1

The affs rejection of chaos constructs an unreal perfect world opposite reality that
they order themselves to this engenders ressentiment. They blame the chaos that is
a part of them on their neighbor, and try to eradicated it.
SAURETTE 96
(Paul Saurette, PhD in political theory at John Hopkins U, in 96 "I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them': Nietzshce, Arendt and the Crisis of the
Will to Order in INternational Relations Theory." Millenium Journal of International Studies. Vol. 25 no. 1 page 3-6)

The Will to Order and Politics-as-Making The Philosophical Foundation of the Will to Truth/Order . I mistrust all systematizers and
avoid them. A will to a system is a lack .of ! integrity." According to Nietzsche, the philosophical foundation of a society is the set of ideas
which give meaning to the phenomenon of human existence within a given cultural framework. As one manifestation of the Will to
Power, this will to , meaning fundamentally influences the social and political organisation of a particular community.5 Anything less
than a profound historical interrogation of the most basic philosophical foundations of our civilization, then, misconceives the origins of
values which we take to be intrinsic and natural. Nietzsche suggests, .therefore, that to understand the development of our

modem conception of society and politics, we must reconsider the crucial influence of the Platonic
formulation of Socratic thought. Nietzsche claims that pre-Socratic Greece based its philosophical
justification of life on heroic myths which honoured tragedy and competition. Life was understood
as a contest in which both the joyful and ordered (Apollonian) and chaotic and suffering (Dionysian)
aspects of life were accepted and .affirmed as inescapable aspects of human existence.6 However, this
incarnation of the will to power as tragedy weakened, and became unable to sustain meaning in Greek life. Greek myths no longer
instilled the self-respect and self-control that had upheld the pre-Socratic social order. -Everywhere the : instincts were in anarchy;
everywhere people were.but five steps from excess: the monstrum-in-animo was a universal danger. No longer willing to accept the

Greek thought yielded to decadence, a search for a new

social foundation which would soften the tragedy of life, while still giving meaning to existence. In this context,
tragic hardness and self-mastery of pre-Socratic myth,

Socrates' thought became paramount. In the words of Nietzsche, Socrates saw behind his aristocratic Athenians; he grasped that his
case, the idiosyncrasy of his case, was no longer exceptional. The same kind of degeneration was everywhere silently preparing itself: the
old Athens was coming to an endAnd Socrates understood that the world had need of him his expedient, his cure and his personal
art of self-preservation. Socrates realised that his search for an ultimate and eternal intellectual standard paralleled the widespread

An alternate
foundation that promised mastery and control not through acceptance of the tragic life, but
through the disavowal of the instinctual, the contingent, and the problematic. In response to the failing
power of its foundational myths, Greece tried to renounce the very experience that had given rise to tragedy
by retreating/escaping into the Apollonian world promised by Socratic reason. In Nietzsche's words,
yearning for assurance and stability within society. His expedient, his cure? An alternative will to power.

'[rationality was divined as a saviour...it was their last expedient. The fanaticism with which the whole of Greek thought throws itself at
rationality betrays a state of emergency: one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational....'9 Thus,
Socrates codified the wider fear of instability into an intellectual framework. The Socratic Will to Truth is characterised

by the attempt to understand and order life rationally by renouncing the Dionysian elements of
existence and privileging an idealised Apollonian order. As life is inescapably comprised of both
order and disorder however, the promise of control through Socratic reason is only possible by
creating a 'Real World* of eternal and meaningful forms, in opposition to an 'Apparent World of
transitory physical existence. Suffering and contingency is contained within the Apparent World,
disparaged, devalued, and^ ignored in relation to the ideal order of the Real World. Essential to the
Socratic Will to Truth, then, is the fundamental contradiction between the experience of Dionysian suffering in the Apparent World and

this dichotomised model led to the emergence of a

uniquely 'modern' understanding of life which could only view suffering as the result of the
imperfection of the Apparent World. This outlook created a modern notion of responsibility in
which the Dionysian elements of life could be understood only as a phenomenon for which someone,
or something is to blame. Nietzsche terms this philosophically-induced condition ressentiment. and
the idealised order of the Real World. According to Nietzsche,

argues that it signalled a potential crisis of the Will to Truth by exposing the central contradiction of the Socratic resolution.

This contradiction,
however, was resolved historically through the aggressive universalisation of the Socratic ideal by Christianity. According to Nietzsche,' ascetic Christianity exacerbated the Socratic dichotomisation by employing the Apparent World as the responsible agent against which
the ressentiment of life could be turned. Blame for suffering fell on individuals within the Apparent World, precisely because they did not live up to God, the Truth, and the Real World, As Nietzsche wrote, I suffer: someone must be to blame for it thinks every sickly sheep.
But his shepherd, the ascetic priest tells him: Quite so my sheep! Someone must be to blame for it: but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for yourself,-you alone are to blame for yourself '-This is brazen and.false enough: but one thing, is achieved by it,
the direction of ressentiment is altered." Faced, with the collapse of the Socratic resolution and the prospect of meaninglessness, once again, 'one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational.... '12 The genius of the ascetic ideal was that it

Through this redirection, the

Real World was transformed from a transcendental world of philosophical escape into a model
towards which the Apparent World actively aspired, always blaming its contradictory experiences
on its own imperfect knowledge and action. This subtle transformation of the relationship between the dichotomised
worlds creates the .Will to Order as the defining characteristic of the modern Will to Truth. Unable to accept the Dionysian
suffering inherent in the Apparent World, the ascetic ressentiment desperately searches for 'the
hypnotic sense of nothingness, the repose of deepest. sleep, in short absence of suffering According to the
ascetic model, however, this escape is possible only when the Apparent World perfectly duplicates the
Real World. The Will to Order, then, is the aggressive need increasingly to order the Apparent
World in line with the precepts of the moral-Truth of the Real World. The ressentiment of the Will to Order,
therefore, generates two interrelated reactions. First, ressentiment engenders a need actively to mould the
Apparent World in accordance with the dictates of the ideal Apollonian Real World. In order to
achieve this," however, the ascetic ideal also asserts that a 'truer', more complete knowledge of the
Real World must be established creating an ever-increasing Will-to Truth. This self-perpetuating
movement creates an interpretative structure within which everything must be understood and
ordered in relation to the ascetic Truth of the Real World. As Nietzsche suggests, [t]he ascetic ideal has a goalthis
preserved the meaning of the Socratic Will to Power as Will to Truth by extrapolating ad absurdiuin the Socratic division through the redirection of ressentiment against the Apparent World!

goal is so universal that all other interests of human existence seem, when compared with it, petty and narrow; it interprets epochs,
nations, and men inexorably with a view to this one goal; it permits no other interpretation, no other goal; it rejects, denies, affirms and
sanctions solely from the point of view of its interpretation.''1 The very structure of the Will to Truth ensures that theoretical
investigation must be increasingly ordered, comprehensive, more True, and closer to the perfection of the ideal. At the same time, this
understanding of intellectual theory ensures that it creates practices which attempt to impose increasing order in the Apparent World.
With this critical transformation, the Will to Order becomes .the fundamental philosophical principle of modernity.

Security is founded on the ressentment of difference which strikes away at all that
makes life worthwhile. Only through an embracement of the inevitability of
difference and insecurity can we affirm life
DER DERIAN 98

(James Der Derian Research Professor of International Studies at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University "2. The Value of
Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard *" On Security CIAO)

One must begin with Nietzsche's idea of the will to power, which he clearly believed to be prior to and generative of all
considerations of security. In Beyond Good and Evil, he emphatically establishes the primacy of the will to power: "Physiologists
should think before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being.
A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strengthlife itself is will to power; self-preservation is only
one of the most frequent results."34 The will to power, then, should not be confused with a Hobbesian perpetual
desire for power. It can, in its negative form, produce a reactive and resentful longing for only power, leading, in
Nietzsche's view, to a triumph of nihilism. But Nietzsche refers to a positive will to power, an active and affective
force of becoming, from which values and meaningsincluding self-preservationare produced which
affirm life. Conventions of security act to suppress rather than confront the fears endemic to life, for "... life
itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness,
imposition of ones own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitationbut why should one
always use those words in which slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages."35 Elsewhere Nietzsche establishes the
pervasiveness of agonism in life: "life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war. But the denial of this
permanent condition, the effort to disguise it with a con-sensual rationality or to hide from it with a fictional
sovereignty, are all effects of this suppression of fear. The desire for security is manifested as a collective
resentment of differencethat which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to
power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which
produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms
to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche asks of the reader "Look, isn't our need for
knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us?
Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubi lation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restora-tion of a
sense of security?**37 The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life,

in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against

contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true,
reasonable. In short, the security imperative pro-duces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which
seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols-. The causal instinct is
thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear. The "why?*1 shall, if at all possible, not give the
cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of causea cause (hat is comforting, liber-ating and relieving. . . . That
which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of
explanation, to serve as a cause, but for a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanationthat which
most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most
habitual explanations.38 A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the
unknown becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostilityrecycling the desire for security. The "influence
of timidity," as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the
"necessities" of security: "they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences."39 The
unknowable which cannot be contained by force or explained by reason is relegated to the off-world. "Trust," the "good," and other common
values come to rely upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling of security such as the Christian possesses; he feels strong in being able to
trust, to be patient and composed: he owes this artificial strength to the illusion of being protected by a god."40 For Nietzsche, of course, only a
false sense of security can come from false gods: "Morality and religion belong altogether to the psychology of error, in every single
case, cause and effect are confused; or truth is confused with the effects of believing something 10 be true; or a
state of consciousness is confused with its 4l causes. Nietzsche's interpretation of the origins of religion can shed some light on
this paradoxical origin and transvaluation of security. In The Gencalo gy of Morals, Nietzsche sees religion arising from a sense of fear and
indebtedness to ones ancestors: The conviction reigns that it is only through the sacrifices and accomplish-ments of the ancestors that the tribe
existsand that one has to pay them back with sacrifices and accomplishments: one thus recognizes a debt that constantly grows greater, since these
forebears never cease, in their contin-ued existence as powerful spirits, to accord the tribe new advantages and new strength/2 Sacrifices, honors,
obedience arc given but it is never enough, for The ancestors of the most powerful tribts are bound eventually to grow to monstrous dimensions
through the imagination of growing fear and to recede into the darkness of the divinely uncanny and unimaginable: in the end the ancestor must
necessarily be transfigured into a god.4i As the ancestors debt becomes embedded in institutions, the community takes on the role of creditor.
Nietzsche mocks this originary, Hobbesian moment: One lives in a community, one enjoys the advantages of communality (oh what advantages! we
sometimes underrate them today), one dwells protected, cared for, in peace and trustfulness, without fear of certain injuries and

hostile acts to which the man outside, the "man without peace," is exposed . . . since one has bound and pledged
oneself to the community precisely with a view to injury and hostile acts.44 The establishment of the
community is dependent upon, indeed it feeds upon, this fear of being left outside. As the castle wall is replaced by
written treaty, however, and distant gods by temporal sovereigns, the martial skills and spiritual virtues of the noble warrior are
slowly debased and dissimulated. The subject of the individual will to power becomes the object of a
collective resentment. The result? The fear of the external other is transvalued into the "love of the neighbor"
quoted in the opening of this section, and the perpetuation of community is assured through the internalization and
legitimation of a fear that lost its original source long ago. This powerful nexus of fear, of external and
internal otherness, generates the values which uphold the security imperative. Indeed, Nietzsche locates the
genealogy of even individual rights, such as freedom, in the calculus of maintaining security: - My rights - are
that pan of my power which others not merely conceded me, but which they wish me to preserve. How do these
others arrive at that? First: through their prudence and fear and caution: whether in that they expect something similar from us in
return (protection of their rights); or in that they consider that a struggle with us would be perilous or to no purpose; or in that they sec in any
diminution of our force a disadvantage to themselves, since we would then be unsuited to forming an alliance with them in opposition to a hostile
third power. Then: by donation and cession.45 The point of Nietzsche's critical genealogy is to show that the perilous

conditions that created the security imperativeand the western metaphysics that perpetuate ithave
diminished if not disappeared; yet, the fear of life persists: "Our century denies this perilousncss, and docs so with a good
conscience: and yet it continues to drag along with it the old habits of Christian security. Christian enjoyment, recreation and evaluation."46
Nietzsche's worry is that the collective reaction against older, more primal fears has created an even worse danger the

tyranny of the herd, the lowering of man, the apathy of the last man which controls through conformity and
rules through passivity. The security of the sovereign, rational self and state comes at the cost of ambiguity,
uncertainty, paradoxall that makes a free life worthwhile. Nietzsche's lament for this lost life is captured at the end of
Daybreak in a series of rhetorical questions: Of future virtuesHow comes it that the more comprehensible the world has grown the more
solemnities of every kind have decreased? Is it that fear was so much the basic clement of that reverence which overcame us in the presence of
everything unknown and mysterious and taught us to fall down before the incomprehensible and plead tor mercy? And has the world not lost

some of its charm for us because we have grown less fearful? With the diminution of our fearrulness has our
own dignity and solemnity, our own fiarsomeness, not also diminished?47 It is of course in Nietzsche's lament, in his

deepest pessimism for the last man, that one finds the celebration of the overman as both symptom and harbinger of a more free-spirited yet fearsome
age. Dismissive of Utopian engineering, Nietzsche never suggests how he would restructure society; he looks forward only so far as to sight the

emergence of "new philosophers" (such as himself?) who would restore a reverence for fear and reevaluate the security imperative. Nietzsche does,
however, go back to a pre-Christian, pre-Socratic era to find the exemplars for a new kind of securi iv. In The Genealogy of Morals^ he holds up
Pericles as an example, for lauding the Athenians for their "rhatbymia"a term that incorporates the notion of "indifference to and contempt for
security."48 It is perhaps too much to expect Nietzsche's message to resonate in late modern times, to expect, at the very time when conditions seem
most uncertain and unpredictable, that people would treat fear as a stimulus for improvement rather than cause for retrenchment. Yet Nietzsche

would clearly see these as opportune times, when fear could be willfully asserted as a force for the affirmation
of difference, rather than canalized into a cautious identity constructed from the calculation of risks and
benefits.

Melancholy negates the will to act it makes us slaves of the powerful and makes
our fears of death absurd vote negative to reject the 1AC salvation morality.
DELEUZE & PARNET 87
(famous philosopher, Professor of Philosophy at the Sorbonne, Dialogues II, European Perspectives, with
Claire Parnet, freelance journalist, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, 2002 pgs.61-62)
When Spinoza says 'The surprising thing is the body ... we do not yet know what a body is capable of ... ', he does not want to make the body a model,
and the soul simply dependent on the body. He has a subtler task. He wants to demolish the pseudo-superiority of the soul over the body. There is the
soul and the body and both express one and the same thing: an attribute of the body is also an expressed of the soul (for example, speed). Just

as
you do not know what a body is capable of, just as there are many things in the body that
you do not know, so there are in the soul many things which go beyond your consciousness.
This is the question: what is a body capable of? what affects are you capable of? Experiment, but you need a lot of prudence to experiment. We
live in a world which is generally disagreeable, where not only people but the established
powers have a stake in transmitting sad affects to us. Sadness, sad affects, are all those
which reduce our power to act. The established powers need our sadness to make us slaves.
The tyrant, the priest, the captors of souls need to persuade us that life is hard and a burden.
The powers that be need to repress us no less than to make us anxious or, as Virilio says, to
administer and organize our intimate little fears. The long, universal moan about life: the
lack-to-be which is life ... In vain someone says, 'Let's dance'; we are not really very happy.
In vain someone says, What misfortune death is'; for one would need to have lived to have
something to lose. Those who are sick, in soul as in body, will not let go of us, the vampires,
until they have transmitted to us their neurosis and their anxiety, their beloved castration,
the resentment against life, filthy contagion. It is all a matter of blood. It is not easy to be a free man,
to flee the plague, organize encounters, increase the power to act, to be moved by joy, to
multiply the affects which express or encompass a maximum of affirmation. To make the
body a power which is not reducible to the organism, to make thought a power which is not
reducible to consciousness. Spinozas famous first principle (a single substance for all attributes) depends on this assemblage and not
vice versa. There is a Spinoza-assemblage: soul and body, relationships and encounters, power to be affected, affects which realize this power, sadness
and joy which qualify these affects. Here philosophy becomes the art of a functioning, of an assemblage. Spinoza, the[wo]manof encounters and
becoming, the philosopher with the tick, Spinoza the imperceptible, always in the middle, always in flight although he does not shift much, a flight

from the Jewish community, a flight from Powers, a flight from the sick and the malignant. He may be ill, he may himself die; he knows that death

is neither the goal nor the end, but that, on the contrary, it is a case of passing his life to
someone else. What Lawrence says about Whitmans continuous life is well suited to Spinoza: the Soul and the Body, the soul is
neither above nor inside, it is with, it is on the road, exposed to all contacts, encounters, in
the company of those who follow the same way, feel with them, seize the vibration of their
soul and their body as they pass, the opposite of a morality of salvation, teaching to soul its
life, not to save it.

Our alternative is to Do nothing in the instance of the plan.

The refusal to act accepts the inevitability of struggle, allowing us to understand
pain positively.
NIETZSCHE 78
(The anti-christ Human, All too Human. Aphorism #284 1878)

The means to real peace. No government admits any more that it keeps an army to satisfy occasionally the desire for conquest. Rather the army is
supposed to serve for defense, and one invokes the morality that approves of self-defense. But this implies one's own morality and the neighbor's

the neighbor must be thought of as eager to attack and conquer if our state must
think of means of self-defense. Moreover, the reasons we give for requiring an army imply
that our neighbor, who denies the desire for conquest just as much as does our own state, and who, for his
part, also keeps an army only for reasons of self-defense, is a hypocrite and a cunning
criminal who would like nothing better than to overpower a harmless and awkward victim
without any fight. Thus all states are now ranged against each other: they presuppose their neighbor's bad
disposition and their own good disposition. This presupposition, however, is inhumane, as
bad as war and worse. At bottom, indeed, it is itself the challenge and the cause of wars, because, as I have said,
it attributes immorality to the neighbor and thus provokes a hostile disposition and act. We
immorality; for

must abjure the doctrine of the army as a means of self-defense just as completely as the desire for conquests. And perhaps the great day will come
when people, distinguished by wars and victories and by the highest development of a military order and intelligence, and accustomed to make the

"We break the sword," and will smash its entire

military establishment down to its lowest foundations. Rendering oneself unarmed when
one had been the best-armed, out of a height of feelingthat is the means to real peace,
which must always rest on a peace of mind; whereas the so-called armed peace, as it now
exists in all countries, is the absence of peace of mind. One trusts neither oneself nor one's
neighbor and, half from hatred, half from fear, does not lay down arms. Rather perish than
hate and fear, and twice rather perish than make oneself hated and fearedthis must someday
heaviest sacrifices for these things, will exclaim of its own free will,

become the highest maxim for every single commonwealth. Our liberal representatives, as is well known, lack the time for reflecting on the nature of
man: else they would know that they work in vain when they work for a "gradual decrease of the military burden." Rather, only when this kind of need
has become greatest will the kind of god be nearest who alone can help here. The tree of war-glory can only be destroyed all at once, by a stroke of
lightning: but lightning, as indeed you know, comes from a cloudand from up high.

2
Mapping fixes mobile resources in place for exploitation flattens and
terrestrializes ocean space for neoliberalism
Olson 10 (Julia, Northeast Fisheries Science Center, Seeding nature, ceding culture: Redefining the boundaries of the marine commons through
spatial management and GIS, Geoforum 41, ScienceDirect)
In 1993, a new way of managing Atlantic Sea Scallops in the Northeast United States was ushered in with the approval of Amendment 10 to the
Scallop Federal Management Plan, a change that resulted in a

spatially-based system of rotationally closed areas. Such a

system of managing was part of a growing interest in re-conceptualizing both ocean space and
livelihoods, changes that draw upon both ecologically-minded discourses of ecosystem- based
management (Pikitch et al., 2004) as well as increasingly neoliberal tendencies in fisheries management
(Mansfield, 2004). While neoliberalismas many theorists have stressed (e.g. Castree, 2008; McCarthy and Prudham, 2004)manifests itself in
a variety of heterogeneous forms and contexts, it also draws upon sets of coherent arguments and practices, which in
fisheries management center primarily on privatizing the commons and substituting market-based controls
for governmental regulations. This convergence of influences in the scallop fishery, while ostensibly seeking simply to increase the
productivity of what is the largest wild scallop fishery in the world, has also heralded a transformation from fishing to farming the resource. This

transformation has been promoted as a more rational form of stewardship, but it also implies
changes in subjectivityalong with changing forms of knowledge and ways of knowing the ocean
with potentially broader and longer-term implications for social-resource dynamics (cf. Agrawal, 2005).
Moreover, these new forms of management have developed along with more spatially-specific modes
of science at the same time that they have utilized technologies of visualization such as GIS , as will be
discussed. The effect of these new spatialities in the ocean has been to make fisheries in some ways seem
more land-like and terrestrial (cf. Steinberg, 1999) such that fishermen can more easily participate in
neoliberal moments of enclosure. Farming the ocean, however, also engages the politics of knowledge involved in fishing, and as such

has also enabled diverse and internal resistances (e.g. Mansfield, 2007a,b). The structuring context of a seemingly smooth fit between a neoliberal drive
to privatization and farmings appeal to private propertyat least in this sociocultural contextnot only does not fully determine the beliefs and
practices of the many different fishermen involved in the scallop fishery (cf. Glassman, 2003), but has also served as a means to rethink more
empowering ways of producing nature. The

inability to fix resources in space has been at the heart of many

understandings of common property. Mobile resources such as fish have given rise to particularly intractable common-pool

problems, for their mobility implies a lack of excludability (or control of access). That is, the physical nature of the resource is such that controlling
access by potential users may be costly and, in the extreme, virtually impossible (Feeny et al., 1990, p. 3). Not only do fish move but, at least in
conventional accounts, so do mobile fishermen, ever seeking highest profit in a rationalist movement through space (e.g. Sanchirico and Wilen, 1999).
There are of course fissures in this story, even for such seemingly mobile resources as fish. While rotational management is argued particularly
appropriate for semi-sedentary species such as scallops (e.g. Hart, 2003), others similarly contend that locally diverse sub-species, like populations of
cod in Norway that follow the ebb and flow of particular fjords and inlets, necessitate more locally-based science and management (e.g. Jorde et al.,
2007). Fishermen too, while often portrayed as opportunistically mobile, may have multiple rationalities that inform their fishing practices, including
their spatial decision-making (Olson, 2006). My point here is not to counter movement with an equally mythical lack of movement, but rather to ask
how forms of resource usehere especially, fishing or farming the oceaninvolve culturally constructed subjectivities, networks of social relations,
and spatially grounded knowledge and practice. In

the case of contemporary fisheries management, these

subjectivities, relations, and knowledge and practice are now increasingly mediated through
technologies like GIS. While mapping and counter-mapping have become more intertwined with
stories of common property in general, the case of fisheries poses a double sort of enigma, for not only is there the issue of
mobility and excludability in space but there is also the question of visualization, or lack thereof. In Hardins classic

account of the tragedy of the commons, for example, he asked that we Picture a pasture open to all (1968: 1244, italics added), where the herders,
herds, and resource degradation are palpable and countable. For fisheries management however, this has not been such an easy task. The

inability to see what is happening has in part structured the orientation of both fisheries
management and biology: stock assessment is a statistical exercise in estimating hidden populations, while management tries to reconcile
its strategies around fishermen who might cheat without being seen. Fisheries management, however, has recently begun to
take a distinctly visual turn through the use of GIS and other spatial techniques for understanding
and monitoring where different resources are and how they are usednot only supporting policy analyses from
habitat classification and protection of essential fish habitat, to the social and economic impacts of closed areas (Meaden, 2000; NOAA, 2004; St.

Martin, 2004), but also

coupled to increasing interest in spatially- based methods of management. What

tends to be missing, however, is an appreciation of arguments raised within geography and other
social sciences that critique the use of GIS as technologically or socially neutral, or which have conversely
grappled with how to use GIS for qualitative and critical approaches to social knowledge.1 The presumed neutrality and
objectivity of GIS in fisheries management has not only assumed a sense of space that is broadly
taken for granted in Western societiesour navely assumed sense of space as emptiness (Smith and
Katz, 1993, p. 75), but has also tended to privilege universal understandings. Thus while the fishery management process
has begun to incorporate spatially sensitive analyses into its development of area-based management, such incorporation has utilized
neoliberal constructions of the typical fisherman that are challenged by more nuanced notions of
fishing and resource dependence. New directions in the mapping of scallops that focus on crucial habitat and life cycle issues, for

example, promise changes both in the science underlying fisheries management and in management itself by better directing fishing effort to particular
places and by better understanding the conditions for resource enhancement through seeding, which at first glance recalls the warnings from early GIS
critics that digital maps would serve to create or reinforce relations of power through the discovery of new things or people to exploit (Schuurman,
2000, p. 580). Yet as this reframing of resources from fishing to farming intersects with an increasing interest in aquaculture (where the idea of farming
is obviously more explicit), it becomes clear that while ideas about property can be more easily enrolled into neoliberal discourses that commodify
resource relations, transformations from fishing to farming also enable alternative projects through their articulation with cultural practices and
processes. This includes the differential spatial practices of often smaller-scale fishermen as well as community-based interests in scallop seeding, who
have soughtquite literallyto sow the seeds of community stability and, in the process, resist and redefine the terms of neoliberal market logic. This
paper thus considers the differing worldviews, practices, and spatialities among and between so-called highliners and small-scale fishermen, fishers and
farmers of scallops, different resource-users and the scientists who map them, and the radically new forms of economic practice and sustainability that
inhere, potentially, in different uses and forms of maps and spatial knowledge, looking in particular at US Federal management of Sea Scallops, a
Canadian example of a private-state partnership, and community-based seeding efforts in Downeast Maine.

NEOLIB RESULTS IN A DEATH DRIVE THAT CREATES COLLECTIVE

SUICIDE
Santos 3 (Boaventura de Sousa, director of the Center for Social Studies at the University of Coimbra,

EUROZINE, COLLECTIVE SUICIDE OR GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW,

http://www.eurozine.com/article/2003-03-26-santos-en.html)
Sacrificial genocide arises from a totalitarian illusion that is manifested in the belief that there are no
alternatives to the present-day reality and that the problems and difficulties confronting it arise from
failing to take its logic of development to its ultimate consequences. If there is unemployment,
hunger and death in the Third World, this is not the result of market failures; instead, it is the
outcome of the market laws not having been fully applied. If there is terrorism, this is not due to the
violence of the conditions that generate it; it is due, rather, to the fact that total violence has not been
employed to physically eradicate all terrorists and potential terrorists. This political logic is based on
the supposition of total power and knowledge, and on the radical rejection of alternatives; it is ultraconservative in that it aims to infinitely reproduce the status quo. Inherent to it is the notion of the
end of history. During the last hundred years, the West has experienced three versions of this logic,
and, therefore, seen three versions of the end of history: Stalinism, with its logic of insuperable
efficiency of the plan; Nazism, with its logic of racial superiority; and neoliberalism, with its logic of
insuperable efficiency of the market. The first two periods involved the destruction of democracy. The last
one trivializes democracy, disarming it in the face of social actors sufficiently powerful to be able to privatize
the State and international institutions in their favour. I have described this situation as a combination of
political democracy and social fascism. One current manifestation of this combination resides in the fact that
intensely strong public opinion, worldwide, against the war is found to be incapable of halting the war
machine set in motion by supposedly democratic rulers. At all these moments, a death drive, a
catastrophic heroism, predominates, the idea of a looming collective suicide, only preventable by the
massive destruction of the other. Paradoxically, the broader the definition of the other and the
efficacy of its destruction, the more likely collective suicide becomes. In its sacrificial genocide
version, neoliberalism is a mixture of market radicalization, neoconservatism and Christian
fundamentalism. Its death drive takes a number of forms, from the idea of "discardable
populations", referring to citizens of the Third World not capable of being exploited as workers and
consumers, to the concept of "collateral damage", to refer to the deaths, as a result of war, of thousands
of innocent civilians. The last, catastrophic heroism, is quite clear on two facts: according to reliable
calculations by the Non-Governmental Organization MEDACT, in London, between 48 and 260 thousand

civilians will die during the war against Iraq and in the three months after (this is without there being civil war
or a nuclear attack); the war will cost 100 billion dollars, - and much more if the costs of reconstruction are
added - enough to pay the health costs of the world's poorest countries for four years.

The Alternative is to use this academic space to stand in opposition to neoliberalism

Only through utilizing every public spaces potential for democratic politics can we
fend off neoliberalism slide into fascism
Giroux 06 (Henry, Global TV Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, The
Emerging Authoritarianism in the United States: Political Culture Under the Bush/Cheney Administration,
Symploke, 2006)PM

The emerging American proto-fascism that threatens the future of democracy can best be
understood by examining a number of characteristics that relate it both to an older form of
fascism and to a set of contemporary conditions that give it a distinctive character. After
documenting and analyzing these central, though far from exhaustive, features of proto-fascism
under the current Bush administration, I want to conclude by examining how neoliberalism
provides a unique set of conditions for both producing and legitimating the central
tendencies of proto-fascism. [End Page 103] The cult of traditionalism and a reactionary modernism are central features of proto-

fascism and are alive and well in Bush's America. The alliance of neoconservatives, extremist evangelical Christians, and free-market advocates on the
political Right imagines a social order modeled on the presidency of William McKinley and the values of the robber barons. The McKinley presidency
lasted from 1897 to 1901 and "had a consummate passion to serve corporate and imperial power" (Moyers 2003c). This was an age when blacks,
women, immigrants, and minorities of class "knew their place"; big government exclusively served the interests of the corporate monopolists;
commanding institutions were under the sway of narrow political interests; welfare was a private enterprise; and labor unions were kept in place by the
repressive forces of the state. All of these conditions were being reproduced under the leadership of the Republican Party that held sway over all
branches of government. William Greider, writing in The Nation, observes a cult of traditionalism and anti-modernism within the Bush administration
3

and its return to a past largely defined through egregious inequality, corporate greed, hyper-commercialism, political corruption, and an utter disdain

A second feature connecting the old fascism to its updated version

is the ongoing corporatization of civil society and the diminishment of public space. The
latter refers to the fact that corporate space is destroying democratic public spheres,
eliminating those public spaces where norm-establishing communication takes place.
Viewed primarily as an economic investment rather than as a central democratic sphere for
fostering the citizen-based processes of deliberation, debate, and dialogue, public space is
consistently shrinking due to the relentless dynamic of privatization and commercialization.
The important notion that space can be used to cultivate citizenship is now transformed by a new
"common sense" that links it almost entirely to the production of consumers. The inevitable
correlate to this logic is that providing space for democracy to grow is no longer a priority. As
theorists such as Jrgen Habermas and David Harvey have argued, the idea of critical citizenship
cannot flourish without the reality of public space.4 Put differently, "the space of citizenship
is as important as the idea of citizenship" (Kaiser 18-19). As a political category, space is
crucial to any critical understanding of how power circulates, how disciplinary practices are
constructed, and how social control is organized. Moreover, as Margaret Kohn points out in her
landmark study on radical space, "spatial practices can also contribute to transformative
politics" (7). Space as a political category performs invaluable theoretical work in
connecting ideas to material struggles, theories to concrete practices, and political
operations to the concerns of everyday life. Without public space, it becomes more difficult
for individuals to imagine themselves as political agents or to understand the necessity for
developing a discourse capable of defending civic institutions. Public space confirms the idea
of individuals and groups having a public voice, thus drawing a distinction between civic liberty and
market liberty. The demands of citizenship affirm the social as a political concept in opposition to its
for economic and political democracy.

conceptualization as a strictly economic category. The sanctity of the town hall or public square in
American life is grounded in the crucial recognition that citizenship has to be cultivated in noncommercialized spaces. Indeed, democracy itself needs public spheres where education as a
condition for democracy can flourish, where people can meet and democratic identities,
values, and relations have the time "to grow and flourish" (Kaiser 17-18). Zygmunt Bauman captures the historical
importance of public spaces for nourishing civic discourses and engaging citizens as well as the consequences of the current disappearance of noncommodified spheres as significant spaces in which powerful individuals can be held directly accountable for the ethical and material effects of their
decisions: These meeting places . . . public spacesagoras and forums in their various manifestations, places where agendas are set, private affairs are
made public . . . were also the sites in which norms were createdso that justice could be done, and apportioned horizontally, thus re-forging the conversationalists into a community, set apart and integrated by the shared criteria of evaluation. Hence a territory stripped of public space provides little
chance for norms being debated, for values to be confronted, to clash and to be negotiated. The verdicts of right and wrong, beauty and ugliness,
proper and improper, useful and useless may only descend from on high, from regions never to be penetrated by any but a most inquisitive eye; the
verdicts are unquestionable since no questions may be meaningfully addressed to the judges and since the judges left no addressnot even an e-mail
addressand no one can be sued where they reside. No room is left for the "local opinion leaders"; no room is left for the "local opinion" as

The totalizing belief that commercial interests and commodification

should be free of any regulation is equally matched by the belief that "every domain of
human life should be open to the forces of the marketplace" (Grossberg 112). The values of
the market and the ruthless workings of finance capital become the template for organizing
the rest of society
such.(1998a, 25-6) [End Page 105]

3
THERE IS NO FUTURESpeed itself has been internalized as a political
technology as we are never able to be outside of speed. Every inch of the planet
has been colonized.
Bifo 11. Franco Bifo Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle
Arti of Milan, After the Future, pg. 16-8
Because of this change political power has changed its nature. When the machine was external the State had to regulate the body and for this
used the law. Agencies of repression were used in order to force the conscious organisms to submit to that rhythm without rebellion. Now the political
domination is internalized and is undistinguishable from the machine itself. Not only the machine but also the
machinic imagination undergoes a mutation during this passage. Marinetti conceived the machine in the modern way, like an external enhancer. In the bio-social
age the machine is difference of information : not exteriority but linguistic modeling, logic and
cognitive automatism, internal necessity. A hundred years on since the publication of the Futurist Manifesto, speed too has been
transferred from the realm of external machines to the information domain . Speed itself has been
internalised . During the 20th century, the machine of speed accomplished the colonisation of global space ; this
was followed by the colonisation of the domain of time, of the mind and perception, so that the
future collapsed. In the acceleration of psychic and cognitive rhythm is rooted the collapse of the
future. Thanks to the external machine the colonization of the space of the planet has been accomplished: transportation tools have made us reach every inch of the
Earth, and have given us the possibility of knowing, marking, controlling and exploiting every single place. The machines have made it possible to displace fast, to penetrate
the bowels of the Earth, to exploit the underground resources, to occupy every visible spot with the products of technical reproduction. As

long as the
spatial colonization was still underway, as far as the external machine could go towards new
territories, a future was conceivable, because the future is not only a dimension of time, but also a
dimension of space. The future is the space that we do not yet know; we are yet to discover and exploit it. When every inch of the planet
has been colonized , the colonization of the temporal dimension has began, i.e., the colonization of
mind, of perception, of life. Thus began the century with no future . The question of the relationship between an unlimited
expansion of cyberspace and the limits of cyber time opens up here. Being the point of virtual intersection of the projections generated by countless issuers, cyberspace is
unlimited and in a process of continuous expansion. Cybertime,

which is the ability of social attention to process

information in time, is organic, cultural and emotional, therefore it is everything but unlimited.
Subjected to the infinite acceleration of the info-stimuli , the mind reacts with either panic or desensitisation . The concept of sensibility (and the different but related concept of sensitivity) are crucial here: sensitivity is the ability of the
human senses to process information, and sensibility is the faculty that makes empathic
understanding possible, the ability to comprehend what words cannot say, the power to interpret a
continuum of non-discrete elements, non- verbal signs and the flows of empathy. This faculty , which
enables humans to understand ambiguous messages in the context of relationships,

might now be disappearing . We are witnessing now the

development of a generation of human beings lacking competence in sensibility, the ability to empathically understand the other and decode signs that are not codified in a
binary system. When

the punks cried No Future , at the turning point of the year 1977, that cry seemed
a paradox not to be taken too seriously. Actually, it was the announcement of something quite
important: the perception of the future was changing . Future is not a natural dimension of the
mind, rather it is a modality of perception and imagination , a feature of expectation and attention,
and its modalities and features change with the changing of cultures. Futurism is the artistic movement that embodies and
asserts the accomplished modernity of the future. The movement called Futurism announces what is most essential in the 20th century because this century is pervaded by a
religious belief in the future. We do not believe in the future in the same way. Of course, we know that a time after the present is going to come, but we dont expect that
this time will fulfill the promises of the present. The Futurists and the moderns in general thought that the future is reliable and trustworthy. In the first part of the

century Fascists and Communists and the supporters of Democracy held very different ideas, and followed divergent methods, but all of them shared the belief that the
future will be bright, no matter how hard the present. Our

post-futurist mood is based on the consciousness that the

future is not going to be bright , or at least we doubt that the future means progress . Modernity started with
the reversal of the theocratic vision of time as Fall and distancing from the City of God. Moderns are those who live time as the sphere of a progress towards perfection, or
at least towards improvement, enrichment, and rightness. Since

the turning point of the century that trusted in the future

and I like to place this turning point in the year 1977 humankind has abandoned this illusion. The insurgents of 68 believed that they were
fulfilling the Modern Hegelian Utopia of the becoming true of thought, the Marcusean fusion of reason and reality. By the integration of Reality and Reason (embedded in
social knowledge, information and technology) turned history into a code-generated world. Terror and Code took over the social relationship and utopia went dystopic.

The century that trusted in the future could be described as the systematic reversal of utopia into
dystopia. Futurism chanted the utopia of Technique, Speed and Energy, but the result was Fascism
in Italy and totalitarian communism in Russia.

The affirmative breaks down the distinction between cognitive and economic labor the knowledge they produce is introduced into a knowledge economy of
representation that erupts into unpredictable and violent revolt - that destroys
cognition.
Bifo '7 (Franco Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Academia di belle Arti in Milan, and Founder of A/traverse,
Technology and Knowledge in a Universe of Indetermination, SubStance #112, Vol. 36 no. 1, trans. Giuseppina Mecchia, pp. 68-72)

When we talk about the mental nature of the productive process we mean that the functions
assigned by governments to the productive processes are subsumed and internalized by them.
There is no longer any distinction between processes of social labor and the general governance of
society. Of course, there remains the fiction of a political decision, of a political representation, but the actual
ability to govern the social processes on the part of the political will can only play an extremely
marginal role. It isnt politics (with all its complicated mechanisms of representation, decision, and sanction) that decides on the fundamental questions arising in
the spheres of technology and finance or in the creation of an interface connecting technology, finance, society, languages, and the imaginary. Government
is integrated into the circulation of information, if we consider information in its fullest sense, as an
algorithm of processes that can be activated by techno-social automatisms. Programming, understood as the
elaboration of a software able to analyze, simplify, systematize, and mechanize entire sequences of human work, is at the core of government action, if we call government a
function of decision and regulation. Within the process of techno-social elaboration, of software development, we

see the configuration of

alternatives which have completely disappeared from the scene of political representation and of
ideology. According to the user interfaces realized by the programmer, technology can function either as an element of control or as an agent of liberation from work.
The political problem is entirely absorbed within the activity of the mental worker, and of the programmer in particular. The problem of the alternative, of a different social
use of certain activities, can no longer be detached from the very forms of this activity. The person who works in a machine shop, or on the assembly line, has to separate
herself from her workplace if she wants to rediscover the conditions for a political transformation, if she wants to upset the political and technological modes of oppression.
This is why, during the proto- industrial era, it was necessary to build a political organization external to the factory and to the working knowledge of the worker. But this is
no longer the case when work becomes an activity of coordination, invention, understanding, and programming. In

the age of mental labor, the

problem of organization and of political action can no longer be separated from the one concerning
the paradigms of the productive operation. Software programming reveals the close relation between dependent labor and creative activity; in
this case, we observe how the mental work of the programmer acquires a political function of transformation within his very way of operating, and not only a productive
function of valorization. The two functions can be distinguished in the sphere of project-oriented consciousness, but they live on the same operational plane. The

consequence of the increasingly mental nature of social labor is that politics is replaced by an
internalized function of social production and becomes a specific and decisive choice between the
alternative uses of a certain knowledge, an invention of interfaces situated between crystallized
information and social use, between cognitive architecture and an ecology of communication. Obviously, this doesnt prevent politics from
continuing to celebrate its ever more excessive rituals. But these rituals have lost their efficacy; their only consequences
are internal to politics itself. But if this is what is happening to politics, what about economics, both as a discipline and as a field defining human
activity? Is economics still a science when the determining factors in the economic field are becoming unstable and immaterial, when they seem to elude the quantifying
rules which are at the core of economics as a conceptualizing system? Keynes, the post-Keynesians and the neo-classicists alike cast the economy in a model in
which a few constants drive the entire machinery. The

model we now need would have to see the economy as

ecology, environment, configuration, and as composed of several integrative spheres: a
microeconomy of individuals and firms, especially transnational ones; a macroeconomy of
national governments; and a world economy. Every earlier economic theory postulated that one such economy totally controls; all others
are dependent and functions. [] But economic reality now is one of three such economies. []. None totally controls the other three; none is totally
controlled by the others. Yet none is fully independent from the others, either. Such complexity can barely be described. It cannot be analyzed since it allows

of no prediction. To give us a functioning economic theory, we thus need a new synthesis that simplifies but so far there is no sign of it. And if no such
synthesis emerges, we might be at the end of economic theory.25 Economics became a science when, with the expansion of capitalism, rules were established as
general principles for productive activity and exchange. But if we want these rules to function we must be able to quantify the basic productive act. The time-atom
described by Marx is the keystone of modern economics. The

ability to quantify the time necessary for the production of a

commodity makes possible the regulation of the entire set of economic relations. But when the main
element in the global productive cycle is the unforeseeable work of the mind, the unforeseeable
work of language,when self-reproducing information becomes the universal commodity, it is no
longer possible to reduce the totality of exchanges and relations to an economic rule. In any system as complex
as the economy of a developed country, the statistically insignificant events, the events at the margin, are likely to be the decisive events, short range at least. By definition
they can neither be anticipated nor prevented. Indeed, they cannot always be identified even after they have had their impact.26 Economic science doesnt seem able to
understand the current transition because it is founded on a quantitative and mechanistic paradigm that could comprehend and regulate industrial production, the physical
manipulation of mechanical matter,

but is unable to explain and regulate the process of immaterial production

based on an activity that cant easily be reduced to quantitative measurements and the repetition of
constants: mental activity. Information and communication technologies are disrupting the social and economical mechanisms of the developed
countries. The current indicators of traditional macroeconomics are becoming obsolete and of little
significance; moreover, the place and function of economics itself as we still see it are put into
question. The phenomenon of growth without job creation devalues a whole series of concepts. This
is how even the concept of productivity fails to resist the challenge raised by the new realities. With the
new technologies, the majority of production costs are determined by research and equipment expenses that actually precede the productive process. Little by little, in
digitalized and automated enterprises, production is no longer subjected to the variations concerning the quantity of operational factors. Marginal cost, marginal profits:
these bases of neoclassical economic calculations have lost a good part of their meaning. The traditional elements of salary and price calculation are crumbling down.27
Robins analysis shows that economic categories cant explain the majority of the processes that are truly meaningful in our time, and the reason clearly consists in the fact
that mental work is not quantifiable like the work performed by an industrial worker.Therefore,

the determination of value the

keystone of classical economy both as a science and as daily economic practice becomes aleatory
and indefinable. In Symbolic Exchange and Death, Baudrillard wrote: The reality principle corresponded to a certain stage of the law of value. Today the
whole system is swamped by indeterminacy, and every reality is absorbed by the hyperreality of the
code and simulation. The principle of simulation governs us now, rather than the outdated reality principle. Finalities have disappeared, the models generate
us now. [] Capital no longer belongs to the order of political economy: it operates with political
economy as its simulated model. With the digitalizing of production, the abstraction of capital makes a qualitative leap. Not only is production an
abstract production of value, but the economic indicators are autonomous from the system of production, and are
constituted as a synchronic, structural, self- referential, and autonomous system, independent from
the real world. The increasingly financial nature of our economy means exactly this. The stock markets are the places where
obsessions, psychological expectations, fears, play, and apocalyptic ideologies regulate the game.
Realist economies were governed by their goals, the nave goal of producing use value for the satisfaction of specific needs, or the subtler goal of valorization as the increase
of invested capital. Now, instead, it

is impossible to explain our economies on the basis of their goals, whether we

identify them with the intentions of certain individuals or certain groups or with the goals of an
entire society. The economy is governed by a code, not by its goals: Finality is there in advance, inscribed in the code. We
can see that nothing has changed the order of goals has simply ceded its place to a molecular play, as the order
of signifieds has yielded to the play of infinitesimal signifiers, reduced to their aleatory
commutation.29 The economy therefore appears as a hyper-reality, a simulated, double, and artificial world that cannot be
translated in terms of real production. The mental nature of todays economy is not only expressed by the technological transformation of the productive process, but by the
global code in charge of interpreting the process constituting our entire world. Consequently, the

science of economics can no longer

explain the fundamental dynamics governing humanitys productive activities; nor can it explain
their crisis. Economics has to be replaced by a global science whose characteristics and field of inquiry are still unknown: a science that would be able to study the
processes of formation of Cyberspace, understood as the global network of signs-commodities. In an interview published in 1993 by the Californian magazine Wired, Peter
Drucker develops once again the theme of the inadequacy of economic categories associated with the digitalization of productive processes: International economic theory
is obsolete. The

traditional factors of production land, labor, and capital are becoming restraints
rather than driving forces. Knowledge is becoming the one critical factor of production. It has two incarnations: knowledge applied to existing
processes, services, and products is productivity; knowledge applied to the new is innovation. [] Knowledge has become the central, key resource that knows no
geography. It underlies the most significant and unprecedented social phenomenon of this century. No class in history has ever risen as fast as the blue-collar worker and no
class has fallen as fast. All within less than a century. Furthermore, Drucker remarks that the concept of intellectual property, which is the juridical concept that was at the
basis of classical economy and of the capitalist system, no longer has any meaning in an age when the circulating commodity is information and the market is the infosphere: We have to rethink the whole concept of intellectual property , which was focused on the printed word. Perhaps within
a few decades, the distinction between electronic transmissions and the printed word will have disappeared. The only solution may be a universal licensing system. Where
you basically become a subscriber, and where it is taken for granted that everything that is published is reproduced. In other words, if you dont want everybody to know,
dont talk about it. The

system of property regarding the products of intellectual labor no longer works in

the age of the reproducibility of information. As a conclusion to these observations on the obsolescence of economics as a generalized
interpretive code, I would like to quote Andr Gorz, who writes in his Mtamorphoses du travail: Discipline by means of money is a hetero-

regulation that interrupts the communicational infrastructure ensuring the symbolic reproduction
of the experiential world. This means that all the activities that transmit or reproduce cultural acquisitions, knowledge, taste, manners, language, mores
[], and that allow us to find our bearings in the world as givens, certitudes, values, and self-explanatory norms; all these activities cannot be regulated by money or by the
state without causing serious pathologies in our world of experience. Money (i.e. economics) and the State (i.e. politics) are no longer able to govern or to discipline the
world of production, now that its center is no longer a de-brained force, a uniform and quantifiable time of manual work. That

center is now occupied

by mind flows, by the ethereal substance of intelligence, which eludes every measurement and
cannot be subjected to any rule without inducing enormous pathologies and causing a truly
maddening paralysis of cognition and affectivity.

This focus on rational economic science has created a bloodthirsty form of

production that erases affective engagements with desire and makes violence
inevitable - this constantly produces crisis to rationalize its capacity for control,
making the destruction of all life the very impulse of the economy
James Wiltgen 2005 (Professor of History and Critical Theory at CalArts, "Sado-Moneatrism or Saint Fond Saint Ford", in Consumption in
the Age of Information, ed. Cohen and Rutsky, BERG, New York, p. 107-10 6 [NN])

How does digital capitalism intertwine with the concept of uncertainty? What key changes have taken place in the
structuring of the world, via the digital and the biotechnological, what forces have emerged or coalesced, and nally, how do
they affect the realm of subjectivity and consumption? Here, Arthur Kroker has transposed McLuhan into the twenty-rst century,

performing an interrogation of what he calls the digital nerve, basically the exteriorization of the human sensorium into the digital circuitry of contemporary capitalism
(Kroker, 2004: 81). This

(in)formation, streamed capitalism, rests not exclusively on exchange value, nor material
goods, but something much more immaterial, a post market, post biological, post image society where the
driving force, the will to will, has ushered in a world measured by probability. In other words, this variant of
capitalism seeks to bind chaos by ever-increasing strictures, utilizing an axiomatic based on capture and
control, with vast circuits of circulation as the primary digital architecture. This system runs on a densely articulated
composition, similar to the earlier addressed concept of sado-monetarism, based upon extensive feedback loops running between exchange value and
abuse value. This assemblage, however, has multiple levels, and not all are connected to the grid at the same speeds; a number of different times exist within this

formation, including digital time, urban time, quotidian time, transversal time, etc. Spatially, the structure relies not on geography but strategic digital nodes for the core of
the system, and connectivity radiates out from these nodal points (Kroker, 2004: 125). For example, a key site for these points would be the Net corporation, dened as as

a self-regulating, self- reexive platform of software intelligence providing a privileged portal into the digital universe (Kroker, 2004: 140). Indeed, his mapping of
digital capitalism has clear parallels with the shifts Katherine Hayles analyzes, in particular the underlying, driving mechanism
whereby information severs itself from embodiment. Boredom and acquisitiveness become the principle markers of this new form of
capitalism, which provides a rationale, or a new value set for the perpetual oscillation between the two poles, producing an insatiable desire for both objects and a
continuing stream of fresh and intense experience. Perhaps the most densely argued assessment of capitalism, whose obvious parallel would be Marxs Capital, is the two

it remains
to understand the analysis as possessing a fundamental focus on the question of political
economy. Capitalism forms, via its structural and affective matrix, a system capable of unparalleled cruelty
and terror, and even though certain indices of well being have increased, exploitation grows constantly
harsher, (and) lack is arranged in the most scientic ways (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983: 373). Their framework for analysis targets the global,
where the deepest law of capitalism sets limits and then repels those limits, a process well known as the concept of deterrorialization. Capitalism functions, then,
by incessantly increasing the portion of constant capital, a deceptively concise formulation that has
tremendous resonance for the organization of the planet resources continually pour into the technological
and machinic apparatus of capture and control, to the increased exclusion of the human component (Deleuze &
Guattari, 1987: 4667). In other words, it not only thrives on crisis but one of the principle denitions of capitalism would
be to continually induce crisis; nostalgia for a lost Sado-Monetarism or Saint Fond-Saint Ford 109 time only drives these processes.
volumes by Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. With all the concern over the theoretical concepts developed in these books,
extremely important

The planet confronts the fourth danger, the most violent and destructive of tendencies, characterized as a turning to destruction, abolition pure and simple, the passion of
abolition (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 229). Deleuze

and Guattari make clear this fourth danger does not translate as a death
drive, because for them desire is always assembled, a creation and a composition; here the task of thinking
becomes to address the processes of composition. The current assemblage, then, has mutated from its original organization of total war, which
has been surpassed toward a form of peace more terrifying still, the peace of Terror or Survival (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 433). Accordingly, the worldwide war
machine has entered a post fascist phase,
where Clausewitz has been dislocated, and this war machine now targets the entire world, its peoples and economies. An unspecied

enemy becomes
the continual feedback loop for this war machine, which had been originally constituted by states, but which

has now shifted into a planetary, and perhaps interstellar mode, with a seemingly insatiable drive to organize
insecurity, increase machinic enslavement, and produce a peace that technologically frees the unlimited
material process of total war (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 467).7 Deleuze has analyzed these tendencies extensively in his own work, in particular with his
dissection of active and reactive forces in his book on Nietzsche but also in his work on Sade and Masoch, where he points to a type of sadism that seems capable of
attempting a perpetually

effective crime, to not only destroy (pro)creation but to prevent it from ever happening
again, a total and perpetual destruction, one produced by a pervasive odium fati, a hatred of fate that seeks absolute revenge in destroying life and any
possible recurrence. (Deleuze, 1989: 37). This tendency far outstrips what Robert Jay Lifton has described as the Armageddonists, in their more commonly analyzed
religious variant and in what he calls the secular type, both of which see the possibility of a world cleansing, preparing the way for a new world order, be it religious or
otherwise (Lifton, 1987: 59). Embedded within the immanence of capitalism, then, one can nd forces which would make fascism seem like child precursors, and
Hitlers infamous Telegram 71 would be applied to all of existence, perpetually. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 467). One nal complication in terms of currently emerging
subjectivities, the well-known analysis in Anti-Oedipus where capitalism,

as basically driven by a certain fundamental insanity,

oscillates between two poles of delirium, one as the molecular schizophrenic line of escape, and the other as
paranoiac molar investment (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983: 315).8 These two markers offer dramatically different
possibilities for the issues of subjectivities and agency, and questions of consumption and the political can be
posed within their dense and complex oscillations.

Prefer exhaustionTheir attempt to invest debate with symbolic activity only

strengthens the hands of neoliberal economics.
Bifo '11 (Franco Berardi, Professor of Social History and Communication at the Academia di belle Arti in Milan and Founder of A/Traverse,
After the Future, ed. Genesko%26Thoburn, AKPress, p. 135-139)

Time is in the mind. The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to enhance time (Cybertime)
beyond a certain level. I think that we are here touching upon a crucial point. The process of re-composition, of conscious and
collective subjectivation, finds here a new paradoxical way. Modern radical thought has always
seen the process of subjectivation as an energetic process: mobilization, social desire and political
activism, expression, participation have been the modes of conscious collective subjectivation in the age of the
revolutions. But in our age energy is running out, and desire which has given soul to modern social dynamics is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization and financial
games, as Jean Baudrillard (1993a) argues in his book Symbolic Exchange and Death, first published in 1976. In this book Baudrillard analyzes the hyper-realistic stage of
capitalism, and the instauration of the logic of simulation. Reality itself founders in hyperrealism, the meticulous reduplication of the real, preferably through another,
reproductive medium, such as photography. From medium to medium, the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced

through its own destruction. It becomes reality for its own sake, the fetishism of the lost object: no longer the object of representation, but the ecstasy
of denial and of its own ritual extermination: the hyperreal. [] The reality principle corresponds to a certain stage of the law of value. Today the whole system is swamped
by indeterminacy, and every reality is absorbed by the hyperreality of the code and simulation. The principle of simulation governs us now, rather that the outdated reality

We must therefore reconstruct the

entire genealogy of the law of value and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the
enchantment of the current system. A structural revolution of value. This genealogy must cover political economy, where it will appear as a
principle. We feed on those forms whose finalities have disappeared. No more ideology, only simulacra.

second-order simulacrum, just like all those that stake everything on the real: the real of production, the real of signification, whether conscious or unconscious. Capital no
longer belongs to the order of political economy: it operates with political economy as its simulated model. The entire apparatus of the commodity law of value is absorbed
and recycled in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, this becoming part of the third order of simulacra. Political economy is thus assured a second life, an
eternity, within the confines of an apparatus in which it has lost all its strict determinacy, but maintains an effective presence as a system of reference for simulation.
(Baudrillard 1993a: 2) Simulation is the new plane of consistency of capitalist growth: financial speculation, for instance, has displaced the process of exploitation from the
sphere of material production to the sphere of expectations, desire, and immaterial labor. The simulation process (Cyberspace) is proliferating without limits, irradiating
signs that go everywhere in the attention market. The

brain is the market, in semiocapitalist hyper-reality. And the brain

is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely. The process of collective
subjectivation (i.e. social recomposition) implies the development of a common language-affection which is
essentially happening in the temporal dimension. The semiocapitalist acceleration of time has destroyed the social possibility of sensitive
elaboration of the semio-flow. The proliferation of simulacra in the info-sphere has saturated the space of attention and imagination. Advertising and
stimulated hyper-expression (just do it), have submitted the energies of the social psyche to permanent
mobilization. Exhaustion follows, and exhaustion is the only way of escape: Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the
symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains .
The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death.
The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide. So hostages are taken. On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which
every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostages death for the terrorist.
Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37) In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the
modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked
by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text
titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only
strategy can be catastrophic: all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. Without this deepseated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable
complicity. (Baudrillard 2003: 6) This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side
of global order. This

malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this orders benefits. An

allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the
World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this
definitive order: No need, then, for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse,
unintended effects. Very logically inexorably the increase in the power heightens the will to
destroy it. And it was party to its own destruction. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicideplanes with their own suicides. It has been said that Even God cannot declare war on Himself. Well, He can. The West, in position of God (divine omnipotence and
absolute moral legitimacy), has become suicidal, and declared war on itself. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7) In Baudrillards catastrophic vision I

see a new way of

thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary
theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on
depression and exhaustion In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body
to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that
once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle. But exhaustion could also become the
beginning of a slow movement towards a wu wei civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal
expectations of life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism, and adopt
the mode of passivity. A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless
productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed. The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble,
would finally deflate. We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and
outrageously too much during the last thirty years. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of
competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade the struggle between Western domination
and jihadist Islam we recognize that the

most powerful weapon has been suicide. 9/11 is the most impressive act of
this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American
military hegemony. And they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security,
and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan. The suicidal
implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere. Against neoliberal
politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in
the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of
the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy,
social creativity and of life?I think that it

is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative

side of withdrawal. The exchange between life and money could be deserted, and exhaustion could
give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange. A new refrain could
emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth. The self-organization of the
general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth, and start a new concatenation,
where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.

Shipping
Multiple alt causes to protectionism, indian ocean SLOC security, natural disasters
can all have effects on our shipping routes.
Free trade causes environmentally catastrophic resource extraction for export
Tim Lang, Director of Parents for Safe Food and Colin Hines, coordinator of Greenpeace Internationals Economic Unit, 1993, The new
protectionism, p. 62-63

The gearing of entire economies to increasing raw material exports for international trade also has its
environmental impact at the point of extraction or production, especially in developing countries. Tropical timber is perhaps
the best publicized case. Although the massive deforestation of the last decade has a range of causes, including clearing land for agriculture
and grazing, mining, fuelwood gathering and trees felled for domestic use, the timber trade represents a significant proportion, about 50 per cent of the
total production of industrial hardwood in tropical countries.8 The

effect of timber trading on deforestation is larger

than the mere numbers of trees cut down for export, since roads built for commercial logging bring
in their wake farmers, miners and those seeking fuelwood. In 1991, this tropical timber industry was worth $6 billion, but
it is beginning to decline as forests are decimated in one country after another to provide for the needs of Europe, Japan and North America. Thailand
and the Philippines, which were once exporters, are now net inporters; Nigerias exports have slumped over the last decade and several other countries
will soon be in the same position. At its most extreme, Sarawak, which along with Sabah provides more than 90 per cent of Japans tropical imports, is
predicted by environmentalists to have no trees left for felling in five years time. This would be both an environmental disaster and a human tragedy,
since it would destroy the homeland of the local Penan people, who are aggressively fighting this trend.9 The

fate of timber in
international trade is repeated with other commodities sold by the South. Developing countries
exploit resources such as food, fish, minerals and energy for export mostly to repay debts, with
often dire adverse environmental effects.

Environmental destruction leads to a global rash of interstate and civil wars

Thomas Homer-Dixon, assistant professor of political science and director of the Peace and Conflict Studies Programme at the University of
Toronto, 1998, World Security Challenges for a New Century, p. 342-343

Another possibility is that global environmental damage might increase the gap between rich and
poor societies, with the poor then violently confronting the rich for a fairer share of the worlds
wealth. Severe conflict may also arise from frustration with countries that do not go along with agreements to protect the global environment, or
that free-ride by letting other countries absorb the costs of environmental protection. Warmer temperatures could lead to contention over more
easily harvested resources in the Antarctic. Bulging

populations and land stress may produce waves of

environmental refugees, spilling across borders and disrupting relations among ethnic groups.
Countries might fight among themselves because of dwindling supplies of water and the effects of
upstream pollution.6 A sharp decline in food crop production and grazing land could lead to conflict between nomadic tribes and sedentary
farmers. Environmental change could in time cause a slow deepening of poverty in poor countries,
which might open bitter divisions between classes and ethnic groups, corrode democratic
institutions, and spawn revolutions and insurgencies. In general, many experts have the sense that environmental
problems will ratchet up the level of stress within states and the international community, increasing the likelihood of
many different kinds of conflictfrom war and rebellion to trade disputesand undermining possibilities for
cooperation.

Trade liberalization causes cycles of food shortages

Seedling, October 1996, http://www.grain.org/publications/oct961-en.cfm

In the South, the different elements of trade liberalisation often translate directly into food
insecurity. Among these elements the following have the most severe impacts on peoples livelihood. In addition they easily result in internal
migration, urban growth and environmental destruction: * undoing land reform and allowing concentration of land
ownership * privatising water * introducing monopoly control on seeds through IPRs * diverting land

from food to cash crops for exports * diverting food from local to global markets Volatile prices and
globalisation are creating an unstable, insecure and costly food system and undermine the ecological
security of agriculture, the livelihood security of farmers and the food security of both poor and affluent consumers. "We
in the South Asian subcontinent have more than the World Bank indices as our guide. We have our history", says Vandana Shiva. "India's worst
famines took place when India's economy was most integrated though the globalisation of the colonial period."

Blips in food prices kill billions

Tampa Tribune, 1-20-96

On a global scale, food supplies - measured by stockpiles of grain - are not abundant. In 1995, world production failed to meet
demand for the third consecutive year, said Per Pinstrup-Andersen, director of the International Food Policy Research Institute in Washington, D.C.
As a result, grain stockpiles fell from an average of 17 percent of annual consumption in 1994-1995 to 13 percent at the end of the 1995-1996 season,
he said. That's troubling, Pinstrup-Andersen noted, since 13 percent is well below the 17 percent the United Nations considers essential to provide a
margin of safety in world food security. During the food crisis of the early 1970s, world grain stocks were at 15 percent. " Even

if they are
merely blips, higher international prices can hurt poor countries that import a significant portion
of their food," he said. "Rising prices can also quickly put food out of reach of the 1.1 billion people in the
developing world who live on a dollar a day or less." He also said many people in low-income countries already spend more than half of
their income on food.

Food shortages lead to World War III

William Calvin, theoretical neurophysiologist at the University of Washington, Atlantic Monthly, January, The Great Climate Flip-Flop, Vol 281,
No. 1, 1998, p. 47-64

The population-crash scenario is surely the most appalling. Plummeting

crop yields would cause some powerful

countries to try to take over their neighbors or distant lands -- if only because their armies, unpaid and
lacking food, would go marauding, both at home and across the borders. The better-organized countries
would attempt to use their armies, before they fell apart entirely, to take over countries with
significant remaining resources, driving out or starving their inhabitants if not using modern weapons to
accomplish the same end: eliminating competitors for the remaining food. This would be a worldwide problem -- and could
lead to a Third World War -- but Europe's vulnerability is particularly easy to analyze. The last abrupt cooling, the Younger Dryas,
drastically altered Europe's climate as far east as Ukraine. Present-day Europe has more than 650 million people. It has excellent soils, and largely
grows its own food. It could no longer do so if it lost the extra warming from the North Atlantic.

Food Prices Low Now- We Control UQ

UN News Centre 9/14 (September 11th, 2014, UN News Center, Food prices drop to four-year low
UN agency http://www.un.org/apps/news/story. asp?NewsID=48690#.VGDdFPTF _yA//Shah)
11 September 2014 Global food prices continued to dip for the fifth month straight reaching their
lowest level since September 2010, the United Nations agriculture agency reported today. The Food
and Agriculture Organizations (FAO) price index which measures monthly changes in the global
price of a basket of meat, dairy, cereals, oils and fats, and sugar averaged 196.6 points in August
2014 which is a 7.3 point (3.6 per cent) decrease compared to July. With the exception of meats, prices
for all of the commodities measured by the index dipped markedly. According to a statement to the press,
FAOs sub-index for dairy products averaged 200.8 points in August, down 25.3 points (11.2 per cent) versus
July and 46.8 points (18.9 per cent) compared to a year ago- the result of abundant supplies for export
coupled with reduced import demand. Russias prohibition at the beginning of the month on imports of
dairy products from several countries helped depress prices, while slackening imports of whole milk
powder by China (the worlds largest importer) also contributed to market uncertainty. Meanwhile,
the vegetable oils sub-index clocked in at 166.6 points in August, 14.5 points (8 per cent) less than the
previous month and the lowest level since November 2009. Sugar prices averaged 244.3 points last month,
down by 14.8 points (5.7 per cent) from July. FAOs price index for cereals averaged 182.5 points in August,
down 2.8 points (1.5 per cent) from last month and 24.2 points (11.7 per cent) versus August 2013. With

2014 being another record year for wheat production, prices for the staple grain continued to slide in August,
reaching their lowest value since July 2010. Similarly, near ideal growing conditions in key producing areas,
coupled with abundant stocks, have seen maize prices retreat to a four year low, the index reported.
However, the price of rice rose in August, reflecting increased import demand, lower-than-expected
releases from stockpiles by Thailand, and unfavourable weather in Asia. Rice prices appear to be
ample worldwide, but stocks are very much concentrated in a small number of countries, and often
owned by Governments. This means that these countries can very much influence world prices, by
deciding whether to let those supplies flow to the market or not, said FAO economist Concepcin
Calpe. Meanwhile, FAOs monthly Cereal Supply and Demand Brief, also released today, has upped the
Organizations forecast for 2014 world cereal production by 14 million tonnes. At 2.5 billion tonnes, the
projection would be 0.5 per cent short of last years record. Wheat production is now expected to reach 716.5
million tonnes also just shy of last years record harvest. Wheat crops in China, the Russian Federation,
Ukraine and the United States are now projected to be larger than previously anticipated.
Production in Argentina, Brazil, China, the European Union, India, and Russia has increased
significantly, offsetting reductions in Australia, the United States and especially Canada]
where the latest official forecast points to a decline of almost 10 million tonnes (26 per cent). In
addition, rice production outlook has worsened compared to July by about 3 million tonnes, as an
erratic rainfall pattern and concerns over weather impacts on crops early next year marred prospects
in China, India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka.

Protectionism inevitable
Mattoo 9 (Aaditya, World Bank Economist 1/6/09, The World Must Go Beyond Doha,
http://www.iie.com/publications/opeds/oped.cfm?ResearchID=1089)

As the financial crisis has morphed into a crisis in the real economy, the world is facing a sharp and
perhaps prolonged economic slump. In these circumstances, resurgent protectionism is a real
threat, especially since pre-existing anxieties about globalisation are widespread. Restrictions on trade and
investment would deepen the recession and undermine efforts to reduce poverty. Recognising these dangers, and to head off protectionist pressures,
leaders at the G20 summit called for a completion of the Doha development agenda of trade negotiations at the World Trade Organisation. But the
current Doha agenda cannot adequately deal with all the challenges facing the trading system. First of all, any likely Doha deal would deliver little by
way of new market opening. It

would also provide only limited insurance against future reversal of trade
policies. The recent trade restrictions attest to the fact that the WTO does not bind developing
countries policies effectively. Even if the Doha talks had not stalled earlier this year and had resulted in a deal, the outcome would not
seriously have changed that. Doha also would do little to tighten disciplines on contingent protection in the form of anti-dumping and safeguard
actions. Such instruments, which some industrial countries adopted in past recessions, are now employed by many developing countries.

High Oil Prices key to Middle East stability

Hargreaves 13 Steve Hargreaves, reporter for CNN, 7/18/13, CNN Money, Falling oil prices could
spark global turmoil http://money.cnn.com/2013/07/18/news/economy/opec-oil/
As a result, Saudi Arabia now needs oil prices close to $100 a barrel just to balance its budget. If oil
prices fall, it may have to cut social spending. In a country that's been a reliable oil exporter to the
global market for over half a century, yet has both a restless segment clamoring for reform as well
as extremists in the ranks, the repercussions could extend well beyond OPEC. It's not in the U.S.
interest to have a more unstable Middle East, even if we are importing no oil from that region ," said
Meghan O'Sullivan, a professor at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government who specializes in
Mideast petro-politics. "Or Russia either," she added, referring to the world's second largest oil exporter.
OPEC in a bind: Thanks to an energy boom in United States, Canada and elsewhere, plus a slowing of
Chinese demand as that economy matures and shifts to less energy-intensive industries, demand for OPEC
oil may fall by a million barrels a day over the next three years, according to the latest projections from the
International Energy Agency. Coupled with rising oil consumption at home and a projected fall in oil

prices, OPEC nations could see a 30% cut in revenue by 2018, according to Trevor Houser, an analyst at
the Rhodium Group.

MDA
Alt. Cause to Russia Relations Ukraine and the U.S. cannot affect Russias
perception
Shishkin and Barnes, 11/3/14 (Philip Shishkin [Reporter, The Wall Street Journal] and Julian E. Barnes [Harvard

University Graduate, Reporter on the Department of Defense and national security issues from The Wall Street Journal's Washington
bureau], U.S. Russia Relations slide over Ukraine Rebel Election, URL: http://online.wsj.com/articles/u-s-russia-relations-slideover-ukraine-rebel-election-1415056381)
WASHINGTONU.S.-Russian

relations headed into a new slide over the crisis in Ukraine following a lull that ended
embrace of disputed elections in rebel-controlled areas, according to U.S. officials. U.S.
officials warned Russia that such destabilizing and dangerous actions, including what they called a new buildup of Russian military
close to the Ukraine border, would carry a cost. At the same time, they acknowledged the limits of the
U.S. ability to influence Russian foreign policy. For the Russian leadership, Ukraine is the central nationalsecurity issue, and it wasnt going to be easy to change their policy, certainly not in the short run, a senior U.S.
official said. Weve seen some change in tactics, but I think we dont see a fundamental change in the strategic direction
on Ukraine, which is to intervene, to destabilize. The latest manifestation of that tactic was Sundays vote held in the areas of east Ukraine held
Monday with Moscows

by pro-Russia insurgents, which saw rebel militia leaders installed as prime ministers of two self-declared republics carved out of eastern Ukraine
with Moscows backing. Kiev and Western officials denounced the vote as a sham and a threat to the fragile peace there, and had urged Russiawhich
had helped broker the two-month-old truceto follow suit. But Russias Foreign Ministry said it respected the will

expressed by the population in the southeast of Ukraine. The elected officials received a mandate to solve practical tasks
of the restoration of normal life in the regions, the ministry said. As part of the peace deal, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko signed a law
granting special status to the separatist regions and providing for local elections there in December, but the rebels ignored it and went ahead with their
own vote. On Monday, Mr. Poroshenko said the law would likely be repealed.

Limited US presence enables Arctic cooperation and solves tensions Russian

aggression is simply rhetoric and wont escalate
Bernstein 14 Leandra, reporter for Ria Novosti, citing Marlene Laruell, program director at the George
Washington Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, Research Professor of International
Affairs, Ph.D. at the National Institute of Oriental Languages and Cultures, 2014 (Arctic Cooperation May
Ease Russia-US Tensions Analyst, Ria Novosti, May 22nd,
http://en.ria.ru/world/20140522/190037278/Arctic-Cooperation-May-Ease-Russia-US-Tensions-Analyst.html | ADM)
Tense relations between Russia and the US and NATO could potentially be cooled through Arctic
cooperation , according to the program director at the George Washington Institute for European, Russian,
and Eurasian Studies.
I think the Arctic is, today at least, one of the last places for cooperation with Russia following the
Ukrainian crisis, Marlene Laruelle said.
US-Russia [Arctic] cooperation will probably be less directed to cooperation on security issues
because of the Ukrainian crisis, she specified, but there are several other elements that are still open
for discussion.
Since 2011 the US has increased its stake in Arctic security and development and currently holds the
chairmanship for the Arctic Council. The US is planning to invest $1.5 billion focusing on the Arctic,
according to former State Department official Heather Conley.
However, US assets in the region are limited and they rely on dated technology and borrowed
equipment from other Arctic nations. Russia is currently the only country employing nuclear-powered
icebreakers.

The securitization trend we see in the Arctic from the Russian side is mostly not an issue of military
aggressiveness , but it is a business issue, Laruelle said.
Concerning Russias delimitation of its continental shelf and control over the North Sea Pass, Laruelle said
Russia is playing by the rules . The demarcation of national and international waterways is contested
within the Arctic Council, but the first voyage of a Chinese merchant ship, Hong Xing, through the
North Sea Pass last year set a precedent when the ship adhered to all Russian requirements for
passage.
There are hopes that increased trade will take place through Arctic routes. The route is expected to see
between ten and twelve commercial trips this year.
Laruelles remarks were part of a panel discussion at the Wilson Center on the interests of the Arctic nations,
and the increasing participation in the region by non-Arctic players, particularly China, Japan, Korea, and
Singapore.

The affs containment strategy provokes Russia into brinksmanship and

wrecks relations causes miscalculation and escalating aggression
Murray and Keating 14 Robert W. Murray, Vice-President, Research at the Frontier Centre for

Public Policy and an Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Alberta, holds a PhD, Political
Science, from the University of Alberta. Tom Keating, Professor of Political Science at the University of
Alberta, 4/25/14, (Why Neo-Containment Should Not Extend to Arctic,
http://opencanada.org/features/the-think-tank/comments/why-neo-containment-should-not-extend-toarctic/)//AW
As the situation in Ukraine continues to worsen, Canada is under increasing pressure to include the Arctic as
part of NATOs strategy to counteract Russian aggression. In the following, we content that it should
continue to resist this pressureeven in the wake of events in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.
The efforts to increase NATOs common interests in the Arctic began as far back as 2010 with Norway
broaching the subject at a NATO Summit. At that time, Canada requested that the Arctic be removed from
the Summits agenda as Canada felt that NATO had no place in Arctic affairs.
Recent events in Ukraine have evoked concern among NATO allies about Russias potential
interest in expanding its borders. In a recent meeting of the Russian Security Council, Russian President
Putin highlighted the special place of the Arctic in Russias sphere of influence . Referring directly to
Russias future Arctic strategy, Putin noted: We need to take additional measures so as not to fall behind
our partners, to maintain Russian influence in the region and, maybe in some areas, to be ahead of our
partners. Russia is in the process of continuing its militarization of the Arctic and this weeks comments
regarding Russias future Arctic interests is cause for concern.
Having mishandled the crisis in Ukraine for so long, NATOs response can now be defined as neocontainment in which NATO bolsters its military presence in Poland and the Baltic states in an effort to
dissuade Putin from going any further with his quest for what he has called New Russia. However, it
would be incredibly unwise for NATO to include the Arctic as a component of the neocontainment strategy moving forward.
The idea of extending NATO to the Arctic theatre is not a new one. Canadian officials raised the possibility
of such an extended mandate in the 1950s when Soviet bombers posed a threat to North America through
Arctic airspace. Canadas concerns at the time, however, were shaped as much by the relationship with its
southern neighbour as they were with the Soviet threat. Indeed, Ottawa was hoping to deflect living under an
exclusively bilateral (NORAD) umbrella by including our European allies in the plan. The Americans and
NATOs European members took little interest in the Canadian request and the matter was dropped.
The situation today is completely different. Russian interests in the Arctic are not primarily about a
global competition for power through territorial expansion (despite the indirect implications of power

accumulation); it is about pressing territorial and resource claims to their most extreme limits. At the same
time, every other Arctic state is pressing similar claims. While military power is not insignificant in asserting
and defending such claims, it has not been the exclusive, nor even primary, means employed thus far.
Diplomatic and institutional measures are still a viable option for resolving these territorial disputes.
A NATO presence in the Arctic would severely undermine these non-military measures and would
likely provoke Russia into a game of brinkmanship .
To date, Arctic relations have been entirely diplomatic , with no genuine hint of armed conflict on the
immediate horizon. It is true that Arctic states have invested significant domestic resources into Arctic
scientific exploration, resource extraction technology and military assets but thus far relations in the
Arctic Region have been cooperative . For the first time since the crisis in Ukraine began, though, the
Arctic became a component of a broader strategic discussion when Canada withdrew from the meeting
of the Arctic Councils task force on black carbon and methane held in Moscow. Even so, it is likely that
Canadas withdrawal from the proceedings had more to do with the fact that the meeting was being held in
Moscow and not a sincere effort on Canadas part to goad Russia on policy issues concerning the Arctic.
The disputes at play in the Arctic are also fundamentally different from those being played out in
Ukraine. Any attempt to link them would be counterproductive on many fronts. Much has been made
in the weeks since the implosion in Ukraine on the effects that NATO expansion has had on Russian foreign
policy. Regardless of how one interprets the effects of NATOs expansion to the borders of Russia,
extending the alliance into the Arctic would only confirm the perception in Moscow that the
alliances primary objective has been to encircle Russia and deny what it views as legitimate
security interests on its borders. If Russians werent paranoid about being trapped before, such a
move by NATO would surely reinforce such a view .

The Arctic is safe no miscalc, intentions are benign

Rybachenkov 13
(Vladimir, Counselor for nuclear affairs at the Russian embassy in Washington, Lecturere at CarnagiePlowshare, The Arctic: region of multilateral cooperation or platform for military tension?,
http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_04_03/The-Arctic-region-of-multilateral-cooperation-or-platform-for-militarytension/)
Some western media have recently been highlighting the view that military conflicts in the struggle
to secure the Arctic's natural resources are inevitable. Russia is carefully monitoring developments in
polar region and considers the general situation in the area to be positive, stable and, on the whole,
predictable, based on the assumption that there are no immediate issues that might call for a military
solution. This assessment has recently been confirmed in a report by the Stockholm Institute for
Peace Research (SIPRI), which refuted recent conjecture about a polar arms race. It is commonly
recognised that there are currently three major factors determining the Arctic situation; Firstly, the end to
military and political confrontation from the Cold War when the Arctic was almost exclusively seen in the
context of flight trajectories for strategic nuclear weapons as well a route for nuclear submarine patrols. Now
the threat of a global nuclear war is substantially reduced, with USRussian arms control treaties
being a key element in the gradual movement towards a world without nuclear weapons.
Impartial assessment of the arms control proces s shows that both countries' nuclear potentials have
steadily diminished over the last 20 years. The START 1 treaty resulted in the removal of about 40% of

the nuclear weapons deployed in Russia and the USA while the 2010 New START treaty provided for their
further fourfold reduction. Substantial efforts have also been made by both countries to reduce the
likelihood of accidental nuclear launches due to unauthorised actions or misunderstandings: strategic
nuclear bombers were taken off full time alert and Open ocean targeting" was mutually agreed,
meaning that in the event of an accidental launch, the missile would be diverted to land in the open
ocean.

Two other factors were contributing to the opening up of new opportunities in the Arctic: the emergence of
new technologies and rapid thawing of the Arctic ice, both rendering natural resources and shipping routes
more accessible. It should also be noted that the ice-cap depletion also has a military dimension, namely the
gradual increase of US multipurpose nuclear submarines and the deployment of missile defence AEGIS
warships in the Northern Seas may be considered by Russia as a threat to its national security.
Russia was the first Arctic state to adopt, in 2008, a long term policy report in response to the new
realities, it pointed to the Arctic region as a, strategic resource base for the country" which would
require the development of a new social and economic infrastructure as well as an upgrading of military
presence in the region to safeguard the Arctic territory. The document however underlined that there
was no question of militarising the Arctic and expressed the importance of sub-regional and
international cooperation to form a favourable social, cultural and economic space. All other Arctic
states have adopted similar strategies with the key common point being a statement that the
national interests of each Arctic state can only be met through multilateral cooperation. A race" for
territory, energy and seafood has been curtailed by historical decisions taken at the 2008 Ilulissat (Greenland)
meeting when five Arctic coastal states declared that their basic framework for future cooperation, territorial
delimitation, resolution of disputes and competing claims would be the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS ).