Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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Whether or not the promulgation of the questioned provision was a valid exercise of Police
Power.
Held:
The Supreme Court declared Section 13 of Act No. 3071 to be unconstitutional for being violative
or restrictive of the right of the people to freely enter into contracts for their affairs. It has been
decided several times, that the right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of the
individual, protected by the "due process of law" clause of the constitution. The contracting parties
may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions they may deem advisable, provided they
are not contrary to law, morals or public policy
The police power of the state is a very broad and expanding power. The police power may
encompass every law for the restraint and punishment of crimes, for the preservation of the public
peace, health, and morals. But that power cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the
state, nor transcend or violate the express inhibition of the constitution. The Police Power is
subject to and is controlled by the paramount authority of the constitution of the state, and will not
be permitted to violate rights secured or guaranteed by the latter.
LAMBINO VS. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 174153; 25 Oct 2006]
Facts:
Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change
the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify
their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of
6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the
1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art
18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to
unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing
initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to
implement the initiative petitions.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative.
Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution.
Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the
Lambino Groups petition.
Held:
According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for
conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of
discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
Direct Proposal by the People
The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time
of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which
renders the initiative void.
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through
Initiatives
The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and
revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may
propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is
a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.
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The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of
Representatives passed the following resolutions:
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the
Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of
Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum
of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the
number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least, one (1)
member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the
convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be
"elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so
as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to
the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in
Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967,
became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in
the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the
general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.
Issue:
Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the
Constitution.
Held:
Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B.
H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they
are hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to
costs. It is so ordered.
As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally. It may not be
contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be
questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer. And the reasons are obvious: (1)
it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if
within the competence of his office, are valid, insofar as the public is concerned.
"The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine
the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof."
Article XV of the Constitution provides:
. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately,
may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a contention for that
purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments
are submitted to the people for their ratification.
From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the
electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators,
even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.
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Held:
The tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is constitutional. The tax under said Act is levied
with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the
threatened sugar industry. Since sugar production is one of the great industries of our nation, its
promotion, protection, and advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare.
Hence, said objectives of the Act is a public concern and is therefore constitutional. It follows that
the Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and
expedient for its promotion. If objectives and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no reason is
seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment.
Taxation may be made with the implement of the states police power. In addition, it is only
rational that the taxes be obtained from those that will directly benefit from it. Therefore, the tax
levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is held to be constitutional.
TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD
[151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-75697; 18 Jun 1987]
Facts:
The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected by
Presidential Decree No. 1987, An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad
powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry.
A month after the promulgation of the said
Internal Revenue Code provided that:
"SEC. 134.
Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed
video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of
five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes
shall be subject to sales tax."
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Issue:
Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its
regulatory and police powers.
Held:
The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power. Police power
is primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, police power may be delegated to
government units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a political government
unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power because it cannot be delegated to them.
It is not a legislative unit of the government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA
to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that grants MMDA police power.
It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with various
national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations and the
private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan
area.
TATEL VS. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC
[207 SCRA 157; G.R. No. 40243; 11 Mar 1992]
Facts:
Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of Virac.
Complaints were received by the municipality concerning the disturbance caused by the
operation of the abaca bailing machine inside petitioners warehouse. A committee was then
appointed by the municipal council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that an
accidental fire within the warehouse of the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties
of the people in the neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the Municipal council
declaring said warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil
Code. According to respondent municipal officials, petitioners warehouse was constructed in
violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a
block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of
200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On
the other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning Article 694 of the Civil
Code
Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional
and void.
Held:
The storage of abaca and copra in petitioners warehouse is a nuisance under the provisions of
Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal
Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is valid because it meets the criteria for a
valid municipal ordinance: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, 2) must not be
unfair or oppressive, 3) must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate
trade, 5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable. The
purpose of the said ordinance is to avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire which is one
of the primordial obligation of government. The lower court did not err in its decision.
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The Baguio water works system is not like a public road, the park, street other public property
held in trust by a municipal corporation for the benefit of the public. But it is a property of a
municipal corporation, water works cannot be taken away except for public use and upon
payment of just compensation. Judgment affirmed.
NATIONAL POWER CORP. VS. GUTIERREZ
[193 SCRA 1; G.R. No. 60077; 18 Jan 1991]
Facts:
Petitioner filed an action to acquire a right of way over the land of Respondents for the
construction of transmission lines. Petitioner was adjudged to pay the full market value of land
traversed by the transmission lines. Petitioner argued that it was only asking for a right of way.
Issue:
Whether or Not the acquisition of the right of way constitutes "taking" and such the case will be
entitled just compensation.
Held:
The acquisition of the right of way constitutes taking. It perpetually deprives Respondents of their
proprietary rights. No plant higher than three meters is allowed below the transmission lines.
Because of high tension current conveyed through the transmission lines, danger to life and limbs
cannot be discounted. The owner of the property is entitled to just compensation.
REPUBLIC VS. CASTELVI
[58 SCRA 336; G.R. No. L-20620; 15 Aug 1974]
Facts:
In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease
agreement with Castelvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castelvi gave notice to terminate the
lease in 1956, the AFP refused. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In
1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in question.
Issue:
Whether or Not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just
compensation should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year.
The requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator must enter a private property, 2) the entry must
be for more than a momentary period, 3) it must be under warrant or color of authorities, 4) the
property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected, and 5) the utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. Under Sec. 4 Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court, just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The
Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides
with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing
of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date
of the filing of the complaint. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in
possession of the Castelvi property, by authority of court, on August 10, 1959. The taking of the
Castelvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must,
therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.
There is no basis to the contention of the Republic that a lease on a year-to-year basis can give
rise to permanent right to occupy since by express provision a lease made for a determinate time,
as was the lease of Castelvi land in the instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of
a demand (Art. 1669, New Civil Code). The Supreme Court, however, did not apply Art. 1250 of
the New Civil Code for the adjustment of the peso rate in times of extraordinary inflation or
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Held:
In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the government
takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal
process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit
against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without
its consent. In the case at bar, since no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back
of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of
the lot to the government, then she remains the owner of the lot. She could then bring an action
to recover possession of the land anytime, because possession is one of the attributes of
ownership. However, since such action is not feasible at this time since the lot has been used for
other purposes, the only relief left is for the government to make due compensationprice or
value of the lot at the time of the taking.
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC
[244 SCRA 272; G.R. No. 119694; 22 May 1995]
Facts:
Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free
Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and
candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all
candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and
their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for
dissemination of vital election information.
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and
magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution
upon the government against the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the
Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec
over the information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard
and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.
Issue:
Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.
Held:
The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media
companies to donate Comelec space amounts to taking of private personal property without
payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of
necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec, considering that the
newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private property for public
use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also
Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the
case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private property
of newspaper or magazine publishers.
REYES VS. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
[395 SCRA 494; GR NO. 147511; 20 JAN 2003]
Facts:
Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane
lands belonging to the petitioners. The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the
expansion of the Dasmarias Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were
relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the
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Issue:
Whether or not Knechts are the lawful owners of the land at subject.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the Knechts were not the owners anymore of the said land. The
Knechts' right to the land had been foreclosed after they failed to redeem it one year after the sale
at public auction. Since the petitions questioning the order of dismissal were likewise dismissed
by the Court of Appeals and this Court, the order of dismissal became final and res judicata on
the issue of ownership of the land. Petitioners contended that they did not receive notice of their
tax delinquency. Neither did they receive notice of the auction sale. However, this question has
been previously raised in the cases which have been already set aside. The court is not a trier of
facts. Res judicata has already set it. The Knechts therefore are not the lawful owners of the land
and are not any longer accountable for just compensation given by the government.
Note: Res judicata is a ground for dismissal of an action. It is a rule that precludes parties from
relitigating Issue actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment. It pervades every
well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is based upon two grounds embodied in various
maxims of the common law one, public policy and necessity, that there should be a limit to
litigation; and another, the individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause. When a right
of fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an
opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains
unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.
To follow a contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of
individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition of the parties to the preservation
of the public tranquility.
Res judicata applies when: (1) the former judgment or order is final; (2) the judgment or order is
one on the merits; (3) it was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; (4) there is between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter
and of cause of action.
REPUBLIC VS. KER
[383 SCRA 584; G.R. NO. 136171, 2 JULY 2002]
Facts:
Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City a petition for expropriation of
portions of two parcels of land owned by respondent. Petitioner needed the parcels of land for the
widening of the road component of J.P. Laurel-Buhangin Interchange in Davao City. The Regional
trial court rendered decision of a fair just compensation for defendant Ker Corporation. However,
it was challenged by Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of
Public Works and Highways alleging that just compensation for site must be reduced. Petitioner
alleged that when the petition for expropriation was filed, the tax declaration of the property
indicated its assessed value at a lower price.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Ker Company was given a decision for fair just compensation.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the valuation for the lot Sites are excessive and unreasonable. Just
compensation cannot be measured by the assessed value of the property as stated in the tax
declaration and schedule of market values. For the purpose of appraisal, the fair market value of
the property is taken into account and such value refers to the highest price in terms of money
which a property will bring if exposed for sale in the public market.
In computing just compensation for expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the land at the
time of the taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint not at the time of the rendition of
judgment which should be taken into consideration. 4 Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the taking or
the filing of the complaint whichever came first. On this matter, the appellate court is correct in
disregarding petitioner's claim.
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Held:
The OPSF is a "Trust Account" which was established "for the purpose of minimizing the frequent
price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustment and/or changes in world market prices
of crude oil and imported petroleum products." Under P.D. No. 1956, as amended by Executive
Order No. 137 dated 27 February 1987, this Trust Account may be funded from any of the
following sources:
a) Any increase in the tax collection from ad valorem tax or customs duty imposed on
petroleum products subject to tax under this Decree arising from exchange rate
adjustment, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the
Board of Energy;
b) Any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax exemptions of
government corporations, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in
consultation with the Board of Energy;
c) Any additional amount to be imposed on petroleum products to augment the resources
of the Fund through an appropriate Order that may be issued by the Board of Energy
requiring payment of persons or companies engaged in the business of importing,
manufacturing and/or marketing petroleum products;
d) Any resulting peso cost differentials in case the actual peso costs paid by oil
companies in the importation of crude oil and petroleum products is less than the peso
costs computed using the reference foreign exchange rate as fixed by the Board of
Energy.
Hence, it seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted
in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF is a special fund is plain
from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general fund; and while
it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains
subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply
with the constitutional description of a "special fund." Indeed, the practice is not without
precedent.
With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that the provision
conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products
provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the general
policy of the law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump
rates, 8(c) of P.D. 1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to augment
the resources of the Fund.
What petitioner would wish is the fixing of some definite, quantitative restriction, or "a specific limit
on how much to tax." The Court is cited to this requirement by the petitioner on the premise that
what is involved here is the power of taxation; but as already discussed, this is not the case. What
is here involved is not so much the power of taxation as police power. Although the provision
authorizing the ERB to impose additional amounts could be construed to refer to the power of
taxation, it cannot be overlooked that the overriding consideration is to enable the delegate to act
with expediency in carrying out the objectives of the law which are embraced by the police power
of the State.
The interplay and constant fluctuation of the various factors involved in the determination of the
price of oil and petroleum products, and the frequently shifting need to either augment or exhaust
the Fund, do not conveniently permit the setting of fixed or rigid parameters in the law as
proposed by the petitioner. To do so would render the ERB unable to respond effectively so as to
mitigate or avoid the undesirable consequences of such fluidity. As such, the standard as it is
expressed suffices to guide the delegate in the exercise of the delegated power, taking account of
the circumstances under which it is to be exercised.
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THE BILL
OF RIGHTS
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Held:
A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an appropriate authority.
However, a warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is
neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle
is merely limited to a visual search. In the case at bar, the guns were not tucked in Arellanos
waist nor placed within his reach, as they were neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a
bag at the back of the car. Given these circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly
searched the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the constitutional injunction.
Absent any justifying circumstance specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and
Arellano, the search could not have been valid. Consequently, the firearms obtained from the
warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. It was also shown in
the facts that the PNP had not informed the public of the purpose of setting up the checkpoint.
Petitioner was also not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election
Code. He was not informed by the City Prosecutor that he was a respondent in the preliminary
investigation. Such constituted a violation of his right to due process. Hence, it cannot be
contended that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he
was not informed that he was himself a respondent in the case. Thus, the warrantless search
conducted by the PNP is declared illegal and the firearms seized during the search cannot be
used as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 is
unconstitutional, and therefore, set aside.
JAVIER VS. COMELEC
[144 SCRA 194; G.R. NOS. L-68379-81; 22 SEPT 1986]
Facts:
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa
in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had
the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984,
the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several
followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men. Seven
suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. Owing to what
he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to
the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were
dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said
body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void
because made only by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as required by
the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, the private respondent took his
oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Second Division of the Commission on Elections authorized to promulgate its
decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election.
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Held:
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge"
as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that
the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance
to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They
should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them
justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his
sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there
would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice
Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal
justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a
judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone
the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are not
orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the
denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge
will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the
basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
YNOT VS. IAC
[148 SCRA 659; G.R. NO. 74457; 20 MAR 1987]
Facts:
Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one
province to another. The carabaos of petitioner were confiscated for violation of Executive Order
No 626-A while he was transporting them from Masbate to Iloilo. Petitioner challenged the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. The government argued that Executive Order No.
626-A was issued in the exercise of police power to conserve the carabaos that were still fit for
farm work or breeding.
Issue:
Whether or Not EO No. 626-A is a violation of Substantive Due Process.
Held:
The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power, because it is not reasonably
necessary for the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. It is difficult to see how prohibiting
the transfer of carabaos from one province to another can prevent their indiscriminate killing.
Retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there. Prohibiting the
transfer of carabeef, after the slaughter of the carabaos, will not prevent the slaughter either.
PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ
[180 SCRA 218; G.R. NO.84818; 18 DEC 1989]
Facts:
Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging
rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose Alcuaz
Commissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be
reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the
power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing.
Issue:
Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.
Held:
Yes. Respondents admitted that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by
administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative. But respondents contention
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The right to hearing, includes the right to present ones case and submit
evidence presented.
The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
The decision must have something to support itself.
Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that is adequate to
support conclusion)
Decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing
The tribunal body must act on its own independent consideration of law and
facts and not simply accept subordinates views
Court must render decision in such a manner that the proceeding can know
the various issued involved and reasons for decisions rendered.
The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise definition of Due Process, it gives
an unavoidable standard that government actions must conform in order that deprivation of life,
liberty and property is valid.
The closure of the radio station is like wise a violation of the constitutional right of freedom of
speech and expression. The court stresses that all forms of media, whether print or broadcast
are entitled to this constitutional right. Although the government still has the right to be protected
against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. The test for the limitation of
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The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations
of an administrative character. There cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and
submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
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(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the
assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
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EQUAL PROTECTION
Art 3, Sec. 1.
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
PEOPLE VS. CAYAT
[68 PHIL 12; G.R. NO. 45987; 5 MAY 1939]
Facts:
Law prohibits any member of a non-Christian tribe to buy, receive, have in his possession, or
drink, any intoxicating liquors of any kind. The law, Act No. 1639, exempts only the so-called
native wines or liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to take.
Issue:
Whether or Not the law denies equal protection to one prosecuted and sentenced for violation of
said law.
Held:
No. It satisfies the requirements of a valid classification, one of which is that the classification
under the law must rest on real or substantial distinctions.
The distinction is reasonable. The classification between the members of the non- Christian and
the members of the Christian tribes is not based upon accident of birth or parentage but upon the
degree of civilization and culture. The term non-Christian tribes refers to a geographical area and
more directly to natives of the Philippines of a low grade civilization usually living in tribal
relationship apart from settled communities. The distinction is reasonable for the Act was
intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non- Christian tribes
The prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to insure peace and order in
and among the non- Christian tribes has often resulted in lawlessness and crime thereby
hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standards of life and civilization. This law is
not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of the enactment. It is intended to
apply for all times as long as those conditions exists. The Act applies equally to all members of
the class. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non- Christians by
reason of their degree of culture is not an argument against the equality of its operation nor affect
the reasonableness of the classification thus established.
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Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime
syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and
Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and
petitioner-intervenors.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation
Command, that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between
the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a
panel of investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a
legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified the panels finding and
recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including
herein petitioner, charged as principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories.
After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations before the Sandiganbayan,
where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting
that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the principal accused are government
officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or
higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their
motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the
word principal from the phrase principal accused in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which
provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not
begun as of the approval hereof.
Issue:
Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners right to due process and the
equal protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for
the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.
Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.
Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was
committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the
determination whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayans or Regional Trial Courts
jurisdiction.
Held:
Petitioner and intervenors posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal
protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing
argument were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every classification made by the law is
presumed reasonable and the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness.
The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must rest on
substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to
existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which
are present in this case.
Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases involving certain public officials
and under the transitory provision in Section 7, to all cases pending in any court. Contrary to
petitioner and intervenors argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong
Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the
Sandiganbayan but also in any court.
There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive
effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is
not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts
and establish penalties for their violations or those that define crimes and provide for their
punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and
other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a
procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all
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Hon. Jose W. Diokno, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, Jose Lukban, in his capacity as
Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation, Special Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I.
Plana and Manuel Villareal, Jr. and Assistant Fiscal Maneses G. Reyes, City of Manila.
2
Hon. Amado Roan, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Roman Cansino,
Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, Hon. Eulogio Mencias, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch, and Hon. Damian Jimenez, Judge of the Municipal (now City)
Court of Quezon City.
3
Covering the period from March 3 to March 9, 1962.
4
Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck.
5
U.S. Tobacco Corporation, Atlas Cement Corporation, Atlas Development Corporation, Far East
Publishing Corporation (Evening News), Investment Inc., Industrial Business Management
Corporation, General Agricultural Corporation, American Asiatic Oil Corporation, Investment
Management Corporation, Holiday Hills, Inc., Republic Glass Corporation, Industrial and
Business Management Corporation, United Housing Corporation, The Philippine Tobacco-FlueCuring and Redrying Corporation, Republic Real Estate Corporation and Merconsel Corporation.
BURGOS, SR. V. CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP
[133 SCRA 800; G.R. NO. 64261; 26 DEC 1984]
Facts:
Petitioners assail the validity of 2 search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent
Judge Cruz-Pano of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, under which the premises known as
No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers,
respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor
vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said
newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged
to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We
Forum" newspaper, were seized. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises
were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said
newspapers were discontinued. Respondents contend that petitioners should have filed a motion
to quash said warrants in the court that issued them before impugning the validity of the same
before this Court. Respondents also assail the petition on ground of laches (Failure or
negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it). Respondents further state that since petitioner had
already used as evidence some of the documents seized in a prior criminal case, he is stopped
from challenging the validity of the search warrants.
Petitioners submit the following reasons to nullify the questioned warrants:
1. Respondent Judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the
applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision
as well as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
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Petition dismissed.
SOLIVEN VS. MAKASIAR
[167 SCRA 393; G.R. NO. 82585; 14 NOV 1988]
Facts:
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners
were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding
of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and,
subsequently, by the President; and (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were
violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining
the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause. Subsequent events have
rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice
sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988.
On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive
Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been
denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.
Issue:
Whether or Not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against
them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the
Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President.
Whether or Not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge
issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if
any, to determine probable cause
Held:
With respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary
investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a
"Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing
counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case
actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All
that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is
so minded.
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional
provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be
authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires
the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence
of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he
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WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials
seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.
MORANO VS. VIVO
[20 SCRA 562; G.R. L-22196; 30 JUN 1967]
Facts:
Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China arrived in the Philippines on November
1961 to visit her cousin, Samuel Lee Malaps. She left China and her children by a first marriage:
Fu Tse Haw and Fu Yan Kai both minors, in the care of neighbors in Fukien, China. Chan Sau
wah arrived in the Philippines with Fu Yan Fun, her minor son also by the first marriage. Chan
Sau Wah and her minor son Fu Yan Fun were permitted only into the Philippines under a
temporary visitor's visa for two months and after they posted a cash bond of 4,000 pesos. On
January 1962, Chan Sau Wah married Esteban Morano, a native-born Filipino citizen. Born to this
union on September 1962 was Esteban Morano, Jr. To prolong their stay in the Philippines, Chan
Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun obtained several extensions. The last extension expired on September
10, 1962. In a letter dated August 31, 1962, the Commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan Sau
Wah and her son, Fu Yan Fun, to leave the country on or before September 10, 1962 with a
warning that upon failure so to do, he will issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause the
confiscation of their bond.
Issue:
Whether or Not the issuance of the warrant of arrest is unconstitutional.
Held:
Chan Sau Wah entered the Philippines on a tourist-temporary visitor's visa. She is a nonimmigrant. Under Section 13 just quoted, she may therefore be admitted if she were a qualified
and desirable alien and subject to the provisions of the last paragraph of Section 9. Therefore,
first, she must depart voluntarily to some foreign country; second, she must procure from the
appropriate consul the proper visa; and third, she must thereafter undergo examination by the
officials of the Bureau of Immigration at the port of entry for determination of her admissibility in
accordance with the requirements of the immigration Act. This Court in a number of cases has
ruled, and consistently too, that an alien admitted as a temporary visitor cannot change his or her
status without first departing from the country and complying with the requirements of Section 9 of
the Immigration Act. The gravamen of petitioners' argument is that Chan Sau Wah has, since her
entry, married in Manila a native-born Filipino, Esteban Morano. It will not particularly help
analysis for petitioners to appeal to family solidarity in an effort to thwart her deportation. Chan
Sau Wah, seemingly is not one who has a high regard for such solidarity. Proof: She left two of
her children by the first marriage, both minors, in the care of neighbors in Fukien, China.Then, the
wording of the statute heretofore adverted to is a forbidding obstacle which will prevent this Court
from writing into the law an additional provision that marriage of a temporary alien visitor to a
Filipino would ipso facto make her a permanent resident in his country. This is a field closed to
judicial action. No breadth of discretion is allowed. We cannot insulate her from the State's power
of deportation. it would be an easy matter for an alien woman to enter the Philippines as a
temporary visitor, go through a mock marriage, but actually live with another man as husband and
wife, and thereby skirt the provisions of our immigration law. Also, a woman of undesirable
character may enter this country, ply a pernicious trade, marry a Filipino, and again throw
overboard Sections 9 and 13 of the Act. Such a flanking movement, we are confident, is
impermissible.Recently we confirmed the rule that an alien wife of a Filipino may not stay
permanently without first departing from the Philippines. Reason: Discourage entry under false
pretenses.
HARVEY V. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
[162 SCRA 840; G.R. NO. 82544; 28 JUN 1988]
Facts:
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This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following: American nationals Andrew
Harvey, 52 and Jonh Sherman 72. Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at
Pagsanjan Laguna respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders
to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to apprehended petitioners at their
residences. The Operation Report read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two
young boys. Richard Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den
Elshout in the after Mission Report read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his
care and subjects confirmed being live-in for sometime now.
Seized during the petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of
suspected child prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex.
Posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found.
Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were apprehended 17
February1988 after close surveillance for 3 month of the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the
arrested aliens opted for self-deportation. One released for lack of evidence, another charged not
for pedophile but working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face deportation proceedings.
On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against aliens for being undesirable
aliens under Sec.69 of Revised Administrative Code.
Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for violation of Sec37, 45 and 46
of Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special
Inquiry III commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988 but was not
granted by the Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988 Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus. The court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending
determination of existence of probable cause.
Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents.
Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners.
Held:
While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of
the state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well being of the youth.
The arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause determined after close surveillance of
3 months. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of articles linked to
the offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles are
admissible evidences (Rule 126, Section12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure).
The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an
absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the
arrest. 2.) Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In view of the
foregoing, the search done was incidental to the arrest.
The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their
arrest and estops them from questioning its validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and
the hearing presently conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their detention legal. It is a
fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not be granted when confinement is or has become
legal, although such confinement was illegal at the beginning.
The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance with
Sec37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised
Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported upon
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board
of Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation against them. Deportation
proceedings are administrative in character and never construed as a punishment but a
preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary
Court proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien
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Petitioners question the admissibility in evidence of the articles seized in violation of their
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. Petitioners aver that while they
concede that Capt. Obrero had permission from Ma. Luisa Veroy to break open the door of their
residence, it was merely for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged
"rebel" soldiers. The permission did not include any authority to conduct a room to room search
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Facts:
According to the prosecution, in the morning of Nov. 17, 1986, PO Jose Luciano gave money and
instructed his civilian informer to buy marijuana from the accused at the Cocoland Hotel. He
actually saw the accused selling marijuana to his civilian informer and that same day Luciano
applied for a search warrant.
About 2pm that day, a police raiding team armed with a search warrant went to the Brgy captain
for them to be accompanied in serving the said warrant at the residence of the accused. The
police was allowed to enter the house upon the strength of the warrant shown to the accused.
The accused begged the police not to search and to leave the house. The police still searched
the house and was led to the kitchen. She pointed a metal basin on top of a table as the hiding
place of died marijuana flowering tops contained in a plastic bag marked ISETANN. The police
also recovered from a native uway cabinet dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in 3 pieces
of komiks paper.
According to the accused, when the police arrived at her house, she saw Sgt. Yte and PFC Jose
Luciano. She invited Sgt. Yte to enter her house while Luciano was left in the jeep that was
parked near the house. While inside the house Yte showed the accused something he claimed as
a search warrant, when someone coming from the kitchen uttered eto na They proceeded to the
kitchen and saw Luciano holding a plastic bag with four other companions. They confronted the
accused and insisted that the bags belonged to her. Accused denied the accusation and told
them that she doesnt know anything about it. She was made to sign a prepared document. She
was brought to the police station and was detained.
The court renders judgment finding the accused guilty.
Issue:
Whether or Not the evidence was properly obtained by the police.
Held:
In the investigation report prepared by Luciano stated that during the search they discovered a
hole at the backyard of the house of the suspect, there was a big biscuit can inside the hole and
on top of the cover a flower pot was placed wherein the marijuana was kept. However, there was
no mention of any marijuana obtained from a flower pot in any of their testimonies. There were
inconsistencies insofar the prosecution is concerned, as to what was recovered and where, the
trial court concluded that these inconsistencies are trivial. There must sufficient evidence that the
marijuana was actually surrendered by the accused. As held in PP vs. Remorosa, Irreconcilable
and unexplained contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses cast doubt on the
guilt of appellant and his culpability to the crime charged.
The claim that the marijuana was planted was strengthen as the police violated sec 7, rule 126
rules of the court provides no search of a house, room or any other premise shall be made except
in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of
the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the
same locality. This requirement is mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution of the search
warrant. Violation of said rule is in fact punishable under Article 130 of the Revised Penal Code.
The document (PAGPAPATUNAY) was inadmissible to the court as the accused was not informed
of her right not to sign the document neither was she informed that she has the right to the
assistance of a counsel and the fact that it may be used as evidence against her. It was not
proved that the marijuana belonged to her. Not only does the law require the presence of
witnesses when the search is conducted, but it also imposes upon the person making the search
the duty to issue a detailed receipt for the property seized. He is likewise required to deliver the
property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true and accurate inventory
thereof duly verified under oath. Again, these duties are mandatory and are required to preclude
substitution of the items seized by interested parties.
The guilt of the accused was has not been established. Judgment is reversed.
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Held:
The NARCOM agents procedure in the entrapment of the accused failed to meet the qualification
that the suspected drug dealer must be caught red-handed in the act of selling marijuana to a
person posing as a buyer, since the operation was conducted after the actual exchange. Said
raid also violated accused right against unreasonable search and seizure, as the situation did not
fall in the circumstances wherein a search may be validly made even without a search warrant,
i.e. when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; when it involves prohibited articles in plain
view. The NARCOM agents could not have justified their act by invoking the urgency and
necessity of the situation because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the
place had already been put under surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to
conduct the raid, then they should, because they easily could, have first secured a search warrant
during that time. The Court further notes the confusion and ambiguity in the identification of the
confiscated marijuana leaves and other prohibited drug paraphernalia presented as evidence
against appellant:
CIC Taduran, who acted as the poseur buyer, testified that appellant sold him 100 grams of dried
marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic bag. Surprisingly, and no plausible explanation has been
advanced therefor, what were submitted to and examined by the PCCL and thereafter utilized as
evidence against the appellant were the following items:
One (1) red and white colored plastic bag containing the following:
Exh. "A"Thirty (30) grams of suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops contained
inside a transparent plastic bag.
Exh. "B" Fifty (50) grams of suspected dried marijuana leaves and seeds
contained inside a white colored plastic labelled "Robertson".
Exh. "C" Four (4) aluminum foils each containing suspected dried marijuana
fruiting tops having a total weight of seven grams then further wrapped
with a piece of aluminum foil.
Exh. "D" Five (5) small transparent plastic bags each containing suspected
dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of seventeen grams.
Exh. "E" One plastic syringe.
Evidently, these prohibited articles were among those confiscated during the so-called follow-up
raid in the house of Rodriguezas father. The unanswered question then arises as to the identity
of the marijuana leaves that became the basis of appellant's conviction. In People vs. Rubio, this
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Issue:
Whether or Not warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful.
Whether or Not petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation.
Held:
Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. Ramos, wherein the Court upheld the
warrantless arrest as valid effected 1 to 14 days from actual commission of the offenses, which
however constituted continuing crimes, i.e. subversion, membership in an outlawed
organization, etc. There was no lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113. This is
because the arresting officers were not actually there during the incident, thus they had no
personal knowledge and their information regarding petitioner were derived from other sources.
Further, Section 7, Rule 112, does not apply.
Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the police station, he neither expressed
surrender nor any statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime. When a complaint was
filed to the prosecutor, preliminary investigation should have been scheduled to determine
probable cause. Prosecutor made a substantive error, petitioner is entitled to preliminary
investigation, necessarily in a criminal charge, where the same is required appear thereat.
Petition granted, prosecutor is ordered to conduct preliminary investigation, trial for the criminal
case is suspended pending result from preliminary investigation, petitioner is ordered released
upon posting a bail bond.
CALLANTA VS. VILLANUEVA
[77 SCRA 377; G.R. NOS. 24646 & L-24674; 20 JUN 1977]
Facts:
Two complaints for grave oral defamation were filed against Faustina Callanta. The City Judge of
Dagupan City, Felipe Villanueva, denied the motions to quash the complaints. Thus, petitioner
Callanta brought the suits for certiorari in the Supreme Court. Petitioner questions the validity of
the issuance of warrant of arrest by respondent, arguing that the City Fiscal should have
conducted the preliminary investigation. According to petitioners counsel, there was jurisdictional
infirmity. After the issuance of the warrants of arrest and the bail fixed at P600, petitioner posted
the bail bond, thus obtaining her provisional liberty. The City Fiscal in this case did not disagree
with the judges investigation, and agreed with the complaints filed.
Issue:
Whether or Not petitioners contentions are to be given merit.
Held:
Based on many precedent cases of the Supreme Court, where the accused has filed bail and
waived the preliminary investigation proper, he has waived whatever defect, if any, in the
preliminary examination conducted prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest. In the case at
bar, it is futile for the petitioner to question the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest,
because she posted the bail bond. Petitioner also erred in arguing that only the City Fiscal can
conduct a preliminary investigation. According to the Charter of the City of Dagupan, the City
Court of Dagupan City may also conduct preliminary investigation for any offense, without regard
to the limits of punishment, and may release, or commit and bind over any person charged with
such offense to secure his appearance before the proper court. Petition for certiorari is denied.
Restraining order issued by the Court is lifted and set aside.
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PEOPLE V. MENGOTE
[210 SCRA 174; G.R. NO. 87059; 22 JUN 1992]
Facts:
The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three
suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila.
A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. The patrolmen saw
two men looking from side to side, one of whom holding his abdomen. They approached the
persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run but unable to
escape because the other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of
them the accused-appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in it, while his
companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken from them and they were turned over to the
police headquarters for investigation. An information was filed before the RTC convicting the
accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness testified that the weapon was among the
articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police including the revolver. For his part,
Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm or that he was licensed to possess it
but instead, he claimed that the weapon was planted on him at the time of his arrest. He was
convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he
pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally
seized and therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree.
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Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal.
Held:
An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure inadmissible in any proceeding
for any purpose as provided by Art. III sec 32 of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of the Rules of
Court, provides arrest without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, (b) when the offense in fact has just
been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating the person arrested has
committed it and (c) the person to be arrested has escaped from a penal establishment or a
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in
question, the accused appellant was merely looking from side to side and holding his abdomen,
according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that has just
been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempt by Mengote in their
presence. Moreover a person may not be stopped and frisked in a broad daylight or on a busy
street on unexplained suspicion.
Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is acquitted.
PEOPLE VS. TANGLIBEN
[184 SCRA 220; G.R. No.L-63630; 6 Apr 1990]
Facts:
Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were conducting surveillance at the San Fernando
Victory Liner Terminal. At around 9:30pm they noticed a person, Medel Tangliben, carrying a
traveling bag who acted suspiciously. They confronted him, inspected his bag, and there they
found marijuana leaves. The accused was then taken to the Police Headquarters for further
investigations. The TC found Tangliben guilty of violating sec.4 art. 2 of the RA 6425 or the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Issue:
Whether or Not there was an unlawful search due to lack of search warrant.
Held;
No. Rule 113 sec. 5 provides the a peace officer or a private person may w/o a warrant arrest a
person when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
In the present case, the accused was found to have been committing possession of marijuana
and can be therefore searched lawfully even without a search warrant. Another reason is that this
case poses urgency on the part of the arresting police officers. It was found out that an informer
pointed to the accused telling the policemen that the accused was carrying marijuana. The police
officers had to act quickly and there was not enough time to secure a search warrant.
PEOPLE VS. MALMSTEDT
[198 SCRA 401; G.R. No. 91107; 19 Jun 1991]
Facts:
In an information filed against the accused- appellant Mikael Malmstead was charged before the
RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in
December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.
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FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Art 3, Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required
for the exercise of civil or political rights.
AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ
[64 PHIL 201; G.R. NO. 45459; 13 MAR 1937]
Facts:
Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of Posts from
issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33 rd International Eucharistic
Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating
that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system of religion,
etc. This provision is a result of the principle of the separation of church and state, for the
purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa, as a
weapon to further their ends and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in
accordance to Act No. 4052, providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the
production and issuance of postage stamps as would be advantageous to the government.
Issue:
Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion.
Held:
What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious toleration. It is
however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in
human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to
his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of
morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052
advantageous to the government does not authorize violation of the Constitution. The issuance
of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious
denomination. They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage
stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the
Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic
Congress. The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila,
being the seat of that congress. This was to to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourists, the officials merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance.
Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church,
any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it was no the aim or purpose of the
Government.
GARCES VS. ESTENZO
[104 SCRA 510; G.R. L-53487; 25 MAY 1981]
Facts:
Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed:
a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of
April. This provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the
construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the said projects will be obtained through
the selling of tickets and cash donations.
b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the
caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his
residence for one year and until the election of his successor. The image would be
made available to the Catholic Church during the celebration of the saints feast day.
These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The
image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after
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Facts:
Fr. Margarito Gonzaga was elected as Municipal Mayor in Alburquerque, Bohol. Petitioner, also
an aspirant for said office, then filed a suit for quo warranto for Gonzagas disqualification based
on the Administrative Code provision: In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a
municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or
compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the
municipality." The respondent Judge, in sustaiing Fr. Gonzagas right to the office, ruled that the
provision had already been impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971. Petitioner on the
other hand argues that there was no implied repeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not Fr. Gonzaga is eligible for the position of municipal mayor, according to law.
Whether or Not the prohibition regarding elected or appointed ecclesiastics is constitutional.
Held:
The court was divided. Five voted that the prohibition was not unconstitutional. Seven others
voted that the provision was impliedly repealed. However, the minority vote overruled the seven.
According to the dissenting seven, there are three reasons for the said provision to be
inoperative. First, the 1935 Constitution stated, No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights. Second, said section 2175 is superseded by the Constitution.
Third, section 2175 has been repealed by Sec. 23 of the Election Code (1971): Appointive public
office holders and active members of the Armed Forces are no longer disqualified from running
for an elective office. Ecclesiastics were no longer included in the enumeration of persons
ineligible under the said Election Code. On the other hand, the controlling five argued: Section
2175 of the Administrative Code deals with a matter different from that of section 23 of the
Election Code. Also, section 2175 of the Administrative Code did not violate the right to freedom
of religion because it did not give any requirement for a religious test.
The view of the dissenting seven failed to obtain a vote of eight members, so it was not
controlling. The provision of the Administrative Code remained operative.
ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR
[492 SCRA 1 ; AM NO P-02-1651; 22 JUN 2006]
Facts:
Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with
Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him
as well. Respondents husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is
still legally married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if
the court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religionthe Jehovahs
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a Declaration
of Pledging Faithfulness under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective
when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
Issue:
Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.
Held:
No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion.
The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our
Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The
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Held:
Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce motion
pictures and exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television.
Furthermore the circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity
expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of
expression.
The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience.
Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would
precisely look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of
any right to privacy. Subject matter is one of public interest and concern. The subject thus relates
to a highly critical stage in the history of the country.
At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that
petitioners propose to film were taking place, Enrile was a "public figure:" Such public figures
were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their right to privacy.
The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional
freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a
requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its
presentation of events.
LOPEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
[34 SCRA 116; L-26549; 31 JUL 1970]
Facts:
In the early part of January, 1956, there appeared on the front page of The Manila Chronicle, of
which petitioner Lopez was the publisher, as well as on other dailies, a news story of a sanitary
inspector assigned to the Babuyan Islands, Fidel Cruz, sending a distress signal to a passing
United States Airforce plane which in turn relayed the message to Manila. An American Army
plane dropping on the beach of an island an emergency-sustenance kit containing, among other
things, a two-way radio set. He utilized it to inform authorities in Manila that the people in the
place were living in terror, due to a series of killings committed since Christmas of 1955. Losing
no time, the Philippines defense establishment rushed to the island a platoon of scout rangers.
Upon arriving Major Encarnacion and his men found, instead of the alleged killers, a man named
Fidel Cruz who merely wanted transportation home to Manila. In view of this finding, Major
Encarnacion branded as a "hoax," the report of respondent.
This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, then edited by Gatbonton, devoted a pictorial
article to it in its issue of January 15, 1956. Mention was made that while Fidel Cruz story turned
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Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," the Court held
that the statements made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a
manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech.
What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive
evil" consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also
the avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the
destruction of the standards of professional conduct required from members of the bar and
officers of the courts, which has some implications to the society.
REYES VS. BAGATSING
[125 SCRA 553; L-65366; 9 NOV 1983]
Facts:
Petitioner sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October
26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta to the gates of the United
States Embassy. Once there, and in an open space of public property, a short program would be
held. The march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such conference. That
would be followed by the handing over of a petition based on the resolution adopted at the closing
session of the Anti-Bases Coalition. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the
exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would
be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally. However the request was denied. Reference
was made to persistent intelligence reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal elements to
infiltrate or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large number of people is expected to
attend. Respondent suggested that a permit may be issued if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum
or any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the general public
may be ensured. An oral argument was heard and the mandatory injunction was granted on the
ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that could justify the denial of a permit. However Justice Aquino dissented that the rally is
violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding of rallies within a
radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes.
Hence the Court resolves.
Issue:
Whether or Not the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble violated.
Held:
Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication
that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. It is settled law that as to public
places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use
dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. There can be
no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on
the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. Time immemorial Luneta has
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions.
Such use of the public places has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities,
rights, and liberties of citizens.
With regard to the ordinance, there was no showing that there was violation and even if it could
be shown that such a condition is satisfied it does not follow that respondent could legally act the
way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged.
A summary of the application for permit for rally: The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly
should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will
take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal
possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public
official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or
to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or
modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached.
Notice is given to applicants for the denial.
BAYAN VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA
[488 SCRA 226; G.R. NO. 169838; 25 APR 2006]
Facts:
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Rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 is at issue. BAYANs rally was violently
dispersed. 26 petitioners were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they
was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. KMU asserts that the right to peaceful
assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of Calibrated Preemptive
Response (CPR) being followed to implement it. KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a
rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them
along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of
their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU
also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along Espaa Avenue in front of the UST and going
towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them
from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them.
Three other rallyists were arrested.
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 The Public Assembly Act of 1985, some of them in
toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They
seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the no permit, no rally policy and the CPR policy
announced on Sept. 21, 2005.
Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that BP 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the
Philippines is a signatory.
They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly
regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice
of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a
public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought.
Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a
curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it
puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without
a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not
mere regulations but are actually prohibitions. Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an
ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from
being void for being vague and for lack of publication.
KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P.
No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the
legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the
Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too
comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain
events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.As to
the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even before the
rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports the policy.
Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the
Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably
assemble.
Respondents argued that petitioners have no standing. BP 880 entails traffic re-routing to prevent
grave public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow of commerce and
trade. It is content-neutral regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public assemblies.
According to Atienza RA. 7160 gives the Mayor power to deny a permit independently of B.P. No.
880. and that the permit is for the use of a public place and not for the exercise of rights; and that
B.P. No. 880 is not a content-based regulation because it covers all rallies.
Issue:
Whether or Not BP 880 and the CPR Policy unconstitutional.
Held:
No question as to standing. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise
the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880. B.P.
880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time,
place and manner of the assemblies. It refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use
public places. The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because
assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and
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The police searched the premises and confiscated twenty-five VHS tapes(among of which is
Kahit sa Pangarap Lang with Myra Manibog as actress who is naked) and ten different
magazines(Dalaga, Penthouse, Swank, Erotic, Rave, Playhouse, Gallery, QUI), which they
deemed pornographic. Petitioners were charged and convicted. CA affirmed the decision hence
this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not the CA erred in affirming RTCs decision.
Held:
No. As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to regulate, the State in
pursuing its mandate to protect the public from obscene, immoral and indecent materials must
justify the regulation or limitation. (Kottinger Rule Applied).
MALABANAN VS. RAMENTO
[129 SCRA 359; G.R. NO.62270; 21 MAY 1984]
Facts:
Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They sought
and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00
P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general
assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place
indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor lobby.
At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the
proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. The same day,
they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was outside the area
covered by their permit. Even they rallied beyond the period allowed. They were asked to explain
on the same day why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then on
September 9, 1982, they were informed that they were under preventive suspension for their
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Facts:
British Horace William Barker (consultant of WB) was slain inside his house in Tuba, Benguet
while his Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza was badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a
robbery. Two household helpers of the victims identified Salvamante (a former houseboy of the
victims) and Maqueda as the robbers. Mike Tabayan and his friend also saw the two accused a
kilometer away from the house of the victims that same morning, when the two accused asked
them for directions.
Maqueda was then arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon. He was taken to Calauag, Quezon where
he signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he narrated his participation in the crime. According
to SPO3 Molleno, he informed Maqueda of his constitutional rights before he signed such
document. Afterwards he was brought to the Benguet Provincial Jail. While he was under
detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail. He stated therein that "he is willing and
volunteering to be a State witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least
guilty among the accused in this case."
Maqueda also admitted his involvement in the commission of the robbery to Prosecutor Zarate
and to Salvosa.
Issue:
Whether or Not the trial court was correct in holding that the Sinumpaan Salaysay is admissible
as evidence.
Held:
No. The Sinumpaang Salaysay is inadmissible because it was in clear violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused. First, he was not informed of his right to remain silent and his
right to counsel. Second, he cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself. At the time of
the confession, the accused was already facing charges in court. He no longer had the right to
remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to refuse to be a witness and not to have any
prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal. And yet, despite his knowing fully well that a
case had already been filed in court, he still confessed when he did not have to do so.
The contention of the trial court that the accused is not entitled to such rights anymore because
the information has been filed and a warrant of arrest has been issued already, is untenable. The
exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section
12(1) of the Bill of Rights are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint
or information but are available at that stage when a person is "under investigation for the
commission of an offense."
Pursuant to Section 12(3) of the Bill of Rights therefore, such extra-judicial admission is
inadmissible as evidence.
As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa, the trial
court admitted their testimony thereon only to prove the tenor of their conversation but not to
prove the truth of the admission because such testimony was objected to as hearsay. Maqueda
voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in
connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the other admission
(Salvosa), it was given to a private person therefore admissible.
Note: a distinction between a confession and admission has been made by the SC:
Admission of a party. The act, declaration or omission of party as to a relevant fact may be
given in evidence against him.
Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or
of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.
PEOPLE VS. BANDULA
[232 SCRA 566; G.R. NO. 89223; 27 MAY 1994]
Facts:
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Things taken: 2 toygun, airgun riffle, CO2 refiller, TV, betamax tapes, betamax rewinder,
Samsonite attache case, typewriter, chessboard, TOYOTA Crown Car Plate No. CAS-997,
assorted jewelry. .22 gun and money.
PEOPLE VS. DY
[158 SCRA 111; G.R. 74517; 23 FEB 1988]
Facts:
Pat. Padilla reported along with Benny Dy, with caliber .38 as suspect to the shooting incident at
"Benny's Bar," at Sitio Angol, Manoc-Manoc Malay, Aklan (Boracay) situated on the Island which
caused the death of Christian Langel Philippe, tourist, 24 years old and a Swiss nationale. He
was charged with the Murder With the Use of Unlicensed firearms. Appellant alleges that he
carried the victim to the shore to be brought to the hospital to save the latter, and who facilitated
the surrender to Pat. Padilla a gun which his helper found the following morning while cleaning
the bar. Accused posted bail which was granted. The accused denied having made any oral
confession alleging that he went to Pat. Padilla not to report the incident but to state that a boy
helper in the bar had found a gun on the sand floor while cleaning and that Pat. Padilla picked up
the gun from the bar at his request. The Accused argues that even if he did make such a
confession, the same would be inadmissible in evidence. He was found guilty in the RTC. Hence
the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not the lower court correct in saying that the constitutional procedure on custodial
interrogation is not applicable in the instant case.
Held:
YES. Appellant's assertion that the gun he had surrendered was merely found by a boy helper
while cleaning the bar deserves no credence for, if it were so, it would have been absurd for him
to have placed himself under police custody in the early morning after the incident. Sworn
Complaint for "Murder with Use of Unlicensed Firearm" signed by the Chief of Police also attests
to Appellant's oral confession. That Complaint forms part of the record of the proceedings before
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga, Aklan, and is prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. Appellant's voluntary surrender implies no violation as "no warrant of arrest is
issued for the apprehension of the accused for the reason that he is already under police custody
before the filing of the complaint." What was told by the Accused to Pat, Padilla was a
spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning, but given in ordinary manner. No written
confession was sought to be presented in evidence as a result of formal custodial investigation.
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Held:
YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated. Firstly, the
complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President
Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary
investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant
and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the
Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911)
prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation
by him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law
is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with
absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable
in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.
GALMAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
[144 SCRA 43; G.R. NO.72670; 12 SEP 1986]
Facts:
Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that
had just landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired pointblank into the back of his head by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a span
of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown
and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that
the military escorts gunned him down in turn.
President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of
people who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and
freedom.
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating
that "the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only
the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was
the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only difference between the two
reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents above-named in the
title of the case involved in the military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would
exclude nineteen of them.
Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.
Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in
the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the
restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to
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Affidavit
1. mentioned 5 assailants
2. stabbing was preceded by a
3. conference by all assailants
4. claimed to have allowed assailants
5. to hitch a ride because Alcantara
6. was familiar to them
Testimony
- only Alcantara was identified
- only 3 assailants had a
- conference
- failed to identify Alcantara
- at the hospital and in open
- court (pointed to another person)
Issue:
Whether or not the rights of the accused was violated.
Held:
YES. The peoples evidence failed to meet the quantum required to overcome the presumption.
The second identification which correctly pointed to accused by Venancio should not be credited.
There is no reason for him to err as they know each other for 3 years. It was also incorrect to give
too much weight to Police Sgt. Awanans testimony as to the previous identification at the
hospital. The testimony of Sgt. Awanan was not corroborated by Venancio.
The identification procedure was irregular. Due process demands that the identification procedure
of criminal suspects must be free from impermissible suggestions as the influence of improper
suggestion probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor.
Conviction must be based on the strength of the prosecution and not the weakness of the
defense. There was blatant violation of the constitutional rights of appellant as an accused.
Appellant belongs to the economically deprived in our society. He is nearly illiterate(third grade
education). Our Constitution and our laws strictly ordain their protection following the Magsaysay
desideratum that those who have less in life should have more in law.
CORPUZ VS. REPUBLIC
[194 SCRA 73; G.R. NO. 74259; 14 FEB 1991]
Facts:
Generoso Corpuz is the Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of
Nueva Viscaya. He was designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the said office. In this capacity,
he received collections, disbursed funds and made bank deposits and withdrawals pertaining to
government accounts. On April 13, 1981 his designation as Acting Supervising Cashier was
terminated and a transfer of accountabilities was effected between him and his successor. The
Certificate of turnover revealed a shortage of P72,823.00. He was able to pay only P10,159.50.
After a final demand letter for the total of P50,596.07 which was not met, a case of malversation
was filed against him. Corpuz did not deny such facts but he insists that the shortage was
malversed by other persons. He alleged that Paymaster Diosdado Pineda through 1 of 4 separate
checks (PNB) issued and encashed such checks while he was of leave. Also, Acting Deputy
Provincial Treasurer Bernardo Aluning made to post the amount on his cashbook although he had
not received the said amount. He was convicted in Sandiganbayan.
Issue:
Whether or Not Corpuz is guilty of malversation.
Held:
It is a subtle way of camouflaging the embezzlement of the money equivalent when 1 of the 4
checks issued and encashed in the same day was entered in the accuseds cash book 3 months
after such encashments. Also, Corpuz claim that he was absent when Paymaster Diosdado
Pineda through 1 of 4 separate checks (PNB) issued and encashed such checks, was not
proven.
Post-Audit is not a preliminary requirement to filing a malversation case. The failure of the public
officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds with which he is chargeable, upon demand by
an authorized officer shall be a prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds to
personal use.
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The equipoise rule(balancing test) which is the presumption of innocence is applicable only where
the evidence of the parties is evenly balance, in which case the scale of justice should be tilt in
favor of the accused. There is no such balance in the case at bar. The evidence of the
prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his claims. The
presumed innocence must yield to the positive finding that he is guilty of malversation.
Wherefore his petition is denied. He is guilty as principal of Malversation of Public Funds.
PEOPLE VS. HOLGADO
[85 PHIL 752; G.R.L-2809; 22 MAR 1950]
Facts:
Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal
detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and
without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado
for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty. He pleaded
guilty (without a counsel) and said that he was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence
was presented to indict the latter.
Issue:
Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court.
Held:
Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be
informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he
desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable
time must be allowed for procuring attorney. This was violated. Moreso the guarantees of our
Constitution that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal
cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by
counsel.
The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused. The record
does not show whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was real and whether it had
reference to the commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No investigation
was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way
of determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the
voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's information
that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with this case.
Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was
not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have
seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel especially because of the qualified plea given
by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court.
PEOPLE VS. MAGSI
[124 SCRA 64; G.R. NO.L-32888; 12 AUG 1983]
Facts:
Soon after appellant was apprehended on August 20, 1970, his arraignment was scheduled
before the Criminal Circuit Court of San Fernando, La Union. The case was actually set and
rescheduled for six (6) times, first of which was on August 1, 1970. On that date, despite
appointment by the court of Atty. Mario Rivera as de officio counsel for the accused, hearing was
re-set to September 8, 1970 on motion of Atty. Rivera, who was prompted to ask for it because of
accused desire to be represented by a de parte counsel. Prior to the next hearing, Atty. Rivera
moved to withdraw as de officio counsel and it was favorably acted on by the court on September
7, 1970. At the second hearing on September 8, 1970, for failure of the de officio and de parte
counsels to appear, despite a second call of the case, the hearing was re-set for the next day and
the court appointed Atty. Dominador Cariaso de officio counsel for the accused. On the third
hearing date, neither the de parte nor the de officio counsel was in Court, so Atty. Rivera was
reappointed that day as de officio counsel for arraignment purposes only. The accused del
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Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused
persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free, and she has been
deprived of that right in defiance of law. We lay down the legal proposition that, where a
prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant
against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year,
the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the
information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.
PEOPLE VS. TAMPAL
[244 SCRA 202; G.R. NO. 102485; 22 MAY 1995]
Facts:
Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon, Samuel Padumon, Pablito Suco, Dario Suco
and Galvino Cadling were charged of robbery with homicide and multiple serious physical injuries
in the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga with Hon. Wilfredo Ochotorena as presiding judge.
However, only private respondents, Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon, and
Samuel Padumon were arrested, while the others remained at large.
The case was set for hearing on July 26, 1991, but Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Wilfredo
Guantero moved for postponement due to his failure to contact the material witnesses. The case
was reset without any objection from the defense counsel. The case was called on September
20, 1991 but the prosecutor was not present. The respondent judge considered the absence of
the prosecutor as unjustified, and dismissed the criminal case for failure to prosecute. The
prosecution filed a motion for reconsidereation, claiming that his absence was because such date
was a Muslim holiday and the office of the Provincial prosecutor was closed on that day. The
motion was denied by respondent judge.
Issue:
Whether or Not the postponement is a violation of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition
of their cases.
Whether or Not the dismissal serves as a bar to reinstatement of the case.
Held:
In determining the right of an accused to speedy disposition of their case, courts should do more
than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of
the case. What are violative of the right of the accused to speedy trial are unjustified
postponements which prolong trial for an unreasonable length of time. In the facts above, there
was no showing that there was an unjust delay caused by the prosecution, hence, the respondent
judge should have given the prosecution a fair opportunity to prosecute its case.
The private respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy. In several cases it was
held that dismissal on the grounds of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would
bar another prosecution for the same offense, but in this case, this does not apply, considering
that the rights of the accused to a speedy trial was not violated by the State. Therefore, the order
of dismissal is annulled and the case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8493 THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
The arraignment of an accused shall be held within 30 days from filing of the information, or from
the date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the charge is
pending, whichever date last occurs. Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is entered, the
accused shall have at least 15 days to prepare for trial. Trial shall commence within 30 days from
arraignment as fixed by the court. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed 180 days from
the 1st day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE TV OF TRIAL OF JOSEPH ESTRADA
[360 SCRA 248; A.M. NO 01-4-03-SC; 29 JUN 2001]
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Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing
the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be
falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional
provision under examination.
Held:
The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely
and forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the
purpose of submitting the latter for comparison. Writing is something more than moving the body,
or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the
application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner
herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the
respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is
similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. We say that, for the
purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to
produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in
both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. It cannot be contended in
the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not
granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a
municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens
of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without
resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right
guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in
evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre
of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.
PASCUAL VS. BME
[28 SCRA 345; G.R. NO. 25018; 26 MAY 1969]
Facts:
Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the Board of Medical
Examiners. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged
immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness the
petitioner. Thereupon, petitioner, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the
constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Petitioner then alleged that
to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of
grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner to
the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only
when a question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged
that the right against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.
Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the
first witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an administrative
charge for malpractice. Hence, this appeal by respondent Board.
Issue:
Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the complainants violates the SelfIncrimination Clause.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for
alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the selfincrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his
consent. The Court found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the
accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to
take the witness stand." If petitioner would be compelled to testify against himself, he could suffer
not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. The
constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence: "The accused has a perfect right to
remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." It is the right of a
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In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with the express consent of
the accused but even upon the urging of his counsel there can be no double jeopardy under Sect.
9 Rule 113, if the indictment against him is revived by the fiscal.
PAULIN VS. GIMENEZ
[217 SCRA 386; G.R. NO. 103323; 21 JAN 1993]
Facts:
Respondent and Brgy Capt. Mabuyo, while in a jeep, were smothered with dust when they were
overtaken by the vehicle owned by Petitioner Spouses. Irked by such, Mabuyo followed the
vehicle until the latter entered the gate of an establishment. He inquired the nearby security guard
for the identity of the owner of the vehicle. Later that day, while engaged in his duties, petitioners
allegedly pointed their guns at him. Thus, he immediately ordered his subordinate to call the
police and block road to prevent the petitioners escape. Upon the arrival of the police, petitioners
put their guns down and were immediately apprehended.
A complaint grave threats was filed against the petitioners (Criminal Case No. 5204). It was
dismissed by the court acting on the motion of the petitioners. Mabuyo filed a MOR thus the
dismissal was reversed. Thereafter, petitioners filed for certiorari, prohibition, damages, with
relief of preliminary injunction and the issuance of a TRO (CEB-9207). Petition is dismissed for
lack of merit and for being a prohibited pleading and ordered to proceed with the trial of the case.
Hence, this instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or Not the dismissal of 5204 was a judgment of acquittal.
Whether or Not the judge ignored petitioners right against double jeopardy by dismissing CEB9207.
Held:
For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case must be without the express consent of
the accused. Where the dismissal was ordered upon motion or with the express assent of the
accused, he has deemed to have waived his protection against double jeopardy. In the case at
bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion of the petitioners. Double jeopardy thus did not
attach.
Furthermore, such dismissal is not considered as an acquittal. The latter is always based on merit
that shows that the defendant is beyond reasonable doubt not guilty. While the former, in the case
at bar, terminated the proceedings because no finding was made as to the guilt or innocence of
the petitioners.
The lower court did not violate the rule when it set aside the order of dismissal for the reception of
further evidence by the prosecution because it merely corrected its error when it prematurely
terminated and dismissed the case without giving the prosecution the right to complete the
presentation of its evidence. The rule on summary procedure was correctly applied.
PEOPLE VS. COURT OF SILAY
[74 SCRA 248; G.R. NO. L-43790; 9 DEC 1976]
Facts:
That sometime on January 4,1974, accused Pacifico Sensio, Romeo Millan and Wilfredo Jochico
who were then scalers at the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, weighed cane cars No.1743,1686
and 1022 loaded with sugar canes which were placed in tarjetas (weight report cards),
Apparently, it was proven and shown that there was padding of the weight of the sugar canes
and that the information on the tarjetas were to be false making it appear to be heavier than its
actual weight. The three accused then were charged with Falsification by private individuals and
use of falsified document. After the prosecution had presented, the respondent moved to
dismiss the charge against them on the ground that the evidences presented were not sufficient
to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on the motion, respondent court issued
its order dismissing the case on the ground that the acts committed by the accused do not
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CITIZENSHIP
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Issue:
Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen.
Held:
It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen,
which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have
himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any
conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption
that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year
1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place
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Issue:
Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the
constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen.
Held:
Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy process
of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the
person concerned resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if
he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored
to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
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