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Ludwig Wittgenstein
First published Fri Nov 8, 2002; substantive revision
Mon Mar 3, 2014
Considered by some to be the greatest philosopher o
f the 20th century, Ludwig Wittgenstein played a ce
ntral, if controversial, role in 20th-century analytic p
hilosophy. He continues to influence current philoso
phical thought in topics as diverse as logic and langu
age, perception and intention, ethics and religion, ae
sthetics and culture. Originally, there were two com
monly recognized stages of Wittgenstein's thought
the early and the laterboth of which were taken to
be pivotal in their respective periods. In more recent
scholarship, this division has been questioned: some
interpreters have claimed a unity between all stages
of his thought, while others talk of a more nuanced d
ivision, adding stages such as the middle Wittgenstei
n and the third Wittgenstein. Still, it is commonly ac

knowledged that the early Wittgenstein is epitomize

d in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. By showing
the application of modern logic to metaphysics, via
language, he provided new insights into the relations
between world, thought and language and thereby in
to the nature of philosophy. It is the later Wittgenstei
n, mostly recognized in the Philosophical Investigati
ons, who took the more revolutionary step in critiqui
ng all of traditional philosophy including its climax i
n his own early work. The nature of his new philoso
phy is heralded as anti-systematic through and throu
gh, yet still conducive to genuine philosophical unde
rstanding of traditional problems.
1. Biographical Sketch
2. The Early Wittgenstein
2.1 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
2.2 Sense and Nonsense
2.3 The Nature of Philosophy
2.4 Interpretative Problems
3. The Later Wittgenstein
3.1 Transition and Critique of Tractatus
3.2 Philosophical Investigations
3.3 Meaning as Use
3.4 Language-games and Family Resemblance

3.5 Rule-following and Private Language

3.6 Grammar and Form of Life
3.7 The Nature of Philosophy
3.8. After the Investigations
Bibliography
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1. Biographical Sketch
Wittgenstein was born on April 26, 1889 in Vienna,
Austria, to a wealthy industrial family, well-situated
in intellectual and cultural Viennese circles. In 1908
he began his studies in aeronautical engineering at
Manchester University where his interest in the philo
sophy of pure mathematics led him to Frege. Upon F
rege's advice, in 1911 he went to Cambridge to study
with Bertrand Russell. Russell wrote, upon meeting
Wittgenstein: An unknown German appeared ob
stinate and perverse, but I think not stupid (quoted
by Monk 1990: 38f). Within one year, Russell was c
ommitted: I shall certainly encourage him. Perhaps
he will do great things I love him and feel he will
solve the problems I am too old to solve (quoted by
Monk 1990: 41). Russell's insight was accurate. Wit

tgenstein was idiosyncratic in his habits and way of l

ife, yet profoundly acute in his philosophical sensitiv
ity.
During his years in Cambridge, from 1911 to 1913,
Wittgenstein conducted several conversations on phi
losophy and the foundations of logic with Russell, w
ith whom he had an emotional and intense relationsh
ip, as well as with Moore and Keynes. He retreated t
o isolation in Norway, for months at a time, in order
to ponder these philosophical problems and to work
out their solutions. In 1913 he returned to Austria an
d in 1914, at the start of World War I (1914-1918), j
oined the Austrian army. He was taken captive in 19
18 and spent the remaining months of the war at a pr
ison camp. It was during the war that he wrote the n
otes and drafts of his first important work, Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus. After the war the book was p
ublished in German and translated into English.
In 1920 Wittgenstein, now divorced from philosoph
y (having, to his mind, solved all philosophical probl
ems in the Tractatus), gave away his part of his famil
y's fortune and pursued several professions (garden
er, teacher, architect, etc.) in and around Vienna. It
was only in 1929 that he returned to Cambridge to re

sume his philosophical vocation, after having been e

xposed to discussions on the philosophy of mathema
tics and science with members of the Vienna Circle,
whose conception of logical empiricism was indebte
d to his Tractatus account of logic as tautologous, an
d his philosophy as concerned with logical syntax. D
uring these first years in Cambridge his conception o
f philosophy and its problems underwent dramatic c
hanges that are recorded in several volumes of conve
rsations, lecture notes, and letters (e.g., Ludwig Witt
genstein and the Vienna Circle, The Blue and Brown
Books, Philosophical Grammar). Sometimes termed
the middle Wittgenstein, this period heralds a reje
ction of dogmatic philosophy, including both traditio
nal works and the Tractatus itself.
In the 1930s and 1940s Wittgenstein conducted semi
nars at Cambridge, developing most of the ideas that
he intended to publish in his second book, Philosop
hical Investigations. These included the turn from fo
rmal logic to ordinary language, novel reflections on
psychology and mathematics, and a general skeptici
sm concerning philosophy's pretensions. In 1945 he
prepared the final manuscript of the Philosophical In
vestigations, but, at the last minute, withdrew it from

publication (and only authorized its posthumous pu

blication). For a few more years he continued his phi
losophical work, but this is marked by a rich develop
ment of, rather than a turn away from, his second ph
ase. He traveled during this period to the United Stat
es and Ireland, and returned to Cambridge, where he
was diagnosed with cancer. Legend has it that, at his
death in 1951, his last words were Tell them I've h
ad a wonderful life (Monk: 579).
2. The Early Wittgenstein
2.1 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was first published i
n German in 1921 and then translatedby C.K. Ogd
en, with F. P. Ramsey's helpand published in Engl
ish in 1922. It was later re-translated by D. F. Pears
and B. F. McGuinness. Coming out of Wittgenstein's
Notes on Logic (1913), Notes Dictated to G. E. Mo
ore (1914), his Notebooks, written in 1914-16, and
further correspondence with Russell, Moore and Key
nes, and showing Schopenhauerian and other cultura
l influences, it evolved as a continuation of and react
ion to Russell and Frege's conceptions of logic and l
anguage. Russell supplied an introduction to the boo
k claiming that it certainly deserves to be consid

ered an important event in the philosophical world.

It is fascinating to note that Wittgenstein thought littl
e of Russell's introduction, claiming that it was riddl
ed with misunderstandings. Later interpretations hav
e attempted to unearth the surprising tensions betwee
n the introduction and the rest of the book (or betwe
en Russell's reading of Wittgenstein and Wittgenstei
n's own self-assessment)usually harping on Russel
l's appropriation of Wittgenstein for his own agenda.
The Tractatus's structure purports to be representativ
e of its internal essence. It is constructed around sev
en basic propositions, numbered by the natural numb
ers 1-7, with all other paragraphs in the text numbere
d by decimal expansions so that, e.g., paragraph 1.1 i
s (supposed to be) a further elaboration on propositio
n 1, 1.22 is an elaboration of 1.2, and so on.
The seven basic propositions are:
Ogden translation
Pears/McGuinness translation
1.
The world is everything that is the case.
The world is all that is the case.
2.
What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic f

acts.
What is the casea factis the existence of states o
f affairs.
3.
The logical picture of the facts is the thought.
A logical picture of facts is a thought.
4.
The thought is the significant proposition.
A thought is a proposition with sense.
5.
Propositions are truth-functions of elementary propo
sitions.
A proposition is a truth-function of elementary prop
ositions.
(An elementary proposition is a truth function of itse
lf.)
(An elementary proposition is a truth function of itse
lf.)
6.
The general form of truth-function is [p, , N()].
The general form of a truth-function is [p, , N()].
This is the general form of proposition.
This is the general form of a proposition.
7.

Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silen

t.
What we cannot speak about we must pass over in si
lence.
Clearly, the book addresses the central problems of p
hilosophy which deal with the world, thought and la
nguage, and presents a solution (as Wittgenstein te
rms it) of these problems that is grounded in logic an
d in the nature of representation. The world is repres
ented by thought, which is a proposition with sense,
since they allworld, thought, and propositionsha
re the same logical form. Hence, the thought and the
proposition can be pictures of the facts.
Starting with a seeming metaphysics, Wittgenstein s
ees the world as consisting of facts (1), rather than th
e traditional, atomistic conception of a world made u
p of objects. Facts are existent states of affairs (2) an
d states of affairs, in turn, are combinations of object
s. Objects are simple (TLP 2.02) but objects can fi
t together in various determinate ways. They may ha
ve various properties and may hold diverse relations
to one another. Objects combine with one another ac
cording to their logical, internal properties. That is to
say, an object's internal properties determine the pos

sibilities of its combination with other objects; this is

its logical form. Thus, states of affairs, being compr
ised of objects in combination, are inherently compl
ex. The states of affairs which do exist could have be
en otherwise. This means that states of affairs are eit
her actual (existent) or possible. It is the totality of st
ates of affairsactual and possiblethat makes up t
he whole of reality. The world is precisely those stat
es of affairs which do exist.
The move to thought, and thereafter to language, is p
erpetrated with the use of Wittgenstein's famous idea
that thoughts, and propositions, are picturesthe p
icture is a model of reality (TLP 2.12). Pictures are
made up of elements that together constitute the pict
ure. Each element represents an object, and the com
bination of elements in the picture represents the co
mbination of objects in a state of affairs. The logical
structure of the picture, whether in thought or in lang
uage, is isomorphic with the logical structure of the s
tate of affairs which it pictures. More subtle is Wittg
enstein's insight that the possibility of this structure
being shared by the picture (the thought, the proposit
ion) and the state of affairs is the pictorial form. Th
at is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches ri

ght out to it (TLP 2.1511). This leads to an understa

nding of what the picture can picture; but also what i
t cannotits own pictorial form.
While the logical picture of the facts is the thought
(3), in the move to language Wittgenstein continues
to investigate the possibilities of significance for pro
positions (4). Logical analysis, in the spirit of Frege
and Russell, guides the work, with Wittgenstein usin
g logical calculus to carry out the construction of his
system. Explaining that Only the proposition has s
ense; only in the context of a proposition has a name
meaning (TLP 3.3), he provides the reader with the
two conditions for sensical language. First, the struc
ture of the proposition must conform to the constrain
ts of logical form, and second, the elements of the pr
oposition must have reference (bedeutung). These co
nditions have far-reaching implications. The analysis
must culminate with a name being a primitive symb
ol for a (simple) object. Moreover, logic itself gives
us the structure and limits of what can be said at all.
The general form of a proposition is: This is how th
ings stand (TLP 4.5) and every proposition is either
true or false. This bi-polarity of propositions enable
s the composition of more complex propositions fro

m atomic ones by using truth-functional operators (5

). Wittgenstein supplies, in the Tractatus, a vivid pre
sentation of Frege's logic in the form of what has bec
ome known as truth-tables. This provides the mean
s to go back and analyze all propositions into their at
omic parts, since every statement about complexes
can be analyzed into a statement about their constitu
ent parts, and into those propositions which complet
ely describe the complexes (TLP 2.0201). He delve
s even deeper by then providing the general form of
a truth-function(6). This form, [p, , N()], makes us
e of one formal operation (N()) and one proposition
al variable (p) to represent Wittgenstein's claim that
any proposition is the result of successive applicati
ons of logical operations to elementary propositions
.
Having developed this analysis of world-thought-lan
guage, and relying on the one general form of the pr
oposition, Wittgenstein can now assert that all meani
ngful propositions are of equal value. Subsequently,
he ends the journey with the admonition concerning
what can (or cannot) and what should (or should not)
be said (7), leaving outside the realm of the sayable
propositions of ethics, aesthetics, and metaphysics.

2.2 Sense and Nonsense

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein's logical construction o
f a philosophical system has a purposeto find the l
imits of world, thought and language; in other words
, to distinguish between sense and nonsense. The b
ook will draw a limit to thinking, or rathernot t
o thinking, but to the expression of thoughts . The
limit can only be drawn in language and what lies
on the other side of the limit will be simply nonsens
e (TLP Preface). The conditions for a proposition's
having sense have been explored and seen to rest on
the possibility of representation or picturing. Names
must have a bedeutung (reference/meaning), but the
y can only do so in the context of a proposition whic
h is held together by logical form. It follows that onl
y factual states of affairs which can be pictured can
be represented by meaningful propositions. This mea
ns that what can be said are only propositions of nat
ural science and leaves out of the realm of sense a da
unting number of statements which are made and us
ed in language.
There are, first, the propositions of logic itself. Thes
e do not represent states of affairs, and the logical co
nstants do not stand for objects. My fundamental th

ought is that the logical constants do not represent. T

hat the logic of the facts cannot be represented (TL
P 4.0312). This is not a happenstance thought; it is f
undamental precisely because the limits of sense rest
on logic. Tautologies and contradictions, the propos
itions of logic, are the limits of language and thought
, and thereby the limits of the world. Obviously, then
, they do not picture anything and do not, therefore,
have sense. They are, in Wittgenstein's terms, sensel
ess (sinnlos). Propositions which do have sense are b
ipolar; they range within the truth-conditions drawn
by the propositions of logic. But the propositions of l
ogic themselves are neither true nor false for the on
e allows every possible state of affairs, the other non
e (TLP 4.462).
The characteristic of being senseless applies not only
to the propositions of logic but also to mathematics
or the pictorial form itself of the pictures that do repr
esent. These are, like tautologies and contradictions,
literally sense-less, they have no sense.
Beyond, or aside from, senseless propositions Wittg
enstein identifies another group of statements which
cannot carry sense: the nonsensical (unsinnig) propo
sitions. Nonsense, as opposed to senselessness, is en

countered when a proposition is even more radically

devoid of meaning, when it transcends the bounds of
sense. Under the label of unsinnig can be found vari
ous propositions: Socrates is identical, but also 1
is a number and there are objects. While some no
nsensical propositions are blatantly so, others seem t
o be meaningfuland only analysis carried out in ac
cordance with the picture theory can expose their no
nsensicality. Since only what is in the world can b
e described, anything that is higher is excluded, in
cluding the notion of limit and the limit points thems
elves. Traditional metaphysics, and the propositions
of ethics and aesthetics, which try to capture the wor
ld as a whole, are also excluded, as is the truth in sol
ipsism, the very notion of a subject, for it is also not
in the world but at its limit.
Wittgenstein does not, however, relegate all that is n
ot inside the bounds of sense to oblivion. He makes
a distinction between saying and showing which is
made to do additional crucial work. What can be sh
own cannot be said, that is, what cannot be formula
ted in sayable (sensical) propositions can only be sh
own. This applies, for example, to the logical form o
f the world, the pictorial form, etc., which show the

mselves in the form of (contingent) propositions, in t

he symbolism, and in logical propositions. Even the
unsayable (metaphysical, ethical, aesthetic) propositi
ons of philosophy belong in this groupwhich Witt
genstein finally describes as things that cannot be p
ut into words. They make themselves manifest. They
are what is mystical (TLP 6.522).
2.3 The Nature of Philosophy
Accordingly, the word philosophy must mean so
mething which stands above or below, but not beside
the natural sciences (TLP 4.111). Not surprisingly,
then, most of the propositions and questions to be f
ound in philosophical works are not false but nonsen
sical (TLP 4.003). Is, then, philosophy doomed to b
e nonsense (unsinnig), or, at best, senseless (sinnlos)
when it does logic, but, in any case, meaningless?
What is left for the philosopher to do, if traditional,
or even revolutionary, propositions of metaphysics,
epistemology, aesthetics, and ethics cannot be formu
lated in a sensical manner? The reply to these two qu
estions is found in Wittgenstein's characterization of
philosophy: philosophy is not a theory, or a doctrine,
but rather an activity. It is an activity of clarification
(of thoughts), and more so, of critique (of language)

. Described by Wittgenstein, it should be the philoso

pher's routine activity: to react or respond to the tradi
tional philosophers' musings by showing them where
they go wrong, using the tools provided by logical a
nalysis. In other words, by showing them that (some
of) their propositions are nonsense.
All propositions are of equal value (TLP 6.4)tha
t could also be the fundamental thought of the book.
For it employs a measure of the value of proposition
s that is done by logic and the notion of limits. It is h
ere, however, with the constraints on the value of pr
opositions, that the tension in the Tractatus is most st
rongly felt. It becomes clear that the notions used by
the Tractatusthe logical-philosophical notionsd
o not belong to the world and hence cannot be used t
o express anything meaningful. Since language, thou
ght and the world, are all isomorphic, any attempt to
say in logic (i.e., in language) this and this there is i
n the world, that there is not is doomed to be a failu
re, since it would mean that logic has got outside the
limits of the world, i.e. of itself. That is to say, the T
ractatus has gone over its own limits, and stands in d
anger of being nonsensical.
The solution to this tension is found in Wittgenstei

n's final remarks, where he uses the metaphor of the

ladder to express the function of the Tractatus. It is t
o be used in order to climb on it, in order to see the
world rightly; but thereafter it must be recognized a
s nonsense and be thrown away. Hence: whereof on
e cannot speak, thereof one must be silent (7).
2.4 Interpretative Problems
The Tractatus is notorious for its interpretative diffic
ulties. In the decades that have passed since its publi
cation it has gone through several waves of general i
nterpretations. Beyond exegetical and hermeneutical
issues that revolve around particular sections (such
as the world/reality distinction, the difference betwe
en representing and presenting, the Frege/Russell co
nnection to Wittgenstein, or the influence on Wittge
nstein by existentialist philosophy) there are a few fu
ndamental, not unrelated, disagreements that inform
the map of interpretation. These revolve around the r
ealism of the Tractatus, the notion of nonsense and it
s role in reading the Tractatus itself, and the reading
of the Tractatus as an ethical tract.
There are interpretations that see the Tractatus as esp
ousing realism, i.e., as positing the independent exist
ence of objects, states of affairs, and facts. That this

realism is achieved via a linguistic turn is recognized

by all (or most) interpreters, but this linguistic persp
ective does no damage to the basic realism that is se
en to start off the Tractatus (The world is all that is
the case) and to run throughout the text (Objects f
orm the substance of the world (TLP 2.021)). Such
realism is also taken to be manifested in the essential
bi-polarity of propositions; likewise, a straightforwa
rd reading of the picturing relation posits objects the
re to be represented by signs. As against these readin
gs, more linguistically oriented interpretations give c
onceptual priority to the symbolism. When reality i
s compared with propositions (TLP 4.05), it is the f
orm of propositions which determines the shape of r
eality (and not the other way round). In any case, the
issue of realism (vs. anti-realism) in the Tractatus m
ust address the question of the limits of language and
the more particular question of what there is (or is n
ot) beyond language. Subsequently, interpreters of th
e Tractatus have moved on to questioning the very p
resence of metaphysics within the book and the statu
s of the propositions of the book themselves.
Nonsense became the hinge of Wittgensteinian inte
rpretative discussion during the last decade of the 20

th century. Beyond the bounds of language lies nons

ensepropositions which cannot picture anything
and Wittgenstein bans traditional metaphysics to that
area. The quandary arises concerning the question o
f what it is that inhabits that realm of nonsense, since
Wittgenstein does seem to be saying that there is so
mething there to be shown (rather than said) and doe
s, indeed, characterize it as the mystical. The traditi
onal readings of the Tractatus accepted, with varying
degrees of discomfort, the existence of that which is
unsayable, that which cannot be put into words, the
nonsensical. More recent readings tend to take nonse
nse more seriously as exactly thatnonsense. This a
lso entails taking seriously Wittgenstein's words in 6
.54his famous ladder metaphorand throwing out
the Tractatus itself, including the distinction betwee
n what can be said and what can only be shown. The
Tractatus, on this stance, does not point at ineffable
truths (of, e.g., metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, etc.),
but should lead us away from such temptations. An a
ccompanying discussion must then also deal with ho
w this can be recognized, what this can possibly mea
n, and how it should be used, if at all.
This discussion is closely related to what has come t

o be called the ethical reading of the Tractatus. Such

a reading is based, first, on the supposed discrepancy
between Wittgenstein's construction of a world-lang
uage system, which takes up the bulk of the Tractatu
s, and several comments that are made about this co
nstruction in the Preface to the book, in its closing re
marks, and in a letter he sent to his publisher, Ludwi
g von Ficker, before publication. In these places, all
of which can be viewed as external to the content of
the Tractatus, Wittgenstein preaches silence as regar
ds anything that is of importance, including the inte
rnal parts of the book which contain, in his own wor
ds, the final solution of the problems [of philosophy
]. It is the importance given to the ineffable that can
be viewed as an ethical position. My work consists
of two parts, the one presented here plus all that I ha
ve not written. And it is precisely this second part th
at is the important point. For the ethical gets its limit
drawn from the inside, as it were, by my book; I'
ve managed in my book to put everything firmly into
place by being silent about it . For now I would re
commend you to read the preface and the conclusion
, because they contain the most direct expression of t
he point (ProtoTractatus, p.16). Obviously, such se

emingly contradictory tensions within and about a te

xtwritten by its authorgive rise to interpretative
conundrums.
There is another issue often debated by interpreters o
f Wittgenstein, which arises out of the questions abo
ve. This has to do with the continuity between the th
ought of the early and later Wittgenstein. Again, the
standard interpretations were originally united in p
erceiving a clear break between the two distinct stag
es of Wittgenstein's thought, even when ascertaining
some developmental continuity between them. And
again, the more recent interpretations challenge this
standard, emphasizing that the fundamental therapeu
tic motivation clearly found in the later Wittgenstein
should also be attributed to the early.
3. The Later Wittgenstein
3.1 Transition and Critique of Tractatus
The idea that philosophy is not a doctrine, and hence
should not be approached dogmatically, is one of th
e most important insights of the Tractatus. Yet, as ea
rly as 1931, Wittgenstein referred to his own early w
ork as dogmatic (On Dogmatism inVC, p. 182. Wi
ttgenstein used this term to designate any conception
which allows for a gap between question and answe

r, such that the answer to the question could be foun

d at a later date. The complex edifice of the Tractatu
s is built on the assumption that the task of logical an
alysis was to discover the elementary propositions,
whose form was not yet known. What marks the tran
sition from early to later Wittgenstein can be summe
d up as the total rejection of dogmatism, i.e., as the
working out of all the consequences of this rejection.
The move from the realm of logic to that of ordinar
y language as the center of the philosopher's attentio
n; from an emphasis on definition and analysis to fa
mily resemblance and language-games; and from
systematic philosophical writing to an aphoristic styl
eall have to do with this transition towards anti-do
gmatism in its extreme. It is in the Philosophical Inv
estigations that the working out of the transitions co
mes to culmination. Other writings of the same perio
d, though, manifest the same anti-dogmatic stance, a
s it is applied, e.g., to the philosophy of mathematics
or to philosophical psychology.
3.2 Philosophical Investigations
Philosophical Investigations was published posthum
ously in 1953. It was edited by G. E. M. Anscombe a
nd Rush Rhees and translated by Anscombe. It comp

rised two parts. Part I, consisting of 693 numbered p

aragraphs, was ready for printing in 1946, but rescin
ded from the publisher by Wittgenstein. Part II was a
dded on by the editors, trustees of his Nachlass. In 2
009 a new edited translation, by P. M. S. Hacker and
Joachim Schulte, was published; Part II of the earlie
r translation was here labeled Philosophy of Psycho
logy - A Fragment (PPF).
In the Preface to PI, Wittgenstein states that his new
thoughts would be better understood by contrast wit
h and against the background of his old thoughts, tho
se in the Tractatus; and indeed, most of Part I of PI i
s essentially critical. Its new insights can be understo
od as primarily exposing fallacies in the traditional
way of thinking about language, truth, thought, inten
tionality, and, perhaps mainly, philosophy. In this se
nse, it is conceived of as a therapeutic work, viewing
philosophy itself as therapy. (Part II (PPF), focusing
on philosophical psychology, perception etc., was n
ot as critical. Rather, it pointed to new perspectives (
which, undoubtedly, are not disconnected from the e
arlier critique) in addressing specific philosophical is
sues. It is, therefore, more easily read alongside Witt
genstein's other writings of the later period.)

PI begins with a quote from Augustine's Confessions

which give us a particular picture of the essence of
human language, based on the idea that the words
in language name objects, and that sentences are c
ombinations of such names (PI 1). This picture of l
anguage cannot be relied on as a basis for metaphysi
cal, epistemic or linguistic speculation. Despite its pl
ausibility, this reduction of language to representatio
n cannot do justice to the whole of human language;
and even if it is to be considered a picture of only th
e representative function of human language, it is, as
such, a poor picture. Furthermore, this picture of lan
guage is at the base of the whole of traditional philos
ophy, but, for Wittgenstein, it is to be shunned in fav
or of a new way of looking at both language and phil
osophy. The Philosophical Investigations proceeds t
o offer the new way of looking at language, which w
ill yield the view of philosophy as therapy.
3.3 Meaning as Use
For a large class of cases of the employment of the
word meaningthough not for allthis way can b
e explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its
use in the language (PI 43). This basic statement is
what underlies the change of perspective most typica

l of the later phase of Wittgenstein's thought: a chan

ge from a conception of meaning as representation t
o a view which looks to use as the crux of the investi
gation. Traditional theories of meaning in the history
of philosophy were intent on pointing to something
exterior to the proposition which endows it with sens
e. This something could generally be located either
in an objective space, or inside the mind as mental r
epresentation. As early as 1933 (The Blue Book) Wi
ttgenstein took pains to challenge these conceptions,
arriving at the insight that if we had to name anythi
ng which is the life of the sign, we should have to sa
y that it was its use (BB 4). Ascertainment of the us
e (of a word, of a proposition), however, is not given
to any sort of constructive theory building, as in the
Tractatus. Rather, when investigating meaning, the p
hilosopher must look and see the variety of uses to
which the word is put. An analogy with tools sheds
light on the nature of words. When we think of tools
in a toolbox, we do not fail to see their variety; but t
he functions of words are as diverse as the function
s of these objects (PI 11). We are misled by the unif
orm appearance of our words into theorizing upon m
eaning: Especially when we are doing philosophy!

(PI 12)
So different is this new perspective that Wittgenstein
repeats: Don't think, but look! (PI 66); and such lo
oking is done vis a vis particular cases, not generaliz
ations. In giving the meaning of a word, any explana
tory generalization should be replaced by a descripti
on of use. The traditional idea that a proposition hou
ses a content and has a restricted number of Fregean
forces (such as assertion, question and command), gi
ves way to an emphasis on the diversity of uses. In o
rder to address the countless multiplicity of uses, the
ir un-fixedness, and their being part of an activity, W
ittgenstein introduces the key concept of language-g
ame. He never explicitly defines it since, as oppose
d to the earlier picture, for instance, this new conce
pt is made to do work for a more fluid, more diversif
ied, and more activity-oriented perspective on langu
age.
3.4 Language-games and Family Resemblance
Throughout the Philosophical Investigations, Wittge
nstein returns, again and again, to the concept of lan
guage-games to make clear his lines of thought conc
erning language. Primitive language-games are scrut
inized for the insights they afford on this or that char

acteristic of language. Thus, the builders' language-g

ame (PI 2), in which a builder and his assistant use e
xactly four terms (block, pillar, slab, beam), is utiliz
ed to illustrate that part of the Augustinian picture of
language which might be correct but which is, never
theless, strictly limited. Regular language-games, s
uch as the astonishing list provided in PI 23 (which i
ncludes, e.g., reporting an event, speculating about a
n event, forming and testing a hypothesis, making up
a story, reading it, play-acting, singing catches, gues
sing riddles, making a joke, translating, asking, than
king, and so on), bring out the openness of our possi
bilities in using language and in describing it.
Language-games are, first, a part of a broader contex
t termed by Wittgenstein a form of life (see below).
Secondly, the concept of language-games points at t
he rule-governed character of language. This does n
ot entail strict and definite systems of rules for each
and every language-game, but points to the conventi
onal nature of this sort of human activity. Still, just a
s we cannot give a final, essential definition of gam
e, so we cannot find what is common to all these a
ctivities and what makes them into language or parts
of language (PI 65).

It is here that Wittgenstein's rejection of general expl

anations, and definitions based on sufficient and nec
essary conditions, is best pronounced. Instead of thes
e symptoms of the philosopher's craving for general
ity, he points to family resemblance as the more s
uitable analogy for the means of connecting particul
ar uses of the same word. There is no reason to look,
as we have done traditionallyand dogmaticallyf
or one, essential core in which the meaning of a wor
d is located and which is, therefore, common to all u
ses of that word. We should, instead, travel with the
word's uses through a complicated network of simil
arities overlapping and criss-crossing (PI 66). Famil
y resemblance also serves to exhibit the lack of boun
daries and the distance from exactness that character
ize different uses of the same concept. Such boundar
ies and exactness are the definitive traits of formb
e it Platonic form, Aristotelian form, or the general f
orm of a proposition adumbrated in the Tractatus. It
is from such forms that applications of concepts can
be deduced, but this is precisely what Wittgenstein n
ow eschews in favor of appeal to similarity of a kind
with family resemblance.
3.5 Rule-following and Private Language

One of the issues most associated with the later Witt

genstein is that of rule-following. Rising out of the c
onsiderations above, it becomes another central poin
t of discussion in the question of what it is that can a
pply to all the uses of a word. The same dogmatic st
ance as before has it that a rule is an abstract entity
transcending all of its particular applications; kno
wing the rule involves grasping that abstract entity a
nd thereby knowing how to use it.
Wittgenstein begins his exposition by introducing an
example: we get [a] pupil to continue a series (s
ay + 2) beyond 1000and he writes 1000, 1004, 1
008, 1012 (PI 185). What do we do, and what does
it mean, when the student, upon being corrected, ans
wers But I did go on in the same way? Wittgenstei
n proceeds (mainly in PI 185-243, but also elsewher
e) to dismantle the cluster of attendant questions: Ho
w do we learn rules? How do we follow them? Wher
efrom the standards which decide if a rule is followe
d correctly? Are they in the mind, along with a ment
al representation of the rule? Do we appeal to intuiti
on in their application? Are they socially and publicl
y taught and enforced? In typical Wittgensteinian fas
hion, the answers are not pursued positively; rather, t

he very formulation of the questions as legitimate qu

estions with coherent content is put to the test. For in
deed, it is both the Platonistic and mentalistic picture
s which underlie asking questions of this type, and
Wittgenstein is intent on freeing us from these assu
mptions. Such liberation involves elimination of the
need to posit any sort of external or internal authorit
y beyond the actual applications of the rule.
These considerations lead to PI 201, often considere
d the climax of the issue: This was our paradox: no
course of action could be determined by a rule, beca
use every course of action can be made out to accord
with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be
made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be
made out to conflict with it. And so there would be n
either accord nor conflict here. Wittgenstein's form
ulation of the problem, now at the point of being a
paradox, has given rise to a wealth of interpretation
and debate since it is clear to all that this is the crux
of the general issue of meaning, and of understandin
g and using a language. One of the influential readin
gs of the problem of following a rule (introduced by
Fogelin 1976 and Kripke 1982) has been the interpre
tation, according to which Wittgenstein is here voici

ng a skeptical paradox and offering a skeptical soluti

on. That is to say, there are no facts that determine w
hat counts as following a rule, no real grounds for sa
ying that someone is indeed following a rule, and Wi
ttgenstein accepts this skeptical challenge (by sugges
ting other conditions that might warrant our assertin
g that someone is following a rule). This reading has
been challenged, in turn, by several interpretations (
such as Baker and Hacker 1984, McGinn1984, and
Cavell 1990), while others have provided additional,
fresh perspectives (e.g., Diamond, Rules: Looking
in the Right Place in Phillips and Winch 1989, and
several in Miller and Wright 2002).
Directly following the rule-following sections in PI,
and therefore easily thought to be the upshot of the d
iscussion, are those sections called by interpreters t
he private-language argument. Whether it be a verit
able argument or not (and Wittgenstein never labele
d it as such), these sections point out that for an utter
ance to be meaningful it must be possible in principl
e to subject it to public standards and criteria of corr
ectness. For this reason, a private-language, in which
words are to refer to what only the speaker can
knowto his immediate private sensations (PI 2

43), is not a genuine, meaningful, rule-governed lan

guage. The signs in language can only function whe
n there is a possibility of judging the correctness of t
heir use, so the use of [a] word stands in need of a j
ustification which everybody understands (PI 261).
3.6 Grammar and Form of Life
Grammar, usually taken to consist of the rules of cor
rect syntactic and semantic usage, becomes, in Wittg
enstein's hands, the widerand more elusivenetw
ork of rules which determine what linguistic move is
allowed as making sense, and what isn't. This notio
n replaces the stricter and purer logic, which played
such an essential role in the Tractatus in providing a
scaffolding for language and the world. Indeed, Ess
ence is expressed in grammar Grammar tells wha
t kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar)
(PI 371, 373). The rules of grammar are not mere
technical instructions from on-high for correct usage
; rather, they express the norms for meaningful langu
age. Contrary to empirical statements, rules of gram
mar describe how we use words in order to both justi
fy and criticize our particular utterances. But as oppo
sed to grammar-book rules, they are not idealized as
an external system to be conformed to. Moreover, th

ey are not appealed to explicitly in any formulation,

but are used in cases of philosophical perplexity to cl
arify where language misleads us into false illusions.
Thus, I can know what someone else is thinking, n
ot what I am thinking. It is correct to say I know wh
at you are thinking, and wrong to say I know what
I am thinking. (A whole cloud of philosophy conde
nsed into a drop of grammar.) (Philosophical Invest
igations 1953, p.222).
Grammar is not abstract, it is situated within the reg
ular activity with which language-games are interwo
ven: the word language-game is used here to e
mphasize the fact that the speaking of language is pa
rt of an activity, or of a form of life (PI 23). What e
nables language to function and therefore must be ac
cepted as given are precisely forms of life. In Witt
genstein's terms, It is not only agreement in definiti
ons but also (odd as it may sound) in judgments that
is required (PI 242), and this is agreement not in o
pinions, but rather in form of life (PI 241). Used by
Wittgenstein sparinglyfive times in the Investigati
onsthis concept has given rise to interpretative qua
ndaries and subsequent contradictory readings. Form
s of life can be understood as changing and continge

nt, dependent on culture, context, history, etc; this ap

peal to forms of life grounds a relativistic reading of
Wittgenstein. On the other hand, it is the form of life
common to humankind, shared human behavior w
hich is the system of reference by means of which
we interpret an unknown language (PI 206). This m
ight be seen as a universalistic turn, recognizing that
the use of language is made possible by the human f
orm of life.
3.7 The Nature of Philosophy
In his later writings Wittgenstein holds, as he did in t
he Tractatus, that philosophers do notor should no
tsupply a theory, neither do they provide explanati
ons. Philosophy just puts everything before us, and
neither explains nor deduces anything.Since every
thing lies open to view there is nothing to explain (
PI 126). The anti-theoretical stance is reminiscent of
the early Wittgenstein, but there are manifest differe
nces. Although the Tractatus precludes philosophical
theories, it does construct a systematic edifice whic
h results in the general form of the proposition, all th
e while relying on strict formal logic; the Investigati
ons points out the therapeutic non-dogmatic nature o
f philosophy, verily instructing philosophers in the w

ays of therapy. The work of the philosopher consist

s in marshalling reminders for a particular purpose
(PI 127). Working with reminders and series of exa
mples, different problems are solved. Unlike the Tra
ctatus which advanced one philosophical method, in
the Investigations there is not a single philosophical
method, though there are indeed methods, different
therapies, as it were (PI 133d). This is directly relat
ed to Wittgenstein's eschewal of the logical form or
of any a-priori generalization that can be discovered
or made in philosophy. Trying to advance such gene
ral theses is a temptation which lures philosophers; b
ut the real task of philosophy is both to make us awa
re of the temptation and to show us how to overcom
e it. Consequently a philosophical problem has the f
orm: I don't know my way about. (PI 123), and he
nce the aim of philosophy is to show the fly the wa
y out of the fly-bottle (PI 309).
The style of the Investigations is strikingly different
from that of the Tractatus. Instead of strictly number
ed sections which are organized hierarchically in pro
grammatic order, the Investigations fragmentarily vo
ices aphorisms about language-games, family resem
blance, forms of life, sometimes jumping, in a sudd

en change, from one area to another (PI Preface). T

his variation in style is of course essential and is co
nnected with the very nature of the investigation (P
I Preface). As a matter of fact, Wittgenstein was acut
ely aware of the contrast between the two stages of h
is thought, suggesting publication of both texts toget
her in order to make the contrast obvious and clear.
Still, it is precisely via the subject of the nature of ph
ilosophy that the fundamental continuity between th
ese two stages, rather than the discrepancy between t
hem, is to be found. In both cases philosophy serves,
first, as critique of language. It is through analyzing
language's illusive power that the philosopher can ex
pose the traps of meaningless philosophical formulat
ions. This means that what was formerly thought of
as a philosophical problem may now dissolve and t
his simply means that the philosophical problems sh
ould completely disappear (PI 133). Two implicatio
ns of this diagnosis, easily traced back in the Tractat
us, are to be recognized. One is the inherent dialogic
al character of philosophy, which is a responsive acti
vity: difficulties and torments are encountered which
are then to be dissipated by philosophical therapy. I
n the Tractatus, this took the shape of advice: The c

orrect method in philosophy would really be the foll

owing: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. pr
opositions of natural science and then whenever s
omeone else wanted to say something metaphysical,
to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a me
aning to certain signs in his propositions (TLP 6.53
) The second, more far- reaching, discovery in the
Investigations is the one that enables me to break of
f philosophizing when I want to (PI 133). This has
been taken to revert back to the ladder metaphor and
the injunction to silence in the Tractatus.
3.8 After the Investigations
It has been submitted that the writings of the period f
rom 1946 until his death (1951) constitute a distincti
ve phase of Wittgenstein's thought. These writings in
clude, in addition to the second part of the first editio
n of the Philosophical Investigations, texts edited an
d collected in volumes such as Remarks on Colour,
Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Zettel, O
n Certainty, and parts of The Foundations of Mathe
matics. Besides dealing with mathematics and psych
ology, this is the stage at which Wittgenstein most se
riously pursued questions traditionally recognized as
epistemological. On Certainty tackles skeptical dou

bts and foundational solutions but is, in typical Wittg

ensteinian fashion, a work of therapy which discount
s presuppositions common to both. This is intimately
related to another of On Certainty's themesthe pri
macy of the deed to the word, or, in Wittgenstein's P
I terminology, of form of life to grammar. The gener
al tenor of all the writings of this last period can then
ce be viewed as, on the one hand, a move away from
the critical (some would say destructive) positions o
f the Investigations to a more positive perspective on
the same problems that had been facing him since hi
s early writings; on the other hand, this move does n
ot constitute a break from the later period but is mor
e properly viewed as its continuation, in a new light.
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Related Entries
analysis | certainty | Frege, Gottlob | logical form | lo
gical truth | mental representation | private language |
Russell, Bertrand | Vienna Circle | Wittgenstein, Lu
dwig: aesthetics | Wittgenstein, Ludwig: logical ato
mism | Wittgenstein, Ludwig: philosophy of mathem
atics
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