SECOND DIVISION

HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES

A.C. No. 6270

LUCAS and FRANCISCA VILLANUEVA,

Complainants,
- versus ATTY. SALUD P. BERADIO,
Respondent.

Promulgated:
January 22, 2007

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment case against Atty. Salud P. Beradio (respondent), filed by the heirs of
the
late
spouses
Lucas
and
Francisca
Villanueva
(spouses
Villanueva),
namely:Ardenio M. Fonacier, Araceli M. Fonacier, Alano M. Fonacier, Eusebio M. Fonacier, Jr.,
Rolando V. Nazarro, Alejandro V. Nazarro, Margarita V. Collado, Felisa Collado,
andHerminigildo Ylhi (complainants).
The Facts
During their lifetime, the spouses Villanueva acquired several parcels of land
in Pangasinan, one of which was covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 2522.
Francisca died in 1968, and Lucas in 1974. Their five children, namely, Simeona, Susana, Maria,
Alfonso, and Florencia, survived them.
On 22 May 1984, Alfonso executed an Affidavit of Adjudication[1] (affidavit of
adjudication) stating that as the only surviving son and sole heirs (sic) of the spouses
Villanueva, he was adjudicating to himself the parcel of land under OCT No. 2522. Alfonso then
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale[2] (deed of sale) on 5 July 1984, conveying the property to

Adriano Villanueva. Respondent appeared as notary public on both the affidavit of adjudication
and the deed of sale.
Contrary to the misrepresentations of Alfonso, his sister Florencia was still alive at the
time he executed the affidavit of adjudication and the deed of sale, as were descendants of the
other children of the spouses Villanueva. Complainants claimed that respondent was aware of
this fact, as respondent had been their neighbor in Balungao,Pangasinan, from the time of their
birth, and respondent constantly mingled with their family. Complainants accused respondent of
knowing the true facts and surrounding circumstances regarding the properties of the spouses
Villanueva, yet conspiring with Alfonso to deprive his co-heirs of their rightful shares in the
property.
In a resolution dated 11 February 2004, this Court required respondent to comment on the
complaint.
In her Comment,[3] respondent admitted that she notarized the affidavit of adjudication
and the deed of sale executed by Alfonso in 1984. However, respondent denied that she
conspired with Alfonso to dispose of fraudulently the property. Respondent alleged that Alfonso
executed the two documents under the following circumstances:

That the properties of the late spouses [Villanueva] have been divided
equally among their compulsory heirs, but said old couple left for themselves one
titled lot, the subject now of the complaint x x x That said titled property was the
only property left by the old couple, to answer for their needs while they are still
alive until their deaths x x x. Alfonso [and his wife] were tasked to take care of
the old couple, as they were the ones living in the same compound with their
late parents. This fact was and is known by the other compulsory heirs, and
they never questioned the said act of their parents, as they already had their
own share on the estate of the late [spouses Villanueva]. This fact was also
known to me because [Lucas] and [Alfonso] lived across the street from our
house and I was requested to the house of the old man when he gave said title
to [Alfonso and Tomasa, his wife]. The other compulsory heirs who were still
alive at the time just made visits to their parents and never stayed in their old
house to help in the care of their parents. Even [when] the parents died, it was
[Alfonso and his wife] who took charge of the funeral and all other acts relative
thereto.
xxxx
That said title remain[ed] in the custody of [Alfonso] and after the death of
the old man, when the spouses Alfonso [and Tomasa] needed money to finance

the schooling of their children, it was then that they thought of disposing the land
x x x and said land was sold by them to one Adriano Villanueva of which in
both documents, I notarized the same (sic).

xxxx
I can say with all clean and good intentions, that if ever I notarized said
documents, it was done in good faith, to do my job as expected of me, to help,
assist and to guide people who come to me for legal assistance, as contained in
my oath as a lawyer when I passed the bar. x x x[4] (Emphasis supplied)

According to respondent, the fact that none of Alfonsos co-heirs filed their objections at
the time he executed the affidavit of adjudication proved that most of the properties of the
spouses Villanueva had earlier been distributed to the other heirs. It also proved that the heirs
had agreed to abide by the intention of the spouses Villanueva to leave the property to Alfonso.
Respondent asserted that the personal appearances and acknowledgment by the party to the
document are the core of the ritual that effectively convert a private document into a public
document x x x.

On 26 May 2004, we resolved to refer the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), which designated Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (IBP
Commissioner Villadolid) to investigate, and submit his report and recommendation on, the
complaint.
The IBPs Findings

In his Report dated 16 September 2005, IBP Commissioner Villadolid found that
respondent violated the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the spirit and
intent of the notarial law when she notarized the affidavit knowing that Alfonso was not the sole
compulsory heir of the spouses Villanueva. Although he found no evidence of fraudulent intent
on respondents part, IBP Commissioner Villadolid held that respondent engaged in conduct
that lessened confidence in the legal system. Thus, he recommended suspension of
respondents notarial commission for one year. He further recommended that respondent be
reprimanded or suspended from the practice of law for up to six months.
The Courts Ruling

We sustain partly the IBPs findings and recommendations.

A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of
which are the acknowledgment and affirmation of a document or instrument. In the performance
of such notarial acts, the notary public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal as
affixed on a document. The notarial seal converts the document from private to public, after
which it may be presented as evidence without need for proof of its genuineness and due
execution.[5] Thus, notarization should not be treated as an empty, meaningless,
or routinary act.[6] As early as Panganiban v. Borromeo,[7] we held that notaries public must
inform themselves of the facts to which they intend to certify and to take no part in illegal
transactions. They must guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements.[8]
On its face, Alfonsos affidavit does not appear to contain any illegal or immoral
declaration. However, respondent herself admitted that she knew of the falsity of Alfonsos
statement that he was the sole heir of the spouses Villanueva. Respondent therefore notarized a
document while fully aware that it contained a material falsehood,i.e., Alfonsos assertion of
status as sole heir. The affidavit of adjudication is premised on this very assertion. By this
instrument, Alfonso claimed a portion of his parents estate all to himself, to the exclusion of his
co-heirs. Shortly afterwards, respondent notarized the deed of sale, knowing that the deed took
basis from the unlawful affidavit of adjudication.
Respondent never disputed complainants allegation of her close relationship with the
Villanueva family spanning several decades. Respondent even underscored this closeness by
claiming that Lucas himself requested her to come to his house the day Lucas handed to Alfonso
a copy of OCT No. 2522, allegedly so she could hear the conversation between them.
Respondent claims she is not administratively liable because at the time Alfonso executed
the affidavit, his co-heirs had already received their respective shares from the estate of the
spouses Villanueva. However, we are not concerned here with the proper distribution of the
spouses Villanuevas estates. Rather, respondents liability springs from her failure to discharge
properly her duties as a notary public and as a member of the bar.
Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a false statement or
information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix his or
hernotarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as
the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the
notarization process may be undermined and public confidence on notarial documents
diminished. In this case, respondents conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes. Respondent also violated Rule 1.01 of the Code which
proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.

We also view with disfavor respondents lack of candor before the IBP proceedings. The
transcript of hearings shows that respondent denied preparing or notarizing the deed of
sale,[9] when she already admitted having done so in her Comment.

WHEREFORE, for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, we REVOKE the commission of respondent Atty. Salud P. Beradio as Notary
Public, if still existing, and DISQUALIFY her from being commissioned a notary public for one
(1) year. We further SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months effective
upon finality of this decision.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondents personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 5439

January 22, 2007

CLARITA J. SAMALA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LUCIANO D. VALENCIA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a complaint1 dated May 2, 2001 filed by Clarita J. Samala (complainant) against
Atty. Luciano D. Valencia (respondent) for Disbarment on the following grounds: (a) serving on
two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties; (b) knowingly misleading the court by
submitting false documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases in exchange for
nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate
children.
After respondent filed his Comment, the Court, in its Resolution of October 24, 2001, referred
the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. 2
The investigation was conducted by Commissioner Demaree Jesus B. Raval. After a series of
hearings, the parties filed their respective memoranda 3 and the case was deemed submitted for
resolution.
Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes prepared the Report and Recommendation 4 dated January
12, 2006. He found respondent guilty of violating Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended the penalty of suspension for six months.
In a minute Resolution 5 passed on May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner Reyes but increased the penalty of
suspension from six months to one year.
We adopt the report of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the issue on immorality and as
to the recommended penalty.
On serving as counsel for contending parties.
Records show that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 272, Marikina City, entitled "Leonora M. Aville v. Editha Valdez" for nonpayment of

rentals, herein respondent, while being the counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel
for the tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga by filing an Explanation and
Compliance before the RTC. 7
In Civil Case No. 98-6804 filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 75, Marikina
City, entitled "Editha S. Valdez and Joseph J. Alba, Jr. v. Salve Bustamante and her husband" for
ejectment, respondent represented Valdez against Bustamante - one of the tenants in the property
subject of the controversy. Defendants appealed to the RTC, Branch 272, Marikina City
docketed as SCA Case No. 99-341-MK. In his decision dated May 2, 2000,8 Presiding Judge
Reuben P. dela Cruz 9 warned respondent to refrain from repeating the act of being counsel of
record of both parties in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK.
But in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK, filed in the RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, entitled
"Editha S. Valdez v. Joseph J. Alba, Jr. and Register of Deeds of Marikina City," respondent, as
counsel for Valdez, filed a Complaint for Rescission of Contract with Damages and Cancellation
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 275500 against Alba, respondent's former client in Civil Case
No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK.
Records further reveal that at the hearing of November 14, 2003, respondent admitted that in
Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, he was the lawyer for Lagmay (one of the tenants) but not for
Bustamante and Bayuga albeit he filed the Explanation and Compliance for and in behalf of the
tenants. Respondent also admitted that he represented Valdez in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and
SCA Case No. 99-341-MK against Bustamante and her husband but denied being the counsel for
Alba although the case is entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband," because
Valdez told him to include Alba as the two were the owners of the property and it was only
Valdez who signed the complaint for ejectment. But, while claiming that respondent did not
represent Alba, respondent, however, avers that he already severed his representation for Alba
when the latter charged respondent with estafa. Thus, the filing of Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK
against Alba.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person
whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. 15 He may not also undertake to
discharge conflicting duties any more than he may represent antagonistic interests. This stern
rule is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste. 16 It springs from the relation of
attorney and client which is one of trust and confidence. Lawyers are expected not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing
for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice. 17
One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. 18

The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on principles of public
policy and good taste. It springs from the attorney's duty to represent his client with undivided
fidelity and to maintain inviolate the client's confidence as well as from the injunction forbidding
the examination of an attorney as to any of the privileged communications of his client. 19
An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but
also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated. 20 The bare attorney-client
relationship with a client precludes an attorney from accepting professional employment from
the client's adversary either in the same case 21 or in a different but related action. 22 A lawyer is
forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when the subject matter
of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous
litigation in which he appeared for the former client. 23
We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez 24 that the termination of the relation of attorney and client
provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of
the former client. The reason for the rule is that the client's confidence once reposed cannot be
divested by the expiration of the professional employment. 25 Consequently, a lawyer should not,
even after the severance of the relation with his client, do anything which will injuriously affect
his former client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor should he disclose or
use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation. 26
In this case, respondent's averment that his relationship with Alba has long been severed by the
act of the latter of not turning over the proceeds collected in Civil Case No. 98-6804, in
connivance with the complainant, is unavailing. Termination of the attorney-client relationship
precludes an attorney from representing a new client whose interest is adverse to his former
client. Alba may not be his original client but the fact that he filed a case entitled "Valdez and
Alba v. Bustamante and her husband," is a clear indication that respondent is protecting the
interests of both Valdez and Alba in the said case. Respondent cannot just claim that the lawyerclient relationship between him and Alba has long been severed without observing Section 26,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court wherein the written consent of his client is required.
In Gonzales v. Cabucana, Jr., 27 citing the case of Quiambao v. Bamba, 28 we held that:
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the
opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no
moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer
has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential
information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly
unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are
present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer's respective retainers with each of them
would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients. 29
Respondent is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
states that "a lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the
attorney-client relation is terminated."

The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust
and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected
with his client's case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong
ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. 30
From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent's representation of Valdez and Alba against
Bustamante and her husband, in one case, and Valdez against Alba, in another case, is a clear
case of conflict of interests which merits a corresponding sanction from this Court. Respondent
may have withdrawn his representation in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK upon being warned by the
court, 31 but the same will not exculpate him from the charge of representing conflicting interests
in his representation in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK.
Respondent is reminded to be more cautious in accepting professional employments, to refrain
from all appearances and acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict of
interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection and dedication befitting a member of the
Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his clients. 32
On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence.
Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 filed before MTC, Branch 75 for ejectment,
respondent submitted TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership despite the fact that a
new TCT No. 275500 was already issued in the name of Alba on February 2, 1995.
Records reveal that respondent filed Civil Case No. 00-7137 on November 27, 2000 and
presented TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership of the subject property. 33 During
the hearing before Commissioner Raval, respondent avers that when the Answer was filed in the
said case, that was the time that he came to know that the title was already in the name of Alba;
so that when the court dismissed the complaint, he did not do anything anymore. 34 Respondent
further avers that Valdez did not tell him the truth and things were revealed to him only when the
case for rescission was filed in 2002.
Upon examination of the record, it was noted that Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK for rescission of
contract and cancellation of TCT No. 275500 was also filed on November 27, 2000, 35 before
RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, thus belying the averment of respondent that he came to know
of Alba's title only in 2002 when the case for rescission was filed. It was revealed during the
hearing before Commissioner Raval that Civil Case Nos. 00-7137 and 2000-657-MK were filed
on the same date, although in different courts and at different times.
Hence, respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the title he submitted was already
cancelled in lieu of a new title issued in the name of Alba in 1995 yet, as proof of the latter's
ownership.
Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by any artifice. It matters not that the trial
court was not misled by respondent's submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name of Valdez, as

shown by its decision dated January 8, 2002 36 dismissing the complaint for ejectment. What is
decisive in this case is respondent's intent in trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No.
273020 despite the fact that said title was already cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 275500,
was already issued in the name of Alba.
In Young v. Batuegas,37 we held that a lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his
admission to the Bar that he will "do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court" and
he shall "conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with
all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients." He should bear in mind that as an officer
of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the
case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. The courts, on the other
hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before
them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client's rights and is expected to display
the utmost zeal in defense of his client's cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth.
A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the
administration of law and the dispensation of justice. 40 As such, he should make himself more
an exemplar for others to emulate.41
>On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees.
Complainant alleges that respondent filed the following cases: (a) Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK
at the RTC, Branch 272; (b) Civil Case No. 00-7137 at the MTC, Branch 75; and (c) I.S. Nos.
00-4439 and 01-036162 both entitled "Valencia v. Samala" for estafa and grave coercion,
respectively, before the Marikina City Prosecutor. Complainant claims that the two criminal
cases were filed in retaliation for the cases she filed against Lagmay docketed as I.S. No. 004306 for estafa and I.S. No. 00-4318 against Alvin Valencia (son of respondent) for trespass to
dwelling.
As culled from the records, Valdez entered into a retainer agreement with respondent. As
payment for his services, he was allowed to occupy the property for free and utilize the same as
his office pursuant to their retainer agreement. 42
Respondent filed I.S. Nos. 00-4439 and 01-036162 both entitled "Valencia v. Samala" for estafa
and grave coercion, respectively, to protect his client's rights against complainant who filed I.S.
No. 00-4306 for estafa against Lagmay, and I.S. No. 00-4318 against Alvin Valencia for trespass
to dwelling.
We find the charge to be without sufficient basis. The act of respondent of filing the aforecited
cases to protect the interest of his client, on one hand, and his own interest, on the other, cannot
be made the basis of an administrative charge unless it can be clearly shown that the same was
being done to abuse judicial processes to commit injustice.
The filing of an administrative case against respondent for protecting the interest of his client and
his own right would be putting a burden on a practicing lawyer who is obligated to defend and
prosecute the right of his client.

On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

We find respondent liable for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three children by Teresita Lagmay who are
all over 20 years of age, 48 while his first wife was still alive. He also admitted that he has eight
children by his first wife, the youngest of whom is over 20 years of age, and after his wife died in
1997, he married Lagmay in 1998. 49Respondent further admitted that Lagmay was staying in
one of the apartments being claimed by complainant. However, he does not consider his affair
with Lagmay as a relationship 50 and does not consider the latter as his second family. 51 He
reasoned that he was not staying with Lagmay because he has two houses, one in Muntinlupa
and another in Marikina. 52
In this case, the admissions made by respondent are more than enough to hold him liable on the
charge of immorality. During the hearing, respondent did not show any remorse. He even
justified his transgression by saying that he does not have any relationship with Lagmay and
despite the fact that he sired three children by the latter, he does not consider them as his second
family. It is noted that during the hearing, respondent boasts in telling the commissioner that he
has two houses - in Muntinlupa, where his first wife lived, and in Marikina, where Lagmay
lives. 53 It is of no moment that respondent eventually married Lagmay after the death of his first
wife. The fact still remains that respondent did not live up to the exacting standard of morality
and decorum required of the legal profession.
Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to specify the degree of
moral delinquency that may qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a lawyer,
immoral conduct has been defined as that "conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the
community. 54 Thus, in several cases, the Court did not hesitate to discipline a lawyer for keeping
a mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the community. 55 That respondent
subsequently married Lagmay in 1998 after the death of his wife and that this is his first
infraction as regards immorality serve to mitigate his liability.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valencia GUILTY of
misconduct and violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years, effective immediately upon receipt
of herein Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let
it be entered in respondent's personal records.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

ST.
LOUIS UNIVERSITY
LABORATORY HIGH SCHOOL
(SLU-LHS)
FACULTY
and
STAFF,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 6010

Promulgated: August 28, 2006

- versus ATTY. ROLANDO C. DELA CRUZ,
Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the Saint
Louis University-Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) against Atty. Rolando C. Dela Cruz,
principal of SLU-LHS, predicated on the following grounds:
1) Gross Misconduct:
From the records of the case, it appears that there is a pending criminal case for child
abuse allegedly committed by him against a high school student filed before the Prosecutors
Office of Baguio City; a pending administrative case filed by the Teachers, Staff, Students and
Parents before an Investigating Board created by SLU for his alleged unprofessional and
unethical acts of misappropriating money supposedly for the teachers; and the pending labor case
filed by SLU-LHS Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged
illegal deduction of salary by respondent.
2) Grossly Immoral Conduct:

In contracting a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage; and
3) Malpractice:
In notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.

According to complainant, respondent was legally married to Teresita Rivera on 31 May

1982 at Tuba, Benguet, before the then Honorable Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. He thereafter
contracted a subsequent marriage with one Mary Jane Pascua, before the Honorable Judge
Guillermo Purganan. On 4 October 1994, said second marriage was subsequently annulled for
being bigamous.

On the charge of malpractice, complainant alleged that respondent deliberately subscribed

and notarized certain legal documents on different dates from 1988 to 1997, despite expiration of
respondents notarial commission on 31 December 1987. A Certification[1] dated 25 May
1999 was issued by the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Baguio City, to the effect
that respondent had not applied for commission as Notary Public for and in the City
of Baguio for the period 1988 to 1997. Respondent performed acts of notarization, as evidenced
by the following documents:

1.
Affidavit of Ownership[2] dated 8 March 1991, executed by
Fernando T. Acosta, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

2.
Affidavit[3] dated 26 September 1992, executed by Maria
Cortez Atos, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

3.
Affidavit[4] dated 14
January
1992,
executed
by Fanolex James A. Menos, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

4.
Affidavit[5] dated 23
December
1993,
executed
by Ponciano V. Abalos, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

5.
Absolute Date of Sale[6] dated 23 June 1993, executed
by Danilo Gonzales
in
favor
of Senecio C. Marzan,
notarized
by
Rolando Dela Cruz;

6.
Joint Affidavit By Two Disinherited Parties[7] dated 5 March
1994, executed by Evelyn C. Canullas and Pastora C. Tacadena, subscribed and
sworn to before Rolando DelaCruz;

7.
Sworn Statement[8] dated 31 May 1994, executed
by Felimon B. Rimorin, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

8.
Deed of Sale[9] dated 17 August 1994, executed by
Woodrow Apurado in favor of Jacinto Batara, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

9.
Joint Affidavit by Two Disinterested Parties[10] dated 1 June
1994, executed by Ponciano V. Abalos and Arsenio C. Sibayan, subscribed and
sworn to before Rolando DelaCruz;

10.
Absolute Deed of Sale[11] dated 23 March 1995, executed by
Eleanor D.Meridor in favor of Leonardo N. Benter, notarized by
Rolando Dela Cruz;

11.
Deed of Absolute Sale[12] dated 20 December 1996, executed
by Mandapat in favor of Mario R. Mabalot, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

12.
Joint Affidavit By Two Disinterested Parties[13] dated 17 April
1996, executed by Villiam C. Ambong and Romeo L. Quiming, subscribed and
sworn to before Rolando DelaCruz;

13.
Conditional Deed of Sale[14] dated 27 February 1997, executed
by Aurelia Demot Cados in favor of Jose Ma. A. Pangilinan, notarized by
Rolando Dela Cruz;

14.
Memorandum of Agreement[15] dated 19 July 1996, executed
by JARCO represented by Mr. Johnny Teope and AZTEC Construction
represented by Mr. George Cham, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz.
Quite remarkably, respondent, in his comment, denied the charges of child abuse,
illegal deduction of salary and others which are still pending before the St. Louis
University (SLU), National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Prosecutors
Office. He did not discuss anything about the allegations of immorality in contracting a
second marriage and malpractice in notarizing documents despite the expiration of his
commission.
After the filing of comment, We referred[16] the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP conducted the mandatory preliminary conference.
The complainants, thereafter, submitted their position paper which is just a reiteration of
their allegations in their complaint.
Respondent, on his part, expressly admitted his second marriage despite the existence of
his first marriage, and the subsequent nullification of the former. He also admitted having
notarized certain documents during the period when his notarial commission had already
expired. However, he offered some extenuating defenses such as good faith, lack of malice and
noble intentions in doing the complained acts.
After the submission of their position papers, the case was deemed submitted for
resolution.
On 30 March 2005, Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his report and
recommended that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that

respondent be administratively penalized for the following acts:

a. For contracting a second marriage without taking the

appropriate legal steps to have the first marriage annulled first, he
be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, and

b. For notarizing certain legal documents despite full

knowledge of the expiration of his notarial commission, he be
suspended from the practice of law for another one (1) year or for a
total of two (2) years.[17]

On 17 December 2005, the IBP Board of Governors, approved and adopted the
recommendation of Commissioner Pacheco, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that
Respondent contracted a second marriage without taking appropriate legal steps to have the first
marriage annulled, Atty. Rolando C. dela Cruz is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for one (1) year and for notarizing legal documents despite full knowledge of the expiration of
his notarial commission Atty. Rolando C. dela Cruz is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for another one (1) year, for a total of two (2) years Suspension from the practice of law.[18]
This Court finds the recommendation of the IBP to fault respondent well
taken, except as to the penalty contained therein.
At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the qualifications required by law for
the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior, and
he can be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after
opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or
right, an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend, based on
conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an
attorney. It must be understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring him as an attorney
is to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney and, thus, to protect the

public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish an
attorney. Elaborating on this, we said on Maligsa v. Atty. Cabanting,[19] that the Bar should
maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer
brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to
the courts and to his clients. A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act
which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty and integrity of the legal profession. Towards this end, an attorney may be disbarred or
suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which
include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of these
being broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private
capacity.
Equally worthy of remark is that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of
standards among its members. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is
committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer
may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
another.[20] Thus, not only his professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter
may reflect unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may
at any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.[21]
One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good
moral character. Possession of such moral character as requirement to the enjoyment of the
privilege of law practice must be continuous. Otherwise, membership in the bar may be
terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral conduct.[22]
In the case at bench, there is no dispute that respondent and Teresita Rivera contracted
marriage on 31 May 1982 before Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. In less than a year, they parted
ways owing to their irreconcilable differences without seeking judicial recourse. The union bore
no offspring. After their separation in-fact, respondent never knew the whereabouts
of Teresita Rivera since he had lost all forms of communication with her. Seven years thereafter,
respondent became attracted to one Mary Jane Pascua, who was also a faculty member of SLULHS. There is also no dispute over the fact that in 1989, respondent married Mary
Jane Pascua in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of BaguioCity, Branch 68. Respondent even
admitted this fact. When the second marriage was entered into, respondents prior marriage
with Teresita Rivera was still subsisting, no action having been initiated before the court to
obtain a judicial declaration of nullity or annulment of respondents prior marriage
to Teresita Rivera or a judicial declaration of presumptive death of Teresita Rivera.

Respondent was already a member of the Bar when he contracted the bigamous second
marriage in 1989, having been admitted to the Bar in 1985. As such, he cannot feign ignorance
of the mandate of the law that before a second marriage may be validly contracted, the first and
subsisting marriage must first be annulled by the appropriate court. The second marriage was
annulled only on 4 October 1994 before the RTC of Benguet, Branch 9, or about five years after
respondent contracted his second marriage. The annulment of respondents second marriage has
no bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding. Firstly, as earlier emphasized, the annulment
came after the respondents second bigamous marriage. Secondly, as we held
in In re: Almacen, a disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely
criminal but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the
acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case against
him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course, then neither
will the judgment of annulment of respondents second marriage also exonerate him from a
wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof - clear preponderance of
evidence - in disciplinary proceedings against members of the Bar is met, then liability
attaches.[23]
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court cites grossly immoral conduct as a ground for
disbarment.
The Court has laid down with a common definition of what constitutes immoral
conduct, vis--vis, grossly immoral conduct. Immoral conduct is that conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community and what is grossly immoral, that is, it must
be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible
to a high degree.[24]

Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes immoral conduct. But is it so gross as to

warrant his disbarment? Indeed, he exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality
required of him as a member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a
sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while
the first marriage was still in place, is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.[25]
However, measured against the definition, we are not prepared to consider respondents act
as grossly immoral. This finds support in the following recommendation and observation of the
IBP Investigator and IBP Board of Governors, thus:

The uncontested assertions of the respondent belies any intention to flaunt the law and the
high moral standard of the legal profession, to wit:

a.
After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or
for a period of almost seven (7) years, he has not been romantically involved with
any woman;
b.
His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total
love for his wife, whom he described to be very intelligent person;
c.

He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and

child;
d.
He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic)
with relation to his wife;
e.
After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways
when the mother and child went to Australia;
f.

Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate.[26]

In the case of Terre v. Terre,[27] respondent was disbarred because his moral character was
deeply flawed as shown by the following circumstances, viz: he convinced the complainant that
her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio and that she was legally single and
free to marry him. When complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent
went through law school while being supported by complainant, with some assistance from
respondents parents. After respondent had finished his law course and gotten complainant
pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant without support and without the wherewithal
for delivering his own child safely to a hospital.

In the case of Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,[28] respondent was also disbarred for his grossly
immoral acts such as: first, he abandoned his lawful wife and three children; second, he lured an
innocent young woman into marrying him; third, he mispresented himself as a bachelor so he
could contract marriage in a foreign land; and fourth, he availed himself of complainants
resources by securing a plane ticket from complainants office in order to marry the latters

daughter. He did this without complainants knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity to
assure complainant that everything is legal.

Such acts are wanting in the case at bar. In fact, no less than the respondent himself
acknowledged and declared his abject apology for his misstep. He was humble enough to offer
no defense save for his love and declaration of his commitment to his wife and child.

Based on the reasons stated above, we find the imposition of disbarment upon him to be
unduly harsh. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and may be imposed
only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer
as an officer of the Court. Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty could
accomplish the end desired.[29] In line with this philosophy, we find that a penalty of two years
suspension is more appropriate. The penalty of one (1) year suspension recommended by the IBP
is too light and not commensurate to the act committed by respondent.

As to the charge of misconduct for having notarized several documents during the years
1988-1997 after his commission as notary public had expired, respondent humbly admitted
having notarized certain documents despite his knowledge that he no longer had authority to do
so. He, however, alleged that he received no payment in notarizing said documents.

It has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty,

meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with substantive public interest, such
that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization of a
private document converts the document into a public one making it admissible in court without
further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face and, for this reason, notaries public must observe with the utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the
integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.[30]

The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as
a mere casual formality. The Court has characterized a lawyers act of notarizing documents
without the requisite commission to do so as reprehensible, constituting as it does not only
malpractice but also x x x the crime of falsification of public documents.[31]

The Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a document is done by a
member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the
offender may be subjected to disciplinary action or one, performing a notarial act without such
commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws, more specifically,
the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not,
he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers
oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: A lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. By acting as a notary public without the
proper commission to do so, the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code, which
directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.

In the case of Buensuceso v. Barera,[32] a lawyer was suspended for one year when he
notarized five documents after his commission as Notary Public had expired, to wit: a complaint
for ejectment, affidavit, supplemental affidavit, a deed of sale, and a contract to sell. Guided by
the pronouncement in said case, we find that a suspension of two (2) years is justified under the
circumstances. Herein respondent notarized a total of fourteen (14) documents[33] without the
requisite notarial commission.

Other charges constituting respondents misconduct such as the pending criminal case for
child abuse allegedly committed by him against a high school student filed before the
Prosecutors Office of Baguio City; the pending administrative case filed by the Teachers, Staff,
Students and Parents before an Investigating Board created by SLU; and the pending labor case
filed by SLU-LHS Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged
illegal deduction of salary by respondent, need not be discussed, as they are still pending before
the proper forums. At such stages, the presumption of innocence still prevails in favor of the
respondent.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Rolando Dela Cruz guilty of immoral

conduct, in disregard of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is
herebySUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, and another two (2)
years for notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission or a total of four (4)
years of suspension.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Court
Administrator, as well as the IBP, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and recorded in the personal
records of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 6057

June 27, 2006

PETER T. DONTON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco ("respondent")
for serious misconduct and deliberate violation of Canon 1,1 Rules 1.012 and 1.023 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility ("Code").
The Facts
In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a
criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of a public document4 against Duane O. Stier
("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who notarized the
Occupancy Agreement.
The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for perjury5 against
complainant. Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint, stated that:
5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and notarized
by me under the following circumstances:
A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located at
No. 33 Don Jose Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.
B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier a U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to
own real property in his name agreed that the property be transferred in the name of
Mr. Donton, a Filipino.
C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several documents
that would guarantee recognition of him being the actual owner of the property despite
the transfer of title in the name of Mr. Donton.

D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT,

recognizing Mr. Stiers free and undisturbed use of the property for his residence and
business operations. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which
Mr. Stier had extended to Mr. Donton.6
Complainant averred that respondents act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite
knowledge that Stier, being a foreign national, is disqualified to own real property in his name,
constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code. Complainant prayed that
respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do something in violation of law and assisting Stier
in carrying out a dishonest scheme.
In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the disbarment
case against him upon the instigation of complainants counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A.
Alentajan,7 because respondent refused to act as complainants witness in the criminal case
against Stier and Maggay. Respondent admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the Occupancy
Agreement and asserted its genuineness and due execution.
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan
("Commissioner San Juan") of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable
for taking part in a "scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition against foreign
ownership of land in the Philippines." Commissioner San Juan recommended respondents
suspension from the practice of law for two years and the cancellation of his commission as
Notary Public.
In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted,
with modification, the Report and recommended respondents suspension from the practice of
law for six months.
On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided
under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B8 of the Rules of Court.
On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP. Respondent
stated that he was already 76 years old and would already retire by 2005 after the termination of
his pending cases. He also said that his practice of law is his only means of support for his family
and his six minor children.
In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for reconsideration because the
IBP had no more jurisdiction on the case as the matter had already been referred to the Court.
The Ruling of the Court

The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance
of the laws which he is bound to uphold and obey.9 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest
scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action
against the lawyer.10
By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from
owning real property.11Yet, in his motion for reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he
caused the transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware of
the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in complainants name. But
respondent provided "some safeguards" by preparing several documents,13including the
Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee Stiers recognition as the actual owner of the
property despite its transfer in complainants name. In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier
in circumventing the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of lands14 by preparing
said documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when
he prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership
of lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act
amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended.15
In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice of law for
three years for preparing an affidavit that virtually permitted him to commit concubinage. In In
re: Santiago,17 respondent Atty. Santiago was suspended from the practice of law for one year
for preparing a contract which declared the spouses to be single again after nine years of
separation and allowed them to contract separately subsequent marriages.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of
Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondents personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

ROBERTO SORIANO,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 6792

- versus Atty. MANUEL DIZON,

Respondent.

Promulgated:
January 25, 2006

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit[1] for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by

Roberto Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the conviction of respondent for a crime involving
moral turpitude, together with the circumstances surrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 of
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;[2] and constitutes sufficient ground for his
disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.[3]
Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint,
the CBD issued a Notice dated May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default, and that an
ex-parte hearing had been scheduled for June 11, 2004.[4] After that hearing, complainant
manifested that he was submitting the case on the basis of the Complaint and its
attachments.[5] Accordingly, the CBDdirected him to file his Position Paper, which he did on
July 27, 2004.[6] Afterwards, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.

On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and

Recommendation, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its
Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005.
In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for frustrated
homicide,[7] which involved moral turpitude, should result in his disbarment.
The facts leading to respondents conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in this wise:

x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his
way home after gassing up in preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with
his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car driven by the
accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had overtaken is not just
someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of the Baguio community who
was under the influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver
until the latter stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and Carino Streets. The
accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi driver and held him by his shirt. To
stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced open his door causing the accused to
fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused had been drinking
because he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused who looked elderly, the
taxi driver got out of his car to help him get up. But the accused, by now enraged,
stood up immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the
latter boxed him on the chest instead. The accused fell down a second time, got
up again and was about to box the taxi driver but the latter caught his fist and
turned his arm around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he could be
pacified and then released him. The accused went back to his car and got his
revolver making sure that the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi
driver was on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed the eyeglasses of the
accused on the ground. He picked them up intending to return them to the
accused. But as he was handing the same to the accused, he was met by the barrel
of the gun held by the accused who fired and shot him hitting him on the
neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him out and sped
off. The incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony

corroborated that of the taxi driver, the complainant in this case, Roberto
Soriano.[8]
It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano and
brought the latter to the hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery on the left
side of his neck,[9] complainant would have surely died of hemorrhage if he had not received
timely medical assistance, according to the attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez,
Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the left part of his body and
disabled him for his job as a taxi driver.
The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January 18,
2002, respondent filed an application for probation, which was granted by the court on several
conditions. These included satisfaction of the civil liabilities imposed by [the] court in favor of
the offended party, Roberto Soriano.[10]
According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to
comply with this particular undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court of
Appeals.[11]
In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that
respondent be disbarred from the practice of law for having been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude.
The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such crime, but
that the latter also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character, based on the following
facts:

1.

He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;

2.

He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the

latter, driving a taxi, had overtaken him;

3.

Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault,

Respondent went back to his car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a
handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was unarmed;

4.

When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and
fled;

5.

Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent

denied that he had shot Complainant;

6.

Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was
the one mauled by Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,

7.

Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,] not

yet satisfied his civil liabilities to Complainant.[12]

On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP Resolution
adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as
approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving
moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is
deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer
possessed of good moral character.[13] In the instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and
he stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has already
been established and is no longer open to question, the only issues that remain to be determined
are as follows: 1) whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2)
whether his guilt warrants disbarment.
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty,
or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a

man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.[14]
The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been
discussed in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,[15] a labor case concerning an
employee who was dismissed on the basis of his conviction for homicide. Considering the
particular circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, this Court rejected the
employers contention and held that homicide in that case did not involve moral turpitude. (If it
did, the crime would have been violative of the IRRIs Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a
ground for dismissal.) The Court explained that, having disregarded the attendant circumstances, the employer
made a pronouncement that was precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter to determine conclusively
whether a crime involved moral turpitude. That discretion belonged to the courts, as explained thus:

x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on

the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and
is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any
particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and
frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. x x x.[16] (Emphasis
supplied)

In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral
turpitude, the Court appreciated the presence of incomplete self-defense and total
absence of aggravating circumstances. For a better understanding of that
Decision, the circumstances of the crime are quoted as follows:

x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then
urinating and had his back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's
face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that
Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was ignored and that it was
while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of
his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa

only after the latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's
intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The
appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of self-defense and
voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance
demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were not inherently vile,
immoral or unjust.[17]

The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly
evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law.
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the
latter least expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the
fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those
were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyers assault.
We also consider the trial courts finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed
morals of respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to defend
himself. In fact, under the impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed
complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly
shot him. To make matters worse, respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief
so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment
for his crime.
The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his
conduct, respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were,
he acted like a god on the road, who deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly,
his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member
of the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an
undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued

complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged, but the
obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge.
It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm[18] and his
unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.[19] He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed
the lawful orders of the courts. We remind him that, both in his attorneys oath[20] and in the Code of
Professional Responsibility, he bound himself to obey the laws of the land.
All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a basic
sense of justice. He obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it suspended his sentence
and granted him probation. And yet, it has been four years[21] since he was ordered to settle his
civil liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent remains adamant in refusing to fulfill that
obligation. By his extreme impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his violent reaction to a
simple traffic altercation, he has taken away the earning capacity, good health, and youthful
vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the measly amount that could
never even fully restore what the latter has lost.
Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the
profession of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral character.[22] Where their misconduct
outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to show them morally unfit for their office
and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law, the court may
be justified in suspending or removing them from that office.[23]
We also adopt the IBPs finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good moral
character, which is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of
law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.[24]

In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous

behavior. As found by the trial court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Farias,
an out-of-court settlement with complainants family.[25] But when this effort failed, respondent
concocted a complete lie by making it appear that it was complainants family that had sought a
conference with him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon.[26]
The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely implausible
story of having been mauled by complainant and two other persons.[27] The trial court had this to
say:
The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors
who examined [Atty. Dizon] does not support his allegation that three people
including the complainant helped each other in kicking and boxing him. The
injuries he sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not downright
unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were bent on beating him to death
could do so little damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the complainants
version of the incident particularly when he said that he boxed the accused on the
chest. x x x.[28]

Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more
important than truthfulness.[29] The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on
honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior.[30] Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or
allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.
The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the legal
profession. They constitute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred. Law is a noble
profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent
intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the
law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their
dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach.[31]

The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they reveal a
basic moral flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find the penalty
recommended by the IBP proper and commensurate.
The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by
requiring that those who exercise this important function be competent, honorable and reliable -lawyers in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.[32] Thus, whenever a clear case of
degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid
our profession of odious members.
We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that
disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish the end desired.
In the instant case, however, the Court cannot extend that munificence to respondent. His
actions so despicably and wantonly disregarded his duties to society and his profession. We are
convinced that meting out a lesser penalty would be irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for
the legal profession -- that every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree
of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing
requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of the exacting
standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances not the
mere fact of their conviction would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal profession. In the
present case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show
his unworthiness to continue as a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his
name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be

entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[A. C. No. 5485. March 16, 2005]
ELMER CANOY, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE MAX ORTIZ, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
There are no good reasons that would justify a lawyer virtually abandoning the cause of the
client in the midst of litigation without even informing the client of the fact or cause of desertion.
That the lawyer forsook his legal practice on account of what might be perceived as a higher
calling, election to public office, does not mitigate the dereliction of professional
duty. Suspension from the practice is the usual penalty, and there is no reason to deviate from
the norm in this case.
A Complaint[1] dated 10 April 2001 was filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant by Elmer
Canoy (Canoy) accusing Atty. Jose Max Ortiz (Atty. Ortiz) of misconduct and malpractice. It
was alleged that Canoy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against his former employer, Coca
Cola Bottlers Philippines. The complaint was filed with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Board VI in Bacolod City.[2] Atty. Ortiz appeared as
counsel for Canoy in this proceeding. In 1998, the labor arbiter hearing the complaint ordered the
parties to submit their respective position papers. Canoy submitted all the necessary documents
and records to Atty. Ortiz for the preparation of the position paper. Thereafter, he made several
unfruitful visits to the office of Atty. Ortiz to follow-up the progress of the case. After a final
visit at the office of Atty. Ortiz in April of 2000, during which Canoy was told to come back as
his lawyer was not present, Canoy decided to follow-up the case himself with the NLRC. He was
shocked to learn that his complaint was actually dismissed way back in 1998, for failure to
prosecute, the parties not having submitted their position papers.[3] The dismissal was without
prejudice. Canoy alleged that Atty. Ortiz had never communicated to him about the status of the
case, much less the fact that he failed to submit the position paper.
The Comment[4] filed by Atty. Ortiz is the epitome of self-hagiography. He informs the
Court that since commencing his law practice in 1987, he has mostly catered to indigent and
low-income clients, at considerable financial sacrifice to himself. Atty. Ortiz claims that for more
than ten years, his law office was a virtual adjunct of the Public Attorneys Office with its steady
stream of non-paying clients in the hundreds or thousands.[5] At the same time, he hosted a
legal assistance show on the radio, catering to far-flung municipalities and reaching the people
who need legal advice and assistance.[6] Atty. Ortiz pursued on with this lifestyle until his
election as Councilor of Bacolod City, a victory which he generously attributes to the help of
the same people whom he had helped by way of legal assistance before.[7]
Canoy was among those low-income clients whom Atty. Ortiz deigned to represent. The
lawyer was apparently confident that the illegal dismissal case would eventually be resolved by
way of compromise. He claims having prepared the position paper of Canoy, but before he could
submit the same, the Labor Arbiter had already issued the order dismissing the case. [8] Atty.
Ortiz admits though that the period within which to file the position paper had already lapsed. He
attributes this failure to timely file the position paper to the fact that after his election as

Councilor of Bacolod City, he was frankly preoccupied with both his functions as a local
government official and as a practicing lawyer. Eventually, his desire to help was beyond
physical limitations, and he withdrew from his other cases and his free legal services.[9]
According to Atty. Ortiz, Mr. Canoy should have at least understood that during all that
time, he was free to visit or call the office and be entertained by the secretary as [he] would
normally report to the office in the afternoon as he had to attend to court trials and report to the
Sanggunian office.[10] He states that it was his policy to inform clients that they should be the
ones to follow-up their cases with his office, as it would be too difficult and a financial burden
to attend making follow-ups with hundreds of clients, mostly indigents with only two office
personnel.[11]
Nonetheless, Atty. Ortiz notes that the dismissal of Canoys complaint was without
prejudice, thus the prescriptive period had been tolled. He claims not being able to remember
whether he immediately informed Canoy of the dismissal of the case, though as far as he could
recall, Canoy had conveyed a message to him that he had a lawyer to handle the case, thus his
office did not insist on refiling the same.[12]
The matter was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.[13] Canoy eventually submitted a motion withdrawing the complaint,
but this was not favorably acted upon by the IBP in view of the rule that the investigation of a
case shall not be interrupted or terminated by reason of withdrawal of the charges. [14]Eventually,
the investigating commissioner concluded that clearly, the records show that [Atty. Ortiz] failed
to exercise that degree of competence and diligence required of him in prosecuting his clients
(sic) claim, and recommended that Atty. Ortiz be reprimanded.[15] The IBP Commission on
Discipline adopted the recommendation, with the slight modification that Atty. Ortiz be likewise
warned that a repetition of the same negligence shall be dealt with more severely in the future.
The Court is sensitive to the difficulties in obtaining legal representation for indigent or lowincome litigants. Apart from the heroic efforts of government entities such as the Public
Attorneys Office, groups such as the IBP National Committee on Legal Aid and the Office of
Legal Aid of the UP College of Law have likewise been at the forefront in the quest to provide
legal representation for those who could not otherwise afford the services of lawyers. The efforts
of private practitioners who assist in this goal are especially commendable, owing to their
sacrifice in time and resources beyond the call of duty and without expectation of pecuniary
reward.
Yet, the problem of under-representation of indigent or low-income clients is just as
grievous as that of non-representation. Admirable as the apparent focus of Atty. Ortizs legal
practice may have been, his particular representation of Canoy in the latters illegal dismissal
case leaves much to be desired.
Several of the canons and rules in the Code of Professional Responsibility guard against the
sort of conduct displayed by Atty. Ortiz with respect to the handling of Canoys case.
CANON 17A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE
SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
...
Rule 18.03A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.
...
CANON 22A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE
AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
...
Rule 22.02 A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien,
immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate
with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including all information necessary for
the proper handling of the matter.
Atty. Ortiz should have filed the position paper on time, owing to his duty as counsel of
Canoy to attend to this legal matter entrusted to him. His failure to do so constitutes a violation
of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with
competence and diligence and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and
devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability
to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally
applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and
defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every
such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the
court, to the bar and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not
only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar
and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.[16]
If indeed Atty. Ortizs schedule, workload, or physical condition was such that he would not
be able to make a timely filing, he should have informed Canoy of such fact. The relationship of
lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the client to be
adequately and fully informed of the developments of the case and should not be left in the dark
as to the mode and manner in which his/her interests are being defended.[17]

There could have been remedies undertaken to this inability of Atty. Ortiz to file on time the
position paper had Canoy been told of such fact, such as a request for more time to file the
position paper, or maybe even the hiring of collaborating counsel or substitution of Atty. Ortiz as
counsel. Since Atty. Ortiz did not exercise the necessary degree of care by either filing the
position paper on time or informing Canoy that the paper could not be submitted seasonably, the
ignominy of having the complaint dismissed for failure to prosecute could not be avoided.
That the case was dismissed without prejudice, thus allowing Canoy to refile the case,
hardly serves to mitigate the liability of Atty. Ortiz, as the failure to file the position paper is per
sea violation of Rule 18.03.[18]
Neither is the Court mollified by the circumstance of Atty. Ortizs election as a City
Councilor of Bacolod City, as his adoption of these additional duties does not exonerate him of
his negligent behavior. The Code of Professional Responsibility does allow a lawyer to withdraw
his legal services if the lawyer is elected or appointed to a public office.[19] Statutes expressly
prohibit the occupant of particular public offices from engaging in the practice of law, such as
governors and mayors,[20] and in such instance, the attorney-client relationship is
terminated.[21] However, city councilors are allowed to practice their profession or engage in any
occupation except during session hours, and in the case of lawyers such as Atty. Ortiz, subject to
certain prohibitions which are not relevant to this case.[22] In such case, the lawyer nevertheless
has the choice to withdraw his/her services.[23] Still, the severance of the relation of attorneyclient is not effective until a notice of discharge by the client or a manifestation clearly indicating
that purpose is filed with the court or tribunal, and a copy thereof served upon the adverse party,
and until then, the lawyer continues to be counsel in the case.[24]
Assuming that Atty. Ortiz was justified in terminating his services, he, however, cannot just
do so and leave complainant in the cold unprotected.[25] Indeed, Rule 22.02 requires that a lawyer
who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a lien, immediately turn over all papers and
property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly
transfer of the matter. Atty. Ortiz claims that the reason why he took no further action on the case
was that he was informed that Canoy had acquired the services of another counsel. Assuming
that were true, there was no apparent coordination between Atty. Ortiz and this new counsel.
In fact, it took nearly two years before Canoy had learned that the position paper had not
been filed and that the case had been dismissed. This was highly irresponsible of Atty. Ortiz,
much more so considering that Canoy was one of the indigent clients whom Atty. Ortiz proudly
claims as his favored clientele. It does not escape the Courts attention that Atty. Ortiz faults
Canoy for not adequately following up the case with his office.[26] He cannot now shift the blame
to complainant for failing to inquire about the status of the case, since, as stated above, it was his
duty as lawyer to inform his clients of the status of cases entrusted to him.[27]
The appropriate sanction is within the sound discretion of this Court. In cases of similar
nature, the penalty imposed by the Court consisted of either a reprimand, a fine of five hundred
pesos with warning, suspension of three months, six months, and even disbarment in aggravated
cases.[28] Given the circumstances, the Court finds the penalty recommended by the IBP too
lenient and instead suspends Atty. Ortiz from the practice of law for one (1) month. The graver
penalty of suspension is warranted in lieu of an admonition or a reprimand considering that Atty.
Ortizs undisputed negligence in failing to timely file the position paper was compounded by his
failure to inform Canoy of such fact, and the successive dismissal of the complaint.

Lawyers who devote their professional practice in representing litigants who could ill afford
legal services deserve commendation. However, this mantle of public service will not deliver the
lawyer, no matter how well-meaning, from the consequences of negligent acts. It is not enough
to say that all pauper litigants should be assured of legal representation. They deserve quality
representation as well.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose Max S. Ortiz is ordered SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) month from notice, with the warning that a repetition of the same
negligence will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be attached to
respondent's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all
chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all the courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition)
and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the
exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am
6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The
Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.

Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign

Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community
in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as
hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal
support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of
advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly
decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we
required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA),
(3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5)
Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de
Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter,
their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable
services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either
case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in
this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to
distinguish the two terms,i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services",
common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially without
substantial distinction. For who could deny that document search, evidence
gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional services from

government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or

business registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or
foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position
manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the
effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's
act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same
through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable
Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical
activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed. 4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal
services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public,
the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering
legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier
mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on
the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of
all, to the very name being used by respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a
name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for
legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical
problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the
term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of
the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more
reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that
it offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a
picture and name of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this
practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the
service or services being offered.

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support

services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer
actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a
distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the
respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt
in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers,
whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts
contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question
are only meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it.
Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student
ought to know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a
foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as
follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between
a man and woman entered into accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject
to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by
this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message
being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage
celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce.
This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of
Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal
practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of
profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.

Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at

defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that
shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle
with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning
a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the
"special contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution," which is
how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and
inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages
celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications
for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be
concluded that the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in
question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone
confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts
are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because
the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime
is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent
offers do not constitute legal services as commonly understood, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent corporation is
being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed.
Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper
reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the
public good, thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the
publication of the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar
thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further
performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very
least, from offering such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research,
electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms,
investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the
legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when
the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the
practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better
performed by specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason
of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the
exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from
"encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the great
benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer
will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in
skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate
the illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of
the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public.
Technological development in the profession may be encouraged without
tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its
services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of
the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not
legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing
between which service may be offered to the public in general and which should
be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This,
however, may require further proceedings because of the factual considerations
involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be
prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration
abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under
Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from simply
disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required to include,
in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that
certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not
authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be
consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot
recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions
for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at
members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should
be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term
being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and
effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form
may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of
such practice may be considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and

By-laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in
giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced
paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2
and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding
out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and
soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a
practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court.
For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch
credulity. Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces a
certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense.
From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and
rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes
drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to
their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after
their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and
such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers
to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent
"The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of
its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the
public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business
conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly
admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to
subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent
uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to
court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to
engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal
right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the law. It follows
that not only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent are
the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated
herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading
and patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal
Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its
unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it
merely renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general
public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of
Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised
services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed
engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and
Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of
marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws,
particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law
of the Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law,
the legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon
and which activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the
activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and
laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration
should be given to the protection of the general public from the danger of being
exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice
of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of
study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and
pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the
administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as

such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study
and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the
Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures
to protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing
with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified
to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers
which may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that
lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from
advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised
not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should
be taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise
legal services without being qualified to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to
give the impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce,
annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence,
adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be
given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name The Legal
Clinic, Inc. does not help matters. It gives the impression again that
Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that
Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the
misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.,
as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in
The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President
and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and
main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek"
article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for
the purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal
and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit
cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc.,
could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal
but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said
agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for
valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to
do so under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting
marriage is not necessary.

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is
towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to
obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can
justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition, for
one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may
serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret
marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not
so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about
having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and
seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is
deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by
our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation
for clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and
offenses of this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as
management consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not,
perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein,
however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in
independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not
necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render
effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes and
regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct
which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's)
knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute
the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men know
the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable
acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of
the law accurate or inaccurate moulds our conduct not only
when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others.
Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather

precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or

profession. A good example is the architect, who must be familiar
with zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and
tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and specification in
harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower,
replies that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations
expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a
decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they
practicing law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate
fee is charged for the legal advice or information, and the legal
question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to
engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the
building code and the like, then an architect who performed this
function would probably be considered to be trespassing on
territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial
relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a
lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is
not the case. The most important body of the industrial relations
experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions and
few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it
has been the practice for some years to delegate special
responsibility in employee matters to a management group chosen
for their practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and without
regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More recently, consultants
like the defendants have the same service that the larger employers
get from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized
profession for which appropriate courses are offered by our leading
universities. The court should be very cautious about declaring
[that] a widespread, well-established method of conducting
business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who
customarily perform a certain function have no right to do so, or
that the technical education given by our schools cannot be used by
the graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should
consider his work for any particular client or customer, as a
whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise

as to the law defining his client's obligations to his employees, to

guide his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client
along the path charted by law. This, of course, would be the
practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case before me.
Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and
psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within which
he must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building
the limits the kind of building the architect may plan. The
incidental legal advice or information defendant may give, does
not transform his activities into the practice of law. Let me add
that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed services
which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be
practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program, he
drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the
employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the
practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may
select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion,
and the person appointed is free to accept the employment whether
or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an
exception where the business turns on a question of law. Most real
estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if
the value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the
principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of
the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion,
then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a
controversy between an employer and his men grows from
differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite
likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach a
definite conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by the
proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before
administrative agencies of the federal government, especially
before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An
agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority
granted by the Congress, may regulate the representation of parties
before such agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to
interfere with such determination or to forbid representation before
the agency by one whom the agency admits. The rules of the
National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to appear
in person, or by counsel, or by other representative. Rules and
Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here
means a licensed attorney, and ther representative' one not a

lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do

whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing questions purely
legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky,
Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling
(which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law
provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a
whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of
Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation
concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is
acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See
Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing
a marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not
constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that
described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby ConcepcionRichard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If
a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence,
annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely
giving informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar
to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and
determines on the subject and determines by himself what courses of action to
take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information,
the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the
client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.

It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which

publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is
amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or
rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a
solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is
urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the
forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out,
constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation
with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to
the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship
with a particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of
confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and
client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE THE
REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR
PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book
assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and does
not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar
to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the
defendant's publication does not purport to give personal advice on
a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified
person in a particular situation in their publication and sale of
the kits, such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful
practice of law . . . . There being no legal impediment under the
statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the
injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose
of selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or
separation agreement any printed material or writings relating to
matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of
modification of the judgment against defendant having an interest
in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and
against his having any personal contact with any prospective
purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the finding that
for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal
advice in the course of personal contacts concerning particular
problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation of
the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of
other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary
documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct
constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference to the
giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific
problems of particular individuals in connection with a divorce,
separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and should
be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in
Statsky, supra at p. 101.).

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic,
non-advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving
legal advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment,
par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be
necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression
(or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the
solemnities, formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq.,
Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph
thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the
limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal
services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the
proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the
clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The
courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the
term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice
or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and
counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured,
although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal
types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their
rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal
principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals
which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to
law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice
of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the
business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing
law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the
conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to
the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18

In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid
down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation,
but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all
kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients
and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust
Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the
practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court
or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex.
rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all
advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of
a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work

performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings
in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice
and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at
all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode
Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations
of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute
"practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the
services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained
paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory,
through the extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the
gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and
communication, such as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction
of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search;
evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding
investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services
from government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or
business registrations; educational or employment records or certifications,
obtaining documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving
information about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign
divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to
emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not involve
representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer systems,
programs, or software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal

departments, courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering

legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical
and technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the
efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these
will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent
than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and
adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is
look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a
bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the
client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken
as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which
services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact
that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of
authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991
issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal
Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent
corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with
offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in
Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as
the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers,
who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal
Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems,
labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the
medical field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the
services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by
analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you
contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you for
the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has
been categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up
treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like
preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our
staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of
these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient,
hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains
Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with
accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and
you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a
specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would
need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to
transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to
deal with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich
relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the
problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What
is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it
renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the
advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts
sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts
for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are
undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules
of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified
in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and
limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from
the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to
draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to
those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or
rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members

of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court.
Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously
acquired through education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing
profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend
the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation,
operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of law those not
admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the
protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and
unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United
States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this
jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be
a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are
schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there
are none in the Philippines.28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in
the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the
major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up
Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even
been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United
States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal
Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association.29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be
considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to
practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render
legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or
regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional
or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for
the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an
unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be
one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal
assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to
use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory
or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or
give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for,
publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort

to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring

newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in
which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like
self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A
lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a
manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of
legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the
practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs.
Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the
present proceeding,39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business
from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things
that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises
his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and
his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by
advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he
defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of
old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement
possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but
must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as
the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a
normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer
needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the
difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which
they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are
expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with
the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data.
"Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and
the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with
dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices;
posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar
associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the
fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their
written consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published
principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief
biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program.
Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or
contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower
the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address,
being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name
listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said
respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not
and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and
constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at
bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a
lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a
statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written
schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such
exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional
Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in
the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any
state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that
an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made
only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition
stands, as in the case at bar.

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in
Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was
found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to
allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to
aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity
has consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in
time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to
adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all
efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action,
to advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator,
major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he
is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are
involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for
which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are
constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the
adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is,
of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding
and forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be
organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule
against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals
supposedly rendering the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province
of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due
ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter,
in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the
Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement
in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this
petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction
proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this

resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and
the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 5580. June 15, 2005]
SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC., as represented by REBECCA V.
LABRADOR, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROBERTO B. ROMANILLOS,respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a Petition[1] for disbarment against Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos for allegedly
representing conflicting interests and for using the title Judge despite having been found guilty
of grave and serious misconduct in Zarate v. Judge Romanillos.[2]
The facts are as follows:
In 1985, respondent represented San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. (SJHAI) before the
Human Settlements Regulation Commission (HSRC) in a case[3] against Durano and Corp., Inc.
(DCI) for violation of the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protection Act (P.D. No.
957). SJHAI alleged that Lot No. 224 was designated as a school site in the subdivision plan that
DCI submitted to the Bureau of Lands in 1961 but was sold by DCI to spouses Ramon and
Beatriz Durano without disclosing it as a school site.
While still the counsel for SJHAI, respondent represented Myrna and Antonio Montealegre
in requesting for SJHAIs conformity to construct a school building on Lot No. 224 to be
purchased from Durano.
When the request was denied, respondent applied for clearance before the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in behalf of Montealegre. Petitioners Board of Directors
terminated respondents services as counsel and engaged another lawyer to represent the
association.
Respondent also acted as counsel for Lydia Durano-Rodriguez who substituted for DCI in
Civil Case No. 18014 entitled San Jose Homeowners, Inc. v. Durano and Corp., Inc. filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134. Thus, SJHAI filed a disbarment
case against respondent for representing conflicting interests, docketed as Administrative Case
No. 4783.
In her Report[4] dated August 3, 1998, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) made the following
findings:
Respondent failed to observe candor and fairness in dealing with his clients, knowing fully
well that the Montealegre case was adverse to the Complainant wherein he had previously been
not only an active board member but its corporate secretary having access to all its documents
confidential or otherwise and its counsel in handling the implementation of the writ of execution
against its developer and owner, Durano and Co. Inc.

Moreso, when Respondent acted as counsel for the substituted defendant Durano and Co. Inc.,
Lydia Durano-Rodriguez; the conflict of interest between the latter and the Complainant became
so revealing and yet Respondent proceeded to represent the former.

For his defense of good faith in doing so; inasmuch as the same wasnt controverted by the
Complainant which was his first offense; Respondent must be given the benefit of the doubt to
rectify his error subject to the condition that should he commit the same in the future; severe
penalty will be imposed upon him.[5]
The Investigating Commissioner recommended dismissal of the complaint with the
admonition that respondent should observe extra care and diligence in the practice of his
profession to uphold its dignity and integrity beyond reproach.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, which we noted in a resolution dated March 8, 1999.
Notwithstanding the admonition, respondent continued representing Lydia DuranoRodriguez before the Court of Appeals[6] and this Court[7] and even moved for the execution of
the decision.
Thus, a second disbarment case was filed against respondent for violation of the March 8,
1999 Resolution in A.C. No. 4783 and for his alleged deceitful conduct in using the title Judge
although he was found guilty of grave and serious misconduct.
Respondent used the title Judge in his office letterhead, correspondences and billboards
which was erected in several areas within the San Jose Subdivision sometime in October 2001.
In his Comment and Explanation,[8] respondent claimed that he continued to represent Lydia
Durano-Rodriguez against petitioner despite the March 8, 1999 Resolution because it was still
pending when the second disbarment case was filed. He maintained that the instant petition is a
rehash of the first disbarment case from which he was exonerated. Concerning the title Judge,
respondent stated that since the filing of the instant petition he had ceased to attach the title to his
name.
On July 7, 2003, the matter was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation.[9]
Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. reported that respondent did not
violate the admonition because it referred to future cases only and not to cases subject of A.C.
No. 4783. Besides, petitioner never questioned the propriety of respondents continued
representation of Lydia Durano-Rodriguez on appeal until the case was terminated.
The Investigating Commissioner, however, believed that respondent was deceitful when he
used the title Judge, thus creating a false impression that he was an incumbent.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended thus:
In view of the foregoing considerations, this Commissioner respectfully recommends the
following penalty range to be deliberated upon by the Board for imposition on Respondent:

minimum penalty of reprimand to a maximum penalty of four (4) months suspension. It is

further recommended that in addition to the penalty to be imposed, a stern warning be given to
Respondent in that should he violate his undertaking/promise not to handle any case in the future
where the Complainant would be the adverse party and/or should he again use the title of
Judge which would create an impression that he is still connected to the judiciary, a more
severe penalty shall be imposed on him by the Commission.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
The IBP Board of Governors approved with modification the report and recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A, and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering Respondents violation of Rule 1.01 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Roberto Romanillos is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
six (6) months with a WARNING that should he violate his undertaking/promise a more severe
penalty shall be imposed against him.
Undoubtedly, respondent represented the inconsistent interests of SJHAI, DCI as substituted
by Lydia Durano-Rodriguez and the Montealegres. Respondent was admonished yet he
continued to represent Durano-Rodriguez against SJHAI.
It is inconsequential that petitioner never questioned the propriety of respondents continued
representation of Lydia Durano-Rodriguez. The lack of opposition does not mean tacit
consent. As long as the lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two (2) or more opposing
clients, he is guilty of violating his oath. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
specifically mandates that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure. Incidentally, it is also misleading for
respondent to insist that he was exonerated in A.C. No. 4783.
We agree with the IBP that respondents continued use of the title Judge violated Rules
1.01 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in
deceitful conduct and from using any misleading statement or claim regarding qualifications or
legal services. The quasi-judicial notice he posted in the billboards referring to himself as a
judge is deceiving. It was a clear attempt to mislead the public into believing that the order was
issued in his capacity as a judge when he was dishonorably stripped of the privilege.
Respondent did not honorably retire from the judiciary. He resigned from being a judge
during the pendency of Zarate v. Judge Romanillos, where he was eventually found guilty of
grave and serious misconduct and would have been dismissed from the service had he not
resigned.
In that case, respondent was found guilty of illegal solicitation and receipt of P10,000.00
from a party litigant. We ruled thus:

Considering the foregoing, respondent Judge Roberto B. Romanillos is hereby found guilty of
grave and serious misconduct affecting his integrity and honesty. He deserves the supreme
penalty of dismissal. However, respondent, in an obvious attempt to escape punishment for his
misdeeds, tendered his resignation during the pendency of this case. Consequently, we are
now precluded from dismissing respondent from the service. Nevertheless, the ruling in People
v. Valenzuela (135 SCRA 712 [1985]), wherein the respondent judge likewise resigned before
the case could be resolved, finds application in this case. Therein it was held that the rule that
the resignation or retirement of a respondent judge in an administrative case renders the case
moot and academic, is not a hard and fast rule.

ACCORDINGLY, in view of our aforestated finding that respondent Judge Romanillos is guilty
of grave and serious misconduct which would have warranted his dismissal from the service had
he not resigned during the pendency of this case, and it appearing that respondent has yet to
apply for his retirement benefits and other privileges if any; the Court, consistent with the
penalties imposed in Valenzuela (supra.), hereby orders the FORFEITURE of all leave and
retirement benefits and privileges to which herein respondent Judge Romanillos may be entitled
WITH PREJUDICE to reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of
government, including government-owned or controlled agencies or corporations.
SO ORDERED.[10]
The penalty imposed upon him in said case included forfeiture of all leave and retirement
benefits and privileges to which he may be entitled with prejudice to reinstatement and/or
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of government, including government-owned or
controlled agencies or corporations. Certainly, the use of the title Judge is one of
suchprivileges.
We have previously declared that the use of titles such as Justice is reserved
to incumbent and retired members of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan and may not be used by any other official of the Republic, including those given
the rank of Justice.[11] By analogy, the title Judge should be reserved only to judges,
incumbent and retired, and not to those who were dishonorably discharged from the service. As
correctly pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the right to retain and use said title
applies only to the aforementioned members of the bench and no other, and certainly not to those
who were removed or dismissed from the judiciary, such as respondent.
Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions.[12] It is
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good
moral character.[13] Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the publics faith in the legal profession.[14]
To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but
such statement can never be overemphasized. Considering that, of all classes and professions,
[lawyers are] most sacredly bound to uphold the law, it is imperative that they live by the
law. Accordingly, lawyers who violate their oath and engage in deceitful conduct have no place
in the legal profession.[15]

Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction. We are mindful that the power
to disbar must always be exercised with great caution, for only the most imperative
reasons,[16] and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and as a member of the bar.[17]
This is not respondents first infraction as an officer of the court and a member of the legal
profession. He was stripped of his retirement benefits and other privileges in Zarate v. Judge
Romanillos.[18] In A.C. No. 4783, he got off lightly with just an admonition. Considering his
previous infractions, respondent should have adhered to the tenets of his profession with extra
fervor and vigilance. He did not. On the contrary, he manifested undue disrespect to our
mandate and exhibited a propensity to violate the laws. He is thus unfit to discharge the duties of
his office and unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed on him as an officer of the
court. His disbarment is consequently warranted.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos is DISBARRED and his name is
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in
respondents record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts
in the country.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003]
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO,respondent.
[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003]
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP COMMISSION ON BAR
DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant
Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5,
2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667.[1]
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the
Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an interested
party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was
an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six
months, provided the case will not involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs.
Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the
time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office
revealed that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of
theManila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.[2]
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint
against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services,
in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court.[3]
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and
solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the
prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the
absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising;
and that the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed
that he be exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that
advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and
public order as long as it is dignified.[4]
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.[5] On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution
No. XV-2002-306,[6] finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him
from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would
be dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11,
2002.[7]
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,[8] which was
denied by the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 2002[9]
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053
entitled, Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty.
Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
Respondents. This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Courts Resolution
dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not
they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings. [10]Complainant
filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting any additional
pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early resolution on the basis of pleadings
and records thereof. [11] Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on
June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit
legal business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or
legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.[12] It is a profession
in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not
primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits.[13] The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary
consideration.[14] The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the
primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they
owe to themselves.[15]The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:

1.

A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which

one may attain the highest eminence without making much money;

2.

A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving

thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;

3.

A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;

4.

A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and

unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.[16]

There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits
that he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for
the Courts indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his
legal services again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention
to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in
the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.[17] Ten months later, he
caused the same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy &
Sell.[18] Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Courts
authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled
Annulment of Marriage Specialist, he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only
the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the
contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients
that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the
case,[19] he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and would
have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for
solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is
made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the
bar.[20] Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and
residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the
same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable.[21]Publication
in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the
canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated
in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:[22]
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers name and the
names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of
law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of
graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of
honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations
and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings

in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written
consent, the names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published
principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief
biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society
program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the
bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address,
being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his
name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of
law. (emphasis and italics supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found
GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule
138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1)
YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.