MAAE 4102

Engineering Materials
Strength & Fracture
Chapter 1
Introduction
Professor R. Bell
Department of Mechanical & Aerospace Engineering
Carleton University
2013
Chapter 1 - Introduction

Department of Mechanical &

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Fracture Control of Structures

Fracture Control of Structures
These procedures are used to ensure the safe operation of
structures without catastrophic fracture and failure

Failure Modes
General Yielding or excessive plastic deformation
Buckling or general instability, either elastic or plastic
Sub-critical crack growth (fatigue, stress corrosion, or corrosion
fatigue) leading to loss of section or unstable crack growth
Unstable crack extension, either ductile or brittle leading to
either partial or complete failure
Corrosion or creep

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Types of Material Failure

Deformation

Time Independent
Elastic
Plastic
Time dependent
Creep

Fracture

Static Loading
Brittle - Ductile
Environmental
Creep Rupture
Fatigue: Cyclic Loading
High Cycle - Low Cycle
Fatigue crack growth
Corrosion Fatigue

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Elastic and Plastic Deformation

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Creep Deformation
Creep is the continuous plastic deformation of a material with time

Log log plot

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Fracture Under Static and Dynamic Loads

Brittle Fracture

Little or no plastic deformation

Brittle fracture of steel below

the transition temperature
occurs by cleavage

Ductile Fracture

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Fracture Toughness
The resistance of a material to fracture in the presence of a crack is measured
by a material property called the Fracture Toughness K
Generally, materials with high strength have low toughness and vice-versa

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Fatigue Under Cyclic Loading

Constant Amplitude

Variable Amplitude

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Fatigue S-N curves

m4 > m3 > m2 > m1

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Thickness Effect in Fatigue

Other things being equal, an

increase in section size will
result in a decrease in fatigue
life

Fatigue is controlled by
weakest link of the material

Probability of weak link

increases with volume

A larger component will have a

larger surface volume and
therefore a larger surface area
subjected to high stress

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Susceptibility to Fracture
3 Primary Factors:
Fracture toughness of a material
(service temp, loading rate and plate thickness)
Size, shape and orientation of the crack
Tensile stress level
(including effects of residual stress, stress
concentration and constraint)

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Relationship between , a and KIC

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Fracture Control Requirements

Damage Tolerance Analysis
Material selection in the design stage
Design Improvement
Structural Testing
Maintenance, Inspection and Replacement
Schedules
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Extent of Fracture Control

This Depends on:
The criticality of the component or structure
The economic consequences of the structure
being out of service
Possible damage caused by the failure
Potential Loss of life

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Damage Tolerance Analysis

Damage Tolerance is the property of a structure to sustain
defects or cracks safely until such time that they can be
repaired or the component replaced.
This Requires:
Material selection in the design stage
Detailed material properties
Periodic inspections either non-destructive or destructive
(hydrostatic tests)
Crack growth calculations
Damage Tolerance Analysis forms the basis of Fracture Control
and the mathematical tool employed is Fracture Mechanics
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Fracture Mechanics
Provides the concepts and equations to determine:

How cracks grow

How cracks affect the strength of a structure

Not perfect but no engineering tool is

Inaccuracies due more to inaccurate inputs more
than the inadequacy of the concepts

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Damage Tolerance Analysis

The objective of Damage tolerance is to determine: The effect of cracks on strength
(margin against fracture)
Crack growth as a function of time

Requires

Material selection at design stage

Periodic inspections
Crack growth calculations
Decisions on repair or retirement

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Residual Strength Diagram

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Pu The ultimate design

strength load
Ps - The maximum
anticipated service load
Pu = SF : Ps - SF safety factor
SF is 3 for civil structures,
1.5 for aircraft
Pa - the average service load
see figure
Pp - the minimum permissible
residual strength - leads to a
maximum permissible crack
size ap

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Crack Growth as a Function of Time

H is the time of safe operation until aP is

reached

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Crack Growth and fracture

To Fracture is the final event and takes place due to one of three
mechanisms
Cleavage
Rupture
Intergranular fracture

Cleavage - is the splitting apart of atomic planes

Ductile rupture - is the breaking of alloying elements forming

voids which link up

Intergranular fracture - the fracture path is along the grain

boundaries
This mechanism of separation requires either cleavage or
rupture

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Crack growth
Crack Growth takes place by:
Fatigue due to cyclic loading
Stress Corrosion due to sustained loading
Creep - constant loading at high temperature
Hydrogen induced cracking - Delayed hydride cracking
Liquid metal induced cracking.
(of little interest in load bearing structures.
e.g. Hg in contact with Al)
Items 1 and 2 are of most interest in general design
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Mechanism of fatigue crack Growth

Ref: Broek, The Practical Use of Fracture Mechanics, Fig1.4. Kluwer Publishers

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Damage Tolerance and Fracture Mechanics

Similar Procedures:
Damage Tolerance
Fitness for Purpose
Fracture and Fatigue Control
in Structures
Fracture Control Plans
Fracture Mechanics uses
stresses rather than loads
Residual Strength Diagram in terms of stress
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Modes of Loading

Mode I

Mode II

Mode III

Concerned with the processes at the crack tip in terms of stresses

The majority of cracks result from Mode I loading
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Crack Tip Equations

Irwin gave the stress and displacement
fields in the vicinity of crack tips
Mode I Loading

x =

3
cos 1 sin sin
2
2
2
2 r

y =

3
cos 1 + sin sin
2
2
2
2 r

xy =

KI

KI

3
cos sin cos
2
2
2
2 r
KI

z = ( x + y )
xz = yz = 0

KI r 2
2

cos
1
2
sin
u=

2
2
G 2
1

KI r 2
2

sin
2
2
cos

v=

2
2
G 2
w=0

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Crack Tip Equations

Mode II Loading
x =

y =
xy =

3
sin 2 + cos cos
2
2
2
2 r

K II

3
sin cos cos
2
2
2
2 r

K II

3
cos 1 sin sin
2
2
2
2 r

K II

z = ( x + y )

xz = yz = 0

K II r 2
2
sin
2
2
cos

u=

2
2
G 2
1

K II r 2
2
cos
1
2
sin

+
+
v=

2
2
G 2
w=0

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Crack Tip Equations

Mode III Loading
xz =

K III

yz =

K III

2 r

2 r

sin

cos

x = y = z = xy = 0
1

K III r 2
w=
2 sin
2
G

u=v=0

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Historical Background
During first half of industrial era structural failures were numerous
too numerous to report
Now less failures due to:

Improved materials
Refinement of design procedures
Design codes
Enforcement of safety factors
Quality control procedures
More vigilant society

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Historical Background

Annual costs of Fracture:

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Historical Background
But number of failures is not zero
> 25 bridges have collapsed during the 20th century
West Gate Bridge Melbourne 1970
Quebec Bridge 1907
Sgt. Aubrey Cosens VC Memorial Bridge 2003

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Quebec Bridge 1st Disaster 1907

Bridge had a 488m (1600 ft) span between peers
Increased to 549 m (1800 ft)
Cantilever (about 600ft) buckled and fell
75 men killed
Royal Commission found
Loads under estimated
failure to recalculate stresses after changes
compressive members under designed

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Quebec Bridge 2 Disaster 1916

Center section to be lifted into place
Material failure in one of 4 bearing
castings with supported span during lift
Span slide into river 13 killed
Center section rebuilt and bridge
finished in 1918

Span
Original

488 m
(1600ft)

Final

549 m
(1800ft)

Compressive
Chords
1.38m high
(4.5ft)
2.21m
(73)

Steel CSA
of Chords
0.543m2
(842in2)
1.252 m2
(1941 in2)

Ref: Canadian Professional Engineering and Geoscience:

Practice and Ethics, Andrews 2005 pp15-26

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West Gate Bridge Melbourne 1970

Cable stayed bridge over river Yarra

total length of the bridge is 2582 m.
longest span 336 m 58 m above river
2 years into construction bridge collapsed

Ref: Report of Royal Commission, Melbourne, Australia, 7073/71

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West Gate Bridge Melbourne 1970

On 15 October 1970, the 112 m span
between piers10 and 11 collapsed and
fell 50 m to the ground and water below.
Thirty-five construction workers were killed.
There was a difference in camber of 4.5 in
between two half girders at the west end
of the span which needed to be joined.
It was proposed that the higher one be
weighted down with 8 concrete blocks,
each 10 tonnes, which were located on site.
The weight of these blocks caused the span
to buckle, which was a sign of
structural failure

Ref: Report of Royal Commission, Melbourne, Australia, 7073/71

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West Gate Bridge Melbourne 1970

On 15 October 1970, the 112 m span
between piers10 and 11 collapsed and
fell 50 m to the ground and water below.
Thirty-five construction workers were killed.
There was a difference in camber of 4.5 in
between two half girders at the west end
of the span which needed to be joined.
It was proposed that the higher one be
weighted down with 8 concrete blocks,
each 10 tonnes, which were located on site.
The weight of these blocks caused the span
to buckle, which was a sign of
structural failure

Ref: Report of Royal Commission, Melbourne, Australia, 7073/71

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West Gate Bridge Melbourne 1970

The longitudinal joining of the half girders
was partially complete when orders
came through to remove the buckle.
unbolting the 4-5 splice is to be done with
the object of making possible the
completion of the diaphragm connection.
As the bolts were removed the bridge
snapped back and the span collapsed.

Ref: Report of Royal Commission, Melbourne, Australia, 7073/71

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Sgt. Aubrey Cosens VC Memorial Bridge

Failure occurred on January 14, 2003 at approximately 3:00 p.m.

This steel arch bridge is located on Highway 11 in Latchford and spans the Montreal River.
As a tractor-trailer crossed the bridge, the concrete deck deflected approximately 2 metres
at the NW corner due to the failure of 3 hanger rods.
Failure was caused by the fatigue-induced fracture of 3 steel hanger rods on the NW side of the bridge.
Ref: Sgt. Aubrey Cosens V.C. Memorial Bridge: Final Report December 1, 2003. Ontario Min. of Transportation

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Sgt. Aubrey Cosens VC Memorial Bridge

The original design did not consider that the pins in the hangers
could seize and cause bending fatigue stresses in the rods.
The bending fatigue stresses led to the eventual fracture of the rods.
The threaded portion of the rods was damaged during construction 40 years ago.
The quality of the steel does not meet current standards for ductility in cold temperatures
and chemical composition.
The critical parts of the hanger rods were hidden from inspection since they were inside the arch.
Ref: Sgt. Aubrey Cosens V.C. Memorial Bridge: Final Report December 1, 2003. Ontario Min. of Transportation

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Historical Background
> 200 civil aircraft had fatal accident due to fatigue cracks
Comet 1954
DC10 disc
Japan Airlines flight 123 1985
Aloha airlines - 1989

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Comet -1954

Ref: Fatigue and the Comet Disasters, T. Bishop., Metal Progress, May 1955

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DC10 Disk Failure

Ref: NTSB, Aircraft Accident Report, PB90-910406, 1989

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Japan Airlines Flight 123 - 1985

The aircraft was involved in a tailstrike incident
at Itami Airport on June 2, 1978, which damaged
the aircraft's rear bulkhead.
The subsequent repair performed by Boeing
was flawed. Boeing's procedures called for a
doubler plate with two rows of rivets to cover up
the damaged bulkhead, but the engineers fixing
the aircraft used two doubler plates with only one
row of rivets.
This reduced the part's resistance to metal
fatigue by 70%.
When the bulkhead gave way, it ruptured the
lines of all four hydraulic systems. With the
aircraft's control surfaces disabled, the aircraft
was uncontrollable

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Type

Accident site

Fatalities
Injuries

Mid-air
disintegration
Mount
Takamagahara,
Gunma, Japan

520
4

Aircraft
Aircraft type

Boeing B-747SR46

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Aloha Airlines - 1988

Aging aircraft
Aircraft flying at 2400 ft. Hilo to Honolulu
89 passengers and 5 crew
Upper half of fuselage comes away
The aircraft had operated for 35,496 hours
The aircraft had taken off 89,680 times,
Each flight had averaged only about 25 minutes
Ref: Http://www.aloha.net

Corrosion in lap joint

Rivets overstressed due to corrosion products
Cracks joined up between rivet holes
1 fatality

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Cracks in Nuclear Plants

Numerous cracks in nuclear plants
Delayed hydride cracking in
Candu reactor
Leak before break critera

Ref: From Steam to Space, CSME 1996, p155

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Offshore Structures
Failures in offshore structures

Alexander L Keilland -1980

Ref: Inquiry on the Alexander L Kielland Accident, NOU 1981:11, Oslo Norway.

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Failures in Ships
Failures in ships
Liberty ships - 1941
Kurdistan 1979

Ref: Barsom & Rolfe, Fatigue and Fracture Control

in Structures, 3rd Ed. Fig. 1.2

Ref: Report 632/1998, TWI, UK

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Failures in Ships - Flare 1988

Ref: Marine Investigation Report

Break-Up and Sinking of the Bulk
Carrier "FLARE Cabot Strait,16
January 1998. TSBC
Report Number M98N0001

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Cracks in Ships TAPS Tankers

Ref: Trans-Alsaka Pipeline Service- Tanker Structural Failure Study May 1991

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Natural Disasters 2005 Hurricanes

Katrina and Rita

http://www.enrg.lsu.edu/presentations/katrinarita

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Structural Safety
No manufacturer or operator of large structures
can afford to ignore fracture control
Society is less tolerant and very litigious
Structural Safety Requires:
Rational fracture control
Damage tolerant analysis
Based on the use of fracture mechanics
Adherence to Codes and Guidelines

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Codes and Guidelines

Civil aircraft FAR.25
Military aircraft Mil-A-83444
Pressure Vessels ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code
Section XI
Ship Structures
A.B.S. - American Bureau of Shipping
Lloyds of London
Offshore Structures
DNV
Norway
Eurocode
API American Petroleum Institute
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Codes and Guidelines

Bridges
AASHTO - American Association of State
Highway Transportation Officials
Fracture Control Plan for Steel Bridges
BSI - BS4710
Welding
A.W.S. D 1.1 - American Welding Society
C.S.A. - Canadian Standard for Steel Structures
Defect Assessment
BS PD 6493 Guidance on Methods for Assessing
the Acceptability of Flaws in welded Structures - 1980
BS 7910 - Guidance on Methods for Assessing
the Acceptability of Flaws in fusion welded Structures 1999
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Failure Assessment Diagrams

Based on BSI PD 6493:1991

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Fracture Analysis
Fracture mechanics concepts and
Damage Tolerance Analysis are never perfect
We will Focus on
Applying Damage Tolerance Analysis
Information required for analysis
Reliability of the analysis
Engineering approaches and approximations

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Fracture Analysis

Hand Tool
Damage Tolerance of an Aircraft
Expensive
20,000 60,000 man hours
Testing for material data and analysis
substantiation a further 20,000 60,000
Concerned with the consequences of failure

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Fracture Analysis
Analysis of a Hand tool
Must be cheap and accurate
There are still consequences of failure
Failure caused by lack of chamfer
Excessive hardness lack of toughness
Striking face not tempered
Did not meet BS:876

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References

Department of Mechanical &

Aerospace Engineering

J.M. Barsom and S.T. Rolfe,

Fatigue & Fracture Control in Structures, Prentice Hall, 1987.
P.A. Ross-Ross,
The Investigation into the Cracking of Pressure Tubes in Pickering
Units 3 and4, From Steam to Space, CSME 1996.
Standard Method for Plane-Strain Fracture Toughness of Metallic
Materials. ASTM Specification E-399-83
Brock, D.
"Elementary Engineering Fracture Mechanics"
(2nd Edition, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982)
Brock, D.
"The Practrical Use of Fracture Mechanics
(Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988)
Anderson, T.L
Fracture Mechanics - Fundamentals and Applications
(2 nd Edition, CRC Press, Boca Raton, 1995)
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References

Louisiana State University Center for Energy Studies (2006)

Almar-Naess, A. "Fatigue Handbook - Offshore Steel structures.
(Tapir Publishers, Trondheim, Norway, 1985)
Journal of Engineering Failure Analysis, Vol 12, 2005

http://www.enrg.lsu.edu/presentations/katrinarita

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