Mind Association

Practical Tortoise Raising

Author(s): Simon Blackburn
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 104, No. 416 (Oct., 1995), pp. 695-711
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
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Practical TortoiseRaising
SIMON BLACKBURN
In 1895 Lewis Carrollwrotehis famousMindarticle"Whatthe Tortoise
said to Achilles".The problemhe raisedcan succinctlybe put like this:
can logic make the mind move? Or, less enigmatically, how do we
describewhat is wrongwith the tortoise'sargumentthat,howevermany
premisesAchilles has him accept, he always has space to refrainfrom
drawingthe conclusion?
In thispaperI amnot so muchconcernedwithmovementsof the mind,
as movementsof the will. Butmy questionbearsa similarityto thatof the
tortoise.I wantto askwhetherthe will is underthe controlof factandreason, combined.I shall try to show that there is always somethingelse,
somethingthatis not underthe controlof factandreason,whichhas to be
given as a bruteextra,if deliberationis ever to end by determiningthe
will. Thisis, of course,a Humeanconclusion,andthe only noveltycomes
in the way I wish to arguefor it. I believe thatmanyphilosophersthink,
erroneously,thatHumerelieson a naiveandoutdatedconceptionof facts,
or on an even morenaive and outdatedconceptionof reason,in orderto
put passionon theirthrone.My tortoisedefendsHume:whatwe do with
ourpremisesis not itself construedas acceptanceof a premise.
As it standsthe projectis only describedmetaphorically.Presumably
everything,includingmovementof the will, is underthe controlof facts
in some sense, for even if they are only facts about our physiology or
chemistry,still, theymakeus move.I am interestedonly in cognitivecontrol, or controlby the apprehensionof fact andreason.

Day 1
Achilles, then,hadovertakenthe tortoiseandwas sittingcomfortablyon
its back. "Yousee", he said, "thedistanceswere constantlydiminishing,
andso-".
"Butif they hadbeen constantlyincreasing?",the tortoiseinterrupted,
"how then? ... Well now, would you like to hear of a race-course,that
mostpeoplefancythey can get to the end of in two or threesteps,while it
Mind, Vol. 104 . 416 . October 1995

C)Oxford University Press 1995

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696 SimonBlackburn
really consistsof an infinitenumberof distances,eachone longerthanthe
previousone? ... let us takea littlebit of an argumentfor acting."
(P) I wouldprefereatinglettuceto eatingsouvlaki.
(B) The momentof decisionis at hand.
(Z) Let me choose to eat lettuceratherthansouvlaki!
"Well",continuedthe tortoise,"thereis no questionof accepting(Z) as
true,buttheremay be a questionof acceptingit. Let us agreethataccepting (Z) amountsto actuallydoingwhateveris involvedin choosinglettuce
ratherthansouvlaki.We accept(Z) only if the will is determined,andan
intentionis formed.Are we to supposethatif we accept(P) and(B), then
we mustaccept(Z)?"
"Waita minute",saidAchilles, "I don't wantto rushyou. It occursto
me that some philosophersmake a distinctionbetweenwhat you prefer
andwhatyou thinkyou oughtto prefer,or wouldpreferif you were ideally placed,for a tortoise.Perhapsthis affectsthe issue."
"If you like",said the tortoise."I too hate this modernfad for rushing
past anythinglike that.Let us put it in."
(P) I wouldprefereatinglettuceto eatingsouvlaki.
(M) I thinkit is rightto preferlettuceto souvlaki.
(B) The momentof decisionis at hand,
(Z) Let me choose to eat lettuceratherthansouvlaki!
"That'sbetter!"saidAchilles. "Thatcertainlywrapsit up for (Z). Surely
you mustaccept(Z) if all those aretrue!"
"Idon'tquiteknow"saidthetortoisesadly."Sometimes,well, I am not
sure how importantrightnessis. I certainlyget these urgesto do what I
thinkis wrong,don'tyou know.I amreallyquitegood at whatyou Greeks
keep callingakrasia;in fact I ratherenjoy it."
"Ifthere
"Goodheavens",repliedAchillessternlyyet compassionately.
is one thing modernmoralphilosophywill tell you, it is that any such
behaviouris quiteirrational.The normsof reasonare foundationsfor the
normsof ethics."
"Andwe don'twantto be unreasonable,do we?"said the tortoise."In
fact, we hadbetteraddit, just to makesure."
(RM) I thinkit is rationalto do whatI thinkis right
"Therewe are",announcedAchilles in triumph."Reasonprevails!"
"Well,thatis certainlya change"saidthe tortoise,"andyet sometimes,
well, I amnot surehow importantrationalityis. I certainlyget theseurges
to act againstreason,don'tyou know.I am reallyquitegood at thatkind
of akrasia;in fact I ratherenjoy it."
"HolyApollo!"exclaimedAchilles."Doyou meanyou havebeenreading the Romantics,so manymillenniabeforetheirtime?Areyou in favour

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Practical TortoiseRaising 697

of short-termismand spontaneity,and againstprudenceand economics?

Or is it somethingelse?"
"I don't know"said the tortoise,"butperhapsyou can explainto me:
mustI be rational?"
"Oh certainly"said Achilles, "you must if ... well, if you want to be
rational,you know."
"I love hypotheticalimperatives",said the tortoise."ButI am not sure
this one is goingto help. Still,we couldmakesurethatrationalityandethics pull together,if you like",he concededhelpfully.
(MR) I thinkit rightto do whatI thinkis rational
"Hmmm"saidAchilles."Ihadn'texpectedto putthatin, butit is terribly
decentof you to let me. Andnow at last we arehome anddry!"
"Only",saidthe tortoiseapologetically,"I get so terriblyconfused.We
had to add (M) and I can't help wonderingthatalthoughI am sure it is
rightto do whatis rational,these fits of akrasiastill afflictme so chronically. I musthavebeen badlybroughtup"he addedbashfully.
Achilles frownedas he replacedhis pencilwith a new one. "Ithinkthat
is probablya bit morbid"he said."Surelyin generalyou preferto do what
is right and rational?""Perhapswe should add it", encouragedthe tortoise.
(P') I preferto do whatI thinkit rightandrationalto do.
"Andnow" said Achilles in triumph,"Wereallyare gettingsomewhere.
The last time I talkedwith you, a centuryago, you mademe keep adding
differentpremises!Butnow thereis simplynothingmoreto add!"Andhe
did a little dance.
"I love the way you move yourself' said the tortoise,sittingcomfortably."AllI admitis thatI preferto do whatis rightandrational.But then,
afterall, I preferredlettuceto souvlaki.And we had to add a bit to that,
didn'twe?"he laughed,modestly.
"SacredZeno!"expostulatedAchilles."Youarenot going to makeme
add anotherroundare you! I can see it coming:you wantme to addthat
it is rightto preferto do whatyou thinkit is rightandrationalto do, and
so on and so on.Youreallyarethe most stubbornanimal."
"Well,I am a bit careful"confessed the tortoise."AndI don't really
knowthatI am all thatconfidentthatit is rightandrationalto preferto do
whatI thinkit is rightandrationalto do. Afterall, manypeoplearewrong
andstupidin preferringto do whattheythinkit is rightandrationalto do.
I wouldn'twantto act while I am worriedin case I am like them!"
But greatAchilleshadflownto the librariesto collect somevolumeson
The Theory of Rational Choice. Munchingsome lettuce, the tortoise
awaitedhis return.

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698 Simon Blackburn

Day H
"Youknow"resumedAchilles, "thiswhole businessis off on the wrong
foot. We have been talkingas if there is a gap between preferenceand
actualchoice. WhereasI now readthatin the best circles the thing is to
believe in the theoryof revealedpreference.Whichmeanswe readyour
preferenceback from your choice. It is not an antecedentstate whose
apprehensiondetermineschoices I admitthatyesterday'sconversation
madethatideapuzzling butsimplya logical constructfromthe choices
you make!"
"Pardonme"said the tortoise."Imusthavemisunderstoodsomething.
Don't these economistsand game theoristsget paid for giving advice
advice aboutwhatto do?"
"Absolutely",saidAchilles. "Theyare very rich andregardedas very
good at it."
"Tellme more",said the tortoiseadmiringly.
"Well"respondedAchilles puttingon his lecturer'sgown, "it seems to
go like this.
"The reasoningbehind talking of revealedpreferencecomes in two
parts.I In the bad old days, it goes, it was thoughtthat 'utility'will be a
Benthamite,empiricalquantitywhichhappenedto be the objectof desire,
or ought to be the objectof desire.But utilitiesso conceivedproveboth
empiricallyand philosophicallybogus, as indeed Benthammight have
learnedfromBishopButler(1953, especiallySermonsI andXI). It is neithertruenor usefulas an approximation
thatpeople or tortoisesact so as
to maximizethe intensityor durationof some state of themselves.They
do not even alwaysactwiththeirown interestsin mind,wherethese interests are construedas statesof themselves.Rather,we see themas having
aninterestin someobjectwhenthatobjectfiguresin theirdecisionmaking.
Butobjectshereincludestatesthatarenotstatesof the subject:the survival
of the whales, or the relief of the famine,or the deathof the blasphemer,
or the success of a friend.Indeed,notoriously,unless this is so the life
resultingis apt to be unenviableand the selfishnessis self-defeating.So
let us insteadreversetheequation:utilitiesareno longerempiricallygiven,
tractableways of handling
butaresimplyconstructsfrommathematically
preferences.Givenvery weak assumptions,an agentwith an orderingof
preferencesover each of some set of optionscan be representedas if she
hadattachedmeasurable'values',calledutilities,to thoseoptions.Theprovision of a scale is similarin principleto thatof providingnumericalmea' A forcefulrecentpresentationby a leadingpractitioneris Binmore(1994,
Vol. 1). See also Kreps(1990, p. 26), andDawes (1988, p. 154 ff).

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Practical TortoiseRaising 699

sures for weights,given only the resultsfroma balance.A balanceis an

empiricaldeterminationof when one object weighs at least as much as
another.The resultsof tests for whetherone objectis at least as heavy as
anothercan be presentednumerically,with the numbersrepresenting
'weights'of the objectsin the set.An elementhasat leastas greata weight
as anotherif andonly if the otherdoes not outweighit, which is to tip the
balance against it.2

"So if we havepairwisepreferencesacrosschoices in a set, we canrepresent theirexpectedutilities numerically.But what correspondsto the

empiricalresultsfromthe balance,telling us when choice a is preferred
to choiceb?Theorthodoxansweramongsteconomistsandgametheorists
to acceptthe theoryof revealedpreferences.This was initiallydefended
in the work of the economist Samuelson(1947), and holds that preferences themselvesare not antecedentpsychologicalstatesthathappento
control (most) decisions. Rather,true preferences are those that are
revealedby decisions. It is, afterall, a truismthatto know what you or
anyoneelse wants,see whatyou or anyoneelse chooses,or wouldchoose
given suitable options. To know that you prefer oil to butter,you see
whetheryou choose it, at least when nothingfurtherhangs on the decision. The theoryof revealedpreferencesis perhapsless popularamong
philosophersthan economists.But we shall see below good reason for
acceptingit, forthereis reallyno othercandidateforthe necessaryempirical test. Puttingthe two foundationstonestogetherthen,we have:
(Util) A utility functionis definedsuch thatthe expectedutility
of a is at least as greatas b if andonly if a is weaklypreferredto
b (i.e. preferredto b, or at leastas muchas b). Sucha functioncan
be definedover a set of optionsif preferencesatisfiestwo consistency conditions:for all outcomes a, b either a is weakly preferredto b, or b to a (totality),and if a is weaklypreferredto b,
andb to c, thena is weaklypreferredto c (transitivity).
(RevpreJ)Choicebehaviouris primitive.If a playermakeschoices, thenhe is makingchoices as thoughhe were equippedwith a
preferencerelationwhichhas thatchoice preferredto others.An
as thoughhe were seeking
eligible agent is always interpretable
to furthera preference.
"Ina nutshell,the firstpartof the approachmakesutilities 'logical constructions'outof preferences,while the secondmakespreferenceslogical
constructionsout of actualchoices.
"Towhomdo Util andRevpref apply? To anyonewith consistent,transitivepreferencesovera set of options.Wemay call suchpersonseligible
persons(it is vital not to confusethe issue by callingthemrational,as is
frequentlydone).An ineligiblepersonwouldbe someonewho cannotbe
2

The classic presentationis by von NeumannandMorgenstem(1944).

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700 SimonBlackburn

interpretedin termsof utilities,just as a balancethatcannotweigh some

elementin a set, or thatweighs a > b, andb > c, butc > a cannotdeliver
a set of weightsdefinedoverthe set. It is of the utmostimportance,then,
to realizethatthereare not two sortsof playersin a prisoners'dilemma,
or other game theoreticstructures,the eligible ones and the ineligible
ones. 'Ineligible'refersnot to a kindof player,butto someonewho cannot be interpretedas playingat all. An ineligibleplayeris like someone
who approacheschess by knockingoverthe board.It is, however,often a
matter of judgment whether someone who appears to be ineligible
throughhavingintransitivepreferencesis so really,or is best interpreted
as havingredefinedthe optionsin frontof her.
"Of course,neitherUtil nor Revprefhave gone uncriticized.Amartya
Sen, for example,introducesnotionsof sympathy(havingyour welfare
affectedby thepositionof others)andan individual'scommitments(conceived of as standingoutside,andevenin oppositionto theirown welfare)
as independentpressureson action.3He pointsout thatpreference,in the
economicsliterature,has two liaisons:one is with choice,butthe otheris
with welfare. That is, increasedpreferencesatisfactionis supposedto
increase welfare, and he denies that a notion of preferencebased on
Revprefcan fulfillthis secondcondition.Forpeoplemaybehaveas if they
had certainpreferences(those are the preferenceswe would read back
fromtheirbehaviour)whentheirwelfare,or even theirexpectedwelfare,
would be betterservedif they behaveddifferently.Sen also believes that
this underminesthe authorityof an approachbasedon Util. If it does so,
it also underminesRevpref;since if becauseof sympathyor commitment
an agent acts againsthis preferences(whathe would really like to do, if
only the situationallowedit), thenof coursehis actionwill not be revealing those preferences.
"Theorthodoxgametheorists'responseis thattheirframeworkis quite
elasticenoughto encompasswhatevermotivationswe believeto exist.As
I have alreadysketched,thereis no need to deny thata playermay care
aboutotherthingsthantheirown interests,realor perceived,or theirown
welfareas opposedto thatof others.In the aptphraseof DavidGauthier,
'it is not interestsin the self, thattakeoneselfas object,butinterestsof the
self, held by oneself as subject,thatprovidethe basis for rationalchoice
andaction'.Choiceis the upshotof whateverthe playercaresabout,and
as I havesketched,utilityderivesfromchoice.4So it is wrongto criticize
either axiom by remindingourselves of the heterogeneousnature of
I

Sen (1982) especiallythe essays collectedin PartI.

It is very easy to forget this. Binmore,for example,describeshomo economicusas someonewhose "concernis with his own self-interest,broadlyconceived"(p. 19). But this is wrong:homoeconomicusneed not be concemedwith
himselfat all, underany conceptionof his own interests.
4

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Practical TortoiseRaising 701

desire.Rather,we mustsimplybe carefulto buildanyapparently'exogenous' or externalindependentdesiresinto the payoffsrepresentedin the

choice situation.
"Thesamecaveatsapplyif we startto contrastpreferencewith principle or withconscience.Thereis certainlya vernaculardistinctionhere,for
we talk of being obligedto do whatwe do not preferto do. But the concepts definedby ourtwo axiomsdo not matchthis distinction,andarenot
refutedby it. Rather,preference,revealedby choice,mayincludethe preferencefor actingon anyspecificprinciple:the preferenceto keepa promise, or keep a vow to God, or to avoidthe gaze of the man within,or the
preferenceto do one's bit, the preferencefor being the manwho bought
the Brooklynbridge,ratherthanthe manwho sold it, or even the preference to try to live up to ourbetterselves. The betterway to describethe
'conflict'betweena narrowsense of preferenceandwhat happenswhen
principleis introducedis to say thatsometimeswe areobligedto do what
we wouldnot otherwisehave preferredto do; butthis leaves it open that
now, in the presenceof the obligation,ourpreferenceis actuallythatwe
conformto the requirementsof obligationor duty.The counterfactual
preferencethatwe would havehad,hadwe not madethe promiseor felt
obliged to cooperate,or whateverit is, is not our all-things-considered
preference."
the tortoise,a littlesharply.
"Splendid,absolutelysplendid"interrupted
for this is whatwe were
into
advice,
this
translates
me
how
tell
"Butnow
hopingto find."
"Well"said Achilles, confidently "considerthe familiar prisoner's
dilemma.
A
Hawk Dove
B

Hawk

1,1

0,3

Dove

3,0

2,2

"Eachplayeracts independently,causally,of the other,and each knows

the other'sutilities.Now, lookingat this the gametheoristcan adviseyou
to be a hawk.Forwhateveryouropponentdoes, you do betterby playing
hawk.Yetthis advicehas been contested,andindeedsome peoplethinkit
is rationalto play dove."
"Well,well",saidthe tortoise."Ifthe advicehas beencontested,thenit
mustbe significantadvice!But tell me, to whomdoes it applyexactly?"
"Aswe have explained",saidAchilles huffily"to anyoneeligible, and
who is presentedwith the game."

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702 SimonBlackburn

"TimeoDanaoset dona ferentis"said the tortoise,smugly."Tellme,

what would happen if I didn't follow the advice to choose hawk?
Wouldn'tI reveala preferencefor beinga dove?"
"Well,yes" admittedAchilles, somewhatimpatiently.
"howdoes it
"Andif that is so" continuedthe tortoiseimperturbably
happenthatthese littlefiguresyou havein the boxes, arethe right ones?I
mean, I can see how they might representmoney,or years in prison or
something,butthe gametheoristis surelynot tellingme thatit is rational
to care only aboutmoney,or yearsin prison.I thoughtthese figuresrepresentedthe sumtotalof my preferences.But since these arerevealedby
choice, if I play dove, thenthey cannotbe right."
"Explainto me"saidAchilles,totteringslightly.
Here, the tortoisepaused to put on the lecturer'sgown. "Supposea
player makes the dove choice. Then he preferredone or both of the
optionsin whichhe acts as a dove to the others;by Revpref we mustconstructa utilityfunctionin accordancewith thatpreference,andhence he
was not actuallyin a prisoners'dilemma.Inthe termsoftenused,his decision problemcannothave been accurately'modelled'by presentinghim
as if he were in a prisoners'dilemma.Fora prisoners'dilemmais defined
so thatthe hawkishutilitiesoutrankthe doveishones, andthatin turnsimply meansthatthe hawkishoptionsarethe ones thatget chosen.The conclusion ought to read that it is a tautology that an eligible player will
necessarilychoose hawkin the prisoners'dilemma."
"Aha"saidAchilles,"it is not quiteas simpleas that.Forin such strategic problems,we haveto considerthe otherplayer'slikelychoice.Imagine, if you will, the poor agent lurchingtowardsa choice, and knowing
thaton the otherside of a mirror,as it were, but quiteindependently,his
twin is doing the same. It will be betterall roundif they plumpfor dove,
in spiteof the way thatsucha choice is dominated.Mightn'tthey eachdo
so?"
"Ohwell" repliedthe tortoise,"Ifthey knowthatit is a realtwin, who
will magically do exactly the same as they do, then the options are
restrictedto the symmetricones, andplayingdove dominates.But in real
sitiationsthey don'tknowthis, andtheymightdo anything.If theyhavea
minuteto chose,thenrecallingwhattheirtwinis doingtheymightchange
theirmind once in the firstthirtyseconds,again in the next fifteen seconds, againin half the remainingtime, andso on. It wouldbe like one of
those lampsgoing on andoff evermorequickly.I seem to rememberyou
he said,nostalgionce modelledyourrunningonjust sucha contraption"
cally rememberinghis firstforayintophilosophy,morethantwo thousand
yearsago. "Heavenknowswherethey end.All I am sayingis thatif they
do go haywire,as well they might,andplumpfor dove, then if anything

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Practical Tortoise Raising 703

they revealdifferentpreferences,and hence expectedutilities, from the

ones on show."
"Forexample",continuedthe tortoise,"whenon p. 27 of his book Binmorestressesthat'it is tautologicalthathomoeconomicusmaximizesall
the time', we might think that this is peculiarto that kind of homo, or
equallyto testudoeconomicus,whom we then may or may not want to
imitate.Whereasin the lightof UtilandRevpref,it is tautologicalthatany
eligible agent maximizes all the time. In interpretingthis it is well to
rememberthe extremelyweak impositionthatconsistencyinvolves:only
thatyou havetransitivepreferencesoverthe entireset of optionsin play.
In particular,consistencydoes not entail any particularattitudetowards
risk, or towardsotherpeople, or action on principle.Nor does it entail
constancy, or consistency over time, which means making the same
choice on lateroccasionsas you madeon earlierones.5
"Moreimportantly,it is to be rememberedthatinconsistentplayersare
of no interest.For if a playeris genuinelyinconsistent,in any way that
mattersto the game, thenwe will be unableto constructa functionfrom
preferencesto utilities.In such a case we cannotsay whatthe utilitiesof
of him as in a
the agentareunderdifferentchoices,andthe interpretation
of
theoretic
probor
kind
decision
other
specific
any
dilemma,
prisoners'
lem, collapses.So in fact the tautologyappliesacrossthe board:it is tautological than any player who can be interpreted as being in a prisoner s

dilemma,chooses the dominantstrategy.There exists no theory about

non-eligibleplayers,so the restrictionto eligibleplayersis insignificant."
"Surelythe game theoristsknowall this?"queriedAchilles.
"Well"said the tortoise,shakinghis headmournfully,"theytendto be
forthrightaboutthe officialframeworkin someplaces,butmorecoy when
they are offeringall that richly-paidadvice. For example,Binmorefrequentlydescribeshimselfas arguingagainstthosewho thinkthatstrongly
dominatedchoicesarerational(p. 174);he sometimesdescribeshis opponents as supposingthat 'out of equilibriumplay can be sustainedin the
long run'(p. 175), andby contrastpresentshimself as the realistic,Hobbesianmanwho is hard-headedenoughto knowthateventuallyif we can
get more for ourselves,we will be temptedto do so. Theoristssuch as
GauthierandMcLennan,who thinkit is sometimesrationalto choose the
dominatedstrategy,areparticulartargets."
"Butisn't thatas it shouldbe?",saidAchilles, fumblinga little.
"Well,I thinkit shouldbe clear"repliedthe tortoise,"thatthese attitudesarethoroughlyincoherent.It is not thatout of equilibriumplay canI Why shouldit? Preferring
buttertodayandoil tomorrowmay be the key to a
healthydiet. Changeof preferenceis oftengood strategy,in poker,or in realand
metaphoricalbattles.Some men findfickle inconstantwomenespeciallycharming, in whichcase these aregeneticallysuccessfultraits.

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704 SimonBlackburn

not be sustainedin the long run,or needs psychologiesthatwe have not

got, or is the privatepreserveof benightedand irrationalbleeding-heart
Kantians,butthatit cannothappenat all. In outof equilibriumplay in the
prisoners'dilemma,an agent chooses what she recognizesas the dominated strategy.But by Util and Revpref this is impossible:if an agent
chooses a strategy,then this shows that(if utilitiesand probabilitiescan
be attachedat all) the expectedutility attachedto it is higherthan that
attachingto any otherstrategyoverwhich it was chosen."
"Hmmm",said Achilles. "Andyet, hasn't the enterpriseof bringing
rationalweight to bearagainstselfishnessmade the prisoners'dilemma
the centralparableof modempoliticaltheory?How can thatbe so if you
are right?"
"Oh,it has nothingto do with rationality"said the tortoise."Oreven
being good. The same pointapplieseven if you wantto be bad", and he
shudderedslightly,which is hardfor a tortoise.
"Explain",saidAchilles wonderingly.
"Well,takeblackmail"saidthe tortoise."Wecanthinkof it in extended
form in termsof a sequenceof plays, one in successionby each of two
players,Adamand Eve. At each node the playerhas to play one of two
options,hawkor dove. We are assumingas usualthateach of Adamand
Eve's payoffsis knownto themselves,andto the other.
Blackmail

t,

(Adam'spayoffis representedfirst)
E
A
O'At2
Dove

1,2

Dove

2,11

Hawk

*-t

| Hawk

0,0

"Thestory is thatbeforethe game startsEve has committedan indiscretion. If Adamdoes nothing(doveish)he has 1 unitof utility,andEve 2. If
he blackmails Eve (hawkish)and she submits (doveish) he takes 1 of
Eve's units. But if she does not submit(hawkish)she blows the gaff on
him, revealinghim as a blackmailer,butalso revealingherown indiscretion, leavingthembothworseoff, in the 0,0 finale.
"Orthodoxdecisiontheoryhas us reasonas follows. In Blackmail,eligible Eve will not play the finalhawkishoption.For doing so represents
simple loss. EligibleAdamknowsthatthis is so. Hence he plays hawk,
and since she thenplays dove, his blackmailis successful.
"Supposenow thatAdamknowsin advancethatthis is the matrix.Then
he knowsin advancethateligible Eve will not choose to be a hawkwhen

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Practical TortoiseRaising 705

it comes to herturn.Forit wouldbe a contradiction(by Util andRevpref)

for Eve to choose 0 when she can have 1. So eligible Eve will play dove,
and eligible Adamwill play hawk.For,once more,it would be a contradictionforAdamto play dovewhenhe couldplay hawk,leavinghimwith
1 insteadof 2. So Adamdoes not face a choice:once he knowsthe matrix,
he knowswhatis going to happen.
"Now rememberthat expert game theorists endorse both Util and
Revpref;and Binmore,for example,impliesthatall the rest of theirkind
do so as well.6 He believes that the 'advantagesof the methodologyin
clarifyingthe underlyinglogic are overwhelming'.Whatthis means is
that the game theoristtakes care of any facts aboutpsychologies at the
modellingstage(see esp. p. 162).Wehavesuccessfullymodelleda set of
playersonly whentheyhaveno interests(nothingtheycareabout)thatare
unrepresentedin the game's payoff structure.Often personswith other
elementsin theirpsychologieswill not be in suchgameswhenothersare.
"So whatEve needs to be is someonewho is not modelledcorrectlyas
being in thisgameeven whenother,nicer,people,wouldbe. In short,she
needs to presentherselfas being vengefulandproud,disinclinedto submit to blackmail,preferringherownfinancialruinandthatof Adamto the
feeling of havingbeen done downby him. Shouldshe knowshe will face
such situationsregularly,she needs to cultivate a nice public vicious
streak,so thatherthreatto exposethembothis all too credible.Of course,
if she hasn'tdonethatin advance,or hadit doneforherin school,she will
be a plausibletargetfor blackmail,poorthing."
"Goodlord,or ratherZeus"said Achilles, correctinghimself quickly.
"I supposephilosopherslike Gauthierwouldhaveto say thatit is rational
to be vicious."And he shudderedin his turn."Letme try to sortit out. It
certainlyqualifieswhat we might have thoughtwas meantby calling a
strategyrational,or indeed calling the situationa game that calls for
choices and strategies.We mighthavethoughtthatif we talk of a game,
and someone tells us that a particularstrategyis rational,then we can
interpretthatas tantamountto giving us permissionto follow it, or if it is
uniquelyrational,telling us to follow it. You do not in deliberationdraw
up two lists; one of what to do in given circumstances,and the otherof
6 Actually,I thinkhe is wrongaboutthis, at leastas faras the foundingfathers
areconcerned.VonNeumannandMorgenstem,for instance,writethat"we shall
in the economicsystemis money,
thereforeassumethatthe aimof all participants

or equivalently a single monetary commodity ..." (1944, 2.2.1). Harsanyi (1977)

contraststhepursuitof "selfinterestandindividualvalues"withthe "rationalpursuitof the interestsof societyas a whole",andsees gamesas modellingthe former
interest.The pointis thatin suchapproaches,an empiricallygiven aim or type of
aim is contrastedwith othersof a person'soverallinclinationsor concerns.Of
course,anyresultantadviceis thenhypotheticalin form:if you wantto maximize
only these specificconcerns,act as follows.

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706 SimonBlackburn

But in gametheoryas
whatit is rationalto do in the samecircumstances.7
it is now being conceived,nothingcan be translatedinto advice.Forsuppose we are 'advised'to follow the dominantstrategy.This is null advice,
equivalentto: behaveso thata tautologyis trueof you. So if we don'tfollow the advice,then our choice revealsthatit wasn'tthatgame. But if it
wasn't thatgamethenthe advicewas inapplicable,and if the advicewas
inapplicable,thentherewas no pointin followingit in any event,for the
game theoristhad failedto modelthe situationproperly.As Wittgenstein
might have said, anythingcould accordwith the advice, and thatmeans
thatno advicewas given. The economists'slogan 'Maximize!'turnsout
not to be an injunctionat all, for nothingcould countas failingto follow
by these
it.8 So the promisethatwe can learnsomethingaboutrationality
meanscollapses.Or,if we preferit, the ideathatthe notionof rationality
gains any purchasehereis refuted.It is inevitablethatso-calledcountertheoreticalactions do not revealthe irrationalityof the players,but the
inadequacyof this applicationof the theory."
"Youalwaysdid catchup fast"saidthetortoiseadmiringly,"Andit also
suggeststhatthe questionis not so muchone of whetherit is rationalfor
Eve to be vicious, as whethershe has been educatedso thatshe and her
peersthrivein the situationsin whichthey will be put. Some have, some
haven't",he addedsententiously,and sat down,which is also quitedifficult for a tortoise,andate some morelettuce.

Day III
"Look"saidAchilles,forlornlycontemplatinghis bonfireof bookson The
Theoryof RationalChoice,"decisionmakingis at leastunderthe control
of fact and reasonin anotherway. Therewill come afterus one greater
thanus, who will show thatit is a dictateof purepracticalreasonthatwe
treateverypersonas an end in themselves.And his name shall be called
Immanuel.But let's not starton that",he addedhurriedly.
"Andeverytortoise",I hope addedthe tortoise.
"If they arerational",assuredAchilles,mutteringsomethingunderhis
breath.
"Tellme", said the tortoise,"it soundsnice and impartial.Must I be
he asked,innocently.
impartial?"
I Unless"rational"
is beingusedin an irrelevant,restrictedsensein whichwhat
is r4tionalcontrastswith spontaneousor emotionallysatisfying.
8 Gauthier(1987, p. 27) points out the futility of this injunctionon similar
grounds.But his own views arenot disentangledfromthe problem.

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Practical TortoiseRaising 707

"Absolutely",said Achilles piously. "EvenHume, whom you somewhatresemble,realizesthatwe haveto takeup a commonpointof view.
In a conversationwithanyoneelse aboutwhatto do, thereis a pointwhere
we must cease speakingthe languageof self-love, and correctour sentimentsby invokingcommonstandards,wherebywe judge thingsandperthem."
sons as they affectthose surrounding
"Andthe penaltyif we don't?"askedthe tortoise.
"Well,practicalreasoningcouldnotgo forward"saidAchilles,"andwe
wouldlose the benefitsof cooperation,or of puttingthe firstpersonplural
in placeof the firstpersonsingular(Postema1995).Wecouldn'tevenrow
boatstogether."
"Wewouldn'twantthat",saidthe tortoisesociably."ButI remembera
coupleof daysago we thrashedoutwantsandpreferences,andI am afraid
I remainedunmoved,if you remember.So whatis new?"
"Heshows
"KantimprovesuponHume"saidAchillesenthusiastically.
how purepracticalreasondictatesrespectfor the law. For impartiality,
fairness,andall that.All sortsof good things"he finishedlamely.
"Itsoundsappetizing"agreedthe tortoise,"buttell me aboutthis dictation andthisrespect.Whatis my awfulfateif I findthisrespectis notactually dictated?"
"Wellif you don'trespectthe law"saidAchilles,"youwill not be free,
not an autonomousself-governingtortoise."
"AndI expectat least you are going to tell me thatI wouldn'twantto
be anythingelse" chimedin the tortoise,"butthatis not going to get us
much further,is it? Presumablyyou reallywould like to tell me thatit is
contraryto reasonnot to respectthe law, therebyachievingfreedomand
self-respect.And I doubtif I am going to believeyou. ForI fearthatKant
will one day tell us that
The realmoralityof actions,theirmeritor guilt, even thatof our
own conduct,thusremainsentirelyhiddenfromus. Ourimputations can referonly to the empiricalcharacter.How muchof this
characteris ascribableto the pureeffect of freedom,how muchto
mere nature,that is, to faultsof temperamentfor which thereis
no responsibility,or to its happyconstitution,can neverbe determined ... . (Critique of Pure Reason, A55 1/B579)
I
"And am afraidmy own self-respectas a just and caringtortoiseis not
facts.And",he addeddropbeholdento any such murkytranscendental
ping his voice a little, "I ratherdoubtwhetheryourself-respectas a hero
is, either."
"But you are a just and fair and compassionatetortoise",reminded
Achilles.
"You'retoo kind",said the tortoiseblushingmodestly."Butit is true.
Youwill knowhowAdamSmithwritesthat

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708 Simon Blackburn

Thejurisdictionof the man within, is foundedaltogetherin the

desireof praise-worthiness,
andin the aversionto blame-worthiness; in the desireof possessingthose qualities,and performing
those actions,which we love andadmirein otherpeople;and in
the dreadof possessingthose qualities,andperformingthose actions, whichwe hateanddespisein otherpeople.(1759, III. 2, p.
33)
"Well,the same goes for the tortoisewithin",he addedhelpfully.
"But it is not rational" wailed Achilles, beatinghis head on the tortoise's shell.
"Justas well", said the tortoise,"givenwherethat leaves us. And it is
luckymy shell is so solid."

Day IV
"Listen",beganAchilles, his locks disheveledby what appearedto have
been a sleepless night. "At least you respectmeans-endsreasoning,do
you not?And quitepossibly thereexists an argumentthatif you do that
then you cannot remainunmovedin otherways. Once you have some
muststhenyou haveto allow others."
"Respectmeans-endsreasoning?",queriedthe tortoise,"Explainto me
whatyou mean."
"Well,supposeyou wantsome of thatlettuceacrossthe road.And you
apprehendthatthe only way to get it is to cross the road,since lettuceis
even less likelyto movethanyou are.Inotherwords,you knowthatif you
wantthe lettuce,you mustcross the road.So it follows thatyou conceive
yourselfundera necessityto cross the road.Therewould thenbe a kind
of inconsistencyin not crossingthe road."
"IthinkI only knowone kindof inconsistency",saidthe tortoise."The
kindthatgoes p & np. Do you meanI am contradictingmyself?It doesn't
feel as if I am."
"Butdon't you agree that if you want the lettuceyou must cross the
road?And you wantthe lettuce(andthe momentof decision is at hand)
... so you must cross the road."

"By modusponens"saidthe tortoise,a nastyglintcominginto his eye.

"Grrr",saidAchilleswarningly.
"Allright",said the tortoisebackingoff relativelyhastily,"butit isn't
even modusponensis it? I mean,if I wanta millionpoundsI mustbuy a
lotteryticket,and I do wanta millionpounds,but I don't see thatI must
buy a lotteryticket.It is one of thoseoff-colourconditionalswheremusts

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Practical Tortoise Raising 709

and oughts make the conclusionnon-detachable.And in fact, I am not

going to buy a lotteryticket"he concludedwith a flourish.
"Aha",repliedAchilles, "thatmust mean you want something else
more,suchas avoidinglotteriesor sittingstill."
"I ratherthinkwe are back in the worldof Revpref" said the tortoise.
"Of courseI recognizethat if I am to get what I want, I must adoptthe
only meansavailable.If I am to get the lettuceI mustcross the road,and
wantingthe lettuceas I do I expectin time to cross the road.If I don't do
so, we mightagreethatI really didn'twant the lettuceall thatmuch, or
perhapsthatI wantedsomethingelse more. MaybeI just didn'twant to
cross the road.No harmin that"he concludedsmugly.
"Youmakeit sounda kindof accidentif you choose the meansto the
end" complainedAchilles. "WhereasI am trying to show that reason
enjoinsthe choice!To coin a phrase,it is an a prioriprincipleconstitutive
of practicalrationality!"
"Notan accident,andnot that,whateverit is" said the tortoise."Natuhasto be done.If I preferlettuce
rallysome difficultradicalinterpretation
to starvation,andrecognizecrossingtheroadas the only meansto lettuce,
yet act as if I preferthe joint outcome<starvation,sit still> to <lettuce,
cross the road>then we will cast aroundfor otherobjectsof concernto
explainmy choice.And equallyobviouslytortoisesof a racethatdoes not
choose necessarymeansto ends will fail to achievetheirends;assuming
theirends includesatisfyingtheirneeds, thenthey will doubtlessdie out
ratherrapidly.I expect thatis why I may be aboutto cross the road.On
the otherhand,tortoiseswho rusharoundbuyinglotteryticketsmay not
do all thatwell either.The raceis not alwaysto the swift"he mused.
"Butwouldn'tyou call a fellow tortoisewho persistentlyfailedto adapt
Don't therehaveto be authoritative,instrumeansto endsunreasonable?
mentalnorms?"fumedAchilles.9
said the tortoise,"peoplewho
"Oh,I call lots of peopleunreasonable",
get angrytoo quicklyor eat too much so thatthey can get sick and lose
competitions.It doesn'tsignifyvery
weight,or who enterdwarf-throwing
muchexceptthattheirbehaviourdoesn'tmakesense to me, or even thatI
disapproveof them.But as for norms,yes, indeedI am glad I am not the
kindof tortoisewho constantlyfails to adaptmeansto ends. I am not sure
I am ever going to meet any who do so fail, bothbecauseit is so hardto
identifythem,and becausewe agreedthatthey will have died out pretty
quickly.But if I did, well I am sure they would really arouse my pas9Thisway of puttingit is thatof JeanHampton(1995, p. 66). In the sameissue
ElijahMilgram(1995) thinksthatHumewas, implausibly,a scepticaboutpractical reasoning.Thetortoisesuggeststhatwe haveno coherentconceptof anything
of which Humewas implausiblysceptical.

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710 SimonBlackburn

sions good-for-nothing,useless animals,everylast tortoiseof them"he

said with a frown.
"Atleast I can agreeto that",repliedAchilles, sadly.
"Whyso sad?",askedthe tortoise,caringly.
"Nothing",said Achilles, "It is just that I thoughtI had a different
thought,andnow I thinkI didn't."

Day V
"But look", said Achilles, "you have resistedall the argumentsI could
muster.And yet I notice thatthis pile of lettucehas steadilyshrunk.So
what is going on?"
"Oh, didn't I tell you?" said the tortoise, pausing surprisedin midmouthful."Ihavean absolutepassionforthe stuff.In fact,I scarcelyever
resist it. Wouldyou like some too?"'0I
Department of Philosophy
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27599
USA
e-mail ublack@gibbs.oit.unc.edu

SIMON BLACKBURN

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I0 Thispaperwas readat a conferencein GlasgowUniversitycommemorating
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for the invitation,and to Pat Shaw,JamesDreier,GilbertHarman,andothersin
the audiencefor valuablecommentary.

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Practical Tortoise Raising 711

Kreps, David M. 1990: Game Theory and Economic Modelling. Oxford:

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