Egypt and Israel: Sinai Heat Thaws the Cold Peace

By Zack Gold - Guest contributor | Dec 16, 2014

Egyptian President Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi is no Zionist, as senior Israeli interlocutors like
to point out, but his vision of state sovereignty and Egyptian national security often
closely aligns with the interests of Israel. When Sinais Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, Egypt's
most lethal jihadi group, recently pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Syria and
Iraq, perhaps the most interesting response was the non-response by the governments of
Egypt and Israel. From the view of both, the origins and ideologies of Islamist groups are
all the same. Therefore, what a group calls itself or the formality of ties is, for them,
irrelevant. Israel has for years referred to the broad phenomenon of global jihad. For its
part, Egypt has called on the international coalition against the Islamic State to counter a
broad spectrum of what it considers radical Islamist groups across the region, including
the Muslim Brotherhood.
Bilateral security relations have expanded since July 2013mostly in response to the
expanded threat Egypt faces from Sinai. However, military-to-military and intelligencesharing ties were close under the presidency of Mohamed Morsi as well. Indeed, it was
under Morsis leadership that the Egyptian military first began cracking down on the
smuggling tunnels underneath the Sinai-Gaza border. At the time, Israeli leaders were
both surprised and pleased at the measures Egypt took in Sinai and especially the role it
played in ending the 2012 Gaza war. Despite this, Israelis never trusted the Muslim
Brotherhood leader, who regularly spoke of respecting the peace treaty but rarely
mentioned the word Israel and refused to speak with his Israeli counterparts.
It is an accurate assessment to point out that the Israel file, and national security
generally, stayed in the hands of Egypts security establishment during the Morsi
administration. While entirely hypothetical, Israeli leaders were concerned about what
would happen to bilateral relations over the long-term if Morsi managed to consolidate
power and govern in a way more aligned with Muslim Brotherhood ideology. When the
military removed Morsi in July 2013, erasing or at least setting back this feared alternate
future, Israel and its backers heaved a sigh of relief and urged the international
community to support the development.
The continuity of Egypts Sinai policy from late 2012 to today is likely the influence of
Sisi, who was appointed defense chief by Morsi, served in an outsized role in the interim
government that followed, and now leads Egypt outright. Unlike his predecessor, Sisi
also publicly talks about Israeli security and is open about discussions he has with Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Sisi likely mentions Israeli security for the same

reasons Morsi spoke of the peace treaty: to gain U.S. support for, or at least quiet
acquiescence of, his domestic policies and actions. It bears repeating thatto the
contrary of propaganda from both the Muslim Brotherhood and Sinai-based jihadisthe
Egyptian military operates to protect sovereign national interests. As outlined in the
Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, Egypt does coordinate with Israel in carrying out operations in
Sinai, but whether these operations also serve Israeli interests is entirely irrelevant to
decision-makers in Cairo.
Given the common interests between Israel and Egyptand, indeed, among Israel and
several regional statesin countering Islamist violence and more generally pushing back
the rise of political Islam, Israeli and even American leaders have expressed the
possibility of a paradigm shift in which Israel can be an accepted part of the region.
Netanyahus speech at this years UN General Assembly suggested that Israel could build
relations with Egypt and others even as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict simmers.
Yet despite 35 years of peace and increased security cooperation over the past couple of
years, Egyptian-Israeli relations have never been normal. Egyptian artists and
academics continue to boycott Israel, and anyone interested in visiting Israel must seek
approval from state security. One area to watch for changes in this cold peace is the
newly developing Eastern Mediterranean energy market. Egypts gas shortage has
resulted in a loss of supply for the foreign companies BG Group and Union Fenosa Gas
(UFG), which no longer have a product to export from Egypt to European markets. BG
and UFG are now interested in processing Israeli gas at their Egyptian facilities
agreements that, if signed, would require Egyptian approval. In November,
representatives from Noble Energythe American company with a majority stake in
Israels offshore gas fieldsparticipated in the largest U.S. trade delegation to Egypt, no
doubt in part to make the case of the importance of approving these private-sector deals.
Such agreements would, indeed, be beneficial for Egypt. The importance of these deals
for the private companies involved, and the requirement of Egyptian approval, gives
Cairo a great amount of leverage. Egypts diversion of energy to its domestic market has
resulted in a loss of billions of dollars for international investors and subsequent
international lawsuits. Egypt's oil ministry bluntly stated earlier this year that no new
deals would be approved until these arbitration cases are solved, that is, dropped. Instead
of, or in addition to, rents, Egypt could even siphon off some of the Israeli gas for its own
domestic needs.
While entirely beneficial in an economic sense, such agreements would be politically
controversial. This is especially true in light of the controversy and perceived corruption
surrounding a previous Israeli-Egyptian gas deal: a 2005 arrangement that sent Egyptian
gas to the Israeli market through a company controlled by a close Mubarak ally. One
Egyptian knowledgeable of bilateral relations with Israel pointed out that the controversy
was less about selling gas to Israel than about the lack of transparency in the details. He
noted that Egyptian officials are now more responsible in discussing bilateral ties and that
a gas deal would be approved by the general public as long as the deal is transparent.
Corruption was indeed the main complaint against the 2005 gas deal, although for others

the issue was compounded by the corruption allegedly favoring Israel. If the deal is
transparent, Egyptians may be further incensed if they see Egypt paying much more for
Israeli gas than the price at which it sold its gas to Israel.
However, bilateral relations between Egypt and Israeleven when mutually beneficial
are still not entirely transparent. This opaqueness is purposeful, both because the
Egyptian government does not want to publicize issues of national security and because
Cairo wants to avoid being linked to certain Israeli government policies or actions of
which the Egyptian public is critical. As such, the Egyptian government may have been
in favor of some military action by Israel against Hamas this summer, but its foreign
ministry harshly criticized Israel for specific incidents in which large numbers of
Palestinian civilians were killed. Similarly, Sisi may be more open about relations with
Israel, but in the same breath he often makes clear that these relations will not be
normal until the Palestinian issue is resolved.
For all the publicized shared interests and mutually beneficial ties, then, it is likely that
Israeli-Egyptian relations will remain strong but behind-the-scenes.

Zack Gold is a visiting fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies in Israel.
On Twitter: @ZLGold

http://www.mei.edu/content/article/egypt-and-israel-sinai-heat-thaws-cold-peace?print=