IN

RE: Petition to Approve the Will of Ruperta Palaganas with Prayer

for the Appointment of Special Administrator, Manuel Miguel
Palaganas and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas, Petitioners, v. Ernesto
Palaganas, Respondent, - WALA
G.R. No. 169144,
26 January 2011
Vda. De Perez vs. Tolete
FACTS:
- Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens
and residents of New York, each executed a will also in New York, containing provisions on
presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not known which one of the spouses died
first, the husband shall be presumed to have predeceased his wife).

by adducing additional evidence. He granted petitioner 45 days to submit the evidence to that
effect.
- However, without waiting for petitioner to adduce the additional evidence, respondent Judge
later ruled in another order that he found "no compelling reason to disturb its ruling of March
31, 1986" but allowed petitioner to "file anew the appropriate probate proceedings for each of
the testator"
- This prompted petitioner to file a second motion for reconsideration stating that she was
"ready to submit further evidence on the law obtaining in the State of New York" and praying
that she be granted "the opportunity to present evidence on what the law of the State of New
York has on the probate and allowance of wills"
- RTC denied the motion holding that to allow the probate of two wills in a single proceeding
"would be a departure from the typical and established mode of probate where one petition
takes care of one will." He pointed out that even in New York "where the wills in question
were first submitted for probate, they were dealt with in separate proceedings"

-Later, the entire family perished in a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was
named trustee in Joses will, filed for separate probate proceedings of the wills.

- Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration to which the RTC denied on the grounds
that "the probate of separate wills of two or more different persons even if they are husband
and wife cannot be undertaken in a single petition

-The Petitioner herein, Evelyns mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan.
RTC issued an order, directing the issuance of letters of special administration in favour of the
petitioner making her administrator of the estate.

- Hence, petitioner instituted the instant petition, arguing that the evidence offered at the
hearing proved the laws of the State of New York on the allowance of wills, and that the
separate wills of the Cunanan spouses need not be probated in separate proceedings.

- Rafael opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir according to New York law. He
contended that since the wills were executed in New York, New York law should govern. He
further argued that, by New York law, he and his brothers and sisters were Joses heirs and as
such entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to give. RTC at first
agreed with the Petitioner that the Cunanans heir were collateral heir that are deliberately
excluded; but upon opposition by the said heirs wherein they make mention of a prior
agreement to settle and divide the estate among all the parties, petitioner is now stopped to
lay claim as a sole heir. The case was later reassigned where probate was denied and the case
should have been given finality.
- Petitioner filed a motion to resume proceedings on account of the final settlement and
termination of the probate cases in New York. Then after, the petitioner herein filed a motion
praying for the reconsideration of the previous decision on the strength of the Order granting
her a period of 15 days upon arrival in the country within which to act on the denial of probate
of the wills of the Cunanan spouses;
- The other heirs filed a motion for reconsideration based on lack of notice to their lawyer, to
which the RTC denied but however, respondent Judge said that the documents did not
establish the law of New York on the procedure and allowance of wills that further evidence
was needed. Petitioner filed a motion to allow her to present further evidence on the foreign
law. After the hearing of the motion, respondent Judge issued an order wherein he conceded
that insufficiency of evidence to prove the foreign law was not a fatal defect and was curable

ISSUES:
1. W/N notice must be given.
2. W/N Joint probate of the wills be allowed.

HELD:
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact - petitioner
has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does
not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of
the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded
respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or
formal party.
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice
thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of
Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should
be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first
time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and
notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator
resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required. The
brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to

notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for
proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be
effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the
Philippines:

ANCHETA v. GUERSEY-DALAYGON
FACTS:
1)
2)
3)

Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place
in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his
country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.

4)

Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by
Philippine laws is imperative. The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills
which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of
the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign
country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country;
(4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country
on procedure and allowance of wills; Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner
submitted all the needed evidence.

6)

The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the
foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
them

10)
11)

Thus the SC cited that there is merit in petitioners insistence that the separate wills of the
Cunanan spouses should be probated jointly. RTCs view that the Rules on allowance of wills is
couched in singular terms and therefore should be interpreted to mean that there should be
separate probate proceedings for the wills of the Cunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic
an approach. Such view overlooks the provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which advise that the rules shall be "liberally construed in order to promote their object
and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding."

5)

7)
8)
9)

12)
13)
14)
15)
16)

Thus order is set aside and the Petitioner may present her evidence.

17)
18)
19)

20)

21)
22)

Spouses Audrey ONeill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens
who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years.
They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle).
On July 29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving a will bequeathing her entire estate to Richard, who
was also designated as executor.
The will was admitted to probate before the Orphans Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A,
which named James N. Phillips as executor due to Richards renunciation of his
2
appointment.
The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta (petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta
3
Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator.
In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two
children, namely, Kimberly and Kevin.
On October 12, 1982, Audreys will was also admitted to probate by the then CFI Rizal.
On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to
respondent, save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he
left to Kyle.
The will was also admitted to probate by the Orphans Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland,
U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated
Atty. William Quasha or any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law
Offices, as ancillary administrator.
Richards will was then submitted for probate before the RTC of Makati.
On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of
Audrey, and a project of partition of Audreys estate.
The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court.
Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Makati issued TCT in the names of the Estate of W.
13
Richard Guersey and Kyle.
Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding No. M-888 also filed a project
2
of partition wherein /5 of Richards undivided interest in the Makati property was
3
allocated to respondent, while /5 thereof were allocated to Richards three children.
This was opposed by respondent on the ground that under the law of the State of
Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the
14
property subject of the legacy."
The trial court found merit in respondents opposition, and disapproved the project of
partition insofar as it affects the Makati property.
On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an amended
complaint.
Respondent contended that petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty when he
disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland on the distribution of Audreys estate in
accordance with her will.
Respondent argued that since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then the Makati
property should be wholly adjudicated to him.
On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial courts
Orders.
Petitioner filed MR, but this was denied by the CA.
Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether it is the national law of the decedent that is applicable in this case, hence, petitioner
should have distributed Aubreys estate in accordance with the terms of her will

RULING: YES. Petitioners failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audreys estate according
to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the
CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.
It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. During the
reprobate of her will in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was shown, among others, that at the time of
Audreys death, she was residing in the Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last Will
and Testament dated August 18, 1972 was executed and probated before the Orphans Court in
Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly authenticated and certified by the Register of Wills of
Baltimore City and attested by the Chief Judge of said court; the will was admitted by the Orphans
Court of Baltimore City on September 7, 1979; and the will was authenticated by the Secretary of State
of Maryland and the Vice Consul of the Philippine Embassy.
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audreys will, especially with regard as to who are her
heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of
the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may
be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
(Emphasis supplied)
Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
nation of the decedent."
As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will Proved Outside the
Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters
testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of
administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the
payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so
far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law
in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or
country. (Emphasis supplied)
While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
37
take judicial notice of them; however, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audreys estate, was
38
duty-bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.
Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of Maryland on Estates
and Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such law is the same as the Philippine law on
wills and succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally disregarded
the terms of Audreys will. The obvious result was that there was no fair submission of the case before
the trial court or a judicious appreciation of the evidence presented.

The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was made to prove the national law of Audrey ONeill
Guersey during the proceedings before the court a quo. While there is claim of good faith in
distributing the subject estate in accordance with the Philippine laws, the defendant appears to put his
actuations in a different light as indicated in a portion of his direct examination.
Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Anchetas action appears to have breached
his duties and responsibilities as ancillary administrator of the subject estate. While such breach of
duty admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances, the fiduciary
nature of the said defendants position, as well as the resultant frustration of the decedents last
will, combine to create a circumstance that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo H.
Anchetas omission to prove the national laws of the decedent and to follow the latters last will, in
sum, resulted in the procurement of the subject orders without a fair submission of the real issues
41
involved in the case.
The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in Special Proceeding No. M-888 noted the law of
the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, as follows:
Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the Annotated Code of the Public General Laws of Maryland
on Estates and Trusts, "all property of a decedent shall be subject to the estate of decedents law, and
upon his death shall pass directly to the personal representative, who shall hold the legal title for
administration and distribution," while Section 4-408 expressly provides that "unless a contrary intent
is expressly indicated in the will, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the
property which is the subject of the legacy". Section 7-101, Title 7, Sub-Title 1, on the other hand,
declares that "a personal representative is a fiduciary" and as such he is "under the general duty to
settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of the will and the estate
of decedents law as expeditiously and with as little sacrifice of value as is reasonable under the
43
circumstances".
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision
of the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold that
the pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be
taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the
project of partition.
In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of Maryland has been brought to record before
the CA, and the trial court in Special Proceeding No. M-888 appropriately took note of the same in
disapproving the proposed project of partition of Richards estate, not to mention that petitioner or
any other interested person for that matter, does not dispute the existence or validity of said law, then
Audreys and Richards estate should be distributed according to their respective wills, and not
according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. Consequently, the entire Makati property
belongs to respondent.

Testate Estate of Idonah Slade Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated

FACTS:
Idonah Slade Perkins died in NYC on 27 March 1960.
Her domiciliary administrator was the County Trust Company of NY.
Her ancillary administrator was Renato Tayag.
Renato Tayag requested that the domiciliary administrator surrender the
decedent's stock certificates in a Philippine corporation, Benguet Consolidated, to
satisfy the legitimate claims of local creditors.
The TC then issued an order compelling the domiciliary administrator to
comply.
Benguet Consolidated appealed therefrom to the SC, challenging the order
compelling the domiciliary administrator to surrender the aforementioned stock
certificates.
ISSUE:

In re: Testate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY. SILVINO SUNTAY, petitioner-
appellant,
vs.
In re: Intestate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY,
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, administrator-appellee.
G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088
July 31, 1954

FACTS:
1.

2.

Whether or not the TC erred in ordering the domiciliary administrator to

surrender the stock certificates in the corporation, Benguet Consolidated.
HELD: NO.
The SC explained the scope of power afforded the ancillary administrator
by referring to previous jurisprudence. Citing Justice Malcolm, the SC pointed out
that where a person dies intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as
well as in a foreign country, administration is had in both countries.
The administrator located in the decedent's last domicile is the
PRINCIPAL ADMINISTRATOR.
The one located in the Philippines is the ANCILLARY
ADMINISTRATOR.
This distinction is important because a grant of administration does not ex
proprio vigore (i.e. by its own force) have any effect beyond the limits of the JD
of the country in which it is granted.
Hence, a principal administrator cannot act beyond the confines of the
decedent's last domicile; the ancillary administrator shall act in all matters
concerning the property of the decedent's estate located in the Philippines.
In this case, appellant Benguet Consolidated is a domestic corporation. As
such, the principal administrator (located in NY) must respect the ancillary
administrator's right to the corporation's stock certificates, for the reason that the
latter's scope of power covers the decedent's property located in the Philippines.
Hence, the TC did not err in ordering the principal administrator to surrender the
stock certificates in Benguet Consolidated.

3.

4.

Jose Suntay, Filipino and resident of the Philippines, died in the city of Amoy
Fookien, China leaving real and personal properties in the Philippines and Amoy
Fookien China and children from first marriage with the late Manuela and a child
nd
Silvino by 2 marriage.
Intestate proceedings were instituted, letters of administration were instituted in
st
Bulacan and after hearing they were issued to Apolonio Suntay (child 1
marriage)
The surviving widow filed a petition in CFI Bulacan for the probate of the last will
and testament claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines by
the deceased.
a. This petition was denied because the loss of said will after the filing of
the petition and before hearing and insufficiency of evidence to
establish the loss.
This is an appeal from a decree of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
disallowing the alleged will and testament executed in Manila on November
1929, and the alleged last will and testament executed in Kulangsu, Amoy, China,
on 4 January 1931, by Jose B. Suntay. The value of the estate left by the deceased
is more than P50,000.

ISSUE: WoN the loss of the will was sufficiently established by evidence
HELD: NO
As to the alleged will and testament executed in Manila -

The witnesses who testified to the provisions of the lost will are Go Toh, an
attesting witness, Anastacio Teodoro and Ana Suntay.
o Go Toh testifies that he was one of the witnesses to the lost will
consisting of twenty-three sheets signed by Jose B. Suntay at the
bottom of the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of
Alberto Barretto, Manuel Lopez and himself and underneath the
testator's signature the attesting witnesses signed and each of them

signed the attestation clause and each and every page of the will in the
presence of the testator and of the other witnesses;
!
At any rate, all of Go Toh's testimony by deposition on the
provisions of the alleged lost will is hearsay, because he came
to know or he learned to them from information given him by
Jose B. Suntay and from reading the translation of the draft
(Exhibit B) into Chinese.
o Ana Suntay testifies that she saw her brother Apolonio Suntay read the
document in her presence and of Manuel and learned of the
adjudication made in the will by her father of his estate, On cross-
examination, she testifies that she read the part of the will on
adjudication to know what was the share of each heir
The testimonies fall short of the legal requirement that the provisions of the lost
will must be "clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses."
Credible witnesses mean competent witnesses and those who testify to facts
from or upon hearsay are neither competent nor credible witnesses.

As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in Amoy, China, the law
on the point in Rule 78.
o

The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate
court must be proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or
allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for the
execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by
competent evidence. There is no proof on these points.
The unverified answers to the questions propounded by counsel for the
appellant to the Consul General of the Republic of China are
inadmissible, because apart from the fact that the office of Consul
General does not qualify and make the person who holds it an expert
on the Chinese law on procedure in probate matters, if the same be
admitted, the adverse party would be deprived of his right to confront
and cross-examine the witness.
Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal
district court of Amoy were for the purpose of taking the testimony of
two attesting witnesses to the will and that the order of the municipal
district court of Amoy does not purport to probate the will. In the
absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate
court and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may
be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating or
allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the a deposition or to a
perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so it does not measure
same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a

proceedings in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal

notice or by publication or both to all interested parties must be made.
The interested parties in the case were known to reside in the
Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice was received by
the interested parties residing in the Philippines
In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said
to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and
fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and
allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of
proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot
be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or
allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be
allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of this country.

Edgar Y. Teves, Petitioner, vs. The Commission on

Elections and Herminio G. Teves, Respondents WALA
G.R. No. 180363
28 April 2009.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand Marcos II

and Imelda R. Marcos - WALA
G.R. Nos. 130371 &130855
04 Aug. 2009


ROMAN OZAETA, ROSA GONZALES VDA. DE PALANCA, JUSTO G. PALANCA, LEONARDA
PALANCA DE ARANAS, SEVERINA G. PALANCA, CARLOS PALANCA, JR., ANTONIO G.
PALANCA, MACARIO G. PALANCA, MILAGROS PALANCA DE FURER, and RAMON G.
PALANCA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE POTENCIANO PECSON, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, respondents
Facts:

Carlos Palanca died on September 2, 1950; leaving a will executed by him

o petitioner Roman Ozaeta, former associate justice of this Court, was
named executor if General Manuel A. Roxas fails to qualify
o General Roxas having died previously, petitioner presented a petition
for the probate of the will, at the same time praying that he be
appointed special administrator
Some of the heirs of the decedent opposed this petition
o the court appointed the Philippine Trust Company, a non-applicant and
a stranger to the proceedings, special administrator
Philippine Trust Company presented a petition to resign as special administrator
on the ground of incompatibility of interest, as it had granted a loan to heir Angel
Palanca, who had pledged to it shares of the Far Eastern University allegedly
belonging to the estate of the deceased
o the court appointed Sebastian Palanca, one of the heirs, to take the
place of the Philippine Trust Company
But on October 23rd, the court rendered an order admitting the will to probate
and appointing petitioner as administrator
And on October 25, 1951, the court allowed the Philippine Trust Company to
resign, reconsidered its order appointing Sebastian Palanca special administrator,
and appointed instead the Bank of the Philippine Islands
o Petitioner moved to reconsider the order, but his motion was denied

issued in favor of petitioner during the pendency of the appeal from the order admitting
the will to probate
Ratio:
It should be noted at the outset that Rule 81 of the Rules of Court, under the provisions of
which the order appealed from was made, grants discretion to the probate court to appoint
or not to appoint a special administrator. It is silent as to the person that may be appointed
as special administrator, unlike section 6 of Rule 79, which expressly gives the order of
preference of the persons that may be appointed regular administrator.
We have held in the case of Roxas vs. Pecson, however, that the appointment of special
administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the appointment of regular
administrators. But we further held, however, that while the choice of the person lies
within the court's discretion, such discretion should not be a whimsical one, but one that is
reasonable and logical and in accord with fundamental legal principles and justice. The fact
that a judge is granted discretion does not authorize him to become partial, or to make his
personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Such discretion
must be based on reason and legal principle, and it must be exercised within the limits
thereof.
Under these circumstances, it would seem unreasonable to refuse to appoint the petitioner
as special administrator. To do so would be delaying the fulfillment of the wishes of the
testator and subjecting the estate to unnecessary expense
The case of In re Erlanger's Estate, 242 N.Y.S. 249, also reiterates the same principle.

The courts have always respected the right to which a testator enjoys to determine who is
most suitable to settle his testamentary affairs, and his solemn selection should not lightly
be disregarded. After the admission of a will to probate, the courts will not name a better
executor for the testator nor disqualify, by a judicial veto, the widow or friend or other
person selected in the will, except upon strict proof of the statutory grounds of
incompetency

Issue: W/N the court has discretion to choose the special administrator and is not
bound to appoint the person named therein as executor, because the order had been
appealed

Held:

The writ prayed for is, therefore, granted, the appealed order reversed, and the temporary
injunction issued by the court made absolute. Let temporary letters of administration be

Cynthia Nittscher, Petitioner vs.

Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher (deceased), Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales and the RTC
of Makati (Branch 59), Respondents
Facts:
-

-
-

-
-

On January 31, 1990, Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed with the RTC
of Makati City a petition for the probate of his holographic will and for
the issuance of letters testamentary to herein respondent Atty. Rogelio P.
Nogales
On September 19, 1991, the probate court allowed the probate of the
will
On September 26, 1994, Dr. Nittscher died. Hence, Atty. Nogales filed a
petition for letters testamentary for the administration of the estate of
the deceased
However, herein Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the petition. This
was denied by the court and thus, granted Respondents petition for
issuance of letters testamentary
MR was denied for lack of merit
Petitioner appealed to the CA arguing that the RTC had no jurisdiction.
The appeal was dismissed. MR of the dismissal of the appeal was likewise
denied
Hence the present motion
o Petitioner contends that respondents petition for the issuance of
letters testamentary lacked a certification against forum-
shopping
o Further argues that the RTC had no jurisdiction because the
deceased was not a resident of the Philippines nor did he leave
real properties in the country
o Lastly, she argues that the properties listed for disposition
belong to her and she was denied due process

Issue/Held:
-

W/N the letters testamentary was validly issued / YES

Ratio:
-

st

1 argument:

The petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is not an

initiatory pleading, but a mere continuation of the original
petition for the probate of Dr. Nittschers will. Hence,
respondents failure to include a certification against forum-
shopping in his petition for the issuance of letters testamentary
is not a ground for outright dismissal of the said petition
nd
2 argument:
o SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he
is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of any province in which he had
estate. (Emphasis supplied.)
o In this case, the RTC and the Court of Appeals are one in their
finding that Dr. Nittscher was a resident of Las Pias, Metro
Manila at the time of his death
o Hence, applying the aforequoted rule, Dr. Nittscher correctly
filed in the RTC of Makati City, which then covered Las Pias,
Metro Manila, the petition for the probate of his will and for the
issuance of letters testamentary to respondent
rd
th
3 and 4 argument:
o We note that the deceased asked for the allowance of his own
will.
! SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be
notified by mail or personally. ... If the testator asks
for the allowance of his own will, notice shall be sent
only to his compulsory heirs
o In this case, records show that petitioner, with whom Dr.
Nittscher had no child, and Dr. Nittschers children from his
previous marriage were all duly notified, by registered mail, of
the probate proceedings
o Petitioner even appeared in court to oppose respondents
petition for the issuance of letters testamentary and she also
filed a motion to dismiss the said petition
o

We are convinced petitioner was accorded every opportunity to

defend her cause. Therefore, petitioners allegation that she
was denied due process in the probate proceedings is without
basis
As a final word, petitioner should realize that the allowance of her
husbands will is conclusive only as to its due execution. Thus, petitioners
claim of title to the properties forming part of her husbands estate
should be settled in an ordinary action before the regular courts
Petition is DENIED
o

COMMON LAW or 2nd

MARRIAGE
Gregorio Ventura +
Juana Cardona

Maria Ventura
(appellant,
"illegit child")

Miguel Ventura
(illegit child)

Testate Estate of the late Gregorio Ventura v. Ventura (1988)
Case Doctrine: In case a named executrix and/or administratix is found
to be incompetent, then the surviving husband or wife, as the case may
be should be the new administrator OR the nearest of kin OR both.

1ST MARRIAGE
Gregorio Ventura
+ Paulina Simpliciano

Facts:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija, Guimba, Branch V in Special Proceedings No. 812, Testate of
the late Gregorio Venture, dated October 5, 1965, removing the
appellant Maria Ventura as executrix and administratrix of the estate of
the late Gregorio Ventura, and in her place appointing the appellees
Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura as joint administratrices of the
estate.

Mercedes
(appellee, legit
child)

Gregoria
(appelle, legit
child)

The paternity of Maria and Miguel were denied by Gregorio in

his will.
In 1953, Gregorio filed a petition for the probate of his will,
which did not include Maria and Miguel. In the will, Maria was named
and appointed by Gregorio (testator) to be the executrix of his will and
administratix of his estate. Gregorios will was admitted probate on
January 14, 1954, and he died on September 26, 1955. Maria then filed a
motion for her appointment as executrix and for the issuance of letters

testamentary in her favor. She was then appointed, and the letters
testamentary were issued in her favor.

Maria then submitted an inventory of Gregorios estate, she filed
her accounts of administration from 1955-1960. The accounts were
oppsed by Mercedes and Gregoria (legitimate children). They assailed
the veracity of the report, as it is not the true income of the estate, and
such expenses are not administration expenses.
But on January 25, 1961, Maria Ventura filed a motion to hold in
abeyance the approval of the accounts of administration or to have
their approval without the opposition of the spouses Mercedes Ventura
and Pedro Corpuz and Gregoria Ventura and Exequiel Victorio on the
ground that the question of the paternity of Mercedes Ventura and
Gregoria Ventura is still pending final determination before the
Supreme Court and that should they be adjudged the adulterous
children of testator, as claimed, they are not entitled to inherit nor to
oppose the approval of the counts of administration.
Mercedes filed an opposition, stating that their legitimacy as
children of Gregorio has already been declared by court, as such, they
have the right to protect their interests. It appears that on July 12, 1963,
the Court set the case for pre-trial on August 7, 1963 in connection with
the accounts of the executrix Maria Ventura dated June 17, 1960 and the
Motion to Annul Provision of Will dated July 14,1962 of Mercedes
Ventura .
On October 22, 1963, four motions were filed by Mercedes
Ventura and Gregoria Ventura, namely: (1) motion to remove the
executrix Maria Ventura which was supplemented on April 27, 1965; (2)
motion to require her to deposit the harvest of palay of the property
under administration in a bonded warehouse; (3) motion to render an
accounting of the proceeds and expenses of Administration; and (4)
motion to require her to include in the inventory of the estate certain
excluded properties. An opposition to said motions was filed by the
heirs Juana Cardona and Miguel Ventura and by the executrix Maria
Ventura herself.

The grounds of aforesaid joint motions to remove the executrix

Maria Ventura are:

(1) that she is grossly incompetent;
(2) that she has maliciously and purposely concealed certain properties
of the estate in the inventory;
(3) that she is merely an illegitimate daughter who can have no
harmonious relations with the appellees;
(4) that the executrix has neglected to render her accounts and failed to
comply with the Order of the Court of December 12, 1963, requiring her
to file her accounts of administration for the years 1961 to 1963 and the
Order of June 11, 1964, reiterating aforesaid Order of December 12, 1963;
and
(5) that she is with permanent physical defect hindering her from
efficiently performing her duties as an executrix.

In 1965, Maria submitted her accounts of administration from
1961-1965 which were again opposed by Gregoria and Mercedes
(together with their husbands). On June 2, 1965, the executrix filed her
supplemental opposition to the aforesaid four motions, and prayed that
the joint supplemental motion to remove the executrix be denied or
held in abeyance until after the status of Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura as heirs of the testator is finally decided. On June 3, 1965, the
Court, finding that the estate taxes have not been paid, ordered the
administratrix to pay the same within thirty (30) days.
On September 13, 1965, the lower court denied the suspension
of the proceedings and deferred the resolution of the joint motion to
remove executrix Maria Ventura until after the examination of the
physical fitness of said executrix to undertake her duties as such. Also, it
ordered the deposit of all palay to be harvested in the next agricultural
year and subsequent years to be deposited in a bonded warehouse to
be selected by the Court and the palay so deposited shall not be
withdrawn without the express permission of the Court. Gregoria then
AGAIN opposed the accounts of administration, Mercedes too! Because
they claim that expenses are fake, exhorbitant and speculative.
The court then decided that Maria has squandered the funds of
the estate, was inefficient and incompetent and was thus removed as

executrix and administratix of the estate. Mercedes and Gregoria were

made joint administrators.

Ventura. The court settled this issue and declared Mercedes and
Gregoria as the legitimate children of Gregorio and Paulina.1

BASIC ISSUE: Whether or not removing Maria as executrix and

administratix is legally justified? (I just put all related issued below, just
in case Sir asks) funny thing is, the case doesnt answer this question
directly, it just stated codal provisions to qualify the assignment of a
new administratrix.

Under Article 854 of the Civil Code, "the pretention or omission

of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of
the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious," and as a result,
intestacy follows, thereby rendering the previous appointment of Maria
Ventura as executrix moot and academic. This would now necessitate
the appointment of another administrator, under the following
provision:

ISSUES:
1.
2.

3.
4.

5.

6.

The lower court erred in removing Maria as executrix and

administratix without giving her full opportunity to be heard
The lower court erred in finding that the executrix Maria
Ventura had squandered and dissipated the funds of the estate
under her administration.
The lower court erred in finding that the executrix Maria
Ventura was inefficient and incompetent.
That, considering the circumtances surrounding the case, the
lower court erred in finding that the failure of Maria Ventura to
submit her periodical account had justified her removal as
executrix.
The lower court erred in considering as an established fact that
the appellees Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura are the
legitimate daughters of the deceased Gregorio Ventura.
The lower court erred in appointing (even without a proper
petition for appointment and much less a hearing on the
appointment of) the appellees Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria
Ventura who have an adverse interest as joint administratrices
of the estate of the deceased Gregorio Ventura.

HELD: YES, it is legally justified.

Basically, both sets of children are claiming that the other are
illegitimate, so there was another case pending with respect to Gregoria
and Mercedes legitimacy. Then, there was also another case, also
involving Gregoria and Mercedes, brought by their cousins, saying that
they are the illegitimate children of Gregorio and Paulina, and that
Gregoria and Mercedes were actually children of another man, Teodoro

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:

When and to whom letters of administration granted.-If
no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to
give bond, or a person dies intestate, a petition shall be
granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be
or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or
to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or

1
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura to be
the ligitimate daughters of Paulina Simpliciano and Gregorio Ventura; declaring that as such ligitimate
daughters of Paulina Simpliciano they are entitled to 1/2 of the properties described in paragraph six of
the complaint; ordering the defendant Maria Ventura, as administratrix of the estate of Gregorio
Ventura to pay to Mercedes Ventura and Gregorio Ventura the amount of P 19,074.09 which shall
be divided equally between Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura declaring Mercedes Ventura and Pedro
Corpuz are the exclusive owners of the property describe in the certificate of Title Nos. T-1102, 212,
T-1213, T-1214, Exhibits 32, 33, 34 and 35, respectively; ordering Mercedes Ventura and Pedro D.
Corpuz to pay to the conjugal partnership of Gregorio Ventura and Paulina Simpliciano the sum of
P100,000.00, one-half of which shall pertain to the estate of Gregorio Ventura and the other half to
the estate of Paulina Simpliciano to whom Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura have succeeded, to be
divided between Mercedes and Gregoria in equal parts; and dismissing Civil Case No. 1476. The
parties are urged to arrive at an amicable partition of the properties herein adjudicated within
twenty days from receipt of this decision. Upon their failure to do so, the Court shall appoint
commissioners to divide the properties in accordance with the terms of the decision. Without
pronouncements as to costs.

both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as

such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests
to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;"
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio
Ventura is Juana Cardona while the next of kin are: Mercedes and
Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin" has
been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of
distribution to the decedent's property. It is generally said that "the
nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more preponderant, is
preferred in the choice of administrator. 'Among members of a class the
strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of
interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred."
As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme
Court, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of
Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore,
as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura they are entitled to preference
over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and
Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference provided in
Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed
administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes
and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes
and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in order to
represent both interests.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., Disenting:
Consistent with my "concurrence in the result" in Acain vs. IAC, et als.,
G.r. No. 72706, October 27, 1987, preterition results in total intestacy if it
was mistakenly made or through inadvertence. In this case there was no
mistake nor oversight whatsoever. The testator himself sought the
probate of his Will during his lifetime wherein he not only excluded his
"forced heirs" but even denied paternity.

Under the circumstances, the omission being obviously intentional, the

effect is a defective disinheritance covered by Article 918 of the Civil
Code under which the institution of heir is not wholly void but only in so
far as it prejudices the ligitimes of the persons disinherited. The nullity is
partial unlike in true preterition where the nullity is total.
This conclusion further finds support in the prevailing spirit in the codal
provisions, which is to make the intention of the testator prevail.

NILDA GABRIEL, EVA GABRIEL, EDGAR GABRIEL, GEORGE GABRIEL, ROSEMARIE

GABRIEL, MARIBEL GABRIEL, CYNTHIA GABRIEL, RENATO GABRIEL, GERARDO
GABRIEL, JOJI ZORAYDA GABRIEL, DANIEL GABRIEL and FELICITAS JOSEGABRIEL, petitioners,
vs.
HON COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL E. YUZON, Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XI, and ROBERTO DINDO GABRIEL, respondents.
G.R. No. 101512
August 7, 1992

HELD:

FACTS

Respondent, Roberto Dindo Gabriel, filed with the RTC a petition for letters of
administration alleging, among others, that he is the son of the decedent, a college
graduate, engaged in business, and is fully capable of administering the estate of
the decedent

respondent mentioned eight (8) of herein petitioners as the other next of kin and
heirs of the decedent.

the probate court issued an order respondent as administrator

petitioners filed their opposition praying for the recall of the letters of administration
issued to respondent and the issuance of such letters instead to petitioner Nilda
Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter of the deceased alleging that the latter should be
preferred over private respondent

the probate court denied the opposition of petitioners on the ground that (1) there
was no evidence submitted by oppositor Nilda Gabriel to prove that she is a
legitimate daughter of the deceased; and (2) there is no proof to show that
respondent is unworthy, incapacitated or unsuitable to perform the trust as to make
his appointment inadvisable under these circumstances

on appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground
that the appointment of an administrator is left entirely to the sound discretion of
the trial court which may not be interfered with unless abused

we deem it just, equitable and advisable that there be a co-administration of the

estate of the deceased by petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel and private respondent
Roberto Dindo Gabrie

the purpose of having co-administrators is to have the benefit of their

judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented,
especially considering that in this proceeding they will respectively
represent the legitimate and illegitimate groups of heirs to the estate.

we feel that we should not nullify the appointment of private respondent as

administrator.

The determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial

administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court
exercising the power of appointment and said judgment is not to be
interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in error

In the instant case, a mere importunity by some of the heirs of the

deceased is not adequate ratiocination for the removal of private
respondent. Removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims,
caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate. In
addition, the court may also exercise its discretion in appointing an
administrator where those who are entitled to letters fail to apply therefor
within a given time. 21

on the other hand, petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel, the widow of the deceased
Domingo Gabriel, has every right and is very much entitled to the administration of
the estate of her husband since one who has greater interest in the estate is
preferred to another who has less.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court prescribes the order of preference

in the issuance of letters of administration, categorically seeks out the
surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and requires that
sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator

petitioners contended that under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, it is the
surviving spouse who is first in the order of preference for the appointment of an
administrator and it is petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel, the widow and legal surviving
spouse of the deceased Domingo Gabriel who should be preferred over private
respondent who is one of the illegitimate children of the decedent by claimant

The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the
benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or,
on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or
mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to
administer the estate correctly

they also claim that assuming that the widow is incompetent, the next of kin must
be appointed. As between a legitimate and an illegitimate child, the former is
preferred, hence petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter, must be
preferred over private respondent who is an illegitimate son

Failure of petitioner to failure to apply for letters of administration within

thirty (30) days from the death of her husband is not sufficient to exclude
the widow from the administration of the estate of her husband. There
must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow from the
administration and there is none in the instant case.

respondent, however, argues that Felicitas Jose-Gabriel may no longer be appointed

administratrix by reason of her failure to apply for letters of administration within
thirty (30) days from the death of her husband, as required under the rules

ISSUE: Who should be appointed administrator of the estate of the decedent

In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Cristina

Aguinaldo-Suntay; Emilio A.M. Suntay III,
Petitioner, vs. Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay,
Respondent - WALA
G.R. No. 183053
16 June 2010.
ISABEL V. SAGUINSIN vs.DIONISIO LINDAYAG
Facts:
- Maria V. Lindayag died intestate in Olongapo, Zambales. Her sister Isabel V. Saguinsin filed
with the CFI a petition for the issuance in her favor of letters of administration over the estate
of said deceased.

Petitioner's interest in the estate of the deceased Maria V. Lindayag was disputed, through a
motion to dismiss her petition, by the surviving spouse on the ground that said deceased was
survived by him and by three legally adopted children thus excluding petitioner as an heir.
In the course of the hearing held in connection with said motion, evidence was introduced in
support thereof which, according to the lower court, established that said deceased was
survived not only by her husband but by three legally adopted children.
Upon these facts which petitioner does not dispute it is manifest that she is not an heir
of her deceased sister and, therefore, has no material and direct interest in her estate.
Petitioner's view that when a motion to dismiss a complaint or a petition is filed, only the facts
alleged in the complaint or petition may be taken into account is not entirely correct. To the
contrary, the rule is that at said hearing said motion may be proved or disproved in
accordance with the rules of evidence, and it has been held that for that purpose, the hearing
should be conducted as an ordinary hearing; and that the parties should be allowed to present
evidence, except when the motion is based on the failure of the complaint or of the petition to
state a cause of action. In the present case, the motion to dismiss the petition was grounded
on petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings which, as already stated
heretofore, was fully substantiated by the evidence presented during the hearing. Thus CFI is
affirmed.

- Dionisio V. Lindayag, the surviving spouse, in his behalf and in representation of the legally
adopted minors Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag, filed a motion to
dismiss the petition on the ground lack of interest in the estate, claiming Maria was neither
heir nor a creditor of the deceased. In opposing the motion to dismiss Maria the petitioner
argued that only the facts alleged in the petition should be considered in determining its
sufficiency.
- After due hearing on the motion, the CFI issued the order of dismissal based on the fact that
the herein petitioner is obviously not an heir and has no interest in estate; and that the
surviving heirs oppose the instant petition on the ground that they want to settle the estate
extra-judicially among them to avoid unnecessary expenses in prosecuting this case, the Court
finds the Dionisio opposition to be well taken. Petitioner submitted a motion for
reconsideration but was denied thus appealed it to the SC.

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION vs. FIDEL P. DUMLAO

Facts:
- Ricardo M. Gonzalez, District Manager of Shell Philippines, Inc. for Mindanao, filed a Petition
for Letters of Administration in the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Regino Canonoy with
the CFI now RTC of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, praying therein that he be appointed
judicial administrator of the estate. Judge Vicente B. Echavez, Jr. issued an Order requiring
that all requirements be done at cost of the petitioner in order for the petitioner to become the
administrator.

Held:

- Respondents, who are heirs of Regino Canonoy, opposed such alleging that: Gonzalez is
neither heir nor creditor of the estate; that his residence which is in Davao would make him an
inefficient administrator being that the properties are in Butaan and he as an employee of
Shell Philippines, an alleged creditor of the estate, would make him unable to properly and
effectively protect the interest of the estate in case of conflicts. They, further propose that
Bonifacio Canonoy, one of Regino's sons, who enjoys preference in appointment pursuant to
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, be appointed administrator of the said intestate
estate and be issued the corresponding letters of administration.

According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters of administration
must be filed an "interested person". An interested party has defined in this connection as one
who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the
estate, such as a credito. And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as
special proceedings, the interest required in order that a person may be a party thereto must
be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.

- The trial court (TC) appointed Bonifacio Canonoy as administrator of the intestate estate of
Regino Canonoy. None of the parties moved to reconsider this order or appealed such.
Petitioner Shell, filed its claim against the estate to which Bonifacio Canonoy as administrator,
filed a Motion to Dismiss the claim of Shell. Shell interposes compulsory counterclaims for the
estate in the amount of P659,423.49 representing rentals for land occupied by the Shell
Service Station, lighting allowances, allowances for salaries and wages of service attendants,

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is "an interested person" in the estate of deceased Maria V.
Lindayag.

sales commission due the deceased Regino Canonoy and reasonable attorney's fees. Petitioner
filed an answer to the Counterclaim.
- Upon joinder of the issues on Shell's claim, the trial court, this time presided over by
respondent Judge Fidel P. Dumlao, set the pre-trial. At the pre-trial, counsel for the
administrator requested for time to file a Motion to Dismiss the case. In an Order issued on
that date, the court granted him ten (10) days to file the motion; opposing counsel was
likewise given ten (10) days from receipt of the same to file whatever pleading he may deem
proper to file, after which the motion shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
- The motion was filed alleging that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject
matter and nature thereof because the petitioner here, Mr. Gonzalez, is not the "interested
person" contemplated by Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court; To which Shell filed its
Opposition to the Motion on the ground that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the
case to issue letters of administration as the interest of Gonzalez in the estate is not a
jurisdictional fact that needs to be alleged in the petition. If at all, Gonzalez' lack of interest in
the estate of the deceased only affected his competence to be appointed administrator.
- RTC dismissed the case and denied the motion for reconsideration.
- Shell filed the instant petition which it denominated as a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
- CA reversed citing that the trial court clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed the case after having set for pre-trial petitioner's amended claim against the estate.
That said dismissal was predicated solely on the ground that petitioner therein, Ricardo
Gonzalez, is not an "interested person," and that, since such interest is a jurisdictional
requirement, thus the TC acquired no jurisdiction over the case is absolutely wrong.
Issues:
1)
2)

Whether or not the jurisdictional facts that need to be stated in a petition for letters
of administration under Section 2(a), Rule 79 of the Rules of Court include the
specific assertion that the petitioner therein is an "interested person," ; and
Whether or not the administration court may properly and validly dismiss a petition
for letters of administration filed by one who is not an "interested person" after
having appointed an heir of the decedent as administrator of the latter's intestate
estate and set for pre-trial a claim against the said estate

Held:
In answering the first issue, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition of letters of administration. A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the
petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of
the creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed. But no
defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.

In Saguinsin vs. Lindayag, where the dismissal of a petition for letters of administration was
affirmed because the petitioner is not an heir of her deceased sister and, therefore, has no
material and direct interest in her estate. In the said case, this Court defined an interested
party as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor; this interest must be material and direct, not merely
indirect or contingent. The Saguinsin doctrine is not, however, without exception. An objection
to a petition for letters of administration on that ground may be barred by waiver or estoppel.
Private respondents herein did not file a motion to dismiss the petition filed by Gonzalez on
the ground of lack of capacity to sue; they instead filed an Opposition which, unfortunately,
did not ask for the dismissal of the petition but merely opposed the issuance of letters of
administration in favor of Gonzalez because, among other reasons, he is a stranger to the
estate. The Opposition also proposed that Bonifacio Canonoy, one of the children of the
deceased Regino Canonoy, be appointed administrator of the latter's intestate estate. The
failure to move for a dismissal amounted to a waiver of the above-mentioned ground. Section
8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provides that:
A motion attacking a pleading or a proceeding shall include all objections then
available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived.
However, if a motion to dismiss is not filed, as what obtains in this case, any of the grounds
available for such a motion, except for improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative
defense, and a preliminary hearing thereon may be had as if a motion to dismiss had been
filed. Excepted from the above rules are the following grounds: (1) failure to state a cause of
action which may be alleged in a later pleading if one is permitted, or by a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits; and (2) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action, subject to the exception as seen in Insurance Company of North
America vs. C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc., wherein this Court ruled:
Finally, appellant would contend that plaintiff has no capacity to sue and is not the
real party in interest. It is now too late to raise these objections here. These should
have been asserted in the motion to dismiss filed by defendant below. Not having
been included therein, they are now barred by the rule on omnibus motion.
Thus, by proposing that Bonifacio Canonoy be appointed as administrator instead of Mr.
Gonzalez, private respondents have in fact approved or ratified the filing of the petition by the
latter.
On the 2nd issue, there can be no dispute that the TC had acquired jurisdiction over case
immediately after its filing, the trial court complied with Section 3, Rule 79 of the Rules of
Court by issuing the Order dated 27 January 1973. At the initial hearing, petitioner Gonzalez

established the jurisdictional requirements by submitting in evidence proof of publication and

service of notices of the petition. Thereafter, it heard the evidence on the qualifications and
competence of Bonifacio Canonoy, then appointed him as the administrator and finally
directed that letters of administration be issued to him, and that he takes his oath of office
after putting up a surety or property bond in the amount of P5,000.00.

8)

It is be presumed that Bonifacio Canonoy immediately qualified as administrator because in

that capacity, he filed a motion to dismiss petitioner's claim against the estate, 33 a Reply to
the Opposition to the motion to dismiss 34 and an Answer to the petitioner's amended claim
against the estate wherein he interposed a counterclaim.

11)

Clearly, therefore, not only had the administrator and the rest of the private respondents
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, they even expressly affirmed and
invoked such jurisdiction in praying for reliefs and remedies in their favor, namely: (a) denial
of Gonzalez' prayer to be appointed as administrator, (b) appointment of Bonifacio Canonoy as
administrator, (c) denial of petitioner Shell's amended claim against the estate, and (d) the
granting of the counterclaim. Hence, they cannot now be heard to question the jurisdiction of
the trial court. While it may be true that jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, a party who has affirmed and invoked it in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief cannot be allowed to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape
penalty.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the Order of the RTC is set aside
Costs against private respondents.

9)
10)

12)
13)
14)
15)

On 6 August 1992, private respondent Vallejo filed a Motion for Admission of an Amended
Petition.
7
On 21 August 1992, the trial court issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack
of merit.
The court ruled that Antonietta Garcia had no personality to file the motion to dismiss not
having proven her status as wife of the decedent.
Further, the court found that the actual residence of the deceased was Cotabato City, and
even assuming that there was concurrent venue among the Regional Trial Courts where the
decedent had resided, the R.T.C. of Cotabato had already taken cognizance of the
settlement of the decedent's estate to the exclusion of all others.
10
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion dated 25 October 1993 praying that the letters of
administration issued to Vallejo be recalled and that new letters of administration be issued
to her.
11
She, likewise, filed a Motion dated 5 November 1993 to declare the proceedings a
mistrial.
Both motions were denied by the trial court in its Order dated 22 November 1993.
Petitioner's MR was likewise denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER THERE IS A NEED TO PUBLISH THE AMENDED PETITION FOR ADMINISTRATION OF
THE INTESTATE ESTATE IN THIS CASE
RULING: NO. The SC held that the jurisdictional facts required in a petition for issuance of letters of
administration are: (1) the death of the testator; (2) residence at the time of death in the province
where the probate court is located; and (3) if the decedent was a non-resident, the fact of being a
resident of a foreign country and that the decedent has left an estate in the province where the court
19
is sitting.
While paragraph 4 of the original petition stating:

VDA. DE CHUA v. CA
FACTS:
1)
2)
3)
4)

5)
6)
7)

(4) That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the above mentioned minors, died intestate on May
28, 1992 in Davao City.
failed to indicate the residence of the deceased at the time of his death, the omission was cured by the
amended petitions wherein the same paragraph now reads:

During his lifetime, Roberto Lim Chua lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita
A. Vallejo from 1970 up to 1981.
Out of this union, the couple begot two illegitimate children, namely, Roberto Rafson
Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo.
On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City.
On 2 July 1992, private respondent filed with the RTC a PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF
HEIRSHIP, GUARDIANSHIP OVERTHE PERSONS AND PROPERTIES OF MINORS ROBERT
RAFSON ALONZO SP. PROC. NO/ 331 and RUDYARD PRIDE ALONZO, and ISSUANCE OF
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.
The trial court issued an order setting the hearing of the petition and directed that notice
thereof be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Maguindanao
and Cotabato City and or Davao City.
On 21 July 1992, herein petitioner Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua, representing to be the
2
surviving spouse of Roberto Chua, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper
venue.
Petitioner alleged that at the time of the decedent's death Davao City was his residence,
hence, the RTC of Davao City is the proper forum.

(4) That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the abovementioned minors is a resident of Cotabato

City and died intestate on May 28, 1992 at Davao City.
All told the original petition alleged substantially all the facts required to be stated in the petition for
letters of administration. Consequently, there was no need to publish the amended petition as
petitioner would insist in her one of the assignment of errors.
Be that as it may, petitioner has no legal standing to file the motion to dismiss as she is not
related to the deceased, nor does she have any interest in his estate as creditor or
otherwise.
Only an interested person may oppose the petition for issuance of letters of administration. An
interested person is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor; his interest is material and direct, and not one that is only
21
indirect or contingent.

Petitioner was not able to prove her status as the surviving wife of the decedent. The best proof of
marriage between man and wife is a marriage contract which Antonietta Chua failed to produce. The
lower court correctly disregarded the photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented,
this being a violation of the best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of evidence.
G.R. No. 101512 August 7, 1992
NILDA GABRIEL, EVA GABRIEL, EDGAR GABRIEL, GEORGE GABRIEL, ROSEMARIE
GABRIEL, MARIBEL GABRIEL, CYNTHIA GABRIEL, RENATO GABRIEL, GERARDO
GABRIEL, JOJI ZORAYDA GABRIEL, DANIEL GABRIEL and FELICITAS JOSEGABRIEL, petitioners,
vs.
HON COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL E. YUZON, Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XI, and ROBERTO DINDO GABRIEL, respondents.
FACTS

ISSUE: Who should be appointed administrator of the estate of the decedent

HELD:

Respondent, Roberto Dindo Gabriel, filed with the RTC a petition for letters of
administration alleging, among others, that he is the son of the decedent, a college
graduate, engaged in business, and is fully capable of administering the estate of
the decedent
respondent mentioned eight (8) of herein petitioners as the other next of kin and
heirs of the decedent.
the probate court issued an order respondent as administrator

petitioners filed their opposition praying for the recall of the letters of administration
issued to respondent and the issuance of such letters instead to petitioner Nilda
Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter of the deceased alleging that the latter should be
preferred over private respondent

the probate court denied the opposition of petitioners on the ground that (1) there
was no evidence submitted by oppositor Nilda Gabriel to prove that she is a
legitimate daughter of the deceased; and (2) there is no proof to show that
respondent is unworthy, incapacitated or unsuitable to perform the trust as to make
his appointment inadvisable under these circumstances

on appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground
that the appointment of an administrator is left entirely to the sound discretion of
the trial court which may not be interfered with unless abused

we deem it just, equitable and advisable that there be a co-administration of the

estate of the deceased by petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel and private respondent
Roberto Dindo Gabrie

respondent, however, argues that Felicitas Jose-Gabriel may no longer be appointed

administratrix by reason of her failure to apply for letters of administration within
thirty (30) days from the death of her husband, as required under the rules

the purpose of having co-administrators is to have the benefit of their

judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented,
especially considering that in this proceeding they will respectively
represent the legitimate and illegitimate groups of heirs to the estate.

we feel that we should not nullify the appointment of private respondent as

administrator.

The determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial

administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court
exercising the power of appointment and said judgment is not to be
interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in error

In the instant case, a mere importunity by some of the heirs of the

deceased is not adequate ratiocination for the removal of private
respondent. Removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims,
caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate. In
addition, the court may also exercise its discretion in appointing an
administrator where those who are entitled to letters fail to apply therefor
within a given time. 21

on the other hand, petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel, the widow of the deceased
Domingo Gabriel, has every right and is very much entitled to the administration of
the estate of her husband since one who has greater interest in the estate is
preferred to another who has less.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court prescribes the order of preference

in the issuance of letters of administration, categorically seeks out the
surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and requires that
sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator

petitioners contended that under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, it is the
surviving spouse who is first in the order of preference for the appointment of an
administrator and it is petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel, the widow and legal surviving
spouse of the deceased Domingo Gabriel who should be preferred over private
respondent who is one of the illegitimate children of the decedent by claimant

The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the
benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or,
on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or
mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to
administer the estate correctly

they also claim that assuming that the widow is incompetent, the next of kin must
be appointed. As between a legitimate and an illegitimate child, the former is
preferred, hence petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter, must be
preferred over private respondent who is an illegitimate son

Failure of petitioner to failure to apply for letters of administration within

thirty (30) days from the death of her husband is not sufficient to exclude
the widow from the administration of the estate of her husband. There
must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow from the
administration and there is none in the instant case.

G.R. No. 74769 September 28, 1990

BEATRIZ F. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ZOILO AGUINALDO, Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati, Metro
Manila and TERESA F. OLBES, respondents.
FACTS:
1.

2.
3.

4.

5.
6.

7.

Special Proceedings No. 021, pending before the court a quo, is an intestate
proceeding involving the estate of the deceased Doa Ramona Gonzales Vda. de
Favis. Doa Ramona is survived by her four (4) children who are her only heirs,
namely, Asterio Favis, Beatriz F. Gonzales, Teresa F. Olbes, and Cecilia Favis-
Gomez.
The court a quo appointed petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales and private respondent
Teresa Olbes as co-administratices of the estate.
While petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was in the United States, private respondent
Teresa Olbes filed a motion to remove Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix, on
the ground that she is incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust and had
committed acts and omissions detrimental to the interest of the estate and the
heirs.
Respondent Judge cancelled the letters of administration granted to Beatriz F.
Gonzales and retained Teresa Olbes as the administratrix of the estate of the late
Ramona Gonzales based on the following grounds:
a. the two administrators have not seen eye to eye with each other and
most of the time they have been at loggerheads with each other to the
prejudice of the estate.
b. Gonzales has been absent from the country and has not returned.
Olbes has been left alone to administer the estate.
Petitioner moved to reconsider. Her motion was opposed by private respondents.
Respondent judge denied petitioners MR - cancelling the appointment and the
letters of administration issued to Beatriz F. Gonzales and it reiterates the same
for the best interest of the estate of the deceased.
Petitioner contends before this Court that respondent Judge's Order dated 15
January 1985 should be nullified on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, as
her removal was not shown by respondents to be anchored on any of the
grounds provided under Section 2, Rule 82, Rules of Court.

ISSUE: WoN Petitioner was correctly removed as co-adminstratix of estate

HELD: NO

The rule is that if no executor is named in the will, or the named executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, the court must appoint an administrator of the estate of the
5
deceased who shall act as representative not only of the court appointing him
6
but also of the heirs and the creditors of the estate. In the exercise of its
discretion, the probate court may appoint one, two or more co-administrators to
have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different
interests represented.
In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the
principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to
be appointed as administrator.
o This is the same consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into
account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of
administrators for the estate. The underlying assumption behind this
rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy,
economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer
the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have
the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the

estate correctly.
Administrators have such an interest in the execution of their trust as entitle
10
them to protection from removal without just cause. Hence, Section 2 of Rule
82 of the Rules of Court provides the legal and specific causes authorizing the
court to remove an administrator.
While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the
removal of an administrator, it however must have some fact legally before it in
order to justify a removal. There must be evidence of an act or omission on the
part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the
orders of the court, which it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant the
removal of the administrator. In making such a determination, the court must
exercise good judgment, guided by law and precedents.
In the present case, the court a quo did not base the removal of the petitioner as
co-administratrix on any of the causes specified in respondent's motion for relief
of the petitioner. Neither did it dwell on, nor determine the validity of the
charges brought against petitioner by respondent Olbes. The court based the
removal of the petitioner on the fact that in the administration of the estate,
conflicts and misunderstandings have existed between petitioner and respondent
Teresa Olbes which allegedly have prejudiced the estate, and the added
circumstance that petitioner had been absent from the country since October
1984, and up to 15 January 1985, the date of the questioned order.

Certainly, it is desirable that the administration of the deceased's estate be

marked with harmonious relations between co-administrators. But for mere
disagreements between such joint fiduciaries, without misconduct, one's removal
is not favored.
The court a quo failed to find hard facts showing that the conflict and
disharmony between the two (2) co-administratrices were unjustly caused by
petitioner, or that petitioner was guilty of incompetence in the fulfillment of her
duties, or prevented the management of the estate according to the dictates of
prudence, or any other act or omission showing that her continuance as co-
administratrix of the estate materially endangers the interests of the estate.
Petitioner had never abandoned her role as co-administratrix of the estate nor
had she been remiss in the fullfilment of her duties. Suffice it to state, temporary
absence in the state does not disqualify one to be an administrator of the estate.
As the appointment of petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was valid, and no
satisfactory cause for her removal was shown, the court a quo gravely abused its
discretion in removing her. Stated differently, petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was
removed without just cause. Her removal was therefore improper.

PEDRO DE GUZMAN, petitioner,
-versus-
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, RTC BRANCH 58, MAKATI, METRO,
MANILA; DEPUTY SHERIFFS JOSE B. FLORA and HONORIO SANTOS and ELAINE G. DE
GUZMAN, respondents
Facts:

On May 5, 1987, private respondent Elaine G. de Guzman filed a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Manolito de Guzman, before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati
The petition alleges, among other things, that:
o the properties left by the decedent were acquired after the marriage of
the petitioner to the decedent and therefore are included in their
conjugal partnership
o after diligent search and inquiry to ascertain whether the decedent left
a last will and testament, none has been found and according to the
best knowledge information and belief of the petitioner, Manolito de
Guzman died intestate
o the petitioner as the survey surviving spouse of the decedent, is most
qualified and entitled to the grant of letters of administration

On May 22, 1987, the private respondent filed a motion for writ of possession
over five (5) vehicles registered under the name of Manolito de Guzman,
alleged to be conjugal properties of the de Guzman's but which are at present in
the possession of the private respondent's father-in- law, herein petitioner Pedro
de Guzman.
o respondent must have the possession of said vehicles in order to
preserve the assets of her late husband
In the meantime, on May 28, 1987, the private respondent filed her "Ex-Parte
Motion to Appoint Petitioner as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Manolito
de Guzman."
o However, no notice of the order was given to the petitioner.
o the lower court granted the private respondent's motion to be
appointed as special administratrix
Trouble ensued when the respondents tried to enforce the above order. The
petitioner resisted when Deputy Sheriffs Jose B. Flora and Honorio Santos tried to
take the subject vehicles on the ground that they were his personal properties

Issue: W/N the court appoint a special administrator even before the court has caused
notice to be served upon all interested parties pursuant to section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised
Rules of
Court
Held:

No

Ratio:
The petitioner contends that the June 5, 1987 order is a patent nullity, the respondent
court not having acquired jurisdiction to appoint a special administratrix because the
petition for the settlement of the estate of Manolito de Guzman was not yet set for hearing
and published for three consecutive weeks, as mandated by the Rules of Court. The
petitioner also stresses that the appointment of a special administratrix constitutes an
abuse of discretion for having been made without giving petitioner and other parties an
opportunity to oppose said appointment
Santos v. Castillo (64 Phil. 211) we ruled that before a court may acquire jurisdiction over
the case for the probate of a will and the administration of the properties left by a
deceased person, the application must allege the residence of the deceased and other
indispensable facts or circumstances and that the applicant is the executor named in the
will or is the person who had custody of the will to be probated
In the instant case, there is no doubt that the respondent court acquired jurisdiction over
the proceedings upon the filing of a petition for the settlement of an intestate estate by the
private respondent since the petition had alleged all the jurisdictional facts, the residence

of the deceased person, the possible heirs and creditors and the probable value of the
estate of the deceased Manolito de Guzman pursuant to Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised
Rules of Court
But Sige, banat Supreme Court!
We must, however, differentiate between the jurisdiction of the probate court over the
proceedings for the administration of an estate and its jurisdiction over the persons
who are interested in the settlement of the estate of the deceased person. The court
may also have jurisdiction over the "estate" of the deceased person but the
determination of the properties comprising that estate must follow established rules.

Facts:
-

Section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. When a petition
for letters of administration is filed in the court having jurisdiction,
such court shall fix a time and place for hearing the petition, and
shall cause notice thereof to be given to the known heirs and
creditors of the decedent, and to any other persons believed to have
an interest in the estate, in the manner provided in sections 3 and 4
of Rule 76.
It is very clear from this provision that the probate court must cause notice through
publication of the petition after it receives the same. The purpose of this notice is to bring
all the interested persons within the court's jurisdiction so that the judgment therein
becomes binding on all the world.
Where no notice as required by Section 3, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court has been given to
persons believed to have an interest in the estate of the deceased person; the proceeding
for the settlement of the estate is void and should be annulled. The requirement as to notice
is essential to the validity of the proceeding in that no person may be deprived of his right to
property without due process of law
Verily, notice through publication of the petition for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person is jurisdictional, the absence of which makes court orders affecting other
persons, subsequent to the petition void and subject to annulment

DALISAY E. OCAMPO, VINCE E. OCAMPO, MELINDA CARLA E. OCAMPO, and LEONARDO E. OCAMPO,
JR., Petitioners
- versus
RENATO M. OCAMPO and ERLINDA M. OCAMPO, Respondents

Petitioners Dalisay E. Ocampo (Dalisay), Vince E. Ocampo (Vince), Melinda Carla E. Ocampo
(Melinda), and Leonardo E. Ocampo, Jr. (Leonardo, Jr.) are the surviving wife and the
children of Leonardo Ocampo (Leonardo), who died on January 23, 2004
Leonardo and his siblings, respondents Renato M. Ocampo (Renato) and Erlinda M. Ocampo
(Erlinda) are the legitimate children and only heirs of the spouses Vicente and Maxima
Ocampo, who died intestate on December 19, 1972 and February 19, 1996, respectively
o
Vicente and Maxima left several properties, mostly situated in Bian,
Laguna. Vicente and Maxima left no will and no debts
On June 24, 2004, five (5) months after the death of Leonardo, petitioners initiated a
petition for intestate proceedings
o
The petition alleged that, upon the death of Vicente and Maxima, respondents
and their brother Leonardo jointly controlled, managed, and administered the
estate of their parents. Under such circumstance, Leonardo had been receiving
his share consisting of one-third (1/3) of the total income generated from the
properties of the estate.
o
However, when Leonardo died, respondents took possession, control and
management of the properties to the exclusion of petitioners.
o
The petition prayed for the settlement of the estate of Vicente and Maxima and
the estate of Leonardo. It, likewise, prayed for the appointment of an
administrator to apportion, divide, and award the two estates among the lawful
heirs of the decedents
Respondents filed their Opposition and Counter-Petition dated October 7, 2004, contending
that the petition was defective as it sought the judicial settlement of two estates in a single
proceeding. They argued that the settlement of the estate of Leonardo was premature, the
same being dependent only upon the determination of his hereditary rights in the
settlement of his parents estate
o
In their counter-petition, respondents prayed that they be appointed as special
joint administrators of the estate of Vicente and Maxima
RTC denied respondents opposition to the settlement proceedings but admitted their
counter-petition
o
It appointed Dalisay and Renato as special joint administrators of the estate of
the deceased spouses, and required them to post a bond ofP200,000.00 each
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration insisting that Dalisay was incompetent and
unfit to be appointed as administrator of the estate, considering that she even failed to take
care of her husband Leonardo when he was paralyzed in 1997
o
In their Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration, respondents asserted
their priority in right to be appointed as administrators being the next of kin of
Vicente and Maxima, whereas Dalisay was a mere daughter-in-law of the
decedents and not even a legal heir by right of representation from her late
husband Leonardo
Pending the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners filed a Motion to
Submit Inventory and Accounting praying that the RTC issue an order directing respondents
to submit a true inventory of the estate of the decedent spouses and to render an
accounting thereof from the time they took over the collection of the income of the estate

Respondents filed their Comment and Manifestation claiming that they could
not yet be compelled to submit an inventory and render an accounting of the
income and assets of the estate inasmuch as there was still a pending motion for
reconsideration
In its Order dated February 16, 2007, the RTC revoked the appointment of Dalisay as co-
special administratrix, substituting her with Erlinda.
o
The RTC took into consideration the fact that respondents were the nearest of
kin of Vicente and Maxima. Petitioners did not contest this Order and even
manifested in open court their desire for the speedy settlement of the estate
On October 15, 2007, or eight (8) months after the February 16, 2007 Order appointing
respondents as special joint administrators, petitioners filed a Motion to Terminate or
Revoke the Special Administration and to Proceed to Judicial Partition or Appointment of
Regular Administrator
o
Petitioners contended that the special administration was not necessary as the
estate is neither vast nor complex, the properties of the estate being identified
and undisputed, and not involved in any litigation necessitating the
representation of special administrators.
o
Petitioners, likewise, contended that respondents had been resorting to the
mode of special administration merely to delay and prolong their deprivation of
what was due them.
o
Petitioners cited an alleged fraudulent sale by respondents of a real property
for P2,700,000.00, which the latter represented to petitioners to have been sold
only for P1,500,000.00, and respondents alleged misrepresentation that
petitioners owed the estate for the advances to cover the hospital expenses of
Leonardo, but, in fact, were not yet paid
In its Order dated March 13, 2008, the RTC granted petitioners Motion, revoking and
terminating the appointment of Renato and Erlinda as joint special administrators, on
account of their failure to comply with its Order, particularly the posting of the required
bond, and to enter their duties and responsibilities as special administrators, i.e., the
submission of an inventory of the properties and of an income statement of the estate
o
The RTC also appointed Melinda as regular administratrix, subject to the posting
of a bond in the amount ofP200,000.00, and directed her to submit an inventory
of the properties and an income statement of the subject estate
Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
before the CA
On December 16, 2008, the CA rendered its assailed Decision granting the petition based on
the finding that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in revoking respondents appointment
as joint special administrators without first ruling on their motion for exemption from bond,
and for appointing Melinda as regular administratrix without conducting a formal hearing to
determine her competency to assume as such.
Petitioners then filed a MR but was denied
Hence this petition
o

-
-

-
-

Issue/Held:
-

W/N the revocation of Respondents appointment as special administrators was proper /

YES

Ratio:
-

A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and
control, expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, with a view to its
smooth administration and speedy settlement
o
When appointed, he or she is not regarded as an agent or representative of the
parties suggesting the appointment
o
The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to
preserve the estate until it can pass to the hands of a person fully authorized to
administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule
80 of the Rules of Court
While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their deceased
parents in their appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a mandatory
requirement for the appointment
o
It has long been settled that the selection or removal of special administrators is
not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular
administrators
The probate court may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other
than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that the need to first pass upon
and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness and the application of the order of preference

under Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not
obtain
o
As long as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on
reason, equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by higher courts is
unwarranted
o
The appointment or removal of special administrators, being discretionary, is
thus interlocutory and may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
It is worthy of mention that, as early as October 11, 2005, in their Motion for Appointment
as Joint Special Administrators, respondents already prayed for their exemption to post
bond should they be assigned as joint special administrators
o
However, the RTC effectively denied this prayer when it issued its June 15, 2006
Order, designating Renato and Dalisay as special administrators and enjoining
them to post bond in the amount of P200,000.00 each. This denial was, in
effect, reiterated when the RTC rendered its February 16, 2007 Order
substituting Dalisay with Erlinda as special administratrix
o
Consequently, the RTC revoked respondents appointment as special
administrators for failing to post their administrators bond and to submit an
inventory and accounting as required of them, tantamount to failing to comply
with its lawful orders
Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 81, the bond secures the performance of the duties and
obligations of an administrator namely: (1) to administer the estate and pay the debts; (2)
to perform all judicial orders; (3) to account within one (1) year and at any other time when
required by the probate court; and (4) to make an inventory within three (3) months. More
specifically, per Section 4 of the same Rule, the bond is conditioned on the faithful

execution of the administration of the decedents estate requiring the special administrator
to (1) make and return a true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of
the deceased which come to his possession or knowledge; (2) truly account for such as
received by him when required by the court; and (3) deliver the same to the person
appointed as executor or regular administrator, or to such other person as may be
authorized to receive them
Hence, the RTC revoked respondents designation as joint special administrators, especially
considering that respondents never denied that they have been in possession, charge, and
actual administration of the estate of Vicente and Maxima since 2002 up to the present,
despite the assumption of Melinda as regular administratrix
o
Respondents had already been distributing the incomes or fruits generated from
the properties of the decedents estate, yet they still failed to post their
respective administrators bonds despite collection of the advances from their
supposed shares
o
What is more, respondents insincerity in administering the estate was betrayed
by the Deed of Conditional Sale dated January 12, 2004
On the other hand, the Court finds the RTCs designation of Melinda as regular
administratrix as improper and abusive of its discretion
o
Admittedly, there was no petition for letters of administration with respect to
Melinda, as the prayer for her appointment as co-administrator was embodied in
the motion for the termination of the special administration
o
Thus, the capacity, competency, and legality of Melindas appointment as such
was not properly objected to by respondents despite being the next of kin to the
decedent spouses, and was not threshed out by the RTC acting as a probate
court in accordance with the above mentioned Rules
However, having in mind the objective of facilitating the settlement of the estate of Vicente
and Maxima, with a view to putting an end to the squabbles of the heirs, we take into
account the fact that Melinda, pursuant to the RTC Order dated March 13, 2008, already
posted the required bond of P200,000.00
These acts clearly manifested her intention to serve willingly as administratrix of the
decedents estate, but her appointment should be converted into one of special
administration, pending the proceedings for regular administration

G.R. No. L-3039

December 29, 1949

VICTORIA REYNOSO and JUAN REYNOSO, petitioners,

vs.
VICENTE SANTIAGO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, PIA REYNOSO,
AGUSTINA REYNOSO, MELITON PALABRICA, LEONCIO CADIZ, ET AL., respondents
FACTS

Leoncio Cadiz and the other heirs of Salvadora Obispo presented an application in
the CFI for the administration of the property of the deceased

Victorio Reynoso and Juan Reynoso, Salvadora Obispo's surviving spouse and eldest
son respectively, opposed the application and filed a document, which purported to
be the last will and testament of Salvadora Obispo, with a counter petition for its
probate

The trial court rejected that instrument as a forgery, but on the appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the finding of the court below, found the will authentic and drawn
with all the formalities of Law.

Thereafter Victorio Reynoso And Juan Reynoso filed two petitions, one in special
proceeding No. 2914 and another under a separate and new docket number (3107)
and with a different title

The first prayed that the special administrator, Meliton Palabrica, who had
theretofore been appointed in special proceeding No. 2914, be ordered to
turn over the properties of the deceased and the proceeds of coprax, nuts
and other agricultural products to Victorio Reynoso, and to render an
accounting within a reasonable time, It also asked for the closing of the
intestate proceeding

The other petition prayed that the estate be administered and settled in
special proceeding No. 3107 and that Victorio Reynoso be appointed
executor of Salvadora Obispo's last will and testament. It also contained a
prayer for an accounting by Palabrica and delivery by him to the new
executor of the properties that came into possession including the
proceeds from the sales of coprax, nuts, etc.

The two petitions were decided separately

With respect to the opening of another expediente, the lower court

believed that the proposed change or substitution was " not only
unnecessary but inconvenient and expensive.

As to the appointment of the deceased's husband as executor or

administrator the court said that action on the petition should be withheld
for the time being, because of the pendency on appeal of a case in which
the special administrator in special proceeding No. 2914 is plaintiff and
appellee and Victorio Reynoso defendant and appellant.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Reynoso should be appointed administrator in the separate
action filed
HELD:

The appointment of a special administrator is justified only when there is delay in

granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from the
allowance or disallowance of a will or some other cause

The Court of Appeals having decreed the probate of the will and the
appointment of analbacea, there is no valid reason for the further
retention of a special administrator.

The appointment of a regular administrator is necessary for the prompt settlement

and distribution of the estate.

There are important duties devolving on a regular administrator which a

special administrator can not perform, and there are many actions to be
taken by the court which could not be accomplished before a regular
administrator is appointed

Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-Garbiel (2005)

Facts:

Cristina Santiago
Vda. De Yanga

But whether or not Victorio Reynoso should be appointed as administrator we do not

and cannot of course decide in a petition for mandamus

While the surviving spouse is entitled to preference in the appointment

(section 6, Rule 79), circumstances might warrant his rejection and the
appointment of someone else.

Mandamus lies where the duty is specific and ministerial. It does not lie
where judgment or discretion is exercised in the performance of the act.
Applying the rule to this case, it is proper to command the court below to
appoint a regular administrator, but it is not proper to tell it whom to
appoint

Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel
+ Lorenzo Almoradie

Mariano

Francisco

(marriage void and

bigamous)

Belinda
(claiming to be the
legitimate child)

Roberto Y. Gabriel
(claiming to be an adopted
child of Crisanta)
+ Dolores

Bena Jean, Daniel, Melchor, Michael,

and Danibel, all surnamed Castillo

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
CA denying the MR.


On January 25, 1989, Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel, wife of Lorenzo B.
Almoradie, died in Malabon City, Metro Manila, leaving behind a sizable
inheritance consisting mostly of real estate and shares of stock.
Cristinas mother, Cristina Santiago Vda. De Yanga commenced an
intestate proceeding before the RTC Malabon City. She alleged that her
daughter left an estate worth P1.5M and it was being managed by her
son-in-law Lorenzo and by two other equally incompetent persons. She
prays that her son, Mariano Yanga, Cristinas brother be given the
letters of administration. This prayer was eventually granted.

Meantime, the marriage between Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel and
Lorenzo Almoradie was declared void for being bigamous. The RTC then
removed Lorenzo as administrator and appointed Mariano, Jr. in his
stead.

On October 16, 1989, one Belinda Dahlia Y. Almoradie Castillo,

claiming to be the only legitimate child of Lorenzo and Crisanta, filed a
motion for intervention. Resolution on this motion was, however, held
in abeyance pending some incidents in the CA.

On November 3, 1989, Roberto Y. Gabriel, the legally adopted
son of Crisanta Y. Gabriel, filed before the RTC of Malabon City a petition
for probate of an alleged will and for the issuance of letters
testamentary in his favor. He alleged that he discovered his mothers
will on October 25, 1989 in which he was instituted as the sole heir of
the testatrix, and designated as alternate executor for the named
executor therein, Francisco S. Yanga, a brother of Crisanta, who had
predeceased the latter sometime in 1985 or 1986.

On June 2, 1990, Belinda Castillo died.

The two (2) special proceedings were consolidated. On May 15,
1991, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the intestate
proceedings. Mariano Yanga, Jr. questioned the dismissal of the
intestate proceedings before the appellate court via a petition
for certiorari. On July 8, 1991, the probate court appointed Roberto Y.
Gabriel as special administrator of his mothers estate. On May 23, 2001,
the
heirs
of
Belinda,
namely,
Bena
Jean,
Daniel,
Melchor, Michael, and Danibel, all surnamed Castillo, filed a
Motion praying that they be substituted as party-litigants in lieu of their
late mother Belinda, who died in 1990.

On April 16, 2001, Roberto Gabriel died. His widow, Dolores L.
Gabriel, filed a Manifestation and Motion where she informed
the probate court of her husbands death and prayed that she be
admitted as substitute in place of her late husband, and be appointed as
administratrix of the estate of Crisanta Gabriel as well. She alleged that
she had a bachelors degree in law and had worked for several years in a
law office. On August 14, 2001, the heirs of Belinda opposed Dolores
manifestation and motion. They averred that Dolores was not Crisanta
Gabriels next of kin, let alone the lawful wife of the late Roberto.

On August 24, 2001, Bena Jean filed a Motion for Appointment
as Administrator of the Estate of Crisanta Y. Gabriel praying that she be

appointed administratrix of the estate of her grandmother Crisanta. On

October 11, 2001, Dolores opposed the motion of Bena Jean, claiming
that the latter has neither proven her kinship with Crisanta Gabriel nor
shown any particular qualification to act as administratrix of the estate.

On November 28, 1991, the CA dismissed the petition
for certiorari of Mariano Yanga, Jr. in CA-G.R. SP No. 25897. In a
Resolution dated December 5, 2001, the lower court appointed Dolores
as special administratrix upon a bond of P200,000.00. The probate
court merely noted the motion for substitution filed by the heirs of
Belinda, stating that they were mere strangers to the case. Dolores
was then appointed as Special Administrator of Crisantas estate. The
heirs of Belinda moved to reconsider but the same was denied.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Dolores
Lacuata-Gabriel is entitled to administration of the estate of
Crisanta, she being the heir of her deceased husband whose
estate is the former estate of his adopting mother Crisanta as
the same is contrary to the law on succession? SO, easily put,
whether or not it was proper to appoint Dolores as special
administratix of the estate of Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel?

Held: Yes, it was proper.


The petitioners argue that since the respondent does not have
any right to inherit from their grandmother, either by her own right or
by the right of representation, she is not qualified to be appointed as
administratrix of the estate; in contrast, they are Crisanta Gabriels only
compulsory heirs. They insist that the respondents late husband,
Roberto, was just a nephew of the decedent and not a legally adopted
son as he claimed to be. Even assuming this claim was true, the fact
that the respondent is not naturally related to the decedent by blood in
the direct descending line makes it unfair to appoint her as the special
administratrix.

In ruling against the petitioners and dismissing their petition, the
CA ratiocinated as follows:

The appointment of a special administrator lies

entirely in the discretion of the court. The order of
preference in the appointment of a regular
administrator under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court does not apply to the selection of a special
administrator. In the issuance of such appointment,
which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular
administrator is appointed, the court determines who is
entitled to the administration of the estate of the
decedent. On this point, We hold that the preference of
private respondent Dolores Gabriel is with sufficient
reason.

The facts of this case show that Roberto Gabriel
the legally adopted son of Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel
survived Crisantas death. When Crisanta died on
January 25, 1989, her estate passed on to her surviving
adopted son Roberto. When Roberto himself later died
on April 16, 2001, pursuant to the law on succession, his
own estate which he inherited from Crisanta passed on
to his surviving widow, private respondent.

While it is true, as petitioners submit, that
private respondent is neither a compulsory nor a legal
heir of Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel and is considered a third
person to the estate of Crisanta, nonetheless, private
respondent is undeniably entitled to the administration
of the said estate because she is an heir of her husband
Roberto, whose estate is the former estate of his
adopting mother Crisanta.

The ruling of the CA is correct. The Court has repeatedly held
that the appointment of a special administrator lies in the sound
discretion of the probate court. A special administrator is a
representative of a decedent appointed by the probate court to care
for and preserve his estate until an executor or general administrator
is appointed. When appointed, a special administrator is regarded not
as a representative of the agent of the parties suggesting the
appointment, but as the administrator in charge of the estate, and, in

fact, as an officer of the court. As such officer, he is subject to the

supervision and control of the probate court and is expected to work
for the best interests of the entire estate, especially its smooth
administration and earliest settlement. The principal object of
appointment of temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until
it can pass into hands of person fully authorized to administer it for the
benefit of creditors and heirs. In many instances, the appointment of
administrators for the estates of decedents frequently become involved
in protracted litigations, thereby exposing such estates to great waste
and losses unless an authorized agent to collect the debts and preserve
the assets in the interim is appointed. The occasion for such an
appointment, likewise, arises where, for some cause, such as a
pendency of a suit concerning the proof of the will, regular
administration is delayed.

Section 1, Rule 80 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Appointment of Special Administrator.
When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or
of administration by any cause including an appeal from
the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may
appoint a special administrator to take possession and
charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions
causing the delay are decided and executors or
administrators appointed.


The new Rules have broadened the basis for the appointment of an
administrator, and such appointment is allowed when there is delay in
granting letters testamentary or administration by any cause, e.g.,
parties cannot agree among themselves. Nevertheless, the discretion
to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate court. In De
Guzman v. Guadiz, Jr., the Court further elucidated


Under the above rule, the probate court may
appoint a special administrator should there be a delay
in granting letters testamentary or of administration
occasioned by any cause including an appeal from the

allowance or disallowance of a will. Subject to this

qualification, the appointment of a special administrator
lies in the discretion of the Court. This discretion,
however, must be sound, that is, not whimsical, or
contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle.

The basis for appointing a special administrator
under the Rules is broad enough to include any cause or
reason for the delay in granting letters testamentary or
of administration as where a contest as to the will is
being carried on in the same or in another court, or
where there is an appeal pending as to the proceeding
on the removal of an executor or administrator, or in
cases where the parties cannot agree among
themselves. Likewise, when from any cause general
administration cannot be immediately granted, a special
administrator may be appointed to collect and preserve
the property of the deceased.

It is obvious that the phrase by any cause
includes those incidents which transpired in the instant
case clearly showing that there is a delay in the probate
of the will and that the granting of letters testamentary
will consequently be prolonged necessitating the
immediate appointment of a special administrator.


As enunciated above, the probate court has ample jurisdiction
to appoint respondent as special administratrix. The deceased Crisanta
Yanga-Gabriel left a document purporting to be her will where her
adopted son, Roberto, was named as the sole heir of all her properties.
However, pending probate of the will, Roberto died leaving his widow,
the respondent herein, as his sole heir. Thus, the respondent has much
stake in Crisantas estate in case the latters will is allowed probate. It
needs to be emphasized that in the appointment of a special
administrator (which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular
administrator is appointed), the probate court does not determine the
shares in the decedents estate, but merely appoints who is entitled to
administer the estate. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in

the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on

the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of
distribution. Thus, the preference of respondent is sound, that is, not
whimsical, or contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle.

The petitioners strenuous invocation of Section 6, Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court is misplaced. The rule refers to the appointment of
regular administrators of estates; Section 1, Rule 80, on the other hand,
applies to the appointment of a special administrator. It has long been
settled that the appointment of special administrators is not governed
by the rules regarding the appointment of regular administrators. Thus,
in Roxas v. Pecson, this Court ruled:

It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred
right of certain persons to the appointment of administrator under
Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory provisions as to causes for
removal of an executor or administrator under section 653 of Act No.
190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of
special administrator. ... As the law does not say who shall be appointed
as special administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have,
the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be
appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or
contrary to reason, justice or equity.

ROWENA F. CORONA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, ROMARICO G. VITUG, AVELINO L.
CASTILLO, NICANOR CASTILLO, KATHLEEN D. LUCHANGCO,
GUILLERMO LUCHANGCO, JR., ANTONIO LUCHANGCO, RODOLFO
TORRES, REYNALDO TORRES and PURISIMA T. POLINTAN,
respondents.
Facts:
-

Dolores Luchangco Vitug died in New York, U.S.A., leaving two

Wills: one, a holographic Will which excluded her husband, and

the other, a formal Will which expressly disinherited her

husband Romarico "for reason of his improper and immoral
conduct amounting to concubinage, which is a ground for legal
separation under Philippine Law"; bequeathed her properties
in equal shares to her sisters and her nieces; and appointed
Rowena F. Corona, herein petitioner, as her Executrix.
Rowena filed a petition for the probate of the Wills and for the
appointment of Nenita P. Alonte as Administrator because she
(Rowena) is presently employed in the United Nations in New
York City.
The surviving husband, Romarico Vitug, filed an opposition
praying for his appointment as Special Administrator because
the Special Administratrix appointed is not related to the heirs
and has no interest to be protected, besides, the surviving
spouse is qualified to administer.
The Probate Court set aside its Order appointing Nenita as
Special Administratrix, and appointed instead the surviving
husband, Romarico as Special Administrator essentially for the
reasons that under Section 6, Rule 78, of the Rules of Court, the
surviving spouse is first in the order of preference for
appointment as Administrator as he has an interest in the
estate; that the disinheritance of the surviving spouse is not
among the grounds of disqualification for appointment as
Administrator; that the next of kin is appointed only where the
surviving spouse is not competent or is unwilling to serve
besides the fact that the Executrix appointed, is not the next of
kin but merely a niece, and that the decedent's estate is nothing
more than half of the unliquidated conjugal partnership
property.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration with an alternate Motion
for the appointment of co-Special Administrators to which
private respondents filed their Opposition. Reconsideration
having been denied, petitioner resorted to a Petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the Petition stating that the Probate Court strictly
observed the order of preference established by the Rules

Issue: Whether Nenite Alonte, a stranger to the estate, can be appointed

as the administrator?

Ruling: Yes.
-

The Court is of the considered opinion that petitioner's

nominee, Nenita F. Alonte, should be appointed as co-Special
Administrator. The executrix's choice of Special Administrator,
considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of
discretion given her by the testatrix in her Will, is entitled to
the highest consideration. Objections to Nenita's appointment
on grounds of impracticality and lack of kinship are over-
shadowed by the fact that justice and equity demand that the
side of the deceased wife and the faction of the surviving
husband be represented in the management of the decedent's
estate.
En passant, it is apropos to remind the Special Administrators
that while they may have respective interests to protect, they
are officers of the Court subject to the supervision and control
of the Probate Court and are expected to work for the best
interests of the entire estate, its smooth administration, and its
earliest settlement.

Vda. De Dayrit v. Ramolete - WALA

G.R. No. L-59935
30 September 1982

Co. vs Hon. Rosario
Facts:
RTC of Makati appointed Luis Co as a special administrator of the estate of
his father, Co Bun Chun. However, the other heirs of the deceased, filed a
motion to set aside the appointment of Co, and this was acted upon by the
trial court. Consequently, Co nominated his son Alvin to be a co-
administrator of the estate. The trial court then, appointed Alvin as a co-
administrator.

Almost four years thereafter, the RTC, acting on a motion filed by one of
the heirs, issued its January 22, 2002 Order revoking and setting aside the
appointment of Alvin. The trial court reasoned that Alvin had become
unsuitable to discharge the trust given to him as special co-administrator
because his capacity, ability or competence to perform the functions of co-
administrator had been beclouded by the filing of several criminal cases
against him, which, even if there was no conviction yet, had provided the
heirs ample reason to doubt his fitness to handle the subject estate with
utmost fidelity, trust and confidence.
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said Order, but
this was denied in the RTC Order.
Subsequently, petitioner brought the matter to the CA on petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. In the aforesaid challenged Decision, the
appellate court affirmed the revocation of the appointment and dismissed
the petition. Thus, the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45.

Issue: W/N the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in revoking
the appointment and if can be reviewable under petitions for review on
certiorari.
Held: No. the trial court did not act with grave abuse of discretion in
revoking Alvin's appointment as special co-administrator. Settled is the
rule that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed
by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators.
Courts may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds
other than those enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion. As long as
the said discretion is exercised without grave abuse, higher courts will not
interfere with it. This, however, is no authority for the judge to become
partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his
passions to rule, his judgment. The exercise of such discretion mustbe
based on reason, equity, justice and legal principles.

Thus, even if a special administrator had already been appointed, once the
court finds the appointee no longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified
in withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect thereto. The
special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its

supervision and control and who is expected to work for the best interest
of the entire estate, especially with respect to its smooth administration
and earliest settlement.
In this case, we find that the trial court's judgment on the issue of Alvin's
removal as special co-administrator is grounded on reason, equity, justice
and legal principle. It is not characterized by patent and gross
capriciousness, pure whim and abuse, arbitrariness or despotism, as to be
correctible by the writ of certiorari.