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Ganzheitspsychologie
Through the Eyes of L. S. Vygotsky

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Manous DAFERMOS &

ATHANASIOS MARvAxis'
Depcirtmem QfPsych0[r)gy
University Q/'Crete/Greece
1

n the beginning of the 20" century in

Germany a strong movement of
criticism
of
the
traditional
Assoziationspsychologie'
and
the
Elernentenpsychologie
emerged.
The
representatives of this movement, which
took the name Garzz/1eirsp.s"ych0!0gie, tried
to work out a holistic perspective of
psychological phenomena (The whole
cannot not be reduced to the sum of its
parts). The Descriptive psychology that
Dilthey tried to construct and the
Understanding Psychology of Spranger,
moved towards the same direction and
inuenced considerably the development of
the Ganzheitspsychologie, In the context of
the Ganzheitspsychologie many distinctive
directions made their appearance.

The Austrian school of thought (in

Graz),
i.e.
the
theory
of
the
advancement/promotion of the tigures/forms
by the so called Produl<tionstheorie der
Gestaltwahrnehmung, was represented
mainly by Ehrenfels (1859 1932), Meinong
(1853 1920), Benussi (1878 1927) and
Witasek (1870 1915). The research of this
school emphasized the principle of the
whole/totality for the study of conception.

An example of this perspective is Ehrenfels

conclusion that in the conception of a
fT1@l0dy something else is introduced that
IS not reducible to the separate elements of
which a melody consists. Ehrenfels named
that something which appears in our
consciousness as a complex of perceptions
Gestaltqualitat (Ehrenfels. 1890; l\/leinong,
1891; Sokolova, 1984).

firmn /u.\'f to Frmira, 1/0!. 5 ( I) Ganzhcitspsychologie and other

forms ofholism. pp. 5 <1 65.

".0 2004 Frances L. Hiatl School 01' Psychology. Clark University
Contact:

University of Crete/Greece, Department of Psychology

University Campus at Gallos. GR 74100 Rethymno/Greece.
13 mail: mtla 1'crniorEaotcnct.pr and inarvaki_sWath(i?p5y,soc.uoog

The school of thought from Berlin

was Founded by Wertheimer (1880 1943)
and was represented mainly by Koffka
(l886l941) Koehler (l887l967), and
Lewin (1890 1947). The representatives of
this school worked out the concept of
Gestalten",
i.e.
of the
articulated
'4, 2

l We would like to thank our friends and colleagues Sofia Triliva and Jannis Melissovas For helping us with the
translation into English:
.
.
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1

'1

Ganzheitspsychologie 55
wholes/totalities, which contribute to the
organisation of the data of our senses
(Koehler, 1921; Koffka 1925, 1935).
The second school of Leipzig,
known as the school of Genetisehe
Ganzheitspsychologie, was founded by
Krueger (1874 1948) and was represented
mainly by Volkelt, Sander, Klemm, and
Wellek. In contradiction to the Gestalten, the
representatives of the school of Leipzig
worked out the concept of the complex
qualities, that is the holistic, emotionally
charged experiences with which people
conceive and understand the world
(Krueger, 1926; Volkelt, 1914, 1924; Sander
& Volkelt, 196,2; Sokolova, 1982).

Ganzheitspsychologie and Soviet

Psychology in the 1920s
The radical social changes that were
going on in the Soviet Union after the
Oetobers revolution inuenced very deeply
the developments in the entire social
sciences

field.

in

the

USSR,

Assoziationspsychologie and more general

critique of the mechanistic tendencies in the
discipline of Psychology that were
widespread in the Soviet Union during the
1920s.
During the l920s in the USSR, we can
trace two different ways in dealing with
Ganzheitspsychologie: a) a total rejection.
This rejection was founded on an
identification of Ganzheitspsychologie with
the traditional idealistic Psychology of
consciousness that had to be rejected
entirely; b) a critical view towards
Ganzheitspsychologie that is accompanied
by an attempt to discover its core and an
attempt to construct a new psychology,
which will take into consideration and will
incorporate
the
findings
of
Ganzheitspsychologie. This perspective is
characteristic for Vygotsky, Rubinstein and
Uznadze.
7

L. S Vygotsky
and the Austrian school of thought

strong

movement of criticism of the traditional

psychology was developed in the l920s and
many attempts were made for the creation of
a new Psychology. The theoretical and
methodological issues were not regarded as
abstract, academic issues; they were viewed
through the prism of matters that played a
leading role in the social processes
(Dafermos, 2002).
In the German~speaking regions and in
the USSR research interest was not focused
only on domains where applications were
feasible, but also on the research of
fundamental
theoretical
issues
of
psychology. But the social and scientific
frame in which those issues were treated in
the above mentioned geo political regions is
quite different. The interest for the
Ganzheitspsychologie emerges in early
Soviet Psychology within two overlapping
contexts of critique: Critique of the

ln his Psychology of arts Vygotsky

examines the views of the representatives of
the Austrian school of Psychology. This
book was \/ygotskys doctoral thesis and
was written before the emergence of his
cultural historical theory.
In this book _\/ygotsky emphasizes the
inability of psychological theories to explain
the relation between the senses and the
objects that appear in our perception. If we
want to deal with that issue it is essential
according to Vygotsky
to ground on
theories, which mark out the relation
between the senses and the imagination.
Meinong (1891) and other psychologists of
that direction underlined the connection
between the imaginations and the senses and
2 The analysis of S. Rubinsteins and D. Uznadzes
perspectives is beyond the scope of this article and
will have to become the subject of study in another
undertaking.
HU
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l\/Ieinongi stressed on the connection of child

imagination and sensory illusion. Vygotsky
characterized this view as /aw 0_/the /"ea/1'1y
Of the .5 ehses.

"I/'1 ruA'r' I/re overcoat in rny her/r00m_/or u

man, if/zen /I7_,l/ er/'0/' is obvious, /vecause /n_v

(2)5/Jr:/"ic'Irt't' is wrong and does not

correspnml 0 any real come/it. Bur (he
_/ee/mg rg/'_/ear that 1 tempt by this is Iota//y
real" (l:1'_l_'!)f.?/\.'_V !997e, p. I99)

Vygotskys later work about the crisis in

psychology. In this work the views, of
Dilthey, Chelpanov, l\/Ieinong, and Stout are
criticized, because they reject according i0
Vygotsky the principle of causality, and
present Psychology as a mere descriptive
S01@nce_ (Vygotsky 199'/e, 316). He
summarizes their position, which he
criticizes as follows:
"The

In other words, even if we have imaginary

and unreal experiences, we live very real
emotional states, and Vygotsky comes to the
conclusion that

mind

must

_ge0n2et/ical forms,

he

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5. iii

as

cc:u.s'a/I'I}.

Two mrmg/e.s' do not engender u .s'q2ir:i'e,'

I/re circle /snows nothing Q/the p_vi'rimz'cf.
N0 relation of {he rear! I t"()!'((f ma) ' be

I/'0/2.;/erred rojzlhe ideal ii. orfd of H0I'??I.S'

cum merilal e.s'sences.' I/rev cam ()Hfl ' he

"the .SLH.\'L.\ rind the imriginatioii do not

represent two sepcimte processes, hm
e.raet!_i' the mme pi'oee.s'.s', and we have the
right to view the iinrigincition as the n rain
expre.s'.\'i'mi Q)" the em0ti0naf
(I/:1/_!:{()I'.\'/{_l /9970, p.199).

i'eactr'0n

The contribution of Meinong consists of

according to Vygotsky the fact that he
revolutionized the traditional associative
interpretation of imagination as a simple
combination/compilation

of

forms.

According to Vygotsky, Meinong showed

that imagination, despite its external
similarity to cognitive processes, ought to be

t/e.s'cribea', ahczlyzec/. c'lci.s'si'fierf, /mi not

e.rp[cu'nec/" ('ifvgrJ!.s'ky 1997c, 3/(5).

Vygotsky places 1\/leinongs view

among the idealistic, phenomenographir;
approaches
of
consciousness,
the
representatives of which organize and
describe the contents of conscience, but they
do not explain their historical origin and
causal
roots.
In
this fashion, the
contradistinction between description and
explanation is reproduced, and more
generally, the methodological dualism of
Psychology as science is (con)firmed.

investigated as a function that serves the

emotional sphere (Vygotsky 1997c, 48). In

this point we have to note that Vygotsky
refers to l\/1einong"s conceptions in order to
criticize the uni dimensional and cognitivist
approach of Potebnya, who regarded art as a
mainly cognitive process. However, in the
frame of that kind of a cognitive
interpretation of art it is impossible to
understand the unique and unrepeatable role
of a specific form of artistic expression and
the emotions that are provoked by it.
However, a different estimation of
l\/leinong's conceptions is expressed in
3 In Vygotsl <y's book there is no reference to a
specific publication of A. 1\/leinong!"

L. S. Vygotsky and the Gestaltpsychologie

The

study

of

Vygotsky's

holistic

approach is a part of a broader analysis of

the methodological crisis of psychology,

which reached its peak during the 20s and
in the beginning of the 30s. In this period,
the basic disciplines of psychology were
being formed and articulated (Behaviorism,
Psychology of Consciousness, Psyclioanalysis,
Personalism).
The
systematic
and
methodological critic of these approaches
was the motivation and content of
Vygotskys work The Hz'.s't0rica/ Meaning of
ar
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the Crisis of Psychology: a Methodological

Investigation (Vygotsky, 1997c).

Vygotsky agreed with Lewins view
that the transition from the descriptive to the
analytic perspective is one of the basic
features of the crisis of Psychology. The
reduction of the scientific analysis to the
description of phenomena does not only
characterize Psychology (for example the
Descriptive Psychology of Dilthey [l977]),
but also to other sciences. Generally, the
descriptive approach consists of the
representation, the analysis of the external
features of an object, as they appear to us
spontaneously,
swiftly
and
straightly
(Vygotsky 1997d, 70).
One of the major methodological
insufficiencies
of
the
descriptive,
phenomenographic method in Psychology
consists of the fact that its representatives
are limited in the external description of the
psychical processes, without exhibiting their
intrinsic substrate. However, two actions
may be similar externally but their intrinsic
psychological content may be radically
different (Vygotsky l997d, 70). The

4 For example: the pre Danviriist biology was limited

to the description ofthe external characteristics of the
organisms without trying to trace their origin.
.

...

personality), and its scientic methods

(subjective
method,
positivism,
objectivism). All these approaches were
developed according to Vygotsky on the
ground of particular discoveries in that eld
of science. However, the representatives of
those new approaches in psychology
preferred to present their particular and
_'agmemary knowledge as general, universal
knowledge that embraces the discipline of
psychology as a whole.
The holistic perspectives appeared,
according to Vygotsky, at the beginning in
particular psychological research on the
conception/perception of forms and were
extended to animal psychology, having as
example the well known experiments of
Koehler. The next step was its diffusion to
nearly all sectors of psychology. But the
course of the holistic approach/perspective
didnt stop here. It ought to embrace all
sectors of scientific knowledge and was to
become a philosophical, universal principle
for the interpretation of all phenomena. In
Vygotskys own words:
"lt conquered the psychology of art and
ethnic psychology, and it tiirned out that
the priinltive conception of the world and
the creation ofart are Gestalten as well. It
conquered
child
psychology
and
[).$'}Cl7()fJC1llI0lOgj) and the Gestalt covered
both child development and mental
disease. Fi'na_lly, having turned into a
worldview, Gestaltpsychologie discovered
the Gestalt in physi'cs, and chen iisti'y, in
ph__v.s'iology and biology and Gestalt
withered to a logical formula, arid
appeared to be the basis of the world.
When God created the world he saio: be
Gestalt and there was Gestalt
everywhere (Vygotslqv 1997c, 245).

distinction between the phenomena and the

essence of the subject of cognition is the

fundamental methodological presupposition
for the development of scientific knowledge.
Vygotsky refers affirmatively at this point to
l\/larxs view that, if the form of
manifestation and the essence. of things
coincided directly, then all of science would
be superuous (Marx & Engels 1962, 384).
During this period, psychological
knowledge was developed, mainly, in an
extensive way, through the conquest of
new fields of study. Spontaneously there
were formed three major approaches, three
major perspectives in the field of
psychology concerning its subject matter
(conscious subconscious,
behaviour,

1 \~

Vygotsky did not reject the holistic

perspective, but its abstract and mechanistic
application onto all sectors of scientific
knowledge (Physics, Chemistry, Biology,
Sociology, etc.) without taking in account
the particularities and the specific level of

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development of each of the specic subjects.

The particular principle has to explain
everything in the world, and in the same

time by this nothing at all. Thus, the

particular principle looses its scientic
status and becomes a teleological and
theological principle.

The sharp and rigorous critic of the

teleological extension and use does not
hinder Vygotsky from expressing his
appreciation and his admiration for
Gestaltpsychologie, which he considered to
be the peak of the European psychology. lt
was not coincidental that the founder of the
cultural historic approach of consciousness
wrote the preface of the Russian edition of

two important works of representatives of

Gestaltpsychologie: Koehlers book The
/nve.s'tigatz'rm Q/' the Intellect Q)/lnthropoia
/lpes and Kotll<as book Fozmdations 0/
Menlczf Deve/opmerzt.
.
The most important theoretical point of

the
Gestaltpsychologie
consists
of,
according to Vygotsky, the attempt to
surpass two elementary impasses in
contemporary Psychology: the mechanistic
and the vitalistic perspective. The concept of
the structure, of the whole implies
essential characteristics that are not
reducible to the properties of the separate
and
distinct
parts.
For
the
Gestaltpsychologie
the
structural
organization is a characteristic point, not
only of the higher conscious processes, but
for the psychical in general. This perspective

is able to contribute according to

Vygotsky in surpassing the gap between
the psychical processes and the physical
processes and in adopting a monistic theory
of the psychological processes. V
However, Vygotsky tried also to find

thetlaws in this theoretical direction. The

representatives of the Gestaltpsychologie
adopted

the

idea

of

the structural

constitution. the idea of the leading role of

the whole, which seems to exist for them

already at the psychical developmental level

ot animals. But, accepting this standpoint,
there 1S no need to research the historicity,
the development of that principle(s) up to
the level of human consciousness.
A characteristic element of the
Gestaltpsychologie is
according to
Vygotsky the naturalistic reduction of the
phenomena of the mental development of
the child to the dominant principle, as it
already exists in the psychical of the
animals. By this Gestaltpsychologie aSSL1me3
and puts the psychical development of the
child on the same level as the mental
development oi animals (Vygotsky 19970,
211). Despite its anti individualism, in
Gestaltpsychologie we can trace a tendency
to reduce the higher forms of development
of mentality to the lower. The signicant
progressive step of Gestaltpsychologie turns
out to be iiisuflicient and leads back to the
traditional Assoziationspsychologie.
In the tier/iglr! Q_f'zrnii 'er.s'c:l .s'!rnc*!m'a{'

re!atr'0n.s', cilf eats are grey. .l.s' /ind

ear/ier been the curse in the m'i'/ig/if Qj

m iivei .90! e.s'.s'0ez'ati've c0imeet:'on.s', it is

i'mp0.r.s':'b[e I0 dimngzris/2 I/rem "
('Vyg0t.sj/ry 1997a, 248).

At this point we can note that the

theoretical positions supported in the

Austrian school of thought and especially
the position that sensory structures are
tormcd in the act oil perception, whose
integral nature is determined by that act and

not by the combination ot the sensations in

themselves inuenced very deeply the
formation
ot the
Gestaltpsyehologie.
However, Vygotsky notes a significant
difference between the psychologists of the
Austrian
school
and
the
Gestalt
psychologists:
L
D
"In (J(J)7lI'(f.\I I0 Efzrezts/.s'
p.\'_vc'/:0/ogisrs,
iv/:0
structure cis at property
mentel pr0ees.s'e.s",
as

and 0!/ zer

c0:i.w'cie1'ed
Qg" higher
.s'<>:zie:/mtg

intmolztced by cohscz'ousness into the

elements om which the perception of
the whole is constmcteo, the new
psvchology
proceeds
from
the
assum prion that these wholes we call
strimteres are not only the privilege of
higher conscioz is processes" but not

construction of the new psychology.5 In

his book History of the higher psychical
functions Vygotsky noticed that both the
old subjective psychology and the new ~
objective ~ psychology (Behaviorism,
Reexology, etc.), despite their signicant
differences, had many things in common.

even an e.rcltzs:'ve property of mind"

vgotslty
l 997e, 193).

The
representatives
of
the
Gestaltpsychologie present the structural
principle as a universal principle not only of
the consciousness, but of the material world
as a whole. Vygotsky did.. not reject the
structural principle, but regarded it as
abstract, not representing sufficiently the
specicities in the particular levels of
historical development. Thus, the structural
principle cannot for example be used in
the same way for the explanation of the
instinct
and
mathematical
thinking
(Vygotsky,
l 9970,
225 226).
The

Gestaltpsychologie adopted a general,

universal standpoint for the analysis of all
psychical phenomena: of the chickens
perception, ofa monkeys mental activity, of
the childs rst comprehensive word, and of
the adults developed deductive thinking.
This approach leads us to a confusion
concerning the different levels of psychical
development, leads us to an insufficient
conception of their specicity, and to an
insufficient

understanding

of

the

mechanisms that rules the transition from

one level of development to another.
According to Vygotsky, the issue is
not the return to the pre structural period of
psychology, but the transition to the post
structural period and how to organize it,
which will have as a main concern the
representation
of
the
higher
psychical/mental functions. The Psychology
of the higher psychical processes
in
contrast to Freuds psychology of the
depth and behaviorists psychology of the
surface ought to become
according to
Vygotsky
the basic axes for the

13

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The point is that in both perspectives,

the purpose of analysis is to equate the
problems of scientific study with
decomposing
higher forms
and
strwtures into primary elements and
reclucing them to lower forms while
ignoring problems ofqzzality, which is
not reclz icing to quantitative clyjererices,
that is, to hon a'z'alectz'cal sc'leht.yic'
thlnlting (Vygotsky 199741, 4).

The representatives of the traditional

Psychology adopted the reduction of the
higher psychical processes to primary and
indivisible experiences and elementary
psychical functions (sense, satisfaction,
voluntary effort, etc.) constructing by this a
multiple fragmented and individualistic view
of psychical life. The insufficiency of the
traditional psychology of elements consists
of the adoption of the idea that the higher
psychical processes are formed through the
coherent union of elementaiy processes. The
representatives of the objective psychology
reduce the higher forms of behavior to
elementary, lower processes (reexes,
reactions, etc.). These two directions of
Psychology through different paths lead to
the same result.6
From this starting point, the
theoretical
propositions
of
Ganzheitspsychologie are much more

5 At this point L. Vygotsky was criticized by many

researchers who observed that this contradistinction
between higher and lower psychical functions leads
exactly to the (re)production of the methodological
duality oftraditional psychology (Brushlinsky, l968).
6 About Ganzheitspsychologie in Soviet Psychology
see Artemov, 1928; Rubinstein, 2000; Sokolova,
1982 and 1984; Yaroshevsky, 1976.

L: 1 i
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\.J2:1l.l..llCJlLbP.)_y \..11u1uE,1\.,

i Voll<elts
theoretical
views
revolutionized the traditional view that
development of perception moves not only
in
animal
psychology
from , the
separate/specific to the general, but also in
child psychology. Vygotsky estimatedthat
for developmental psychology \/oll<elts
view was of great importance, that is that for
the child, duringits early age, the primal and
total perception of a situation goes ahead of
the clear cut perception of distinct and
separate objects, which are included in it
(Vygotsky 1984a, l l6).
This primal perception of the child is
emotionally charged (Volkelt, l9l4; l924).
Perception and emotion constitute an
undiversified unit in the course of early child
development. lf we take in account also
Lewins view that perception is connected
straightly with action (Lewin. 1926; 192.9)
then we can conclude that during early child
development, consciousness is composed as
a unit of emotionally charged perception,
emotion and action (Vygotsky, 1984a, 343).
Consequently, the child ~ from the very
beginning of its development does not react
in a passive, mechanistic way to some
distinct internal or external stimuli, but
forms a characteristic, holistic relation
towards the reality surrounding him.
Although Vygotsl<.ys views being
different from the methodological principles
of Ganzheitspsychologie he showed interest
in many research ndings of that school of
thought. Thus, Vygotsl<ys theory about
psychological systems, and that about the
unity of intellectual/cognitive and emotional
processes, incorporates to a certain point
the findings of the Leipzig school of thought
in the frame of a wider theoretical system.
\/ygotsl<y
agreed
with
Voll<elts
conclusions that the majority of the
research in experimental child psychology
was based on methods that had been

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7 Vygotsky does not quote any particular work or

publication here!
' '

u 1.

elaborated in the research of animal

psychology, making redundant the necessity
to research the significance of speech for the
childs psychical development. However,
Vygotsky estimates this discovery of
Volkelt as being not sufficient and expands
it to a, broader conclusion: child psychology
is permeated by a naturalistic view on the
child and, because of this, studies the child
primarily as a natural being and not as a
social one (Vygotsky, 1997a; 34). Even
\/olkelts theory is not free from the
naturalistic orientation, which characterizes
mainstream
psychology.
Voll<elts
methodological insufficiency consists of,
according to Vygotsky, the fact that he
equates the complex thinking of spiders with
the primitive verbal thinking (Vygotsky,
1997a, 160). On the contrary, Vygotsky
emphasized the difference between the
human
thinking/intellect
formed and
developed in the course of history and the
forms of intellect, which are characteristic of
the biological lower levels of development
(for example apes). Another significant
difference between Vygotsl<ys theory and
\/olkelts approach consists of Vygotsl<ys
emphasis on the historical character of
childhood itself. Vygotsky stated that child
psychology through Volkelt praised the
primitive
wholeness/totality,
which
characterizes the psychical life of the child
and thus constitute the essence and value of
the eternal child. Volkelt, according to
Vygotsky, did not represent only his
individual position but also the fundamental
tendency of all of modem child psychology
(of his historical period) to give expression
to the eternal child. In opposition to this
for Vygotsky the essence of childhood
alters substantially in the different historical
and social contexts.

The task ofpsychologjv, however. is not

the discovery ofrhe eternal chiid. The {ask
of psychology is the dfSL'()V?j/ of the

DA rrom Vast Lt) rutuit: Jti)

.>

/?f.S'[0tfL'(t/ L./H/( J, of the Goethe c'tr//ed the

ti"ah.s'i't0t;it chihf " (Vyg0tsftji' /9970, 9!).

Ln his Lectures of Psychology Vygotsky

criticized the view of the traditional
Assoziationspsychologie, that the babys
perception is chaotic, according to Buehlers
words, a wild dance of uncoordinated
sensations. Vygotsky agreed with the
criticism on the mechanistic views of the
Assoziationspsychologie. The insufficiency
of Volkelts approach as well as of those
representatives of the Ganzheitspsychologie,
consist of the fact that for them the structural
character of perception is set as primary and
is not viewed as a result of a long lasting
development.
Where are we t0_/ind devehipment if
the niost e.s'.s <:.*ntt'u/feature 0_f'perceptt'0ri
(Le. its .~:trm.'tttt't1/, integral! tratttre) is

pt'C.'t.I1! hot/2 ct! the hegiizning Q/' the

development
process
and
its
e"t.tt'mt't2cttt'tm ht the adrift?" ('V:Vg0t.s'Aj ',
/9970, 29/)

Generally, not only the psychical

processes, but also mans sociality is not a
static characteristic, which pre~exists, nor is
it given in a ready form at the time of the

persons birth, but appears, transforms and

develops during the process of ontogenesis
as a result of ones continuous transaction
with the other humans.

Analysis in elements and analysis in

units: Two different tactics in
psychological research
Vygotsky identifies the uni dimensional
character of two popular perspectives in
psychology concerning the link between the
part
and
the
whole
(that
is
Elementenpsychologie
and
Ganzheits
psychologie) i and
he
proposes
the
construction of a new synthetic theory,
which will surpass this uni dimensionality.
But this synthetic theory cannot be realised

just by a simple and eclectic conjunction of

those two extreme perspectives. ln order to
understand \/ygotsl<ys view on the
Ganzheitspsychologie we may focus on his
Lectures on Pedology (Vygotsky 2001).
The method of Pedology should be,
according to Vygotsky, the
"ho/t'stic

method

0/

developmental

t'esec.'t'ch. ivhteh does not 0!?/V hie/ztde ct

part Q/ the organism. the persona/t'tjt, the

child. /mt a!/ the aspects of the pemtmct/t'{ii
and the orgcmism as tr who/e"(l"1'gtJts'.1q=,

2001, 32)

The holistic method of the research of

development cannot be reduced to the mere
collection and classification of elements
from a variety of sciences concerning
aspects of the organism or personality.
\_/ygotskys approach is in dissent with the
popular
perspectives,
which
identify
interdisciplinary with a mere and eclectic
accumulation of facts from different
disciplines without understanding of their
mutual interrelation, and is also in dissent
with the post modern view concerning the
de differentiation of scientific knowledge,

which leads to the disappearance of the

borders between scientific disciplines.
Vygotsky criticized the view that the holistic
method

is

radically

different

from

the

analytic approach of the research subject.

According to him, the holistic method
includes
as a necessary moment
the
analytic approach. Analysis. though, can be
realised by two types. The first type consists
of the division, the separation of the
psychological whole into its separate
elements and can be compared with the
chemical resolution of water into hydrogen
and oxygen.
"The essehtt'ct/ g/ec2t_m"e of this _/brm Of
tutu/_vsi.s is that its prochtcts are of tr

ch/_/eretit natitre than the who/e rim

wht'r:h their were derived. The elements

[tie/r the c'hc:ractert'.sti'cs' irihererit in the

.
T
'1.
l'':".

iavnltrwau, ~,~, we .. i. mwncuemaoneap. _

.nmu:em: .w:p:!i:.

1WTQ#@5$1%%Ea 'iHM

_'
Wmm
M. m,__ ,|_._ _.$N"_n _,, 5

\J'C.l.11L11\_.iILDi.)D_)t\.1J\JA\_)::._;)1\..

at
#1
i5

53

f
it

e
it

who/e and they possess properties that

it did not possess" (Vygotsky, 19970,
45).

In contrast to the analysis in elements,

the
second
type
consists
of the
understanding of the separate units of which
the whole consists.
"In contrast to the term eiement, the
term trait designates a product of
analysis that possesses all the basic
charactert'stt'cs of the who/e. The tmit is
a vita! and t'rrech tcihle .part of the
whole. The key to the expianatton ofthe _
investr'gatt'0n o/its chemical_formula hut
in the inve.s'tigatt()h ofits mo/ectt/e rind

its molecular movements" (Pfvgots/qv.

1997a, 46).

Vygotsky tried to identify the units,

which are necessary for the study of the

complex
psychological
whole.
The
elementary unit for the understanding of the
relation between speech and thinking is
the meaning of the word. ln the works of
Vygotsky one can observe ambiguity and
contradiction in the question, which is the

1'

unit for studying consciousness. In his

book Thinking and Speech this unit is

identified as the meaning, in other works
it is the concept of experience or the
developmental

social

situation,

etc.

It

seems most probably to us that none of the

previous conceptions satisfied Vygotsky
completely.
Thus, Vygotsky based his elaboration of
the holistic method in/for psychology in
comparison with the main representatives of
Ganzheitspsychologie on different grounds,
but the elaboration remained yet unfinished
and open. From that historical point on,
many Soviet psychologists tried to discover
the unit, the elementary cell for the
construction of a system of categories and
laws for psychology. For example, many
Soviet psychologists regarded the category
of activity as the fundament on which the

:1
s
t

whole of the categories and laws of

psychology could be constructed. From our
point of view, these attempts led to articial
categorizations and they failed. One of the
reasons for this failure lies in the fact that
they who tried to createcategorical systems
and laws for psychology did not study the
issue of terminology, nor the methodological
prerequisites for the application of the
holistic method in psychology.
Some summarizing remarks

chcu'ac'ter'i.stt'c.s' of water lies not in the

1!

\_J._2

In
Soviet
psychology
seminal
discussions on the important and different
perspectives in contemporary Psychology
including Ganzheitspsychologie
were
undertaken which were to be seen in the
context of the creation of a new
psychology. Vygotsky agreed with the
critics of Ganzheitspsychologie on the
Assoziationspsychologie,
on
the
Elementenpsychologie because they identify
real insufficiencies. and impasses of
contemporary psychological research. He
also agreed to the fact that a thorough
reection
on the theoretical
issues
formulated by the Ganzheitspsychologie is
essential and necessary. Simultaneously,
Vygotsky estimated that the theoretical
program/project of the Ganzheitspsychologie
was part of a more general problem, that of
the methodological crisis in Psychology.
From
his
point
of
view,
Ganzheitspsychologie does not surpass the
theoretical insufciencies of the traditional
psychology. Actually, the interest of the
Soviet psychologists tumed to
the
Gestaltpsychologie,
while
the
other
perspectives of Ganzheitspsychologie were
given less attention.
It was in particular Vygotsky who tried
to elaborate on a new psychology which
was to surpass the methodological dualism
in all of his forms and articulations
" According to..Lomov (.1984) the. .fsysternic method.

64 From Past to Future 5(1)

(elements
vs.
structure/whole,
objectivism vs. subjectivism, nomothetic
vs. ideographical method,.etc). Vygotsky
notes the abstract, formalistic characterof
the structural
principle, . the holistic
principle,
as
it
was
used
in
Ganzheitspsychologie and the difficulties of
application this principle in different sectors
of Psychology. The mechanistic salience of
that principle leads to the confusion of the
different levels of analysis (development of
life,
ph.ylogcnetic
development
of
consciousness, historical development of
society,
ontogenetic
development
of
personality, etc.) and leads to an incapability
analysing the development of particular and
dynamic psychical processes.
One of the theoretical difficulties that
could
not
be
surpassed
by
the
Ganzheitspsychologie
was
the
understanding of the relationship between
subject and object. lts representatives
limited themselves in the phenomenographic
description and analysis of the situations of
consciousness of an abstract and a historical
subject, without examining the multiple
forms of the dialectical transaction between
subject and object. The representatives of
Ganzheitspsychologie view/use the holistic
and structural conditions ofconsciousness as
something ready and given, without
reecting on the historical descent and the
concrete social context which contributed to
it
emergence.
Thus,
nally,
in
Ganzheitspsychologie the very concrete
social subjects tend to confuse, to disappear
in universal structures, in abstract complexes
of thought and emotionality, in a~historical
assumed totalities.
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Artemov,

V.

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Covremenaia

nemetskaia
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