G.R. No.

76217
September 14, 1989
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO VILLEZA, respondents.
G.R. No. 76216
September 14, 1989
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ORLANDO GERNALE, respondents.
Alam, Verano & Associates for petitioner.
Francisco D. Lozano for private respondents.
DECISION
FERNAN, C.J.:
Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are the owners of a parcel of land situated
in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of 232,942 square
meters and covered by TCT No. 50023 of the Register of Deeds of the
province of Rizal issued on September 11, 1980 which canceled TCT No.
56762/T-560. The land was originally registered on August 5, 1948 in the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal as OCT No. 19, pursuant to a
Homestead Patent granted by the President of the Philippines on July 27,
1948, under Act No. 141.
On February 26, 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of
attorney authorizing petitioner German Management Services to develop
their property covered by TCT No. 50023 into a residential subdivision.
Consequently, petitioner on February 9, 1983 obtained Development Permit
No. 00424 from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission for said
development. Finding that part of the property was occupied by private
respondents and twenty other persons, petitioner advised the occupants to
vacate the premises but the latter refused. Nevertheless, petitioner
proceeded with the development of the subject property which included the
portions occupied and cultivated by private respondents.
Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner before
the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, alleging that they are
mountainside farmers of Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal and
members of the Concerned Citizens of Farmers Association; that they have
occupied and tilled their farmholdings some twelve to fifteen years prior to
the promulgation of P.D. No. 27; that during the first week of August 1983,
petitioner, under a permit from the Office of the Provincial Governor of Rizal,

was allowed to improve the Barangay Road at Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro,
Antipolo, Rizal at its expense, subject to the condition that it shall secure the
needed right of way from the owners of the lot to be affected; that on August
15, 1983 and thereafter, petitioner deprived private respondents of their
property without due process of law by: (1) forcibly removing and destroying
the barbed wire fence enclosing their farmholdings without notice; (2)
bulldozing the rice, corn fruit bearing trees and other crops of private
respondents by means of force, violence and intimidation, in violation of P.D.
1038 and (3) trespassing, coercing and threatening to harass, remove and
eject private respondents from their respective farmholdings in violation of
1
P.D. Nos. 316, 583, 815, and 1028.
On January 7, 1985, the Municipal Trial Court dismissed private respondents
2
complaint for forcible entry. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo,
3
Rizal, Branch LXXI sustained the dismissal by the Municipal Trial Court.
Private respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.
On July 24, 1986, said court gave due course to their petition and reversed
4
the decisions of the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court.
The Appellate Court held that since private respondents were in actual
possession of the property at the time they were forcibly ejected by
petitioner, private respondents have a right to commence an action for
5
forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of possession. Petitioner
moved to reconsider but the same was denied by the Appellate Court in its
6
resolution dated September 26, 1986.
Hence, this recourse.
The issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals denied due
process to petitioner when it reversed the decision of the court a quo without
giving petitioner the opportunity to file its answer and whether or not private
7
respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against petitioner.
We affirm. The Court of Appeals need not require petitioner to file an answer
for due process to exist. The comment filed by petitioner on February 26,
1986 has sufficiently addressed the issues presented in the petition for
review filed by private respondents before the Court of Appeals. Having
heard both parties, the Appellate Court need not await or require any other
additional pleading. Moreover, the fact that petitioner was heard by the Court
of Appeals on its motion for reconsideration negates any violation of due
process.
Notwithstanding petitioners claim that it was duly authorized by the owners
to develop the subject property, private respondents, as actual possessors,
can commence a forcible entry case against petitioner because ownership is

not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never

8
determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the
property, private respondents were already in possession thereof . There is
no evidence that the spouses Jose were ever in possession of the subject
property. On the contrary, private respondents peaceable possession was
manifested by the fact that they even planted rice, corn and fruit bearing
trees twelve to fifteen years prior to petitioners act of destroying their crops.
Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the
muniments of title it presented, such evidence does not responsively address
the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be
stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the
party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand,
9
violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can
recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be
the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he
has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully
ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion
10
reivindicatoria.
Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court have rationalized
petitioners drastic action of bulldozing and destroying the crops of private
respondents on the basis of the doctrine of self-help enunciated in Article 429
11
of the New Civil Code. Such justification is unavailing because the doctrine
of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened
dispossession which is absent in the case at bar. When possession has
already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery
of property. This is clear from Article 536 of the Civil Code which states, (I)n
no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as
there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an
action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the
aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DENY the instant petition. The decision
of the Court of Appeals dated July 24,1986 is herebyAFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST
In February 1982, the spouses Manuel and Cynthia Jose contracted
with German Management and Services, Inc. for the latter to develop their

landholdings into a residential subdivision. The spouses also executed a

special power of attorney to that effect.
German Management started the project in February 1983, however,
German Management discovered that the land was being possessed by
Ernest0 Villeza et al who were the farmers tilling the said land at that time.
German Management spoke with Villeza et al but the farmers refused to
vacate the land as the farmers claimed that they have been occupying the
land for twelve years.
Nevertheless, German Management went on to develop the property and
demolished the properties of the farmers without acquiring a court order. In
turn, Villeza et al filed a case of forcible entry against German Management.
In its defense, German Management invoked the Doctrine of Self-help which
provides that:
The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person
from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such
force as may be reasonably necessary to repel orprevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.
(Article 429, Civil Code)
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of self-help is applicable in this case.
HELD: No. The Doctrine of Self-help is not applicable because at the time
when German Management excluded the farmers, theres no longer an
actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation. That actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion by the farmers have already lapsed 12
years ago when they began occupying the said land. In fact, they were
already peaceably farming the land.
What should have been the remedy by German Management?
German Management should have filed either accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria to lawfully eject the farmers.
But the farmers are not the real owners and in fact, the spouses Jose have a
lawful title over the land?
Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in
peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand,
violence or terror. Further, there is now a presumption of ownership in favor
of the farmers since they are the ones occupying the said property. They can
only be ejected either by accion publiciana or accion. reivindicatoria through
which the spouses Joses better right may be proven.

People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389 (1983)

FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by
treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968,
Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during
the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez
from getting into his house and rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap
when he heard sounds of construction and
found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop
destroying his house and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer
responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go
ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun.
He also shot Rubia who was running towards the jeep where the deceased's
gun was placed. Prior to the
shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved
in a legal battle with the defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over
certain pieces of property. At the time
of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers
wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of
the shooting, defendant had leased his
property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to
avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant received letter terminating contract
because he allegedly didn't pay rent.
He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was
barely 2 months after letter. Defendant claims he killed in defense of his
person and property. CFI ruled that
Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation
offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both
murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs,
and to pay for moral damages.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the
fact that he acted in defense of his person.

No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the
house of the defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the part of the
victim. However, this
aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights
to property. On the first issue, the courts did not err. However, in
consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art.
30 of the civil code recognizing the right of owners to close and fence their
land.
Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to
the article because his ownership of the land being awarded by the
government was still pending, therefore putting ownership into question. It
is accepted that the victim was the original aggressor.
2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he
acted in defence of his rights.
Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is
applicable only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates
these requisites:
Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression
towards appellant's property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months
and he should have left him in peace before time was up, instead of
chiseling Narvaez's house and putting up fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code
also provides that possession may not be acquired through force or
intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that every possessor has the right to
be respected in his possession
Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In the
case, killing was disproportionate to the attack.
Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here,
there was no provocation at all since he was asleep

Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the special
mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC.
These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender and passion and
obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not
murder because treachery is not applicable on account of provocation by
the deceased. Also, assault was not deliberately chosen with view to kill
since slayer acted instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of
planning or preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is
reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating circumstances and
incomplete defense, it can be lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to
arrestomayor.
3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable
to pay the civil indemnity due to the offended party.
No. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for nonpayment of civil
indemnity. RA 5465 made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only
and not to reparation of damage caused, indemnification of consequential
damages and costs of proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its
conviction, considering that RA 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not
a habitual delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect pursuant to Art. 22
of the RPC.
Judgment: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances
and extenuating circumstance of incomplete self defense. Penalty is 4
months arresto mayor and to indemnify
each group of heirs 4,000 w/o subsidiary imprisonment and w/o award for
moral damages. Appellant has already been detained 14 years so his
immediate release is ordered.
Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of property can only be invoked when
coupled with form of attack on person defending property. In the case at
bar, this was not so. Appellant should then be sentenced to prision mayor.
However, since he has served more than that, he should be released.