ALBENSON vs.

COURT OF APPEALS,217 SCRA 16

FACTS: Albenson Ent. delivered mild steel plates to guaranteed Industries
Inc. A Pacific banking Corporation Check was paid and drawn against the
account of El Wood works. Check was paid and drawn against the account
closed. Company traced source of check and later discover that the
signature belonged to one Eugenio Baltao. Albenson made an extrajudicial
demand upon Baltao but the latter denied that he issued the check or that
the signature was his. Company filed a complaint against Baltao for
violation of BP 22. It was later discovered that private respondent had son,
Eugene Baltao III, who manages the business establishment, EL
Woodworks. No effort from the father to inform Albenson of such
information rather the father filed compliant for damages against Albenson.

ISSUE: Whether there is indeed cause for the damages against Albenson
Enterprise.
HELD: Based on Art 19, 20, 21 of the Civil Code, petitioners didnt have the
intent to cause damage to the respondent or enrich themselves but just to
collect what was due to them. There was no abuse of right on the part of
Albenson on accusing Baltao of BP 22. There is a legal right or duty
exercised in bad faith for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring other
elements under Article 21. A person who has not been paid an obligation
owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the debtor to pay him. It was
normal for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of the check pay the
amount thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or
bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of
an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to
the payment of damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a
penalty on the right to litigate. (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488
[1986]).

DE LIMA VS. LAGUNA TAYABAS COMPANY, 160 SCRA 70

FACTS: This present action arose from a collision between a passenger bus of
the Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. (LTB) and a delivery truck of the Seven-up Bottling
Co. of the Philippines which took place in June 1958 resulting in the death of
Petra de la Cruz and serious physical injuries of Eladia de Lima and Nemesio
Flores, passengers of the LTB bus. In December 1963, a judgment is rendered
against the defendants LTB Co. Inc. and Claro Samonte ordering them to pay
jointly the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs seek for an award of legal interest on the amounts
adjudged in their favor from the date of the said decision but their motion was not
acted upon by the court. All of the plaintiffs hope that the defendants LTB Co.
and its driver Claro Samonte will be persuaded to make immediate payment to
them as adjudged by the court. Only the said defendants appealed the decision
to the Court of Appeals. They sought for an immediate decision of the case with
a prayer for the granting of legal interest from the date of the decision of the court
and for the increase to P12,000.00 of the civil indemnity of P3,000.00 awarded
for the death of de la Cruz. Potenciano Requijo, as heir of the deceased Petra de
la Cruz, further sought an increase in the civil indemnity of P3,000.00 to
P12,000.00. The Appellate Court denied the motion for reconsideration holding
that since the plaintiffs did not appeal from the failure of the court a quo to award
interest on the damages and that the court on its own discretion awarded such
interest in view of Art. 2210 of the Civil Code, the effectivity of the interest should
not be rolled back to the time the decision of the court was rendered.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the CA erred in granting legal interest on damages to start only
from the date of its decision instead of from the date of the trial court's decision;
2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not increasing the indemnity for
the death of de La Cruz from P3,000.00 to P12,000.00.
HELD:The first issue, petitioners contend that the ruling of the Appellate Court
departs from the consistent rulings of this court that the award of the legal rate of
interest should be computed from the promulgation of the decision of Art. 2210.
New Civil Code, stating that "Interest may, in the petition of the court, be allowed
upon damages awarded for breach of contract." There is no doubt that the
damages awarded in these civil cases arise from the breach of a contractual
obligation on the part of the defendants- appellants. The court deems it just and
equitable. The ruling of the Appellate Court as to the date when the legal interest
should commence to ran. As to the second issue, civil indemnity for the death of
Petra de la Cruz was properly awarded by virtue of Art. 176 in relation to Art.
2206 of the Civil Code which allows a minimum indemnity of P3,000.00 for the
death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier.

DBP VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 445 SCRA 500

FACTS: In May 1987, Juan B. Dans, together with his wife Candida, his
son and daughter-in-law, applied for a loan of P500,000.00 with the (DBP),
Basilan Branch. As the principal mortgagor, Dans, then 76 years of age,
was advised by DBP to obtain a mortgage redemption insurance (MRI) with
the DBP Mortgage Redemption Insurance Pool (DBP MRI Pool). A loan, in
the reduced amount of P300,000.00, was approved by DBP on 4 August
1987 and released on 11 August 1987. From the proceeds of the loan,
DBP deducted the amount of P1,476.00 as payment for the MRI premium.

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not there was a perfected contract of insurance for DBP MRI
Pool to be held liable.
2.) Whether or not the DBP is liable for the entire value of the insurance
policy, as it led Dans to believe that he has fulfilled all the requirements for
the MRI and that the issuance of his policy was forthcoming.

HELD:
1.) NO. When Dans applied for MRI, he filled up and personally signed a
"Health Statement for DBP Pool".
2.) It was DBP, as a matter of policy and practice that required Dans, the
borrower, to secure MRI coverage. Apparently, DBP had full knowledge
that Dan's application was never going to be approved. The maximum age
for MRI acceptance is 60 years as clearly and specifically provided in
Article 1 of the Group Mortgage Redemption Insurance Policy signed in
1984 by all the insurance companies concerned. The DBP is not authorized
to accept applications for MRI when its clients are more than 60 years of
age.

FERRAZZINI VS. GSELL 34 PHIL 693

FACTS: Carlos Gsell is engaged in the manufacture of umbrellas, matches
and that. An salmon Ferrazzini was employed by Gsell as foreman in the
umbrella factory at some point, he was discharged by Gsell so he filed this
case to recover damages for an alleged wrongful ldischarge Gsell, for his
part admitted he discharged Ferrazzini without written advice of six months
in advance as provided in the contract But, he says the discharge was
lawful on account of absence, unfaithfulness, and disobedience of orders
He also sought a counterclaim for further alleged breach by Ferrazzini after
his discharge (that he cannot enter into employment of any enterprise in
the Philippines, during his employment and within 5 years after termination
except when given written permission; if he does, he will Gsell P10k; Gsell
was employed in cement industry Trial court favored Ferrazzini and
declined to consider the counterclaim, so Gsell appealed.

ISSUES:
1.) Was the discharge lawful?
2.) Is the stipulation preventing Ferrazzini to enter into the employment of
any enterprise in the Philippine Islands, whatever save and except after
obtaining special written permission their public policy.

HELD: The discharge was lawful. The Court looked into whether Gsell
had just cause to discharge Ferrazzini. Gsell has to prove justification for
his act because it was in contravention of the six-month clause in the
contract. If it was without just cause, it was in violation of the contract and
Ferrazzini is entitled to recover.
The Court further based the justifications on the testimonies of the
parties: Ferrazini was allowed by Gsell in the morning 10 or 15 minutes
during the hot season to absent himself to have a drink of beer or whiskey,
and the same in the afternoon. For his unfaithfulness, Ferrazzini admitted
saying to persons at supper in the mess hall that Gsell measured the cloth
for the umbrellas, that it is his idea that Gsell has no confidence in his
employees but he testified that he did not remember saying that Speech,
the foreman, was not receiving sufficient salary.

FLORESCA VS. PHILEX MINING, GR 30642 30 APRIL 1985

FACTS: Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex
Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working
at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28,
1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the
mine. Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations, negligently
and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of
the lives of its men working underground. Floresca et al moved to claim
their benefits pursuant to the Workmens Compensation Act before the
Workmens Compensation Commission. They also petitioned before the
regular courts and sue Philex for additional damages. Philex invoked that
they can no longer be sued because the petitioners have already claimed
benefits under the WCA.

ISSUE: Whether or not Floresca can claim benefits and at the same time
sue.

HELD: Under the law, Floresca could only do either one. If they filed for
benefits under the WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a
civil case before the regular courts.
Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts then they would also
be estopped from claiming benefits under the WCA. The Supreme Court
however ruled that Floresca et. Al. are excused from this deficiency due to
ignorance of the fact.
The heirs have a choice but they cannot pursue both choices
simultaneously. The Court however, noted that the heirs only learned
of the negligence report after they have already availed and received
compensation under the WCA; thus they could not make an intelligent
and informed choice at the time they opted for the WCA remedy
The heirs were thus allowed to pursue the civil code remedy but they
are not entitled to recover under both remedies. Any payment they
received under the WCA shall be deducted from the court's award of
damages, if any.

LICHAUCO VS. APOSTOL, 44 PHIL. 138

FACTS:
Lichauco &, Silverio Apostol, as Director of Agriculture, and Rafael
Corpus, as Secretary of Agriculture. It is alleged in the complaint that the
petitioner is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippine
Island Engaged for several years in the business of importing Carabao and
other draft animals into the Philippine and that it is now desirous of
importing from Pnom-Pehn, in French Indo-China, a shipment of draft cattle
and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum.Apostol, except upon the
condition, stated in A.O No. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture, immunized
from rinderpest before embarkation . Lichauco asserts that under the first
proviso to section 1762 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No.
3052 of the Philippine Legislature
ISSUES:
1.)Whether or not the meaning and construction of Act No. 3052 of the
Legislature at its special session approved March 14, 1922, as it amends
Sec.1762 of Act No. 2711,
2. To what extent, if any, it repeals or modifies section 1770 of Act No.
2711.

HELD:
Act No. 3052, which says that the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases
permit the importation, etc., becomes a nullity and is overruled. In legal
effect, it holds that, in so far as there is a conflict between them, the
provisions of section 1770 must prevail over the provisions of Act No. 3052.
That is not good law. In so far as there is a conflict, Act No. 3052 should be
construed as repealing section 1770, for the simple reason that Act No.
3052 became a law about five years after section 1770.The petition granted
with the majority opinion violates every canon of statutory construction.

LORENZO VS. POSADAS 64 PHIL 353

FACTS: On 27 May 1922, Thomas Hanley died in Zamboanga, leaving a will
and considerable amount of real and personal properties. Hanleys will
provides the following: his money will be given to his nephew, Matthew
Hanley, as well as the real estate owned by him. It further provided that the
property will only be given ten years after Thomas Hanleys death. Thus, in
the testamentary proceedings, the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
appointed P.J.M. Moore as trustee of the estate. Moore took oath of office on
March 10, 1924, and resigned on Feb. 29, 1932. Pablo Lorenzo was
appointed in his stead. Juan Posadas, Collector of Internal Revenue,
assessed inheritance tax against the estate amounting to P2,057.74 which
includes penalty and surcharge. He filed a motion in the testamentary
proceedings so that Lorenzo will be ordered to pay the amount due. Lorenzo
paid the amount in protest after CFI granted Posadas motion. He claimed that
the inheritance tax should have been assessed after 10 years. He asked for a
refund but Posadas declined to do so. The latter counterclaimed for the
additional amount of P1,191.27 which represents interest due on the tax and
which was not included in the original assessment. However, CFI dismissed
this counterclaim. It also denied Lorenzos claim for refund against Posadas.
Hence, both appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the estate was delinquent in paying the inheritance
tax and therefore liable for the P1,191.27 that Posadas is asking for.

HELD: Yes. It was delinquent because according to Sec. 1544 (b) of the
R.A.C, payment of the inheritance tax shall be made before delivering to each
beneficiary his share. This payment should have been made before March 10,
1924, the date when P.J.M. Moore formally assumed the function of trustee.
Although the property was only to be given after 10 years from the death of
Hanley, the court considered that delivery to the trustee is delivery to cestui
que trust, the beneficiary within the meaning of Sec. 1544 (b). Even though
there was no express mention of the word trust in the will, the court of first
instance was correct in appointing a trustee because no particular or technical
words are required to create a testamentary trust (69 C.J.,p. 711). The
requisites of a valid testamentary trust are: 1) sufficient words to raise a trust,
2) a definite subject, 3) a certain or ascertained object. There is no doubt that
Hanley intended to create a trust since he ordered in his will that certain of his
properties be kept together undisposed during a fixed period or for a stated
purpose.

U.S VS. PALACIO, 33 PHIL 208

FACTS: Mateo P. Palacio with having violated section 87 of Act No. 82, in
the following manner, to wit: Said accused, on or about the 26th day of
September, 1914, in the municipality of Tacloban, Province of Leyte he
being then and there a deputy to the provincial assessor of Leyte, charged
with the duty of assessing real property, did willfully, unlawfully, and
criminally upon revising the assessment and in reassessing the property of
Francisco Madlonito, situated in the barrio of Di-it, municipality of Tacloban,
omit from the tax list certain real properties and improvements belonging to
said Francisco Madlonito, knowing that the properties omitted were lawfully
taxable; in violation of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty for the provincial assessor or his deputy
who, in revising the assessment and preparing the tax list of real property,
willful makes any omission?

HELD: For the reasons stated in the preceding paragraphs Judge Ceniza's
opinion that the Rules of court have replaced and absorbed section 73 of
the Code of Civil Procedure is clearly erroneous. It may be said that there
is less reason to hold that this section has been impliedly repealed by the
Rules of Court than that it has been abrogated by section 211 of the
Revised Administrative Code; for authority of a judge to try a case is a
matter of substantive law, not embraced by the purposes and scope of the
Rules of Court, which concern "pleading, practice admission and procedure
in all courts of the Philippines, and the admission to the practice of law
therein." (Introductory section of the Rules of Court.)

BOCOBO VS. ESTANISLAO , L- 30458, AUGUST 31, 1976

FACTS:
A Municipal Judge Vicente Estanislao of Balanga, Bataan. a criminal
complaint for libel filed by him with the Municipal Court of Balanga, Bataan,
against petitioner, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1575. Pursuant to such
criminal complaint, respondent Judge conducted a preliminary
investigation. Then came the challenged order to the effect that the offense
charged is one that falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of the said place,
with the records of the case being referred to the Provincial Fiscal of
Bataan for the filing of the corresponding information. Subsequently, the
Provincial Fiscal of Bataan pursuant to such order of respondent Judge,
filed an information for libel against petitioner in the Municipal Court of
Balance Bataan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court had been unwavering in its

pronouncement that the expanded jurisdiction of the municipal trial courts
be exercised over libel cases.

HELD: Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as last amended by Republic
Act No. 4363 that took effect in 1965, insofar as pertinent, reads: "Any
person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication n or exhibition of
any defamation in writing or by similar means shall be responsible for the
same.. . The author or editor of a book or , as provided for in this chapter
shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of
the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published
or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the So it was in the
earlier statute Rep. Act No. 1289 (1955).
The writ of certiorari is granted and the challenged orders of January 15,
1968 as well as of January 27, 1969 are nullified and set aside on the
ground that the exclusive jurisdiction of libel cases belongs to a court of first
instance.