Eminent Domain - Requisites for the Exercise Taking in the Constitutional Sense

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-60077 January 18, 1991

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
SPS. MISERICORDIA GUTIERREZ and RICARDO MALIT and THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS,respondents.
Pedro S. Dabu for private respondents.

BIDIN, J.:p
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the National Power Corporation (NPC) seeking the reversal or
modification of the March 9, 1986 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 54291-R entitled "National
Power Corporation v. Sps. Misericordia Gutierrez and Ricardo Malit", affirming the December 4, 1972 Decision
of the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Fifth Judicial District, Branch II, in Civil Case No. 2709,
entitled National Power Corporation v. Matias Cruz, et al.
The undisputed facts of the case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Plaintiff National Power Corporation, a government owned and controlled entity, in accordance
with Commonwealth Act No. 120, is invested with the power of eminent domain for the purpose
of pursuing its objectives, which among others is the construction, operation, and maintenance of
electric transmission lines for distribution throughout the Philippines. For the construction of its
230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, plaintiff's lines have to pass the lands belonging to
defendants Matias Cruz, Heirs of Natalia Paule and spouses Misericordia Gutierrez and Ricardo
Malit covered by tax declarations Nos. 907, 4281 and 7582, respectively.
Plaintiff initiated negotiations for the acquisition of right of way easements over the
aforementioned lots for the construction of its transmission lines but unsuccessful in this regard,
said corporation was constrained to file eminent domain proceedings against the herein
defendants on January 20, 1965.
Upon filing of the corresponding complaint, plaintiff corporation deposited the amount of P973.00
with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga, tendered to cover the provisional value of the land of
the defendant spouses Ricardo Malit and Misericordia Gutierrez. And by virtue of which, the
plaintiff corporation was placed in possession of the property of the defendant spouses so it
could immediately proceed with the construction of its Mexico-Limay 230 KV transmission line. In
this connection, by the trial court's order of September 30, 1965, the defendant spouses were
authorized to withdraw the fixed provisional value of their land in the sum of P973.00.

The only controversy existing between the parties litigants is the reasonableness and adequacy
of the disturbance or compensation fee of the expropriated properties.
Meanwhile, for the purpose of determining the fair and just compensation due the defendants,
the court appointed three commissioners, comprised of one representative of the plaintiff, one for
the defendants and the other from the court, who then were empowered to receive evidence,
conduct ocular inspection of the premises, and thereafter, prepare their appraisals as to the fair
and just compensation to be paid to the owners of the lots. Hearings were consequently held
before said commissioners and during their hearings, the case of defendant Heirs of Natalia
Paule was amicably settled by virtue of a Right of Way Grant (Exh. C) executed by Guadalupe
Sangalang for herself and in behalf of her co-heirs in favor of the plaintiff corporation. The case
against Matias Cruz was earlier decided by the court, thereby leaving only the case against the
defendant spouses Ricardo Malit and Misericordia Gutierrez still to be resolved. Accordingly, the
commissioners submitted their individual reports. The commissioner for the plaintiff corporation
recommended the following:
. . . that plaintiff be granted right of way easement over the 760 square meters of
the defendants Malit and Gutierrez land for plaintiff transmission line upon
payment of an easement fee of P1.00 therefor. . . . (Annex M)
The commissioner for the defendant spouses recommended the following:
. . . that Mr. and Mrs. Ricardo Malit be paid as disturbance compensation the
amount of P10.00 sq. meter or the total amount of P7,600.00' (Annex K)
The Court's commissioner recommended the following:
. . . the payment of Five (P 5.OO) Pesos per square meter of the area covered by the Right-ofway to be granted, . . .(Annex L)
The plaintiff corporation urged the Court that the assessment as recommended by their
commissioner be the one adopted. Defendant spouses, however, dissented and objected to the
price recommended by both the representative of the court and of the plaintiff corporation.
With these reports submitted by the three commissioners and on the evidence adduced by the
defendants as well as the plaintiff for the purpose of proving the fair market value of the property
sought to be expropriated, the lower court rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, responsive to the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering plaintiff National Power Corporation to pay defendant spouses
Ricardo Malit and Misericordia Gutierrez the sum of P10.00 per square meter as
the fair and reasonable compensation for the right-of-way easement of the
affected area, which is 760 squares, or a total sum of P7,600.00 and P800.00 as
attorney's fees' (Record on Appeal, p. 83)
Dissatisfied with the decision, the plaintiff corporation filed a motion for reconsideration which
was favorably acted upon by the lower court, and in an order dated June 10, 1973, it amended its
previous decision in the following tenor:
On the basis of an ocular inspection made personally by the undersigned, this
court finally classified the land of the spouses Ricardo Malit and Misericordia to
be partly commercial and partly agricultural, for which reason the amount of
P10.00 per sq. meter awarded in the decision of December 4,1972 is hereby
reduced to P5.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable market value of
the 760 square meters belonging to the said spouses.

There being no claim and evidence for attorney's fees, the amount of P800.00
awarded as attorney's fees, in the decision of December 4, 1972 is hereby
reconsidered and set aside. (Annex S)
Still not satisfied, an appeal was filed by petitioner (NPC) with the Court of Appeals but respondent Court of
Appeals in its March 9, 1982, sustained the trial court, as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error committed by the court a quo, the appealed judgment
is hereby affirmed with costs against the plaintiff-appellant.
Hence, the instant petition.
The First Division of this Court gave due course to the petition and required both parties to submit their
respective memoranda (Resolution of January 12, 1983). It also noted in an internal resolution of August 17,
1983 that petitioner flied its memorandum while the respondents failed to file their memorandum within the
period which expired on February 24,1983; hence, the case was considered submitted for decision.
The sole issue raised by petitioner is
WHETHER PETITIONER SHOULD BE MADE TO PAY SIMPLE EASEMENT FEE OR FULL
COMPENSATION FOR THE LAND TRAVERSED BY ITS TRANSMISSION LINES.
It is the contention of petitioner that the Court of Appeals committed gross error by adjudging the petitioner liable
for the payment of the full market value of the land traversed by its transmission lines, and that it overlooks the
undeniable fact that a simple right-of-way easement (for the passage of transmission lines) transmits no rights,
except that of the easement. Full ownership is retained by the private respondents and they are not totally
deprived of the use of the land. They can continue planting the same agricultural crops, except those that would
result in contact with the wires. On this premise, petitioner submits that if full market value is required, then full
transfer of ownership is only the logical equivalent.
The petition is devoid of merit. The resolution of this case hinges on the determination of whether the acquisition
of a mere right-of-way is an exercise of the power of eminent domain contemplated by law.
The trial court's observation shared by the appellate court show that ". . . While it is true that plaintiff are (sic)
only after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as
manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that below said transmission lines no plant higher
than three (3) meters is allowed. Furthermore, because of the high-tension current conveyed through said
transmission lines, danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath said wires cannot altogether be
discounted, and to cap it all plaintiff only pays the fee to defendants once, while the latter shall continually pay
the taxes due on said affected portion of their property."
The foregoing facts considered, the acquisition of the right-of-way easement falls within the purview of the power
of eminent domain. Such conclusion finds support in similar cases of easement of right-of-way where the
Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use
(See National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 665, 1984; Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 102
SCRA 597,1981). The Supreme Court, in Republic of the Philippines vs. PLDT, * thus held that:
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to,
and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may
not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of
title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be
subjected to an easement of right-of-way.
In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain.
Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation
imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary
use.

For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which should be
neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said
property. Just compensation has always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss
which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation (Province of Tayabas vs.
Perez, 66 Phil. 467 [1938]; Assoc. of Small Land Owners of the Phils., Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
G.R. No. 78742; Acuna vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 79310; Pabrico vs. Juico, G.R. No. 79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R.
No. 79777,14 July 1989, 175 SCRA 343 [1989]). The price or value of the land and its character at the time it
was taken by the Government are the criteria for determining just compensation (National Power Corp. v. Court
of Appeals, 129 SCRA 665, [1984]). The above price refers to the market value of the land which may be the full
market value thereof. According to private respondents, the market value of their lot is P50.00 per square meter
because the said lot is adjacent to the National and super highways of Gapan, Nueva Ecija and Olongapo City.
Private respondents recognize the inherent power of eminent domain being exercised by NPC when it finally
consented to the expropriation of the said portion of their land, subject however to payment of just
compensation. No matter how laudable NPC's purpose is, for which expropriation was sought, it is just and
equitable that they be compensated the fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of
the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity (EPZA v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 [1987];
Mun. of Daet v. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 503 (1979]).
It appearing that the trial court did not act capriciously and arbitrarily in setting the price of P5.00 per square
meter of the affected property, the said award is proper and not unreasonable.
On the issue of ownership being claimed by petitioner in the event that the price of P5.00 per square meter be
sustained, it is well settled that an issue which has not been raised in the Court a quo cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal as it would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process . . . (Filipino
Merchants v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85141, November 8, 1989, 179 SCRA 638; Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Procter and Gamble Philippines Manufacturing Corporation, 160 SCRA 560 [1988]; Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Wander Philippines, Inc., 160 SCRA 573 1988]). Petitioner only sought an easement of
right-of-way, and as earlier discussed, the power of eminent domain may be exercised although title was not
transferred to the expropriator.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3144

November 19, 1907

CARMEN AYALA DE ROXAS and PEDRO P. ROXAS, plaintiffs,

vs.
THE CITY OF MANILA and ROBERT G. DIECK, as city engineer, defendants.
Del-Pan, Ortigas and Fisher, for plaintiffs.
Modesto Reyes, for defendants.

ARELLANO, C.J.:
The defendants' demurred to the amended complaint having been overruled, an answer was presented, and the
trial of the case proceeded with.
Briefly, the subject of this action may be stated as follows:
1. That on the 15th of January, 1906, the plaintiff, as owner of the property situated on the Escolta, district of
Binondo, city of Manila, the eastern boundary of which adjoins the canal of San Jacinto or Sibacon to the extent
of 23.50 meters, the total area of the ground being 658.19 square meters, applied to the city engineer, Robert G.
Dieck, the defendant herein, for a license to construct a terrace over "the strip of land 3 meters in width between
the main wall of her house and the edge of the said canal of Sibacon or San Jacinto, which strip of land belongs
exclusively to her"; but the defendant refused to grant the license or authorize the plaintiff to build the terrace.
2. That a similar petition was addressed to the Municipal Board of the city of Manila on the 30th of said month
and year, and it also was denied.
3. That, as the plaintiff has been informed, the sole reason wherefore the license was denied is because "the
said defendants pretend to compel the plaintiff to leave vacant and without any construction whatever thereon
the said strip of 3 meters in width which is a portion of the ground belonging to her, in order to use the same as
the wharf or public way so that the plaintiff will only be able to use the said strip in the same manner and for the
same purposes as the public in general, thus losing the enjoyment, use, and exclusive possession of the said
strip of the property which the plaintiff and the former owners thereof have enjoyed quietly and peacefully during
more than seventy years."
4. That the strip in question was occupied by a two-storey building constructed more than seventy years ago.
It appears from the evidence:
First. That the plaintiff's ownership of the whole ground and of the strip in question is beyond all doubt, both by
reason of her title thereto and the entry thereof in the registry of property, and by the acknowledgment thereof
made by the city itself when obtaining by means of condemnation proceedings a portion of the same property
adjoining the public road.
Second. That as a matter of fact, the license which the plaintiff, using her right of ownership, requested for the
construction of a terrace on the strip of 3 meters adjoining the canal of San Jacinto or Sibacon, was denied; both
parties agreeing that the denial was due to the intent to reserve the said strip for the establishment of a public
easement, although the opposing witnesses did not agree as to the special easement intended to be
established.

Third. That it was agreed between both parties that the strip above referred to had not been expropriated in
whole or in part by the municipality of Manila, and that neither had the latter offered any compensation for the
same to the owner thereof.
Fourth. That according to Engineer Dieck, a defendant, the purpose of the city was to use the said strip of 3
meters as a place for discharging and landing goods, and as a place of shelter for shipwrecked persons and for
fishermen, and to devote it also, together with other strips along the canal, by the gradual acquisition of land, to
a towpath for craft passing through the canal; that a building line has been established by the Municipal Board
along the Sibacon Creek leaving a strip of 3 meters within which, according to ordinances, no constructions
would be permitted; that such is the purpose and the intent on which the existing ordinances are based. But
John Tuther, the secretary of the Municipal Board, declares that, when Ordinance No. 78 was under discussion,
he does not recall having heard any of the members of the board make reference to a towpath nor did he ever
hear anything said with reference to the purpose to which the strip of 3 meters mentioned in Ordinance No. 78
was to be devoted, though he believes that, by thus leaving a strip of 3 meters, it would be easier to prevent
collisions; that it would facilitate navigation, and that it had never been the intention of the Board to indemnify the
owners of such strips of 3 meters by reason of the use which parties landing thereon may make of the same.
Fifth. That, as stated in the brief of the defendants, "the intention of the Municipal Board, when denying the
permit asked for by the plaintiff, has never been to establish any way whatever along the Sibacon Creek so that
said plaintiff could, if she chose to, close her property with walls or the like perpendicularly to said creek, that is,
over the two lines perpendicular to said creek, provided she does not close or build over the 3-meter space
running along the creek," which space is subject, as stated in the evidence submitted by the defendants, to the
"easement of public use for the general interest of navigation, flotation, fishing, and salvage," citing the Law of
Waters and the Civil Code.
Sixth. And that the result is, according to No. 19 of the statement of facts of the complaint, "that the plaintiff shall
only be able to use said strip in the same manner and for the same purposes as the general public, thus losing
the enjoyment, use, and exclusive possession of said strip of the ground which the plaintiff and the former
owners of the same have enjoyed as such owners quietly and peacefully during more than seventy years."
What the defendants have therefore done is to prevent the plaintiffs from continuing to enjoy, use, and freely
dispose of such strip of their ground, as they had been doing up to the time when they applied for a license to
construct a terrace over said strip, and the defendants prevented it with the intention of establishing a public
easement provided for in an ordinance of their own which they consider is pursuant to the provisions of the Law
of Waters and of the Civil Code in force.
In the decision entered by this court on the 5th of May, 1906, regarding the demurrer, the following was set forth:
The easement of a zone for public use, authorized by article 73 of the Law of Waters of 1866, is
developed in articles 160 and 161, inclusive, of said law; the general interest on behalf of which the
easement is supported is determined, for navigation, by articles 160 and 161; for flotation, by article 162;
for salvage, by article 163; and for fishing, by article 164; in all of them the owner of the riverside property
supports the easement "upon being previously indemnified for loss and damage." (Folio 41.)
Said zone for public use, the same as a towpath, is solely available for the purposes of navigation,
flotation, fishing, and salvage, being closed to any other use which be attempted; therefore, it is
erroneous to pretend that the right of the owner of the property bordering upon the stream can be
reduced to the level of the public right; on the contrary he should only be called upon to bear those
burdens which are in the general interest, but not without prior, or subsequently indemnity. (Folio 43.)
If as affirmed in statement No. 4, and accepted by the defendants, the Sibacon Creek is a canal let us grant
that it is navigable, because it has been held by competent authority and that under the name of a public
wharf, which is the largest in area, it is desired to establish a towpath, which is the smallest, it must be
remembered that the law does not grant it along navigable canals (art. 157), and, at all events, the establishment
thereof must be preceded by the corresponding indemnity. (Arts. 154 and 157.)
The matter at issue herein being the enforcement of the Law of Waters and of the Civil Code, it is not out of
place nor untimely, even now, to point out the administrative law which ought to have been applied had this act
of the city of Manila been carried out by the late ayuntamiento during the former sovereignty; an administrative

law which, owing to its having been so often repeated, is now raised to the rank of an incontrovertible principle of
law on the matter.
The powers of the administration do not extend to the establishment of new easements upon private
property but simply to preserve old ones, whenever a recent and easily proven usurpation exists.
(Decision of January 23, 1866.)
lawphil.net

Ayuntamientos are not authorized to impose an easement upon private property; therefore, any order
thus given can not be held to have been issued in the exercise of their lawful powers. (Decision of July
28, 1866.)
Administrative action for the recovery of a public easement which has been usurped by a constructive
work of private ownership can only be taken when such usurpation is of recent date and easily proven.
When real rights are concerned an ayuntamiento may prosecute such actions as it may consider itself
entitled to, for the possession or ownership in accordance with law. (Decision of October 26, 1866.)
This doctrine will be found far more vigorous at present upon reference to the principles of the law now in force.
According to article 349 of the Civil Code, no one shall be deprived of his property, except by competent
authority and with sufficient cause of public utility, always after proper indemnity; if this requisite has not been
fulfilled the courts must protect, and eventually restore possession to the injured party.
Under section 5 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, no legislation shall be enacted in the Philippine Islands
which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; and the due process of law
in order to deprive a person of his property is, according to the Code of Civil Procedure, reserved to the judicial
authority. The refusal to grant a license or the enactment of an ordinance whereby a person may be deprived of
property or rights, or an attempt thereat is made, without previously indemnifying him therefor, is not, nor can it
be, due process of law.
1aw phil.net

And, considering that the easement intended to be established, whatever may be the object thereof, is not
merely a real right that will encumber the property, but is one tending to prevent the exclusive use of one portion
of the same, by expropriating it for a public use which, be it what it may, can not be accomplished unless the
owner of the property condemned or seized be previously and duly indemnified, it is proper to protect the
appellant by means of the remedy employed in such cases, as it is the only adequate remedy when no other
legal action can be resorted to, against an intent which is nothing short of an arbitrary restriction imposed by the
city by virtue of the coercive power with which the same is invested. The question involved here is not the actual
establishment of an easement which might be objected to by an action in court, but a mere act of obstruction, a
refusal which is beyond the powers of the city of Manila, because it is not simply a measure in connection with
building regulations, but is an attempt to suppress, without due process of law, real rights which are attached to
the right of ownership.
When . . . any corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes the plaintiff
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled and from which he is unlawfully
precluded by such inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, and the court, on trial, finds the
allegations of the complaint to be true, it may, if there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary courts of law, render a judgment granting a peremptory order against the defendant,
commanding him, immediately after the receipt of such order, or at some other specified time, to do the
act required to be done to protect the rights of the plaintiff. (Code of Civil Procedure, sec 222.)
Therefore, we hereby command the defendants, the city of Manila, and Robert G. Dieck, as city engineer, or
whomsoever may now be acting as such, to immediately issue a license in favor of the plaintiff herein, Doa
Carmen Ayala de Roxas, to construct the terrace as aforesaid in accordance with the plan and specification as
per Exhibit A, the said defendants to pay the costs of these proceedings. So ordered.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 109338. November 20, 2000]

CAMARINES NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (CANORECO), petitioner,

vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. LUIS L. DICTADO, Presiding Judge, RTC,
Branch 39, Daet, Camarines Norte, EDUARDO R. MORENO, LT. COL. RUFINO
CHAVEZ, CAPT. ALFREDO BORJA, CONRAD C. LEVISTE and VINES REALTY
CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls within the purview of the power of eminent
domain.
We have before the Court for consideration a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals,[1] and its resolution,[2] which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.[3]
The facts of the case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On May 18, 1989, Conrad L. Leviste filed with the Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte, a
complaint[4] for collection of a sum of money and foreclosure of mortgage against Philippine Smelter
Corporation (PSC).
For failure to file an answer to the complaint, the trial court declared PSC in default and allowed plaintiff
Leviste to present evidence ex-parte.
On November 23, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant
ordering the latter
1. to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,798,750.00 with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per
annum from November, 1989 until the whole amount shall have been fully paid;
2. to pay the plaintiff the sum of P11,500.00 as attorneys fees;
to pay the plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 as expenses incidental to this litigation; and
3. to pay the costs of this suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

[5]

When the decision became final and executory, the trial court issued a writ of execution and
respondent sheriff Eduardo R. Moreno levied upon two (2) parcels of land covered TCT Nos. T-13505 and
T-13514 issued by the Registrar of Deeds in the name of PSC. On April 24, 1990, the parcels of land were
sold at public auction in favor of Vines Realty Corporation (Vines Realty). On April 25, 1990, the Clerk of
Court, as ex-officio Provincial Sheriff, issued a Certificate of Sale,[6] which Judge Luis D. Dictado, in his
capacity as executive judge, approved.

On June 23, 1992, Vines Realty moved for the issuance of a writ of possession over said property. On
June 25, 1992, the trial court granted the motion.[7]
On August 7, 1992, copy of the writ of possession was served on petitioner as owner of the power lines
standing on certain portions of the subject property. Later, on August 12, 1992, Vines Realty filed an
amended motion for an order of demolition and removal[8] of improvements on the subject land.
Among the improvements for removal were the power lines and electric posts belonging to petitioner.
Petitioner opposed the motion[9]on the ground, among other reasons, that petitioner was not a party to
the case and therefore not bound by the judgment of the trial court and that it had subsisting right-of-way
agreements over said property.
The trial court[10] set the hearing on the amended motion on September 29, 1992 but the hearing was
re-scheduled on October 28, 1992, and then again on November 10, 1992.[11] On all these dates, no hearing
was conducted.
Then the case was re-raffled to Branch 39 of the regional trial court presided over by respondent judge.
On November 27, 1992, the trial court[12] set the hearing on the amended motion for
demolition. However, instead of adducing evidence for petitioner, its counsel[13] manifested that he was
withdrawing his appearance since the authority given him by petitioner was only for the filing of the
opposition to the amended motion. The trial court proceeded with the hearing despite the fact that
petitioner had no counsel present. Thus, only Vines Realty presented its evidence.
On the same date, November 27, 1992, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of demolition
directing and deputizing Lt. Col. Rufino Chavez, Jr. and Capt. Alfredo Borja to constitute an augmentation
force for the immediate implementation of the writ.[14]
On December 7, 1992, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition with
restraining order and preliminary injunction.[15] Petitioner argued that the trial court acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order dated November 27. 1992.
On December 10, 1992, the Court of Appeals sent telegrams to respondents informing them of the
issuance of a restraining order. On the same day, however, the trial court issued a writ of demolition. [16] The
court addressed the writ to sheriff Eduardo de los Reyes,[17] who was not a respondent in the petition before
the Court of Appeals, so that the latter can implement the writ on the pretext that he was not covered by the
restraining order.
On December 11, 1992, the trial court issued another order directing the National Power Corporation
sub-unit in Camarines Norte to shut off the power lines energizing the New Lucena Oil Products
Corporation, one of the consumers serviced by petitioner, as shown by the radiogram [18] of Simeon P. Zao
III, OIC Labo, NPC. Mr. Zao filed a manifestation[19] with the trial court that if NPC would shut off said
power supply before the sub-station of petitioner, it would deprive Benguet Mining Corporation of electricity
and endanger the lives of its miners.
On the same day, December 11, 1992, respondent Vines Realty cut down petitioners electric posts
professedly using a chainsaw[20] and resulting in a loud blast affecting the area. Philippine National Police
desk officer Bianito Cobacha[21]of Barangay Jose Panganiban Police Station entered in the police blotter that
on December 11, 1992, at about 2 p.m., men led by the provincial sheriff felled petitioners electric posts
along the cemetery of Bagumbayan.
Even the members of the Sangguniang Bayan at San Jose appealed to respondent Sheriff to desist
from proceeding with the demolition due to a restraining order but to no avail.
On January 4, 1993, Vines Realty filed with the trial court a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of
demolition.[22] The hearing was scheduled on January 12, 1993, at 8:30 a. m. but petitioners lawyer, Atty.
Jose Maacop, received a copy only on January 11, 1994.
Atty. Bienvenido A. Paita made a special appearance for petitioner through a manifestation with motion
for reconsideration[23] dated January 21, 1993. Atty. Paita declared it was impossible for him to appear and
file an opposition to the motion on very short notice. He said that petitioner was not a party to the case,
that the restraining order of the Court of Appeals was good until further orders, and the writ of execution
was executed on December 11, 1992. Petitioner manifested that it was denied its day in court.

On January 25, 1993,[24] the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration on the ground that the
appearance of Atty. Paita was irregular and that Atty. Maacop as the counsel in the appellate court must
first make an entry of appearance with the trial court.
On January 26, 1993, the trial court issued an alias writ of demolition.[25]
The sheriff, at the request of Vines Realty demolished the remaining electric posts resulting in the
cutting off of power supply to various business establishments and barangays.
Meantime, on January 19, 1993, the Court of Appeals, promulgated a decision[26]dismissing the petition
for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Let it be stated that the temporary restraining order which was issued by this Court on
December 9, 1992 has a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of issue (Carbungco vs. CA,
181 SCRA 313) and has therefore become void at the expiration of the said twenty (20) days
(Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa vs. NLRC, 198 SCRA 586).
SO ORDERED.
On February 19, 1993, petitioners new counsel, Gancayco Law Offices, filed with the Court of Appeals
an Urgent Appearance And Motion To Admit Supplemental Petition.[27] This was a new petition
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction.[28]
On March 15, 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration as well as the
admission of the supplemental petition on the ground that the petition had been decided.[29]
Meanwhile, in response to the publics urgent basic need, petitioner re-constructed its power lines
along the provincial road leading to the Port of Osmea upon authority of the District Engineer of the
Department of Public Works and Highways [DPWH].
On April 23, 1993, however, petitioner received a letter dated April 10, 1993, stating that Vines Realty
was the owner of the roadside and that petitioner could not construct power lines therein without its
permission. Petitioner promptly replied that the power lines were constructed within the right of way of the
provincial road leading to the port of Osmea as granted by the District Engineer of DPWH.
Hence, this petition.[30]
At issue is whether petitioner is entitled to retain possession of the power lines located in the land sold
at public auction as a result of extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage.
The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard.[31] A court denies a party due process if it
renders its orders without giving such party an opportunity to present its evidence.[32]
We find that petitioner was denied due process. Petitioner could have negated private respondents
claims by showing the absence of legal or factual basis therefor if only the trial court in the exercise of
justice and equity reset the hearing instead of proceeding with the trial and issuing an order of demolition
on the same day.
It is incumbent upon the trial court to receive evidence on petitioners right over the property to be
demolished.
The essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings,
an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.[33] Due process is equally applicable in a case involving public utilities, where a strict
application of the rules would bring about catastrophic inconveniences to the public. Hence, the act would
do more harm than good to the public, which the government seeks to protect. Damages and losses of a
considerable amount of time (about 8 years) could have been prevented if the trial court did not gravely
abuse its discretion on the matter.

Well aware that the counsel was not authorized, the trial court could have stretched its liberality a little
to ensure that it would serve the ends of justice well for the people of Camarines Norte. Petitioner must be
given the chance to prove its position.
We cannot conceive how, knowing fully well that destroying the power lines and electric posts would
cause overwhelming losses to a lot of business establishments and a great inconvenience to a lot of
people, the trial court still ordered the demolition of the property. Their personal motives aside, the Court
finds that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in hastily ordering the removal of the electric posts.
We are not a trier of facts. We cannot determine whether petitioners Agreements of Right of Way[34] or
that of the authorization[35] of the OIC District Engineer to construct electric posts within the limits of the road
right of way were genuine instruments. We can, however, determine the legality of the acts of the trial court
in issuing the writs of demolition over the property.
The trial court failed to appreciate the nature of electric cooperatives as public utilities.
Among the powers granted to electric cooperatives by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 269[36] are:

Section 16 Powers(j) To construct, maintain and operate electric transmission and distribution lines along, upon,
under and across publicly owned lands and public thoroughfares, including, without limitation,
all roads, highways, streets, alleys, bridges and causeways; Provided, that such shall not
prevent or unduly impair the primary public uses to which such lands and thoroughfares are
otherwise devoted;
(k) To exercise the power of eminent domain in the manner provided by law for the exercise
of such power by other corporations constructing or operating electric generating plants and
electric transmission and distribution lines or systems.
Electric cooperatives, like CANORECO, are vested with the power of eminent domain.
The acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls within the purview of the power of eminent
domain. Such conclusion finds support in easements of right-of-way where the Supreme Court sustained
the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use.[37] The Supreme Court, in
Republic vs. PLDT[38] thus held that:

"Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title
to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said
power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property,
without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through
expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right-of-way."
However, a simple right-of-way easement transmits no rights, except the easement.[39] Vines Realty
retains full ownership and it is not totally deprived of the use of the land. It can continue doing what it wants
to do with the land, except those that would result in contact with the wires.
The acquisition of this easement, nevertheless, is not gratis. Considering the nature and effect of the
installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private
respondents of its ordinary use. For these reasons, Vines Realty is entitled to payment of just
compensation,[40] which must be neither more nor less than the money equivalent of the property.
Just compensation has been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss, which the
owner of the res expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation.[41] The value of the land and its
character at the time it was taken by the Government are the criteria for determining just
compensation.[42] No matter how commendable petitioners purpose is, it is just and
equitable that Vines Realty be compensated the fair and full equivalent for the taking of its property,
which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity. [43]

Moreover, CANORECO only sought the continuation of the exercise of its right-of-way easement and
not ownership over the land. Public utilities power of eminent domain may be exercised although title is
not transferred to the expropriator.[44]
Consequently, we rule that a courts writ of demolition can not prevail over the easement of a right-ofway which falls within the power of eminent domain.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated
on January 19, 1993, and the resolution adopted on March 15, 1993, in CA-G. R. SP No. 29624, are SET
ASIDE. The orders of the trial court dated November 27, 1992, December 10, 1992, January 18, 1993, and
January 25, 1993 and the writs of demolition issued on December 11, 1992, and January 26, 1993, are
ANNULLED.
Private respondents are ordered to restore or restitute petitioners electric posts and power lines or
otherwise indemnify petitioner for the cost of the restoration thereof. Finally, private respondents are
permanently enjoined or prohibited from disturbing or interfering with the operation and maintenance of the
business of petitioner.
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-48685 September 30, 1987
LORENZO SUMULONG and EMILIA VIDANES-BALAOING, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BUENAVENTURA GUERRERO and NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, respondents.

CORTES, J.:
On December 5, 1977 the National Housing Authority (NIIA) filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land
covering approximately twenty five (25) hectares, (in Antipolo, Rizal) including the lots of petitioners Lorenzo
Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing with an area of 6,667 square meters and 3,333 square meters
respectively. The land sought to be expropriated were valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per square meter
adopting the market value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance with presidential decrees prescribing
the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings.
Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties. The NHA deposited the
amount of P158,980.00 with the Philippine National Bank, representing the "total market value" of the subject
twenty five hectares of land, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1224 which defines "the policy on the
expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon payment of just compensation."
On January 17, 1978, respondent Judge issued the following Order:
Plaintiff having deposited with the Philippine National Bank, Heart Center Extension Office,
Diliman, Quezon City, Metro Manila, the amount of P158,980.00 representing the total market
value of the subject parcels of land, let a writ of possession be issued.
SO ORDERED.

Pasig, Metro Manila, January 17, 1978.

(SGD) BUENAVENTURA S.
GUERRERO
Jud
ge
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the possession of
their property without due process of law. This was however, denied.
Hence, this petition challenging the orders of respondent Judge and assailing the constitutionality of Pres.
Decree No. 1224, as amended. Petitioners argue that:
1) Respondent Judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion by issuing the Order of January 17, 1978 without notice and without hearing and in
issuing the Order dated June 28, 1978 denying the motion for reconsideration.
2) Pres. Decree l224, as amended, is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process
clause, specifically:
a) The Decree would allow the taking of property regardless of size and no matter
how small the area to be expropriated;
b) "Socialized housing" for the purpose of condemnation proceeding, as defined
in said Decree, is not really for a public purpose;
c) The Decree violates procedural due process as it allows immediate taking of
possession, control and disposition of property without giving the owner his day in
court;
d) The Decree would allow the taking of private property upon payment of unjust
and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by government assessors;
e) The Decree would deprive the courts of their judicial discretion to determine
what would be the "just compensation" in each and every raise of expropriation.
Indeed, the exercise of the power of eminent domain is subject to certain limitations imposed by the constitution,
to wit:
Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation (Art. IV, Sec. 9);
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws (Art. IV, sec. 1).
Nevertheless, a clear case of constitutional infirmity has to be established for this Court to nullify legislative or
executive measures adopted to implement specific constitutional provisions aimed at promoting the general
welfare.
Petitioners' objections to the taking of their property subsumed under the headings of public use, just
compensation, and due process have to be balanced against competing interests of the public recognized and
sought to be served under declared policies of the constitution as implemented by legislation.
1. Public use
a) Socialized Housing

Petitioners contend that "socialized housing" as defined in Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended, for the purpose
of condemnation proceedings is not "public use" since it will benefit only "a handful of people, bereft of public
character."
"Socialized housing" is defined as, "the construction of dwelling units for the middle and lower class members of
our society, including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities" (Pres. Decree No.
1224, par. 1). This definition was later expanded to include among others:
a) The construction and/or improvement of dwelling units for the middle and lower income groups
of the society, including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities;
b) Slum clearance, relocation and resettlement of squatters and slum dwellers as well as the
provision of related facilities and services;
c) Slum improvement which consists basically of allocating homelots to the dwellers in the area
or property involved, rearrangemeant and re-alignment of existing houses and other dwelling
structures and the construction and provision of basic community facilities and services, where
there are none, such as roads, footpaths, drainage, sewerage, water and power system schools,
barangay centers, community centers, clinics, open spaces, parks, playgrounds and other
recreational facilities;
d) The provision of economic opportunities, including the development of commercial and
industrial estates and such other facilities to enhance the total community growth; and
e) Such other activities undertaken in pursuance of the objective to provide and maintain housing
for the greatest number of people under Presidential Decree No, 757, (Pres. Decree No. 1259,
sec. 1)
The "public use" requirement for a and exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving
concept influenced by changing conditions. In this jurisdiction, the statutory and judicial trend has been
summarized as follows:
The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal
meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for
the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It
is not anymore. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain
comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt,
determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots
for resale at cost to individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of
utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present
whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public
use [Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 60549, 60553-60555 October 26, 1983, 125
SCRA 220 (1983) at 234-5 quoting E. FERNANDO, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
PHILIPPINES 523-4, (2nd ed., 1977) Emphasis supplied].
The term "public use" has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the term signifying
strict use or employment by the public has been added the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage.
As discussed in the above cited case of Heirs of Juancho Ardona:
The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which circumscribes the scope
of government activities and public concerns and which possesses big and correctly located
public lands that obviate the need to take private property for public purposes. Neither
circumstance applies to the Philippines. We have never been a laissez faire State. And the
necessities which impel the exertion of sovereign power are all too often found in areas of scarce
public land or limited government resources. (p. 231)
Specifically, urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public
purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the
Constitution. The 1973 Constitution made it incumbent upon the State to establish, maintain and ensure

adequate social services including housing [Art. 11, sec. 7]. The 1987 Constitution goes even further by
providing that:
The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and
independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide
adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living and an improved
quality of life for all. [Art. II, sec. 9]
The state shall by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the private
sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make available at
affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in
urban centers and resettlement areas. It shall also promote adequate employment opportunities
to such citizens. In the implementation of such program the State shall respect the rights of small
property owners. (Art. XIII, sec. 9, Emphaisis supplied)
Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and
significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum, the general welfare. The public character
of housing measures does not change because units in housing projects cannot be occupied by all but only by
those who satisfy prescribed qualifications. A beginning has to be made, for it is not possible to provide housing
for are who need it, all at once.
Population growth, the migration to urban areas and the mushrooming of crowded makeshift dwellings is a
worldwide development particularly in developing countries. So basic and urgent are housing problems that the
United Nations General Assembly proclaimed 1987 as the "International Year of Shelter for the Homeless" "to
focus the attention of the international community on those problems". The General Assembly is Seriously
concerned that, despite the efforts of Governments at the national and local levels and of international
organizations, the driving conditions of the majority of the people in slums and squatter areas and rural
settlements, especially in developing countries, continue to deteriorate in both relative and absolute terms." [G.A.
Res. 37/221, Yearbook of the United Nations 1982, Vol. 36, p. 1043-4]
In the light of the foregoing, this Court is satisfied that "socialized housing" fans within the confines of "public
use". It is, particularly important to draw attention to paragraph (d) of Pres. Dec. No. 1224 which opportunities
inextricably linked with low-cost housing, or slum clearance, relocation and resettlement, or slum improvement
emphasize the public purpose of the project.
In the case at bar, the use to which it is proposed to put the subject parcels of land meets the requisites of
"public use". The lands in question are being expropriated by the NHA for the expansion of Bagong Nayon
Housing Project to provide housing facilities to low-salaried government employees. Quoting respondents:
1. The Bagong Nayong Project is a housing and community development undertaking of the
National Housing Authority. Phase I covers about 60 hectares of GSIS property in Antipolo,
Rizal; Phase II includes about 30 hectares for industrial development and the rest are for
residential housing development.
It is intended for low-salaried government employees and aims to provide housing and
community services for about 2,000 families in Phase I and about 4,000 families in Phase II.
It is situated on rugged terrain 7.5 kms. from Marikina Town proper; 22 Kms. east of Manila; and
is within the Lungs Silangan Townsite Reservation (created by Presidential Proclamation No.
1637 on April 18, 1977).
The lands involved in the present petitions are parts of the expanded/additional areas for the
Bagong Nayon Project totalling 25.9725 hectares. They likewise include raw, rolling hills. (Rollo,
pp. 266-7)
The acute shortage of housing units in the country is of public knowledge. Official data indicate that more than
one third of the households nationwide do not own their dwelling places. A significant number live in dwellings of
unacceptable standards, such as shanties, natural shelters, and structures intended for commercial, industrial,
or agricultural purposes. Of these unacceptable dwelling units, more than one third is located within the National

Capital Region (NCR) alone which lies proximate to and is expected to be the most benefited by the housing
project involved in the case at bar [See, National Census and Statistics Office, 1980 Census of Population and
Housing].
According to the National Economic and Development Authority at the time of the expropriation in question,
about "50 per cent of urban families, cannot afford adequate shelter even at reduced rates and will need
government support to provide them with social housing, subsidized either partially or totally" [NEDA, FOUR
YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN For 1974-1977, p. 357]. Up to the present, housing some remains to be out of the
reach of a sizable proportion of the population" [NEDA, MEDIUM-TERM PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN
1987-1992, p. 240].
The mushrooming of squatter colonies in the Metropolitan Manila area as well as in other cities and centers of
population throughout the country, and, the efforts of the government to initiate housing and other projects are
matters of public knowledge [See NEDA, FOUR YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN For 1974-1977, pp. 357-361;
NEDA, FIVE-YEAR PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1978-1982, pp. 215-228 NEDA, FIVE YEAR
PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1983-1987, pp. 109-117; NEDA, MEDIUM TERM PHILIPPINE
DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1987-1992, pp. 240-254].
b) Size of Property
Petitioners further contend that Pres. Decree 1224, as amended, would allow the taking of "any private land"
regardless of the size and no matter how small the area of the land to be expropriated. Petitioners claim that
"there are vast areas of lands in Mayamot, Cupang, and San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal hundred of hectares of which
are owned by a few landowners only. It is surprising [therefore] why respondent National Housing Authority
[would] include [their] two man lots ..."
In J.M. Tuason Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration [G. R. No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413
(1970) at 428] this Court earlier ruled that expropriation is not confined to landed estates. This Court, quoting the
dissenting opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Republic vs. Baylosis, [96 Phil. 461 (1955)], held that:
The propriety of exercising the power of eminent domain under Article XIII, section 4 of our
Constitution cannot be determined on a purely quantitative or area basis. Not only does the
constitutional provision speak of lands instead of landed estates, but I see no cogent reason why
the government, in its quest for social justice and peace, should exclusively devote attention to
conflicts of large proportions, involving a considerable number of individuals, and eschew small
controversies and wait until they grow into a major problem before taking remedial action.
The said case of J.M. Tuason Co., Inc. departed from the ruling in Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration [84
Phil. 847 (1949)] which held that the test to be applied for a valid expropriation of private lands was the area of
the land and not the number of people who stood to be benefited. Since then "there has evolved a clear pattern
of adherence to the "number of people to be benefited test" " [Mataas na Lupa Tenants Association, Inc. v.
Dimayuga, G.R. No. 32049, June 25,1984, 130 SCRA 30 (1984) at 39]. Thus, in Pulido vs. Court of
Appeals [G.R. No. 57625, May 3, 1983, 122 SCRA 63 (1983) at 73], this Court stated that, "[i]t is unfortunate that
the petitioner would be deprived of his landholdings, but his interest and that of his family should not stand in the
way of progress and the benefit of the greater may only of the inhabitants of the country."
The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the particular property/properties
to be taken for socialized housing purposes and how much thereof may be expropriated. Absent a clear showing
of fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of discretion, which petitioners herein failed to demonstrate, the Court will give
due weight to and leave undisturbed the NHA's choice and the size of the site for the project. The property
owner may not interpose objections merely because in their judgment some other property would have been
more suitable, or just as suitable, for the purpose. The right to the use, enjoyment and disposal of private
property is tempered by and has to yield to the demands of the common good. The Constitutional provisions on
the subject are clear:
The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development. (Art. II, sec. 10)
The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance
the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities,

and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common
good. To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of
property and its increments. (Art, XIII, sec. 1)
Indeed, the foregoing provisions, which are restatements of the provisions in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions,
emphasize:
...the stewardship concept, under which private property is supposed to be held by the individual
only as a trustee for the people in general, who are its real owners. As a mere steward, the
individual must exercise his rights to the property not for his own exclusive and selfish benefit but
for the good of the entire community or nation [Mataas na Lupa Tenants Association,
Inc. supra at 42-3 citing I. CRUZ, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, 70 (1983 ed.)].
2. Just Compensation
Petitioners maintain that Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended, would allow the taking of private property upon
payment of unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by government assessors. In addition, they assert that
the Decree would deprive the courts of their judicial discretion to determine what would be "just compensation".
The foregoing contentions have already been ruled upon by this Court in the case of Ignacio vs. Guerrero (G.R.
No. L-49088, May 29, 1987) which, incidentally, arose from the same expropriation complaint that led to this
instant petition. The provisions on just compensation found in Presidential Decree Nos. 1224, 1259 and 1313
are the same provisions found in Presidential Decree Nos. 76, 464, 794 and 1533 which were declared
unconstitutional in Export Processing Zone All thirty vs. Dulay (G.R. No. 5960 April 29, 1987) for being
encroachments on prerogatives.
This Court abandoned the ruling in National Housing Authority vs. Reyes [G.R. No. 49439, June 29,1983, 123
SCRA 245 (1983)] which upheld Pres. Decree No. 464, as amended by - Presidential Decree Nos. 794, 1224
and 1259.
In said case of Export Processing Zone Authority, this Court pointed out that:
The basic unfairness of the decrees is readily apparent.
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and
full equivalent for the loss sustained. ALL the facts as to the condition of the property and its
surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered.
xxx xxx xxx
Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out for
expropriation. The values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas
covering several barrios or even an entire total with the exception of the poblacion. Individual
differences are never taken into account. The value of land is based on such generalities as its
possible cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often land described as
directional has been cultivated for generations. Buildings are described in terms of only two or
three classes of building materials and estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than correct.
Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation.
To say that the owners are estopped to question the valuations made by assessors since they
had the opportunity to protest is illusory. The overwhelming mass of landowners accept
unquestioningly what is found in the tax declarations prepared by local assessors or municipal
clerks for them. They do not even look at, much less analyze, the statements. The Idea of
expropriation simply never occurs until a demand is made or a case filed by an agency
authorized to do so. (pp. 12-3)
3. Due Process

Petitioners assert that Pres. Decree 1224, as amended, violates procedural due process as it allows immediate
taking of possession, control and disposition of property without giving the owner his day in court. Respondent
Judge ordered the issuance of a writ of possession without notice and without hearing.
The constitutionality of this procedure has also been ruled upon in the Export Processing Zone Authority case,
viz:
It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in
the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to basic concepts of justice and fairness
to allow the haphazard work of minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment
of a court promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after
evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and
considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously evaluated. (p. 13)
On the matter of the issuance of a writ of possession, the ruling in the Ignacio case is reiterated, thus:
[I]t is imperative that before a writ of possession is issued by the Court in expropriation
proceedings, the following requisites must be met: (1) There must be a Complaint for
expropriation sufficient in form and in substance; (2) A provisional determination of just
compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated must be made by the trial court on the
basis of judicial (not legislative or executive) discretion; and (3) The deposit requirement under
Section 2, Rule 67 must be complied with. (p. 14)
This Court holds that "socialized housing" defined in Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended by Pres. Decree Nos.
1259 and 1313, constitutes "public use" for purposes of expropriation. However, as previously held by this Court,
the provisions of such decrees on just compensation are unconstitutional; and in the instant case the Court finds
that the Orders issued pursuant to the corollary provisions of those decrees authorizing immediate taking without
notice and hearing are violative of due process.
WHEREFORE, the Orders of the lower court dated January 17, 1978 and June 28, 1978 issuing the writ of
possession on the basis of the market value appearing therein are annulled for having been issued in excess of
jurisdiction. Let this case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings to determine the
compensation the petitioners are entitled to be paid. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 103125 May 17, 1993

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV. LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE and HON. BENJAMIN V.
PANGA as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 33 at Pili, Camarines Sur, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION), ERNESTO SAN JOAQUIN and EFREN SAN
JOAQUIN,respondents.
The Provincial Attorney for petitioners.
Reynaldo L. Herrera for Ernesto San Joaquin.

QUIASON, J.:
In this appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 20551 entitled "Ernesto
N. San Joaquin, et al., v. Hon. Benjamin V. Panga, et al.," this Court is asked to decide whether the
expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units is subject, to the prior approval of the Secretary of
the Agrarian Reform, as the implementator of the agrarian reform program.
On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution
No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to
the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and
a housing project for provincial government employees.
The "WHEREAS" clause o:f the Resolution states:
WHEREAS, the province of Camarines Sur has adopted a five-year Comprehensive
Development plan, some of the vital components of which includes the establishment of model
and pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops, soil testing and tissue culture
laboratory centers, 15 small scale technology soap making, small scale products of plaster of
paris, marine biological and sea farming research center,and other progressive feasibility
concepts objective of which is to provide the necessary scientific and technology know-how to
farmers and fishermen in Camarines Sur and to establish a housing project for provincial
government employees;
WHEREAS, the province would need additional land to be acquired either by purchase or
expropriation to implement the above program component;
WHEREAS, there are contiguous/adjacent properties to be (sic) present Provincial Capitol Site
ideally suitable to establish the same pilot development center;
WHEREFORE . . . .
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, Hon. Luis R.Villafuerte, filed
two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin, docketed as
Special Civil Action Nos. P-17-89 and P-19-89 of the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur, presided by the
Hon. Benjamin V. Panga.

Forthwith, the Province of Camarines Sur filed a motion for the issuance of writ of possession. The San Joaquins
failed to appear at the hearing of the motion.
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their
property. In an order dated December 6, 1989, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the
Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the
amount of P5,714.00, the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private
respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court issued a writ of
possession in an order dated January18, 1990.
The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied in
the order dated February 1990.
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for expropriation be
dismissed; and (c) that the order dated December 6, 1989 (i) denying the motion to dismiss and (ii) allowing the
Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the order dated
February 26, 1990, denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They also asked
that an order be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a
writ of injunction.
In its answer to the petition, the Province of Camarines Sur claimed that it has the authority to initiate the
expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and that the
expropriations are for a public purpose.
Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General stated that under
Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval by the Office of the
President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the
Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the amended motion to
dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of
Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the
classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.
Hence this petition.
It must be noted that in the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked for: (i) the dismissal of the complaints for
expropriation on the ground of the inadequacy of the compensation offered for the property and (ii) the
nullification of Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Camarines Sur.
The Court of Appeals did not rule on the validity of the questioned resolution; neither did it dismiss the
complaints. However, when the Court of Appeals ordered the suspension of the proceedings until the Province
of Camarines Sur shall have obtained the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to change the
classification of the lands sought to be expropriated from agricultural to non-agricultural use, it assumed that the
resolution is valid and that the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of "public purpose" or "public use" for
which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. The old concept was that the condemned property must
actually be used by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could
satisfy the constitutional requirement of "public use". Under the new concept, "public use" means public
advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the
whole community, like a resort complex for tourists or housing project (Heirs of Juancho Ardano v. Reyes, 125
SCRA 220 [1983]; Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SC.RA 461 [1987]).

The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The
establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the
Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make available to the community invaluable
information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the
farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose
requirement of the Constitution. As held in Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461, "Housing is a basic human
need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health,
safety, the environment and in sum the general welfare."
It is the submission of the Province of Camarines Sur that its exercise of the power of eminent domain cannot be
restricted by the provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657), particularly Section 65
thereof, which requires the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform before a parcel of land can be
reclassified from an agricultural to a non-agricultural land.
The Court of Appeals, following the recommendation of the Solicitor General, held that the Province of
Camarines Sur must comply with the provision of Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and
must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the
San Joaquins.
In Heirs of Juancho Ardana v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, petitioners raised the issue of whether the Philippine
Tourism Authority can expropriate lands covered by the "Operation Land Transfer" for use of a tourist resort
complex. There was a finding that of the 282 hectares sought to be expropriated, only an area of 8,970 square
meters or less than one hectare was affected by the land reform program and covered by emancipation patents
issued by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. While the Court said that there was "no need under the facts of this
petition to rule on whether the public purpose is superior or inferior to another purpose or engage in a balancing
of competing public interest," it upheld the expropriation after noting that petitioners had failed to overcome the
showing that the taking of 8,970 square meters formed part of the resort complex. A fair and reasonable reading
of the decision is that this Court viewed the power of expropriation as superior to the power to distribute lands
under the land reform program.
The Solicitor General denigrated the power to expropriate by the Province of Camarines Sur by stressing the
fact that local government units exercise such power only by delegation. (Comment, pp. 14-15; Rollo, pp. 128129)
It is true that local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when
expressly authorized by the legislature (City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 28l US 439, 74 L.ed. 950, 50 SCt. 360). It is
also true that in delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or impose certain
restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments (Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 US 668 67 L. ed.
1167, 43 S Ct. 684). While such delegated power may be a limited authority, it is complete within its limits.
Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the law
conferring the power or in other legislations.
Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local
Government Code, which provides:
A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its
sanggunian exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for
public use or purpose.
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government, units must first secure the
approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use,
before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local
government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The closest provision of law that the
Court of Appeals could cite to justify the intervention of the Department of Agrarian Reform in expropriation
matters is Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which reads:
Sec. 65. Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land
ceases to be economically feasible and sound for, agricultural purposes, or the locality has

become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or
industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due
notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the reclassification or
conversion of the land and its disposition:Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his
obligation.
The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision sends signals that it applies to lands previously placed under the
agrarian reform program as it speaks of "the lapse of five (5) years from its award."
The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order No. 129-A,
Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the
suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating
authority. While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve or
disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial uses, such authority is
limited to the applications for reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries.
Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by
implication (Schulman v. People, 10 N.Y. 2d. 249, 176 N.E. 2d. 817, 219 NYS 2d. 241).
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate
agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for
conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would
naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to
scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether the use of the
property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts
defer to such legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or
substantial relation to the public use (United States Ex Rel Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 US 546, 90
L. ed. 843, 66 S Ct 715; State ex rel Twin City Bldg. and Invest. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 174 NW 885, 8
ALR 585).
There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no matter how broad their terms are, do not embrace the
sovereign unless the sovereign is specially mentioned as subject thereto (Alliance of Government Workers v.
Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1 [1983]). The Republic of the Philippines, as sovereign, or its
political subdivisions, as holders of delegated sovereign powers, cannot be bound by provisions of law couched
in general term.
The fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of the valuation declared in the tax
declarations of their property, are unfounded. This Court has declared as unconstitutional the Presidential
Decrees fixing the just compensation in expropriation cases to be the value given to the condemned property
either by the owners or the assessor, whichever was lower ([Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, 149
SCRA 305 [1987]). As held inMunicipality of Talisay v. Ramirez, 183 SCRA 528 [1990], the rules for determining
just compensation are those laid down in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which allow private respondents to
submit evidence on what they consider shall be the just compensation for their property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside
insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of
private respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c)
requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert
or reclassify private respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial court, denying
the amended motion to dismiss of the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 107916. March 31, 1995.]

PERCIVAL MODAY, ZOTICO MODAY (deceased) and LEONARA MODAY, Petitioners, v. COURT OF
APPEALS, JUDGE EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO OF BRANCH 6, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AGUSAN
DEL SUR AND MUNICIPALITY OF BUNAWAN, Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; WILLFUL

REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH THE TERMS THEREOF CONSTITUTES CONTEMPT OF COURT.
Respondent Municipality of Bunawan, acting through its mayor, clearly disobeyed the restraining order
issued by the Court on December 8, 1993. Respondent admits having constructed temporary booths on the
subject land as well as having used the buildings thereon for public service-oriented activities. The
explanation given by respondent municipality is unacceptable. The purpose for which the buildings were
used is immaterial. Respondent was duty bound to obey the injunction issued by this Court. The TRO was
explicit in its language. Violating its purpose and language is patently contemptuous and merits the
corresponding punishment. We reiterate the restraining order issued by the Court on December 8, 1993.
WHEREFORE, the respondent Municipality of Bunawan, Agusan Del Sur, through its incumbent Municipal
Mayor, is cited for contempt and is hereby FINED in the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) with
the WARNING that a repetition or continuation of the acts herein found to constitute contempt of court will
be dealt with more severely. The mayor is hereby ordered to DEMOLISH the structures subject of the
restraining order.
DECISION

ROMERO, J.:

Petitioner seeks the resolution of his Omnibus Motion for the Enforcement of Restraining Order and
Contempt.
In connection with the petition for review involving the expropriation of petitioners land by respondent
Municipality of Bunawan, Agusan Del Sur, the Court on December 8, 1993 resolved to issue a temporary
restraining order enjoining and restraining:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"a) Judge Evangeline S. Yuipco of the Regional Trial Court of Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur, Branch 6, from
further enforcing her decision, dated July 2, 1991 in Special Civil Case No. 719, for "Eminent Domain", and
"b) the respondent Municipality of Bunawan, through its incumbent Mayor from using and occupying all
buildings constructed within and from further constructing any building on the land subject of the herein
petition, effective immediately and until further orders from this Court."cralaw virtua1aw library
In his aforesaid Omnibus Motion, petitioner alleges that the municipal mayor continues to use the buildings
on the subject land and even constructed new "blocktiendas" thereon in October 1994. Photographs,
affidavits and an invitation to an affair held there attached to the motion show such continuing use of the
subject land. He prays that the municipal mayor and municipal officials be cited for
contempt.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
Petitioner also alleges that the sheriff has refused to enforce the TRO enjoining his regional trial court from
proceeding with the case. Accordingly, he prays that a law enforcement agency be designated to enforce
the restraining order by padlocking the buildings and demolishing the blocktiendas on the land.
In their opposition to the motion, respondent municipal mayor admits the construction of temporary booths

for a certain municipal project which was due to be demolished after October 29, 1994. However, no photos
or other proofs were submitted to show that the booths had indeed been demolished. Respondent also
alleges that the buildings and the land were indeed used, not for Mayor Bustillos personal purposes, but for
public service and public interest.
Respondent Municipality of Bunawan, acting through its mayor, clearly disobeyed the restraining order
issued by the Court on December 8, 1993. Respondent admits having constructed temporary booths on the
subject land as well as having used the buildings thereon for public service-oriented
activities.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
The explanation given by respondent municipality is unacceptable. The purpose for which the buildings
were used is immaterial. Respondent was duty bound to obey the injunction issued by this Court. The TRO
was explicit in its language. Violating its purpose and language is patently contemptuous and merits the
corresponding punishment.
We reiterate the restraining order issued by the Court on December 8, 1993.
WHEREFORE, the respondent Municipality of Bunawan, Agusan Del Sur, through its incumbent Municipal
Mayor, is cited for contempt and is hereby FINED in the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) with
the WARNING that a repetition or continuation of the acts herein found to constitute contempt of court will
be dealt with more severely. The mayor is hereby ordered to DEMOLISH the structures subject of the
restraining order.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 170432

March 24, 2008

AMOS P. FRANCIA, JR., CECILIA P. FRANCIA, and HEIRS OF BENJAMIN P. FRANCIA, Petitioners,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
On February 6, 2003, respondent Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan filed a complaint for
expropriation1 against petitioners Amos P. Francia, Jr., Cecilia P. Francia and Benjamin P. Francia2 in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 16. Respondent needed petitioners' 16,256 sq. m. idle
property at the junction of the North Expressway, Malhacan-Iba-Camalig main road artery and the MacArthur
Highway.3 It planned to use it to establish a common public terminal for all types of public utility vehicles with a
weighing scale for heavy trucks.
In their answer,4 petitioners denied that the property sought to be expropriated was raw land. It was in fact
developed5 and there were plans for further development. For this reason, respondents offer price
of P2,333,500 (or P111.99 per square meter) was too low.
After trial, the RTC ruled that the expropriation was for a public purpose. The construction of a common terminal
for all public utility conveyances (serving as a two-way loading and unloading point for commuters and goods)
would improve the flow of vehicular traffic during rush hours. Moreover, the property was the best site for the
proposed terminal because of its accessibility. Thus, on November 8, 2004, the RTC issued the following order:6
WHEREFORE, premises considered, after [respondent] has deposited with this Court the fifteen percent (15%)
of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated, it
may take immediate possession of the property upon issuance of writ of possession that this court will issue for
that purpose.
Further, the purposes of assessment and determination of the area needed that will suit the purpose of
expropriation and just compensation of the lot sought to be expropriated, the court hereby appoints
commissioners to be composed of the officer-in-charge of this court, Lerida Socorro E. Joson and one each from
[respondent] and [petitioners].
Notify all parties concerned.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the November 8, 2004 order but the motion was denied in an order
dated January 31, 2005.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA) contending that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its November 8, 2004 and January 31, 2005 orders. They
claimed that the trial court issued the orders without conducting a hearing to determine the existence of a public
purpose.
On July 28, 2005, the CA rendered a decision8 partially granting the petition. Finding that petitioners were
deprived of an opportunity to controvert respondent's allegations, the appellate court nullified the order of
expropriation except with regard to the writ of possession. According to the CA, a hearing was not necessary

because once the expropriator deposited the required amount (with the Court), the issuance of a writ of
possession became ministerial.
Petitioners moved for partial reconsideration but their motion was denied. Hence, this recourse.
Petitioners essentially aver that the CA erred in upholding the RTC's orders that, in expropriation cases, prior
determination of the existence of a public purpose was not necessary for the issuance of a writ of possession.
We deny the petition.
Section 19 of Republic Act 71609 provides:
Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to
an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the
poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws; Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and
definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and that such offer was not accepted; Provided,
further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing
of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen
percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the
property to be expropriated;Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be
determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.
(emphasis supplied)10
Before a local government unit may enter into the possession of the property sought to be expropriated, it must
(1) file a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance in the proper court and (2) deposit with the
said court at least 15% of the property's fair market value based on its current tax declaration.11 The law does
not make the determination of a public purpose a condition precedent to the issuance of a writ of possession.12
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.