-Nazario, J.
1. The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the State to condemn
or to take private property for public use upon payment of just
compensation while police power is the power of the state to promote
public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property
without compensation;
2. In the exercise of police power, enjoyment of a property is restricted
because the continued use thereof would be injurious to public welfare. In
such case, there is no compensable taking provided none of the property
interests is appropriated for the use or for the benefit of the public.
Otherwise, there should be compensable taking if it would result to public
use.
3. Properties condemned under police power are usually noxious or intended
for noxious purpose; hence , no compensation shall be paid. Likewise, in
the exercise of police power, property rights of private individuals are
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort,
health and prosperity of the state.
2. the means employed is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive to individuals. (LAWFUL MEANS). In short, the end does not
justify the means.
Facts:
1. On January, 13, 1984, Ynot transported six carabaos by using a pumpboat from
Masbate to Iloilo. The six carabaos, were, however, confiscated by the Police
Station Commander of Baratoc Nuevo, Iloilo for alleged violation of Executive
Order No. 626-A which prohibits the inter-provincial transporting of carabaos and
carabeefs which does not comply with the provisions of Executive No.626;
2. That Section 1 of the said law provides that "henceforth, no carabaos regardless
of age, sex physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported
from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of
the said law shall be subjected to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to
be distributed to charitable institution and similar institutions as the Chairman of
the National meat inspection Commission may see fit in the case of the carabeef,
and to deserving farmers through the dispersal of the Director of Animal Industry,
in the case of carabaos;
3. Ynot filed a suit for recovery and the carabao were returned to him upon the
issuance of a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersede as bond in the amount
of P12,000.00;
4. After trial of the case, the Judge upheld the validity of the act of the Police
Station Commander in confiscating the carabaos. Ynot was ordered to returned
the carabaos but since he could not do so, the court ordered the confiscation of the
bond. The court refused to rule on the constitutionality of the said Executive
Order on the ground of lack of authority to do so and also because of its presumed
validity;
5. The petitioner appealed to the IAC but the said court upheld the decision of the
Trial Court. Hence this petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court
where YNOT claimed that the penalty of confiscation is INVALID the same was
imposed without according the owner the right to be heard before a competent
and impartial tribunal as guaranteed by due process.
Issues:
1. May a lower court (like the MTC, RTC, of the Court of Appeals) declare a law
unconstitutional?
Held:
provide, final judgments and orders of the lower courts in all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that lower courts may
declare whether or not a law is constitutional.
2. In order that a measure or law may be justified under the police power of
the state, it must meet two tests:
Since the prohibition of the slaughtering of carabaos except where they are at
least 7 years old when male and at least 11 years old when female is in
furtherance of the public interest since said carabaos are very useful to the work at
the farm, it is conceded
that the Executive Order meets the first test---- it has lawful subject.
But does the law meets the second requisite or test which is lawful method?
Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughtering of
carabaos BUT ON THIER MOVEMENT, providing that "no carabao regardless
of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported
from one province to another." The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the question measure is
missing. We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter considering that they can be killed any
where, with no less difficulty in one province than in the other. Obviously,
retaining a carabao in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any
more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there.
The law is unconstitutional because it struck at once and pounced upon the
petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the
centuries-old guarantee of elementary fair play.
Since the Executive Order in question is a penal law, then violation thereof should
be pronounce not by the police BUT BY A COURT OF JUSTICE, WHICH
ALONE WOULD HAVE HAD THE AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE THE
PRESCRIBED PENALTY, AND ONLY AFTER TRIAL AND CONVICTION
OF THE ACCUSED.
The Executive Order is, therefore, invalid and unconstitutional and not a valid
police power measure because the METHOD EMPLOYED TO CONSERVE
CARABAOS IS NOT REASONABLY NECESSARY TO THE PURPOSE OF
THE LAW AND, WORSE IS UNDULY OPPRESSIVE. DUE PROCESS IS
VIOLATED BECAUSE THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY CONFISCATED IS
DENIED THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD IN HIS DEFENSE AND IS
IMMEDIATELY CONDEMNED AND PUNISHED. THE CONFERMENT ON
THE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES (like the police) OF THE POWER TO
ADJUDGE THE GUILT OF THE SUPPOSED OFFENDER IS A CLEAR
ENCROACHMENT OF JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS AND MILITATES AGAINST
THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS.
5. Read:
A law prohibiting the use of Heavy and Extra Heavy Vehicles on weekends and holidays when
there is energy crisis is a valid police power measure.
Facts:
1. On May 31, 1979, President Marcos issued Letter of Instruction No. 869
prohibiting the use of private motor vehicles with H (Heavy Vehicles) and EH
(Extra Heavy Vehicles) on week-ends and holidays from 12:00 a.m. Saturday
morning to 5:00 a.m. Monday morning, or 1:00 a.m. of the holiday to 5:00 a.m. of
the day after the holiday. Motor vehicles of the following classifications are
however, exempted:
1. S----service;
2. T----Truck;
3. DPL--Diplomatic;
4. CC---Consular Corps; and
5. TC---Tourist Cars
b. The LOI denies the owners of H and EH vehicles of due process, more
specifically of their right to use and enjoy their private property and of their
freedom to travel and hold family gatherings, reunions, outings on week-ends and
holidays, while those not included in the prohibition are enjoying unrestricted
freedom;
HELD:
1. It must be pointed out that the LOI was promulgated to solve the oil crisis
which was besetting the country at that time. It was therefore a valid police power
measure to ensures the country's economy as a result of spiralling fuel prices. In
the interplay of Bautista's right to due process and the exercise of police power by
the State, the latter must be given leeway. The police power is intended to
promote public health, public morals, public safety and general welfare.
2. The petitioners' claim that their right to equal protection was violated is without
basis. This is so because there is a valid classification in this case. Definitely,
Heavy and Extra-Heavy vehicles consume more gasoline that the other kinds of
vehicles and it is but proper to regulate the use of those which consumes more
gasoline. If all the owner of H and EH vehicles are treated in the same fashion, or
whatever restrictions cast on some in the group is held equally binding on the rest,
there is no violation of the equal protection clause.
1. substantive due process---requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the
rights of the person to life, liberty or property. In short, it is to determine whether it has a
valid governmental objective like for the interest of the public as against mere particular
class.
2. Procedural due process---one which hears before it condemns as pointed out by Daniel
Webster.
Due process is a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial (Per Daniel Webster in the DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE)
If the proceeding is not covered by any of the above, due process may not be invoked if one
was not given the right to be heard.
Illustrative case:
DUE PROCESS
majority, that the COMELEC had jurisdiction over the intra-party leadership dispute; that
the Salonga Constitution had been validly amended; and that, as a consequence,
respondent Drilons term as LP president was to end only on November 30, 2007.
Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before
respondent Drilons term expired. Fifty-nine NECO members out of the 87 who were
supposedly qualified to vote attended. Before the election, however, several persons
associated with petitioner Atienza sought to clarify their membership status and raised
issues regarding the composition of the NECO. Eventually, that meeting installed
respondent Manuel A. Roxas II (Roxas) as the new LP president.
On January 11, 2008 petitioners Atienza, Matias V. Defensor, Jr., Rodolfo G.
Valencia, Danilo E. Suarez, Solomon R. Chungalao, Salvacion Zaldivar-Perez, Harlin
Cast-Abayon, Melvin G. Macusi, and Eleazar P. Quinto, filed a petition for mandatory
and prohibitory injunction before the COMELEC against respondents Roxas, Drilon and
J.R. Nereus O. Acosta, the party secretary general. Atienza, et al. sought to enjoin Roxas
from assuming the presidency of the LP, claiming that the NECO assembly which elected
him was invalidly convened. They questioned the existence of a quorum and claimed
that the NECO composition ought to have been based on a list appearing in the partys
60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. Both Atienza and Drilon adopted that list as
common exhibit in the earlier cases and it showed that the NECO had 103 members.
Petitioners Atienza, et al. also complained that Atienza, the incumbent party
chairman, was not invited to the NECO meeting and that some members, like petitioner
Defensor, were given the status of guests during the meeting. Atienzas allies allegedly
raised these issues but respondent Drilon arbitrarily thumbed them down and railroaded
the proceedings. He suspended the meeting and moved it to another room, where Roxas
was elected without notice to Atienzas allies.
On the other hand, respondents Roxas, et al. claimed that Roxas election as LP
president faithfully complied with the provisions of the amended LP Constitution. The
partys 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program could not be used for determining the NECO
members because supervening events changed the bodys number and composition.
Some NECO members had died, voluntarily resigned, or had gone on leave after
accepting positions in the government. Others had lost their re-election bid or did not run
in the May 2007 elections, making them ineligible to serve as NECO members. LP
members who got elected to public office also became part of the NECO. Certain
persons of national stature also became NECO members upon respondent Drilons
nomination, a privilege granted the LP president under the amended LP Constitution. In
other words, the NECO membership was not fixed or static; it changed due to
supervening circumstances.
Respondents Roxas, et al. also claimed that the party deemed petitioners Atienza,
Zaldivar-Perez, and Cast-Abayon resigned for holding the illegal election of LP officers
on March 2, 2006. This was pursuant to a March 14, 2006 NAPOLCO resolution that
NECO subsequently ratified. Meanwhile, certain NECO members, like petitioners
Defensor, Valencia, and Suarez, forfeited their party membership when they ran under
other political parties during the May 2007 elections. They were dropped from the roster
of LP members.
On June 18, 2009 the COMELEC issued the assailed resolution denying petitioners
Atienza, et al.s petition. It noted that the May 2007 elections necessarily changed the
composition of the NECO since the amended LP Constitution explicitly made incumbent
senators, members of the House of Representatives, governors and mayors members of
that body. That some lost or won these positions in the May 2007 elections affected the
NECO membership. Petitioners failed to prove that the NECO which elected Roxas as
LP president was not properly convened.
As for the validity of petitioners Atienza, et al.s expulsion as LP members, the
COMELEC observed that this was a membership issue that related to disciplinary action
within the political party. The COMELEC treated it as an internal party matter that was
beyond its jurisdiction to resolve.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution,
petitioners Atienza, et al. filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondents Roxas, et al. violated petitioners Atienza, et al.s
constitutional right to due process by the latters expulsion from the party.
HELD:
Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from the party is not a simple
issue of party membership or discipline; it involves a violation of their constitutionallyprotected right to due process of law. They claim that the NAPOLCO and the NECO
should have first summoned them to a hearing before summarily expelling them from the
party. According to Atienza, et al., proceedings on party discipline are the equivalent of
administrative proceedings and are, therefore, covered by the due process requirements
laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.
But the requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal affairs
of political parties. The due process standards set in Ang Tibay cover only
administrative bodies created by the state and through which certain governmental
acts or functions are performed. An administrative agency or instrumentality
contemplates an authority to which the state delegates governmental power for the
performance of a state function. The constitutional limitations that generally
apply to the exercise of the states powers thus, apply too, to administrative bodies
The constitutional limitations on the exercise of the states powers are found in
Article III of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights, which guarantees
against the taking of life, property, or liberty without due process under Section 1 is
generally a limitation on the states powers in relation to the rights of its citizens. The
Requisites:
1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and
decide the matter before it;
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the
property subject of the proceedings;
3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard;
4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.
Purisima, J.
Facts:
1. On June 8, 1984, IMELDA MARCOS and JOSE DANS, as Chairman and Vice
Chairman of the Light Railway Transit Authority (LRTA) entered into a Lease Contract
with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation (PGHFI) involving an LRTA property in
Pasay City for P102,760.00 per month for 25 years;
2. On June 27,1984, the PGHFI subleased the said property for P734,000.00 per month to
the Transnational Construction Corporation represented by one Ignacio Jumenez;
3. After petitioners husband was deposed as President of the Philippines, she and Dans
were charged of alleged violation of Section 3 [g] of RA 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan;
4. After trial , the First Division of the Sandiganbayan failed to comply with the legal
requirement that all the 3 justices must be unanimous in its Decision because Justice
Garchitorena and Justice Jose Balajadia voted for the conviction of both accused while
Justice Narciso Atienza voted to acquit them;
5. Thereafter, Justice Garchitorena as Presiding Justice issued Administrative Order No.
288-93 constituting a Special Division of five and designating Justices Augusto Amores
and Cipriano del Rosario;
6. On September 21, 1993, Justice Amores wrote Justice Garchitorena that he be given 15
days his Manifestation. On the same date, however, Justice Garchitorena dissolved the
division of 5 allegedly because he and Justice Balajadia had agreed to the opinion of
Justice del Rosario;
7. On September 24, 1993, a Decision was rendered convicting the petitioner and Dans of
violation of Sec. 3 [g] of RA 3019;
8. On June 29, 1998, the Third Division of the Supreme Court by a vote of 3-2 affirmed the
conviction of the petitioner but acquitted DANS;
9. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and at the same time prayed that her
Motion be heard by the Supreme Court en banc claiming that her right to due process of
law, both substantive and procedural, was violated:
1. as a result of the fact that she was convicted as a result of the alleged disparity of the
rentals agreed upon with PGHFI and the subsequent sub-lease contract between PGHFI
and Transnational Construction Corporation; and
2. the First Division convicted her after Justice Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division
of 5 after a lunch in a Quezon City restaurant where they agreed to convict her in one
case and acquit her in her other cases. The said meeting was attended by another justice
who is not a member of the First Division or the Special Division in violation of the
Rules of the Sandiganbayan which requires that sessions of the court shall be done only
in its principal office in Manila and that only justices belonging to the division should
join the deliberations.
Held:
1. The great disparity between the rental price of the lease agreement signed by
the petitioner (P102,760.00 per month) and the sub-lease rental (P734,000.00 per
month) does not necessarily render the monthly rate of P102,760.00 manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the government in the absence of any evidence
using rentals of adjacent properties showing that the rentals in the property subject
of the lease agreement is indeed very low. NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER
WAS PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION REGARDING THE RENTAL
RATE OF ADJACENT PROPERTIES.. As such, the prosecution failed to prove
the guilt of the petitioner reasonable doubt.
2. The court notes likewise the bias and prejudice of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena against the petitioner as shown by his leading, misleading and
baseless hypothetical questions of said justice to RAMON F. CUERVO, witness
for the petitioner. Said justice asked 179 questions to the witness as against the
prosecutor who cross-examined the witness and asked 73. Said number of
questions could no longer be described as clarificatory questions. Another
ground therefore for the acquittal of the petitioner is that she was denied
IMPARTIAL TRIAL before the Sandiganbayan. This is one reason why the case
could no longer be remanded to the Sandiganbayan especially so that the other
Sandiganbayan Justices in the Special Division of 5 have retired. There is
therefore no compelling reason why the case should still be remanded to the lower
court when all the evidence are already with the Supreme Court.
(NOTE: The vote was 9-5 for Acquittal. CJ Narvasa, Justices Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Romero, and Panganiban voted for conviction while Justice Vitug was the
only Justice who voted for the return of the case to the Sandiganbayan to allow
the corrections of the perceived irregularities in the proceedings below.)
3. DBP VS. CA, January 29, 1999 (Repeated failure of a party to present evidence
justifies the court to consider the case submitted for decision and hold that the party
has waived the right to present evidence)
4. MATUGUINA VS. CA, 263 SCRA 490
5. PEOPLE VS. CA, 262 SCRA 452
6. JAVIER VS. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194
FACTS:
1. The petitioner Evelio Javier and the private respondent Arturo Pacificador were
candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa election in May 1984;
2. Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of the elections and the canvass of
the election returns, Javier went to the COMELEC to prevent the impending
proclamation of his rival;
3. On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the COMELEC directed the
provincial board of canvassers to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the
proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders;
4. On June 7, 1984, the same Second Division ordered the board to immediately
convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the
petition filed by Javier with the COMELEC;
5. On certiorari with the S.C. the proclamation made by the Board of Canvassers
was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5 - day
period of appeal, which the petitioner seasonably made;
6. On July 23, 1984 the Second Division itself proclaimed Pacificador the elected
assemblyman of Antique.
ISSUE:
Was the Second Division of the COMELEC, authorized to promulgate its decision
of July 23, 1984 proclaiming Pacificador the winner in the election ?
The applicable provisions of the 1973 Constitution are Art. XII-C, secs. 2 and 3,
which provide:
"Section 2. Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of all members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial
and city officials."
Petitioner:
The proclamation made by the Second Division is invalid because all contests
involving members of the Batasang Pambansa come under the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Elections en banc.
Respondents:
Only "contests" need to be heard and decided en banc, all other cases can be - in
fact, should be - filed with and decided only by any of the three divisions.
HELD:
a. The S.C. decided to resolve the case even if the Batasang Pambansa had already
been abolished by the Aquino government, and even if Javier had already died in
the meantime. This was because of its desire for this case to serve as a guidance
for the future. Thus it said: "The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of
legal questions but also the conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us
in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The two are not always the
same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been
settled and decision is no longer possible according to law. But there are also
times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless
cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act, then, not only for the
vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as
a restraint upon the future."
b. The S.C. held on the main issue that in making the COMELEC the sole judge
of all contests involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials, the Constitution
intended to give it full authority to hear and decide these cases from beginning to
end and on all matter related thereto, including those arising before the
proclamation of the winners.
The decision rendered by the Second Division alone was therefore set aside as
violative of the Constitution. The case should have been decided en banc.
d. The word "contests" should not be given a restrictive meaning; on the contrary,
it should receive the widest possible scope conformably to the rule that the words
used in the Constitution should be interpreted liberally. As employed in the 1973
Constitution, the term should be understood as referring to any matter involving
the title or claim of title to an elective office, made before or after the
proclamation of the winner, whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in
dispute.
e. There was also a denial of due process. One of the members of the Second
Division, Commissioner Jaime Opinion was a law partner of Pacificador. He
denied the motion to disqualify him from hearing the case. The Court has
repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that
requirement we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also
appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be
just.
Vitug, J.
Mayor Alonte of Binan, Laguna was charged of rape before Branch 25,
RTC of Laguna. However, as a result of a petition for a transfer of venue filed by
the prosecution and granted by the SC, his case was transferred to RTC Branch
53, Manila, presided over by the respondent judge.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was denied his right to due process of law.
Held:
1. the court or tribunal trying the case is clothed with jurisdiction to hear and determine the
matter before it;
2. that jurisdiction was lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;
3. that the accused is given the opportunity to be heard; and
4. that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing (PEOPLE VS. DAPITAN, 197 SCRA
378)
As long as there is a notice to a party in the hearing of a motion on the custody of their children
in a Declaration of Nullity of Marriage case, there is no violation of the right to due process.
and rule on the motion based on the evidence presented by respondent. Petitioner cannot
now come to this Court crying denial of due process.
The right of the accused to due process of law was violated when the judge issued a
warrant for her arrest even though she has not received any notice for her arraignment
before the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City because the notice was actually sent to her
through the Chief of Police of Quezon City.
No. 118628, as proven by Registry Receipt No. 0310. It is true that the return on the
court's Order dated August 8, 2006 had not yet been made by the QC Police on or before
October 10, 2006. Nonetheless, she issued the warrant of arrest in good faith and upon
the following grounds: (a) under Sec. 3 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the court was
entitled to presume that on October 10, 2006, after the lapse of a little over two months,
official duty had been regularly performed and a letter duly directed and mailed had been
received in the regular course of mail; and (b) Sec. 12 of the 1983 Rule on Summary
Procedure in Special Cases provides that bail may be required where the accused does not
reside in the place where the violation of the law or ordinance was committed. The
warrant of arrest she issued was meant to implement this provision, which was not
repealed by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, since complainant is a
resident of Quezon City and not of Baguio City. If her interpretation was erroneous, she
(respondent) believes that an administrative sanction for such error would be harsh and
unsympathetic. She has nothing personal against complainant and did not want to
embarrass or humiliate her. She issued the warrant in the honest belief that her act was in
compliance with the rules. She prays that the case against her be dismissed and that a
ruling on the interpretation of Secs. 10 & 12, of the 1983 Rule on Summary Procedure in
Special Cases, in relation to Sec. 16 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure be
made for the guidance of the bench and bar.
HELD:
Whenever a criminal case falls under the Summary Procedure, the general rule is
that the court shall not order the arrest of the accused, unless the accused fails to appear
whenever required. This is clearly provided in Section 16 of the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure which states:
Sec. 16. Arrest of accused. - The court shall not order the
arrest of the accused except for failure to appear whenever required.
Release of the person arrested shall either be in bail or on recognizance by
a responsible citizen acceptable to the court. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, respondent claims that the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of
complainant was justified, since complainant failed to appear during the arraignment in
spite of an order requiring her to do so. Respondent admits, however, that a copy of the
Order dated August 8, 2006, was sent to complainant through the Chief of Police, PNP,
1104, Quezon City.
While it is true that the Rules of Court provides for presumptions, one of which is
that official duty has been regularly performed, such presumption should not be the sole
basis of a magistrate in concluding that a person called to court has failed to appear as
required, which in turn justifies the issuance of a warrant for her arrest, when such notice
was not actually addressed to her residence but to the police in her city. So basic and
fundamental is a person's right to liberty that it should not be taken lightly or brushed
aside with the presumption that the police through which the notice had been sent,
actually served the same on complainant whose address was not even specified.
The Court has held that a judge commits grave abuse of authority when she
hastily issues a warrant of arrest against the accused in violation of the summary
procedure rule that the accused should first be notified of the charges against him and
given the opportunity to file his counter-affidavits and countervailing evidence .
Hence, complainants right to due process was violated.
Considering that this is respondent's first administrative infraction in her more
than 8 years of service in the judiciary, which serves to mitigate her liability, the Court
holds the imposition of a fine in the amount of P10,000.00 to be proper in this case.
6. Procedural due process before administrative bodies
Requisites:
e. PEDRO CONSULTA VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 179462, February 12, 2009
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant was denied due process having been represented by a
fake lawyer during arraignment, pre-trial and presentation of principal
witnesses for the prosecution.
HELD:
That appellants first counsel may not have been a member of the bar does not dent the proven
fact that appellant prevented Nelia and company from proceeding to their destination. Further,
appellant was afforded competent representation by the Public Attorneys Office during the
presentation by the prosecution of the medico-legal officer and during the presentation of his
evidence. People v. Elesterio1[4] enlightens:
As for the circumstance that the defense counsel turned out later to be a nonlawyer, it is observed that he was chosen by the accused himself and that his
representation does not change the fact that Elesterio was undeniably carrying an
unlicensed firearm when he was arrested. At any rate, he has since been
represented by a member of the Philippine bar, who prepared the petition for
habeas corpus and the appellants brief.
THE FACTS:
PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente
and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were
expelled by the De La Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde
(CSB) Joint Discipline Board because of their involvement in an offensive action
causing injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other student members of
Domino Lux Fraternity.
The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a complaint with the
Discipline Board of DLSU charging private respondents with direct assault.
Similar complaints were also filed by Dennis Pascual and Ericson Cano against
Alvin Lee and private respondents Valdes and Reverente. Thus, cases entitled De
La Salle University and College of St. Benilde v. Alvin Aguilar (ABBSM/9152105), James Paul Bungubung (AB-PSM/9234403), Robert R. Valdes,
Jr. (BS-BS-APM/9235086), Alvin Lee (EDD/9462325), Richard Reverente (ABMGT/9153837) and Malvin A. Papio (AB-MGT/9251227) were docketed as
Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
Please be informed that a joint and expanded Discipline Board had been
constituted to hear and deliberate the charge against you for violation of CHED
Order No. 4 arising from the written complaints of James Yap, Dennis C.
Pascual, and Ericson Y. Cano.
You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board scheduled on April
19, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. at the Bro. Connon Hall for you and your witnesses to give
testimony and present evidence in your behalf. You may be assisted by a lawyer
when you give your testimony or those of your witnesses.
During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28, 1995, private
respondents interposed the common defense of alibi. No full-blown hearing was
conducted nor the students allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them.
ISSUE
Were private respondents accorded due process of law because there was no full-blown
hearing nor were they allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them?
H E L D:
Private respondents right to due process of law was not violated.
In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found
violating school discipline, [t]here are withal minimum standards which
must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due process and
these are: that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause
of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them and with the assistance if counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be
informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce
evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear
and decide the case.
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential
to due process it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present
supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based. To be heard does not
only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court one may also be heard
through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is
accorded, there is no denial of due process.
Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by
the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through petitioner Sales. They were given
the opportunity to answer the charges against them as they, in fact, submitted their
respective answers. They were also informed of the evidence presented against
them as they attended all the hearings before the Board. Moreover, private
respondents were given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and they did.
Lastly, the Discipline Board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it
by all the parties before rendering its resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-325121.
Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process when
they were not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them. This
argument was already rejected in Guzman v. National University] where this Court
held that x x x the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of
procedural due process. And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary
cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those
FACTS:
Petitioners who are students of the National University were barred from
enrolment. The school claims that their scholastic standing is poor and that they
have been involved in activities that have disrupted classes and had conducted
mass actions without the required permits.
HELD:
Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite any duly published rule of
theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor
scholastic standing.
b. Under the Education Act of 1982, students have the right "to freely choose their
field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up
The petitioner were denied of this right, and were being disciplined without due
process, in violation of the admonition in the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools that "no penalty shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as
defined in *** (the) Manuel and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly
promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted. It has
already been held in Berina vs. Philippine Maritime Institute, 117 SCRA 581,
that it is illegal of a school to impose sanctions on students without conducting
due investigation.
c. Of course, all schools have the power to adopt and enforce its rules. In fact the
maintenance of good school discipline is a duty specifically enjoined on every
private school. The Manual of Regulations for Private Schools provides that:
"* * The school rules governing discipline and the corresponding sanctions
therefor must be clearly specified and defined in writing and made known to the
students and/or their parents or guardians. Schools shall have the authority and
prerogative to promulgate such rules and regulations as they may deem necessary
from time to time effective as of the date of their promulgation unless otherwise
specified."
a. need not entail proceedings and hearing similar to those prescribed for actions
and proceedings in court of justice;
But the S.C. said that the following minimum standards must be met to satisfy the
demands of procedural due process:
1. the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them;
2. they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance
of counsel;
3. they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
4. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;
5. the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
1. Notice; and
2. Hearing
9. In administrative proceedings, does due process require that [1] a party be assisted by
counsel and [2] be able to cross-examine the witnesses?
There is no law, whether the Civil Service Act or the Administrative Code of
1987, which provides that a respondent in an administrative case should be
assisted by counsel in order that the proceedings therein is considered valid. Not
only, that, petitioner herein was given the opportunity several times to engage the
services of a lawyer to assist him but he confidently informed the investigators
that he could protect himself.
Administrative Due Process before the Civil Service Commission does not require crossexamination of the complainant and his witnesses by the respondent.
THE FACTS:
2. That Erece did not comply with the directive of the Central Office
addressed to all Regional Human Rights Directors, as follows: to regularize your
receipt of the transportation allowance component of the RATA to which you are
entitled monthly, you are hereby directed to immediately transfer to any of your
staff, preferably one of your lawyers, the memorandum receipt of the vehicle(s)
now still in your name;
3. That he certified in his monthly liquidation of his RATA that he did not
use any government vehicle for the corresponding month, which is not true
because he is the regular user of the government vehicle issued to CHR-Region I.
After a formal investigation of the case, the CSC issued Resolution No.
020124, dated January 24. 2002, finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and penalizing him with
dismissal from the service.
Petitioner filed a petition for review of the CSC Resolution with the CA.
I S S U E:
Petitioner raised the issue of violation of his right to due process because
he was denied the right to cross-examine the respondents on their affidavitcomplaint.
H e l d:
Petitioner contends that he was denied due process as he was not afforded
the right to cross-examine his accusers and their witnesses. He stated that at his
instance, in order to prevent delay in the disposition of the case, he was allowed to
present evidence first to support the allegations in his Counter-Affidavit. After he
rested his case, respondents did not present their evidence, but moved to submit
their position paper and formal offer of evidence, which motion was granted by
the CSC over his (petitioners) objection. Respondents then submitted their
Position Paper and Formal Offer of Exhibits.
The Court agrees with the CA that petitioner was not denied due process
when he failed to cross-examine the complainants and their witnesses since he
was given the opportunity to be heard and present his evidence. In administrative
proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones
side.
There is violation of the right to due process of law if a party he is declared as having waived the
right to file his answer despite improper service of summons.
DATUPAX MANGUDADATU VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET), G.R. No. 179813, December 18, 2008
during the May 14, 2007 national elections. Petitioner won by 17,451 votes and
was proclaimed on May 22, 2007 by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as the
duly elected Representative of the said congressional district. On May 31, 2007,
respondent filed with the HRET a Petition of Protest (Ad Cautelam)3[4] contesting
the results of the elections and the proclamation of petitioner. On June 14, 2007,
the Secretary of the HRET caused the service of summons4[5] upon petitioner
through registered mail at Purok Losaria,5[6] Tamnag (Poblacion), Lutayan,
Sultan Kudarat, requiring petitioner to file an Answer to the protest within ten
(10) days from receipt thereof.
On July 11, 2007, the HRET received the Registry Return Receipt Card,6[7]
showing that a certain Aileen R. Baldenas7[8] (Baldenas) received the summons on
June 27, 2007. On August 16, 2007, the HRET issued Resolution No. 07-1798[9]
which noted the aforementioned Registry Return Receipt Card and that despite
the fact that 43 days from June 27, 2007 had passed since Baldenas received the
summons, petitioner had not filed an answer in accordance with Rule 279[10] of the
2004 HRET Rules. In the same Resolution, the HRET considered petitioner to
have entered a general denial of the allegations of the protest.
In an Order dated August 17, 2007, the HRET set the preliminary conference on
September 27, 2007 at 11:00 a.m.
On September 19, 2007, the HRET issued Resolution No. 07-30012[13] denying for
lack of merit.
In his comment, respondent countered that the HRET did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution Nos. 07-179 dated August 16,
2007 and 07-300 dated September 19, 2007. He argued that Rule 22 of the 2004
HRET Rules merely states that the Secretary of the Tribunal shall issue the
corresponding summons to the protestee or respondent, as the case may be. He
posited then that the intent of the HRET in not expressly specifying personal
service of summons on the protestee or respondent was to give it a reasonable
discretion or leeway in serving the summons by other means such as registered
mail. Thus, service of summons on petitioner through registered mail did not
violate Rule 22 of the 2004 HRET Rules. Further, respondent claimed that Rule
14, Sections 6 and 7 of the Rules of Court were inconsistent with Rule 22 of the
2004 HRET Rules and therefore should not be given suppletory application to
HRET proceedings.
HELD:
The 2004 HRET Rules on summons is silent on how the summons should
be served on the protestee. Significantly, Rule 8014[15] of the 2004 HRET Rules
provides that the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure applies by analogy or suppletorily
in so far as the latter may be applicable and not inconsistent therewith as well as
with the orders, resolutions and decisions of the HRET. In view of the failure of
the HRET Rules to specify the authorized modes of service of summons, resort
then is necessary to Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which state:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may
be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence
with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b)
by leaving copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.
In the case at bar, the service of the summons was made through registered
mail, which is not among the allowed modes of service under Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court.
The Court sees no reason why the HRET cannot make use of its own
process servers to personally serve the summons, or alternatively, delegate the
matter to the process server of a court with territorial jurisdiction over the place of
residence of the respondent/protestee in the election case, at the expense of the
petitioner/protestant. Considering that the proper service of summons on the
respondent/protestee is a jurisdictional requirement and goes to heart of due
process, we cannot allow service of summons by a method not sanctioned by the
HRET Rules in relation to the Rules of Court.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the HRET committed grave abuse of
discretion in considering petitioner to have entered a general denial of the
allegations in respondents petition of protest and in denying his motion to
reconsider as well as his motion to admit answer with counter-protest.
The right to due process on the part of the respondent was violated when the Civil Service
Commission reconsidered its earlier decision in favor of the former based on a Motion for
Reconsideration wherein said respondent was not furnished a copy thereof nor given the chance
to comment on it.
Acting on the complaints, DECS-RO No. III Regional Director Vilma L. Labrador
constituted an Investigating Committee, composed of three DepEd officials from
the province, to conduct a formal investigation. Following the investigation, the
Investigating Committee submitted its Investigation Report dated December 14,
1999, finding Cuanan guilty of sexual harassment and recommending his forced
resignation without prejudice to benefits. In a Decision dated January 28, 2000,
In an Order dated April 13, 2000, then DepEd Secretary Andrew Gonzales
affirmed the Decision of Regional Director Labrador. On May 30, 2000, Cuanan
filed a Petition for Reconsideration thereof, but the same was denied for lack of
merit by Secretary Gonzales in a Resolution dated June 19, 2000.
Cuanan elevated his case to the CSC. On January 20, 2003, the CSC issued
Resolution No. 030069 , which set aside the June 19, 2000 Resolution of
Secretary Gonzales and exonerated Cuanan from the charge of sexual harassment.
On January 23, 2003, copies of the resolution were duly sent to the parties,
including the DepEd , Cuanan received a copy of Resolution No. 030069 on
January 31, 2003 .
On April 11, 2003, then DepEd Secretary Edilberto C. de Jesus filed a Petition for
Review/Reconsideration with the CSC. No copy of the pleading was served upon
Cuanan.
Subsequently, pursuant to Division Special Order No. 001 series of 2003 dated
June 18, 2003, Cuanan was reinstated to his former position as school principal
effective April 30, 2003 In Division Special Order No. 285, series of 2003 dated
July 8, 2003, Cuanan was directed to return to duty . Based thereon, Cuanan
requested payment of salaries and his inclusion in the payroll, which the Division
School Superintendent of Nueva Ecija duly endorsed on November 7, 2003 .
However, on October 22, 2004, the CSC issued Resolution No. 041147 setting
aside CSC Resolution No. 030069 dated January 20, 2003. It found Cuanan guilty
of Sexual Harassment, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service and meted out the penalty of dismissal from the
service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of his service eligibility,
and perpetual disqualification from holding public office. Cuanan received a copy
of the Resolution on November 9, 2004 .
Thirteen days later, or on November 22, 2004, Cuanan filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA seeking to annul Resolution No. 041147, alleging that the
CSC should not have entertained the petition for review/reconsideration since the
DepEd was not the complainant or the party adversely affected by the resolution;
that the petition for review/reconsideration was filed out of time; and that Cuanan
was not furnished copies of the pleadings filed by the DepEd in violation of
procedural due process.
The DepEd sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper
remedy, the mode of review from a decision of the CSC being a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
On May 16, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision granting the petition for certiorari
and setting aside CSC Resolution No. 041147 dated October 12, 2004. The CA
held that while a motion for reconsideration and a petition for review under Rule
DepEd filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the CA denied the same in its
Resolution dated July 18, 2005.
II
DepEd contends that the CA should have dismissed outright the petition for
certiorari because CSC decisions are appealable to the CA by petition for review
under Rule 43; that the filing of a motion for reconsideration was a precondition
to the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65; that the DepEd, even if not
the complainant, may question the resolution of the CSC; that Cuanan failed to
prove that the CSC's petition for review/reconsideration was not seasonably filed;
that even if Cuanan was not served a copy of the pleadings filed by the DepEd,
the CSC was not bound by procedural rules.
Cuanan, on the other hand, contends that the DepEd cannot file a motion for
reconsideration from the CSC Resolution exonerating him, since it is not the
complainant in the administrative case and therefore not a party adversely affected
by the decision therein; that even if DepEd may seek reconsideration of the CSC
Resolution, the petition for review/reconsideration was filed out of time; and that
Cuanans right to due process was violated when he was not given a copy of the
pleadings filed by the DepEd or given the opportunity to comment thereon.
The Court finds it necessary, before delving on the grounds relied upon by the
DepEd in support of the petition, to first resolve the question of whether the
DepEd can seek reconsideration of the CSC Resolution exonerating Cuanan.
Hence, Cuanan's exoneration under CSC Resolution No. 030069 may be subject
to a motion for reconsideration by the DepEd which, as the appointing and
disciplining authority, is a real party in interest.
The remedy of an aggrieved party from a resolution issued by the CSC is to file a
petition for review thereof under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court within fifteen days
from notice of the resolution. Recourse to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
renders the petition dismissible for being the wrong remedy. Nonetheless, there
are exceptions to this rule, to wit: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of
public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c)
when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned order
amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority . As will be shown
forthwith, exception (c) applies to the present case.
At any rate, Cuanan's petition for certiorari before the CA could be treated as a
petition for review, the petition having been filed on November 22, 2004, or
thirteen (13) days from receipt on November 9, 2004 of CSC Resolution No.
041147, clearly within the 15-day reglementary period for the filing of a petition
for review . Such move would be in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading
the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice .
Furthermore, CSC Resolution No. 030069 has long become final and executory. It
must be noted that the records show that copies of CSC Resolution No. 030069
were duly sent to the parties, including DepEd, on January 23, 2003 . Cuanan
received a copy thereof on January 31, 2003 while the DepEd requested a copy
sometime in March 2003, or about two months later. Under the Rules of
Evidence, it is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed, unless
contradicted . This presumption includes that of regularity of service of
judgments, final orders or resolutions.
Consequently, the burden of proving the irregularity in official conduct -- that is,
non-receipt of the duly sent copy of CSC Resolution No. 030069 -- is on the part
of the DepEd, which in the present case clearly failed to discharge the same .
Thus, the presumption stands that CSC Resolution No. 030069 dated January 20,
2003 had already become final and executory when the DepEd filed its Petition
for Review/Reconsideration on April 11, 2003, more than two months later.
It is elementary that once judgment has become final and executory, it becomes
immutable and can no longer be amended or modified. In Gallardo-Corro v.
Gallardo , this Court held:
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it
thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land.
Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period,
the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of his case. The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on
fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice, and that, at the
risk of occasional errors, the judgments or orders of courts must become final at
some definite time fixed by law; otherwise, there would be no end to litigations,
thus setting to naught the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the
enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling
justiciable controversies with finality .
There is no violation of the petitioners right to due process when after the election protest
against him was already submitted for decision and the ballots transferred to the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, the COMELEC went to deliberate on the case at the Senate Electoral
Tribunal using the ballots therein in the process without notice to the petitioner.
BRION, J.:
The petitioner and the respondent vied for the position of Governor of the
Province of Bulacan in the May 14, 2007 elections. The petitioner was proclaimed
winning candidate and assumed the office of Governor.
The respondent seasonably filed an election protest with the COMELEC, which
was raffled to the Second Division and docketed as EPC No. 2007-44. Revision of ballots
involving the protested and counter-protested precincts in Angat, Bocaue, Calumpit,
Doa Remedios Trinidad, Guiginto, Malolos, Meycauayan, Norzagaray, Pandi,
Paombong, Plaridel, Pulilan, San Rafael and San Jose del Monte soon followed. The
revision was conducted at the COMELECs office in Intramuros. After revision, the
parties presented their other evidence, leading to the parties formal offer of their
respective evidence.
The COMELEC approved the parties formal offer of evidence and then required
the parties to submit their respective memoranda. The parties complied with the
COMELECs order. The case was thereafter submitted for resolution.
On March 2, 2009 the COMELEC transferred the Bulacan ballot boxes, including
those involved in the provincial election contest, to the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) in
connection with the protest filed by Aquilino Pimentel III against Juan Miguel Zubiri. In
light of this development, the petitioner moved to suspend further proceedings. .
The COMELECs Second Division denied the petitioners motion in its Order of April
29, 2009, ruling that the COMELEC has plenary powers to find alternative methods to
facilitate the resolution of the election protest; thus, it concluded that it would continue
the proceedings after proper coordination with the SET. The petitioner moved to
reconsider this Order, but the COMELECs Second Division denied the motion in its
Order of May 26, 2009. These inter-related Resolutions led to the COMELECs
continued action specifically, the appreciation of ballots on the provincial election
contest at the SET offices---which the COMELEC did without informing the petitioner.
ISSUE:
The petitioner argues that the election protest involves his election as Governor;
thus, its subject matter involves him and the people of the Province of Bulacan who
elected him. On this basis, he claims entitlement to notice and participation in all matters
that involve or are related to the election protest. He further asserts that he had the
legitimate expectation that no further proceedings would be held or conducted in the case
after its submission for decision.
Citing the commentaries of Father Joaquin Bernas,17[4] the petitioner argues that
the proceedings before the COMELEC in election protests are judicial in nature and
character. Thus, the strictures of judicial due process specifically, (a) opportunity to be
heard and (b) that judgment be rendered only after lawful hearing apply. Notices in
judicial dispute, he claims, are not really just a matter of courtesy; they are elementary
fundamental element of due process, they are part and parcel of a right of a party to be
heard. He further cites Justice Isagani A. Cruz,18[5] who wrote:
The petitioner claims that without notice to him of the proceedings, the due
process element of the right to have judgment only after lawful hearing is absent. There is
no way, he claims, that a judicial proceeding held without notice to the parties could be
described as a lawful hearing, especially a proceeding which has as its subject matter the
sovereign will of an entire province.
He was therefore denied his day in court, he claims, when the COMELEC conducted the
examination and appreciation of ballots. The proceedings should be stopped and declared
null and void; its future results, too, should be nullified, as nothing derived from the
anomalous and unconstitutional clandestine and unilateral proceedings should ever be
part of any decision that the COMELEC may subsequently render. The poisonous fruits
(derived from the proceedings) should have no part and should not be admitted for any
purpose and/or in any judicial proceeding.
HELD:
The petition is anchored on the alleged conduct of proceedings in the election protest
following the completed revision of ballots at the SET premises without notice to and
without the participation of the petitioner. Significantly, the conduct of proceedings is
confirmed by the SET Secretary in the letter we quoted above.19[8] As the issues raised
show the petitioners focus is not really on the COMELEC Orders denying the
suspension of proceedings when the ballot boxes and other election materials pertinent to
the election contest were transferred to the SET; the focus is on what the COMELEC did
after to the issuance of the Resolutions. We read the petition in this context as these
COMELEC Orders are now unassailable as the period to challenge them has long
passed.20[9]
The substantive issue we are primarily called upon to resolve is whether there
were proceedings within the SET premises, entitling the petitioner to notice and
participation, which were denied to him; in other words, the issue is whether the
petitioners right to due process has been violated. A finding of due process violation,
because of the inherent arbitrariness it carries, necessarily amounts to grave abuse of
discretion.
As a preliminary matter, we note that the petitioner has claimed that COMELEC
exercises judicial power in its action over provincial election contests and has argued its
due process position from this view. We take this opportunity to clarify that judicial
power in our country is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.21[10] This exclusive grant of authority to the Judiciary is reinforced
under the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which further
states that Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.. ., thus
constitutionally locating the situs of the exercise of judicial power in the courts.
In contrast with the above definitions, Section 2, Article IX(C) of the Constitution
lists the COMELECs powers and functions, among others, as follows:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions
affecting elections, including determination of the number and location of
polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and
registration of voters.
Under these terms, the COMELEC under our governmental structure is a
constitutional administrative agency and its powers are essentially executive in nature
(i.e., to enforce and administer election laws),22[11] quasi-judicial (to exercise original
jurisdiction over election contests of regional, provincial and city officials and appellate
jurisdiction over election contests of other lower ranking officials), and quasi-legislative
(rulemaking on all questions affecting elections and the promulgation of its rules of
procedure).
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes
the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof. xxx
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his
case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he
asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to
decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded,
namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party at
hearing stage of the proceedings. The essence of this aspect of due process, we have
consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.27[17] A formal or trial-type hearing is
not at all times and in all instances essential; in the case of COMELEC, Rule 17 of its
Rules of Procedure defines the requirements for a hearing and these serve as the
standards in the determination of the presence or denial of due process.
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements are
reinforcements of the right to a hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at the
deliberative stage, as the decision-maker decides on the evidence presented during the
hearing. These standards set forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the case
and are the material and substantial components of decision-making. Briefly, the tribunal
must consider the totality of the evidence presented which must all be found in the
records of the case (i.e., those presented or submitted by the parties); the conclusion,
reached by the decision-maker himself and not by a subordinate, must be based on
substantial evidence.28[18]
Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the decision of a quasijudicial body, further complements the hearing and decision-making due process rights
and is similar in substance to the constitutional requirement that a decision of a court
must state distinctly the facts and the law upon which it is based.29[19] As a component of
the rule of fairness that underlies due process, this is the duty to give reason to enable
the affected person to understand how the rule of fairness has been administered in his
case, to expose the reason to public scrutiny and criticism, and to ensure that the decision
will be thought through by the decision-maker.
In the present case, the petitioner invokes both the due process component rights
at the hearing and deliberative stages and alleges that these component rights have all
been violated. We discuss all these allegations below.
Based on the pleadings filed, we see no factual and legal basis for the petitioner to
complain of denial of his hearing stage rights. In the first place, he does not dispute that
he fully participated in the proceedings of the election protest until the case was deemed
submitted for resolution; he had representation at the revision of the ballots, duly
presented his evidence, and summed up his case through a memorandum. These various
phases of the proceedings constitute the hearing proper of the election contest and the
COMELEC has more than satisfied the opportunity to be heard that the Ang Tibay
hearing stage rights require. In these proceedings, the petitioner stood head-to-head with
the respondent in an adversarial contest where both sides were given their respective
rights to speak, make their presentations, and controvert each others submission, subject
only to established COMELEC rules of procedures. Under these undisputed facts, both
parties had their day in court, so to speak, and neither one can complain of any denial of
notice or of the right to be heard.
In the petition, the petitioner alleged that there were strange proceedings30[20]
which were unilateral, clandestine and surreptitious within the premises of the SET, on
documents, ballots and election materials whose possession and custody have been
transferred to the SET, and the petitioner was NEVER OFFICIALLY NOTIFIED of the
strange on-goings at the SET.31[21] Attached to the petition was the letter of the Secretary
of the SET confirming the conduct of proceedings in the provincial election contest,
and citing as basis the authority of Acting SET Chairman, Justice Antonio T. Carpio,
upon the formal request of the Office of Commissioner Lucenito N. Tagle, and citing
Section 3, COMELEC Resolution No. 2812 dated 17 October 1995 on the coordination
envisioned among the COMELEC, the SET and the courts so as not to delay or interrupt
the revision of ballots being conducted. While the SET letter made the reservation that
While the said provision speaks only of revision, it has been the practice of the Tribunal
to allow the conduct of other proceedings in local election protest cases within its
premises as may be requested, no mention whatsoever was made of the kind of
proceedings taking place.
It was at this point that this Court intervened, in response to the petitioners prayer
for the issuance of temporary injunctive relief, through the issuance of a Status Quo
Order with a non-extendible directive for the respondents to file their comments on the
petition; for indeed, any further revision of ballots or other adversarial proceedings after
the case has been submitted for resolution, would not only be strange and unusual but
would indicate a gross violation of due process rights.
In other words, what took place at the SET were the internal deliberations of the
COMELEC, as a quasi-judicial body, in the course of appreciating the evidence presented
and deciding the provincial election contest on the merits. These deliberations are no
different from judicial deliberations which are considered confidential and privileged.33[23]
We find it significant that the private respondents Comment fully supported the
COMELECs position and disavowed any participation in the contested proceeding the
petitioner complained about. The petitioner, on the other hand, has not shown that the
private respondent was ever present in any proceeding at the SET relating to the
provincial election contest.
To conclude, the rights to notice and to be heard are not material considerations in
the COMELECs handling of the Bulacan provincial election contest after the transfer of
the ballot boxes to the SET; no proceedings at the instance of one party or of COMELEC
has been conducted at the SET that would require notice and hearing because of the
possibility of prejudice to the other party. The COMELEC is under no legal obligation to
notify either party of the steps it is taking in the course of deliberating on the merits of the
provincial election contest. In the context of our standard of review for the petition, we
Alleged Violations of
Deliberation Stage Rights.
On the basis of the above conclusion, we see no point in discussing any alleged
violation of the deliberative stage rights. First, no illegal proceeding ever took place that
would bear the poisonous fruits that the petitioner fears. Secondly, in the absence of the
results of the COMELEC deliberations through its decision on the election protest, no
basis exists to apply the Ang Tibay deliberative stage rights; there is nothing for us to test
under the standards of the due process deliberative stages rights before the COMELEC
renders its decision. Expressed in terms of our standard of review, we have as yet no basis
to determine the existence of any grave abuse of discretion.
Conduct of COMELEC
Deliberations at the SET Premises
We state at the outset that the COMELEC did not lose jurisdiction over the
provincial election contest, as the petitioner seems to imply, because of the transmittal of
the provincial ballot boxes and other election materials to the SET. The Constitution
conferred upon the COMELEC jurisdiction over election protests involving provincial
officials. The COMELEC in this case has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the subject
matter, i.e., the provincial election contest, as well as over the parties. After its
jurisdiction attached, this jurisdiction cannot be ousted by subsequent events such as the
temporary transfer of evidence and material records of the proceedings to another tribunal
exercising its own jurisdiction over another election contest pursuant to the Constitution.
This is the rule of adherence of jurisdiction.34[24]
Thus, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over provincial election contest exists
side by side with the jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, with each tribunal
being supreme in their respective areas of concern (the Senate election contests for the
SET, and the regional, provincial and city election contests for the COMELEC), and with
neither one being higher than the other in terms of precedence so that the jurisdiction of
one must yield to the other.
This order of preference dictated that the ballot boxes and other election materials in
Bulacans provincial election contest, had to be transferred to the SET when the latter
needed these materials for its revision of ballots. The transfer to the SET, however, did
not mean that the Bulacan provincial election contest at that time already submitted for
decision had to be suspended as the COMELEC held in its Orders of 29 April 2009 and
26 May 2009 in EPC No. 2007-44.35[25] This is particularly true in Bulacans case as no
revision had to be undertaken, the revision having been already terminated.
The laws considering appointed officials of the government who filed their certificates of
candidacy considered resigned while elected officials are not does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO TOLENTINO, JR. VS.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010 (Reversing
the December 1, 2009 En Banc Decision)
Puno, CJ
The main issue in this case is whether or not the second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, providing that appointive
officials are deemed automatically resigned from their jobs upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy (while the elected officials are not) is unconstitutional mainly on
the ground that they violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution and suffer
from overbreadth.
On December 1, 2009, the Supreme Court held that the questioned provisions of
the above-mentioned laws are unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection
clause.
On Motion for Reconsideration, the Supreme Court reconsidered its earlier
Decision and declared the above laws and COMELEC Resolution constitutional.
In support of their respective motions for reconsideration, respondent COMELEC
and movants-intervenors submit the following arguments:
(1) The assailed Decision is contrary to, and/or violative of, the constitutional
proscription against the participation of public appointive officials and
members of the military in partisan political activity;
(2) The assailed provisions do not violate the equal protection clause when they
accord differential treatment to elective and appointive officials, because such
differential treatment rests on material and substantial distinctions and is
germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) The assailed provisions do not suffer from the infirmity of overbreadth; and
(4) There is a compelling need to reverse the assailed Decision, as public safety
and interest demand such reversal.
We find the foregoing arguments meritorious.
The assailed December 1, 2009 Decision struck down Section 4(a) of Resolution
8678, the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act (RA) 9369,
and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the following grounds:
(1) They violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because of the
differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices and those holding
elective positions;
(2) They are overbroad insofar as they prohibit the candidacy of all civil servants
holding appointive posts: (a) without distinction as to whether or not they
occupy high/influential positions in the government, and (b) they limit these
civil servants activity regardless of whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in
character, or whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level; and
(3) Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental
right of these public appointive officials.
We grant the motions for reconsideration. We now rule that Section 4(a) of
Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the second proviso in the
third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not unconstitutional, and accordingly
reverse our December 1, 2009 Decision.
We now hold that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code, and the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369
are not violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
i.
In truth, this Court has already ruled squarely on whether these deemed-resigned
provisions challenged in the case at bar violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution in Farias, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al.
In Farias, the constitutionality of Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation
to Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, was assailed on the ground, among
others, that it unduly discriminates against appointive officials. As Section 14 repealed
renowned jurist Benjamin Cardozo stated in his treatise The Nature of the Judicial
Process:
It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of
litigants and the opposite way between another. If a group of cases
involves the same point, the parties expect the same decision. It would be
a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case
was decided against me yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for
the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide differently would
raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an
infringement, material and moral, of my rights." Adherence to precedent
must then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith
in the even-handed administration of justice in the courts.
Our Farias ruling on the equal protection implications of the deemed-resigned
provisions cannot be minimalized as mere obiter dictum. It is trite to state that an
adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot be considered as
obiter dictum. This rule applies to all pertinent questions that are presented and resolved
in the regular course of the consideration of the case and lead up to the final conclusion,
and to any statement as to the matter on which the decision is predicated. For that reason,
a point expressly decided does not lose its value as a precedent because the disposition of
the case is, or might have been, made on some other ground; or even though, by reason of
other points in the case, the result reached might have been the same if the court had held,
on the particular point, otherwise than it did. As we held in Villanueva, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, et al.:
The Farias ruling on the equal protection challenge stands on solid ground even
if reexamined.
To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application
of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality
among equals as determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by
jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned
provisions satisfy the first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however,
proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive officials vis-vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law, because whether one
holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the
measure remain, viz.:
For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet
for that matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-President who
at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected
Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social
welfare development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs).
With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid
justification to treat them differently when both file their [Certificates of
Candidacy] for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the VicePresident, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President,
retains his position during the entire election period and can still use the
resources of his office to support his campaign.
Sad to state, this conclusion conveniently ignores the long-standing rule that to
remedy an injustice, the Legislature need not address every manifestation of the evil at
once; it may proceed one step at a time. In addressing a societal concern, it must
invariably draw lines and make choices, thereby creating some inequity as to those
included or excluded. Nevertheless, as long as the bounds of reasonable choice are not
exceeded, the courts must defer to the legislative judgment. We may not strike down a
law merely because the legislative aim would have been more fully achieved by
expanding the class. Stated differently, the fact that a legislative classification, by itself, is
under inclusive will not render it unconstitutionally arbitrary or invidious. There is no
constitutional requirement that regulation must reach each and every class to which it
might be applied; that the Legislature must be held rigidly to the choice of regulating all
or none.
Thus, any person who poses an equal protection challenge must convincingly
show that the law creates a classification that is palpably arbitrary or capricious. He
must refute all possible rational bases for the differing treatment, whether or not the
Legislature cited those bases as reasons for the enactment, such that the constitutionality
of the law must be sustained even if the reasonableness of the classification is fairly
debatable. In the case at bar, the petitioners failed and in fact did not even attempt to
discharge this heavy burden. Our assailed Decision was likewise silent as a sphinx on this
point even while we submitted the following thesis:
... [I]t is not sufficient grounds for invalidation that we may find
that the statutes distinction is unfair, underinclusive, unwise, or not the
best solution from a public-policy standpoint; rather, we must find that
there is no reasonably rational reason for the differing treatment.
and vagrant, existing at the behest of both appointive and elected officials, over another
in which a significant portion thereof is contained. The absurdity of that position is selfevident, to say the least.
The concern, voiced by our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Nachura, in his
dissent, that elected officials (vis--vis appointive officials) have greater political clout
over the electorate, is indeed a matter worth exploring but not by this Court. Suffice it
to say that the remedy lies with the Legislature. It is the Legislature that is given the
authority, under our constitutional system, to balance competing interests and thereafter
make policy choices responsive to the exigencies of the times. It is certainly within the
Legislatures power to make the deemed-resigned provisions applicable to elected
officials, should it later decide that the evils sought to be prevented are of such frequency
and magnitude as to tilt the balance in favor of expanding the class. This Court cannot
and should not arrogate unto itself the power to ascertain and impose on the people the
best state of affairs from a public policy standpoint.
iii.
employees with respect to their jobs and their political acts and beliefs it is
not enough merely to forbid one employee to attempt to influence or
coerce another. For example, at the hearings in 1972 on proposed
legislation for liberalizing the prohibition against political activity, the
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission stated that the prohibitions
against active participation in partisan political management and partisan
political campaigns constitute the most significant safeguards against
coercion . . .. Perhaps Congress at some time will come to a different
view of the realities of political life and Government service; but that is its
current view of the matter, and we are not now in any position to dispute
it. Nor, in our view, does the Constitution forbid it.
As we see it, our task is not to destroy the Act if we can, but to
construe it, if consistent with the will of Congress, so as to comport with
constitutional limitations. (italics supplied)
Broadrick likewise definitively stated that the assailed statutory provision is
constitutionally permissible, viz.:
Appellants do not question Oklahoma's right to place even-handed
restrictions on the partisan political conduct of state employees.
Appellants freely concede that such restrictions serve valid and important
state interests, particularly with respect to attracting greater numbers of
qualified people by insuring their job security, free from the vicissitudes of
the elective process, and by protecting them from political extortion.
Rather, appellants maintain that however permissible, even commendable,
the goals of s 818 may be, its language is unconstitutionally vague and its
prohibitions too broad in their sweep, failing to distinguish between
conduct that may be proscribed and conduct that must be permitted. For
these and other reasons, appellants assert that the sixth and seventh
paragraphs of s 818 are void in toto and cannot be enforced against them
or anyone else.
We have held today that the Hatch Act is not impermissibly vague.
We have little doubt that s 818 is similarly not so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning. Whatever
other problems there are with s 818, it is all but frivolous to suggest that
xxxx
xxxx
x x x But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that
facial over-breadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of
practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the
otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves
from pure speech toward conduct and that conduct-even if expressivefalls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect
legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Although such laws, if too
broadly worded, may deter protected speech to some unknown extent,
there comes a point where that effect-at best a prediction-cannot, with
confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a
State from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly within
its power to proscribe. To put the matter another way, particularly where
conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the
overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well,
judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. It is our view
that s 818 is not substantially overbroad and that whatever overbreadth
may exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact
situations to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied.
Assembly. The Mayor of Cranston then began the process of enforcing the
resign-to-run provision of the City Home Rule Charter.
xxxx
The court, however, remanded the case to the district court for
further proceedings in respect of the petitioners overbreadth charge.
Noting that invalidating a statute for being overbroad is not to be taken
lightly, much less to be taken in the dark, the court held:
Indeed, the Morial court even quoted Broadrick and stated that:
In any event, the legislature must have some leeway in determining which
of its employment positions require restrictions on partisan political
activities and which may be left unregulated. And a State can hardly be
faulted for attempting to limit the positions upon which such restrictions
are placed. (citations omitted)
V.
Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code Do Not Suffer from Overbreadth
Apart from nullifying Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369,
and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code on equal protection ground, our assailed
Decision struck them down for being overbroad in two respects, viz.:
(1) The assailed provisions limit the candidacy of all civil servants holding
appointive posts without due regard for the type of position being held by the
employee seeking an elective post and the degree of influence that may be
attendant thereto; and
(2) The assailed provisions limit the candidacy of any and all civil servants
holding appointive positions without due regard for the type of office being
sought, whether it be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or in the national,
municipal or barangay level.
Again, on second look, we have to revise our assailed Decision.
i.
According to the assailed Decision, the challenged provisions of law are overly
broad because they apply indiscriminately to all civil servants holding appointive posts,
without due regard for the type of position being held by the employee running for
elective office and the degree of influence that may be attendant thereto.
Its underlying assumption appears to be that the evils sought to be prevented are
extant only when the incumbent appointive official running for elective office holds an
influential post.
Such a myopic view obviously fails to consider a different, yet equally plausible,
threat to the government posed by the partisan potential of a large and growing
bureaucracy: the danger of systematic abuse perpetuated by a powerful political
machine that has amassed the scattered powers of government workers so as to give
itself and its incumbent workers an unbreakable grasp on the reins of power. As
elucidated in our prior exposition:
Attempts by government employees to wield influence over others
or to make use of their respective positions (apparently) to promote their
own candidacy may seem tolerable even innocuous particularly when
viewed in isolation from other similar attempts by other government
employees. Yet it would be decidedly foolhardy to discount the equally (if
not more) realistic and dangerous possibility that such seemingly
disjointed attempts, when taken together, constitute a veiled effort on the
ii.
The assailed Decision also held that the challenged provisions of law are overly
broad because they are made to apply indiscriminately to all civil servants holding
appointive offices, without due regard for the type of elective office being sought,
whether it be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or in the national, municipal or
barangay level.
This erroneous ruling is premised on the assumption that the concerns of a truly
partisan office and the temptations it fosters are sufficiently different from those involved
in an office removed from regular party politics [so as] to warrant distinctive treatment,
so that restrictions on candidacy akin to those imposed by the challenged provisions can
validly apply only to situations in which the elective office sought is partisan in character.
To the extent, therefore, that such restrictions are said to preclude even candidacies for
nonpartisan elective offices, the challenged restrictions are to be considered as
overbroad.
Again, a careful study of the challenged provisions and related laws on the matter
will show that the alleged overbreadth is more apparent than real. Our exposition on this
issue has not been repudiated, viz.:
A perusal of Resolution 8678 will immediately disclose that the
rules and guidelines set forth therein refer to the filing of certificates of
candidacy and nomination of official candidates of registered political
parties, in connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local
Elections. Obviously, these rules and guidelines, including the restriction
in Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, were issued specifically for purposes
of the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections, which, it must be
noted, are decidedly partisan in character. Thus, it is clear that the
restriction in Section 4(a) of RA 8678 applies only to the candidacies of
appointive officials vying for partisan elective posts in the May 10, 2010
The only elections which are relevant to the present inquiry are the
elections for barangay offices, since these are the only elections in this
country which involve nonpartisan public offices.
xxxx
certificate of substitution for representative of the first district of Quezon province last
December 14, 2009 even as her position as Justice Secretary includes supervision over
the City and Provincial Prosecutors, who, in turn, act as Vice-Chairmen of the respective
Boards of Canvassers. The Judiciary has not been spared, for a Regional Trial Court
Judge in the South has thrown his hat into the political arena. We cannot allow the tilting
of our electoral playing field in their favor.
For the foregoing reasons, we now rule that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678 and
Section 13 of RA 9369, which merely reiterate Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code,
are not unconstitutionally overbroad.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondents and
the intervenors Motions for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Courts
December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution declaring
as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, (2)
the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3)
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
1. The scope of the equal protection clause, 95 SCRA 420
2. Read again, Association of Small Landowners vs. Sec. of Agrarian reform, July
14, 1989
4. Equal protection in general-
Read:
There is no violation of the equal protection clause when the Compensation and Classification
Act of 1989 includes certain allowances and fringe benefits into the standardized salaries of most
government employees but not to police and military personnel.
VICTORIA C. GUTIERREZ,
et al vs. DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
G.R. No. 153266,
March 18, 2010
ABAD, J.:
These consolidated cases question the inclusion of certain allowances and fringe
benefits into the standardized salary rates for offices in the national government, state
universities and colleges, and local government units as required by the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 and implemented through the challenged National
Compensation Circular 59 (NCC 59) while the said allowances and other fringe benefits
are not included insofar as members of the police and military are concerned.
The Facts and the Case
Congress enacted in 1989 Republic Act (R.A.) 6758, called the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 to rationalize the compensation of government
employees. Its Section 12 directed the consolidation of allowances and additional
compensation already being enjoyed by employees into their standardized salary rates.
But it exempted certain additional compensations that the employees may be receiving
from such consolidation. Thus:
Section 12. Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation. -All allowances, except for representation and transportation
allowances; clothing and laundry allowances; subsistence allowance of
marine officers and crew on board government vessels and hospital
personnel; hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel
stationed abroad; and such other additional compensation not
otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall be
deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed.
Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being
received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the
standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized.
The Issue:
Whether or not the grant of COLA to military and
police personnel to the exclusion of other government
employees violates the equal protection clause.
The Courts Ruling
At the heart of the present controversy is Section 12 of R.A. 6758 as quoted
above. .
As will be noted from the first sentence above, all allowances were deemed
integrated into the standardized salary rates except the following:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
hazard pay;
(6)
(7)
But, while the provision enumerated certain exclusions, it also authorized the
DBM to identify such other additional compensation that may be granted over and above
the standardized salary rates. In Philippine Ports Authority Employees Hired After July
1, 1989 v. Commission on Audit, the Court has ruled that while Section 12 could be
considered self-executing in regard to items (1) to (6), it was not so in regard to item (7).
The DBM still needed to amplify item (7) since one cannot simply assume what other
allowances were excluded from the standardized salary rates. It was only upon the
issuance and effectivity of the corresponding implementing rules and regulations that
item (7) could be deemed legally completed.
Clearly, COLA is not in the nature of an allowance intended to reimburse expenses
incurred by officials and employees of the government in the performance of their official
functions. It is not payment in consideration of the fulfillment of official duty. As
defined, cost of living refers to the level of prices relating to a range of everyday items
or the cost of purchasing those goods and services which are included in an accepted
standard level of consumption. Based on this premise, COLA is a benefit intended to
cover increases in the cost of living. Thus, it is and should be integrated into the
standardized salary rates.
Petitioners contend that the continued grant of COLA to military and police to the
exclusion of other government employees violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
But as respondents pointed out, while it may appear that petitioners are
questioning the constitutionality of these issuances, they are in fact attacking the very
constitutionality of Section 11 of R.A. 6758. It is actually this provision which allows the
uniformed personnel to continue receiving their COLA over and above their basic pay,
thus:
Section 11. Military and Police Personnel. - The base pay of
uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Integrated National Police shall be as prescribed in the salary
schedule for these personnel in R.A. 6638 and R.A. 6648. The
longevity pay of these personnel shall be as prescribed under R.A.
6638, and R.A. 1134 as amended by R.A. 3725 and R.A. 6648:
No violation of the equal protection clause if Congress would legalize cockfighting and horse racing since police power could regulate gambling.
There is no valid distinction for a law removing the franking privilege of the
judiciary while leaving the same to the Executive and Legislative despite the fact
that there is considerable volume of mails from the courts. Loss of revenue is not
a valid ground unless it would be withdrawn to all government offices.
PUNO, J.
These petitions challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled
An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and for Other Purposes. RA
8180 seeks to end 26 years of government regulation of the downstream oil
industry.
The facts:
1. Prior to 1971, no government agency was regulating the oil industry. New players were
free to enter the oil market without any government interference. There were four (4)
refining companies at that time. SHELL, CALTEX, BATAAN REFINING COMPANY
and FILOIL MARKETING and six (6) petroleum marketing companies: ESSO, FILOIL,
CALTEX, GETTY, MOBIL and SHELL;
2. In 1971, the country was driven to its knees by the crippling oil crisis and in order to
remedy the same, the OIL INDUSTRY COMMISSION ACT was enacted
REGULATING the oil industry ;
3. On November 9, 1973, then President Marcos created the Philippine national Oil
Corporation (PNOC) t break the control of the foreigners to the oil industry. It acquired
ownership of ESSO Philippines and Filoil and likewise bought controlling shares of the
Bataan Refining Corporation. PNOC then operated under the business name PETRON
CORPORATION and for the first time, there was a Filipino presence in the Philippine oil
market;
4. In 1984, Pres. Marcos through section 8 of PD 1956 created the OIL PRICE
STABILIZATION FUND (OPSF) to cushion the effects of frequent changes in the price
of oil caused by the exchange rate adjustments or increase of the world market prices
crude oil and imported petroleum products;
5. By 1985, only three (3) oil companies were left operating in the country. These are:
CALTEX, FILIPINAS SHELL and PNOC;
6. In May, 1987, Pres. Corazon Aquino signed Executive Order No. 172 creating the
ENERGY REULATORY BOARD to regulate the business of importing, exporting,
shipping, transporting, processing, refining, marketing and distributing energy resources
WHEN WARRANTED AND ONLY WHEN PUBLIC NECESSITY REQUIRES. The
Board was empowered to fix and regulate the prices of petroleum products and other
related merchandise;
7. In March, 1996, Congress enacted RA 8180 deregulating the Oil Industry not later than
March, 1997. The law requires that the implementation of the regulation, shall as far as
practicable be made at a time WHEN THE PRICES OF CRUDE OIL AND
PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN THE WORLD ARE DECLINING AND WHEN THE
EXCHANGE RATE OF THE PESO IN RELATION TO THE US DOLLAR; IS
STABLE;
8. On February 8, 1997, Executive Order No. 372 was issued by President Fidel Ramos
implementing full deregulation ON THE GROUND THAT THE OPSF FUND HAS
BEEN DEPLETED;
9. The petitioners questioned the constitutionality of RA 8180 on the following grounds:
The provisions of the law being questioned as unconstitutional are Section 5 [b]
and Section 15 which provide:
xxx
Procedural Issues:
Substantive Issues:
1. Whether or not Section 5 of RA 8180 violates the one titleone subject requirement of
the Constitution;
2. Whether or not Section 5 of RA 8180 violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution;
3. Whether section 15 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of
legislative power;
4. Whether or not EO 392 is arbitrary and unreasonable; and
5. Whether or not RA 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against monopolies,
combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.
HELD:
1. Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle controversies involving
rights but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any agency or branch
of the government. The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent
authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit
imposed by the fundamental law. When the statute violates the Constitution, it is not only
the right of the judiciary to declare such act as unconstitutional and void.
2. The question of locus standi must likewise fall . As held in KAPATIRAN NG MGA
NAGLILINGKOD SA PAMAHALAAN NG PILIPINAS, INC. VS. TAN, it was held
that:
hold that Section 5 providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of RA 8180
which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
4. The contention that there is undue delegation of legislative power when it authorized the
President to determine when deregulation starts is without merit. The petitioners claim
that the phrases as far as practicable, decline of crude oil prices in the world market
and stability of the peso exchange rate to the US dollar are ambivalent, unclear and
inconcrete in meaning and could not therefore provide the determinate or determinable
standards which can guide the President in his decision to fully deregulate the oil
industry. The power of Congress to delegate the execution of laws has long been settled
by this Court in 1916 in the case of COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE
FILIPINA VS. THE BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONERS WHERE IT
WAS HELD THAT:
The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law , which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made.
Two tests have been developed to determine whether the delegation of the
power to execute laws does not involve the abdication of the power to make law
itself. We delineated the metes and bounds of these tests in EASTERM
SHIPPING LINES VS. POEA, thus:
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid
delegation of legislative power , viz: the completeness test and the sufficiency of
standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate,
the only thing he will do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there
must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of
the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. BOTH
TESTS ARE INTENDED TO PREVENT A TOTAL TRANSFERENCE OF
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY TO THE DELEGATE, WHO IS NOT ALLOWED
TO STEP INTO THE SHOES OF THE LEGISLATURE AND EXERCISE A
POWER ESSENTIALLY LEGISLATIVE.
5. EO No. 392 failed to follow faithfully the standards set by RA 8180 when it considered
the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF Fund. The misapplication of this extra
factor cannot be justified. The executive is bereft of any right to alter either by addition or
subtraction the standards set by RA 8180 for it has no power to make laws. To cede to the
executive the power to make laws would invite tyranny and to transgress the separation
of powers. The exercise of delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for the
delegate is a mere agent whose action cannot infringe the terms of the agency.
The state shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interests so
requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be
allowed.
to guaranty continuous domestic supply of petroleum and to discourage fly-bynight operators. They also claim that the prohibition against predatory pricing is
intended to protect prospective entrants.
The validity of the assailed provisions of RA 8180 has to be decided in the light of
the letter and spirit of Section 19, Art. XII of the Constitution. While the
Constitution embraced free enterprise as an economic creed, it did not prohibit per
se the operation of monopolies which can, however, be regulated in the public
interest. This distinct free enterprise system is dictated by the need to achieve the
goals of our national economy as defined under Section 1, Art. XII of the
Constitution which are: more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and
wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the
nation for all, especially the underprivileged . It also calls for the State to protect
Filipino enterprises against unfair and trades practices.
In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that our oil industry is operated and
controlled by an oligopoly (dominated by a handful of players) and a foreign
oligopoly at that. As the dominant players, SHELL, CALTEX & PETRON boast
of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% works to
their immense advantage. Yet, this is only one edge on tariff differential. THE
OTHER EDGE CUTS AND CUTS DEEP IN THE HEART OF THEIR
COMPETITORS. IT ERECTS HIGH BARRIERS TO NE PLAYERS. New
players in order to equalize must build their refineries worth billions of pesos.
Those without refineries had to compete with a higher cost of 4%.They will be
competing on an uneven field.
Now comes the prohibition on predatory pricing or selling or offering to sell any
product at a price unreasonably below the industry average cost so as to attract
customers to the detriment of the competitors. According to HOVENKAMP:
The rationale for predatory pricing is the sustaining of losses today that will
give a firm monopoly profits in the future. The monopoly profits will never
materialize, however, if the market is flooded with new entrants as soon as
the successful predator attempts to raise its price. Predatory pricing will be
profitable only if the market contains significant barriers to new entry.
Coupled with the 4% tariff differential and the inventory requirement, the
predatory pricing is a significant barrier which discourage new players to enter the
oil market thereby promoting unfair competition, monopoly and restraint of trade
which are prohibited by the Constitution.
The judge shall forthwith submit his report within 3 calendar days from
the time the suspect was brought to his/her residence or office.
suspects may not be detained for more than three days without the written
approval of a municipal, city, provincial or regional official of a Human
Rights Commission, or judge of the municipal, regional trial court, the
Sandiganbayan or a justice of the Court of Appeals nearest the place of
arrest. If the arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays or holidays, or after
office hours, the arresting police of law enforcement personnel shall bring
the person thus arrested to the residence of any of the officials mentioned
above that is nearest the place where the accused was arrested. The
approval in writing of any of the said officials shall be secured by the
police or law enforcement personnel concerned within five days after the
date of the detention of the persons concerned; Provided, however, That
within three days after the detention the suspects whose connection with
the terror attack or threat is not established, shall be released immediately.
Section 26 provides that persons who have been charged with terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism---even if they have been granted bail
because evidence of guilt is not strongcan be:
Prohibited from using any cellular phones, computers, or other means of communications
with people outside their residence.
Section 39. Seizure and Sequestration.- The deposits and their outstanding
balances, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records in any bank or
financial institution, moneys, businesses, transportation and
communication equipment, supplies and other implements, and property
of whatever kind and nature belonging:
The accused or suspect may withdraw such sums as are reasonably needed
by his family including the services of his counsel and his familys
medical needs upon approval of the court. He or she may also use any of
his property that is under seizure or sequestration or frozen because of
his/her indictment as a terrorist upon permission of the court for any
legitimate reason.
Read:
In applying for a search warrant, the police officers had in their mind the
first four (4) separate apartment units at the rear of ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE
in Quezon City to be the subject of their search. The same was not, however, what
the Judge who issued the warrant had in mind, AND WAS NOT WHAT WAS
ULTIMATELY DESCRIBED IN THE SEARCH WARRANT. As such, any
evidence obtained from the place searched which is different from that indicated
in the search warrant is inadmissible in evidence for any purpose and in any
proceeding.
NOTE: Very Important: Where a search warrant is issued by one court and
the criminal action base don the results of the search is afterwards commenced in
another court, IT IS NOT THE RULE THAT A MOTION TO QUASH THE
WARRANT (or to retrieve the things seized) MAY BE FILED ONLY IN THE
On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello of the Olongapo PNP was tipped off
by an informer that Aling Rosa would be arriving from Baguio City the following
day with a large volume of marijuana. As a result of the tip, the policemen waited
for a Victory Bus from Baguio City near the PNB Olongapo, near Rizal Ave.
When the accused got off, she was pointed to by the informer. She was carrying a
traveling bag at that time. She was not acting suspiciously. She was arrested
without a warrant.
The bag allegedly contained 8.5 kilos of marijuana. After trial, she was
convicted and imposed a penalty of life imprisonment.
Issue:
Held:
1. customs searches;
2. searches of moving vehicle;
3. seizure of evidence in plain view;
4. consented searches;
5. search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
6. stop and frisk measures.
1. the policemen had sufficient time to apply for a search warrant but they failed to do so;
2. the accused was not acting suspiciously;
3. the accuseds identity was previously ascertained so applying for a warrant should have
been easy;
4. the accused in this case was searched while innocently crossing a street
anything suspicious. The arresting officers do not have personal knowledge that
the accused was committing a crime at that time.
Since there was no valid warrantless arrest, it logically follows that the
subsequent search is similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest.
This is so because if a search is first undertaken, and an arrest effected based on
the evidence produced by the search, both such search and arrest would be
unlawful, for being contrary to law.
On June 19, 1994, at about 2 p.m., SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin of the
Dasmarinas, Cavite PNP were informed by an INFORMER that a drug courier
would be arriving in Barangay Salitran, Dasmarinas, Cavite, from Baguio City,
with an undetermined amount of marijuana. The informer likewise informed them
that he could recognize said person.
At about 4 in the morning of June 20, 1994, the appellant was arrested by the
above-named police officers while alighting from a passenger jeepney near a
waiting shed in Salitran, Dasmarinas, Cavite, upon being pointed to by the
informer. The policemen recovered 28 kilos of dried marijuana leaves. The arrest
was without warrant.
The trial court convicted the appellant for transporting marijuana based on the
testimonies of the Above-named police officers without presenting the alleged
informer.
Issue:
Held:
The accused claims that the warrantless search and seizure is illegal because the
alleged information was received by the police on June 19, 1994 and therefore,
they could have applied for a search warrant. The said contention is without merit
considering that the information given by the informer is too sketchy and not
detailed enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or search warrant.
While there is indication that the informer knows the courier, the records do not
show that he knew his name. On bare information, the police could not have
secured a warrant from a judge.
1. customs searches;
2. searches of moving vehicle;
3. seizure of evidence in plain view;
4. consented searches;
5. search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
6. stop and frisk measures.
Since the accused was arrested for transporting marijuana, the subsequent
search on his person is justified. An arresting officer has the right to validly search
and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons; and (2) those that may be
used as proof of the commission of the offense.
In the case at bar, upon being pointed to by the informer as the drug
courier, the policemen requested the accused to open and show them the contents
of his bag and the cartoon he was carrying and he voluntarily opened the same
and upon cursory inspection, it was found out that it contains marijuana. Hence
the arrest.
The accused insists that it is normal for a person traveling with a bag and
cartoon which should not elicit the slightest suspicion that he was committing a
crime. In short, there was no probable cause for this policemen to think that he
was committing a crime.
The said contention was considered without merit by the Supreme Court
considering the fact that he consented to the search as well as the fact that the
informer was a reliable one who had supplied similar information to the police in
the past which proved positive.
(NOTE: The SC held that the non-presentation of the informer does not
affect the case for the prosecution because he is not even the best witness. He is
merely a corroborative witness to the arresting officers. )
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
To say that reliable tips from informers constitute probable cause for a
warrantless arrest or search IS A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT AND PLACES IN
GREAT JEOPARDY THE DOCTRINES LAID DOWN IN MANY DECISIONS
MADE BY THIS COURT. (PEOPLE VS. BURGOS, 144 SCRA 1; PEOPLE VS.
AMINNUDIN, 163 SCRA 402; PEOPLE VS. ENCINADA, October 2, 1997;
PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE, 220 SCRA).
The case is similar to the case of People vs. Encimada where the appellant
was searched without a warrant while disembarking from a ship on the strength of
a tip from an informer received by the police the previous afternoon that the
appellant would be transporting prohibited drugs. The search yielded a plastic
package containing marijuana. On Appeal, the SC reversed the decision of
conviction and held that Encinada did not manifest any suspicious behavior that
would necessarily and reasonably invite the attention of the police.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
During their arraignment, accused-appellants all gave a not guilty plea.
Version of the Prosecution
In the morning of December 20, 2002, a confidential informant (CI) came to the
Heinous Crime Investigation Section (HCIS) of the Davao City Police Department and
reported that three (3) suspected drug pushers had contacted him for a deal involving six
(6) plastic sachets of shabu. He was instructed to go that same morning to St. Peters
College at Toril, Davao City and look for an orange Nissan Sentra car.
Police Chief Inspector Fulgencio Pavo, Sr. immediately formed a buy-bust team
composed of SPO3 Reynaldo Capute, SPO4 Mario Galendez, SPO3 Antonio Balolong,
SPO2 Arturo Lascaos, SPO2 Jim Tan, SPO1 Rizalino Aquino, SPO1 Bienvenido Furog,
PO2 Vivencio Jumawan, Jr., PO2 Ronald Lao, and PO1 Enrique Ayao, Jr., who would act
as poseur-buyer.
The team proceeded to the school where PO1 Ayao and the CI waited by the gate.
At around 8:45 a.m., an orange Nissan Sentra bearing plate number UGR 510 stopped in
front of them. The two men approached the vehicle and the CI talked briefly with an old
man in the front seat. PO1 Ayao was then told to get in the back seat as accusedappellant Mike Talib opened the door. The old man, later identified as accused-appellant
SPO3 Ara, asked PO1 Ayao if he had the money and the latter replied in the positive. Ara
took out several sachets with crystalline granules from his pocket and handed them to
PO1 Ayao, who thereupon gave the pre-arranged signal of opening the car door. The
driver of the car, later identified as accused-appellant Jordan Musa, tried to drive away
but PO1 Ayao was able to switch off the car engine in time. The back-up team appeared
and SPO1 Furog held on to Musa while PO2 Lao restrained Talib. PO1 Ayao then asked
Ara to get out of the vehicle.
Recovered from the group were plastic sachets of white crystalline substance: six
(6) big sachets, weighing 26.6563 grams, from Ara by PO1 Ayao; five (5) big sachets,
weighing 14.2936 grams, from Musa by SPO1 Furog; and a small sachet, weighing
0.3559 gram, from Talib by PO2 Lao.
The three suspects were brought to the HCIS and the seized items indorsed to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. Forensic Chemist
Austero, who conducted the examination, found that the confiscated sachets all tested
positive for shabu.
Version of the Defense
The defense offered the sole testimony of Ara, who said that he had been a member
of the PNP for 32 years, with a spotless record. On December 20, 2002, SPO3 Ara was
in Cotabato City, at the house of his daughter Marilyn, wife of his co-accused Musa. He
was set to go that day to the Ombudsmans Davao City office for some paperwork in
preparation for his retirement on July 8, 2003. He recounted expecting at least PhP 1.6
million in retirement benefits. Early that morning, past three oclock, he and Musa
headed for Davao City on board the latters car. As he was feeling weak, Ara slept in the
back seat.
Upon reaching Davao City, he was surprised to see another man, Mike Talib, in
the front seat of the car when he woke up. Musa explained that Talib had hitched a ride
on a bridge they had passed.
When they arrived in Toril, Ara noticed the car to be overheating, so they stopped.
Ara did not know that they were near St. Peters College since he was not familiar with
the area. Talib alighted from the car and Ara transferred to the front seat. While Talib was
getting into the back seat, PO1 Ayao came out of nowhere, pointed his .45 caliber pistol
at Ara even if he was not doing anything, and ordered him to get off the vehicle. He saw
that guns were also pointed at his companions. As the group were being arrested, he told
PO1 Ayao that he was also a police officer. Ara insisted that he was not holding anything
and that the shabu taken from him was planted. He asserted that the only time he saw
shabu was on television.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing the Court finds the
following:
SO ORDERED.
As the death penalty was imposed on Ara, the case went on automatic review
before this Court. Conformably with People v. Mateo, we, however, ordered the transfer
of the case to the CA.
The Issue
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the arrest of the
accused-appellants was valid based on the affidavits of the complaining
witnesses
Warrantless Arrest and Seizure Valid
In calling for their acquittal, accused-appellants decry their arrest without probable
cause and the violation of their constitutional rights. They claim that the buy-bust team
had more than a month to apply for an arrest warrant yet failed to do so.
Owing to the special circumstances surrounding the drug trade, a buy-bust
operation has long been held as a legitimate method of catching offenders. It is a form of
entrapment employed as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of
commission of an offense. We have ruled that a buy-bust operation can be carried out
after a long period of planning. The period of planning for such operation cannot be
dictated to the police authorities who are to undertake such operation. It is unavailing
then to argue that the operatives had to first secure a warrant of arrest given that the
objective of the operation was to apprehend the accused-appellants in flagrante delicto.
In fact, one of the situations covered by a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5(a),
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court is when a person has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense in the presence of a peace officer or private person.
It is erroneous as well to argue that there was no probable cause to arrest accusedappellants. Probable cause, in warrantless searches, must only be based on reasonable
ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be
committed. There is no hard and fast rule or fixed formula for determining probable
cause, for its determination varies according to the facts of each case. Probable cause was
Held:
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which
may be waived expressly or impliedly. BUT A WAIVER BY IMPLICATION
CANNOT BE PRESUMED. There must be clear and convincing evidence of an
actual intention to relinquish the right. There must be proof of the following:
The search was therefore held illegal and the members of the searching party held
liable for damages in accordance with the doctrine laid down in Lim vs. Ponce de
Leon and MHP Garments vs. CA.
Read:
Concepcion, C.J.
The petitioners are questioning the validity of a total of 42 search warrants issued
on different dates against them and the corporations in which they are officers,
directing the peace officer to search the persons above-named and/or the premises
of their offices, warehouses and to seize and take possession of the following
personal property, to wit:
since they are the subject of the offense of violating the CENTRAL BANK
LAWS, TARIFF AND CUSTOMS LAWS, INTERNAL REVENUE CODE AND
THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
The petitioners claim that the search warrants are void being violative of the
Constitutional provision on search and seizure on the ground that:
a. The search warrants did not particularly describe the documents, books and
things to be seized;
c. The warrants were issued to fish evidence in the deportation cases against them;
e. the things seized were not delivered to the court to be disposed of in a manner
provided for by law.
Issue:
Were the searches and seizures made in the offices and residences of the
petitioners valid?
a. As to the searches made on their offices, they could not question the same in
their personal capacities because the corporations have a personality separate and
distinct with its officers. An objection to an unlawful search and seizure IS
PURELY PERSONAL AND CANNOT BE AVAILED OF BY THIRD PARTIES.
CONSEQUENTLY, THE PETITIONERS MAY NOT VALIDLY OBJECT TO
THE USE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THEM OF THE DOCUMENTS, PAPERS
AND THINGS SEIZED FROM THE OFFICES AND PREMISES OF THE
CORPORATIONS, TO WHOM THE SEIZED EFFECTS BELONG, AND MAY
NOT BE INVOKED BY THE CORPORATE OFFICERS IN PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST THEM IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY.
b. As to the documents seized in the residences of the petitioners, the same may
not be used in evidence against them because the warrants issued were in the
nature of a general warrant for failure to comply with the constitutional
requirement that:
1. that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants.
They were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons
therein named had committed a violation of Central bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal revenue Code and Revised Penal Code. IN OTHER
WORDS, NO SPECIFIC OFFENSE HAD BEEN ALLEGED IN SAID
APPLICATIONS. THE AVERMENTS THEREOF WITH RESPECT TO THE
OFFENSE COMMITTED WERE ABSTRACT. AS A CONSEQUENCE, IT
WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE JUDGE WHO ISSUED THE WARRANTS
EN BANC
GUTIERREZ, JR. J.
Facts:
--------
Petitioners are suspects of the slaying of Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and
three of his security escorts and the wounding of another. They were initially
charged, with three others, with the crime of multiple murder with frustrated
murder. After conducting a preliminary investigation, a warrant of arrest was
issued on July 31, 1989. Bail was fixed at P200,000.
On September 22, 1989, Fiscal Alfane, designated to review the case, issued a
Resolution affirming the finding of a prima facie case against the petitioners but
ruled that a case of Murder for each of the killing of the four victims and a
physical injuries case for inflicting gunshot wound on the survivor be filled
instead against the suspects. Thereafter, four separate informations to that effect
were filed with the RTC of Masbate with no bail recommended.
On November 21, 1989, a motion for change of venue, filed by the petitioners
was granted by the SC. It ordered that the case may be transferred from the RTC
of Masbate to the RTC of Makati.
substance , and there was no defect on its face. Hence it found it just and proper to
rely on the prosecutors certification in each information.
ISSUE:
----------
Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply
relying on the prosecutions certification and recommendation that a probable
cause exists?
Held:
-----
In the case of Placer vs. Villanueva, the sc ruled that a judge may rely upon the
fiscal's certification of the existence of a probable cause and on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest. However, the certification does not bind the judge to
come out with the warrant of arrest. This decision interpreted the "search and
seizure" provision of the 1973 Constitution. Under this provision, the judge must
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of
order of arrest. If on the face of information, the judge finds no probable cause, he
may disregard the fiscal's certification and require the submission of the affidavits
of witness to aid him at arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable
cause. This has been the rule since U.S vs. Ocampo and Amarga vs. Abbas.
2. In the case of Soliven vs. Makasiar, decided under the 1987 Constitution, the
Court noted that the addition of the word personally after the word determined
and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue
warrants to other respondent officers as to may be authorized by law does not
require the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witness in his
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.What the
(1) personally evaluate the reports and the supporting documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest;
(2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him
in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
3. The case of People vs. Honorable Enrique B. Inting reiterates the following
doctrines:
(1) The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge. It is not for the
Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only
the judge alone makes this detemination.
(2) The preliminary inquiry made by the prosecutor does not bind the judge. It
merely assist him to make the determination of probable cause. The judge does
not have to follow what the prosecutor's present to him. By itself, the prosecutor's
certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the
transcripts of stenographic notes, and all other supporting documents behind the
prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the judge to make his
determination.
4. In the case of Castillo vs. Villaluz, the court ruled that judges of RTC no longer
have authority to conduct preliminary investigations: This authority was removed
from them by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, effective on January 1,
1985.
5. In the present case, the respondent judge relies solely on the certification of the
prosecutor. Considering that all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he
has not personally determined the existence of probable cause. The determination
was made by the provincial prosecutor. The constitutional requirement had not
been satisfied.
The word personally after the word determined does not necessarily mean that
the judge should examine the complainant and his witnesses personally before
issuing the search warrant or warrant of arrest but the exclusive responsibility on
the part of said judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. As
such, there is no need to examine the complainant and his witnesses face to face.
It is sufficient if the judge is convinced of the existence of probable cause upon
reading the affidavits or deposition of the complainant and his witnesses.
Due process; right to bail; probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
(Note: This might be useful also in your Criminal Law)
Narvasa, J.
On February 27, 1990, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law
enforcement officers led by NBI Director Alfredo Lim on the strength of a
warrant of arrest issued by the respondent judge, HON. JAIME SALAZAR,
Regional trial Court, Branch 103, Quezon City in Criminal Case No. 90-10941.
The warrant was issued on an information signed and filed earlier in the day by
Senior State Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE charging Senator Enrile, the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during
the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.
Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI Headquarters on Taft
Ave., Manila, WITHOUT BAIL, NONE HAVING BEEN RECOMMENDED IN
THE INFORMATION AND NONE FIXED IN THE WARRANT OF ARREST.
On February 28, 1990, petitioner through counsel filed a petition for Habeas
Corpus alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or
having been:
a. held to answer for a criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;
d. arrested or detained on the strength of warrant issued without the judge who
issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause.
HELD:
The parties' oral and written arguments presented the following options:
1. Abandon the Hernandez Doctrine and adopt the dissenting opinion of Justice
Montemayor that "rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes";
2. On the second option, the Supreme Court was unanimous in voting to reject the
same though four justices believe that the arguments in support thereof is not
entirely devoid of merit.
3. With the rejection of the first two options, the Hernandez Doctrine remains a
binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other
b. Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed
and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The record shows that a complaint
for simple rebellion against petitioner was filed by the NBI Director and that
based on the strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted
by the respondent prosecutors culminating in the filing of the questioned
information. THERE IS NOTHING INHERENTLY IRREGULAR OR
CONTRARY TO LAW IN FILING AGAINST A RESPONDENT AN
INDUCTMENT FOR AN OFFENSE DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IS
CHARGED IN THE INITIATORY COMPLAINT, IF WARRANTED BY THE
EVIDENCE DEVELOPED DURING THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION.
c. The petitioner claims that the warrant issued is void because it was issued
barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled to the respondent
judge which could hardly gave him sufficient time to personally go over the
voluminous records of the preliminary investigation. Also, the petitioner claims
that the respondent judge issued the warrant for his arrest without first personally
determining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or
affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, Section 2,
of the Constitution. This Court has already ruled that it is not unavoidable duty of
the judge to make such a personal examination, it being sufficient that he follows
established procedure by PERSONALLY EVALUATING THE REPORT AND
THE SUPPORTING DOCUMENT SUBMITTED BY THE PROSECUTOR.
MEREBY BECAUSE SAID RESPONDENT JUDGE HAD WHAT SOME
d. Petitioner also claims that he is denied of his constitutional right to bail. In the
light of the Court's affirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and
of the logical and necessary corollary that the information against him should be
considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion which is bailable before
conviction, THAT MUST NOW BE ACCEPTED AS A CORRECT
PROPOSITION.
NOTES:
Was a petition for Habeas Corpus before the Supreme Court the appropriate
vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?
The Supreme Court held that the criminal case before the respondent judge is the
normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty
pending trial and judgment. The correct course was for the petitioner to invoke
that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail
per se or by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. ONLY AFTER
THAT REMEDY WAS DENIED BY THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD THE
REVIEW JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT BE INVOKED, AND
EVEN THEN, NOT WITHOUT FIRST APPLYING TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS IF APPROPRIATE RELIEF WAS ALSO AVAILABLE THERE.
Even assuming that the petitioner's premise that the information charges a nonexistent crime would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under
either hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash
brought in the criminal action before the respondent judge.
Read:
PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE, G.R. No. 87059, June, 1992, 210 scra 174
Cruz, J.
Facts|
1. On August 8, 1987, the Western Police District received a telephone call from
an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan
Luna and North Bay Blvd., in Tondo, Manila;
2. When the surveilance team arrived therein, they saw the accused "looking from
side to side" and "holding his abdomen". They approched these persons and
identified themselves as policement that is why they tried to ran away because of
the other lawmen, they were unable to escape;
3. After their arrest, a .38 cal. Smith and Wessor revolver was confiscated from
the accused and several days later, an information for violation of PD 1866 was
filed against him;
4. After trial, Mengote was convicted of having violated PD 1866 and was
sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua based on the alleged gun as the principal
evidence. Hence this automatic appeal.
Issue:
Held:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.- A peace officer or private person
may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
xxx
We have carefully examined the wording of this Rule and cannot see how we we
can agree with the prosecution.
Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he
is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the
presence of the arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the
arrest in question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side"
and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting officers themselves. There
was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being actually
committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in thie presence.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not
necessary as long as Mengote's acts created a reasonable suspicion on the part of
the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an offense had been
committed and that accused-appellant had committed it". The question is, What
offense? What offense could possibly have been suggested by a person "looking
from side to side" and "holding his abdomen" and in aplace not exactly forsaken.
These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made them less
so, if at all. It might have been different if Mengote had been apprehended at an
unholy hour and in a place where he had no reason to be, like a darkened alley at
3 o'clock in the morning. But he was arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a
crowded street shortly after alighting from a passenger jeep with his
companion.He was not skulking in the shadows but walking in the clear light of
day. There was nothing clandestine about his being on that street at that busy hour
in the blaze of the noonday sun.
On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them
innoent, why hiseyes were darting from side to sideand he was holding his
abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers, as the
prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion was
all about.
xxx
The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting
officers' suspicion other than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his
abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these
acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or
was at least being attempted in their presence.
This is similar to PEOPLE vs. AMMINUIDIN, 163 SCRA 402 where the Court
held that a warrantless arrest of the accused was unconstitutional. This was
effected while he was coming down the vessel, to all appearances no less innocent
than the other disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor was actually
committing or attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting
officers. He was not even acting suspiciously. In short, there was no probable
cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly suggested, dispensed with the
constitutional requirement of a warrant.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also
not been satisfied. Theprosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's
arrest an offense had in fact been committed and that the arresting officers had
personal knowldge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they
had was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had
yet to bem committed.
xxx
Before these events, the peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote's
identity, let alone the fact that he was involved in the robbery of Danganan's
house.
In the landmark case of People vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1, this Court declared:
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have
personalknowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his
presence or within his view. (SAYO vs. CHIEF OF POLICE, 80 Phil. 859).
xxx
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that
there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed
a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime
has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to
suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the
offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the
identity of the perpetrator..
This doctrine was affirmed in Alih vs. Castro, 151 SCRA 279, thus:
If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in
connection with a crime about to be committed, being committed, or just
committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the record of such a
falsification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the Revised Rule 113,
Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the
ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People vs. Burgos.
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and
searched just because he is holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of
a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer could clamp handcuffs on any person with a
shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act is actually
committing or attempting it. This simply cannot be done in a free society. This is
not a police state where order is exalted over liberty or, worse, personal malice on
the part ofthe arresting officer may be justified in the name of security.
xxx
The court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions
of the Bill of Rights, the prosecution of the accused-appellant might have
succeeded. As it happened, they allowed their over zealousness to get the better of
them, resulting in their disregard of the requirements of a valid search and seizure
that rendered inadmissible the evidence they had invalidly seized.
This should be a lesson to other peace officers. Their impulsiveness may be the
very cause of the acquittal of persons who deserve to be convicted, escaping the
clutches of the law, because, ironically enough, it has not been observed by those
who are supposed to enforce it.
Mendoza, J.
However, by entering a plea of not guilty during the arraignment, the accusedappellant waived his right to raise the issue of illegality of his arrest. IT IS NOW
SETTLED THAT OBJECTION TO A WARRANT OF ARREST OR THE
PROCEDURE BY WHICH A COURT ACQUIRES JURISDICTION OVER THE
PERSON OF AN ACCUSED MUST BE MADE BEFORE HE ENTERS HIS
PLEA, OTHERWISE, THE OBJECTION IS DEEMED WAIVED. THE FACT
THAT THE ARREST WAS ILLEGAL DOES NOT RENDER THE
SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS VOID AND DEPRIVE THE STATE OF ITS
RIGHT TO CONVICT THE GUILTY WHEN ALL THE FACTS POINT TO THE
CULPABILITY OF THE ACCUSED.
g-1. Warrantless Search and seizure by a private person. (Valid since the
constitutional provision is not applicable to him; when it is not valid)
Read:
1. PEOPLE VS. MENDOZA, 301 SCRA 66
Carpio-Morales, J.
The petitioner suspects that the respondents who are officers of the Silahis
International Hotel Union were using the Union Office located inside the hotel in
the sale or use of marijuana, dollar smuggling, and prostitution. They arrived at
the said conclusion through surveillance.
In the morning of January 11, 1988, while the respondent union officer was
opening the Union Office, security officers of the plaintiff entered the union office
despite objections thereto by forcibly opening the same. Once inside the union
office they started to make searches which resulted in the confiscation of a plastic
bag of marijuana. An information for violation of the dangerous drugs act was
filed against the respondent before the RTC of Manila which acquitted them on
the ground that the search conducted was illegal since it was warrantless and
without consent by the respondents.
After their acquittal, the respondents filed a case for Malicious Prosecution
against the petitioner for violation of Art. 32 of the Civil Code. After trial, the
Regional Trial Court held that petitioners are liable for damages as a result of an
illegal search. The same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Held:
The search is not valid and they are civilly liable under Art. 32 of the Civil Code.
The fact that the union office is part of the hotel owned by the petitioners does not
justify the warrantless search. The alleged reports that the said union office is
being used by the union officers for illegal activities does not justify their acts of
barging into the said office without the consent of the union officers and without a
search warrant. If indeed there was surveillance made, then they should have
applied for a search warrant.
The ruling in People vs. Andre Marti is not applicable here because in Marti, a
criminal case, the issue was whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in
violation of ones constitutional rights may be invoked against the State. In other
words, the issue in Marti is whether the evidence obtained by a private person
acting in his private capacity without the participation of the State, is admissible.
Bidin, J.
FACTS:
Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging
and Export Forwarders to send four (4) packages to Zurich, Switzerland. Anita
Reyes, owner of the place (no relation to Shirley), received said goods and asked
if she could examine and inspect it. Marti refused. However later, following
standard operating procedure, Job Reyes, co-owner and husband of Anita opened
the boxes for final inspection, before delivering it to the Bureau of Customs
and/or Bureau of Posts.
Upon opening, a peculiar odor emanated from the box that was supposed to
contain gloves. Upon further perusal, he felt and saw a dried leaves inside the
box. Job Reyes then brought samples to the NBI, he told them that the boxes to be
shipped were still in his office. In the presence of the NBI agents, Reyes opened
the box and discovered that the odor came from the fact that the dried leaves were
actually those of the marijuana flowering tops.
Two other boxes,marked as containing books and tabacalera cigars; also revealed
bricks or case-like marijuana leaves and dried marijuana leaves respectively.
Marti was later invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the
dried leaves. Thereafter an information was filed against the appellant for
violating RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. The Special Criminal Court of
Manila convicted accused Marti of violating sec.21(b) of said RA.
ISSUES:
1. Did the search conducted by a private person, violate accused's right against
unreasonable searches seizures and invocable against the state?
Held:
1. No, constitutional protection on search and seizure is imposable only against
the state and not to private persons.
Since Art. III,2 of the 1987 constitution is almost verbatim from the United States
constitution, the SC may consider US Fed. SC cases as likewise doctrinal in this
Case at bar will show that it was Job Reyes` initiative that perpetrated the search.
He opened the packages and took the samples to NBI. All the NBI agents did was
to observe and look in plain sight. This did not convert it to a search as
contemplated by the constitution.
2. Yes, since the search was valid, the evidence from therein is admissible
evidence.
(U.S. cases cited: Burdeau v. McDowell (256 us 465 [1921], state v. Bryan (457 p
2d 661 [1968], Walker v. state (429 s.w 2d 121 [1969]), Barnes v. us (373 F 2d
517 [1967]), Chadwick v. state (329 sw 2d 135).
In fact, the subsequent discovery in his car which was parked in a distant place
from where the illegal possession of firearm was committed [after he requested
that he will bring his car to the Police Station after his warrantless arrest) , of a
drug paraphernalia and shabu, CANNOT BE SAID TO HAVE BEEN MADE
DURING AN ILLEGAL SEARCH. As such, the items do not fall under the
exclusionary rule and the unlicensed firearms, drug paraphernalia and the shabu,
can be used as evidence against the accused.
FACTS:
In July 1987, the Special Operations Group of the CIS received a tip from one of
its informers about an organized group engaged in importation of illegal drugs
and smuggling of contraband items. To infiltrate the crime syndicate, they
recruited confidential men and "deep penetration agents" under OPLAN
SHARON 887. One such agent was Reynaldo Tia (the dicharged/accused). As an
agent, he submitted regular reports of undercover activities of suspected
syndicates. CAPTAIN PALMERA, head of oplan sharon 887, in turned informed
the Dan
gerous Drugs Board of Tia's activities.
Tia was introduced to his co-accused Lim Cheng Huat by another agent named
George. Lim wanted a male travelling companion for his business trips abroad.
Tia offered his services and was hired by Lim. Later, Tia was introduced to Peter
Appellant Lo Ho Wing and Tia left for Hongkong on October 4, 1987. Tia
telephoned Capt. Palmera that they would return to the Philippines on October 6.
From Hongkong, the two proceeded to Guangzhou in mainland China. There,
appeallant Lo Ho Wing bought six (6) cans of tea.Tia saw these 6 bags when they
were opened for examination. That evening, they went to Lo Ho Wing's room and
he saw two other men with him. One was fixing the tea bags, while the other was
burning a substance on a piece of aluminum foil using a lighter. Appellant Lo Ho
Wing joined the second man and sniffed the smoke emitted by the burning
substance. When Tia asked Lo Ho Wing what cargo they would bring to Manila,
the latter replied that they would be bringing Chinese drugs.
The next day en route to Manila, customs examiners inspected the bags
containing the tin cans of tea. Since the bags were not closely examined, appellant
Lo Ho Wing and Tia were cleared. In Manila, They were met by Lim Cheng Huat.
Appelant Lo Ho Wing and Tia boarded a taxi from the airport and loaded their
luggage in the taxi's compartment. Lim Cheng Huat followed them in another
taxi.
A tin can of tea was taken out of the compartment. Sgt. Cayabyab of the CIS pried
the lid open and pressed it in the middle to pull out the contents. Crystalline white
powder resmbling crushed alum came out. Suspecting the crystalline powder to be
a dangerous drug, he had the three travelling bags opened for inspection. All the
bags threshed out a total of six tin cans. Tia and appellant were taken to the CIS
headquarters for questioning. Meanwhile, the second taxi carrying Lim Cheng
Huat sped in attempt to escape. However, they were later captured.
Samples from the bag tested positive for metamphetamine. The three suspects
were indicted for violating Art. III, sec.15 of the Dangerous Drug Act. Appellant
Lo Ho Wing and Lim Cheng Huat were sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and
to pay a fine of P25,000 each. Reynaldo Tia was discharged as a state witness.
The trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of government agents since
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties were in their
favor.
ISSUES:
1. Was the warrantless search valid?
2. Are the effects taken admissible as evidence?
HELD:
2. Since the search and seizure are valid, the evidence obtained is admissible as
evidence in any proceeding.
Warrantless searches;
"zonings" and "saturation drives"
Section 17, Art. VII of the Constitution
Gutierrez, Jr., J.
Facts:
The respondents claim that they have legal authority to conduct saturation drives
under Art. VII, Sec. 17 of the Constitution which provides:
The respondents would want to justify said military operation on the following
constitutional provisions:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion x x x
xxxx
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Held:
There can be no question that under ordinary circumstances, the police action of
the nature described by the petitioners would be illegal and blatantly violative of
the Bill of Rights. If the military wants to flush out subversive and criminal
elements, the same must be consistent with the constitutional and statutory rights
of the people. However, nowhere in the Constitution can we see a provision which
prohibits the Chief Executive from ordering the military to stop unabated
criminality, rising lawlessness and alarming communist activities. However, all
police actions are governed by the limitations of the Bill of Rights. The
government cannot adopt the same reprehensible methods of authoritarian
systems both of the right and of the left. This is so because Art. III, Section 3 of
the Constitution is very clear as explained in Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687
and Century Fox vs. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 655. Also, it must be pointed
out that police actions should not be characterized by methods that offend one's
sense of justice (Rochin vs. California, 342 US 165).
The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were actually
committed. But the remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the essential
and legitimate ones. A show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights
of people are protected and not violated. However, the remedy of the petitioners is
not an original action for prohibition since not one victim complains and not one
violator is properly charged. It is basically for the executive department and the
trial courts. The problem is appropriate for the Commission of Human Rights.
The petition was therefore remanded to the Regional Trial Courts of Manila,
Malabon and Pasay City where the petitioners may present evidence supporting
their allegations so that the erring parties may be pinpointed and prosecuted. In
the meantime, the acts violative of human rights alleged by the petitioners as
committed during the police actions are ENJOINED until such time as permanent
rules to govern such actions are promulgated.
********************
Where liberty is involved, every person is a proper party even if he may not be
directly injured. Each of us has a duty to protect liberty and that alone makes him
a proper party. It is not only the owner of a burning house who has the right to call
the firemen.
Section 2, Art. III of the constitution is very clear: Unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for whatever purpose is prohibited.
should instead categorically and emphatically that these saturation drives are
violative of human rights and individual liberty and should be stopped
immediately. While they may be allowed in the actual theater of military
operations against the insurgents, the Court should also make it clear that Metro
Manila is not such a battleground.
h. If the judge finds that there's probable cause, must he issue a warrant of arrest
as a matter of course? See the distinctions.
Read:
1. SAmulde vs. Salvani, September 26, 1988 (No because a warrant is issued in order to
have jurisdiction of the court over the person of an accused and to assure the court of his
presence whenever his case is called in court. As such, if the court believes that the
presence of the accused could be had even without a warrant of arrest, then he may not
issue said warrant. Note: This case involves a minor offense)
2. GOZO VS. TAC-AN, 300 SCRA 265. If the offense committed is a serious one like that
obtaining in this case for murder, the Judge must issue a warrant of arrest after
determining the existence of probable cause)
i. Searching questions
Read:
Padilla, J.
This is a petition to annul and set aside the Order of respondent Judge DENYING
the motion of the petitioner to quash Search Warrant No. 87-14 as well as its
Order denying the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Facts:
1. On October 31, 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of the Intelligence
Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police District (WPD) filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, presided by the respondent Judge,
an application for the issuance of a Search Warrant for violation of PD 1866
against the petitioner;
"1. That he has been informed and has good and sufficient reasons to believe that
NEMESIO PRUDENTE who may be found at the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines x x x has in his control or possession firearms, explosives, hand
grenades and ammunition intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense x x x;
"2. That the undersigned has verified the report and found it to be a fact x x x ".
3. On November 1, 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search warrant was
enforced by some 200 WPD operatives led by Col. Edgar Dula Torre and Major
Maganto;
5. On November 6, 1987, the petitioner moved to quash the search warrant on the
grounds that:
a. the complainant's lone witness, Lt. Angeles had no personal knowledge of the
facts which formed the basis for the issuance of the search warrant;
b. the examination of said witness was not in the form of searching questions and
answers;
c. the search warrant was a general warrant, for the reason that it did not
particularly describe the place to be searched and that it failed to charge one
specific offense; and
d. the warrant was issued in violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in
that the complainant failed to allege that the issuance of the search warrant on a
Saturday was urgent.
6. On March 9, 1986, the respondent judge denied the motion to quash and on
April 20, 1988, the same judge denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
Was the Search Warrant issued by the respondent judge valid? Was there probable
cause?
Held:
a. For a valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be
determined by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The probable cause
must be in connection with one specific offense and the judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements together with any affidavits submitted.
The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched". (Quintero vs.
NBI, June 23, 1988). This probable cause must be shown to be within the
personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not
based on mere hearsay. (P. VS. SY JUCO, 64 PHIL. 667; ALVAREZ VS. CFI, 64
PHIL. 33; US VS. ADDISON, 28 PHIL. 566).
In his affidavit, Major Dimagmaliw declared that "he has been informed" that
Nemesio Prudente "has in his control and possession" the firearms and
explosivees described therein, and that he "has verified the report and found it to
be a fact." On the other hand, Lt. Angeles declared that as a result of continuous
surveillance for several days, they "gathered informations from verified sources"
that the holders of said firearms and explosives are not licensed t possess them. It
is clear from the foregoing that the applicant and his witness HAD NO
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES which
became the basis for issuing the questioned search warrant, but acquired
knowledge thereof only through information from other sources or persons.
Despite the fact that Major Dimagmaliw stated in his affidavit that "he verified
the information he had earlier received and found it to be a fact, YET THERE IS
NOTHING IN THE RECORD TO SHOW OR INDICATE HOW AND WHEN
SAID APPLICANT VERIFIED THE EARLIER INFORMATION ACQUIRED
BY HIM AS TO JUSTIFY HIS CONCLUSION. He might have clarified this
point if there had been searching questions and answers, but there were none. In
fact, the records yield no questions and answers, whether searching or not, vis-avis the said applicant.
In ALVAREZ VS. CFI, 64 PHIL. 33, it was held that the following test must be
complied with in an application for search warrant or in a supporting deposition
based on personal knowledge or not-
Tested by the above standards, the allegation of the witness, Lt. Angeles, do not
come up to the level of facts based on his personal knowledge so much so that he
cannot be held liable for perjury for such allegations in causing the issuance of the
questioned search warrant.
Besides, respondent judge did not take the deposition of the applicant as required
by the Rules of Court. As held in Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 694, "mere
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus insufficient. The
examining judge has to take the depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record."
b. There was also no searching questions asked by the respondent judge because
as shown by the record, his questions were too brief and short and did not
examine the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and
answers. On the contrary, the questions asked were leading as they called for a
simple "yes" or "no" answer. As held in Quintero vs. NBI, June 23, 1988, "the
questions propounded are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause.
Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant
and conducting of examination in a general manner would not satisfy the
requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant."
The Court avails of this decision to reiterate the strict requirements for
determination of probable cause in the valid issuance of a search warrant as
enunciated in earlier cases. True, this requirements are stringent but the purpose is
to assure that the constitutional right of the individual against unreasonable search
and seizure shall remain both meaningful and effective.
c. The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer
with the warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place
intended (P VS. VELOSO, 48 PHIL. 180). In the case at bar, the warrant
described the place to be searched as the premises of the PUP, more particularly
the offices of the Department of Science and Tactics as well as the Office of the
President, Nemesio Prudente.
Read also:
1. Alvarez vs. CFI, 64 Phil. 33 (When the applicant is basing his knowledge from
an informant, the same is not valid)
2. Luna vs. Plaza, 26 SCRA 313
3. De Mulata vs. Irizari, 62 SCRA 210
4. Marinas vs. Siochi, 104 SCRA 423
5. Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 687
6. Mata vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388 (Depositions of the applicants and witnesses
should be attached to the record of the case)
7. Corro vs. Lising, 137 SCRA 541
8. Nolasco vs Pano, 147 SCRA 509
9. Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800
10. P. vs. Burgos, September 14,1986
11. P. vs. Aminnudin Y Ahni, July 6,1988
12. Ponsica vs. Ignalaga, July 31,1987 (When the statements in the affidavits of
witnesses are mere generalities, mere conclusions of law, and not positive
statements of particular acts, the warrant is not valid)
13. Aberca vs. Ver, April 15,1988
2. Panganiban vs. Cesar, 159 SCRA 599
3. PENDON VS. CA, November 16, 1990. (When the questions asked to the applicant for a
search warrant was pre-typed, the same is not valid since there could have been no
searching questions)
Read:
Padilla, J.
Facts:
1. On January 20, 1987, the National Capital Region District Command
(NCRDC) was activated with the mission of conducting security operations
within its area of responsibility for the purpose of maintaining peace and order. As
part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in
various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Issue:
Whether or not the existence of said checkpoints as well as the periodic searches
and seizures made by the military authorities without search warrant valid?
Held:
Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the
military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the
checkpoints as per se illegal.
Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is
to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle
which is parked on a public fair grounds (People vs. Case, 190 MW 289), or
simply looks into a vehicle (State vs. Gaina, 97 SE 62), or flashes a light therein
(Rowland vs. Commonwealth, 259 SW 33), these do not constitute unreasonable
search.
Finally, it must be emphasized that on July 17, 1988, the military checkpoints in
Metro Manila were temporarily lifted and a review and refinement of the rules in
the conduct of the police and military manning the checkpoints upon order of the
NCRDC Chief.
The bland declaration by the majority that individual rights must yield to the
demands of national security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended
precisely to limit the authority of the State even if asserted on the ground of
national security.
The Supreme Court in its Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration dated 15
June, 1990, held that military and police checkpoints are not illegal as these
measures to protect the government and safeguards the lives of the people. The
checkpoints are legal as where the survival of the organized government is on the
balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril. However,
the Supreme Court held further that the military officers manning the
checkpoints may conduct VISUAL SEARCH ONLY, NOT BODILY
SEARCH.
Read also:
Read:
Read:
Read:
1-c. P. vs. Maspil, Jr., August 20, 1990 (Compare with P. vs. Aminnudin, July 6,
1988, supra)
1-d. Posadas vs. CA, Aug. 2, 1990
1-e. P. vs. De la Cruz
1-f. P. vs. ortiz, Dec. 3, 1990
1-g. Rolito Go vs. CA, Feb. 11, 1992
1-h. People vs. Mati, January 18, 1991
2. Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 121 SCRA 538
2-a. P vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1
2-b. People vs. de la Cruz, 184 SCRA 416
2-c. Gatchalian vs. Board, May 31, 1991
2-d. People vs. Sucro, March 18, 1991
2-e. PEOPLE VS. SOLAYAO, 262 SCRA 255
2-f. PEOPLE VS. CUISON, 256 SCRA 325
2-g. PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212 SCRA 547
2-h. OPOSADAS VS. CA, 258 SCRA 188
2-i. PEOPLE VS. JUATAN, 260 SCRA 532 (Buy-bust operation)
3. Sec. 6, Rule 113, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended
n. Effect posting bail or entering a plea during the arraignment, if the arrest was
illegal. (The alleged illegality of the arrest is deemed waived upon posting of the
bond by the accused)
Mendoza, J.
However, by entering a plea of not guilty during the arraignment, the accusedappellant waived his right to raise the issue of illegality of his arrest. IT IS NOW
SETTLED THAT OBJECTION TO A WARRANT OF ARREST OR THE
PROCEDURE BY WHICH A COURT ACQUIRES JURISDICTION OVER THE
PERSON OF AN ACCUSED MUST BE MADE BEFORE HE ENTERS HIS
PLEA, OTHERWISE, THE OBJECTION IS DEEMED WAIVED. THE FACT
THAT THE ARREST WAS ILLEGAL DOES NOT RENDER THE
SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS VOID AND DEPRIVE THE STATE OF ITS
RIGHT TO CONVICT THE GUILTY WHEN ALL THE FACTS POINT TO THE
CULPABILITY OF THE ACCUSED.
Read:
Read:
Read:
1. Century Fox vs. CA, 164 SCRA 655 (The master copy of the allegedly pirated tape
should be presented before the judge in order to convince him of the existence of
probable cause)
2. COLUMBIA PICTURES VS. CA, 261 SCRA 144
The protection against unreasonable search and seizure covers both innocent and
guilty alike against any form of highhandedness of law enforces.
The plain view doctrine, which may justify a search without warrant,
APPLIES ONLY WHERE THE POLICE OFFICER IS NOT SEARCHING
FOR EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED, BUT INADVERTENTLY
COMES ACROSS AN INCRIMINATING OBJECT.
Just because the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does nor prevent
the appellant from invoking the protection afforded by the Constitution. The right
against unreasonable search and seizure is the immunity of ones person, which
includes his residence, papers and other possessions. For a person to be immune
against unreasonable searches and seizures, he need not be in his home or office,
within a fenced yard or private place.
CHAPTER IV
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Read:
Read:
Please observe the procedure in obtaining the The Warrant [or Order] of
Surveillance, not found in the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
That there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the said crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism has been
committed, or is being committed, or is about to be committed;
That there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that evidence which is essential to the conviction of any charged or
suspected person for, or to the solution or prevention of any such crimes, will be
obtained; and
That there is no other effective means readily available for acquiring such evidence.
Sec. 9. Classification and Contents of the Order of the Court. The written order
granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals as well as its order, if
any, to extend or renew the same, the original application of the applicant,
including his application to extend or renew, if any, and the written authorizations
of the Anti-Terrorism Council shall be deemed and are hereby declared as
classified information: Provided, That the person being surveilled or whose
communications, letters, papers, messages, conversations, discussions, spoken or
written words and effects have been monitored, listened to, bugged or recorded by
law enforcement authorities has the right to be informed of the acts done by the
law enforcement authorities in the premises or to challenge, if he or she intends to
do so, the legality of the interference before the Court of Appeals which issued
said written order. The written order of the authorizing division of the court of
Appeals shall specify the following:
The identity, such as name and address, if known, of the charged of suspected persons
whose communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written
words are to be tracked down, tapped, listened to, intercepted or recorded and, in case of
radio, electronic, or telephone (whether wireless or otherwise) communications,
messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words, the electronic
transmission systems or the telephone numbers to be tracked down, tapped, listened to,
intercepted, and recorded and their locations if the person suspected of the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is not fully known, such person shall be
subject to continuous surveillance provided there is reasonable ground to do so;
The identity (name and address, and the police or law enforcement organization) of the
members of his team judicially authorized to track down, tap, listen to, intercept, and
record the communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written
words;
The length of time which the authorization shall be used or carried out.
The CA may extend or renew the said authorization for another non-extendible
period, which shall not exceed 30 days from the expiration of the original
periodThe ex-parte application for renewal has been duly authorized by the
Anti-terrorism Council in writing.
If no case is filed within the 30-day period, the applicant police or law
enforcement official shall immediately notify the person subject of the
surveillance, interception, and recording of the termination of the said
surveillance, interception and recording. [Penalty to be imposed on the police
official who fails to inform the person subject of surveillance of the termination of
the surveillance, monitoring, interception and recording shall be penalized to 10
years and 1 day to 12 years.
Section 27. judicial authorization required to examine bank deposits, accounts and
records.
-which have been secured in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall
absolutely not be admissible and usable as evidence against anybody in any
judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative investigation, inquiry,
proceeding or hearing.
The wife forcibly opened the drawers at the clinic of her doctor-husband and took
diaries, checks and greeting cards of his alleged paramours. Thereafter, she used
the same in their legal separation case. Said documents are inadmissible in
evidence. This is so because the intimacies of husband and wife does not justify
the breaking of cabinets to determine marital infidelity.
Puno, J.
Facts:
The AO seeks to have all Filipino citizens and foreign residents to have a
Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the National Statistics Office
(NSO) through the use of BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY .
1. The establishment of the PRN without any law is an unconstitutional usurpation of the
legislative powers of the Congress of the Philippines;
2. The appropriation of public funds for the implementation of the said AO is
unconstitutional since Congress has the exclusive authority to appropriate funds for such
expenditure; and
3. The AO violates the citizens right to privacy protected by the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution.
Held:
of AO 308 therefore is beyond the power of the President to issue and it is a usurpation of
legislative power.
2. The AO likewise violates the right to privacy since its main purpose is to provide a
common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies through the
use of BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY. Biometry is the science of the application of
statistical methods to biological facts; a mathematical analysis of a biological data. It is
the confirmation of an individuals identity through a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand
geometry or facial features. Through the PRN, the government offices has the chance of
building a huge and formidable information base through the electronic linkage of the
files of every citizen. The data, however, may be gathered for gainful and useful
government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information
constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of
our authorities to resist.
Further, the AO does not even tells us in clear and unequivocal terms how
these informations gathered shall be handled. It does not provide who shall
control and access the data and under what circumstances and for what purpose.
These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of
the information. The computer linkage gives other government agencies access to
the information. YET, THERE ARE NO CONTROLS TO GUARD AGAINST
LEAKAGE OF INFORMATIONS. WHEN THE ACCESS CODE OF THE
CONTROL PROGRAMS OF THE PARTICULAR COMPUTER SYSTEM IS
BROKEN, AN INTRUDER, WITHOUT FEAR OF SANCTION OR PENALTY,
CAN MAKE USE OF THE DATA FOR WHATEVER PURPOSE, OR WORSE,
MANIPULATE THE DATA STORED WITHIN THE SYSTEM.
Carpio, J.
Based on the Ople ruling, the petitioners claimed that Proclamation No. 420 is
unconstitutional on two (2) grounds:
Held:
The said Executive Order No. 420 does not violate the citizens right to privacy since
it does not require all the citizens to be issued a national ID as what happened in
AO 308. Only those dealing or employed with the said government entities who
are required to provide the required information for the issuance of the said ID.
CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006, 504
SCRA 704
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
The Facts:
On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio and other commissioners of the PCGG declined
the invitation because of prior commitment.38[7] At the same time, they invoked
Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 earlier quoted.
Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
habeas corpus against the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators
Richard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and Members.
I S S U E S:
H E L D:
The answers are in the negative. Petitioners were invited in the Senates
public hearing to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455, particularly on the
anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications
This goes to show that the right to privacy is not absolute where there
is an overriding compelling state interest. In Morfe v. Mutuc,44[51] the Court, in
line with Whalen v. Roe,45[52] employed the rational basis relationship test when it
held that there was no infringement of the individuals right to privacy as the
requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, i.e., to curtail and
minimize the opportunities for official corruption, maintain a standard of honesty
in public service, and promote morality in public administration.46[53] In Valmonte
v. Belmonte,47[54] the Court remarked that as public figures, the Members of the
former Batasang Pambansa enjoy a more limited right to privacy as
compared to ordinary individuals, and their actions are subject to closer
scrutiny. Taking this into consideration, the Court ruled that the right of the people
to access information on matters of public concern prevails over the right to
privacy of financial transactions.
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for the
redress of their grievances.
Section 26 provides that persons who have been charged with terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism---even if they have been granted bail because
evidence of guilt is not strongcan be:
Prohibited from using any cellular phones, computers, or other means of communications
with people outside their residence.
Read:
Read:
Freedom of Expression; the public has the right to be informed on the mental,
moral and physical fitness of candidates for public office.
FACTS:
1. In the January 3, 1988 issue of the Baguio Midland Courier (BMC), Cecille Afable, the
Editor-in-Chief, in her column In and Out of Baguio made the following comments:
Of all the candidates for Mayor of Baguio City), Labo has the most
imponderables about him. People would ask: can he read and write? Why is he
always talking about his Japanese father-in-law? Is he really a Japanes Senator or
a barrio Kapitan? Is it true that he will send P18M aid to Baguio? Somebody
wanted to put an advertisement of Labo in the Midland Courier but was refused
because he has not yet paid his account of the last time he was a candidate for
Congress. We will accept all advertisements for him if he pays his old account
first.
2. In the same column, Cecille Afable wrote the following comments in her January 10,
1988 column at the Courier:
I heard that the Dumpty in the Egg is campaigning for Cortes. Not fair. Some
real doctors are also busy campaigning against Labo because he has not also paid
their medical services with them. Since he is donating millions he should also
settle his small debts like the reportedly insignificant amount of P27,000 only. If
he wins, several teachers were signifying to resign and leave Baguio forever, and
Pangasinan will be the franca-liqua of Baguio.
3. As a result of the above articles, Ramon Labor, Jr. filed a complaint for Damages before
the regional trial Court of Baguio City as he claimed said articles were libelous. He
likewise filed a separate criminal complaint before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Baguio but was dismissed;
4. Labo claimed that the said articles were tainted with malice because he was allegedly
described as Dumpty in the Egg or one who is a failure in his business which is false
because he is a very successful businessman or to mean zero or a big lie; that he is a
balasubas due to his alleged failure to pay his medical expenses;
5. The petitioners, however, were able to prove that Labo has an unpaid obligation to the
Courier in the amount of P27,415.00 for the ads placed by his campaigners for the 1984
Batasang Pambansa elections;
6. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio City, in its Decision dated June 14, 1990
dismissed Labos complaint for damages on the ground that the article of petitioner
Afable was privileged and constituted fair comment on matters of public interest as it
dealt with the integrity, reputation and honesty of private respondent Labo who was a
candidate for Mayor of Baguio City;
7. On January 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision and ordered the
petitioners to pay Ramon Labo, Jr. damages in the total amount of P350,000.00 after
concluding that the Dumpty in the Egg refers to no one but Labo himself.
ISSUES:
Was Labo the Dumpty in the Egg described in the questioned article/
HELD:
1. The Court of Appeals is wrong when it held that Labo is the Dumpty in the Egg in the
questioned article. This is so because the article stated that The Dumpty in the Egg is
campaigning for Cortes, another candidate for mayor and opponent of Labo himself. It
is unbelievable that Labo campaigned for his opponent and against himself. Although
such gracious attitude on the part of Labo would have been commendable, it is contrary
to common human experience. As pointed out by the petitioners, had he done that, it is
doubtful whether he could have won as City Mayor of Baguio in the 1988 elections,
which he actually did. In line with the doctrine in BORJAL VS. CA, 310 SCRA 1, that it
is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or
defamed, but it must be shown that at least a 3rd person could identify him as the object of
the libelous publication, the case should be dismissed since Labo utterly failed to dispose
of this responsibility.
2. Labo claims that the petitioners could not invoke public interest to justify the
publication since he was not yet a public official at that time. This argument is without
merit since he was already a candidate for City mayor of Baguio. As such, the article is
still within the mantle of protection guaranteed by the freedom of expression provided in
the Constitution since it is the publics right to be informed of the mental, moral and
physical fitness of candidates for public office. This was recognized as early as the case
of US VS. SEDANO, 14 Phil. 338 [1909] and the case of NEW YORK TIMES VS.
SULLIVAN, 376 U.S. 254 where the US Supreme Court held:
Medialdea, J.
Facts:
2. Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and Provinces of Benguet, Abra, Mt.
Province, Ifugao and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the autonomous region
shall take part in a plebiscite originally scheduled for December 27, 1989 but was
reset to January 30, 1990 specifically for the ratification or rejection of the said
act;
3. By virtue of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881),
the Comelec issued Comelec Resolution No. 2167, Section 19 of which provides:
"Section 19. Prohibition on columnist, commentators or announcers.During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite
day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality
shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against
the plebiscite issues."
6. On January 9, 1990, Comelec through the Solicitor General filed its Comment
and moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that Section 19 of
Resolution No. 2167 does not absolutely bar the petitioner from expressing his
views because under Section 90 and 92 of BP 881, he may still express his views
or campaign for or against the act through the Comelec space and airtime.
Held:
What is granted by Art. IX-C of the Constitution to the Comelec is the power to
supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other
grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities to the end
that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums
among candidates are insured. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is
the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give undue advantage to a
candidate in terms of advertising time and space. This is also the reason why a
columnist, commentator or announcer is required to take a leave of absence from
his work during the campaign period if he is a candidate.
While it is true that the petitioner is not absolutely barred from campaigning for or
against the Organic Act, said fact does not cure the constitutional infirmity of
Section 19, Comelec Resolution No. 2167. This is so because IT IS STILL A
RESTRICTION ON HIS CHOICE OF THE FORUM WHERE HE MAY
EXPRESS HIS VIEW.
Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right
to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be
better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, INCLUDING
THE FORUM. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should
not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression
may be exercised.
Read:
3. National Press Club vs. Comelec, March 5, 1992. Real also the dissenting and separate
opinions of the justices. (Preventing campaigns through radio, TV and newspapers is
valid in order to even the playing field between rich and poor candidates)
4. Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 7960-707 & Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, GR No. 80578,
February 1, 1989
5. Eastern Broadcasting vs. Dans,137 SCRA 628
6. Newsweek vs. IAC, 142 SCRA 171
7. Kapisanan vs. Camara Shoes, 11 SCRA 477
8. IN RE: Atty. Tipon, 79 SCRA 372
9. Lacsa vs. IAC, May 23,1988
10. Kapunan vs. De Villa, December 6, 1988
4. Not within the protection of the freedom of expression clause of the
Constitution
1. Obscenity; test of
Read:
Tests:
3. Whether the work as a whole lacks serious literary , artistic, political or scientific
value.
c. Miller vs. California, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419
d. Ginsberg vs. New York,390 U.S. 629
e. Pita vs. CA, 178 SCRA 362 (A City Mayor may not order the warrantless
seizure of magazines which he believes to be obscene; otherwise, he will become
the complainant, prosecutor and judge at the same time. He should obtain a search
warrant from a judge)
Read:
3. Cases undersub-judice
Read:
In the meantime, the appellate court ruled, in CA-G.R. SP No. 94949, by the first
assailed issuance, that the petition became moot and lacked merit. The appellate court
also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration by the second assailed issuance.
Hence, the filing of the present petition for review on certiorari, to which
respondent filed his Comment of November 18, 2008 which merited petitioners Reply of
October 2, 2009.
ISSUE:
The main issue is whether the appellate court erred in holding that the modification
of the venue in IBPs rally permit does not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioners assert that the partial grant of the application runs contrary to the Pubic
Assembly Act and violates their constitutional right to freedom of expression and
public assembly.
HELD:
The Court shall first resolve the preliminary issue of mootness.
Undoubtedly, the petition filed with the appellate court on June 21, 2006 became
moot upon the passing of the date of the rally on June 22, 2006.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or
value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of
mootness. However, even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot,
this Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public. Moreover, as an exception to
the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of
repetition, yet evading review.
In the present case, the question of the legality of a modification of a permit to rally
will arise each time the terms of an intended rally are altered by the concerned official,
yet it evades review, owing to the limited time in processing the application where the
shortest allowable period is five days prior to the assembly. The susceptibility of
recurrence compels the Court to definitively resolve the issue at hand.
Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act reads:
Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to
issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that
the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order,
public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the
application within two (2) working days from the date the application was
filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any
reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the
application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on
the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been
filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he
shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the
application [sic] within twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or
modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the
decision in an appropriate court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the
Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial
Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court, its decisions may be appealed
to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the
same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision
granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant
shall, be immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within
twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the
applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether
favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus
if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. (italics and
underscoring supplied)
In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when
he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the
matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may
warrant the changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action
on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable
action on the permit.
Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the
permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears
repeating, is an indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued
permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which blank
denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have
it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.
It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of
discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not, however,
unfettered discretion. While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of
what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant
circumstances, still the assumption especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a
specific public place is that the permit must be for the assembly being held there. The
exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberts, speaking for the
American Supreme Court, is not to be "abridged on the plea that it may be
exercised in some other place. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Notably, respondent failed to indicate in his Comment any basis or explanation for his
action. It smacks of whim and caprice for respondent to just impose a change of venue
for an assembly that was slated for a specific public place. It is thus reversible error for
the appellate court not to
have found such grave abuse of discretion.
The Court DECLARES that respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
modifying the rally permit issued on June 16, 2006 insofar as it altered the venue from
Mendiola Bridge to Plaza Miranda.
The petitioners admitted that they participated in concerted mass actions in Metro
Manila from September to the first half of October, 1990 which temporarily
disrupted classes in Metro Manila but they claimed that they were not on strike.
They claimed that they were merely exercising their constitutional right to
peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of their grievances.
Thus, they may not be penalized administratively.
HELD:
The issue of whether or not the mass action launched by the public school
teachers during the period from September up to the 1st half of October, 1990 was
a strike or not has been decided in the case of MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL
TEACHERS ASSOCIATION VS. LAGUIO, 200 SCRA 323 where it was held
that these mass actions were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted
a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the
teachers duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons.
It is undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that petitioners purpose
was to realize their demands by withholding their services. The fact that the
conventional term strike was not used by the striking employees to describe
their common course of action is inconsequential, SINCE THE SUBSTANCE OF
THE SITUATION, AND NOT ITS APPEARANCE, WILL BE DEEMED
CONTROLLING.
The petitioners are not therefore entitled to their salaries during their suspension
because the general proposition is that a public official is not entitled to any
compensation if he had not rendered any service.
AZCUNA, J.:
The Facts:
The first petitioners, Bayan, et al., in G.R. No. 169838, allege that they are
citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and
individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005
was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No.
880.
The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners, Jess del Prado, et al., in
G.R. No. 169848, who allege that they were injured, arrested and detained when a
peaceful mass action they held on September 26, 2005 was preempted and
violently dispersed by the police. They further assert that on October 5, 2005, a
group they participated in marched to Malacaang to protest issuances of the
Palace which, they claim, put the country under an undeclared martial rule, and
the protest was likewise dispersed violently and many among them were arrested
and suffered injuries.
The third group, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al., petitioners in G.R. No.
169881, allege that they conduct peaceful mass actions and that their rights as
organizations and those of their individual members as citizens, specifically the
right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the
policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR) being followed to implement
it.
KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be
conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and
Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their
members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally
which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along Espaa Avenue in
front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police
officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding
further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three
other rallyists were arrested.
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others
only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek
to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the no permit, no rally policy and the
CPR policy recently announced.
Section 1. Title . This Act shall be known as The Public Assembly Act of
1985.
(b) Public place shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street,
bridge or other thoroughfare, park, plaza square, and/or any open space of public
ownership where the people are allowed access.
(c) Maximum tolerance means the highest degree of restraint that the military,
police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly
or in the dispersal of the same.
Sec. 4. Permit when required and when not required.-- A written permit shall be
required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a
public place. However, no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be
done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private
property, in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its
legal possession is required, or in the campus of a government-owned and
operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations
of said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any
election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act.
Sec. 5. Application requirements.-- All applications for a permit shall comply with
the following guidelines:
The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or
organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and
place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable number of persons
participating, the transport and the public address systems to be used.
2. The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under Section 8
hereof.
3. The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in
whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days before
the scheduled public assembly.
4. Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the office
of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a
conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.
It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a
permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a
clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals
or public health.
2. The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2)
working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be
deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf
refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the
applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been
filed.
3. If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil
warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the
applicant who must be heard on the matter.
4. The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within twentyfour hours.
5. If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the
terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court
of law.
6. In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate
court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours
after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A
decision granting such permit or modifying if in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall
be immediately executory.
7. All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours
from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive
judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.
CPR, on the other hand, is a policy set forth in a press release by Malacaang
dated September 21, 2005, shown in Annex A to the Petition in G.R. No.
169848, thus:
Malacaang Official
Manila, Philippines NEWS
The Presidents call for unity and reconciliation stands, based on the rule of law.
Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a
violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.
They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public
assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It
also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of
expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the
message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral
as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words
lawful cause, opinion, protesting or influencing suggest the exposition of
some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase maximum
tolerance shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government
because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the
strict scrutiny test.
Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear
standards. The two standards stated in the laws (clear and present danger and
imminent and grave danger) are inconsistent.
Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters
the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being
void for being vague and for lack of publication.
Finally, petitioners KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the
right to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of
securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this
right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the
permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too
comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long
as certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue
would possibly wane.
As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes
action even before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or
executive order supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum
tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a
chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.
I s s u e s:
H e l d:
action as contrary to law and dispersed the public assemblies held without the
permit.
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition
for redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and
of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection.
For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without
which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected. As stated in
Jacinto v. CA, the Court, as early as the onset of this century, in U.S. v. Apurado
already upheld the right to assembly and petition, as follows:
It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public
assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary,
because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of
excitement, and the greater, the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the
less perfect, as a rule will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their
irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every
instance of such disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an
excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against
the authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances
would expose all those who took part therein to the severest and most unmerited
punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be
pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on
such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefor,
but the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly
and seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a
tumultuous uprising.
assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. Free speech,
like free press, may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully
any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. There is to be
then no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability
whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt
proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
[the State] has a right to prevent. Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the
people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public
concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to
be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of
expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a
right to prevent. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had
occasion to stress that it is a necessary consequence of our republican institutions
and complements the right of free speech. To paraphrase the opinion of Justice
Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the American Supreme Court in Thomas v.
Collins, it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech
and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances.
All these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every case, therefore,
where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the judiciary is
called upon to examine the effects of the challenged governmental actuation. The
sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to
the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both
grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public
health, or any other legitimate public interest.
may be something worth hearing from the dissenter. That is to ensure a true
ferment of ideas. There are, of course, well-defined limits. What is guaranteed is
peaceable assembly. One may not advocate disorder in the name of protest, much
less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent. The Constitution frowns on
disorder or tumult attending a rally or assembly. Resort to force is ruled out and
outbreaks of violence to be avoided. The utmost calm though is not required. As
pointed out in an early Philippine case, penned in 1907 to be precise, United
States v. Apurado: It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark
the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or
imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of
excitement, and the greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less
perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their
irresponsible followers. It bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be
invoked, riotous conduct, injury to property, and acts of vandalism must be
avoided. To give free rein to ones destructive urges is to call for condemnation. It
is to make a mockery of the high estate occupied by intellectual liberty in our
scheme of values.
There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger
of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally
would start. The Philippines is committed to the view expressed in the plurality
opinion, of 1939 vintage of, Justice Roberts in Hague v. CIO: Whenever the title
of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the
use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such
use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the
privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of
the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on
national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but
relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and
convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but must not, in the
guise of respondents, be abridged or denied. The above excerpt was quoted with
approval in Primicias v. Fugoso. Primicias made explicit what was implicit in
Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, a 1915 decision, where this Court categorically
affirmed that plazas or parks and streets are outside the commerce of man and
thus nullified a contract that leased Plaza Soledad of plaintiff-municipality.
Reference was made to such plaza being a promenade for public use, which
certainly is not the only purpose that it could serve. To repeat, there can be no
valid reason why a permit should not be granted for the proposed march and rally
starting from a public park that is the Luneta.
4. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets to the
gates of the US embassy, hardly two blocks away at the Roxas Boulevard.
Primicias v. Fugoso has resolved any lurking doubt on the matter. In holding that
the then Mayor Fugoso of the City of Manila should grant a permit for a public
meeting at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo, this Court categorically declared: Our
conclusion finds support in the decision in the case of Willis Cox v. State of New
Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569. In that case, the statute of New Hampshire P.L. chap.
145, section 2, providing that no parade or procession upon any ground abutting
thereon, shall be permitted unless a special license therefor shall first be obtained
from the selectmen of the town or from licensing committee, was construed by
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not conferring upon the licensing board
unfettered discretion to refuse to grant the license, and held valid. And the
Supreme Court of the United States, in its decision (1941) penned by Chief
Justice Hughes affirming the judgment of the State Supreme Court, held that a
statute requiring persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to
procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an
unconstitutional abridgment of the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and
press, where, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing
authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration of the
time, place, and manner of the parade or procession, with a view to conserving the
public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing,
and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license, * * *.
Nor should the point made by Chief Justice Hughes in a subsequent portion of
the opinion be ignored: Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply
the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which
liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestricted abuses. The authority of
a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience
of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as
inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the
good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on the streets
of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a
restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the public
convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted
exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to
protection.
xxx
xxx
B.P. No. 880 was enacted after this Court rendered its decision in Reyes.
The provisions of B.P. No. 880 practically codify the ruling in Reyes:
Reyes v. Bagatsing
8. By way of a summary.
The applicants for a permit to
hold an assembly should
inform the licensing authority
of the date, the public place
where and the time when it
will take place. If it were a
private place, only the
consent of the owner or the
one entitled to its legal
possession is required. Such
application should be filed
well ahead in time to enable
the public official concerned
to appraise whether there
may be valid objections to
the grant of the permit or to
its grant but at another public
place. It is an indispensable
condition to such refusal or
modification that the clear
and present danger test be the
standard for the decision
reached. If he is of the view
that there is such an
imminent and grave danger
of a substantive evil, the
applicants must be heard on
the matter. Thereafter, his
decision, whether favorable
or adverse, must be
transmitted to them at the
earliest opportunity. Thus if
so minded, they can have
recourse to the proper judicial
authority.
requirements.-- All
applications for a permit
shall comply with the
following guidelines:
(a) The applications
shall be in writing and shall
include the names of the
leaders or organizers; the
purpose of such public
assembly; the date, time
and duration thereof, and
place or streets to be used
for the intended activity;
and the probable number of
persons participating, the
transport and the public
address systems to be used.
(b) The application shall
incorporate the duty and
responsibility of applicant
under Section 8 hereof.
(c) The application shall
be filed with the office of
the mayor of the city or
municipality in whose
jurisdiction the intended
activity is to be held, at
least five (5) working days
before the scheduled public
assembly.
(d) Upon receipt of the
application, which must be
duly acknowledged in
writing, the office of the
city or municipal mayor
shall cause the same to
immediately be posted at a
conspicuous place in the
city or municipal building.
Sec. 6. Action to be
taken on the application.
(a) It shall be the duty of
the mayor or any official
acting in his behalf to issue
or grant a permit unless
there is clear and
convincing evidence that
the public assembly will
create a clear and present
danger to public order,
public safety, public
convenience, public morals
or public health.
(b) The mayor or any
official acting in his behalf
shall act on the application
within two (2) working
days from the date the
application was filed,
failing which, the permit
shall be deemed granted.
Should for any reason the
mayor or any official
acting in his behalf refuse
to accept the application
for a permit, said
application shall be posted
by the applicant on the
premises of the office of
the mayor and shall be
deemed to have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the
view that there is imminent
and grave danger of a
substantive evil warranting
the denial or modification
of the permit, he shall
immediately inform the
applicant who must be
It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public
assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner
of the assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmea v. Comelec,48 where the Court
referred to it as a content-neutral regulation of the time, place, and manner of
holding public assemblies.49
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all
kinds of public assemblies50 that would use public places. The reference to
lawful cause does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to
be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to
protection. Neither are the words opinion, protesting and influencing in the
definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject.
The words petitioning the government for redress of grievances come from the
wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum
tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the
content of the expressions in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and
present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or
public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right even
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.
Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful
assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present
danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent.
There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is
not relevant to the regulation.
As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and
sufficient standard the clear and present danger test stated in Sec. 6(a). The
reference to imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil in Sec. 6(c)
substantially means the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. As to
whether respondent Mayor has the same power independently under Republic Act
No. 716051 is thus not necessary to resolve in these proceedings, and was not
pursued by the parties in their arguments.
Finally, for those who cannot wait, Section 15 of the law provides for an
alternative forum through the creation of freedom parks where no prior permit is
needed for peaceful assembly and petition at any time:
Sec. 15. Freedom parks. Every city and municipality in the country shall
within six months after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least
one suitable freedom park or mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far
as practicable, shall be centrally located within the poblacion where
demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any
prior permit.
The Court now comes to the matter of the CPR. As stated earlier, the
Solicitor General has conceded that the use of the term should now be
discontinued, since it does not mean anything other than the maximum tolerance
policy set forth in B.P. No. 880. This is stated in the Affidavit of respondent
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, submitted by the Solicitor General, thus:
laws of the land . . . unlawful mass actions will be dispersed. None of these is at
loggerheads with the letter and spirit of Batas Pambansa Blg. 880. It is thus
absurd for complainants to even claim that I ordered my co-respondents to violate
any law.
In sum, this Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the fundamental rights
of our people, especially freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. For this
reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our
legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It
merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses.
On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does
not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places
as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious,
maximum tolerance is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The
delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally permits is valid because it is
subject to the constitutionally-sound clear and present danger standard.
A building was consequently erected on the property, and therefrom, DZNC and
Star FM operated as radio stations. Both stations successfully secured all
necessary operating documents, including mayors permits from 1997 to
2001.58[12] During that period, CDC paid real property taxes on the property based
on the classification of the land as commercial.59[13]
I S S U E:
HELD:
Petitioners have taken great pains to depict their struggle as a textbook case of
denial of the right to free speech and of the press. In their tale, there is undeniable
political color. They admit that in 2001, Bombo Radyo was aggressive in
exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have
favored respondent Dy and other members of the Dy political dynasty.65[34]
Respondent Ceasar Dy is the brother of Faustino Dy, Jr., governor of Isabela from
2001 until he was defeated in his re-election bid in 2004 by Grace Padaca, a
The following undisputed facts bring the issue of free expression to fore.
Petitioners are authorized by law to operate radio stations in Cauayan City, and
had been doing so for some years undisturbed by local authorities. Beginning in
2002, respondents in their official capacities have taken actions, whatever may be
the motive, that have impeded the ability of petitioners to freely broadcast, if not
broadcast at all. These actions have ranged from withholding permits to operate to
the physical closure of those stations under color of legal authority. While once
petitioners were able to broadcast freely, the weight of government has since bore
down upon them to silence their voices on the airwaves. An elementary school
child with a basic understanding of civics lessons will recognize that free speech
animates these cases.
Without taking into account any extenuating circumstances that may favor the
respondents, we can identify the bare acts of closing the radio stations or
preventing their operations as an act of prior restraint against speech, expression
or of the press. Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on
the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or
dissemination.69[38] While any system of prior restraint comes to court bearing
a heavy burden against its constitutionality,70[39] not all prior restraints on
speech are invalid.71[40]
At the same time, jurisprudence distinguishes between a contentneutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one
that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined
standards; and a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is
based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.74[43] Content-based laws are
generally treated as more suspect than content-neutral laws because of judicial
concern with discrimination in the regulation of expression.75[44] Content-neutral
regulations of speech or of conduct that may amount to speech, are subject to
lesser but still heightened scrutiny.76[45]
However, the circumstances of this case dictate that we view the action of the
respondents as a content-based restraint. In their petition for mandamus filed with
the RTC, petitioners make the following relevant allegations:
6.2. Newsounds only rival AM station in Cauayan and the rest of Isabela,
DWDY, is owned and operated by the family of respondent Dy.77[46]
xxxx
35. Respondents closure of petitioners radio stations is clearly tainted with ill
motives.
35.1. It must be pointed out that in the 2001 elections, Bombo Radyo was
aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear
to have favored respondent Dy and other members of the Dy political dynasty. It
is just too coincidental that it was only after the 2001 elections (i.e., 2002) that the
Mayors Office started questioning petitioners applications for renewal of their
mayors permits.
35.2. In an article found in the Philippine Daily inquirer dated 20 February
2004, respondent Dy was quoted as saying that he will disenfranchise the radio
station. Such statement manifests and confirms that respondents denial of
petitioners renewal applications on the ground that the Property is commercial is
merely a pretext and that their real agenda is to remove petitioners from Cauayan
City and suppress the latters voice. This is a blatant violation of the petitioners
constitutional right to press freedom.
The Court is of the position that the actions of the respondents warrant
heightened or strict scrutiny from the Court, the test which we have deemed
appropriate in assessing content-based restrictions on free speech, as well as for
laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, of laws
dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental
rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.80[54] The
immediate implication of the application of the strict scrutiny test is that the
burden falls upon respondents as agents of government to prove that their actions
do not infringe upon petitioners constitutional rights. As content regulation
cannot be done in the absence of any compelling reason,81[55] the burden lies with
the government to establish such compelling reason to infringe the right to free
expression.
It is thus evident that respondents had no valid cause at all to even require
petitioners to secure approved land conversion papers from the DAR showing
that the property was converted from prime agricultural land to commercial land.
That requirement, assuming that it can be demanded by a local government in the
context of approving mayors permits, should only obtain upon clear proof that
the property from where the business would operate was classified as agricultural
under the LGUs land use plan or zoning ordinances and other relevant laws. No
evidence to that effect was presented by the respondents either to the petitioners,
or to the courts.
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or
impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable
to the latter for damages:
xxxx
(2) Freedom of speech;
We noted in Lim v. Ponce de Leon that [p]ublic officials in the past have
abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the
performance of their duties [and] the object of [Article 32 of the Civil Code] is
to put an end to official abuse by plea of the good faith.82[85] The application of
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang
Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made the following remarks:
Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical
affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private
respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in
connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt
directly alluded to in petitioners remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular
host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.90[3] Forthwith, the MTRCB sent
petitioner a notice of the hearing on August 16, 2004 in relation to the alleged use
of some cuss words in the August 10, 2004 episode of Ang Dating Daan.91[4]
On September 27, 2004, in Adm. Case No. 01-04, the MTRCB issued a
decision, disposing as follows:
SO ORDERED.96[9]
Petitioner then filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer
for injunctive relief, docketed as G.R. No. 165636.
III
[PD] 1986 IS NOT COMPLETE IN ITSELF AND DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR
A SUFFICIENT STANDARD FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION THEREBY
RESULTING IN AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY
REASON THAT IT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR THE PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATIONS OF ITS PROVISIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, THE [IRR], RULES
OF PROCEDURE, AND OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE MTRCB PURSUANT
THERETO, I.E. DECISION DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND ORDER
DATED 19 OCTOBER 2004, ARE LIKEWISE CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM
AS APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BENCH98[11]
We shall first dispose of the issues in G.R. No. 164785, regarding the
assailed order of preventive suspension, although its implementability had already
been overtaken and veritably been rendered moot by the equally assailed
September 27, 2004 decision.
order of preventive suspension. And this authority stems naturally from, and is
necessary for the exercise of, its power of regulation and supervision.
Sec. 3 of PD 1986 pertinently provides the following:
xxxx
vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good name and reputation of
any person, whether living or dead;
xxxx
(d) To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the x x x
production, copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition, and/or television
broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to
the end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are determined by
the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be
x x x produced, copied, reproduced, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited and/or
broadcast by television;
xxxx
k) To exercise such powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to
the attainment of the purposes and objectives of this Act x x x. (Emphasis added.)
Sec. 3(c) and (d) of PD 1986 finds application to the present case,
sufficient to authorize the MTRCBs assailed action. Petitioners restrictive
reading of PD 1986, limiting the MTRCB to functions within the literal confines
of the law, would give the agency little leeway to operate, stifling and rendering it
inutile, when Sec. 3(k) of PD 1986 clearly intends to grant the MTRCB a wide
room for flexibility in its operation. Sec. 3(k), we reiterate, provides, To exercise
such powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of
the purposes and objectives of this Act x x x. Indeed, the power to impose
preventive suspension is one of the implied powers of MTRCB. As distinguished
from express powers, implied powers are those that can be inferred or are implicit
in the wordings or conferred by necessary or fair implication of the enabling
act.104[17] As we held in Angara v. Electoral Commission, when a general grant of
power is conferred or a duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the
exercise of one or the performance of the other is also conferred by necessary
implication.105[18] Clearly, the power to impose preventive suspension pending
investigation is one of the implied or inherent powers of MTRCB.
At any event, that preventive suspension can validly be meted out even
without a hearing.109[22]
Petitioner next faults the MTRCB for denying him his right to the equal
protection of the law, arguing that, owing to the preventive suspension order, he
was unable to answer the criticisms coming from the INC ministers.
He would also have the Court declare PD 1986, its Sec. 3(c) in particular,
unconstitutional for reasons articulated in this petition.
weighing competing values,121[34] or, with like effect, determining which of the
clashing interests should be advanced.
The Court rules otherwise. It has been established in this jurisdiction that
unprotected speech or low-value expression refers to libelous statements,
obscenity or pornography, false or misleading advertisement, insulting or
fighting words, i.e., those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of peace and expression endangering national security.
While adults may have understood that the terms thus used were not to be
taken literally, children could hardly be expected to have the same discernment.
Without parental guidance, the unbridled use of such language as that of petitioner
in a television broadcast could corrupt impressionable young minds. The term
putang babae means a female prostitute, a term wholly inappropriate for
children, who could look it up in a dictionary and just get the literal meaning,
missing the context within which it was used. Petitioner further used the terms,
ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, making reference to the female sexual
organ and how a female prostitute uses it in her trade, then stating that Sandoval
was worse than that by using his mouth in a similar manner. Children could be
motivated by curiosity and ask the meaning of what petitioner said, also without
placing the phrase in context. They may be inquisitive as to why Sandoval is
different from a female prostitute and the reasons for the dissimilarity. And upon
learning the meanings of the words used, young minds, without the guidance of
an adult, may, from their end, view this kind of indecent speech as obscene, if
they take these words literally and use them in their own speech or form their own
ideas on the matter. In this particular case, where children had the opportunity to
hear petitioners words, when speaking of the average person in the test for
obscenity, we are speaking of the average child, not the average adult. The
average child may not have the adults grasp of figures of speech, and may lack
the understanding that language may be colorful, and words may convey more
than the literal meaning. Undeniably the subject speech is very suggestive of a
female sexual organ and its function as such. In this sense, we find petitioners
utterances obscene and not entitled to protection under the umbrella of freedom of
speech.
Even if we concede that petitioners remarks are not obscene but merely indecent
speech, still the Court rules that petitioner cannot avail himself of the
constitutional protection of free speech. Said statements were made in a medium
easily accessible to children. With respect to the young minds, said utterances are
to be treated as unprotected speech.
With the view we take of the case, the suspension MTRCB imposed under the
premises was, in one perspective, permissible restriction. We make this
disposition against the backdrop of the following interplaying factors: First, the
indecent speech was made via television, a pervasive medium that, to borrow
from Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak,129[42] easily reaches every home where there is
a set [and where] [c]hildren will likely be among the avid viewers of the programs
therein shown; second, the broadcast was aired at the time of the day when there
was a reasonable risk that children might be in the audience; and third, petitioner
uttered his speech on a G or for general patronage rated program. Under Sec.
2(A) of Chapter IV of the IRR of the MTRCB, a show for general patronage is
[s]uitable for all ages, meaning that the material for television x x x in the
judgment of the BOARD, does not contain anything unsuitable for children and
minors, and may be viewed without adult guidance or supervision. The words
petitioner used were, by any civilized norm, clearly not suitable for children.
Where a language is categorized as indecent, as in petitioners utterances on a
general-patronage rated TV program, it may be readily proscribed as unprotected
speech.
Despite the settled ruling in FCC which has remained undisturbed since 1978,
petitioner asserts that his utterances must present a clear and present danger of
bringing about a substantive evil the State has a right and duty to prevent and such
danger must be grave and imminent.132[45]
Petitioners invocation of the clear and present danger doctrine, arguably the most
permissive of speech tests, would not avail him any relief, for the application of
said test is uncalled for under the premises. The doctrine, first formulated by
Justice Holmes, accords protection for utterances so that the printed or spoken
words may not be subject to prior restraint or subsequent punishment unless its
expression creates a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantial evil
which the government has the power to prohibit.133[46] Under the doctrine, freedom
of speech and of press is susceptible of restriction when and only when necessary
to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the government may
lawfully protect. As it were, said doctrine evolved in the context of prosecutions
for rebellion and other crimes involving the overthrow of government.134[47] It was
originally designed to determine the latitude which should be given to speech that
espouses anti-government action, or to have serious and substantial deleterious
consequences on the security and public order of the community.135[48] The clear
and present danger rule has been applied to this jurisdiction.136[49] As a standard of
limitation on free speech and press, however, the clear and present danger test is
not a magic incantation that wipes out all problems and does away with analysis
and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech and which
compels a court to release a defendant from liability the moment the doctrine is
invoked, absent proof of imminent catastrophic disaster.137[50] As we observed in
Eastern Broadcasting Corporation, the clear and present danger test does not
lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation applicable to all
utterances in all forums.138[51]
To be sure, the clear and present danger doctrine is not the only test which has
been applied by the courts. Generally, said doctrine is applied to cases involving
the overthrow of the government and even other evils which do not clearly
undermine national security. Since not all evils can be measured in terms of
proximity and degree the Court, however, in several casesAyer Productions v.
Capulong139[52] and Gonzales v. COMELEC,140[53] applied the balancing of interests
test. Former Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in Gonzales v. COMELEC, elucidated
in his Separate Opinion that where the legislation under constitutional attack
interferes with the freedom of speech and assembly in a more generalized way
and where the effect of the speech and assembly in terms of the probability of
realization of a specific danger is not susceptible even of impressionistic
calculation,141[54] then the balancing of interests test can be applied.
xxx
This balancing of interest test, to borrow from Professor Kauper,143[56] rests on the
theory that it is the courts function in a case before it when it finds public
interests served by legislation, on the one hand, and the free expression clause
affected by it, on the other, to balance one against the other and arrive at a
judgment where the greater weight shall be placed. If, on balance, it appears that
the public interest served by restrictive legislation is of such nature that it
outweighs the abridgment of freedom, then the court will find the legislation
valid. In short, the balance-of-interests theory rests on the basis that constitutional
freedoms are not absolute, not even those stated in the free speech and expression
clause, and that they may be abridged to some extent to serve appropriate and
important interests.144[57] To the mind of the Court, the balancing of interest
doctrine is the more appropriate test to follow.
In the case at bar, petitioner used indecent and obscene language and a three (3)month suspension was slapped on him for breach of MTRCB rules. In this setting,
the assertion by petitioner of his enjoyment of his freedom of speech is ranged
against the duty of the government to protect and promote the development and
welfare of the youth.
After a careful examination of the factual milieu and the arguments raised by
petitioner in support of his claim to free speech, the Court rules that the
governments interest to protect and promote the interests and welfare of the
children adequately buttresses the reasonable curtailment and valid restraint on
petitioners prayer to continue as program host of Ang Dating Daan during the
suspension period.
No doubt, one of the fundamental and most vital rights granted to citizens of a
State is the freedom of speech or expression, for without the enjoyment of such
right, a free, stable, effective, and progressive democratic state would be difficult
to attain. Arrayed against the freedom of speech is the right of the youth to their
moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social being which the State is constitutionally
tasked to promote and protect. Moreover, the State is also mandated to recognize
and support the vital role of the youth in nation building as laid down in Sec. 13,
Art. II of the 1987 Constitution.
The Constitution has, therefore, imposed the sacred obligation and responsibility
on the State to provide protection to the youth against illegal or improper
activities which may prejudice their general well-being. The Article on youth,
approved on second reading by the Constitutional Commission, explained that the
State shall extend social protection to minors against all forms of neglect,
cruelty, exploitation, immorality, and practices which may foster racial, religious
or other forms of discrimination.145[58]
moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being of the youth to better prepare
them fulfill their role in the field of nation-building.146[59] In the same way, the
State is mandated to support parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and the development of moral character.147[60]
FCC explains the duty of the government to act as parens patriae to protect the
children who, because of age or interest capacity, are susceptible of being
corrupted or prejudiced by offensive language, thus:
Moreover, Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak likewise stressed the duty of the State to
attend to the welfare of the young:
The compelling need to protect the young impels us to sustain the regulatory
action MTRCB took in the narrow confines of the case. To reiterate, FCC justified
the restraint on the TV broadcast grounded on the following considerations: (1)
the use of television with its unique accessibility to children, as a medium of
broadcast of a patently offensive speech; (2) the time of broadcast; and (3) the
G rating of the Ang Dating Daan program. And in agreeing with MTRCB, the
court takes stock of and cites with approval the following excerpts from FCC:
Petitioner theorizes that the three (3)-month suspension is either prior restraint or
subsequent punishment that, however, includes prior restraint, albeit indirectly.
After a review of the facts, the Court finds that what MTRCB imposed on
petitioner is an administrative sanction or subsequent punishment for his
offensive and obscene language in Ang Dating Daan.
To clarify, statutes imposing prior restraints on speech are generally illegal and
presumed unconstitutional breaches of the freedom of speech. The exceptions to
prior restraint are movies, television, and radio broadcast censorship in view of its
access to numerous people, including the young who must be insulated from the
prejudicial effects of unprotected speech. PD 1986 was passed creating the Board
of Review for Motion Pictures and Television (now MTRCB) and which requires
prior permit or license before showing a motion picture or broadcasting a TV
program. The Board can classify movies and television programs and can cancel
permits for exhibition of films or television broadcast.
The power of MTRCB to regulate and even impose some prior restraint on radio
and television shows, even religious programs, was upheld in Iglesia Ni Cristo v.
Court of Appeals. Speaking through Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, the Court
wrote:
We thus reject petitioners postulate that its religious program is per se beyond
review by the respondent Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious
program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that
reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule that the
exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring
about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty
bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public
health, public morals, or public welfare. x x x
xxx
While the thesis has a lot to commend itself, we are not ready to hold that [PD
1986] is unconstitutional for Congress to grant an administrative body quasijudicial power to preview and classify TV programs and enforce its decision
subject to review by our courts. As far back as 1921, we upheld this setup in Sotto
vs. Ruiz, viz:
Bernas adds:
Under the decree a movie classification board is made the arbiter of what
movies and television programs or parts of either are fit for public consumption. It
decides what movies are immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good
customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people,
and what tend to incite subversion, insurrection, rebellion or sedition, or tend
to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government and/or
duly constituted authorities, etc. Moreover, its decisions are executory unless
stopped by a court.151[64]
The three (3) months suspension in this case is not a prior restraint on the
right of petitioner to continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a
permit was already issued to him by MTRCB for such broadcast. Rather, the
suspension is in the form of permissible administrative sanction or
subsequent punishment for the offensive and obscene remarks he uttered on
the evening of August 10, 2004 in his television program, Ang Dating Daan. It
is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under its charter without
running afoul of the free speech clause. And the imposition is separate and distinct
from the criminal action the Board may take pursuant to Sec. 3(i) of PD 1986 and
the remedies that may be availed of by the aggrieved private party under the
provisions on libel or tort, if applicable. As FCC teaches, the imposition of
sanctions on broadcasters who indulge in profane or indecent broadcasting does
not constitute forbidden censorship. Lest it be overlooked, the sanction imposed is
not per se for petitioners exercise of his freedom of speech via television, but for
the indecent contents of his utterances in a G rated TV program.
More importantly, petitioner is deemed to have yielded his right to his full
enjoyment of his freedom of speech to regulation under PD 1986 and its IRR as
television station owners, program producers, and hosts have impliedly accepted
the power of MTRCB to regulate the broadcast industry.
Neither can petitioners virtual inability to speak in his program during the period
of suspension be plausibly treated as prior restraint on future speech. For viewed
in its proper perspective, the suspension is in the nature of an intermediate penalty
for uttering an unprotected form of speech. It is definitely a lesser punishment
than the permissible cancellation of exhibition or broadcast permit or license. In
fine, the suspension meted was simply part of the duties of the MTRCB in the
enforcement and administration of the law which it is tasked to implement.
Viewed in its proper context, the suspension sought to penalize past speech made
on prime-time G rated TV program; it does not bar future speech of petitioner
in other television programs; it is a permissible subsequent administrative
sanction; it should not be confused with a prior restraint on speech. While not on
all fours, the Court, in MTRCB,153[66] sustained the power of the MTRCB to
penalize a broadcast company for exhibiting/airing a pre-taped TV episode
without Board authorization in violation of Sec. 7 of PD 1986.
Any simplistic suggestion, however, that the MTRCB would be crossing the
limits of its authority were it to regulate and even restrain the prime-time
Finally, petitioner argues that there has been undue delegation of legislative
power, as PD 1986 does not provide for the range of imposable penalties that may
be applied with respect to violations of the provisions of the law.
Given the foregoing perspective, it stands to reason that the power of the MTRCB
to regulate and supervise the exhibition of TV programs carries with it or
necessarily implies the authority to take effective punitive action for violation of
the law sought to be enforced. And would it not be logical too to say that the
power to deny or cancel a permit for the exhibition of a TV program or broadcast
necessarily includes the lesser power to suspend?
The MTRCB promulgated the IRR of PD 1986 in accordance with Sec. 3(a)
which, for reference, provides that agency with the power [to] promulgate such
rules and regulations as are necessary or proper for the implementation of this
Act, and the accomplishment of its purposes and objectives x x x. And Chapter
XIII, Sec. 1 of the IRR providing:
This is, in the final analysis, no more than a measure to specifically implement the
aforequoted provisions of Sec. 3(d) and (k). Contrary to what petitioner implies,
the IRR does not expand the mandate of the MTRCB under the law or partake of
the nature of an unauthorized administrative legislation. The MTRCB cannot
shirk its responsibility to regulate the public airwaves and employ such means as
it can as a guardian of the public.
In Sec. 3(c), one can already find the permissible actions of the MTRCB,
along with the standards to be applied to determine whether there have been
statutory breaches. The MTRCB may evaluate motion pictures, television
programs, and publicity materials applying contemporary Filipino cultural values
as standard, and, from there, determine whether these audio and video materials
are objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good
customs, [etc.] x x x and apply the sanctions it deems proper. The lawmaking
body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement of a particular
statute.156[69] The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a
relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the nondelegation of legislative powers.157[70] Administrative regulations or subordinate
legislation calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of the
growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the
law.158[71] Allowing the MTRCB some reasonable elbow-room in its operations
and, in the exercise of its statutory disciplinary functions, according it ample
latitude in fixing, by way of an appropriate issuance, administrative penalties with
due regard for the severity of the offense and attending mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, as the case may be, would be consistent with its mandate to
effectively and efficiently regulate the movie and television industry.
But even as we uphold the power of the MTRCB to review and impose
sanctions for violations of PD 1986, its decision to suspend petitioner must be
modified, for nowhere in that issuance, particularly the power-defining Sec. 3
nor in the MTRCB Schedule of Administrative Penalties effective January 1,
1999 is the Board empowered to suspend the program host or even to prevent
certain people from appearing in television programs. The MTRCB, to be
sure, may prohibit the broadcast of such television programs or cancel permits for
exhibition, but it may not suspend television personalities, for such would be
beyond its jurisdiction. The MTRCB cannot extend its exercise of regulation
beyond what the law provides. Only persons, offenses, and penalties clearly
falling clearly within the letter and spirit of PD 1986 will be considered to be
within the decrees penal or disciplinary operation. And when it exists, the
reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the person charged with violating
the statute and for whom the penalty is sought. Thus, the MTRCBs decision in
Administrative Case No. 01-04 dated September 27, 2004 and the subsequent
order issued pursuant to said decision must be modified. The suspension should
cover only the television program on which petitioner appeared and uttered
the offensive and obscene language, which sanction is what the law and the
facts obtaining call for.
This is like suspending the publication of the Philippine Daily Inquirer for three
months if its editorial describes a private person as masahol pa sa putang
babae. This is also similar to suspending for three months the column of a
newspaper columnist for using the expletive putang ina mo in his column. Such
suspension is the censorship that the Constitution outlaws when it states that [n]o
law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press
x x x.159[1]
The remedy of any aggrieved person is to file a libel or tort case after the
utterance or publication of such cusswords. Our libels laws punish with fine,
imprisonment or damages libelous language already uttered or published.160[2]
Our tort laws also allow recovery of damages for tortious speech already uttered
or published.161[3] However, both our libel and tort laws never impose a gag order
on future expression because that will constitute prior restraint or censorship.
Thus, our libel and tort laws do not allow the filing of a suit to enjoin or punish an
expression that has yet to be uttered or written.
Indeed, there can never be a prior restraint on future expression, whether for fear
of possible libelous utterance or publication, or as a punishment for past libelous
utterance or publication. Otherwise, many of the radio and TV political programs
will have to be banned for the frequent use of cusswords and other libelous
language. Even politicians will have to be barred from addressing political rallies,
or the rallies themselves will have to be banned, because politicians often use
cusswords and other profanities during political rallies.
The well-settled rule is there can be no prior restraint on expression. This rule
emanates from the constitutional command that [n]o law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press x x x. The history
of freedom of expression has been a constant struggle against the censors prior
restraint on expression. The leading American case of Near v. Minnesota162[4]
teaches us that the primordial purpose of the Free Expression Clause is to
prevent prior restraint on expression.
The exceptions start with the four types of expression that may be subject to prior
restraint. If a certain expression is subject to prior restraint, its utterance or
publication in violation of the lawful restraint naturally subjects the person
responsible to subsequent punishment. Thus, acts of pornography,170[12] false or
misleading advertisement,171[13] advocacy of imminent lawless action,172[14] and
endangering national security,173[15] are all punishable under the law.
Two other exceptions are defamation,174[16] which includes libel and slander, and
tortious speech.175[17] Defamatory and tortious speech, per se, are not subject to
prior restraint because by definition they do not constitute a clear and present
danger to the State that is grave and imminent. Once defamatory or tortuous
speech rises to the level of advocacy of imminent lawless action, then it may be
subject to prior restraint because it is seditious176[18] but not because it is
defamatory or tortious. Defamation and tortious conduct, however, may be subject
to subsequent punishment, civilly or criminally.
Fighting words are not subject to subsequent punishment unless they are
defamatory or tortious. Fighting words refer to profane or vulgar words that are
likely to provoke a violent response from an audience. Profane or vulgar words
like Fuck the draft, when not directed at any particular person, ethnic or
religious group, are not subject to subsequent punishment.177[19] As aptly stated,
one mans vulgarity may be another mans lyric.178[20]
Obviously, what petitioner uttered does not fall under any of the four types of
expression that may be subject to prior restraint. What respondents assail is the
following ranting of petitioner:
No matter how offensive, profane or vulgar petitioners words may be, they do
not constitute pornography, false or misleading advertisement, advocacy of
imminent lawless action, or danger to national security. Thus, petitioners
offensive, profane or vulgar language cannot be subject to prior restraint but may
be subject to subsequent punishment if defamatory or tortious.
In short, Congress may pass a law punishing defamation or tortious speech but the
punishment cannot be the suspension or suppression of the constitutional right to
freedom of expression. Otherwise, such law would be abridging the freedom
of speech, of expression, or of the press. If Congress cannot pass such a law,
neither can respondent MTRCB promulgate a rule or a decision suspending for
three months petitioners constitutional right to freedom of expression. And of
course, neither can this Court give its stamp of imprimatur to such an
unconstitutional MTRCB rule or decision.
Read:
2. New York Times vs. U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (Any system of prior restraints of
expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its validity)
3. Near vs. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
4. Times Film vs. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43
5. Freedman vs. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51
8. Clear and present danger and dangerous tendency rule (whether the words used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that the State has the right to
prevent)
7-a. Dangerous tendency rule (If the words uttered create a dangerous
tendency which the State has the right to prevent, then such words are
punishable)
Read:
Read:
Read also:
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Puno, J.
Respondent is the Court interpreter of RTC Branch 253, Las Pinas City.
Complainant requested for an investigation of respondent for living with a man
not her husband while she was still legally married and having borne a child
within this live-in arrangement. Estrada believes that Escritor is committing a
grossly immoral act which tarnishes the image of the judiciary, thus she should
not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court
condones her act.
Respondent admitted she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. more than 20
years ago when her husband was still alive but living with another woman. She
likewise admitted having a son with Quilapio but denies any liability for alleged
grossly immoral conduct because:
She is a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower Society;
That the conjugal arrangement was in conformity with their religious beliefs;
That the conjugal arrangement with Quilapio has the approval of her congregation.
HELD:
Escritors conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case
for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to religion. The Court
recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms---including
religious freedom---may be enjoyed. IN THE AREA OF RELIGIOUS
EXERCISE AS A PREFERRED FREEDOM, HOWEVER, MAN STANDS
ACCOUNTABLE TO AN AUTHORITY HIGHER THAN THE STATE, and so
the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will
erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence
of a showing that the state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the
Infinite.
Escritor was therefore held not administratively liable for grossly immoral
conduct.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
-any specific system of belief, worship or conduct, often involving a code
of ethics and philosophy.
-A profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his
Creator.
Strong fences make good neighbors. The idea is to delineate the boundaries
between two institutions and prevent encroachments by one against the other.
The doctrine cuts both ways. It is not only the State that is prohibited from
interfering in purely ecclesiastical affairs; the Church is likewise barred from
meddling in purely secular matters.
NON-STABLISHMENT CLAUSE:
It simply means that the State cannot set up a church; nor pass laws which aids
one religion; aid all religion, or prefer one religion over another nor force nor
influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will; or force
him to profess a belief or disbelief; that the State cannot openly or secretly
participate in the affairs of any religious organization or group and vice versa
(EVERSON VS. BOARD OF EDUCATION, 330 US 1)
The government is neutral and while protecting all, it prefers none and disparages
none. All here applies both to the believer and the non-believer. FREEDOM OF
RELIGION INCLUDES FREEDOM FROM RELIGION; THE RIGHT TO
WORHIP INCLUDES THE RIGHT NOT TO WORSHIP.
It is unconstitutional for a law to require that at least 10 verses from the Holy
Bible be read daily without comment because the same constitute a religious
exercise which violates the non-establishment clause.
IN the first, such freedom is absolute. He may indulge in his own theories
about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or none at all. He may not be
punished even if he cannot prove what he believes.
2. Read:
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 7, 2010
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an
application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT
Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009 (the First Assailed Resolution) and December
16, 2009 (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the
Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang
Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known
as the Party-List System Act.
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify
themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs).
Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in
2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization
had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a
Petition for registration with the COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a
marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of
their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion,
discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are
constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections. Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting
of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of
governance.
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC
(Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner
tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines
nuisance as Any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or
anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or disregards decency or morality x x x
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The contracting parties
may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that Contracts whose cause, object or
purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy are
inexistent and void from the beginning.
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, penalizes Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions
and indecent shows as follows:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent
shows. The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve
thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:
Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the
party-list system of electing congressional representatives is to enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and
who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.
If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an
organization to represent its constituencies, then all representative organizations would
have found themselves into the party-list race. But that is not the intention of the framers
of the law. The party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of
misunderstood persons or groups of persons. Rather, the party-list system is a tool for
the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the
nations only that their interests have not been brought to the attention of the nation
because of their under representation. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to
justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial
to the nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list system will
remain just that.
Intervention. The CHR opined that the denial of Ang Ladlads petition on moral grounds
violated the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHRs motion to intervene.
HELD:
We grant the petition.
Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the ground
that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it
associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for
the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to
said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals)
may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the enumeration of
marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is
not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlads initial petition shows that it never claimed to
exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT
community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it
had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in its
electronic discussion group. Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be a national LGBT
umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the following
LGBT networks:
Abra Gay Association
Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) Aklan
Albay Gay Association
Arts Center of Cabanatuan City Nueva Ecija
Boys Legion Metro Manila
Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it
appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and
perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not
difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure religious beliefs, convictions about
the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of
homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the
Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore,
these generally accepted public morals have not been convincingly transplanted into
the realm of law.
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act
performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that there should have been a finding
by the COMELEC that the groups members have committed or are committing immoral
acts. The OSG argues:
x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a
different gender, or more than one gender, but mere attraction does not translate to
immoral acts. There is a great divide between thought and action. Reduction ad
absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would have its hands full
of disqualification cases against both the straights and the gays. Certainly this is not
the intendment of the law.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or
why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list system
would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course,
do not suggest that the state is wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning
morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the government will and
should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we
cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate
morality on one end of an argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors
of legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value.
Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and
civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a
nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else
which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality, the remedies for which are a
prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or
abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal
Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is
not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of
civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is
simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded
that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that
the COMELEC made an unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified by
the circumstances of the case.
Freedom of Expression and Association
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a
democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received
but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere
must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest,
it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise
stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason
than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is
not illegal in this country. It follows that both expressions concerning ones
homosexuality and the activity of forming a political association that supports LGBT
individuals are protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even
overwhelming public perception that homosexual conduct violates public morality does
not justify criminalizing same-sex conduct. European and United Nations judicial
decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on both privacy and equality
grounds, citing general privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign and
international texts. To the extent that there is much to learn from other jurisdictions that
have reflected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly illuminating.
These foreign authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine courts, may
nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Courts analysis.
In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled
that existing free speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In
order to justify the prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, public institutions
must show that their actions were caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid
the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.
With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs,
in Europe, with its vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party may campaign for a change in the law
or the constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means and the
changes it proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has emphasized
that political ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization is advocated by
peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression through the exercise
of the right of association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or unacceptable to the
authorities or the majority of the population. A political group should not be hindered
solely because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find
solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned. Only if a political party incites
violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with democracy does it fall
outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee.
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual
conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express
that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with
equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent
to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that view.
However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious
or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of
other members of the community.
Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay
rights litigants. It well may be that this Decision will only serve to highlight the
discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and the more complex
moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion, even at its most
liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we neither
attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality through this
Decision.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED.
Grino--Aquino, J.
Facts:
1. The petitioners are high school and grade schools students enrolled in the
different public schools of the Province of Cebu and who belong to the religious
group known as the Jehovah's Witnesses;
2. That they rrefused to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing by
a band or singing the Philippine National Anthem, saluting the Philippine Flag
and reciting the patriotic pledge because they considered the flag as an image and
they should not worship it except GOD;
Issue:
------
May the petitioners be expelled for refusing to salute the flag, recite the patriotic
pledge or sing the national anthem in order to follow their religious beliefs?
Held:
The same issue was raised in Gerona vs. Secretary of Education, 106 Phil. 2
(1959) and Balbuna vs. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150 (1960) where the
SC held that:
The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an
emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom
and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Under a system of
complete separation of church and state in the government, the flag is utterly
devoid of any religious significance.
The law, RA 1265 was likewise incorporated in Executive Order No. 297,
September 21, 1988.
Our task is extremely difficult for the 30-year old decision of this Court in
GERONA upholding the salute law and approving the expulsion of students who
refuse to obey it, is not lightly to be trifled with.
The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national anthem,
and recite the patriotic pledge, during flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed
from one's job or be expelled in school, IS ALIEN TO THE CONSCIENCE OF
THE PRESENT GENERATION OF FILIPINOS WHO CUT THEIR TEETH ON
THE BILL OF RIGHTS WHICH GUARANTEES THEIR RIGHTS TO FREE
SPEECH AND THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGIOUS PROFESSION AND
WORSHIP (Section 5, Art. III, 1987 Constitution).
The right to religious profession has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe
and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is
confined within the realm of the thought. The second is subject to regulation
where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious
freedom (according the Former Chief justice Teehankee in his dissenting opinion
in German vs. Baranagan) is the existence of a grave and present danger of a
character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public
morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has the
right and duty to presvent. Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of
the petitioners from the schools is not justified since they are not doing anything
that could warrant their expulsion since during flag ceremonies, they just quietly
stand at attention to show their respect for the rights of others who choose to
participate in the solemn proceedings.
In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54, we upheld the
exemption of the members of the Iglesia ni Kristo from the coverage of the
closed-shop agreement between the labor union and the company because it
would violate the teaching of their church not to join any labor group.
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by
law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to
travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health,
as may be provided by law.
Section 26 provides that persons who have been charged with terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism---even if they have been granted bail because
evidence of guilt is not strongcan be:
Prohibited from using any cellular phones, computers, or other means of communications
with people outside their residence.
Upon application of the prosecutor, the suspects right to travel shall be limited to
the municipality or city where he resides or where the case is pending, in the
interest of national security and public safety. Travel outside of said municipality
or city, without the authorization of the court, shall be deemed a violation of the
terms and conditions of the bail which shall then be forfeited as provided in the
Rules of Court.
2. Read:
Cortes, J.
This is a petition for mandamus and prohibition asking the Supreme Court to
Order the respondents to issue travel documents to the petitioners and to enjoin
the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the
Philippines.
The case for the petitioners is founded on the assertion that their right to return to
the Philippines is guaranteed by the following provisions of the Constitution:
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except in the interest of national security,
public safety or public health, as may be provided by law.
The petitioners contend that the President has no power to impair the liberty of
abode of the Marcoses because only the Courts may do so "within the limits
prescribed by law". Nor may the President impair the right to travel because no
law has authorized her to do so.
Also, the petitioners claim that under international law, particularly the Universal
Declaration of Humjan Rights guaranteed the right of the Marcoses to return to
the Philippines. Thus:
Art. 13 (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within
the borders of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, AND TO
RETURN TO HIS COUNTRY.
Likewise, under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which
had been ratified by the Philippines, provides:
Art. 12
4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.
The respondents argue that the issue in this case involves a political question
which is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. Furthermore, they argue
that the right of the state to national security prevails over individual rights, citing
Section 4, Art. II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted in the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
The sub-issues, which could help in the determination of the main issue, are:
1. Does the President have the power to bar the Marcoses to return to the
Philippines?
2. Assuming that the President has the power to bar former Pres. Marcos and his
family from returning to the Philippines, in the interest of national security, public
safety or public health, has the President made a finding that the return of the
petitioners to the Philippines is a clear and present danger to national security,
public welfare or public health. And if she has made that finding, have the
requirements of due process been complied with in making such finding? Has
there been prior notice to the petitioners?
Held:
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved in this case is not the
right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines.
These are what the right to travel connote. Essentially, the right to return to one's
country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent from, though
related to the right to travel. Thus, even the Universal declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right
to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of the state, the right to
leave a country and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights.
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the
common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power
involved is the President's RESIDUAL POWER to protect the general
welfare of the people.
The court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is
not besieged by the insurgency, separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist
conspiracies to grab power, etc. With these before her, the President cannot be
said to have acted arbitrarily, capriciously and whimsically.
Lastly, the issue involved in the case at bar is not political in nature since under
Section 1, Art. VIII of the Constitution, judicial power now includes the duty to
"determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
NOTE:
The main opinion was concurred in by 7 justices (CJ Fernan, Narvasa, MelencioHerrera, Gancayco, Grino-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado) or a total of 8
justices in voting in favor of DISMISSING the petition. Seven justices filed
separate dissenting opinions (Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin
and Sarmiento).
***********************
Amazingly, however, the majority has come to the conclusion that there exist
"factual bases for the President's decision" to bar Marcos's return. That is not my
recollection of the impressions of the Court after the hearing.
2. Silverio vs. CA, April 8, 1991
Read also:
1. Caunca vs. Salazar, 82 Phil. 851
2. Kwong vs. PCGG, December 7,l987
1. Petitioner Ricardo Manotoc, Jr. has 6 criminal cases for estafa pending against
him. In said cases he was admitted to bail with the FGU Insurance Corporation as
surety.
3. Petitioner subsequently filed before the trial courts a motion entitled "motion
for permission to leave the country" stating as ground therefor his desire to go to
the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities".
4. The motion was denied by the lower courts and the matter was elevated to the
Court of Appeals which also denied the same. Petitioner brings the matter to the
S.C. claiming his constitutional right to travel and also contending that having
been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him
bail nor the SEC would have jurisdiction over his liberty.
HELD:
Petition denied.
a. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail
bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all
times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on
his right to travel.
b. "x x x the result of the obligation assumed by appellee to hold the accused
amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to
prohibit the accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because,
otherwise, said orders and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the
jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not extend beyond that of
the Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said
jurisdiction."(People vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (l935)
c. To allow the petitioner to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason would
place him beyond the reach of the courts.
d. Petitioner cites the Court of Appeals case of People vs. Shepherd (C.A.-G.R.
No. 23505-R, Feb. 13, 1980) as authority for his claim that he could travel. The
S.C. held however that said case is not squarely on all fours with the case at bar.
Unlike the Shepherd case, petitioner has failed to satisfy the courts of the urgency
of his travel, the duration thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to the
proposed travel.
e. It may thus be inferred that the fact that a criminal case is pending against an
accused does not automatically bar him from travelling abroad. He must however
convince the courts of the urgency of his travel, the duration thereof, and
that his sureties are willing to undertake the responsibility of allowing him to
travel.
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official recordsshall be afforded the citizen subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
1. Read:
CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006, 504
SCRA 704
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
The Facts:
Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate premises where he was
detained. Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
habeas corpus against the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators
Richard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and Members. The case was docketed as
G.R. No. 174340.
I S S U E S:
H E L D:
Yes.
Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 which was invoked by the petitioners in support
of their refusal to testify in the Senate limits the power of legislative inquiry by
exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative
or administrative proceeding, thus:
Held:
The COMELEC should publish the list of nominees of all the party-list
groups. This is in accordance with the right to information on matters of
public concern which shall be accorded to every citizen.
Valmonte vs. Belmonte, GR No. 74930, February 13, 1989 in relation to the
Right to Privacy
Cortes, J.
Facts:
1. On June 4, 1986, petitioner Valmonte wrote the respondent asking the latter to
furnish him copies of former members of the Batasang Pambansa who were able
to secure a "clean loan" from the GSIS prior to the February 7, 1986 elections;
2. On June 17, 1986, respondent through counsel refused to give the petitioner a
list of said lawmakers who obtained "clean loans" from the GSIS on the ground
that there is a confidential relationship between the GSIS and its borrowers and it
would be proper for them to preserve the same;
Issues:
Held:
1. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that before a party can be allowed to resort
to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress
available under the law.
In the case at bar, the decision of the General Manager of the GSIS is
appealable/reviewable by the GSIS Board of Trustees. Petitioners did not ask the
Board of Trustees to review the decision of the respondent.
This is not the first time that the court is confronted with a case involving the right
to information. In Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, we upheld the citizen's right
to information as well as in Legaspi vs. CSC, 150 SCRA 530 and ordered the
government officers involved to act as prayed for by the petitioners. The pertinent
provision of the Constitution is Section 7, Art. III which provides:
Petitioners are members of the media. As such, they have both the right to gather
and the obligation to check the accuracy of the information they disseminate x x x
Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute.
It is subject to limitations provided for by law and the people's right to
information is limited to "matters of public concern". Similarly, the State's policy
of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public interest" and subject
to "reasonable conditions prescribed by law."
The Facts:
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its
various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of
legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of
the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in
Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging
the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of
the contract covering the North Rail Project.
On September 28, 2005, the President of the Philippines issued E.O. 464,
Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the
Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials
Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution,
and For Other Purposes, which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect
immediately. The salient provisions of the Order are as follows:
I S S U E S:
1. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern; and
H E L D:
government officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of
expression. Thus holds Valmonte v. Belmonte:
It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political
discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and
be responsive to the peoples will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only
to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will
intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues
and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.183 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.
4. Read:
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation
2. Who may exercise it? How about a barangay? Yes with the Presidents
approval.
Read:
2. Procedure for the exercise of said power; Extent of payment to be made before writ of
possession shall be issued in favor of the government.
Tinga, J.
Facts:
In 2003, the Supreme Court held in AGAN VS. PIATCO, 402 SCRA 612
that the CONCESSION AGREEMENT FOR THE BUILD OPERATE
This Court, however, is not unmindful of the reality that the structures
comprising the NAIA IPT III facility are almost complete and that funds have
been spent by PIATCO in their construction. For the government to take over the
said facility, IT HAS TO COMPENSATE RESPONDENT PIATCO as builder
of the said structures. The compensation must be just and in accordance with
law and equity FOR THE GOVERNMENT CAN NOT UNJUSTLY
ENRICH ITSELF AT THE EXPENSE OF PIATCO AND ITS
INVESTORS.
On December 21, 2004, the Government filed a complaint for expropriation with
the RTC of Pasay City seeking a writ of possession authorizing to take immediate
possession and control over NAIA 3 facilities and deposited the amount of P3.0B
in cash with Land Bank of the Philippines representing the assessed value of the
terminals assessed value for taxation purposes.
On the same day, Judge Gingoyon issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ
of possession to the government to take or enter upon the possession of the
NAIA 3 facilities. It held that it is the ministerial duty of the government to issue
writ of possession upon deposit of the assessed value of the property subject of
expropriation.
Both Orders were questioned by the government as having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion.
ISSUES:
1. What law is applicable in this expropriation case: Rule 67 of the Rules of Court
or RA 8974?
2. If RA 8974 will be used, may the court used the provision of Rule 67 on the 3
commissioners to determine just compensation.
HELD:
1.
Application of Rule 67 would violate the AGAN Doctrine which provides that
for the government to take over the said NAIA 3 facility, IT HAS TO
COMPENSATE RESPONDENT PIATCO AS BUILDER OF THE SAID
STRUCTURES. If Section 2, Rule 67 will be applied, PIATCO would be
enjoined from receiving the just compensation even if the government takes over
the NAIA 3 facility. It is sufficient that the government deposits the amount equal
to the assessed value of the facilities. It would violate the proscription in the
AGAN Decision that the government must pay first the just compensation before
taking over the facilities.
So when shall Rule 67 be used in expropriation cases and when shall RA 8974
be used?
1. Under Rule 67, the government merely deposits the assessed value of the property
subject of expropriation and can have a writ of possession over the same while under RA
8974, the scheme of immediate payment (100%) shall be followed.
2. Under Rule 67, there can be writ of possession even if the owner of the property has not
received a single centavo while under RA 8974, as in this case, Writ of Possession may
not be issued in favor of the government UNTIL ACTUAL RECEIPT by PIATCO of the
preferred value of just compensation.
THE FACTS:
On 18 March 2002, TRB filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the issuance
of a Writ of Possession, manifesting that it deposited a sufficient amount to cover
the payment of 100% of the zonal value of the affected properties, in the total
amount of P28,406,700.00, with the Land Bank of the Philippines, South Harbor
Branch (LBP-South Harbor), an authorized government depository. TRB
maintained that since it had already complied with the provisions of Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 8974184[5] in relation to Section 2 of Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial on the part of
the RTC.
The RTC issued, on 19 March 2002, an Order for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession.
On 3 March 2003, HTRDC filed with the RTC a Motion to Withdraw
Deposit, praying that the respondent or its duly authorized representative be
allowed to withdraw the amount of P22,968,000.00, out of TRBs advance deposit
of P28,406,700.00 with LBP-South Harbor, including the interest which
accrued thereon.
Thereafter, the RTC allowed the release of the principal amount together
with the interest to the respondent but on Motion for Reconsideration of the TRB,
it disallowed the withdrawal of the interest reasoning out that the said issue will
be included in the second stage of expropriation, that is, the determination of just
compensation.
The private respondent elevated the issue to the Court of Appeals which
ruled that the respondent is entitled to the interest by way of accession.
I S S U E:
Who has the right over the interest of the amount deposited representing the zonal
value of the property sought to be expropriated? The expropriator or the
landowner?
HELD:
The TRB further points out that the expropriation account with LBP-South
Harbor is not in the name of HTRDC, but of DPWH. Thus, the said expropriation
account includes the compensation for the other landowners named defendants in
Civil Case No. 869-M-2000, and does not exclusively belong to respondent.
xxxx
Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more
favorable to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances
when the national government expropriates property for national government
infrastructure projects. Thus, if expropriation is engaged in by the national
government for purposes other than national infrastructure projects, the assessed
value standard and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply.
There is no question that the proceedings in this case deal with the
expropriation of properties intended for a national government infrastructure
project. Therefore, the RTC correctly applied the procedure laid out in Republic
Act No. 8974, by requiring the deposit of the amount equivalent to 100% of the
zonal value of the properties sought to be expropriated before the issuance of a
writ of possession in favor of the Republic.
The controversy, though, arises not from the amount of the deposit, but as
to the ownership of the interest that had since accrued on the deposited amount.
Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the interest
earned by the deposited amount in the expropriation account would accrue to
HRTDC by virtue of accession, hinges on the determination of who actually owns
the deposited amount, since, under Article 440 of the Civil Code, the right of
accession is conferred by ownership of the principal property:
The principal property in the case at bar is part of the deposited amount in
the expropriation account of DPWH which pertains particularly to HTRDC. Such
amount, determined to be P22,968,000.00 of the P28,406,700.00 total deposit,
was already ordered by the RTC to be released to HTRDC or its authorized
representative. The Court of Appeals further recognized that the deposit of the
amount was already deemed a constructive delivery thereof to HTRDC:
Since the Court of Appeals found that the HTRDC is the owner of the
deposited amount, then the latter should also be entitled to the interest which
accrued thereon.
The deposit was made in order to comply with Section 4 of Republic Act
No. 8974, which requires nothing less than the immediate payment of 100% of the
value of the property, based on the current zonal valuation of the BIR, to the
property owner. Thus, going back to our ruling in Republic v. Gingoyon190[16]:
It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974 to supersede the system of
deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of immediate payment in cases
involving national government infrastructure projects.
The critical factor in the different modes of effecting delivery which gives
legal effect to the act is the actual intention to deliver on the part of the party
making such delivery.191[17] The intention of the TRB in depositing such amount
through DPWH was clearly to comply with the requirement of immediate
payment in Republic Act No. 8974, so that it could already secure a writ of
possession over the properties subject of the expropriation and commence
implementation of the project. In fact, TRB did not object to HTRDCs Motion to
Withdraw Deposit with the RTC, for as long as HTRDC shows (1) that the
property is free from any lien or encumbrance and (2) that respondent is the
absolute owner thereof.192[18]
A close scrutiny of TRBs arguments would further reveal that it does not
directly challenge the Court of Appeals determinative pronouncement that the
interest earned by the amount deposited in the expropriation account accrues to
HTRDC by virtue of accession. TRB only asserts that HTRDC is entitled only to
an amount equivalent to the zonal value of the expropriated property, nothing
more and nothing less.
Harbor. By depositing the said amount, TRB is already considered to have paid
the same to HTRDC, and HTRDC became the owner thereof. The amount earned
interest after the deposit; hence, the interest should pertain to the owner of the
principal who is already determined as HTRDC. The interest is paid by LBPSouth Harbor on the deposit, and the TRB cannot claim that it paid an amount
more than what it is required to do so by law.
The issue in Angas is whether or not, in the computation of the legal rate
of interest on just compensation for expropriated lands, the applicable law is
Article 2209 of the Civil Code which prescribes a 6% legal interest rate, or
Central Bank Circular No. 416 which fixed the legal rate at 12% per annum. We
ruled in Angas that since the kind of interest involved therein is interest by way of
damages for delay in the payment thereof, and not as earnings from loans or
forbearances of money, Article 2209 of the Civil Code prescribing the 6% interest
shall apply. In Wycoco, on the other hand, we clarified that interests in the form of
damages cannot be applied where there is prompt and valid payment of just
compensation.
The case at bar, however, does not involve interest as damages for delay in
payment of just compensation. It concerns interest earned by the amount
deposited in the expropriation account.
final and executory, where the implementing agency shall pay the owner the
difference between the amount already paid and the just compensation as
determined by the court (final payment)
Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and the
doctrine laid down IN THE ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CASE, the only
requisites for the immediate entry by the government in expropriation cases
are:
1. the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and
The owners of the expropriated land are entitled to legal interest on the
compensation eventually adjudged from the date the condemnor takes possession
of the land until the full compensation is paid to them or deposited in court.
THE CITY OF ILOILO VS. JUDGE LEGASPI, RTC 22, ILOILO CITY,
444 SCRA 269
1. the complaint for expropriation filed in court is sufficient in form and substance; and
2. the expropriator must deposit the amount equivalent to 15% of the fair market
value of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration.
But if the government fails to use the property expropriated for the purpose for which it
was intended, the landowner has the right to buy-back the same.
NACHURA, J.:
Subject of this case is Lot No. 88-SWO-25042 (Lot No. 88), with an area of 1,017
square meters, more or less, located in Lahug, Cebu City. Its original owner was
Anastacio Deiparine when the same was subject to expropriation proceedings, initiated
by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented by the then Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA), for the expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport. The
case was filed with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Third Branch, and docketed
as Civil Case No. R-1881.
As early as 1947, the lots were already occupied by the U.S. Army. They were
turned over to the Surplus Property Commission, the Bureau of Aeronautics, the National
Airport Corporation and then to the CAA.
During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings, respondent Bernardo L.
Lozada, Sr. acquired Lot No. 88 from Deiparine. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 9045 was issued in Lozadas name.
On December 29, 1961, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Republic
and ordered the latter to pay Lozada the fair market value of Lot No. 88, adjudged at
P3.00 per square meter, with consequential damages by way of legal interest computed
from November 16, 1947the time when the lot was first occupied by the airport.
Lozada received the amount of P3,018.00 by way of payment.
The affected landowners appealed. Pending appeal, the Air Transportation Office
(ATO), formerly CAA, proposed a compromise settlement whereby the owners of the lots
affected by the expropriation proceedings would either not appeal or withdraw their
respective appeals in consideration of a commitment that the expropriated lots would be
resold at the price they were expropriated in the event that the ATO would abandon the
Lahug Airport, pursuant to an established policy involving similar cases. Because of this
promise, Lozada did not pursue his appeal. Thereafter, Lot No. 88 was transferred and
registered in the name of the Republic under TCT No. 25057.
The projected improvement and expansion plan of the old Lahug Airport, however,
was not pursued.
Lozada, with the other landowners, contacted then CAA Director Vicente Rivera,
Jr., requesting to repurchase the lots, as per previous agreement. The CAA replied that
there might still be a need for the Lahug Airport to be used as an emergency DC-3
airport. It reiterated, however, the assurance that should this Office dispose and resell
the properties which may be found to be no longer necessary as an airport, then the policy
of this Office is to give priority to the former owners subject to the approval of the
President.
On November 29, 1989, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued a Memorandum
to the Department of Transportation, directing the transfer of general aviation operations
of the Lahug Airport to the Mactan International Airport before the end of 1990 and, upon
such transfer, the closure of the Lahug Airport.
Sometime in 1990, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6958, entitled An Act Creating the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority,
Transferring Existing Assets of the Mactan International Airport and the Lahug Airport to
the Authority, Vesting the Authority with Power to Administer and Operate the Mactan
International Airport and the Lahug Airport, and For Other Purposes.
From the date of the institution of the expropriation proceedings up to the present,
the public purpose of the said expropriation (expansion of the airport) was never actually
initiated, realized, or implemented. Instead, the old airport was converted into a
commercial complex. Lot No. 88 became the site of a jail known as Bagong Buhay
Rehabilitation Complex, while a portion thereof was occupied by squatters. The old
airport was converted into what is now known as the Ayala I.T. Park, a commercial area.
Thus, on June 4, 1996, petitioners initiated a complaint for the recovery of possession and
reconveyance of ownership of Lot No. 88. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB-18823 and was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 57, Cebu City.
In their Answer, petitioners asked for the immediate dismissal of the complaint.
They specifically denied that the Government had made assurances to reconvey Lot No.
88 to respondents in the event that the property would no longer be needed for airport
operations. Petitioners instead asserted that the judgment of condemnation was
unconditional, and respondents were, therefore, not entitled to recover the expropriated
property notwithstanding non-use or abandonment thereof.
After pretrial, but before trial on the merits, the parties stipulated on the following
set of facts:
(1)
(2)
(3)
The public purpose for which the property was expropriated was for
the purpose of the Lahug Airport;
(4)
(5)
On October 22, 1999, the RTC rendered its Decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby
renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr., and
the heirs of Rosario Mercado, namely, Vicente M. Lozada, Marcia L.
Godinez, Virginia L. Flores, Bernardo M. Lozada, Jr., Dolores L. Gacasan,
Socorro L. Cafaro and Rosario M. Lozada, represented by their attorneyin-fact Marcia Lozada Godinez, and against defendants Cebu-Mactan
International Airport Authority (MCIAA) and Air Transportation Office
(ATO):
No pronouncement as to costs.
Aggrieved, petitioners interposed an appeal to the CA. After the filing of the
necessary appellate briefs, the CA rendered its assailed Decision dated February 28,
2006, denying petitioners appeal and affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC, Branch
57, Cebu City. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was, likewise, denied in the
questioned CA Resolution dated February 7, 2007.
Hence, this petition arguing that: (1) the respondents utterly failed to prove that
there was a repurchase agreement or compromise settlement between them and the
Government; (2) the judgment in Civil Case No. R-1881 was absolute and unconditional,
giving title in fee simple to the Republic; and (3) the respondents claim of verbal
assurances from government officials violates the Statute of Frauds.
The petition should be denied.
Petitioners anchor their claim to the controverted property on the supposition that
the Decision in the pertinent expropriation proceedings did not provide for the condition
that should the intended use of Lot No. 88 for the expansion of the Lahug Airport be
aborted or abandoned, the property would revert to respondents, being its former owners.
Petitioners cite, in support of this position, Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan, which
declared that the Government acquires only such rights in expropriated parcels of land as
may be allowed by the character of its title over the properties
If x x x land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition
that when that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to
its former owner, then, of course, when the purpose is terminated or
abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so expropriated. If x
x x land is expropriated for a public street and the expropriation is granted
upon condition that the city can only use it for a public street, then, of
course, when the city abandons its use as a public street, it returns to the
former owner, unless there is some statutory provision to the contrary. x x
x. If, upon the contrary, however, the decree of expropriation gives to the
entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the land becomes the absolute
property of the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, or
municipality, and in that case the non-user does not have the effect of
defeating the title acquired by the expropriation proceedings. x x x.
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple,
unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase,
the former owner retains no right in the land, and the public use may be
abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any
impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former
owner. x x x.
Contrary to the stance of petitioners, this Court had ruled otherwise in Heirs of
Timoteo Moreno and Maria Rotea v. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, thus
While in the trial in Civil Case No. R-1881 [we] could have simply
acknowledged the presence of public purpose for the exercise of eminent
domain regardless of the survival of Lahug Airport, the trial court in its
Decision chose not to do so but instead prefixed its finding of public
purpose upon its understanding that Lahug Airport will continue to be in
operation. Verily, these meaningful statements in the body of the
Decision warrant the conclusion that the expropriated properties would
remain to be so until it was confirmed that Lahug Airport was no longer
in operation. This inference further implies two (2) things: (a) after the
Lahug Airport ceased its undertaking as such and the expropriated lots
were not being used for any airport expansion project, the rights vis--vis
the expropriated Lots Nos. 916 and 920 as between the State and their
former owners, petitioners herein, must be equitably adjusted; and (b) the
foregoing unmistakable declarations in the body of the Decision should
merge with and become an intrinsic part of the fallo thereof which under
purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is
not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former
owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the
return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of
the power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required factual
justification.
On the matter of the repurchase price, while petitioners are obliged to reconvey Lot
No. 88 to respondents, the latter must return to the former what they received as just
compensation for the expropriation of the property, plus legal interest to be computed
from default, which in this case runs from the time petitioners comply with their
obligation to respondents.
Respondents must likewise pay petitioners the necessary expenses they may have
incurred in maintaining Lot No. 88, as well as the monetary value of their services in
managing it to the extent that respondents were benefited thereby.
Held:
The taking of private lands under the agrarian reform program of the government
partakes of the nature of an expropriation proceedings. As such, in computing the
just compensation, it is the value of the land at the time of the taking, not at
the time of the rendition of the judgment, which should be taken into
consideration.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the
owners loss. Market value is that sum of money which a person desirous but not
compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on
as a price to be given and received therefore.
The just compensation is determined as of the date of taking of the property or the
filing of the complaint for expropriation, WHICHEVER COMES FIRST.
Read:
Read also:
Cruz, J.
Facts:
1. On June 18, 1982, Vicente Viray, then President of Apolinario Apacible School
of Fisheries, a government institution in Nasugbu, Batangas, sent the petitioner a
written offer to buy the property of the latter with an area of 10,640 square meters
for its 5-year expansion program;
2. That the petitioner expressed willingness to sell at P50.00 per square meter in
its reply;
3. Viray then requested the Office of the Provincial Assessor of the Province of
Batangas to appraise the land and the latter fixed its market value at P32.00 per
square meter;
4. Viray then wrote the petitioner and expressed willingness to buy the latter's
property at P32.00 per square meter. The petitioner, however, stuck to its original
valuation. Later on, it said that its property had in fact appreciated to as much as
P100.00 per square meter;
5. On October 28, 1983, the Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint for the
expropriation of the petitioner's property and invoked the assessment made by the
Provincial Appraisal Committee of the Provincial Assessor of Batangas in the
amount of P32.00. The government likewise sought immediate possession of the
property upon deposit of 10% of the total assessment in accordance with PD 48;
7. The RTC then appointed a panel of commissioners in accordance with Rule 67,
ection 5, of the Rules of Court, to determine the just compensation to be paid for
the land;
8. On September 23, 1985, the panel of commissioners submitted its report to the
trial court and pegged the market value at P85.00 per square meter;
9. The Republic of the Philippines objected and pointed to three (3) contracts of
sale executed by the petitioner in 1985 whereby it sold three (3) tracts of land
similar in topography and adjacent to the property in question for the unit price of
only P19.18 per square meter;
10. The court directed the commissioners to convene anew and to receive
additional evidence. However, in its second report dated April 1, 1987, the panel
reiterated its original recommendation of P85.00/sq. m. or a total of P904,400.00
for the entire area sought to be expropriated. The trial court acting on this
recommendation rendered judgment requiring the Republic to pay the petitioner
the amount of P904,400.00 for the entire area sought to be expropriated;
11. The government appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals
which rendered a decision REVERSING THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION
and declaring that the fair market value which should be the basis in computing
the amount to be paid by the government to the petitioner shall be P19.18, the
market value according set by the petitioner if we follow the three (3) deeds of
sale it executed in favor of three (3) different individuals;
12. The petitioner was therefore constrained to file this instant petition claiming
that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that P19.18 per square meter should be
the basis of the computation for the just compensation of its property because:
a. Viray even offered the amount of P32.00 per squaremeter as the fair market
value;
b. that P32.00 per square meter was the appraised value made by the Office of the
Provincial Assessor of Batangas; and
c. the complaint itself prays that the market value be pegged at P32.00 per square
meter.
Issue:
WHAT SHOULD BE THE BASIS IN THE COMPUTATION OF THE JUST
COMPENSATION: P32.00/SQ. M. IN ACCORANCE WITH THE APPRAISAL
OF THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR; P100.00/SQ.M. AS CLAIMED BY THE
OWNER; P85.00/SQ. M. AS RECOMMENDED BY THE BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED BY THE COURT TO EVALUATE THE
SAME, OR P19.18 PER SQUARE METER WHICH WAS THE SELLING
PRICE IN AN ADJACENT LOT SOLD BY THE PETITIONER TO THREE
PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS.
Held.
The basis in the computation of just compensation shall be P19.18 per square
meter or the price which the petitioner sold its other lots to other individuals.
This is so because there is no showing that the petitioner had any special reason
for granting each of the individual vendees the extraordinary discount amounting
to as much as 75% of its claimed real value of the land. To all appearances, they
were ordinary buyers who bought the land for their own private purposes only and
not for the public purpose invoked by the government.
The petitioner's claim that the value as appearing in the deeds of sale in the three
other parcels is not a reliable index of just compensation "because owners usually
undervalue the selling price of the property to lower the expenses they would
have to pay for capital gains tax and documentary stamps tax" is practically an
admission that it did not indicate the actual consideration in the three transactions
where it was made to appear that the price per square meter was only P19.18. If
this was the purpose of the petitioner when it executed the 3 deeds of sale, then IT
IS SURELY HOIST NOW BY ITS OWN PETARD. AND RIGHTLY SO, FOR
IT CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM ITS OWN DECEPTION AND
CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY SHOULD BE ASSESSED AT THE
HIGHER RATE IT CLANDESTINELY AGREED UPON WITH THE BUYERS.
The Court is disappointed that the petitioner should demand a higher price from
the republic, which needs the land for a public purpose, when it was willing to
accept less from the three individual buyers who had only their private interests to
serve.
The fact that the petitioner sold the 3 other parcels of land at P19.18 per square
meter which are admittedly of the same topography as that subject of this case, it
impliedly admitted that the price for the latter should be the same as the former.
This rule of consistency is best expressed in the familiar saying, surely not
unknown to the petitioner, THAT WHAT IS SAUCE FOR THE GOOSE IS ALSO
SAUCE FOR THE GANDER.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the proerty sought
to be expropriated (Association of Small Landowners vs. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, 175 SCRA 378). The measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss.
he compensation, to be just, must be fair not only to the owner but also to the
taker.
To determine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain the market
value of the property, to which should be added the consequential benefits which
may arise from the expropriation.
The market value of the property is the price that may be agreed upon by the
parties willing but not compelled to enter into a contract of sale.
Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair market value are:
1. cost of acquisition;
2. the current value of like proerties;
3. its actual or potential uses;
4. particular case of lands;
5. their size, shape, location; and
6. the tax declarations thereon.
Finally, note that as held in the case of Republic vs. Santos, 141 SCRA 30, the
market value as recommended by the board of commissioners appointed by the
court were at best only ADVISORY AND PERSUASIVE AND BY NO MEANS
FINAL OR BINDING.
Read:
Requisites of taking:
1. the expropriator must enter the property;
2. the entrance must not be for just a momentary period;
3. the entry must be under warrant of color or title;
4. the property must be devoted for public use; and
5. the owner must be ousted from beneficial use of his land.
Read:
1. City of Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40 Phil. 349 ( A private property which
is devoted to public use may not be expropriated for another public purpose.)
Expropriation
Gancayco, J.
Facts:
1. On February 20, 1979, the Rep. of the Philippines initiated an expropriation
proceedings against the owners of the houses standing along Fernando Rein-Del
Pan streets, among them Cristina de Knecht together with Concepcion Cabarrus,
and some other fifteen defendants in Civil Case No. 7001-P;
2. In June, 1979, the Republic of the Philippines prayed for the issuance of a writ
of possession of the property to be expropriated on the ground that it had already
deposited with the PNB 10% of the amount of compensation stated in the
complaint; that on June 14, 1979, the Lower Court issued a writ of possession
authorizing the Republic to enter into the properties condemned and created a
committee to determine just compensation;
3. On July 16, 1979, De Knecht went to the Supreme Court on a petition for
certiorari and prohibition directed against the June 14, 1979 order of the lower
court;
4. On October 30, 1980, the Supreme Court rendered its decision granting the
petition for certiorari and prohibition and directing that the Order of the
respondent Judge dated June 14, 1979 be SET ASIDE and the respondent Judge is
permanently enjoined from taking any further action on Civil Case No. 7001-P;
5. On August 8, 1981, the defendants in Civil Case No. 7001- moved for the
dismissal of said case since the decision of the Supreme Court is already final;
6. On September 2, 1983, the Republic moved for the dismissal of the case due to
the enactment of BP 340 expropriating the same properties for the same purpose.
On the same date, the Court dismissed the case. The defendants moved for a
reconsideration which the Court denied;
7. De Knecht appealed the Order dismissing the case to the Court of Appeals who
on December 28, 1988 issued its decision setting aside the Order appealed from
and dismissing the expropriation proceedings before the lower court on the
ground that the choice of the above-mentioned streets as the line through which
the EDSA should be extended is arbitrary and should not receive judicial
approval;
8. The Republic of the Philippines filed a Petition for Review with the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the legislature could still pass a law expropriating the lots of the
private respondents despite the existence of a final decision of the Supreme Court
which held that choice of their lot to be used as an extension of EDSA is
arbitrary?
Held:
It is true that there is already a final decision of the Supreme Court to the effect
that the choice of the Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets is arbitrary and should not
receive judicial approval. However, it is equally true that the Constitution and our
laws may expropriate private properties after the payment of just compensation.
When on February 17, 1983, the Batasang Pambansa passed BP 340 expropriating
the same properties for the same purpose, IT APPEARS THAT THE SAME WAS
BASED ON SUPERVENING EVENTS THAT OCCURRED after the decision of
the SC in De Knecht vs. Bautista in 1980. The social impact factor which
persuaded the Court to consider this extension has disappeared because of the fact
that the residents of the area have been relocated and duly compensated and only
DE KNECHT now is left while her property is only about 5% of the area to be
expropriated. The Republic could continue it expropriation proceedings
considering the supervening events after the decision was rendered.
************************
7. When shall we base the computation of the value of the property expropriated:
at the time of taking or at the time of the institution of the expropriation
proceedings?
Read:
1. Read:
Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall
not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
Section 21. Rights of a person under custodial detention.- The moment a person
charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to
commit terrorism is apprehended or arrested and detained, he shall forthwith be
informed by the arresting police or law enforcement officers to whose custody the
person concerned is brought, of his or her right:
1. to be informed of the nature and cause of his arrest, to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel of his or her choice, the police or law enforcement officers
concerned shall immediately contact the free legal assistance unit of the IBP or the Public
attorneys office (PAO). It shall be the duty of the free legal assistance unit of the IBP or
the PAOs thus contacted to immediately visit the person detained and provide him with
legal assistance. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
the counsel of choice;
2. informed of the cause or causes of his detention in the presence of his legal counsel;
3. allowed to communicate freely with his legal counsel and to confer with them at any time
without restriction;
4. allowed to communicate freely and privately without restrictions with the members of his
family or with his nearest relatives and be visited by them; and
5. allowed freely to avail of the services of a physician or physicians of choice.
Section 23. Requirement for an official custodial logbook and its contents.The police or other law enforcement custodial unit in whose care and control the
person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of
conspiracy to commit terrorism has been placed under custodial arrest and
detention shall keep a securely and orderly maintained official logbook, which is
hereby declared as public document and opened and made available for inspection
and scrutiny of the lawyer or lawyers of the person under custody or any member
of his family or relative by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree or his
physician at any time of the day without any form of restriction. The logbook
shall contain a clear and concise record of:
5. the date and time of each removal of the detained person from his cell for interrogation or
for any purpose;
6. the date and time of his return to his cell;
7. name and address of the physician who examined him physically and medically;
8. summary of the physical and medical findings after each interrogation;
9. names and addresses of the members of his family and relatives;
10. names and addresses of the persons who visited him;
11. date and time of such visits;
12. date and time when the detained person requested to communicate or confer with his
lawyer;
13. the date and time of visits by his legal counsel and the date and time of departure; and
14. all other important events bearing on all relevant details regarding the treatment of the
detained person while under custodial arrest or detention.
The summary of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation (from the time of
arrest) under the Constitution, laws and jurisprudence.
Per Curiam:
Considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that evidence
against an accused were obtained through lawful means, the Court, as
guardian of the rights of the people, lays down the PROCEDURE, GUIDELINES,
AND DUTIES WHICH THE ARRESTING, DETAINING, INVITING OR
INVESTIGATING OFFICER OR HIS COMPANIONS MUST OBSERVE AT
THE TIME OF MAKING THE ARREST AND AGAIN AT AND DURING THE
TIME OF THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION OR INTERROGATION IN
ACCORDANCE with the Constitution, jurisprudence and Republic Act No.
7438. It is high time to educate our law enforcement agencies who neglect
either by ignorance or indifference the so-called Miranda rights which had
become insufficient and which the court must update in the light of new legal
developments.
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed
in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be
shown a copy of the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings, information or
communication must be in a language known to and understood by said person;
2. He must be warned that he has the right to remain silent and that any statement he makes
may be used as evidence against him;
3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence
of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer,
one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his
behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one
acting in his behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, , he must be informed that no
custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his
counsel or after a valid waiver has been made;
6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate
or confer by the most expedient means---telephone, radio, letter or messenger---with his
lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family; or any
medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate
family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly accredited national or
international non-governmental organization. IT SHALL BE THE RESPONSIBILITY
OF THE OFFICER TO ENSURE THAT THIS IS ACCOMPLISHED;
7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same;
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it
must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned
that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;
9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time
or state of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with the warning that once
he makes such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet
commenced, or the interrogation has begun;
10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent,
the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any other
time during the process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or
volunteered some information or statements;
11. He must be informed that any statement OR EVIDENCE, as the case may be, obtained in
violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part,
SHALL BE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
(NOTE: Any violation of the foregoing rights of the accused shall entitle him to
sue for damages against the arresting or investigating officers in accordance with
RA7438, not to mention the possible criminal liability of said persons under
existing laws).
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSE TING LAN UY, JR., et al.,
475 SCRA 248
Ynares-Santiago, J.
Facts:
For allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the National Power Corporation
intended for the purchase of US Dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank
(UCPB), the accused-appellants were charged of Malversation through
Falsification of Commercial Documents as defined and penalized under Arts. 217
and 171 [8] in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. After trial, all
accused were convicted by the Sandiganbayan.
Accused Ochoa interposed an appeal and claimed that his conviction was based
on his alleged sworn statement and the transcript of stenographic notes of a
supposed interview with an NPC personnel and the report of the NBI. He
maintains that he signed the sworn statement while confined a the Philippine heart
center and upon assurance that it would not be used against him. He was not
assisted by counsel nor he was apprised of his constitutional rights when he
executed the affidavit. He likewise claimed that his constitutional rights to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against and due process were
violated.
Held:
1. Even if the information charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation through
negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves that mode of
commission of the offense. (Diaz vs. Sandiganbayan, 302 SCRA 118). This was the
doctrine laid down in the case of Samson vs. Court of appeals, 103 Phil. 277.
2. The claim that his affidavit is inadmissible in evidence in accordance with section 12 [1]
of the Bill of Rights is not tenable. The investigation under said provision refers to
custodial investigation where a suspect has already been taken into police custody and
that the investigating officers begin to ask questions to elicit information and confessions
or admissions from the suspect. Succinctly stated, custodial investigation refers to the
critical pre-trial stage when the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has began to focus on a particular person as a suspect (People vs.
Duenas, Jr., 426 SCRA 666). Clearly, therefore, the rights enumerated by the accused
are not available BEFORE GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATORS ENTER THE
PICTURE. The protective mantle of section 12, article III does not apply to
administrative investigations (People vs. Judge Ayson, 175 SCRA 216); confession to a
private individual (Kimpo vs. CA, 232 SCRA 53); verbal admission made to a radio
announcer who was not a part of the investigation (People vs. Ordono, 334 SCRA 673);
or even to a Mayor approached as a personal confidante and not in his official capacity
(People vs. Zuela, 323 SCRA 589). In fact, even a videotaped interview where the
accused willingly admit his guilt in the presence of newsmen is not covered by the said
provision though the trial courts were warned by the supreme Court to take extreme
caution in admitting similar confessions because of the distinct possibility that the police,
with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize
coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having
an accused admit an offense on television (People vs. Endino, 353 SCRA 307).
It is always incumbent on the prosecution to prove at the trial that, prior to incustody questioning, the confessant was informed of his constitutional rights. The
presumption of regularity of official acts does not prevail over the constitutional
presumption of innocence. Hence, in the absence of proof that the arresting
officers complied with the above constitutional safeguards, extrajudicial
statements, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, made during the custodial
investigation, are inadmissible not only against the declarant but with more so
against 3rd persons. THIS IS SO EVEN IF SUCH STATEMENTS ARE GOSPEL
TRUTH AND VOLUNTARILY GIVEN.
The protection under Section 12 , Art. III of the Constitution begins when a
person is taken into custody for investigation of his possible participation in the
commission of a crime, or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the
commission of the crime, although not yet in custody.
PEOPLE VS. DANO, G.R. NO. 117690, 339 SCRA 515, SEPT. 1, 2000;
PEOPLE VS. MAYORGA, G.R. NO. 135405, 346 SCRA 458, NOVEMBER
29, 2000.
PEOPLE VS. DANO, G.R. NO. 117690, 339 SCRA 515, SEPT. 1, 2000;
PEOPLE VS. SAMOLDE, G.R. NO. 128551, 336 SCRA 632, JUL. 31, 2000.
accused Datulayta and Aleman led Tabucon, the city prosecutor, and a police inspector, to
the dump site where they left their victims body. After some search, the group found a
spot covered with burnt rice husks and a partially burnt body of a man. About a foot
from the body, they found the shells of a 5.56 caliber gun and an armalite rifle.
On being arraigned, all three accused, assisted by Atty. Besinga, pleaded not
guilty to the murder charge. After the prosecution rested its case, accused Tuniaco filed a
demurrer to evidence which the Court granted, resulting in the dismissal of the case
against him. On being re-arraigned at his request, accused Datulayta pleaded guilty to the
lesser offense of Homicide. The trial court sentenced him to imprisonment of six years
and one day and to pay P50,000.00 to the victims family.
For some reason, the trial court had Aleman subjected to psychiatric examination at
the Davao Mental Hospital. But, shortly after, the hospital sent word that Aleman had
escaped. He was later recaptured. When trial in the case resumed, Alemans new PAO
lawyer raised the defense of insanity. This prompted the court to require the Provincial
Jail Warden to issue a certification regarding Alemans behavior and mental condition
while in jail to determine if he was fit to stand trial. The warden complied, stating that
Aleman had been observed to have good mental condition and did not commit any
infraction while in jail.
Although the prosecution and defense stipulated that Atty. Besinga assisted accused
Aleman during the taking of his extrajudicial confession, the latter, however, recanted
what he said to the police during the trial. He testified that sometime in 1992, some
police officers took him from his aunts house in Purok Palen, Labangal, General Santos
City, and brought him to the Lagao police station. He was there asked to admit having
taken part in the murder of Cortez. When he refused, they tortured him until he agreed to
sign a document admitting his part in the crime.
Accused Aleman also testified that he could not remember having been assisted
by Atty. Besinga during the police investigation. He even denied ever knowing the
lawyer. Aleman further denied prior association with accused Tuniaco and Datulayta. He
said that he met them only at the city jail where they were detained for the death of
Cortez.
On October 8, 2001 the RTC rendered judgment, finding accused Aleman guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The court also ordered him to pay death indemnity of P70,000.00
and moral damages of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Cortez.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC 00311, the court
rendered judgment on January 21, 2008, affirming the decision of the RTC with the
modification that directed accused Aleman and Datulayta to indemnify the heirs of
Cortez, jointly and severally, in the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
P50,000.00 as moral damages; P25,000.00 as temperate damages; and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages. Aleman appealed to this Court.
never brought this to the attention of his counsel, his relatives, or the prosecutor who
administered his oath.
Accused Aleman claims, citing People v. Galit, that long questions followed by
monosyllabic answers do not satisfy the requirement that the accused is amply informed
of his rights. But this does not apply here. Tabucon testified that he spoke to Aleman
clearly in the language he knew. Aleman, joined by Atty. Besinga, even signed a
certification that the investigator sufficiently explained to him his constitutional rights
and that he was still willing to give his statement.
Further, Aleman asserts that he was lacking in education and so he did not fully
realize the consequences of a confession. But as the CA said, no law or jurisprudence
requires the police officer to ascertain the educational attainment of the accused. All that
is needed is an effective communication between the interrogator and the suspect to the
end that the latter is able to understand his rights. This appears to have been done in this
case.
Moreover, as the lower court noted, it is improbable that the police fabricated
Alemans confession and just forced him to sign it. The confession has details that only
the person who committed the crime could have possibly known. What is more, accused
Datulaytas confession corroborate that of Aleman in important details. Under the
doctrine of interlocking confessions, such corroboration is circumstantial evidence
against the person implicated in it.
Custodial Investigation before Bantay Bayan Members requires that the suspect be
informed of his Expanded Miranda Rights; otherwise, the evidence obtained shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
On the other hand, only appellant testified for the defense. He believed that the
charge against him was ill-motivated because he sometimes physically abuses his wife in
front of their children after engaging in a heated argument, and beats the children as a
disciplinary measure. He went further to narrate how his day was on the date of the
alleged rape.
The lone assignment of error in the appellants brief is that, the trial court gravely
erred in finding him guilty as charged despite the failure of the prosecution to establish
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, because: (1) there were inconsistencies in the
testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB; (2) his extrajudicial confession before Moises
Boy Banting was without the assistance of a counsel, in violation of his constitutional
right; and (3) AAAs accusation was ill-motivated.
HELD
Appellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with a
bantay bayan and the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution.
Admissibility in Evidence of an Extrajudicial Confession
before a Bantay Bayan
Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a
bantay bayan, the confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted
by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such requirement.
The case of People v. Malngan is the authority on the scope of the Miranda
doctrine provided for under Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution. In
Malngan, appellant questioned the admissibility of her extrajudicial confessions given to
the barangay chairman and a neighbor of the private complainant. This Court
distinguished. Thus:
Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman,
in this particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer
for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the
Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall
in the morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the
only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses x x x. She was,
therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed
by x x x [the] Constitution should have already been observed or applied
to her. Accused-appellants confession to Barangay Chairman x x x was
made in response to the interrogation made by the latter admittedly
conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her rights under
the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the
confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman x x x, as
well as the lighter found x x x in her bag are inadmissible in evidence
against her x x x.
Voluntary and spontaneous confession of a suspect who is already under custody of the
police is admissible in evidence even in the absence of counsel.
People of the Philippines vs. victor villarino, g.r.no. 185012,
March 5, 2010
Facts:
On April 28, 1995, BBB, together with her 10-year old daughter AAA and
her younger son CCC went to the house of their relative in Barangay D to attend the
fiesta to be held the next day.
On even date, from 7:00 oclock to 9:00 oclock in the evening, SPO4 Jesus
Genoguin (SPO4 Genoguin) was in his house in Barangay D entertaining his guests,
one of whom was appellant. While personally serving food and drinks to appellant, SP04
Genoguin noticed that the latter was wearing a bracelet and a necklace with pendant.
Appellant even allowed SPO4 Genoguin to put on the bracelet.
On April 29, 1995, at around 9:00 oclock in the morning, the appellant who was
on his way to Barangay D, passed by the house of Rodrigo Olaje (Rodrigo). At that
time, Rodrigo noticed appellant wearing a bracelet and a necklace with pendant. He was
also wearing a white sleeveless t-shirt (sando).
At 11:00 oclock in the morning, appellant was at the house of BBBs aunt.
BBB offered him food. BBB also noticed that he was dressed in a white sando and
that he wore jewelry consisting of a bracelet and a necklace with pendant. At 1:00
oclock in the afternoon, he was seen wearing the same sando and jewelry while drinking
at the basketball court in Barangay D.
At around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, BBB told AAA to go home to
Barangay D1 to get a t-shirt for her brother. AAA obeyed. However, she no longer
returned. While BBB was anxiously waiting for AAA in the house of her aunt in
Barangay D, she received information that a dead child had been found in Barangay
D1. She proceeded to the area where she identified the childs body as that of her
daughter, AAA.
At around 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, Rodrigo, who was the barangay captain
of Barangay D1 received information that a dead child was found in their barangay.
He instructed a barangay tanod to inform the police about the incident. Thereafter,
Rodrigo proceeded to the specified area together with other barangay tanods.
SPO4 Genoguin also went to the crime scene after being informed by his
commander. Upon arrival, he saw the corpse of a little girl behind a big boulder that was
about 10 meters away from the trail junction of the barangays. People had gathered
seven to 10 meters away from the dead body, but no one dared to approach.
AAAs lifeless body lay face up with her buttocks on top of a small rock. Her
body was slanted downward with her legs spread apart and dangling on the sides of the
small boulder. She was no longer wearing short pants and panty, and blood oozed from
her vagina. Wrapped around her right hand, which was positioned near her right ear, was
a white sando.
AAAs panty was found a meter away from her body, while her short pants was
about two meters farther. A bracelet and a pendant were also recovered from the crime
scene. Rodrigo and BBB identified these pieces of jewelry as those seen on the
appellant. They also identified the sando on AAAs arm as the appellants. Thus, the
hunt for appellant began.
On the same day, the appellant was found in the house of Aurelia Susmena near
the seashore of Barangay D1. He was drunk and violent. He resisted arrest and had to
be bodily carried to the motorboat that would take him to the municipal building in
Almagro, Samar. The arresting team made the appellant take off his clothes since they
were wet. When he complied, his briefs revealed bloodstains.
On May 2, 1995, the police brought appellant to Calbayog City for medical
examination since he had scratches and abrasions on his body. While waiting for a boat
ride at 4:00 oclock in the morning, the police team took a coffee break. SPO4 Genoguin
was momentarily left alone to guard the appellant. During this short period, the appellant
voluntarily admitted to SPO4 Genoguin that he committed the crime charged. He also
told SPO4 Genoguin that he could keep the pendant and bracelet if he would retrieve the
t-shirt and throw it into the sea. SPO4 Genoguin rejected the appellants offer and
reminded him of his right to a counsel and that everything the appellant said could be
used against him in court. Unperturbed, the appellant reiterated his offer.
When they boarded the motorboat, the appellant repeatedly offered to give SPO4
Genoguin P20,000.00 if he would throw the sando into the sea. However, the police
officer ignored the offer and instead reported the matter to the Chief of Police of
Almagro, SPO4 Basilio M. Yabao. Later, the appellants mother, Felicidad Mabute y
Legaspi, asked him not to testify against her son.
At the Calbayog District Hospital, Senior Resident Physician Dr. Jose V. Ong,
found that appellants body had 10 healed abrasions and two linear abrasions or scratches,
particularly, on his breast, knees, as well as right and left ears, that could have been
caused by fingernails.
On August 3, 1995, an Information was filed charging appellant Victor Villarino y
Mabute with the special complex crime of rape with homicide. The Information
contained the following accusatory allegations:
That on or about the 29th day of April, 1995, at about 5:00 oclock
in the afternoon, at Barangay D1, Municipality of Almagro, Province of
Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above named accused, with lewd design, by means of force, violence
and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge against a minor ten (10) years [sic], AAA,
without the latters consent and against her will, and thereafter, with
deliberate intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously inflict upon the said AAA mortal wounds on x x x different
parts of her body, which caused her untimely death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. After the termination of the
pre-trial conference, trial ensued.
The RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
Rape with Homicide and sentenced to Death.
ISSUE:
Is accused-appellants voluntary confession to SPO4 Genoguin admissible in evidence?
HELD:
In the instant case, appellant voluntarily confessed to raping and killing AAA to
SPO4 Genoguin. He even offered to give the pieces of jewelry to the latter if his sando is
thrown into the sea. The appellant did not deny this accusation nor assail its truthfulness.
When appellant confessed to the crime, he was alone with SPO4 Genoguin, and
no force or intimidation was employed against him. The confession was spontaneously
made and not elicited through questioning. The trial court did not, therefore, err in
holding that compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation is
not applicable in the instant case.
In People v. Dy, we held that:
Contrary to the defense contention, the oral confession made by
the Accused to Pat. Padilla that he had shot a tourist and that the gun he
had used in shooting the victim was in his bar which he wanted
surrendered to the Chief of Police (t.s.n., October 17, 1984, pp. 6-9), is
competent evidence against him. The declaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged may be given in evidence
against him (Sec. 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court). It may in a sense be also
regarded as part of the res gestae. The rule is that, any person, otherwise
competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify
Read:
Read:
Read:
The accused was under coercive and uncounselled custodial investigation by the
police without a lawyer for 2 and a half days . Then, he was brought to the IBP
Office where a lawyer assisted him in his extrajudicial confession.
We are inclined to believe that when he was brought to the IBP Office, his body
and his will were in no position to raise any objection much less to complaint to
the IBP lawyer about what he has gone through. In fact, the IBP lawyer was
working on an appeal in another case while the extrajudicial confession was being
taken.
The mere presence of a lawyer is not sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement of assistance of counsel. Assistance of counsel must be effective,
vigilant and independent. A lawyer who could just hear the investigation going on
while working on another case hardly satisfies the minimum requirements of
effective assistance of counsel. Not only was the accused subjected to custodial
investigation without counsel, he was likewise denied effective assistance of
counsel during the taking of his extra-judicial confession.
PEOPLE V. JIMENEZ
G.R.No. 82604. December 10, 1991
NARVASA, J.:
FACTS:
On August 13, 1985, police authorities, acting upon a report, came upon the
corpse of Pelagio Jimenez below a cliff near a balite tree. The police investigators
learned that Marcos, the son of the deceased Pelagio Jimenez told his mother that
his father had not come home the previous night: that the search for the deceased,
who was living separately from them, commenced a day earlier but it was not
until the morning of the following day, August 13, 1985, that deceased Pelagio
was finally found dead. They also learned from the persons they interviewed of
circumstances that drew their suspicion to the son, Marcos and Robert, such as;
the bathing at the artesian well "as if washing away stains of blood"; the
deceased's violent quarrels with his children and occasions that he had been boxed
and hit by his children. The police had invited the deceased's widow and her sons
for questioning about the killing. A draft of the confession was prepared by the
investigating officer but Marcos was not able to sign the same due to the absence
of the judge before whom it is supposed to be sworn and signed. Marcos agreed to
come back and sign his statement, but upon his return, he, assisted by a former
judge whose presence was requested by the police authorities, refused to sign his
statement. Subsequently, an information for parricide was filed against the widow
and her sons, Marcos, Robert, and Wilkins. In an order dated July 21, 1986, the
trial court absolved the widow and Wilkins of any participation in the filling for
lack of proof. On December 12. 1986, the trial court found Marcos and Robert
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide, noting that the unsigned
confession is admissible in evidence inasmuch as evidence aliunde corroborated
such confession. Both accused contest such ruling. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Section 12 (1), Article III OF THE 1987 Constitution declares that a person being
investigated by the police as a suspect in an offense has the right, among others,
(1) to have a competent and independent counsel of his own choice and if he
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one; and that (2)
said right cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
The lawyer who assists the suspect under custodial interrogation should be of
the latter's own choice, not one foisted on him by the police investigators or
other parties. In this case, the former judge whose assistance was requested
by the police was evidently not of Marcos Jimenez' own choice; she was the
police officers' own choice; she did not ask Marcos if was is willing to have
her represent him. This is not the mode of solicitation of legal assistance
contemplated by the constitution.
Furthermore, the former judge was not present when Marcos was being
interrogated by the police. While she asked him if he had voluntarily given the
statements contained in the typewritten document, this is far from being
substantial compliance with the constitutional duty of police investigators during
custodial interrogation.
Neither can the confession prejudice his co-accused, his brother Robert, not only
because it was obtained in violation of the constitution but also because of the
principle of res inter alios acta.
PEOPLE VS. PANFILO CABILES, 284 SCRA 199; PEOPLE VS. TAN, 286
SCRA 207
Melo, J.
Even if the confession of the accused speaks of the truth, if it was made without
the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence
of coercion or even if it was voluntarily given.
The above requirements, however, are not applicable when the suspect makes an
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, BUT
GIVEN IN AN ORDINARY MANNER WHEREBY THE ACCUSED ORALLY
ADMITTED HAVING COMMITTED THE CRIME. This was the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of PEOPLE VS. ANDAN, March 3, 1997 when the
accused made a voluntary and verbal confession to the Municipal Mayor that he
committed the crime imputed to him. As such, his uncounselled confession is
admissible in evidence.
Mendoza, J.
There are two (2) kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions under Art. III,
Section 12 of the Constitution. These are:
1. confession which are the product of third degree methods such as torture, force, violence,
threat, intimidation; and
3-a. How about if the accused gives an spontaneous statement before he could be
advised of his right to remain silent?
Read:
3-b. When shall the constitutional rights of the accused as mentioned above
demandable? During police line-up?
Read:
The next case is very important. It diminishes the right to counsel during
custodial investigation and makes the work of the investigator easier to make the
confession of a suspect admissible as evidence. It is obviously a reversal of the
People vs. Juanerio ruling.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
On 11 August 1999, an Information193[4] was filed before the RTC charging
appellants with the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with
homicide. The accusatory portion of the information reads:
That on or about 11:00 p.m. on July 16, 1999, at Sitio Lambakin, barangay Sto.
Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
The Yao family is composed of Yao San (father), Chua Ong Ping Sim
(mother), Robert and Raymond (children), Lenny (daughter-in-law, wife of
Robert), Matthew and Charlene (grandchildren), and Jona Abagatnan and
Josephine Ortea (housemaids). The Yao family owns and operates a poultry farm
in Barangay Santo Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
On 16 July 1999, at about 11:00 p.m., the Yao family, on board a Mazda
MVP van, arrived at the their poultry farm in Barangay Sto. Cristo, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan. Yao San alighted from the van to open the gate of the farm. At
this juncture, appellant Reyes and a certain Juanito Pataray (Pataray) approached,
poked their guns at Yao San, and dragged him inside the van. Appellant Reyes and
Pataray also boarded the van. Thereupon, appellants Arnaldo and Flores, with two
male companions, all armed with guns, arrived and immediately boarded the van.
Appellant Flores took the drivers seat and drove the van. Appellants Reyes and
Arnaldo and their cohorts then blindfolded each member of the Yao family inside
the van with packaging tape.194[6]
After about 30 minutes of traveling on the road, the van stopped. Per order
of appellants and their cohorts, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Jona
Abagatnan (Abagatnan) stepped out of the van with appellants Reyes and
Arnaldo, Pataray and one of their male companions.195[7] Appellant Flores, with
the other male companion, drove the van with the remaining members of the Yao
family inside the vehicle.196[8]
Later, the van stopped again. Appellant Flores and his male companion
told Yao San to produce the amount of five million pesos (P5,000,000.00) as
ransom in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and
Abagatnan. Thereafter, appellant Flores and his male companion left the van and
fled; while Yao San, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene and Josephine remained inside the
van. Upon sensing that the kidnappers had already left, Yao San drove the van
towards the poultry farm and sought the help of relatives.197[9]
Meanwhile, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan were
taken on foot by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and one male companion
to a safe-house situated in the mountainous part of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan
where they spent the whole night.198[10]
On the morning of the following day, at around 4:00 a.m., appellants and
their cohorts tried to contact Yao San regarding the ransom demanded, but the
latter could not be reached. Thus, appellants instructed Abagatnan to look for Yao
San in the poultry farm. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and one male companion
escorted Abagatnan in proceeding to the poultry farm. Upon arriving therein,
Abagatnan searched for Yao San, but the latter could not be found. Appellants
Reyes and Arnaldo told Abagatnan to remind Yao San about the ransom
demanded. Thereafter, appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their male companion
left Abagatnan in the poultry farm and went back to the safe-house.199[11]
In the safe-house, appellants told Robert that they would release him so he
could help Abagatnan in locating Yao San. Robert and appellants left the safehouse, and after 30 minutes of trekking, appellants abandoned Robert. Robert then
ran towards the poultry farm. Upon arriving at the poultry farm, Robert found Yao
San and informed him about the ransom demanded by the appellants. Robert also
told Yao San that Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were still held by appellants
and their cohorts.200[12]
On 18 July 1999, appellants called Yao San through a cellular phone and
demanded the ransom of P5 million for Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond. Yao
San acceded to appellants demand. Appellants allowed Yao San to talk with Chua
Ong Ping Sim.201[13]
On the morning of 19 July 1999, appellants again called Yao San via a
cellular phone and threatened to kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond because
of newspaper and radio reports regarding the incident. Yao San clarified to
appellants that he did not report the incident to the police and also pleaded with
them to spare the life of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond. Appellants then
instructed Yao San to appear and bring with him the ransom of P5 million at 3:00
p.m. in the Usan dumpsite, Litex Road, Fairview, Quezon City. Yao San arrived at
the designated place of the pay-off at 4:00 p.m., but none of the appellants or their
cohorts showed up. Yao San waited for appellants call, but none came. Thus, Yao
San left.202[14]
On 23 July 1999, the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were
found at the La Mesa Dam, Novaliches, Quezon City.203[15] Both died of asphyxia
by strangulation.204[16]
On 26 July 1999, appellant Arnaldo surrendered to the Presidential AntiOrganized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) at Camp Crame, Quezon City.
Thereupon, appellant Arnaldo, with the assistance of Atty. Uminga, executed a
written extra-judicial confession narrating his participation in the incident.
Appellant Arnaldo identified appellants Reyes and Flores, Pataray and a certain
Tata and Akey as his co-participants in the incident. Appellant Arnaldo also
described the physical features of his cohorts and revealed their whereabouts.205[17]
Subsequently, appellant Reyes was arrested in Sto. Cristo, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan. Thereafter, appellants Arnaldo and Reyes were identified in a
police line-up by Yao San, Robert and Abagatnan as their kidnappers.206[18]
certain Tata and Akey as his co-participants in the incident. Appellant Flores was
subsequently identified in a police line-up by Yao San, Robert and Abagatnan as
one of their kidnappers.207[19]
For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of appellants, Marina
Reyes, Irene Flores Celestino, Wilfredo Celestino, Jr., Rachel C. Ramos, and
Isidro Arnaldo. Appellants denied any liability and interposed alibis and the
defense of frame-up. Their testimonies, as corroborated by their witnesses, are as
follows:
He denied having met with Atty. Uminga. He was not assisted by the latter
when he was forced by the PAOCTF to make a written extra-judicial confession
on the kidnapping of the Yao family. Further, he claimed that while he was under
the custody of PAOCTF, a certain Major Paulino utilized him as a drug pusher.
Upon failing to remit the proceeds of the drug sale, he was beaten up by PAOCTF
agents and thereafter included as accused with appellants Reyes and Flores for the
kidnapping of the Yao family.210[33]
On the other hand, appellant Reyes testified that he slept in his house with
his family from 6:00 p.m. of 16 July 1999 until the morning of the next day; that
on the early morning of 26 July 1999, five policemen barged into his house and
arrested him; that the policemen told him that he was a suspect in the kidnapping
of the Yao family; that he was mauled by the policemen outside his house; that the
policemen forcibly brought him to Camp Crame, where he was subsequently
tortured; that he knew the Yao family because he worked as a carpenter in the
familys poultry farm at Brgy. Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan; that he
had no involvement in the kidnapping of the family; and that appellant Arnaldo
implicated him in the kidnapping of the family because appellant Arnaldo held a
grudge against him.211[34]
For his part, appellant Flores testified that he stayed in his sisters house at
Antipolo City from 12 July 1999 up to 30 July 1999; that he went to her house on
12 July 1999 because it was the birthday of her child; that he worked as a
construction worker during his stay in his sisters house; that he was arrested in
Batangas and thereafter brought to Camp Crame, where he was beaten up by
policemen for refusing to admit involvement in the kidnapping of the Yao family;
that after three days of beating, he was forced to sign a document which he later
found out to be a written extra-judicial confession; that he never met nor did he
know Atty. Rous; that he knew the Yao family because he lived near the familys
poultry farm, and he used to work therein as a welder; that he had no participation
in the kidnapping of the family; and that appellant Arnaldo implicated him in the
kidnapping of the family because he and appellant Reyes had mauled appellant
Arnaldo several years ago.212[35]
Appellants were also ordered to pay jointly and severally the Yao family
P150,000.00 as civil indemnity, P500,000.00 as moral damages and the costs of
the proceedings. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
competent and independent; that is, he must be willing to fully safeguard the
constitutional rights of the accused.224[73] A competent and independent counsel is
logically required to be present and able to advice and assist his client from the
time the latter answers the first question asked by the investigator until the signing
of the confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession was
made voluntarily, and that the person under investigation fully understood the
nature and the consequence of his extra-judicial confession vis-a-vis his
constitutional rights. 225[74]
However, the foregoing rule is not intended to deter to the accused from
confessing guilt if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires, but to protect him
from admitting what he is being coerced to admit although untrue. To be an
effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded
to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from
saying anything which might incriminate him; but, rather, it was adopted in
our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion on the accused to admit
something false. The counsel should never prevent an accused from freely
and voluntarily telling the truth.226[75]
We have gone over the records and found that the PAOCTF investigators
have duly apprised appellants Arnaldo and Flores of their constitutional rights to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel of their own choice
during their respective custodial investigations.
Records reflect that appellants Arnaldo and Reyes were likewise accorded
their right to competent and independent counsel during their respective custodial
investigations.
Further, Atty. Uminga sat beside appellant Arnaldo during the inquiry and
listened to the latters entire confession. After the taking of appellant Arnaldos
confession, Atty. Uminga requested the PAOCTF investigators to give him a copy
of appellant Arnaldos confession. Upon obtaining such copy, he read it entirely
and thereafter gave it to appellant Arnaldo. He instructed appellant Arnaldo to
read and comprehend the same carefully. He told appellant Arnaldo to ask him for
clarification and comment if he did not agree or understand any part of his written
confession. Appellant Arnaldo read his entire written confession and handed it to
him. Atty. Uminga asked him if he had objections to it. Appellant Arnaldo replied
in the negative. He then reminded appellant Arnaldo that the latter could still
change his mind, and that he was not being forced to sign. Appellant Arnaldo
manifested that he would sign his written confession. Later, he and appellant
Arnaldo affixed their signatures to the written confession.230[79]
With respect to appellant Flores, Atty. Rous declared that before the
PAOCTF investigators began questioning appellant, Atty. Rous interviewed him
in Tagalog inside a room, where only the two of them were present. He asked
appellant Flores about his personal circumstances. Appellant Flores replied that he
was a suspect in the kidnapping of the Yao family, and he wanted to give a
confession regarding his involvement in the said incident. He asked appellant
Flores whether he would accept his assistance as his lawyer. Appellant Flores
affirmed that he would. He asked appellant Flores why he wanted to give such
confession. Appellant Flores answered that he was bothered by his conscience.
Atty. Rous warned appellant Flores that his confession would be used against him
in a court of law, and that the death penalty might be imposed on him. Appellant
Flores told him that he wanted to tell the truth and unload the burden on his mind.
He requested appellant Flores to lift his shirt for the former to verify if there were
torture marks or bruises on his body, but found none. Again, he cautioned
appellant Flores about the serious consequences of his confession, but the latter
maintained that he wanted to tell the truth. Thereafter, he permitted the PAOCTF
investigators to question appellant Flores.231[80]
Additionally, Atty. Rous stayed with appellant Flores while the latter was
giving statements to the PAOCTF investigators. After the taking of appellant
Flores statements, he instructed appellant Flores to read and check his written
confession. Appellant Flores read the same and made some minor corrections. He
also read appellant Flores written confession. Afterwards, he and appellant Flores
signed the latters written confession.232[81]
It is true that it was the PAOCTF which contacted and suggested the
availability of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous to appellants Arnaldo and Flores,
respectively. Nonetheless, this does not automatically imply that their right to
counsel was violated. What the Constitution requires is the presence of competent
and independent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his clients defense
without any intervening conflict of interest.233[82] There was no conflict of interest
with regard to the legal assistance rendered by Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous. Both
counsels had no interest adverse to appellants Arnaldo and Flores. Although Atty.
Uminga testified that he was a former National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
agent, he, nevertheless, clarified that he had been separated therefrom since
1994234[83] when he went into private practice. Atty. Uminga declared under oath
that he was a private practitioner when he assisted appellant Arnaldo during the
custodial investigation.235[84] It appears that Atty. Uminga was called by the
PAOCTF to assist appellant Arnaldo, because Atty. Umingas telephone number
was listed on the directory of his former NBI officemates detailed at the PAOCTF.
Atty. Rous, on the other hand, was a member of the Free Legal Aid Committee of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City at the time he rendered legal
assistance to appellant Flores.236[85] Part of Atty. Rous duty as member of the said
group was to render legal assistance to the indigents including suspects under
custodial investigation. There was no evidence showing that Atty. Rous had
organizational or personal links to the PAOCTF. In fact, he proceeded to the
PAOCTF office to assist appellant Flores, because he happened to be the lawyer
manning the office when the PAOCTF called.237[86] In People v. Fabro,238[87] we
stated:
Further, as earlier stated, under Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987
Constitution, an accused is entitled to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. The phrase preferably of his own choice does not
convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is
exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from
handling the defense. Otherwise, the tempo of custodial investigation would be
solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct, the progress of
the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is
not available to protect his interest.239[88] While the choice of a lawyer in cases
where the person under custodial interrogation cannot afford the services of
counsel or where the preferred lawyer is not available is naturally lodged in
the police investigators, the suspect has the final choice, as he may reject the
counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any
objection to the counsels appointment during the course of the investigation, and
the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the
swearing officer.240[89] Appellants Arnaldo and Flores did not object to the
appointment of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous as their lawyers, respectively, during
their custodial investigation. Prior to their questioning, appellants Arnaldo and
Flores conferred with Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous. Appellant Arnaldo manifested
that he would be assisted by Atty. Uminga, while appellant Flores agreed to be
counseled by Atty. Rous. Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous countersigned the written
extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores, respectively. Hence,
appellants Arnaldo and Flores are deemed to have engaged the services of Atty.
Uminga and Atty. Rous, respectively.
Since the prosecution has sufficiently established that the respective extrajudicial confessions of appellant Arnaldo and appellant Flores were obtained in
accordance with the constitutional guarantees, these confessions are admissible.
They are evidence of a high order because of the strong presumption that no
person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime,
unless prompted by truth and conscience.241[90] Consequently, the burden of
proving that undue pressure or duress was used to procure the confessions rests on
appellants Arnaldo and Flores.242[91]
In the case at bar, appellants Arnaldo and Flores failed to discharge their
burden of proving that they were forced or coerced to make their respective
confessions. Other than their self-serving statements that they were maltreated by
the PAOCTF officers/agents, they did not present any plausible proof to
substantiate their claims. They did not submit any medical report showing that
their bodies were subjected to violence or torture. Neither did they file complaints
against the persons who had allegedly beaten or forced them to execute their
respective confessions despite several opportunities to do so. Appellants Arnaldo
and Flores averred that they informed their family members/relatives of the
alleged maltreatment, but the latter did not report such allegations to proper
authorities. On the contrary, appellants Arnaldo and Flores declared in their
respective confessions that they were not forced or harmed in giving their sworn
statements, and that they were not promised or given any award in consideration
of the same. Records also bear out that they were physically examined by doctors
before they made their confessions.243[92] Their physical examination reports
certify that no external signs of physical injury or any form of trauma were noted
during their examination.244[93] In People v. Pia,245[94] we held that the following
factors indicate voluntariness of an extra-judicial confession: (1) where the
accused failed to present credible evidence of compulsion or duress or
violence on their persons; (2) where they failed to complain to the officers
who administered the oaths; (3) where they did not institute any criminal or
administrative action against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; (4)
where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies; and (5)
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The person who assisted him in court during his arraignment and pre-trial is not a
lawyer.
PEDRO CONSULTA VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 17942, February 12, 2009
That appellants first counsel may not have been a member of the bar does not
dent the proven fact that appellant prevented Nelia and company from proceeding
to their destination. Further, appellant was afforded competent representation by
the Public Attorneys Office during the presentation by the prosecution of the
medico-legal officer and during the presentation of his evidence. People v.
Elesterio251[4] enlightens:
As for the circumstance that the defense counsel turned out later to be a nonlawyer, it is observed that he was chosen by the accused himself and that his
representation does not change the fact that Elesterio was undeniably carrying an
unlicensed firearm when he was arrested. At any rate, he has since been
represented by a member of the Philippine bar, who prepared the petition for
habeas corpus and the appellants brief. (Underscoring supplied)
Read also:
Read:
Could the Fiscal also represent the accused during custodial investigation to
satisfy the requirement of the Constitution that the accused is assisted by counsel?
No. The Fiscal is the counsel for the State, not the accused or the suspect.
Read:
5. Right to remain silent and to counsel and the right to be informed of such
rights; cases in general/when does these rights demandable? Effect of its nonobservance by the investigator
Read:
Read:
Read:
Read:
8. Inadmissible as evidence
En Banc
Facts:
1. In the morning of September 19, 1995, accused-appellant and his cousin, RONNIE
GARCIA were drinking gin in a canteen in Urdaneta, Pangasinan;
2. At around 10 a.m. of the same day, Rosita Mangunay saw both persons walking along
Ambrosio St., in the poblacion and noticed that they smelled liquor when they greeted
her;
3. In the early afternoon of the same day, accused-appellant and his cousin went to look for
6-year old Maria Lourdes Galinato, also known as Tisay and found her playing inside a
jeepney and took her;
4. At around 2:45 p.m. of the same day, Mangunay again saw the accused-appellant walking
along Ambrosio St., carrying Tisay who was crying and struggling. She claimed that she
clearly saw the accused-appellant since they were walking towards each other coming
from opposite directions;
6. At about the same time, witness Leah Magno saw the accused-appellant carrying a child
was seen heading towards the wooded area in the Macalong River;
7. By 5 p.m. to 6:30 p.m. of that same day, Magno saw accused-appellant walking alone to
town coming from the direction of the Macalong River;
8. Meanwhile, the parents of Tisay were frantically searching for their child and when their
search proved futile, they reported the matter to the Barangay Captain and to the Police;
9. Upon receipt of the information that the child was last seen with the accused-appellant,
the police together with the Barangay Captains of Camantiles and Bayaoas, Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, proceeded to the house of the accused-appellant;
10. As they approached the house, the accused-appellant jumped out of the window carrying
a black bag. The police authorities gave chase and finally caught him after twenty (20)
exhausting hours;
11. After his arrest, accused-appellant was brought to the Urdaneta Police Station where he
admitted that he raped, killed and buried Maria Lourdes near the Macalong River in
Barangay San Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, while UNDER INVESTIGATION
WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF A LAWYER. INDEED, THE BODY OF TISAY
WAS FOUND IN THE PLACE WHICH HE DESCRIBED DURING HIS CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION.
12. After trial, the trial court (RTC 45 presided over by JUDGE JOVEN COSTALES)
rendered a judgment of conviction and imposing the penalty of death to the accusedappellant. The court admitted as evidence the extrajudicial confession of the accusedappellant and used the same as one of the grounds in support of the judgment of
conviction.
A.I S S U E S
Held:
This is so because under the 1987 Constitution, the said rights could not be
waived except in the presence of counsel. As such, in accordance with the
doctrine of the fruit of the poisoned tree, the same is inadmissible in evidence.
doubt the possibility of his innocence. In People vs. Mahinay, it was held that
conviction may be had on circumstantial evidence provided the following
requisites are present: [a] there is more than one circumstance; [b] the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and [c] the combination of all
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The evidence in this case are more than sufficient to prove the accused-appellants
beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence is not a weaker form of
evidence vis--vis direct evidence and cases have recognized that circumstantial
evidence in its weight and probative force, may surpass direct evidence in its
effect upon the Supreme Court.
(NOTE: The indemnification for the death of a person in a rape with Homicide
cases was increased from P50,000.00 to P125,000.00. The said indemnity shall
also be applicable where the death penalty is authorized by applicable amendatory
laws))
Read:
Read:
9. Sec. 12(2)
Read:
Read:
Read:
Read:
12. Is the testimony of the arresting officer on the alleged oral confession of the
accused admissible?
Read:
Austria-Martinez, J.
Facts:
Manuel Bagaporo, Jr. was convicted of frustrated murder and was sentenced four
years and two months to eight years and one day of imprisonment. He started
serving his sentence and subsequently, he filed an application for release on
recognizance. In support of his application, the Provincial Jail Warden issued a
certification that Bagaoporo has been confined at the Provincial Jail since
February 9, 1996 and is already entitled to parole. Another certification was
issued by the Supervising Parole and Probation Officer showing that Bagaporo
applied for parole in lieu of the DOJs Maagang Paglaya Program.
Held:
Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for ordering the release
of Bagaporo pending the approval of his application for parole and before the
completion of the minimum period of the sentence imposed upon him.
his sentence and that the offense and the penalty for the offense is within the
purview of the Probation Law.
Sections 5 and 16 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court (on the different kinds of
bail) APPLIES ONLY TO AN ACCUSED UNDERGOING PREVENTIVE
IMPRISONMENT DURING TRIAL OR ON APPEAL. THEY DO NOT
APPLY TO A PERSON CONVICTED BY FINAL JUSGMENT AND
ALREADY SERVING SENTENCE.
Judge Bugtas was therefore fined P40,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law and
sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.
3. Read:
Excessive bail:
A person facing extradition proceedings is not entitled to bail even if the crime he
was charged of in a foreign country is bailable. This is so because the
constitutional provision on the right to bail under Art. III of the 1987 Constitution
applies only to criminal cases, not in extradition proceedings.
Right to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest in extradition case when
earlier, the extraditee was allowed to be out on bail by the court. The bail could not be cancelled
without hearing.
2
EDUARDO RODRIGUEZ VS. THE PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC 17,
MANILA, 483 SCRA 290
Quisumbing, J.
In Secretary of Justice vs. Judge Lantion, 322 SCRA 160 (The Mark Jimenez
Case) , the Supreme Court on a 9-6 vote held that the extraditee is entitled to
notice and hearing even when a request for extradition by another country is still
being evaluated. However, on Motion for Reconsideration in the same case, in a
9-6 decision, the Supreme Court held that the prospective extraditee is not entitled
to notice and hearing while his case is still under evaluation because this would
defeat the purpose of the arrest warrant since it could give warning that
respondents would be arrested and even encourage them to flee but entitled to
notice and hearing if the case is already filed in court.
It is a different matter if at first, the extraditee was allowed bail. The cancellation
of his bail bond may be made only after notice and hearing. Otherwise, his right
to due process of law will be violated.
(NOTE: In the case of US vs. Judge Purugganan, 389 SCRA 623), the Supreme
Court held that the extraditee is not entitled to post a bond even if the crime he
was charged of abroad is a bailable offense. This is so because of the possibility of
flight.)
In UNITED STATES VS. JUDGE PURUGGANAN, 389 SCRA 623, it was held
that the constitutional provision on bail does not available in extradition
proceedings. It applies only in criminal proceedings because of the word
conviction.
However, the modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on
the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. As such, the
right to bail was applied in a deportation proceedings, i.e., MEJOFF VS.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, 90 Phil. 70 [1951] and justified the same with the
Universal declaration of Human Rights. If the right to bail is available in
deportation cases, then there is no reason why it is not allowed in extradition
proceedings.
1. In general:
HELD:
A review of the records of this case reveals that circumstances warrant a reversal
of the trial courts decision.
needed to sustain a guilty verdict. The corpus delicti should be identified with
unwavering exactitude.
The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165 states:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized,
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA
shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated,
seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
The Court finds that the apprehending officers failed to comply with the
guidelines set under R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR.
SPO1 Llanillo himself admitted that the marking of the seized items was done in
the police station and not immediately after the buy-bust operation.
The failure to follow the procedure mandated under R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR
must be adequately explained. The justifiable ground for non-compliance must be
proven as a fact. The court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.
Accordingly, non-compliance with the procedure shall not render void and invalid
the seizure and custody of the drugs only when: (1) such non-compliance is attended by
justifiable grounds; and (2) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending team. There must be proof that these two (2)
requirements were met before such non-compliance may be said to fall within the scope
of the proviso.
In this case, it was admitted that it was SPO3 Yadao, the assigned investigator, who
marked the seized items, and only upon seeing the items for the first time at the police
station. Moreover, there was no physical inventory made or photographs of the seized
items taken under the circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR. There was
also no mention that representatives from the media and from the DOJ, and any elected
official, were present during this inventory. The prosecution never explained the reasons
for these lapses.
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about
every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered
in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how
and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it
was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the
precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and
no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. Indeed, it is
from the testimony of every witness who handled the evidence that a reliable assurance
can be derived that the evidence presented in court and that seized from the accused are
one and the same.
Accordingly, the failure to establish, through convincing proof, that the integrity of
the seized items has been adequately preserved through an unbroken chain of custody is
enough to engender reasonable doubt on the guilt of an accused. Reasonable doubt is that
doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability after such
investigation to let the mind rest upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is
not demanded by the law to convict a person charged with a crime, but moral certainty is
required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense. A conviction
cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug.
Indeed, the prosecutions failure to prove that the specimen submitted for
laboratory examination was the same one allegedly seized from appellant is fatal to the
prosecutions case.
Finally, the prosecution cannot find solace in its invocation of the presumption of
regularity in the apprehending officers performance of official duty.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by
itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Moreover, the failure to observe the proper procedure negates the
operation of the presumption of regularity accorded to police officers. As a general rule,
the testimonies of the police officers who apprehended the accused are accorded full faith
and credit because of the presumption that they have performed their duties regularly.
But when the performance of their duties is tainted with failure to comply with the
procedure and guidelines prescribed, the presumption is effectively destroyed.
Thus, even if the defense evidence is weak, the prosecutions whole case still
falls. The evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot
be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.
ELPIDIO BONDAD, JR. VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 173804, EDecember 10,
2008
That on or about the 29th day of January 2004, in the City of Marikina,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly sell to poseur buyer 0.02 gram of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu) contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet,
a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.254[3] (Underscoring supplied)
He was likewise charged for violation of Section 11, par. 2(3), Article II
also of R.A. No. 9165, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of January 2004, in the City of Marikina,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without being authorized by law to possess or otherwise use any
dangerous drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
his possession direct custody and control 0.04 gram of white crystalline substance
contained in two (2) heat-sealed plastic sachets which gave positive result to the
At around 7:05 p.m. of January 29, 2004, while PO2 Ferdinand Brubio,
PO1 Christopher Anos, and PO1 Roberto Muega were at the Station Anti Illegal
Drug Special Operations Task Force (SAIDSOTF), Office of the Marikina City
Police Station, PO2 Nelson Arribay arrived together with a confidential
informant. The confidential informant reported, among other things, about the
rampant sale of shabu in a billiard hall along Bonifacio Avenue, Barangka,
Marikina City and named a certain alias Jun as the vendor.
The Chief of the SAIDSOTF, P/Sr. Insp. Ramchrisen Haveria, Jr., at once
formed a buy-bust team composed of, among others, PO2 Ramiel Soriano and
PO2 Dano who was designated as the poseur-buyer. PO2 Dano was given a one
hundred peso bill bearing Serial No. Q487945 to be used as buy-bust money. It
was agreed that PO2 Danos removal of his cap would signal that the buy-bust
was consummated.
The conduct of a buy-bust operation was recorded in the police blotter and
was coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) which
gave it control number NOC-012904-28.
rights. Upon PO2 Danos order, appellant returned the buy-bust money, handed
the Vicks container, and gave his name as
Elpidio Burac Bondad, Jr.
Still at the place of arrest, PO2 Dano placed the markings EBB-ED
BUYBUST 01/29/04 on the substance-filled sachet sold to him, and EBB-ED,
POS 1 and 2, 01/29/04 on the sachets that remained inside the Vicks container.
The buy-bust team thereupon brought appellant and the seized items to the
Marikina City Police Station where a memorandum dated January 29, 2004257[6]
was prepared by P/Sr. Insp. Chief Haveria, Jr., addressed to the Chief of the
Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory Office, requesting for the conduct of
laboratory examination on the seized items to determine the presence of
dangerous drugs and their weight. PO2 Dano also requested that appellant be
subjected to a drug test.258[7]
The following day or on January 30, 2004, at 3:00 P.M., upon receipt of
three sachets, a laboratory examination was conducted thereon by Police Senior
Inspector Annalee R. Forro, Forensic Chemical Officer of the Eastern Police
District Crime Laboratory Office, who, in Physical Science Report No. D-009404E259[8], recorded, among other things, the specimen submitted, her findings and
conclusion as follows:
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
F I N D I N G S: x x x
C O N C L U S I O N:
On January 29, 2004, while he was playing inside 3 Cs billiard hall, PO2
Brubio, whom he knew was a policeman, entered the billiard hall. After greeting
PO2 Brubio in Bicolano, he continued playing but PO2 Brubio suddenly
handcuffed him and asked him Sumama ka muna. Another person who was at
his back pushed him out of the billiard hall in the course of which he felt PO2
Brubio reaching his (appellants) right front pocket,261[10] drawing him to restrain
the hand of PO2 Brubio, telling him pera ko yan!
Aware that his son was inside the billiard hall, appellant summoned and
handed him his wallet containing P2,000. PO2 Brubio, however, took the wallet
from his son, telling him Huwag ka makialam dito. He was then made to board
a car and taken to the Office of the SAIDSOTF at the police station.
Finding for the prosecution, the trial court convicted appellant in both
charges, disposing as follows:
The evidence for the prosecution fully proved beyond reasonable doubt
the elements necessary to successfully prosecute a case for illegal possession of a
prohibited drug, namely, (a) the accused is in possession of an item or an object
identified to be a prohibited or a regulated drug, (b) such possession is not
authorized by law and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed said drug.
Under Section 11, Par. 2 [3] of R.A. 9165, the mere act of possessing any
dangerous drug consummates the crime. There is no doubt that the charge of
illegal possession of shabu was proven beyond reasonable doubt since the
accused-appellant knowingly possessed plastic sachets with white crystalline
granules, without legal authority at the time he was caught during the buy-bust
operation. The white crystalline granules found in his possession, upon laboratory
examination, were positively identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a dangerous drug.265[14] (Italics in the original, underscoring supplied)
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, appellant faulting the
appellate court:
Appellant claims that there was failure to follow the requirements of Sec.
21 of R.A. No. 9165, hence, it compromised the integrity and evidentiary value of
the allegedly seized items.
The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the persons/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Atty. Puentebella:
When you brought him to the police, it was there that the items taken from him
were inventoried, is it not?
Witness:
We did not make inventory because we simply brought the evidence confiscated.
xxx
Atty. Puentebella:
You also did not take photographs of the items taken from the accused?
Witness:
Yes, sir.
Atty. Puentebella:
And you know for a fact that under the new drugs law, this is a requirement for
the apprehending team to do, is it not?
Pros. Gapuzan:
Counsel is asking for a conclusion of law. I will object.
Court:
Witness may answer the question.
Witness:
Yes, sir.
xxxx
Atty. Puentebella:
So it is very clear now Mr. Witness that at the time you apprehended the accused,
you did not make an inventory in the presence of the accused nor you did not
[sic] make a photograph of the items seized in the presence of the accused, an
elective official, a representative from the Department of Justice, or the media,
thats very clear?
Witness:
Yes, sir.
Atty. Puentebella:
Since you did not make any inventory, it follows that you did not require them to
sign your inventory as required by law?
Witness:
Yes, sir.266[16] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Clearly then, the apprehending police officers failed to comply with the
above-quoted provision of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in
the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.267[17] (Citation omitted,
emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Atty. Puentebella:
xxxx
Exhibits B which is the brown envelope, B-1, B-2 and B-3 are objected
to for being product of irregular functions of police and therefore fruit of
poisonous thinking [sic] and they are not admissible and they were not
photographed in the presence of the accused as provided for by Sec. 21, par.1,
R.A. 9165;270[20] (emphasis supplied)
IN FINE, as the failure to comply with the aforesaid requirements of the law
compromised the identity of the items seized, which is the corpus delicti of each
of the crimes charged against appellant,271[21] his acquittal is in order.
This leaves it unnecessary to still dwell on the first and third assignments
of error.
PEOPLE VS. SAMUEL OBMIRANIS, G.R. No. 181492, December 16, 2008
Tinga, J.:
That on or about May 18, 2004, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, not having been authorized by law to sell, trade, deliver or give away to
another any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly attempt to sell or offer for sale one (1) transparent plastic sachet
containing TWO POINT EIGHT ZERO ZERO (2.800) grams of white crystalline
substance known as SHABU containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.
Contrary to law.274[3]
At the pre-trial, both the prosecution and the defense stipulated on the
qualification of Forensic Chemist Elisa Reyes and, thus, both parties dispensed
with her testimony. The prosecution further admitted that the forensic chemist
who analyzed the seized the confiscated substancewhich yielded positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride contentdid not have personal knowledge of
the ultimate source of the drug.275[4]
The narrative woven by Velasco established the following facts: On 17 May 2004,
Police Superintendent Marcelino Pedrozo (Pedrozo) of the MWPD organized a
buy-bust team on the information of a confidential informant that the latter was
able to place an order for half a bulto of shabu with appellant. Velasco was
designated as the team leader and the poseur-buyer, with Police Officers Wilfredo
Cinco, Edgardo Palabay, Roberto Benitez and one278[7]confidential informant as
members.279[8] Pedrozo gave the team a marked 500-peso bill to be used as buybust money which was placed on top of a deck of boodle money. The team
informed the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) of the impending
operation,280[9] entered the same in the blotter281[10] and proceeded to Bambang in
G.Tuazon Street just before 12 a.m. of 18 May 2004the appointed time and date
that the confidential informant and appellant had agreed to meet. The informant
joined Velasco in his car, and they awaited the arrival of appellant at the corner of
G.Tuazon and Jhocson Streets.282[11] At around 12:30 a.m., appellant on board a car
arrived at the scene and seeing the informant he approached the latter. The
informant introduced Velasco to appellant and said that Velasco would like to buy
one-half bulto of shabu. Velasco negotiated with appellant to lower the price
but the latter refused. Velasco then insisted that he must first see the merchandise.
Appellant went back to his car, took the item and brought it to Velasco. Velasco
readily recognized the item as a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline
substance. When appellant asked for payment, he seemed to have recognized
Velascos co-officer because he uttered the words, May pulis yata. At that point,
he was arrested just as he was trying to get back to his car.283[12]
According to Velasco, he was the one who effected the arrest but it was Cinco
who seized the plastic sachet from appellant. He further stated that immediately
after the arrest, he and his team brought the seized item to the police headquarters
and there, in his presence, Cinco marked the same with the initials SOO. At the
trial, he identified the plastic sachet as that seized from appellant as well as the
marking made by Cinco on it. Furthermore, he admitted on cross-examination that
there was no evidence custodian designated and that he could not remember if the
seized item had been inventoried and photographed in the presence of the
accused; that Cinco put the item in his pocket after the same was recovered and
did not mark it on the spot and that the markings made on the buy-bust money had
not been entered in the blotter.284[13]
The chemistry report issued at the instance of Pedrozo and signed by Forensic
Chemical Officer Maritess Mariano of the PNP Crime Laboratory revealed that
the specimen supposedly seized from appellant yielded positive of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride content.285[14]
Taking the stand, appellant boldly asserted that he was merely framed up by the
buy-bust team, and strongly denied having transacted the alleged sale of shabu
with Velasco and the confidential informant. He claimed that he was taken by
Velasco and his team not on 18 May 2004 but rather on 17 May 2004 at 7:00 p.m.
along Santa Teresita Street, Sampaloc, Manila;286[15] that he was there to see his
girlfriend who was residing in that area; that when he was arrested by two men in
civilian clothes, he was not committing any crime; that he asked them why they
were arresting him but neither of them gave an answer and instead one of them
grabbed him by his shoulder and ushered him inside a police car; that once inside
the car, one of the men pulled out a gun with which he hit his neck, kicked him
and uttered, Makulit ka ha, yuko!; that he asked them why they were doing that
to him when in fact he merely told them to park their car properly on the street;
that they cuffed his hands at the back and the driver, Velasco, asked if he could
give them P200,000.00; that he answered he did not have that much money; that
they drove the car around and told him that if he could not give them the money
then he must just find for them someone who sells drugs in large-scale (Magturo
ka ng nagbebenta ng droga, iyong malakihan ha!); that because he said he did
not know anyone who was into selling drugs, he was taken to the U.N. Avenue
police headquarters; that he was not detained at the headquarters but rather, he
was brought to the second floor where the two arresting officers demanded
P50,000.00 from him; that the demand was then reduced to P30,000.00 in
exchange for the mitigation of his case.287[16] Olivia Ismael, another defense
witness who introduced herself as a friend of appellants girlfriend and who
admitted having witnessed appellants arrest, corroborated the material points of
appellants testimony.288[17]
In its 23 February 2006 Decision, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment, and to pay a P500,000.00 fine without subsidiary
imprisonment as well as the costs.289[18]
and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.295[27] It is therefore of prime importance that in these cases, the
identity of the dangerous drug be likewise established beyond reasonable
doubt.296[28] In other words, it must be established with unwavering exactitude that
the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same
as that seized from him in the first place. The chain of custody requirement
performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the
identity of the evidence are removed.297[29]
The prosecution evidence in the case at bar, however, does not suffice to
afford such assurance. Of all the people who came into direct contact with the
sachet of shabu purportedly seized from appellant, only Velasco was able to
observe the uniqueness thereof in court. Cinco, who, according to Velasco, took
initial custody of the plastic sachet at the time of arrest and who allegedly marked
the same with the initials SOO at the police station, was not even presented in
court to directly observe the uniqueness of the specimen and, more importantly, to
acknowledge the marking as his own. The same is true with respect to the
laboratory personnel who could have but nevertheless failed to testify on the
circumstances under which he received the specimen at the laboratory for analysis
and testing, as well as on the conduct of the examination which was administered
on the specimen and what he did with it at the time it was in his possession and
custody. Aside from that, it was not reasonably explained why these same
witnesses were not able to testify in court. While indeed the prosecution and the
defense had stipulated on the qualification of the forensic chemist, dispensed with
his testimony and admitted that said forensic chemist had no personal knowledge
of the ultimate source of the drug submitted for examination, nevertheless, these
stipulations and admission pertain only to a certain Elisa G. Reyes and not to
Forensic Chemical Officer Maritess Mariano who, based on the chemistry report,
was the one who examined the contents of the plastic sachet at the crime
laboratory.
The Court certainly cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the possibility of
substitution, alteration or contaminationwhether intentional or unintentional
of narcotic substances at any of the links in the chain of custody thereof especially
because practically such possibility is great where the item of real evidence is
small and is similar in form to other substances to which people are familiar in
their daily lives.306[38] Graham v. State307[39] in fact acknowledged this danger. In
that case, a substance later shown to be heroin was excluded from the prosecution
evidence because prior to examination, it was handled by two police officers who,
however, did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit
at the time it was in their possession. The court in that case pointed out that the
white powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or
baking powder. It thus declared that the state must be able to show by records or
testimony the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it
came into the possession of police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to
determine its composition.308[40]
These guidelines, however, were not shown to have been complied with
by the members of the buy-bust team, and nothing on record suggests that they
had extended reasonable efforts to comply with the statutory requirements in
handling the evidence. Velasco, the leader of the raiding team, himself admitted
that as soon as appellant was arrested, Cinco had taken custody of the plastic
sachet of shabu, placed it in his pocket and brought the same together with
appellant to the police station. It was at the police stationand not at the place
where the item was seized from appellantwhere according to him (Velasco),
Cinco had placed the initials SOO on the specimen. Velasco never even
mentioned that the identifying mark on the specimen was placed in appellants
presence; he could not even remember whether or not the specimen had been
properly inventoried and photographed at least in appellants presence. Even more
telling is the fact that, as elicited from Velasco himself during his crossexamination, no evidence custodian had been designated by the raiding team to
safeguard the identity and integrity of the evidence supposedly seized from
appellant.314[46]
All these aforementioned flaws in the conduct of the post-seizure custody of the
dangerous drug allegedly recovered from appellant, taken together with the failure
of the key persons who handled the same to testify on the whereabouts of the
exhibit before it was offered in evidence in court, militates against the
prosecutions cause because it not only casts doubt on the identity of the corpus
delicti but also tends to discredit, if not totally negate, the claim of regularity in
the conduct of official police operation.
What we can fairly assume is that the Court of Appeals had overlooked the
significance of these glaring details in the records of the case as it placed blind
reliance right away on the credibility of Velascos testimony and on the
presumption of regularity and thereby it failed to properly account for the missing
substantial links in the chain of custody of the evidence.
All told, in view of the deviation by the buy-bust team from the mandated
conduct of taking post-seizure custody of the dangerous drug in this case, there is
no way to presume that the members thereof had performed their duties regularly.
Even granting that we must blindly rely on the credibility of Velascos testimony,
still, the prosecution evidence would fall short of satisfying the quantum of
evidence required to arrive at a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
inasmuch as the evidence chain failed to solidly connect appellant with the seized
drug in a way that would establish that the specimen is one and the same as that
seized in the first place and offered in court as evidence. The Court cannot indulge
in the presumption of regularity of official duty if only to obliterate the obvious
infirmity of the evidence advanced to support appellants conviction. In Mallillin
v. People,321[54] we categorically declared that the failure of the prosecution to offer
in court the testimony of key witnesses for the basic purpose of establishing a
sufficiently complete chain of custody of a specimen of shabu and the irregularity
which characterized the handling of the evidence before the same was finally
offered in court, materially conflict with every proposition as to the culpability of
the accused. For the same plain but consequential reason, we will not hesitate to
reverse the judgment of conviction in the present appeal.
One final word. In no uncertain terms must it be stressed that basic and
elementary is the presupposition that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused
rests on the prosecution which must draw strength from its own evidence and not
from the weakness of the defense. The rule, in a constitutional system like ours, is
invariable regardless of the reputation of the accused because the law presumes
his innocence until the contrary is shown. In dubio pro reo. When moral certainty
as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably
becomes a matter of right.322[55]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.H.C. No. 02158 affirming the judgment of conviction rendered by the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant
Samuel Obmiranis y Oreta is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and is thus
accordingly ordered released immediately from confinement, unless he is lawfully
confined for another offense.
JUNIE MALLILLIN Y. LOPEZ VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 172953 , April 30,
2008
THE FACTS:
On the strength of a warrant of search and seizure issued by the RTC of Sorsogon
City, Branch 52, a team of five police officers raided the residence of petitioner in
Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City on 4 February 2003. The team was headed by
P/Insp. Catalino Bolanos (Bolanos), with PO3 Roberto Esternon (Esternon),
SPO1 Pedro Docot, SPO1 Danilo Lasala and SPO2 Romeo Gallinera (Gallinera)
as members. The searchconducted in the presence of barangay kagawad Delfin
Licup as well as petitioner himself, his wife Sheila and his mother, Norma
allegedly yielded two (2) plastic sachets of shabu and five (5) empty plastic
sachets containing residual morsels of the said substance.
That on or about the 4th day of February 2003, at about 8:45 in the
morning in Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City, Philippines, the said accused did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody
and control two (2) plastic sachets of methamphetamine hydrochloride [or]
shabu with an aggregate weight of 0.0743 gram, and four empty sachets
containing shabu residue, without having been previously authorized by law to
possess the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Taking the witness stand, Bolanos, the leader of the raiding team, testified
on the circumstances surrounding the search as follows: that he and his men were
allowed entry into the house by petitioner after the latter was shown the search
warrant; that upon entering the premises, he ordered Esternon and barangay
kagawad Licup, whose assistance had previously been requested in executing the
warrant, to conduct the search; that the rest of the police team positioned
themselves outside the house to make sure that nobody flees; that he was
observing the conduct of the search from about a meter away; that the search
conducted inside the bedroom of petitioner yielded five empty plastic sachets with
suspected shabu residue contained in a denim bag and kept in one of the cabinets,
and two plastic sachets containing shabu which fell off from one of the pillows
searched by Esternona discovery that was made in the presence of
petitioner.323[10] On cross examination, Bolanos admitted that during the search, he
was explaining its progress to petitioners mother, Norma, but that at the same
time his eyes were fixed on the search being conducted by Esternon.
Esternon testified that the denim bag containing the empty plastic sachets
was found behind the door of the bedroom and not inside the cabinet; that he
then found the two filled sachets under a pillow on the bed and forthwith called
on Gallinera to have the items recorded and marked.324[12] On cross, he admitted
that it was he alone who conducted the search because Bolanos was standing
behind him in the living room portion of the house and that petitioner handed to
him the things to be searched, which included the pillow in which the two sachets
of shabu were kept;325[13] that he brought the seized items to the Balogo Police
Station for a true inventory, then to the trial court326[14] and thereafter to the
laboratory.327[15]
Supt. Lorlie Arroyo (Arroyo), the forensic chemist who administered the
examination on the seized items, was presented as an expert witness to identify
the items submitted to the laboratory. She revealed that the two filled sachets were
positive of shabu and that of the five empty sachets, four were positive of
containing residue of the same substance.328[16] She further admitted that all seven
sachets were delivered to the laboratory by Esternon in the afternoon of the same
day that the warrant was executed except that it was not she but rather a certain
Mrs. Ofelia Garcia who received the items from Esternon at the laboratory .]
The evidence for the defense focused on the irregularity of the search and
seizure conducted by the police operatives. Petitioner testified that Esternon
began the search of the bedroom with Licup and petitioner himself inside.
However, it was momentarily interrupted when one of the police officers declared
to Bolanos that petitioners wife, Sheila, was tucking something inside her
underwear. Forthwith, a lady officer arrived to conduct the search of Sheilas body
inside the same bedroom. At that point, everyone except Esternon was asked to
step out of the room. So, it was in his presence that Sheila was searched by the
lady officer. Petitioner was then asked by a police officer to buy cigarettes at a
nearby store and when he returned from the errand, he was told that nothing was
found on Sheilas body.329[18] Sheila was ordered to transfer to the other bedroom
together with her children.
Petitioner asserted that on his return from the errand, he was summoned
by Esternon to the bedroom and once inside, the officer closed the door and asked
him to lift the mattress on the bed. And as he was doing as told, Esternon stopped
him and ordered him to lift the portion of the headboard. In that instant, Esternon
showed him sachet of shabu which according to him came from a pillow on the
bed.330[20] Petitioners account in its entirety was corroborated in its material
respects by Norma, barangay kagawad Licup and Sheila in their testimonies.
Norma and Sheila positively declared that petitioner was not in the house for the
entire duration of the search because at one point he was sent by Esternon to the
store to buy cigarettes while Sheila was being searched by the lady officer. Licup
for his part testified on the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the plastic
sachets. He recounted that after the five empty sachets were found, he went out of
the bedroom and into the living room and after about three minutes, Esternon,
who was left inside the bedroom, exclaimed that he had just found two filled
sachets.]
On 20 June 2004 the trial court rendered its Decision declaring petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. Petitioner was condemned
to prison for twelve years (12) and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and to pay a
fine of P300,000.00. The trial court reasoned that the fact that shabu was found in
the house of petitioner was prima facie evidence of petitioners animus
possidendi sufficient to convict him of the charge inasmuch as things which a
person possesses or over which he exercises acts of ownership are presumptively
owned by him. It also noted petitioners failure to ascribe ill motives to the police
officers to fabricate charges against him.
HELD:
The Equipoise Rule; Evidence of guilt and evidence of innocence are about
even; effect of non-presentation of forensic chemist who examined the shabu
or marijuanaground for acquittal.
This is an appeal from the Decision dated July 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00476 which affirmed the April 23, 2004 Decision
in Criminal Case No. 00-181929 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 53 in
Manila. The RTC found accused-appellant Monalyn Cervantes guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. (RA)
6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
CONTRARY TO LAW.337[1]
The black plastic bag containing the six small self-sealing bags of white
crystalline substance was likewise taken to Camp Vicente Lim where PO3 Ramos
prepared the booking sheets and arrest reports and the request for a qualitative
analysis of the seized items. Regional Crime Laboratory Office IV Chief
Inspector (C/I) Mary Jean Geronimo then conducted the standard physical and
chemical examinations on the specimen referred to her.
Apart from the witnesses affidavits and other documents, the prosecution,
in the hearing of March 4, 2002, offered in evidence the following exhibits,340[4]
inclusive of its sub markings, which, as may be expected, were objected to by the
defense: (a) Exhibit B Chemistry Report No. D-115800 prepared by C/I
Geronimo; (b) Exhibit C Memorandum of RSOG-IV dated April 5, 2000 to
the Chief, Laboratory Service, requesting for qualitative analysis of the contents
of the six transparent plastic bags; (c) Exhibits D and D-1 to D-6 Black
plastic bag with markings; and six (6) self-sealing transparent bags allegedly
Accused-appellant testified that after she did laundry works at her house in
Estrella Street near F.B. Harrison on April 4, 2000, her youngest child asked her
to go to [McDonalds], Vito Cruz branch, to buy ice cream. When they arrived
thereat at about 4:30 in the afternoon, there was a commotion going on in front of
the restaurant. She then saw a woman who alighted from a nearby van and
pointed her out to her companions, one of whom [was] an old man boarded her
inside the van causing her to lose hold of her child. Thereafter, two (2) younger
male persons, whom she later came to know as DEL MONTE and REQUIZ, were
also boarded into the same van. They were taken to a cemetery where another
vehicle came and took them to Camp Vicente Lim, where she allegedly met
ARGUSON for the first time.
On the other hand, accused DEL MONTE testified that he was a parking
boy around Vito Cruz and that on the day in question, while he was watching a
vehicle near [McDonalds], Vito Cruz branch, a commotion happened near his
post. As he moved backward from where he stood, he was suddenly approached
by a policeman who arrested him and boarded him inside a vehicle together with
CERVANTES and REQUIZ, whom he did not know prior to that incident.
For his part, accused REQUIZ testified that on the date and time in
question, he was riding a borrowed bicycle on his way to the Cultural Center,
passing by F.B. Harrison St., when he bumped a parked van, wherefrom a man
alighted and cursed him, saying pulis ako wag kang aalis dyan[!] The man left
and when he returned, accused CERVANTES was with him. Thereafter, he was
boarded into the van together with the other accused.341[5]
While not stated in the CA decision, Del Monte testified, like accusedappellant, that he was taken to a cemetery somewhere in Cavite where the
arresting officers lingered for an hour before bringing him to Camp Vicente
Lim.342[6] These testimonies remained uncontroverted. Arguson died during the
course of the trial resulting in the dismissal of the case against him.343[7]
On April 23, 2004, the RTC rendered judgment acquitting Del Monte and
Requiz but finding accused-appellant guilty as charged and meting upon her the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The fallo of the RTC Decision reads:
2. Finding the prosecutions evidence insufficient to prove the guilt of accused WILSON
DEL MONTE and RICHARD REQUIZ beyond reasonable doubt, and who are hereby
ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.344[8]
By its Decision347[11] dated July 19, 2007, the CA, finding the elements
necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs348[12] to have sufficiently been
On March 24, 2008, this Court required the parties to submit supplemental briefs
if they so desired. The parties manifested their willingness to submit the case on
the basis of the records already submitted, thus veritably reiterating their principal
arguments raised in the CA, which on the part of accused-appellant would be:
THE [CA] GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION.
For its part, the People, thru the Office of the Solicitor General, counters
that the prosecution has established that the buy-bust transaction took place, has
identified accused-appellant and her complicity in Argusons illegal trade, and has
presented the corpus delicti, as evidence.
We start off with the most basic, the testimony of the prosecutions
principal witness, PO3 Ramos, who identified accused-appellant and described
her role in the conspiracy to sell shabu. In the witness box, PO3 Ramos testified
that, after being told by Arguson to wait for someone who will come out from the
street whence Arguson would enter, accused-appellant emerged from said street,
checked on the purchase money, asked the operatives to wait, and later reappeared. What happened next is captured by the following answers of PO3
Ramos to the prosecutors questions:
Q: What did you see when Cervantes already returned? A: When Monalyn return
the one holding the plastic bag was Wilson, sir.
Q: Wilson? A: Yes, sir, together with Richard, Wilson, Arguson, they were four
(4).
Fiscal Formoso: Thats part of the answer x x x now, when all these accused here
return with Monalyn Cervantes, what happen[ed]?
A: Arguson took the plastic bag from Wilson, sir and handed it to Balosbalos,
Balosbalos gave Arguson the boodle money while I flash the signal x x x then we
apprehended them.349[13]
As may be noted, PO3 Ramos categorically stated that Del Monte was
among the four who emerged with Arguson from a street. Without hesitation, PO3
Ramos pointed to Del Monte as the one holding the plastic bag allegedly
containing the prohibited substance until Arguson took it from him and handed it
over to PO2 Balosbalos. There is no suggestion that accused-appellant, while at
the crime scene, ever handled the merchandise or its container. Yet, the trial court
acquitted Requiz and Del Monte, but convicted accused-appellant, stating:
x x x While PO3 Ramos testified that the bag was initially held by accused
Del Monte and then taken from him by accused Arguson, there is no other
evidence which can support the charge of conspiracy with Arguson and Cervantes
x x x. The court does not find the evidence sufficient to pass the test of moral
certainty to find accused Del Monte liable as charged. Even if PO3 Ramos saw
him to have held the bag for Arguson, it could have been possible that he was
merely asked by Cervantes or Arguson to carry the bag.351[15]
But even if we were to cast aside the foregoing equipoise rule, a reversal
of the appealed decision is indicated on another but more compelling ground. We
refer to the postulate that the prosecution, having failed to positively and
convincingly prove the identity of the seized regulated substance, is deemed to
have also failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellants guilt. We
shall explain.
Sec. 1(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, or
the Guidelines on the Custody and Disposition of Seized Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, and Laboratory
Equipment, defines chain of custody, thusly:
custody [was] made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and
the final disposition.359[23]
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is
almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes
indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive
and is not really identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial
is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same
standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration,
tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the
exhibits level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tamperingwithout
regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise notdictates the level of
strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.
xxxx
completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been
exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with.361[25] (Emphasis
added.)
As the Court distinctly notes in this case, of the individuals who came into
direct contact with or had physical custody of the seized regulated items, only
PO3 Ramos testified for the specific purpose of identifying the evidence. In the
witness box, however, he did not indicate how he and his companions, right after
the buy bust, handled the seized plastic bag and its contents. He did not name the
duty desk officer at Camp Vicente Lim to whom he specifically turned over the
confiscated bag and sachets at least for recording. What is on record is Exhibit
C, which, as earlier described, is a memorandum362[26] PO3 Ramos prepared363[27]
dated April 5, 2000 from the RSOG-IV Director to the Chief, PNP R-IV Crime
Laboratory Service, submitting for qualitative analysis the white crystalline
substance confiscated by the buy-bust group. Needless to stress, the unnamed
person who delivered the suspected shabu and the recipient of it at the laboratory
were no-show in court to testify on the circumstances under which they handled
the specimen or whether other persons had access to the specimen before actual
testing. And C/I Geronimo, the analyzing forensic chemist, was not also
presented. Then, too, no one testified on how the specimen was cared after
following the chemical analysis. As the Court observed aptly in People v. Ong,
[T]hese questions should be answered satisfactorily to determine whether the
integrity of the evidence was compromised in any way. Otherwise, the
prosecution cannot maintain that it was able to prove the guilt of appellants
beyond reasonable doubt.364[28]
It cannot be overemphasized that Inspector Tria was really not part of the
custodial chain. And she did not as she could not, even if she wanted to,
testify on whether or not the specimen turned over for analysis and
eventually offered in court as exhibit was the same substance received from
Arguson.
In this case, no physical inventory was made and no photograph taken nor
markings made on the seized articles at the crime scene. PO3 Ramos admitted as
much, thus:
Q. Now, you were able to arrest all the accused here, after their arrest,
what did you do? A. After informing their rights and the reason why we arrest
them we brought them immediately to our office in Canlubang.
xxxx
Q. Now, what about this Shabu, who was in possession of this Shabu x x x
when you left the place and proceeded to Canlubang? A. PO2 Balosbalos, sir.
xxxx
Q. Now, when you reach your office, what did you do there? A. I made the
booking sheet and I requested for their medical/physical examination x x x.366[30]
Just as clear is the fact that the exacting chain of custody rule was not
observed. Withal, there is no reasonable assurance that no tampering or
substitution occurred between the time the police seized the black bag in P.
Ocampo St. in Manila until its contents were tested in the laboratory of the
PNP R-IV headquarters in Canlubang, Laguna. In net effect, a heavy cloud of
doubt hangs over the integrity and necessarily the evidentiary value of the seized
items. The prosecution cannot, thus, rightfully assert that the six sachets seized
from Arguson were the very same objects tested by C/I Geronimo and offered in
court in proving the corpus delicti.
Adding a negative dimension to the prosecutions case is the nonpresentation of C/I Geronimo and the presentation in her stead of Inspector Tria to
testify on the chemical report C/I Geronimo prepared. While Inspector Tria can
plausibly testify on the fact that C/I Geronimo prepared the chemical report in the
regular course of her duties, she, Inspector Tria, was incompetent to state that the
specimen her former colleague analyzed was in fact shabu and was the same
specimen delivered to the laboratory for chemical analysis.
To be sure, the Court, notably in People v. Bandang, has held that the nonpresentation of the forensic chemist in illegal drug cases is an insufficient cause
for acquittal. In it, the accused persons were convicted of illegal sale of shabu
even if the forensic chemist who prepared the corresponding laboratory report
was not presented. Thus, we wrote:
Second, it must be stressed that Atty. Enriquez raises his objection to the
Initial Laboratory Report and Chemistry Report No. D-1585-00 only now. He
should have objected to their admissibility at the time they were being offered.
Otherwise, the objection shall be considered waived and such evidence will form
part of the records of the case as competent and admissible evidence. The familiar
rule in this jurisdiction is that the admissibility of certain documents x x x cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal.367[31] (Emphasis added.)
It should be pointed out, however, that the Bandang ruling was cast
against a different backdrop where: (1) the seized crystalline substance was the
same item examined and tested positive for shabu and presented in court,
implying that the identity and integrity of prohibited drug was safeguarded
throughout, a circumstance not obtaining in this case; (2) there was a compelling
reason for not presenting the examining forensic chemist, i.e., the parties
stipulated that the confiscated seven plastic bags have been identified and
examined and that the chemist stated in his report that the substance is positive for
shabu. In this case, C/I Geronimos resignation from the service is not, standing
alone, a justifying factor for the prosecution to dispense with her testimony; and
(3) accused Bandang, et al. did not raise any objection to the chemical report
during trial, unlike here where accused-appellant objected to Inspector Trias
competency to testify on the Geronimo chemical report.
At any rate, Inspector Trias testimony on, and the presentation of, the
chemistry report in question only established, at best, the existence, due
execution, and authenticity of the results of the chemistry analysis.368[32] It does not
prove compliance with the requisite chain of custody over the confiscated
substance from the time of seizure of the evidence. In this regard, the Court in
effect stated in Malillin that unless the state can show by records or testimony that
the integrity of the evidence has not been compromised by accounting for the
continuous whereabouts of the object evidence at least between the time it came
into the possession of the police officers until it was tested in the laboratory,369[33]
then the prosecution cannot maintain that it was able to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. So it was that in People v. Kimura the Court
said that in establishing the corpus delicti, proof beyond reasonable doubt
demands that unwavering exactitude370[34] be observed, a demand which may be
addressed by hewing to the chain-of-custody rule. Evidently, the prosecution has
not proved that the substance seized in front of the McDonalds was the same
substance adduced in evidence as an indispensable element of corpus delicti of
the crime, which failure produces a serious doubt as to accused-appellants
guilt.371[35]
Both the trial and appellate courts made much of the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions both with respect to the acts of
PO3 Ramos and other PNP personnel at Camp Vicente Lim. To a point, the
reliance on the presumptive regularity is tenable. This presumption is, however,
disputable and may be overturned by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty;372[36] any taint of irregularity vitiates the performance
and negates the presumption. And as earlier discussed, the buy bust team
committed serious lapses in the handling of the prohibited item from the very start
of its operation, the error of which the PNP R-IV command later compounded.
The Court need not belabor this matter anew.
For failure then of the prosecution to establish the guilt of accusedappellant beyond reasonable doubt, she must perforce be exonerated from
criminal liability. The facts and the law of the case call for this kind of disposition.
To be forewarned is to be forearmed.
WHEREFORE, the CA Decision dated July 19, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00476, affirming that of the RTC, Branch 53 in Manila which found her guilty of
violating Sec. 15, Art. III of RA 6425 and imposed upon her the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and a fine of PhP 500,000, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accused-appellant Monalyn Cervantes y Solar is ACQUITTED on the
ground of reasonable doubt and is accordingly immediately RELEASED from
custody unless she is being lawfully held for some lawful cause.
FACTS:
On October 1, 1995, at 7:20 in the evening, armed men robbed the house of
spouses George and Rosemarie Gante in Barangay Pug-os, Cabugao, Ilocos Sur,
forcibly taking with them several valuables, including cash amounting to
P600,000.00.375[3] Forthwith, the spouses reported the matter to the police, who, in
turn, immediately applied for a search warrant with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur.376[4] The MTC issued Search Warrant No. 5-95,377[5]
directing a search of the items stolen from the victims, as well as the firearms
used by the perpetrators. One of the target premises was the residence of
petitioner, named as one of the several suspects in the crime.
On October 6, 1995, armed with the warrant, policemen searched the premises of
petitioner's house located in Sitio Padual, Barangay Pug-os, Cabugao, Ilocos Sur.
The search resulted in the recovery of a firearm and ammunitions which had no
license nor authority to possess such weapon, and, consequently, the filing of a
criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1651-K, for violation of P.D. No.
1866 or Illegal Possession of Firearms, against petitioner before the RTC.
Thereafter, trial ensued. The prosecution presented eight witnesses namely: (1)
P/Insp. Anselmo Baldovino378[7] (P/Insp. Baldovino), a police investigator and the
applicant for the search warrant; (2) Rosemarie Gante (Gante), the victim of the
robbery and private complainant; (3) Ignacio Yabes (Yabes), a Municipal Local
Government Operations Officer of the Department of Interior and Local
Government who was the civilian witness to the search; (4) P/Supt. Bonifacio
Abian379[8] (P/Supt. Abian), Deputy Provincial Director of the Philippine National
Police and part of the search team; (5) SPO4 Marino Peneyra (SPO4 Peneyra); (6)
SPO1 Franklin Cabaya (SPO1 Cabaya); (7) SPO1 James Jara (SPO1 Jara); and
(8) SPO2 Florentino Renon (SPO2 Renon).
The prosecution's case centered mainly on evidence that during the enforcement
of the search warrant against petitioner, a .38 caliber revolver firearm was found
in the latter's house.380[9] In particular, SPO1 Cabaya testified that while poking at
a closed rattan cabinet near the door, he saw a firearm on the lower shelf.381[10] The
gun is a .38 caliber revolver382[11] with five live ammunitions,383[12] which he
immediately turned over to his superior, P/Insp. Baldovino.384[13]
Petitioner anchored his defense on denial and frame-up. The petitioner and his
wife Lorna assert that petitioner does not own a gun.385[14] Lorna testified that she
saw a military man planting the gun.386[15]
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision387[16] dated July 7, 1999, finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA, which rendered the assailed Decision388[18]
dated January 22, 2003, affirming with modification the decision of the trial court,
thus:
Hence, the instant Petition for Review, on the principal ground that the CA
gravely erred in finding that the guilt of petitioner has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt; and more specifically, in giving weight and credence to the
testimonies of the police officers who searched the house of the petitioner which
are replete with material and irreconcilable contradictions and in giving SPO1
Cabaya the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty despite the claim
of Lorna that the .38 caliber revolver was planted.
Petitioner insists that the trial court and the CA committed reversible error in
giving little credence to his defense that the firearm found in his residence was
planted by the policemen. He also alleges material inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the policemen as witnesses for the prosecution, which amounted to
failure by the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
The paramount issue in the present case is whether the prosecution established the
guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt; and in the determination thereof, a
factual issue, that is, whether a gun was found in the house of petitioner, must
necessarily be resolved.
It is a well-entrenched rule that appeal in criminal cases opens the whole case
wide open for review.389[20]
Weighing these findings of the lower courts against the petitioner's claim that the
prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt due to the material
inconsistencies in the testimonies of its witnesses, the Court finds, after a
meticulous examination of the records that the lower courts, indeed, committed a
reversible error in finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
he was charged with. The RTC and the CA have overlooked certain facts and
circumstances that would have interjected serious apprehensions absolutely
impairing the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution.
SPO1 Cabaya testified that he entered the house with four other policemen,
among whom were SPO1 Jara, SPO4 Peneyra, SPO3 Bernabe Ocado (SPO3
Ocado) and another one whose name he does not remember.393[26] While searching,
he discovered the firearm in the kitchen, inside a closed cabinet near the
door.394[27] He said that SPO1 Jara was standing right behind him, at a distance of
just one meter, when he (Cabaya) saw the firearm;395[28] and that he picked up the
gun, held it and showed it to SPO1 Jara.396[29] He asserted that SPO2 Renon was
not one of those who went inside the house.397[30]
However, SPO1 Jara, the best witness who could have corroborated SPO1
Cabaya's testimony, related a different story as to the circumstances of the
firearm's discovery. SPO1 Jara testified that he merely conducted perimeter
security during the search and did not enter or participate in searching the
house.398[32] SPO1 Jara testified that he remained outside the house throughout the
search, and when SPO1 Cabaya shouted and showed a gun, he was seven to eight
meters away from him.399[33] He could not see the inside of the house and could see
Cabaya only from his chest up.400[34] He did not see the firearm at the place where
it was found, but saw it only when Cabaya raised his arm to show the gun, which
was a revolver.401[35] He is certain that he was not with Cabaya at the time the
latter discovered the firearm.402[36] He further testified that SPO3 Ocado, who,
according to SPO1 Cabaya was one of those near him when he (Cabaya)
discovered the firearm, stayed outside and did not enter or search the house.403[37]
P/Insp. Baldovino testified that only SPO2 Renon conducted the search
and entered the house together with SPO1 Cabaya,404[38] directly contradicting
SPO1 Cabaya's testimony that he, together with SPO1 Jara, SPO4 Peneyra, SPO3
Ocado, and another one whose name he cannot recall, were inside the house when
he discovered the gun405[39] and that SPO2 Renon did not enter the house of
petitioner.406[40]
Although the Court has held that frame-up is inherently one of the weakest
defenses,409[61] as it is both easily concocted and difficult to prove,410[62] in the present case, the lower courts
seriously erred in ignoring the weakness of the prosecution's evidence and its failure to prove the guilt of petitioner
beyond reasonable doubt. The rule requiring a claim of frame-up to be supported by clear and convincing
evidence411[63] was never intended to shift
to the accused the burden of proof in a criminal case. As the Court held in
People of the Philippines v. Ambih:412[64]
[W]hile the lone defense of the accused that he was the victim of a frame-up is
easily fabricated, this claim assumes importance when faced with the rather shaky
nature of the prosecution evidence. It is well to remember that the prosecution
must rely, not on the weakness of the defense evidence, but rather on its own
proof which must be strong enough to convince this Court that the prisoner in the
dock deserves to be punished. The constitutional presumption is that the
accused is innocent even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is
not strong enough to convict him.413[65] (Emphasis supplied)
In People of the Philippines v. Gonzales,414[66] the Court held that where
there was material and unexplained inconsistency between the testimonies of two
principal prosecution witnesses relating not to inconsequential details but to the
alleged transaction itself which is subject of the case, the inherent improbable
character of the testimony given by one of the two principal prosecution witnesses
had the effect of vitiating the testimony given by the other principal prosecution
witness. The Court ruled that it cannot just discard the improbable testimony of
one officer and adopt the testimony of the other that is more plausible. In such a
situation, both testimonies lose their probative value. The Court further held:
Why should two (2) police officers give two (2) contradictory descriptions
of the same sale transaction, which allegedly took place before their very eyes, on
the same physical location and on the same occasion? We must conclude that a
reasonable doubt was generated as to whether or not the "buy-bust" operation ever
took place.415[69]
Read also:
Where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
interpretations one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and
the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of
moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.
Read:
FACTS:
2. On appeal with the S.C. after he was convicted the accused later claims that
there was a violation of the order of trial provided for in Sec. 3, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court. He also cites the case of Alejandro vs. Pepito, 96 SCRA 322,
wherein the S.C. ruled that : "It behooved the respondent Judge to have followed
the sequence of trial set forth x x x the form of a trial is also a matter of public
order and interest; the orderly course of procedure requires that the prosecution
should go forward and present all of its proof in the first instance."
HELD:
The case of Alejandro vs. Pepito is not applicable inasmuch as the accused in the
case at bar did not object to the procedure followed. In fact in the said Alejandro
case, the Court also stated:
"It is true that in the case of U.S. vs. Gaoiran, 17 Phil. 404 (l910), relied upon by
the prosecution and the trial Court, the defense has produced its proofs before the
prosecution presented its case, and it was held that no substantial rights of the
accused were prejudiced. There is one radical difference, however, since in that
case no objection was entered in the Court below to the procedure followed in the
presentation of proof. In this case, the change in the order of trial made by
respondent Judge was promptly and timely objected to by the defense."
In fact it should be noted that under the newly adopted 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure (Sec. 3e), Rule 119)the said procedure is now expressly sanctioned.
Thus:
"However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint
or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified
accordingly."
4. Other cases -
Read:
Read:
Effect of the fact that accused was represented by a NON-LAWYER at the early
part of the trial but a full-pledged lawyer took over as his counsel when he
presented his evidence. (Also important in your criminal law as to the distinctions
between robbery and grave coercion)
PEDRO CONSULTA VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 179462, February 12, 2009
The Court of Appeals having, by Decision of April 23, 2007,416[1] affirmed the
December 9, 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
139 convicting Pedro C. Consulta (appellant) of Robbery with Intimidation of
Persons, appellant filed the present petition.
That on or about the 7th day of June, 1999, in the City of Makati, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent of gain, and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away
complainants NELIA R. SILVESTRE gold necklace worth P3,500.00, belonging
to said complainant, to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in the
aforementioned amount of P3,500.00.
From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is gathered:
At about 2:00 oclock in the afternoon of June 7, 1999, private complainant Nelia
R. Silvestre (Nelia), together with Maria Viovicente (Maria) and Veronica Amar
(Veronica), boarded a tricycle on their way to Pembo, Makati City. Upon reaching
Ambel Street, appellant and his brother Edwin Consulta (Edwin) blocked the
tricycle and under their threats, the driver alighted and left. Appellant and Edwin
at once shouted invectives at Nelia, saying Putang ina mong matanda ka,
walanghiya ka, kapal ng mukha mo, papatayin ka namin. Appellant added
Putang ina kang matanda ka, wala kang kadala dala, sinabihan na kita na kahit
saan kita matiempuhan, papatayin kita.
Nelia and her companions immediately went to the Pembo barangay hall where
they were advised to undergo medical examination. They, however, repaired to
the Police Station, Precinct 8 in Comembo, Makati City and reported the incident.
They then proceeded to Camp Crame where they were advised to return in a few
days when any injuries they suffered were expected to manifest.
Nine days after the incident or on June 16, 1999, Nelia submitted a
medico-legal report and gave her statement before a police investigator.
Denying the charge, appellant branded it as fabricated to spite him and his
family in light of the following antecedent facts:
He and his family used to rent the ground floor of Nelias house in
Pateros. Nelia is his godmother. The adjacent house was occupied by Nelias
parents with whom she often quarreled as to whom the rental payments should be
remitted. Because of the perception of the parents of Nelia that his family was
partial towards her, her parents disliked his family. Nelias father even filed a case
for maltreatment against him which was dismissed and, on learning of the
maltreatment charge, Nelia ordered him and his family to move out of their house
and filed a case against him for grave threats and another for light threats which
were dismissed or in which he was acquitted.
Appellants witness Darius Pacaa testified that on the date of the alleged robbery,
Nelia, together with her two companions, approached him while he was at Ambel
Street in the company of Michael Fontanilla and Jimmy Sembrano, and asked him
(Pacaa) if he knew a bald man who is big/stout with a big tummy and with a
sister named Maria. As he replied in the affirmative, Nelia at once asked him to
accompany them to appellants house, to which he acceded. As soon as the group
reached appellants house, appellant, on his (Pacaas) call, emerged and on
seeing the group, told them to go away so as not to cause trouble. Retorting, Nelia
uttered Mga hayop kayo, hindi ko kayo titigilan.
The trial court, holding that intent to gain on appellants part is presumed
from the unlawful taking of the necklace, and brushing aside appellants denial
and claim of harassment, convicted appellant of Robbery, disposing as follows:
The said accused is further ordered to pay unto the complainant Nelia
Silvestre the amount of P3,500.00 representing the value of her necklace taken by
him and to pay the costs of this suit.
(2) Whether or not appellant was denied due process having been represented by a fake
lawyer during arraignment, pre-trial and presentation of principal witnesses for
the prosecution;
The first two issues, which appellant raised before the appellate court only when
he filed his Motion for Reconsideration of said courts decision, were resolved in
the negative in this wise:
That appellants first counsel may not have been a member of the bar does not
dent the proven fact that appellant prevented Nelia and company from proceeding
to their destination. Further, appellant was afforded competent representation by
the Public Attorneys Office during the presentation by the prosecution of the
medico-legal officer and during the presentation of his evidence. People v.
Elesterio419[4] enlightens:
As for the circumstance that the defense counsel turned out later to be a nonlawyer, it is observed that he was chosen by the accused himself and that his
representation does not change the fact that Elesterio was undeniably carrying an
unlicensed firearm when he was arrested. At any rate, he has since been
represented by a member of the Philippine bar, who prepared the petition for
habeas corpus and the appellants brief. (Underscoring supplied)
THE FACTS:
Petitioner, together with one Gilbert Alijid (Alijid), was charged with two
counts420[3] of Murder in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, Quezon City
to which petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty.
During trial, Atty. Raul Rivera of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), counsel of
Alijid, took over representing petitioner in view of the death of the latter's
counsel.
On May 10, 2002, petitioner, this time unassisted by counsel, filed with the RTC a
Petition for Relief422[5] from the Decision dated December 5, 2001 together with
an affidavit of merit. In his petition, petitioner contended that at the time of the
promulgation of the judgment, he was already confined at Quezon City Jail and
was directed to be committed to the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa; that he
had no way of personally filing the notice of appeal thus he instructed his lawyer
to file it on his behalf; that he had no choice but to repose his full trust and
confidence to his lawyer; that he had instructed his lawyer to file the necessary
motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal; that on May 2, 2002, he was
already incarcerated at the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City and learned
from the grapevine of his impending transfer to the Iwahig Penal Colony,
Palawan; that believing that the notice of appeal filed by his counsel prevented the
Decision dated December 5, 2001 from becoming final to warrant his transfer, he
instructed his representative to get a copy of the notice of appeal from the RTC;
that no notice of appeal was filed by his lawyer in defiance of his clear
instructions; and that the RTC Decision showed that it was received by his
counsel on February 1, 2002 and yet the counsel did not inform him of any action
taken thereon.
I S S U E:
Whether or not the delay in appealing the instant case due to the defiance or
failure of the petitioner's counsel de oficio to seasonably file a Notice of Appeal,
constitutes excusable negligence to entitle the undersigned detention prisoner/
petitioner to pursue his appeal?
Whether or not pro hac vice, the mere invocation of justice warrants the review of
a final and executory judgment?
HELD:
Petitioner contends that the negligence of his counsel de oficio cannot be binding
on him for the latter's defiance of his instruction to appeal automatically breaks
the fiduciary relationship between counsel-client and cannot be against the client
who was prejudiced; that this breach of trust cannot easily be concocted in this
situation considering that it was a counsel de oficio, a lawyer from PAO, who
broke the fiduciary relationship; that the assailed CA Resolutions both harped on
technicalities to uphold the dismissal by the RTC of his petition for relief; that
reliance on technicalities to the prejudice of petitioner who is serving 14 years
imprisonment for a crime he did not commit is an affront to the policy
promulgated by this Court that dismissal purely on technical grounds is frowned
upon especially if it will result to unfairness; and that it would have been for the
best interest of justice for the CA to have directed the petitioner to complete the
records instead of dismissing the petition outright.
In his Comment, the OSG argues that the mere invocation of justice does not
warrant the review of an appeal from a final and executory judgment; that
perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is
not only mandatory but jurisdictional and failure to perfect the appeal renders the
judgment sought to be reviewed final and not appealable; and that petitioner's
appeal after the finality of judgment of conviction is an exercise in futility, thus
the RTC properly dismissed petitioner's petition for relief from judgment. The
OSG further claims that notice to counsel is notice to clients and failure of
counsel to notify his client of an adverse judgment would not constitute excusable
negligence and therefore binding on the client.
A litigant who is not a lawyer is not expected to know the rules of procedure.
In fact, even the most experienced lawyers get tangled in the web of
procedure.423[12] We have held in a civil case that to demand as much from
ordinary citizens whose only compelle intrare is their sense of right would
turn the legal system into an intimidating monstrosity where an individual
may be stripped of his property rights not because he has no right to the
property but because he does not know how to establish such right. 424[13] This
finds application specially if the liberty of a person is at stake. As we held in
Telan v. Court of Appeals:
xxxx
Even the most experienced lawyers get tangled in the web of procedure.
The demand as much from ordinary citizens whose only compelle intrare is their
sense of right would turn the legal system into an intimidating monstrosity where
an individual may be stripped of his property rights not because he has no right to
the property but because he does not know how to establish such right.
The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all times. More so,
in the case of an on-going litigation, it is a right that must be exercised at every
step of the way, with the lawyer faithfully keeping his client company.
Cases should be determined on the merits after full opportunity to all parties for
ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some
procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be served
better.427[16]
While as a general rule, the failure of petitioner to file his motion for
reconsideration within the 15-day reglementary period fixed by law rendered the
resolution final and executory, we have on some occasions relaxed this rule. Thus,
in Barnes v. Padilla428[17] we held:
However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial
justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case,
(d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not
be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice,
must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The
power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to
alter even that which this Court itself had already declared to be final.
The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines
in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it,
for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of
judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering justice have always
been, as they ought to be guided by the norm that when on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way
around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice
Makalintal, "should give way to the realities of the situation.
Indeed, the emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every
party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his
cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.429[18]
Even if the judgment had become final and executory, it may still be
recalled, and the accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself
and counsel.431[22] However, instead of remanding the case to the CA for a
decision on the merits, we opt to resolve the same so as not to further delay the
final disposition of this case.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appeal in the
manner prescribed by law. The importance and real purpose of the remedy of
appeal has been emphasized in Castro v. Court of Appeals432[27] where we ruled
that an appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and trial courts are
advised to proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal
and instructed that every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of
technicalities. While this right is statutory, once it is granted by law, however,
its suppression would be a violation of due process, a right guaranteed by the
Constitution. Thus, the importance of finding out whether petitioner's loss of the
right to appeal was due to the PAO lawyer's negligence and not at all
attributed to petitioner.
Mendoza, J.
Atty. Brotonel as counsel de oficio, had the duty to defend his client and protect
his rights, no matter how guilty or evil he perceives accused-appellant to be. The
performance of this duty was all the more imperative because the life of the
accused-appellant hangs in the balance. His duty was no less because he was
counsel de oficio.
The Decision of the RTC convicting the accused is SET ASIDE and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
Read:
PEOPLE VS. YAMBOT, G.R. NO. 120350, 343 SCRA 20, OCT. 30, 2000;
PEOPLE VS. BANIHIT, G.R. NO. 132045, 339 SCRA 86, AUG. 25, 2000.
Right to be Heard by himself and counsel and to present evidence for his defense.
In this case, the non-appearance of counsel for the accused on the scheduled
hearing was not construed as waiver by the accused of his right to present
evidence for his defense. Denial of due process can be successfully invoked
where no valid waiver of rights had been made as in this case.
Read:
The right to a speedy trial; not a case of; Requisites of double jeopardy;
DANTE TAN VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 173637, April 21, 2009
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision433[1]
dated 22 February 2006 and Resolution434[2] dated 17 July 2006 issued by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83068 entitled, People of the Philippines v.
Hon. Briccio C. Ygana, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 153,
Regional Trial Court, Pasig City and Dante Tan.
The assailed Decision reinstated Criminal Case No. 119830, earlier dismissed by
the trial court due to an alleged violation of petitioner Dante T. Tans right to
speedy trial. The assailed Resolution denied his Motion for Reconsideration and
Motion to Inhibit.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the instant petition are as follows:
(RTC) of Pasig City. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 119830, No.
119831 and No. 119832, all entitled, People of the Philippines v. Dante Tan.
In two other related cases, two Informations were filed against a certain Jimmy
Juan and Eduardo G. Lim for violation of the Revised Securities Act involving
BW shares of stock. These were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 119828 and No.
119829.
On the same day, the DOJ, through Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Nilo C.
Mariano, filed a Motion for Consolidation praying that Criminal Cases No.
119830, No. 119831 and No. 119832 be consolidated together with Criminal
Cases No. 119828 and No. 119829, which the trial court granted.
On 21 December 2000, Criminal Cases No. 119830, No. 119831 and No. 119832
were raffled off to the Pasig RTC, Branch 153, presided by Judge Briccio C.
Ygana. Criminal Cases No. 119828 and No. 119829 also went to the same court.
Petitioner was arraigned on 16 January 2001, and pleaded not guilty to the
charges.438[6]
On 6 February 2001, the pre-trial was concluded, and a pre-trial order set, among
other things, the first date of trial on 27 February 2001.439[7]
Atty. Celia Sandejas of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), under
the direct control and supervision of Public Prosecutor Nestor Lazaro, entered her
appearance for the People; Atty. Agnes Maranan for petitioner Dante Tan; Atty.
Sigfrid Fortun for Eduardo Lim, Jr.; and Atty. Rudolf Brittanico for Jimmy Juan.
State Prosecutors Susan Dacanay and Edna Villanueva later on took over as
lawyers for the People.
The People insists that during the pendency of the initial hearing on 27 February
2001, the parties agreed that Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832 would
be tried ahead of Criminal Case No. 119830, and that petitioner would not
interpose any objection to its manifestation, nor would the trial court disapprove
it.
Thereafter, the People presented evidence for Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No.
119832. On 18 September 2001, the prosecution completed the presentation of its
evidence and was ordered by the RTC to file its formal offer of evidence within
thirty days.
After being granted extensions to its filing of a formal offer of evidence, the
prosecution was able to file said formal offer for Criminal Cases No. 119831 and
No. 119832 on 25 November 2003.440[8]
On 2 December 2003, petitioner moved to dismiss Criminal Case No. 119830 due
to the Peoples alleged failure to prosecute. Claiming violation of his right to
speedy trial, petitioner faults the People for failing to prosecute the case for an
unreasonable length of time and without giving any excuse or justification for the
delay. According to petitioner, he was persistent in asserting his right to speedy
trial, which he had allegedly done on several instances. Finally, he claimed to
have been substantially prejudiced by this delay.
The prosecution opposed the Motion, insisting on its claim that the parties had an
earlier agreement to defer the trial of Criminal Case No. 119830 until after that of
Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832, as the presentation of evidence and
prosecution in each of the five cases involved were to be done separately. The
presentation of evidence in Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832, however, were
done simultaneously, because they involved similar offenses of non-disclosure of
beneficial ownership of stocks proscribed under Rule 36(a)-1441[9] in relation to
Sections 32(a)-1442[10] and 56443[11] of Batas Pambansa Bilang 178, otherwise
known as the Revised Securities Act. Criminal Case No. 119830 pertains to
alleged violation of Section 27 (b),444[12] in relation to Section 56 of said act.
On 22 December 2003, Judge Briccio C. Ygana of the Pasig RTC, Branch 153,
ruled that the delays which attended the proceedings of petitioners case (Criminal
Case No. 119830) were vexatious, capricious and oppressive, resulting in
violation of petitioners right to speedy trial. The RTC ordered445[13] the dismissal
of Criminal Case No. 119830, disposing as follows:
On motion for reconsideration, the prosecution insisted that the parties agreed to
hold separate trials of the BW cases, with petitioner acquiescing to the
prosecution of Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832 ahead of Criminal
Case No. 119830. In an Order dated 20 January 2004, the RTC denied the Motion
for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
The RTCs order of dismissal was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition
for certiorari, with the People contending that:
Setting aside the trial courts order of dismissal, the Court of Appeals granted the
petition for certiorari in its Decision dated 22 February 2006. In resolving the
petition, the appellate court reinstated Criminal Case No. 119830 in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the assailed Orders dated December
22, 2003 and January 20, 2004 are set aside. Criminal Case No. 119830 is
reinstated and the trial court is ordered to conduct further proceedings in said case
immediately.446[14]
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the Decision and filed a motion for
inhibition of the Justices who decided the case.
Petitioner Dante Tan, henceforth, filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari, raising the following issues:
I.
II.
III.
IV.
In an attempt at having the instant petition dismissed, petitioner contends that the
certificate of non-forum shopping attached to the Peoples appeal before the Court
of Appeals should have been signed by the Chairman of the SEC as complainant
in the cases instead of Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas N. Gutierrez.
The preliminary issues having been resolved, the Court shall proceed to discuss
the main issues.
At the crux of the controversy is the issue of whether there was a violation of
petitioner Dante Tans right to speedy trial.
Petitioner Dante Tan assails the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 83068. The appellate court determined that he impliedly
agreed that Case No. 119830 would not be tried until after termination of
Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832, which finding was grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises and conjectures.
Both parties concede that this issue is factual. It is a basic rule that factual issues
are beyond the province of this Court in a petition for review, for it is not our
function to review evidence all over again.449[17] Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
provides that only questions of law may be raised in this Court in a petition for
review on certiorari.450[18] The reason is that the Court is not a trier of facts.451[19]
However, the rule is subject to several exceptions.452[20] Under these exceptions,
the Court may delve into and resolve factual issues, such as in cases where the
findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are absurd, contrary to the
evidence on record, impossible, capricious or arbitrary, or based on a
misappreciation of facts.
In this case, the Court is convinced that the findings of the Court of
Appeals on the substantial matters at hand, while conflicting with those of the
RTC, are adequately supported by the evidence on record. We, therefore, find no
reason to deviate from the jurisprudential holdings and treat the instant case
differently.
A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused
necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
From the initial hearing on 27 February 2001 until the time the prosecution filed
its formal offer of evidence for Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832 on 25
November 2003, both prosecution and defense admit that no evidence was
presented for Criminal Case No. 119830. Hence, for a period of almost two years
and eight months, the prosecution did not present a single evidence for Criminal
Case No. 119830.
In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan,457[30] the Court ruled that there was no violation of the
right to speedy trial and speedy disposition. The Court took into account the
reasons for the delay, i.e., the frequent amendments of procedural laws by
presidential decrees, the structural reorganizations in existing prosecutorial
agencies and the creation of new ones by executive fiat, resulting in changes of
personnel, preliminary jurisdiction, and the functions and powers of prosecuting
agencies. The Court also considered the failure of the accused to assert such right,
and the lack of prejudice caused by the delay to the accused.
ATTY. SANDEJAS [SEC Prosecuting Lawyer]: May we make some manifestation first,
your Honor, before we continue presenting our witness. First of all, this witness
xxxx
ATTY. SANDEJAS: Our witness is Mr. Wilfredo Baltazar of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, your Honor. We are presenting this witness for the purpose of nondisclosure of beneficial ownership case
COURT: I would advise the counsel from the SEC to make it very clear your purpose in
presenting your first witness.
ATTY. SANDEJAS: Crim. Case Nos. 119831 and 119832, for Violation of RA Rule
36(a)1, in relation to Sec. 32 (a)-1 of the Revised Securities Act when he failed to
disclose his beneficial ownership amounting to more than 10% which requires
disclosure of such fact.462[35]
During the same hearing, the People manifested in open court that the parties had
agreed to the separate trials of the BW Cases:
PROSECUTOR LAZARO:
Your Honor please, as we x x x understand, this is not a joint trial but a separate
trial x x x so as manifested by the SEC lawyer, the witness is being presented
insofar as 119831 and 119832 as against Dante Tan only x x x.463[36]
The transcript of stenographic notes taken from the 3 April 2001 hearing further
clarifies that only the two cases against Dante Tan were being prosecuted:
ATTY. DE LA CRUZ [new counsel for accused Eduardo Lim, Jr.]:
Your Honor, please, may I request clarification from the prosecutors regarding the
purpose of the testimony of the witness in the stand. While the Private Prosecutor
stated the purpose of the testimony of the witness. .
PROSECUTOR LAZARO:
I was present during the last hearing. I was then going over the transcript of this
case, well, I believe the testimony x x x mainly [is] on accused Dante Tan, your
Honor. As a matter of fact, there was a clarification made by the parties and
counsels after the witness had testified that the hearing in these cases is not a joint
trial because it involves separate charges, involving different documents, your
Honor. That is why the witness already testified only concerning Dante Tan. Per
the query made by Atty. Fortun, because at that time, Atty. Fortun was still
representing Mr. Lim, I believe, your Honor, then I understand that the testimony
of this witness cannot just be adopted insofar as the other accused, your Honor.
ATTY. MARANAN:
We confirm that, your Honor, since x x x particularly since this is already cross, it
is clear that the direct examination dealt exclusively with Mr. Dante Tan.
PROS. LAZARO:
Moreover, although periods for trial have been stipulated, these periods are not
absolute. Where periods have been set, certain exclusions are allowed by law.465[38]
After all, this Court and the law recognize that it is but a fact that judicial
proceedings do not exist in a vacuum and must contend with the realities of
everyday life. In spite of the prescribed time limits, jurisprudence continues to
adopt the view that the fundamentally recognized principle is that the concept of
speedy trial is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.466[39]
As to the assertion that delay in the presentation of evidence for Criminal Case
No. 119830 has prejudiced petitioner because the witnesses for the defense may
no longer be available at this time, suffice it to say that the burden of proving his
guilt rests upon the prosecution.467[40] Should the prosecution fail for any reason to
present evidence sufficient to show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, petitioner
will be acquitted. It is safely entrenched in our jurisprudence that unless the
prosecution discharges its burden to prove the guilt of an accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the latter need not even offer evidence in his behalf.468[41]
For the reasons above-stated, there is clearly insufficient ground to conclude that
the prosecution is guilty of violating petitioners right to speedy trial. Grave abuse
of discretion defies exact definition, but generally refers to capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Any
The constitutional protection against double jeopardy shields one from a second
or later prosecution for the same offense. Article III, Section 21 of the 1987
Constitution declares that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense, providing further that if an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
Following the above constitutional provision, Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Court found it apt to stipulate:
For double jeopardy to attach then, the following elements in the first criminal
case must be present:
(a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction;
(c) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and
Among the above-cited elements, we are concerned with the fourth element,
conviction or acquittal, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused. This element is crucial since, as a general rule,
the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal, made with the express
consent of the accused or upon his own motion, will not place the accused in
double jeopardy.471[44] This rule, however, admits of two exceptions, namely:
insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial.472[45] While indeed
petitioner was in fact the one who filed the Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No.
119830, the dismissal thereof was due to an alleged violation of his right to
speedy trial, which would otherwise put him in double jeopardy should the same
charges be revived. Petitioners situation is different. Double jeopardy has not
attached, considering that the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 119830 on the
ground of violation of his right to speedy trial was without basis and issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Where the
right of the accused to speedy trial has not been violated, there is no reason to
support the initial order of dismissal.
Following this Courts ruling in Almario v. Court of Appeals,473[46] as petitioners
right to speedy trial was not transgressed, this exception to the fourth element of
double jeopardy that the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused
was not met. Where the dismissal of the case was allegedly capricious, certiorari
lies from such order of dismissal and does not involve double jeopardy, as the
petition challenges not the correctness but the validity of the order of dismissal;
such grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, which prevents
double jeopardy from attaching.474[47]
It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that dismissal of cases on
the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar
further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must be stressed,
however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to
speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench considering
that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by
the State. x x x.
From the foregoing, it follows that petitioner cannot claim that double jeopardy
attached when said RTC order was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Double
jeopardy does not apply to this case, considering that there is no violation of
petitioners right to speedy trial.
The old adage that justice delayed is justice denied has never been more valid
than in our jurisdiction, where it is not a rarity for a case to drag in our courts for
years and years and even decades. It was this difficulty that inspired the
constitutional requirement that the rules of court to be promulgated by the
Supreme Court shall provide for a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy trial and disposition of cases.477[50] Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales
must balance, for justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone.478[51]
Finally, we reiterate that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and
the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons. Courts are tasked to give meaning to
that intent. There being no capricious, vexatious, oppressive delay in the
proceedings, and no postponements unjustifiably sought, we concur in the
conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals.
The instant controversy arose from a complaint by private respondent Abutal with
then Chancellor of UP-Manila Perla D. Santos-Ocampo for Grave Misconduct against
petitioner Capt. Roquero. The formal charge filed on 1 October 1998 and docketed as
ADM Case No. UPM-AC 97-007 reads as follows:
On 1 October 1998, the petitioner was placed under preventive suspension for
ninety (90) days by Chancellor Santos-Ocampo, the material portion of said Order reads:
The Prosecution presented its only witness, private respondent Abutal. After the
completion of the cross-examination on the prosecutions only witness, the prosecution
agreed to submit its Formal Offer of Evidence on or before 16 July 1999.
The prosecution, however, failed to submit its formal offer of evidence within the
period agreed upon.
Thereafter, on 10 August 1999, when the case was called, only petitioner and his
counsel appeared. Atty. Flor merely called by telephone and requested Atty. Docena to
reset the case to another date. Atty. Docena then ordered the resetting of the hearing on
the following dates: 11 August and 21 August 1999. On 11 August 1999, only petitioner
and his counsel came. No representative from the prosecution appeared before the ADT.
Atty. Flor again called and asked for the postponement of the hearing. By reason thereof,
Atty. Docena issued an Order, which reads as follows:
SO ORDERED.
11 August 1999.
On said date, the representative from the prosecution again failed to appear.
The ADT was not able to act on the said Motion for almost five (5) years. Due to
the unreasonable delay, petitioner, on 19 May 2004 filed another Motion asking for the
dismissal of the administrative case against him. The Motion to Dismiss was anchored
on the following reasons: that the prosecution had not formally offered its evidence; that
the ADT had failed to act on the motion filed on 22 October 1999; that the unfounded
charges in the administrative complaint were filed just to harass him; and that he is
entitled to a just and speedy disposition of the case.
On 8 June 2004, Atty. Docena issued the assailed Order denying petitioners
motion to dismiss, to wit:
SO ORDERED.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but the same was denied in an
Order dated 9 November 2004.
Petitioner Captain Wilfredo Roquero then filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87776, alleging
therein that the ADT committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to
dismiss the administrative case filed against him.
In a Decision dated 22 March 2007, the Honorable Court of Appeals denied the
petition with prayer for TRO of Roquero reasoning that the ADT did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders.
Hence, this Petition.
The core issue of this case is whether the failure of the ADT to resolve Roqueros
Motion (to declare complainant Imelda Abutal to have waived her right to submit her
Formal Offer of Exhibit) which he seasonably filed on 22 October 1999 and the assailed
Order of the ADT dated 8 June 2004 admitting the Formal Offer of Exhibit of
complainant Imelda Abutal despite having filed after almost five years violated the
constitutional right of Roquero to a speedy disposition of cases.
HELD:
Indeed, while Section 27 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil
Service states that the failure to submit the formal offer of evidence within the given
period shall be considered as waiver thereof, the ADT in fact allowed the prosecution
to present its formal offer almost five (5) years later or on 24 January 2004. Starting on
that date, petitioner was presented with the choice to either present his evidence or to, as
he did, file a motion to dismiss owing to the extraordinary length of time that ADT failed
to rule on his motion.
We cannot accept the finding of the Court of Appeals that there was no grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the ADT because a formal offer of evidence was filed by
the prosecution, a copy of which was received by petitioners counsel. The
admission by ADT on 8 June 2004 of the formal offer of exhibits belatedly filed did not
cure the 5-year delay in the resolution of petitioners 1999 motion to deem as waived
such formal offer of evidence. Indeed, the delay of almost five (5) years cannot be
justified.
The ADT admitted this explanation of the prosecutor hook, line and sinker without
asking why it took him almost five (5) years to make that explanation. If the excuses
were true, the prosecution could have easily manifested with the ADT of its predicament
right after Roquero filed his motion to declare the waiver of the formal offer. It is evident
too that the prosecution failed to explain why it took them so long a time to find a
replacement for the original prosecutor. And, the stenographer who had been in and out
of the hospital due to serious illness should have been replaced sooner.
While it is true that administrative investigations should not be bound by strict
adherence to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial
proceedings, the same however should not violate the constitutional right of respondents
to a speedy disposition of cases.
Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 16. All person shall have the right to a speedy disposition
of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the
accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and
administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial
hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious
action by all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is
deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed
to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing
test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a
speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution
and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for
such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice
caused by the delay. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must
necessarily be a flexible concept.
Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has
been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the
length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such
right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
Applying the doctrinal ruling vis-a-vis the factual milieu of this case, the violation
of the right to a speedy disposition of the case against petitioner is clear for the following
reasons: (1) the delay of almost five (5) years on the part of ADT in resolving the motion
of petitioner, which resolution petitioner reasonably found necessary before he could
present his defense; (2) the unreasonableness of the delay; and (3) the timely assertions
by petitioner of the right to an early disposition which he did through a motion to
dismiss. Over and above this, the delay was prejudicial to petitioners cause as he was
under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days, and during the interregnum of almost
five years, the trial of the accusation against him remained stagnant at the prosecution
stage.
The Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of
cases was intended to stem the tide of disenchantment among the people in the
administration of justice by our judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals. The adjudication of
cases must not only be done in an orderly manner that is in accord with the established
rules of procedure but must also be promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice.
Excessive delay in the disposition of cases renders the rights of the people guaranteed by
the Constitution and by various legislations inutile.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Administrative
Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) of the University of the Philippines-Manila, Atty. Zaldy B.
Docena, Eden Perdido and Isabella Lara, in their capacities as Chairman and Members of
the ADT respectively, are hereby ORDERED to DISMISS the administrative case
against Capt. Wilfredo G. Roquero for violation of his constitutional right to a speedy
disposition of cases.
JAIME BERNAT VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, May 20, 2004
Facts:
1. On August 14, 1991, the petitioner and several others were charged of violation of
Section 3 [e] of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act;
2. On August 23, 1994 after the presentation of the parties evidence, the case was deemed
submitted for decision before the 2nd Division;
3. Thereafter, the case was unloaded to the newly created 5th Division, particularly to Justice
Godofredo Legaspi and later re-assigned to Justice Ma. Cristina Cortez-Estrada upon her
assumption of office on November 3, 1998.
4. In the early part of 2002 while Justice Estrada was writing the decision of the case, she
found out that the November 26, 1993 transcript of stenographic notes, which was the
cross-examination of the petitioner, was missing so she called the parties for a conference
on April 19, 2002 to discuss the matter.
5. Instead of attending the conference, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case based on
the alleged violation of his right to speedy trial. The Court denied the same as well as the
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this Petition.
Issue:
Was there violation of the petitioners right to a speedy disposition of his case
when the same was not decided for almost 8 years from the time it was deemed
submitted for decision?
Held:
No. The right is violated only if the proceedings were attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays. The determination of whether the delays are of
said nature is relative and cannot be based on mere mathematical reckoning of
time. Particular regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. As held in the
case of DE LA PENA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, certain factors shall be
considered and balanced to determine if there is delay, as follows:
a. Read Admin. Circular No. 4 of the Supreme Court dated September 22, 1988
b. Department of Justice Circular No. 27, dated September 16, 1988
Read:
Read:
e. In general
Read:
SUMBANG VS. GEN. COURT MARTIAL, G.R. NO. 140188, 337 SCRA
227, AUG. 3, 2000; BLANCO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NOS. 136757
58, 346 SCRA 108, NOV. 27, 2000; SOLAR TEAM ENTERTAINMENT,
INC. HON. HOW, G.R. NO. 140863, 338 SCRA 51, AUG. 22, 2000.
(i) The determination of whether an accused had been denied the right to speedy
trial depends on the surrounding circumstances of each case. Although it took
about 8 years before the trial of this case was resumed, such delay did not amount
to violation of petitioners right to speedy trial considering that such delay was not
by attributable to the prosecution.
1. length of delay,
2. reasons for such delay, and
3. assertion or failure to assert such rights by the accused and the prejudice caused by the
delay.
(ii) Speedy Trial Act of 1998. The authority of the Secretary of Justice to review
resolutions of his subordinates even after an information has already been filed in
court does not present an irreconcilable conflict with the 30-day period prescribed
in Sec. 7 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998.
Read:
Read:
10. The right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation. When the same
is considered waived.
THE FACTS:
On March 17, 1999, appellant Jerry Nazareno was indicted for violation of
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. 2638 for the
alleged rape of BBB, his daughter. The information reads:
CONTRARY TO LAW.480[18]
After trial , the accused was found guilty of qualified rape in both cases. He
appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals in accordance with the People vs.
Mateo Doctrine but the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision. Hence, this
Petition before the Supreme Court.
I S S U E:
Is the constitutional right of the petitioner to be informed of the nature and cause
of accusation against him violated since the information failed to specify with
certainty the approximate date of the commission of the offenses for rape which is
a fatal defect.
H E L D:
the offense has been committed.481[27] Further, it must embody the essential
elements of the crime charged by setting forth the facts and circumstances that
have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused, so that he can
properly prepare for and undertake his defense.482[28]
However, it is not necessary for the information to allege the date and time
of the commission of the crime with exactitude unless time is an essential
ingredient of the offense.483[29] In People v. Bugayong,484[30] the Court held that
when the time given in the information is not the essence of the offense, the time
need not be proven as alleged; and that the complaint will be sustained if the
proof shows that the offense was committed at any time within the period of the
statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action.
In People v. Gianan,485[31] the Court ruled that the time of the commission
of rape is not an element of the said crime as it is defined in Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code. The gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal knowledge
under any of the circumstances enumerated therein, i.e.: (1) by using force or
intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. In
accordance with Rule 110, Section 11 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
long as it alleges that the offense was committed at any time as near to the actual
date at which the offense was committed, an information is sufficient.
In the case under review, the information in Criminal Case No. 2638 alleged that
the rape of BBB transpired sometime and between January 1992 up to December
6, 1998 in Barangay Codon, Municipality of San Andres, Province of
Catanduanes. In Criminal Case No. 2650, the information averred that from
sometime in January 1990 up to December 1998 in Barangay Codon,
Municipality of San Andres, Province of Catanduanes, AAA was raped by
appellant. To the mind of the Court, the recitals in the informations sufficiently
comply with the constitutional requirement that the accused be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
In People v. Garcia,488[34] the Court upheld a conviction for ten counts of rape
based on an Information which alleged that the accused committed multiple rapes
from November 1990 up to July 21, 1994. In People v. Espejon,489[35] the Court
found the appellant liable for rape under an information charging that he
perpetrated the offense sometime in the year 1982 and dates subsequent thereto
and sometime in the year 1995 and subsequent thereto.
In the case under review, the information in Criminal Case No. 2638 alleged that
the rape of BBB transpired sometime and between January 1992 up to December
6, 1998 in Barangay Codon, Municipality of San Andres, Province of
Catanduanes. In Criminal Case No. 2650, the information averred that from
sometime in January 1990 up to December 1998 in Barangay Codon,
Municipality of San Andres, Province of Catanduanes, AAA was raped by
appellant. To the mind of the Court, the recitals in the informations sufficiently
comply with the constitutional requirement that the accused be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Indeed, this Court has ruled that allegations that rapes were committed
before and until October 15, 1994,490[36] sometime in the year 1991 and the
days thereafter,491[37] and on or about and sometime in the year 1988492[38]
constitute sufficient compliance with Rule 110, Section 11 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
More than that, the Court notes that the matter of particularity of the dates in the
information is being raised for the first time on appeal. The rule is wellentrenched in this jurisdiction that objections as to matter of form or substance in
the information cannot be made for the first time on appeal.493[39] Appellant failed
to raise the issue of defective informations before the trial court. He could have
moved to quash the informations or at least for a bill of particulars. He did not.
Clearly, he slumbered on his rights and awakened too late.
Too, appellant did not object to the presentation of the evidence for the People
contending that the offenses were committed sometime and between January
1992 up to December 6, 1998 for Criminal Case No. 2632 and sometime in
January 1990, up to December 1998 in Criminal Case No. 2650. On the contrary,
appellant actively participated in the trial, offering denial and alibi as his defenses.
Simply put, he cannot now be heard to complain that he was unable to defend
himself in view of the vagueness of the recitals in the informations.
Read:
11. The right to meet witnesses face to face or the right of confrontation
Read:
Read:
Read:
Read:
1In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Ferdinand Marcos, etc, GR
No. 88079, May 18, 1989 and August & October, 1989.
xxxx
xxxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutors office with a criminal
offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6)
years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered
political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA
9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue
delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to
determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection
clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And
for a third, a persons constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached by said
provisions.
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck
down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary
to the due process and equal protection guarantees.
SJS Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)
The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and
tertiary level students and public and private employees, while mandatory, is a random and
suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process
the well being of [the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous
drugs. This statutory purpose, per the policy-declaration portion of the law, can be achieved via
the pursuit by the state of an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use
of dangerous drugs x x x through an integrated system of planning, implementation and
enforcement of anti-drug abuse policies, programs and projects.496[14] The primary legislative
intent is not criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug use as a result of this
random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal
liability should the illegal drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA
9165 are clear on this point:
xxxx
Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary
Submission Program.A drug dependent under the voluntary submission
program, who is finally discharged from confinement, shall be exempt from the
criminal liability under Section 15 of this Act subject to the following conditions:
xxxx
School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the physical,
psychological, and addictive effects of drugs. Maturing nervous systems of the young are more
critically impaired by intoxicants and are more inclined to drug dependency. Their recovery is
also at a depressingly low rate.497[15]
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the
right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure498[16] under Sec. 2, Art.
III499[17] of the Constitution. But while the right to privacy has long come into its own, this case
appears to be the first time that the validity of a state-decreed search or intrusion through the
medium of mandatory random drug testing among students and employees is, in this jurisdiction,
made the focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these proceedings is veritably one of first
impression.
The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of drug testing even
among non-athletes on the basis of the schools custodial responsibility and authority. In so
ruling, said court made no distinction between a non-athlete and an athlete. It ratiocinated that
schools and teachers act in place of the parents with a similar interest and duty of safeguarding
the health of the students. And in holding that the school could implement its random drugtesting policy, the Court hinted that such a test was a kind of search in which even a reasonable
parent might need to engage.
In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to this
jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their
students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the
custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco
parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their students and may adopt such
measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right
to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the
provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students
are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a
condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies.
To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements.
The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country
that threatens the well-being of the people,503[21] particularly the youth and school children who
usually end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a more effective method is conceptualized and
put in motion, a random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only
acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population,
doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected. To borrow
from Vernonia, [d]eterring drug use by our Nations schoolchildren is as important as enhancing
efficient enforcement of the Nations laws against the importation of drugs; the necessity for the
State to act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug-infested school are visited not just
upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty.504[22] Needless to stress, the random
testing scheme provided under the law argues against the idea that the testing aims to incriminate
unsuspecting individual students.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random
drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private
offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that
petitioner SJS, other than saying that subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without
probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy,505[23]
has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c)
and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented
search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.506[24] Petitioner Lasernas lament is just as
simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration. Consider what he
wrote without elaboration:
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.508[26] In context, the right to privacy
means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into
ones private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities.
509[27]
And while there has been general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been
held, reasonableness is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion.512[30]
And whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of
the government-mandated intrusion on the individuals privacy interest against the promotion of
some compelling state interest.513[31] In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of
probable cause to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug-testing policy for
employeesand students for that matterunder RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative
search needing what was referred to in Vernonia as swift and informal disciplinary procedures,
the probable-cause standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review
should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy
interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III
of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the
analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing
requirement. The employees privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by
the companys work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by
management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain
discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office
environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been
upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the
challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set
forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search narrowly
drawn or narrowly focused?514[32]
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed
towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a
humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the
law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really
singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in
advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165
itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees
concerned shall be subjected to random drug test as contained in the companys work rules and
regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place.
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to
protect as much as possible the employees privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test,
the law specifies that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and
the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results.
But the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained
professionals in access-controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to
safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody.515[33] In addition,
the IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the need to
know basis;516[34] that the drug test result and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to
the usual accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test results.517[35] Notably, RA
9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any
information or evidence relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the
employees privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against
embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country
and thus protect the well-being of the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects
of dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve this through the medium, among others, of
promoting and resolutely pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory
random drug test.518[36] To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use
is substantial enough to override the individuals privacy interest under the premises. The Court
can consider that the illegal drug menace cuts across gender, age group, and social- economic
lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the sale, manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs,
with their ready market, would be an investors dream were it not for the illegal and immoral
components of any of such activities. The drug problem has hardly abated since the martial law
public execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid back stance
with respect to this modern-day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory
random drug test to be an effective way of preventing and deterring drug use among employees
in private offices, the threat of detection by random testing being higher than other modes. The
Court holds that the chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the
part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-
defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random
testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the
case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also
labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other
laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service.519[37]
And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it
should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be
accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and
efficiency.520[38]
Petitioner SJS next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the ground of
undue delegation of power hardly commends itself for concurrence. Contrary to its position, the
provision in question is not so extensively drawn as to give unbridled options to schools and
employers to determine the manner of drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug testing
for students of secondary and tertiary schools and officers/employees of public/private offices
should be conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall undergo drug testing. In the case of
students, the testing shall be in accordance with the school rules as contained in the student
handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of officers/employees, the testing shall take into
account the companys work rules. In either case, the random procedure shall be observed,
meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an
unplanned way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the
confidentiality of the test results are established.
Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue, in consultation with
the DOH, Department of the Interior and Local Government, Department of Education, and
Department of Labor and Employment, among other agencies, the IRR necessary to enforce the
law. In net effect then, the participation of schools and offices in the drug testing scheme shall
always be subject to the IRR of RA 9165. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools and
employers have unchecked discretion to determine how often, under what conditions, and where
the drug tests shall be conducted.
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the constitutional
landscape.521[39] In the face of the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the
increasing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its
attention, resort to delegation of power, or entrusting to administrative agencies the power of
subordinate legislation, has become imperative, as here.
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid
justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the
constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students
emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry
to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of
school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of
the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the
drug test policy and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public
prosecutors office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day
imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are randomness and
suspicionless. In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutors office, a
mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and
being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They
are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of
committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The
persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutors office and peaceably
submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the
procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.522[40] To impose mandatory drug testing on the
accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary
to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons right to
privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are
veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
2. Read
2. Galman vs. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294, read including the concurring and
dissenting opinions
3. Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62
4. Beltran vs. Samson, 50 Phil. 570
5. Bagadiong vs. Gonzales, 94 SCRA 906
6. BASECO vs. PCGG, supra
7. Isabela Sugar vs. Macadaeg, 98 Phil. 995
8. Fernando vs. Maglanoc, 95 Phil. 431
9. US vs. Tang Teng, 23 Phil. 145
10. P vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244
11. P vs. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513
12. P vs. Boholst-Amadore, 152 SCRA 263
13. P vs. Rosas, 148 SCRA 464
14. P vs. Ruallo, 152 SCRA 635
15. P vs. Policarpio, 158 SCRA 85( Compare with the Rosas & Boholst cases)
16. P vs. Lumayok, 139 SCRA 1
17. Cabal vs. Kapunan, Jr. December 29, 1962
PEOPLE VS. BANIHIT, G.R. NO. 132045, 339 SCRA 86, AUG. 25, 2000;
PEOPLE VS. CONTINENTE, G.R. NOS. 100801- 02, 339 SCRA 1, AUG. 25,
2000.
suffering from a disease that was contracted by his victim without violating this
right.
1. Read:
Read:
No. Death through lethal injection is the most humane way of implementing the
death Penalty (Leo Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice)
Read:
Read:
1. Read:
If the dismissal is through the instance of the accused or with his express consent,
there is no double jeopardy and the case could be reinstated. However, this rule
admits of two (2) exceptions:
This is so because the dismissal is actually an acquittal and therefore, all the
requisites of double jeopardy are complete.
The case had its origins in the filing of an Information523[4] on 29 December 2004
by the Provincial Prosecutors Office, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, charging herein
petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap with the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to
Homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries, and Damage to Property. The pertinent
portion of the information reads:
An act defined and penalized by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
On 10 January 2005, before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sibulan, Negros
Oriental, petitioner was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the charge.524[5]
Pre-trial and trial of the case proceeded. Respondents testified for the prosecution.
After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner sought leave to file a demurrer
to evidence which was granted. Petitioner filed his Demurrer to Evidence529[10]
dated 15 April 2005 grounded on the prosecutions failure to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that he is criminally liable for reckless imprudence, to which
respondents filed a Comment530[11] dated 25 April 2005.
In the Order531[12] dated 16 May 2005, the MTC granted the demurrer and
acquitted petitioner of the crime of reckless imprudence. The MTC found that the
evidence presented by respondents failed to establish the allegations in the
Information. Pertinent portions of the order state:
Nowhere in the evidence of the prosecution can this Court find that it was the
accused who committed the crime as charged. Its witnesses have never identified
the accused as the one who has committed the crime. The prosecution never
bothered to establish if indeed it was the accused who committed the crime or
asked questions which would have proved the elements of the crime. The
prosecution did not even establish if indeed it was the accused who was driving
the truck at the time of the incident. The Court simply cannot find any evidence
which would prove that a crime has been committed and that the accused is the
person responsible for it. There was no evidence on the allegation of the death of
Lou Gene R. Sendiong as there was no death certificate that was offered in
evidence. The alleged less serious physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran
and Elvie Sy were not also proven as no medical certificate was presented to state
the same nor was a doctor presented to establish such injuries. The alleged
damage to the [C]olt [G]alant was also not established in any manner as no
witness ever testified on this aspect and no documentary evidence was also
presented to state the damage. The prosecution therefore failed to establish if
indeed it was the accused who was responsible for the death of Lou Gene R.
Sendiong and the injuries to Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy, including the damage to
the Colt Galant. The mother of the victim testified only on the expenses she
incurred and the shock she and her family have suffered as a result of the incident.
But sad to say, she could not also pinpoint if it was the accused who committed
the crime and be held responsible for it. This Court could only say that the
prosecution has practically bungled this case from its inception.
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
SO ORDERED.532[13]
In the order534[15] dated 23 August 2005, the RTC affirmed the acquittal of
petitioner but ordered the remand of the case to the MTC for further proceedings
on the civil aspect of the case. The RTC ruled that the MTCs recital of every fact
in arriving at its conclusions disproved the allegation that it failed to consider the
evidence presented by the prosecution. The records also demonstrated that the
MTC conducted the trial of the case in the manner dictated by Sec. 11, Rule 119
of the Rules of Court, except that the defense no longer presented its evidence
after the MTC gave due course to the accuseds demurrer to evidence, the filing of
which is allowed under Sec. 23, Rule 119. The RTC however agreed that the
MTC failed to rule on the accuseds civil liability, especially since the judgment
of acquittal did not include a declaration that the facts from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the RTC declared that the aspect of civil
liability was not passed upon and resolved to remand the issue to the MTC. The
dispositive portion of the decision states:
SO ORDERED.535[16]
Both parties filed their motions for reconsideration of the RTC order, but
these were denied for lack of merit in the order536[17] dated 12 September 2005.
Respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals under Rule
42, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179. The appellate court subsequently
rendered the assailed decision and resolution. The Court of Appeals ruled that
there being no proof of the total value of the properties damaged, the criminal
case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC and the proceedings before the MTC
are null and void. In so ruling, the appellate court cited Tulor v. Garcia (correct
title of the case is Cuyos v. Garcia)537[18] which ruled that in complex crimes
involving reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or physical injuries and
damage to property, the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the case is
determined by the fine imposable for the damage to property resulting from the
reckless imprudence, not by the corresponding penalty for the physical injuries
charged. It also found support in Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980 and the 1991 Rule 8 on Summary Procedure, which govern the summary
procedure in first-level courts in offenses involving damage to property through
criminal negligence where the imposable fine does not exceed P10,000.00. As
there was no proof of the total value of the property damaged and respondents
were claiming the amount of P1,500,000.00 as civil damages, the case falls within
the RTCs jurisdiction. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated 17 August
2006 reads:
SO ORDERED.538[19]
In the present petition for review, petitioner argues that the MTC had jurisdiction
to hear the criminal case for reckless imprudence, owing to the enactment of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691,541[22] which confers jurisdiction to first-level courts
on offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence. He asserts
that the RTC could not have acquired jurisdiction on the basis of a legally unfiled
and officially withdrawn amended information alleging abandonment.
Respondents are also faulted for challenging the MTCs order acquitting
petitioner through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 in lieu of an
ordinary appeal under Rule 42.
The first issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that jurisdiction
over the offense charged pertained to the RTC.
Both the MTC and the RTC proceeded with the case on the basis of the
Information dated 29 December 2004 charging petitioner only with the complex
crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, less serious physical injuries
and damage to property. The Court of Appeals however declared in its decision
that petitioner should have been charged with the same offense but aggravated by
the circumstance of abandonment of the victims. It appears from the records
however that respondents attempt to amend the information by charging the
aggravated offense was unsuccessful as the MTC had approved the Provincial
Prosecutors motion to withdraw their motion to amend the information. The
information filed before the trial court had remained unamended.542[23] Thus,
petitioner is deemed to have been charged only with the offense alleged in the
original Information without any aggravating circumstance.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any person who, by reckless
imprudence, commits any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a
grave felony, with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period. When such reckless imprudence the use of a
motor vehicle, resulting in the death of a person attended the same article imposes
upon the defendant the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods.
Applicable as well is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to
hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application
thereof.545[26] When this case was filed on 29 December 2004, Section 32(2) of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 had already been amended by R.A. No. 7691. R.A.
No. 7691 extended the jurisdiction of the first-level courts over criminal cases to
include all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
Accordingly, respondents filed before the RTC the petition for certiorari
alleging that the MTC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the case and
failing to consider the evidence of the prosecution in resolving the same, and in
allegedly failing to follow the proper procedure as mandated by the Rules of
Court. The RTC correctly ruled that the MTC did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing the criminal complaint. The MTCs conclusions were based on facts
diligently recited in the order thereby disproving that the MTC failed to consider
the evidence presented by the prosecution. The records also show that the MTC
correctly followed the procedure set forth in the Rules of Court.
The second issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the
remand of the case of the matter of civil liability for the reception of evidence.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals on directing the remand of the case
to the RTC for further proceedings on the civil aspect, as well as with the RTC in
directing a similar remand to the MTC.
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the
accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the
court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist.553[34] This is because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence,
he has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case.
The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial
court should do is issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to
evidence and acquitting the accused, and set the case for continuation of trial for
the accused to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case and for the private
complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall
render judgment on the civil aspect of the case.554[35]
A scrutiny of the MTCs decision supports the conclusion that the acquittal
was based on the findings that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist and that petitioner did not commit the acts or omission
imputed to him; hence, petitioners civil liability has been extinguished by his
acquittal. It should be noted that the MTC categorically stated that it cannot find
any evidence which would prove that a crime had been committed and that
accused was the person responsible for it. It added that the prosecution failed to
establish that it was petitioner who committed the crime as charged since its
witnesses never identified petitioner as the one who was driving the cargo truck at
the time of the incident. Furthermore, the MTC found that the proximate cause of
the accident is the damage to the rear portion of the truck caused by the swerving
of the Colt Galant into the rear left portion of the cargo truck and not the reckless
driving of the truck by petitioner, clearly establishing that petitioner is not guilty
of reckless imprudence. Consequently, there is no more need to remand the case
to the trial court for proceedings on the civil aspect of the case, since petitioners
acquittal has extinguished his civil liability.
******************
It must be pointed out, however, that in PEOPLE VS. TAMPAL, 244
SCRA 202 and PEOPLE VS. LEVISTE, 255 SCRA 238, the SC reversed the
dismissal of the criminal case by the trial court based on speedy trial since the
same was not predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. It is
only when there is a clear violation of the accuseds right to speedy trial that the
dismissal results in double jeopardy.
If the accused was charged of theft of electricity based on the City Ordinance of
Batangas and not based on the Revised Penal Code and later on the case is
dismissed by the judge due to the fact that the crime has prescribed, the
government can no longer charge the accused of the same crime under the
Revised Penal Code since double jeopardy has set in.
Read:
FACTS:
1. Molero was charged for having raped his daughter. The original complaint was
dated March 22, 1977, the complainant charged Molero of having raped her on
the "13th day of February 1976".
3. During the trial, the complainant testified that she was raped by her father on
February 5, 1976 and not February 13, 1976 as alleged in the complaint;
4. The Fiscal filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint. The motion was
granted but was subsequently reconsidered. The lower court in its order dismissed
the original complaint, but ordered the Fiscal to cause the filing of a new
complaint charging the proper offense of rape committed on or before February 5,
1976;
6. Molero claims that the new complaint places him in double jeopardy.
HELD:
a. Dismissal of the first case contemplated by the rule against double jeopardy
presupposes a definite and unconditional dismissal which terminates the case.
(Jaca vs. Blanco, 86 Phil. 452; People vs. Manlapas, 5 SCRA 883; People vs.
Mogol, 131 SCRA 296) And "for dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy
clause of the Constitution, it must have the effect of acquittal.(People vs.
Agoncillo, 40 SCRA 579);
b. It is quite clear that the order of the trial court dismissal the original complaint
was without prejudice to the filing of a new complaint and/or information
charging Molero with the proper offense. The said dismissal did not therefore
amount to an acquittal.
c. In fact there was no need for the trial court to have adopted such a cumbersome
procedure. It could have merely ordered an amendment of the complaint. Sec. 12,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court applies when there is a mistake in
charging the proper offense, but not when an honest error of a few days is sought
to be corrected and the change does not affect the rights of the accused.
d. The precise time of the commission of the crime is not an essential element of
the offense of rape. The amendment of the complaint changing the date of the
commission of the crime of rape from February 13, 1976 to February 5, 1976 , a
difference of 8 days was only a matter of form under the facts of this case and did
not prejudice the rights of the accused.
e. The reliance of the accused on the case of People vs. Opemia, 98 Phil. 698 is
not well-taken. In the said case the proposed amendment was the changing of
the date of the commission of the crime from June 18, 1952 to July 1947, or a
difference of 5 years. The S.C. held that the amendment that would change
the date of the commission of the offense from 1947 to 1952 is certainly not a
matter of form.
f. The dismissal of the first complaint did not amount to the appellant's acquittal.
In effect, the order of dismissal does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of
double jeopardy. (People vs. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166)
5. May the government appeal a judgment of acquittal or for the increase of the
penalty imposed? No.
PEOPLE VS. HON. VELASCO, G.R. NO. 127444, 340 SCRA 207, SEPT. 13,
2000.
6. May the appellate court of the Supreme Court increase the pernalty imposed by
the trial court on appeal by the accused? Yes.
Appellant Jesus Domingo assails the Decision555[1] of the Court of Appeals dated
30 April 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 30511, modifying the Decision556[2] dated 13
November 2006 of Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan. The Court of Appeals found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Yes because it was the accused who interposed the appeal making the
court review the evidence. And it it finds the evidence sufficient for
conviction of the crime of Murder, it could increase the penalty.
Read:
1. Central Bank of the Philippines vs. CA, GR No. 41859, March 8, 1989
1-a. P vs. Montemayor, January 30, 1969, 26 SCRA 687
2. P vs. Ruiz,81 SCRA 455
3. US vs. Yam Tung Way, 21 Phil. 67
4. P vs. Ang ho Kio, 95 Phil. 475
Read:
1. 76 SCRA 469
2. P vs. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260
3. P vs. Villasis, 46 O.G. 268
4. Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766
5. P vs. Buling, 107 Phil. 712
5-a. P vs. Adil, 76 SCRA 462
5-b. P. vs. Tac-an, 182 SCRA 601
6. P vs. City Court of Manila, 121 SCRA 637
7. Read also Sec. 7, Rule 117, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
CHAPTER XXI
RIGHT AGAINST EX-POST FACTO LAW,
BILL OF ATTAINER, ETC.
Read:
The petitioner seeks to stop the Sandiganbayan from trying the multiple murder
case against him and 26 other police officers for the death of 11 Kuratong
Baleleng members in the early morning of May 18, 1995 at Commonwealth
Avenue, Quezon City. The police officers claimed that it was a shoot-out between
them and the Kuratong Baleleng Members while SPO2 Eduardo de los Reyes
claimed it was a summary execution or rub-out.
Upon motion by the petitioner and his co-police officers with leave from the
Sandiganbayan, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman who AMENDED the 11 informations on March 1, 1996 charging
the petitioner , ROMEO ACOP and FRANCISCO ZUBIA, JR., as mere
accessories.
While the Motions for Reconsideration were pending before the Sandiganbayan,
Congress passed into law Republic Act No. 8249 which was approved by the
President on February 5, 1997 entitled AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE
JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THIS
PURPOSE PD 1606, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR
which deleted the word PRINCIPAL in Section 2, paragraphs [a] and [c] of RA
7975 thereby giving jurisdiction to the Sandiganbayan criminal cases involving
police generals like the petitioners even though they are not charged as principals
but merely accessories or accomplices. The new law further provides that it shall
be applicable to all cases which are pending in court before the passage of the
same provided trial has not begun at the time of its approval.
On March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution denying the Motion
for Reconsideration of the Office of the Special Prosecutor and ruled that it
stands pat in its Resolution dated May 8, 1996 ordering the transfer of the 11
criminal cases to the RTC of Quezon City. On the same day, however, the
Sandiganbayan issued an ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 Resolution where it
that with the passage of RA 8249, the court admitted the amended informations
in these cases and by the unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring nor
dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and decide the cases.
1. their right to due process of law and equal protection of the law was violated as a result of
the application of the new law by which restored to the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over
their cases especially so that the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for 9 months the
resolution of the pending incident involving the transfer of these cases to the RTC of
Quezon City and waited for the passage of the law to overtake such resolution and
thereby rendering their vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law moot;
2. the retroactive application of the new law violates their constitutional right against expost facto law;
3. the title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid innocuous provisions in
Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan law
thereby violating the one title one subject requirement of Section 26 [1] Article VI of the
Constitution.
Held:
1. The contention that the law violates petitioners right to due process and equal protection
of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. It is an established precept in constitutional
law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation
based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when
there is concurrence of four elements, namely:
2. The petitioners argument that the retroactive application of the new law to the Kuratong
Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law for they are deprived of their right to due
process as they can no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly
acquired under RA 7975 is without merit.
In order that a law is an ex post facto law, the same must be one
1. which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was
innocent when committed, and punishes such action;
2. which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed;
3. which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when it was committed;
4. which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than
the law required a the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
defendant;
5. every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of
a person to his disadvantage;
6. that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies but in effect imposes a
penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;
The other contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they
acquired under RA 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of RA 8249 is
incorrect. The same contention had been rejected by the court several times in the
cases of RODRIGUEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 205 Phil. 567; ALVIAR VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN, 137 SCRA 63; NUNEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 111
SCRA 433; DE GUZMAN VS. PEOPLE, December 15, 1982 considering that the
right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by
law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not
included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Moreover, the new law did
not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial.
3. The contention that the new Sandiganbayan law violates the one title-one subject
provision of the Constitution is without merit. The petitioners claim that the new does not
define the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but expands the same. But even assuming
that that is true, the expansion of the jurisdiction, does not have to be expressly stated in
the title of the law because such is the necessary consequence of the amendments. The
requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title is satisfied if
the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the
general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. The Congress, in employing the word
define in the title of the law, acted within its power since Section 2, Article VIII of the
Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to define, prescribe and apportion the
jurisdiction of various courts.
(NOTE: Though the Supreme Court rejected all the above arguments raised by the
petitioner and the intervenors who are against the trial of their cases with the
Sandiganbayan and prefer to have their cases be tried and decided by the RTC of
Quezon City, they got what they want in the end because it was held that the 11
criminal informations failed to alleged that they committed the crimes in relation
to their public office which is a jurisdictional requirement in order that the same
be tried by the Sandiganbayan.
Finally, sometime in May, 1999, the Quezon City RTC to whom the said cases
were raffled DISMISSED the 11 murder cases as a result of the retraction made
by the eyewitnesses. The same was revived by the DOJ in April, 2001. The same
was returned to the QC RTC to determine if the 2-year provisional rule under the
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure is applicable)
1[4] G.R. No. 63971, May 9, 1989, 173 SCRA 243, 249.
2
[4]
Id. at 35-36.
24[13] See: Cario v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 483, on the activities
encompassed by the exercise of quasi-judicial power.
25[14] See: Cipriano v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 158830, August 10, 2004, 436 SCRA 45, citing Sandoval v. COMELEC, 323 SCRA
403 [2000].
27[17] Bautista v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 154796-97, October 23, 2003, 414 SCRA 299.
28[18] Supra note 17.
29[19] CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 14; See Solid Homes, Inc. v. Laserna, G.R. No. 166051, April 8, 2008, 550 SCRA
613.
37
38
[4]
[6]
[7]
39
Marquez v. Desierto, G.R. No. 135882, June 27, 2001, 359 SCRA 772.
40
See Morfe v. Mutuc No. L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424.
41
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See also Article 17 (1) and (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.
42
Constitutional and Legal Systems of ASEAN Countries, Sison, Academy of ASEAN Law and Jurisprudence, 1990, at 221, citing I.R.
Cortes, The Constitutional Foundations of Privacy, 7 (1970).
43
Burrows v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P 2d 590 (1974). See Katz v. United states (1967), 389 U.S. 347,
350-352, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576; People v. Krivda (1971) 5 Cal. 3d 357, 364, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62, 486 P. 2d 1262; 8 Cal. 3d 623624,105 Cal. Rptr. 521, 504 P. 2d 457. INSERT Herreras Handbook on Arrest, Search and Seizure.
44
Supra.
[46]
[47]
[48]
[49]
[50]
[51]
45
46
47
[52]
[53]
[54]
51 The Local Government Code. Specifically, Section 16 stating the general welfare clause, thus:
Sec. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a
balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote
full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.
52
[6]
53
[7]
Id.
54
[8]
Id. at 90.
55[9]Id. at 91.
56
[10]
Id. at 92.
57
[11]
Id. at 93-97.
58
[12]
Id. at 98-102.
59
[13]
Id. at 103-110.
60
[14]
Id. at 103.
61
[15]
Id. at 111.
62
[16]
Id. at 18-19.
63
[32]
Article 3, Sec. 4.
64
[33]
65
[34]
66
[35]
See TJ Burgonio, Isabela gov who ended a dynasty wins RM prize, Philippine Daily Inquirer (1 August 2008), at
http://opinion.inquirer.net/inquireropinion/letterstotheeditor/view /20080801-151950/Isabela-gov-who-ended-a-dynasty-winsRM-prize
67
[36]
68
[37]
69
[38]
Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, 15 February 2008, 545 SCRA 441, 491.
70
[39]
Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. COMELEC, 409 Phil. 571, 585 (2001); citing New York Times v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 714, 29 L. Ed. 2d 822, 824 (1971).
71
[40]
Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168335, 15 February 2008, 545 SCRA 441, 492.
72
[41]
73
[42]
74
[43]
Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, 15 February 2008, 545 SCRA 441, 493.
75
[44]
76
[45]
Id. at 957.
77
[46]
78
[47]
Id. at 178-179.
79
[53]
80
[54]
See White Light v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122846, 20 January 2009.
81
[55]
82
[85]
160 Phil. 991, 1001 (1975). See also MHP Garments, Inc., v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86720, 2 September 1994,
236 SCRA 227, 235.
83
[86]
84
[87]
85
[88]
According to an article posted on the official website of Bombo Radyo, DZNC accordingly resumed broadcast on 8
February 2006. See http://www.bomboradyo.com/archive/ new/stationprofile /bombocauayan/index.htm (last visited, 6 March
2009)
86
[89]
87
[90]
[Exemplary damages] are an antidote so that the poison of wickedness may not run through the body politic. Octot
v. Ybaez, etc., et al., 197 Phil. 76, 82 (1982).
88
[91]
[The award of exemplary damages] would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. Octot v. Ybaez, supra note 87, at 85; citing Ong Yiu v. CA, 91 SCRA 223.
89
[92]
104 [17] Chavez v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007, 530 SCRA 235, 295-296; citing Azarcon,
supra note 12, at 761; Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. Santiago, Nos. L-29236 & 29247, August 21, 1974, 58
SCRA 493, 497.
112[25] US v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131; Eastern Broadcasting Corporation v. Dans, Jr., No. L-59329, July 19,
1985, 137 SCRA 628.
113 [26] Eastern Broadcasting Corporation v. Dans, Jr., supra note 25; citing FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726;
Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak, No. L-69500, July 22, 1985, 137 SCRA 717.
114 [27] J.G. Bernas, S.J., The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary 205 (1996).
115 [28] Lagunsad v. Soto vda. De Gonzales, No. L-32066, August 6, 1979, 92 SCRA 476.
116 [29] Trohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); cited in Bernas, supra at 218.
117 [30] G.R. No. 136185, October 30, 2000, 344 SCRA 481, 490.
118[31] 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
137[50] Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707 & 80578, February 1, 1989, 170 SCRA 1.
138[51] Supra note 25, at 635.
139[52] No. L-82380, April 29, 1988, 160 SCRA 861.
140 [53] Supra note 48.
141 [54] Supra at 898.
156 [69] People v. Maceren, No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450, 458.
157 [70] Id.
158 [71] Id.
159[1]
160[2]
161[3]
162[4]
163[5]
164[6]
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, G.R. No. 173034, 9 October 2007, 535 SCRA 265.
165[7]
166[8]
Id.
167[9]
Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119673, 26 July 1996, 259 SCRA 529; New York Times v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971).
168[10]
Bayan v. Ermita, G.R. Nos. 169838, 169848 and 169881, 25 April 2006, 488 SCRA 226.
169[11]
170[12]
171[13]
172[14]
173[15]
174[16]
See note 2.
175[17]
See note 3.
176[18]
177[19]
178[20]
Id.
179[21]
See note 9.
180
181
182
[4]
[6]
[7]
183 G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989, 170 SCRA 256.
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
224[73] People v. Deniega, G.R. No. 103499, 29 December 1995, 251 SCRA 626, 637.
225[74] People v. Velarde, 434 Phil. 102, 119 (2002).
226[75] People v. Base, supra note 67.
227[76] Records, pp. 312-318.
228[77] TSN, 25 September 2001 and 27 September 2001.
229[78] TSN, 27 September 2001, pp. 5-9.
230[79] Id. at 9-15.
231[80] TSN, 25 September 2001, pp. 2-14.
232[81] Id. at 14-19.
233[82] People v. Velarde, supra note 74.
234[83] TSN, 27 September 2001, p. 5.
235[84] Id.
236[85] TSN, 25 September 2001, pp. 4-5.
237[86] Id. at 6.
238[87] Supra note 65 at 726.
239[88] People v. Mojello, 468 Phil. 944, 954 (2004).
240[89] People v. Base, supra note 67.
241[90] People v. Bagnate, G.R. Nos. 133685-86, 20 May 2004, 428 SCRA 633, 651.
242[91] People v. Fabro, supra note 65.
243[92] Records, p. 18.
244[93] Id. at 19.
245[94] 229 Phil. 577, 582 (1986).
246[95] People v. Bagnate, supra note 90.
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
[10]
[12]
324
325
Id. at 16-17.
326
327
Id. at 9.
[13]
[14]
[15]
328
[16]
TSN, 28 May 2003, p. 14. The results of the chemical analysis are embodied in Chemistry Report No. D-037-03. See records, p. 18.
[18]
329
330
Id. at 11-12.
331
332
[20]
[41]
[42]
333
[43]
334
People v. Ambrosio, G.R. No. 135378, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 312, 318 citing People v. Tan, 382 SCRA 419 (2002).
335
People v. Ambrosio, G.R. No. 135378, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 312, 318 citing People v. Tan, 382 SCRA 419 (2002).
[52]
[53]
336
[54]
348 [12] (a) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and
payment therefor.
355 [19] People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 175832, October 10, 2008; citing Valdez v. People, G.R. No. 170180, November 23, 2007,
538 SCRA 611.
356 [20] Valdez, supra note 19, at 628-629; citing People v. Ong, G.R. No. 137348, June 21, 2004, 432 SCRA 470.
357 [21] G.R. No. 172953, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 619, 632; citing American jurisprudence.
358 [22] Valdez, supra; Ong, supra note 20.
359 [23] In accordance with Sec. 21, Art. II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 in relation to Sec. 81(b), Art. IX of RA 9165.
370 [34] G.R. No. 130805, April 27, 2004, 428 SCRA 51, 70.
371 [35] Id.
372 [36] Sevilla v. Cardenas, G.R. No. 167684, July 31, 2006, 497 SCRA 428, 443; citing Mabsucang v. Judge Balgos, 446 Phil.
217, 224 (2003).
373 [37] People v. Caete, G.R. No. 138400, July 11, 2002, 384 SCRA 411, 424.
374 [38] People v. Tan, G.R. No. 129376, May 29, 2002, 382 SCRA 419, 444.
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416[1] Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and
Lucas P. Bersamin; CA rollo, pp. 166-176.
417[2] Records, p. 1.
418[3] Rollo, p. 169
419[4] G.R. No. 63971, May 9, 1989, 173 SCRA 243, 249.
420
421
422
Id. at 53-60.
423
See Telan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95026, October 4, 1991, 202 SCRA 534, 541.
424
Id.
425
Id. at 540-541.
426
Id. at 541.
427
428
429
Id. at 686-687.
430
431
Telan v. Court of Appeals, supra note 12, at 540-541; People of the Philippines v. Holgado, 85 Phil. 752, 756-757 (1950); Flores v. Judge
Ruiz, 179 Phil. 351, 355 (1979); Delgado v. Court of Appeals, 229 Phil. 362, 366 (1986).
[3]
[4]
[5]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[21]
[22]
432
433[1] Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta with Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Sesinando E.
Villon, concurring; rollo, pp. 90-100.
(a) Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than ten per centum of any class of any equity security
which is registered pursuant to this Act, or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of such security, shall file, at the
time of the registration of such security on a securities exchange or by the effective date of a registration statement or
within ten days after he becomes such a beneficial owner, director, or officer, a statement with the Commission and, if
such security is registered on a securities exchange, also with the exchange, of the amount of all equity securities of
such issuer of which he is the beneficial owner, and within ten days after the close of each calendar month thereafter, if
there has been a change in such ownership during such month, shall file with the Commission, and if such security is
registered on a securities exchange, shall also file with the exchange, a statement indicating his ownership at the close
of the calendar month and such changes in his ownership as have occurred during such calendar month.
442[10] Section 32. Reports. (a) (1) Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the beneficial ownership of any
equity security of a class which is registered pursuant to this Act, is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more
than ten (10%) per centum of such class shall, within ten days after such acquisition or such reasonable time as fixed by
the Commission, submit to the issuer of the security, to the stock exchanges where the security is traded, and to the
Commission a sworn statement x x x.
443[11] Penalties. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this Act, or the rules and regulations promulgated by the
Commission under authority thereof, or any person who, in a registration statement filed under this Act, makes any
untrue statement of a material fact of omits to state any material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make
the statements therein not misleading, shall, upon conviction, suffer a fine of not less than five thousand (P5,000.00)
pesos nor more than five hundred thousand (P500,000.00) pesos or imprisonment of not less than seven (7) years nor
more than twenty one (21) years, or both in the discretion of the court. If the offender is a corporation, partnership or
association or other juridical entity, the penalty shall be imposed upon the officer or officers of the corporation,
partnership, association or entity responsible for the violation, and if such officer is an alien, he shall, in addition to the
penalties prescribed, be deported without further proceedings after service of sentence.
444[12] Section 27. Manipulative and deceptive devices. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any facility of any exchange
xxxx
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security, any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance.
454[27] Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, 407 Phil. 985, 999-1000 (2001); Dela Pena v. Sandiganbayan, 412 Phil. 921, 929 (2001).
455[28] Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 324 Phil. 151, 170 (1996); Tai Lim v. Court of Appeals, 375 Phil. 971, 977 (1999).
456[29] Santiago v. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 109266, 2 December 1993, 228 SCRA 214, 221.
457[30] G.R. No. 101689, 17 March 1993, 220 SCRA 55.
458[31] 408 Phil. 767 (2001).
459[32] G.R. No. 104776, 5 December 1994, 238 SCRA 721.
460[33] TSN, 27 February 2001.
461[34] Producers Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 430 Phil. 812, 823 (2002); People v. Hernandez, 328 Phil. 1123,
1143 (1996).
481
People v. Quitlong, 354 Phil. 372, 388 (1998), citing Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000), Rule 110, Secs. 6 and 8.
482
Id.
483
People v. Santos, 390 Phil. 150, 161 (2000); Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000), Rule 110, Sec. 11 reads:
[18]
[27]
[28]
[29]
Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense. It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was
committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as
possible to the actual date of its commission.
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
People v. Magbanua, G.R. No. 128888, December 3, 1999, 319 SCRA 719.
492
People v. Santos, G.R. Nos. 131103 & 143472, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 655.
493
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
494
495
496[14] RA 9165, Sec. 2.
497 [15] Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), 661.
498 [16] Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA 141, 169; citing Morfe v. Mutuc, No. L-20387, January 31,
1968, 22 SCRA 424, 444-445.
499 [17] Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be
seized.
500 [18] 536 U.S. 822 (2002); cited in 2 Bernas, Constitutional Rights and Social Demands 224-227 (2004).
501 [19] The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
502 [20] The Fourth Amendment is almost similar to Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, except that the latter limited the
determination of probable cause to a judge after an examination under oath of the complainant and his witnesses. Hence,
pronouncements of the US Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Court may be considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction,
unless they are manifestly contrary to our Constitution. See Herrera, Handbook on Arrest, Search and Seizure 8 (2003).
503 [21] Tolentino v. Alconcel, No. L-63400, March 18, 1983, 121 SCRA 92, 95-96.
504 [22] Rollo (G.R. No. 158633), p. 204, respondents Consolidated Memorandum.
505 [23] Rollo (G.R. No. 157870), p. 10.
506 [24] Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized.
516 [34] DOH IRR Governing Licensing and Accreditation of Drug Laboratories, Sec. 7 [10.3] provides that the original copy of
the test results form shall be given to the client/donor, copy furnished the DOH and the requesting agency.
519[37] Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officers and Employees, Sec. 2.
520 [38] Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 1.
521 [39] Tatad, supra note 6, at 351.
522 [40] Leona Pasion Viuda de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, 695 (1938); citing Cooley, Const. Lim. 630 (8th ed.).
523
[4]
Records, p. 32.
524
[5]
525
[6]
526
[7]
Id. at 37.
527
[8]
Id. at 41.
528
[9]
Rollo, p. 55.
529
[10]
530
[11]
Id. at 93-94.
531
[12]
532
[13]
533
[14]
534
[15]
535
[16]
Id. at 81.
536
[17]
Id. at 89-90.
537
[18]
538
[19]
Rollo, p. 35.
539
[20]
Id. at 90-94.
540
[21]
Supra note 2.
541
[22]
Entitled An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Otherwise Known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980, which took effect on 14 April 1994.
542
[23]
543
[24]
People v. de los Santos, 407 Phil. 724, 744 (2001, citing Reodica v. Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA 87, 102 (1998).
544
[25]
545
[26]
Venancio Figueroa y Cervantes v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 147406, 14 July 2008, citing Alarilla v.
Sandiganbayan, 393 Phil. 143, 155 (2000) and Escovar v. Justice Garchitorena, 466 Phil. 625, 635 (2004).
546
[27]
Venancio Figueroa y Cervantes v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 147406, 14 July 2008.
547
[28]
People v. Sandiganbayan, 488 Phil. 293, 310 (2004), citing People v. City of Silay, No. L-43790, 9 December 1976,
74 SCRA 247.
548
[29]
Id.
549
[30]
People v. Uy, G.R. No. 158157, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 668.
550
[31]
Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, G.R. No. 165496, 12 February 2007, 515 SCRA 502, 513.
551
[32]
552
[33]
553
[34]
Id. at 607.
554
[35]
Id. at 518-519.
555[1] Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta with Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Apolinario D.
Bruselas, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 2-25.