1AC

Plan: The United States federal government should establish a scientific

hydrocarbon development mission in the Arctic to facilitate cooperation with
the Russian federation.

Contention 1 is Russian Relations

Science cooperation in the Arctic is insufficient expanding it is vital to overall
US/Russia Arctic collaboration.
Benton, 14 (David Benton, Presidential appointment to the Arctic Research Commission, International Cooperation Works,
1/22/14, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=3020#top)

We cooperate very well in the North Pacific and the Bering Sea. And an example of this success is that we have the
longest maritime boundary between any two nations in the world. And we have very little conflict along that boundary. We have very good cooperation
between Russian border guards and the United States coast guards in terms of enforcement and search and rescue operations. And our fishery
managers exchange data and information on a regular basis. That all works fairly well. However,

where we have a gap , in my view,

is in the Arctic , in the area of the Northern Bering Sea and north into the Chukchi Sea in the Arctic Ocean. Weve not had a
reason until recent times to start thinking about how to cooperate, because of the ice there was
little activity. Now that region is opening up. I believe that the United States and Russia should look at some bilateral
arrangements that would deal with enforcement, with science, and cooperation or at least coordination in terms of our management activities
for things like fisheries. The first step in the relationship that will have to be built over time, in my mind, is science . We
have good projects that we are cooperating on. But theyre very specific. What we dont have,
in my view, is an institutional arrangement that would have long-lasting durability over decades,
and we need that. And we should do that bilaterally in our shared boundary . It should be a
Russia and United States -led, reciprocal scientific cooperation agreement that helps us on a
regular basis to plan and coordinate our research activities,
interests that we have in that region.

share resources

and achieve the joint

The second thing is the working relationship between the Russian border guards and the

United States Coast Guard. Thats a pretty solid good working relationship that should extend and continue. Its working very well in the Bering Sea and
the North Pacific and should continue and work its way up to the Arctic Ocean as well, and we should look for opportunities to strengthen tha t
relationship as well. And whats your assessment of these opportunities? And do you think that if Russia and the US start cooperating in the Arctic, the
others will follow? I think the opportunities

are there. And I think that we have the chance to make things
happen over the next few years. And yes, I believe that if we start cooperating on science and enforcement,
other kinds of opportunities will present themselves, so the relationship will strengthen. If
we dont seize those opportunities, then well face a situation where one side does one thing,
the other side does another thing, and because one does not talk to the other, we wont know if were helping
or hurting.

This cooperation spills over solves US/Russian arctic competition.

Berkman, 14 (Paul Arthur, research professor at the Marine Science Institute and Bren School
of Environmental Science and Management at the University of California, Santa Barbara,
Stability and peace in the Arctic through Science Diplomacy, 6/23/14
http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/perspective/2014/stability-and-peace-in-arctic-oceanthrough-science-diplomacy)
High north, low tensions has been the mantra of diplomats, as coined by former Norwegian foreign
minister Jonas Gahr Stre. After all, the Cold War is over and cooperation has been evolving in productive
directions ever since for the North Polar region. Lessons of the Arctic , such as those from the Antarctic,
reveal science as a tool of diplomacy that creates bridges among nations and fosters stability in
regions. It is well known that science is necessary for Earth system monitoring and assessment, especially
as an essential gauge of change over time and space. Science also is a frequent determinant of public policy

agendas and institutions, often for early warning about future events. However, even more than an immediate source of
insight, invention, and commercial enterprise, science provides continuity in our global society with its evolving
foundation of prior knowledge. These and other features of science diplomacy,1 as a field of human endeavor, are relevant to our
global future in the Arctic. Building on the East-West breakthrough in the 1986 Reykjavik Summit, with his Murmansk speech in
October 1987, Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev envisioned a shared path where the community and interrelationship of the
interests of our entire world is felt in the northern part of the globe, in the Arctic, perhaps more than anywhere else. Recognizing
that scientific exploration of the Arctic is of immense importance for the whole of mankind,
Gorbachev called for creation of a joint Arctic Research Council. Emerging from his Murmansk speech, the International Arctic
Science Committee was founded in 1990, followed by the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy in 1991, which revealed a
common future among Arctic countries and peoples. Also involving the eight Arctic states,2 the Barents-Euro Arctic Council and
Standing Committee of the Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region were formed in 1993 and 1994, respectively.
Eventually established in 1996, the Arctic Council breathed life into a circumpolar community of the eight
states and six indigenous peoples organizations inhabiting the region north of the Arctic Circle. As a high level forum, the Arctic
Council has become central in an institutional arena for the high north that includes the above organizations along with many
others, starting with the 1920 Treaty Concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen. With its forty-two signatories, this treaty still stands
as a beacon of peaceful development in the high north. Together, the

six scientific working groups of the Arctic

Council are facilitating knowledge discovery and contributing to informed decisions about
common Arctic issues of sustainable development and environmental protection. As a direct consequence of
the Arctic Council, pan-Arctic agreements are being signed by all Arctic states, beginning with the 2011
search and rescue agreement and 2013 marine oil pollution response agreement. Interests of twelve non-Arctic states, including
China and India, also are being accommodated as they are brought in as observers to the Arctic Council. Moreover, the so-called
Arctic Five3 coastal states are reaching territorial agreements. As noted in their 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, sovereignty, sovereign
rights and jurisdiction in large areas of the Arctic Oceanare being addressed cooperatively under the Law of the Sea, particularly
with regard to outer limits of the continental shelf. This commitment includes the United States, even though it has not yet ratified
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Highlighting the cooperation, Russia and Norway signed an agreement in
2010 about Barents Sea resources, ending a dispute that had escaped their resolution for the previous four decades.

Winds Are

Changing The current crisis related to Ukraine has introduced global geopolitics into the
Arctic unlike any world event since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Within weeks of the Crimea annexation, former U.S. secretary
of state Hillary Clinton was linking the Arctic, Russia, and Ukraine , suggesting in a March 2014 speech in
Montreal that we need a united front, as reported by the Globe and Mail. The following month, Canada, the current chair of the
Arctic Council, boycotted the Arctic Council meeting in Moscow. Lines are being redrawn, which the May/June 2014 issue of Foreign
Affairs reflected with its articles related to The Return of Geopolitics.

Such political posturing risks fueling the

long-dormant burning security issues that Gorbachev warned of in the Arctic. Perhaps the world was arriving at
this security intersection in any case, but for different reasons. The Arctic Ocean is undergoing an environmental state-change,
where the boundary conditions of the system are being altered. The Arctic Ocean is undergoing an environmental state-change,
where the boundary conditions of the system are being altered. In factwith the Arctic warming twice as fast as anywhere else on
Earththe Arctic Ocean is undergoing the largest environmental state-change on our planet. The surface of this maritime region
surrounding the North Pole is being transformed from a sea-ice cap that has persisted for millennia (perhaps even hundreds of
millennia) to a system with sea ice retreating and advancing seasonally. Rather than projecting out to the mid-twenty-first century, it
is clear that the Arctic Ocean already has crossed a threshold with open water during the summer and first-year sea ice during the
winter covering more than 50 percent of its area. Of greater significance, the volume of Arctic sea ice has decreased more than 70
percent since the late 1970s. With increasing accessibility in the Arctic Ocean, countries, along with multinational corporations
such as ExxonMobil and Royal Dutch Shell, are preparing to exploit the regions enormous energy reserves,
estimated to contain 30 percent of the worlds undiscovered gas and 13 percent of its undiscovered oil. Fisheries are opening to
commercial harvesting without regulation, especially in areas of the high seas lacking any regional fisheries management
organization. Arctic

shipping routes are being established to supplement trade through the Panama and Suez
Canals. It is not a matter of waiting decades or even years for the Arctic Ocean to be completely ice-free during the summer. There
is now a new Arctic Ocean, one that lacks a permanent sea-ice cap. Like removing the ceiling to a room, the fundamental
shift in the surface boundary of the Arctic Ocean has created a new natural system with different dynamics than anything previously
experienced by humans in the region. There is now a new Arctic Ocean, one that lacks a permanent sea-ice cap. Separate from the
Ukraine situation, the

environmental state-change in the Arctic Ocean is introducing inherent risks

of political, economic, and cultural instabilitieswhich are at the heart of every security dialogue. Exposing
security risks in the Arctic may be a good thing, but only if accompanied by inclusive solutions
that both promote cooperation and prevent conflict.

Achieving International Stability Leaving loose the

elephant in the room, questions about conflict in the Arctic Ocean remain unattended. As a consequence, the associated community
of states and peoples lacks a shared understanding of expectations, capabilities, interests, and wills to foster lasting stability in the
Arctic Ocean. Matters related to military security are off the table for the Arctic Council. The council avoids even general
considerations of security in the Arctic Ocean, as reflected by elimination of the security chapter from its second Arctic Human
Development Report, which is due in 2014. Matters related to military security are off the table for the Arctic Council. With all
Arctic coastal states except Russia as members, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the only northern Atlantic
organization without a remit in the Arctic Ocean. This position seems reasonable as long as NATO is seen by Russia as the main
external threat of war, as stated in the 2010 Military Doctrine of Russia. These positions made sense immediately after the Cold
War, but decades of cooperation have followed and there now is capacity to project peace into the future for the Arctic Ocean. Not
all military capabilities are designed for force,4 as affirmed for the Arctic Ocean in 2010 by then NATO supreme allied commander,
Admiral James Stavridis. Illustrating this point, in association with the Arctic Council, meetings among the chiefs of defense from all
Arctic states began in 2012 with regard to their shared emergency responses in the Arctic Ocean. An opportunity to think about the
Arctic more holistically is further revealed by the NATO Advanced Research Workshop Environmental Security in the Arctic Ocean,
which the author chaired with Russian co-directorship in 2010 at the University of Cambridge. That workshop became the first
formal dialogue between NATO and Russia regarding security issues in the Arctic Ocean.

Global recognition of the need

for international stability is a necessary first step toward lasting peace in the maritime region
bounded by North America, Europe, and Asia at the top of the Earth, where the interests of the entire international community are
increasingly focused. The

next step will involve implementing an inclusive venue for ongoing

dialogue to prevent conflict as well as promote cooperation in the Arctic Ocean. Cultivating Common
Interests International stability is inextricably linked to sustainable development, which already is acknowledged as a common Arctic
issue to balance economic prosperity, environmental protection and social equity, taking into consideration the needs of present
and future generations. Even more basic to stability in the Arctic Ocean is balancing national interests and common interests.
Although peace is the most basic foundation for international stability, the term was consciously rejected as a common Arctic issue
when the Arctic Council was established. The fear then, as now, was that peace implies demilitarization. It was only in 2009 that this
term even began to appear in Arctic Council ministerial declarations. Still, peace is not used among all Arctic states in their
national security policies for the Arctic. In fact, it remains to be seen whether Canada, in contrast to its Arctic foreign policies, will
include peace in the 2015 Arctic Council ministerial declaration. If the Arctic states are too timid or nationalistic to openly discuss
balance, stability, and peace when tensions are low, how will they possibly cooperate when conflicts arise? The path forward is
reflected by the Arctic states commitment to the Law of the Sea, which includes zones within as well as beyond sovereign
jurisdictions. Even if continental shelf extensions were conferred all the way to the North Poleunambiguously in the overlying
water columnhigh seas still would exist beyond sovereign jurisdictions, where more than 160 nations have rights and
responsibilities under international law. Implications

of the high seas surrounding the North Pole are just

now entering front stage. At their February 2014 meeting in Nuuk, Greenland, the Arctic Five took the initiative to
prevent unregulated fishing in the central Arctic Ocean. Whatever the international outcomes from this meeting, lessons will
resonate from the high seas of the Arctic Ocean outward across our civilization on a planetary scale. Statesmanship Is Required At

the moment, there is neither a forum nor leadership to foster lasting stability in the Arctic
Ocean. To prepare for the 2016 Arctic heads of state meeting that is being considered in the United States on the twentieth
anniversary of the Arctic Council, President Barack Obama has the option to inspire stability and peace for
the Arctic

across the twenty-first century and beyond. Turning back the calendar only a few months to winter 2014 (remember

the Sochi Olympics), Russia was seen in a different light. Since 2010, the Russian Geographical Society had been convening the
Arctic Forum for Dialogue, first in Moscow then in Arkhangelsk in 2011 and in Salekhard in 2013. Each of these international
gatherings in Russia involved scientists and diplomats as well as government administrators, commercial operators, advocates from
nongovernmental organizations, and indigenous peoples. Most prominent in the Arctic forums were the head-of-state
presentations, stimulated by participation of Vladimir Putin initially as prime minister and most recently as president of the Russian
Federation. President lafur Ragnar Grmsson of Iceland, as the elder statesman of the Arctic, participated in all three forums. Prince
Albert II of Monaco presented in 2010 and 2011. With invitations extended to all Arctic heads of state, President Sauli Niinist of
Finland also participated in 2013. As a common interest, these heads of state all spoke of stability and peace in the Arctic, even if
only for their national benefit. In each forum, it also was clear that the level of trust and cooperation in the Arctic had matured since
the Cold War, signaling that international relationships in the Arctic are open and strong enough to deal with the more difficult
issues of preventing conflict. To build on the earlier head-of-state engagements for the Arctic, Obama has the opportunity to
convene a meeting with all other Arctic heads of state and act as a statesman who puts out the brushfires of the moment while
planting seeds of hope and inspiration for the future.5 The

challenge is to create a process of ongoing and

inclusive dialogue about Arctic issues that have so far eluded shared consideration. With the Arctic,
Obama must be brave enough to share the coin of peace, promoting cooperation on one side and
preventing conflict on the other. Historic perspectives and the roles of science diplomacy will help provide
direction . However, to bear fruit in the interests of humankind, the political will for lasting stability and

peace in the Arctic must come from all Arctic heads of state. At the end of the day, peace must be
established explicitly as a common interest among all states and peoples in the Arctic Ocean. As Gorbachev imagined a generation
ago, Let the North Pole be a Pole of Peace.

Arctic cooperation has broken down risks conflict.

Robertson, 14 (Dylan C., contributor to Metro News, Far north turf war: who really rules the
Arctic? 3/24/14, Metro News, http://metronews.ca/news/world/980914/the-far-north-turfwar-who-really-rules-the-arctic/)
Five countries lay claim to territory around the North Pole. Some of those claims conflict, while
other countries, like China, want the Arctic to be deemed an international zone. So far, the
Arctic has remained peaceful, but as countries scramble for resources, how long will that peace
last? As polar ice melts away, rising temperatures are unlocking oil, trade routes and the
potential for conflict in the Far North. Its the opening chapter of whats going to amount to
be a very long story, and people are playing nice and working together for now, says Robert
Huebert, a University of Calgary professor and expert in circumpolar relations and defence
policy. Five countries claim territory around the North Pole: Canada, Russia, the United States
(through Alaska), Norway and Denmark (through Greenland). Some claims conflict, while other
countries like China want the Arctic to be deemed an international zone. Polar ice has been
steadily decreasing as high temperatures lead to longer summer melts. The U.S. Navy published
a study last December suggesting summers in the Arctic could be ice-free as early as 2016, with
regular shipping routes expected by 2030. Meanwhile, 13 per cent of the worlds undiscovered
oil and a third of its untapped natural gas lies in the Arctic, according to the U.S. Geological
Survey. That leaves countries scrambling for resources and trade routes. Canada recently
asserted a claim over the North Pole, following Russia and Denmark. The Arctic has remained
peaceful, with each state respecting United Nations rules on international waters. But cooperation broke down this month . Canada, the U.S. and Norway cancelled joint military
operations with Russia following the countrys invasion of Ukraine. This is going to cause a
pushback on the side of the Russians, in the Arctic region specifically , Huebert says. It
contains two of the most powerful states in the international system that are increasingly
having different interests.

US-Russian competition for energy in the Arctic goes nuclear.

Cohen 10 Ariel [Senior Research Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy, The Kathryn and
Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies+ From Russian Competition to Natural Resources Access: Recasting U.S.
Arctic Policy The Heritage Foundation 6/15/10 http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/06/from-russian-competition-tonatural-resources-access-recasting-us-arctic-policy ]
To advance its position, Russia has undertaken a three-year mission to map the Arctic.[26] The Kremlin is also moving rapidly to
establish a comprehensive sea, ground, and air presence. Under Putin, Russia focused on the Arctic as a major natural resources
base. The Russian national leadership insists

that the state, not the private sector, must take the lead in
developing the vast region. The Kremlin published its Arctic doctrine in March 2009.[27] The main goal is to transform the
Arctic into Russias strategic resource base and make Russia a leading Arctic power by 2020. Russian Militarization of the Arctic.

The military is an important dimension of Moscows Arctic push. The policy calls for creating general
purpose military formations drawn from the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation as well as other troops and military
formations [most importantly, border units] in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, capable of ensuring security under various
military and political circumstances.*28+ These formations will be drawn from the armed forces and from the power ministries
(e.g., the Federal Security Service, Border Guard Service, and Internal Ministry). Above all, the policy calls for a coast guard to patrol

Russia views the High North as a major staging area for a potential
nuclear confrontation with the United States and has steadily expanded its military presence in
the Arctic since 2007. This has included resuming air patrols over the Arctic, including strategic bomber flights.[29] During 2007
alone, Russian bombers penetrated Alaskas 12-mile air defense zone 18 times.[30] The Russian Navy is expanding its
presence in the Arctic for the first time since the end of the Cold War, increasing the operational radius
of the Northern Fleets submarines. Russia is also reorienting its military strategy to meet threats to the
countrys interests in the Arctic, particularly with regard to its continental shelf.[31] Russia is
also modernizing its Northern Fleet. During 2008 and 2009, Russian icebreakers regularly patrolled in the Arctic.
Russias Arctic waters and estuaries.

Russia has the worlds largest polar-capable icebreaker flotilla, with 24 icebreakers. Seven are nuclear, including the 50 Years of
Victory, the largest icebreaker in the world.[32] Russia plans to build new nuclear-powered icebreakers starting in 2015.[33] Moscow
clearly views a strong icebreaker fleet as a key to the regions economic development. Russia s Commercial Presence. Russias
energy rush to the Arctic continues apace. On May 12, 2009, President Dmitry Medvedev approved Russias security strategy.*34]
This document views Russias natural resources in the Arctic as a base for both economic development and geopolitical influence.
Paragraph 11 identifies potential battlegrounds where

conflicts over energy may occur : The attention of

international politics in the long-term will be concentrated on controlling the sources of energy resources in the Middle East, on the
shelf of the Barents Sea and other parts of the Arctic, in the Caspian Basin and in Central Asia. The document seriously considers
the use of military force to resolve competition for energy near Russias borders or those of its allies: In

case of a
competitive struggle for resources it is not impossible to discount that it might be resolved by
a decision to use military might . The existing balance of forces on the borders of the Russian Federation and its allies
can be changed.*35+ In August 2008, Medvedev signed a law that allows the government to allocate strategic oil and gas deposits
on the continental shelf without auctions. The law restricts participation to companies with five years experience in a regions
continental shelf and in which the government controls at least a 50 percent stake. This effectively allows only state-controlled
Gazprom and Rosneft to participate.[36] However, when the global financial crisis ensued, Russia backtracked and began to seek
foreign investors for Arctic gas development.

Russian nuclear war causes extinction

Bostrum 2, (Nick prof of philosophy at Oxford University and recipient of the Gannon Award,
Existential Risks, Journal of Evolution and Technology, p.
http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html)

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the
US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial
probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to
qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available
at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or
permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear
arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or
deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a
smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential
risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankinds potential permanently. Such a war might however
be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or
asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

Contention 2 is Hegemony
Current US policies are creating a Russia/China counterbalance. Only
demonstrating the value of the West to Russia can prevent the alliance.
Migranyan 14 (Andranik Migranyan; director of the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation
in New York; July 10, 2014; Washington's Creation: A Russia-China Alliance; The National
Interest; http://nationalinterest.org/feature/washingtons-creation-russia-china-alliance-10843;
JX)
In June, I participated in a seminar called The Dynamic of Trilateral Relations among Russia, China, and the United States in the
Context of the Ukrainian Crisis and Western Sanctions against Russia in China itself. The participants supported the assertion
frequently repeated by Russian and Chinese leadersthat relations between Russia

and China have never been

friendlier. Indeed, despite the fact that U.S. imposed sanctions on Russia do not directly affect China, Beijing is keenly aware of
U.S. policies directed at containing it. The United States has unequivocally stated its support for Chinas opponents in a series of
conflicts concerning Chinese-Japanese, Chinese-Filipino, and Chinese-Korean squabbles. In addition, the American pivot to Asia has
as its primary objective to preserve the status quo in Asia and contain a rising China. Despite internal concerns in both Russia and
China that prevent both countries from announcing loudly and decidedly their support for each otheras was in the case of Chinas
restraint in recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia or the reincorporation of Crimea, and as in the reciprocal
case when Russia has not voiced outright support for China in Chinese territorial disputes with neighborsthe

two countries
act as allies on a host of issues in world politics. These issues include stabilizing Syria, the Iranian nuclear
program, U.S. regime change around the world, and the hard attempts of the United States to interfere in Chinese
and Russian internal affairs masked as support for human rights. Russian-Chinese relations are entering a
qualitatively new stage . They are more than merely partnership relations, but are not quite
those of allies.

However, it is entirely possible that increasing U.S. sanctions on Russia and attempts to contain China will

The present situation in trilateral U.S.-Chinese-Russian relations is at

odds with the strategy articulated by Henry Kissinger during the Nixon Administration, which held that American
relations with either Russia or China had to be substantially better than the bilateral relations
between Russia and China themselves. Today the opposite is occurring. U.S. relations with either of the
push the two countries into a full-blown alliance.

other two countries are considerably worse than bilateral Russia-China relations. Therefore, the potential for America pitting one
against the other is decidedly smaller than the potential of the two countries uniting their efforts and resources to oppose American
pressure in the spheres each country considers most sensitive. In both the U.S. and in Russian liberal circles, it is not uncommon to
hear the tired assertions that further rapprochement between Russia and China will render Russia a junior partner in the RussoChinese relationship and that Russia should keep this in mind when choosing between China and the West. I believe such
pronouncements stem more from their authors ideological convictions than from real political facts. They are meant to scare
Moscow and to cow it into avoiding the strategic alliance with a growing China that is asserting its interests against the status quo in
the face of American containment, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, where it faces conflicts with virtually all of its neighbors
Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, Vietnam, Indiaand needs an alliance with Russia, with whom it lacks any potential conflicts in
the foreseeable future. In talking about the threat of Moscow becoming Beijings junior partner, and in

pressuring Moscow
to choose the West over China, our Western partners have never articulated their vision of Russia in
the world, the character of Russian relations with the West and especially with the United States. We are, of
course, grateful to our Western partners for their espoused worry that Russia may inadvertently become a junior partner to China.
But they have never articulated the place of Russia in the Western world, particularly in the Western economic and security
frameworks. Since the 1990s, Western, and especially American, policy towards Russia followed a clear line according to which
Moscow was to be treated as a whipping boy. Since the collapse of the USSR, the United States has not once, in words or deeds,
demonstrated its readiness for an equal partnership with Russia. And by the way, in the context of the Ukrainian crisis, the West,
and U.S. politicians and military officials, hurried to place Russia not in the role of a partner, but that of an adversary, which, in their
understanding, is practically indistinguishable from that of an enemy. Recently, various analysts have been busy using statistics to
prove yet another unsubstantiated claim frequently invoked to discourage Russo-Chinese relations, namely, the alleged prospect of
large Chinese populations pouring into Siberia and the Far East, thereby presenting a threat to Russias territorial integrity. As we
can see from migratory tendencies in the northern border regions of China, the vast majority of migrants flock not to Russias Siberia
and the Far East, but rather to the central regions of China and the new large cities, where lifestyle conditions are more comfortable.
And, thanks to Chinas demographic policies during last decades, the population in the border regions close to Russia is projected to
decline rather than grow. In the foreseeable future, Russia has plenty of space for maneuver in its relations with China. Russias next
steps with regard to Beijing will largely depend on Washingtons readiness to impose tougher sanctions because of Ukraine. Russo-

Chinese relations have great potential for development.

We cannot exclude the possibility that Russia and

China will enter into a military-political alliance that can shift the global balance of power . The
military, technological, and resource potential of Russia propped up by the economic and colossal labor resources of China would
allow the two countries to make decisions on many global issues in a way that would rattle the current balance
of power in international relations. Apparently, there is some sort of instinctive understanding of this in Washington, which is
why the U.S. is not pushing Japan to adopt strict sanctions against Russia. Should Japan impose such sanctions, Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe would have to forget his ambition to solve the question of the Northern territories in his relations with Russia, as he
might force Russias hand in supporting Chinas claim over the contentious Senkaku islands. A potential alliance of Russia and China
can present many new and unexpected developments for both Washington and Brussels in economic and military-political relations.
Today, there are many politicians and analysts in Washington who, on the one hand, desperately thirst to punish Russia and China,
and on the other, consciously or not, avoid calculating the consequences of their actions and remain blind to the real preconditions
for a closer partnership between Russia and China on all leading global problems. A

continued refusal to contemplate

such a partnership could have profound consequences for the U.S. foreign policy.

Russia-China relations destroy US hegemony only partnering can solve.

Gelb and Simes, 13 (Leslie H. Gelb, a former columnist, editor and correspondent for The
New York Times, is president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations. Dimitri K. Simes is
president of the Center for the National Interest and publisher of its magazine, The National
Interest. July 6, 2013. A New Anti-American Axis? The New York Times.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/opinion/sunday/a-new-anti-americanaxis.html?pagewanted=all)
THE flight of the leaker Edward J. Snowden from Hong Kong to Moscow last month would not have been possible without the
cooperation of Russia and China. The two countries behavior in the Snowden affair demonstrates their
growing assertiveness and their willingness to take action at Americas expense. Beyond their
protection of Mr. Snowden, Chinese-Russian policies toward Syria have paralyzed the United Nations
Security Council for two years, preventing joint international action. Chinese hacking of
American companies and Russias cyberattacks against its neighbors have also caused concern
in Washington. While Moscow and Beijing have generally supported international efforts to end Irans nuclear weapons
program, they clearly were not prepared to go as far as Washington was, and any coordinated shift in their approach
could instantly gut Americas policy on the issue and endanger its security and energy
interests. To punctuate the new potential for cooperation, China is now carrying out its largest ever joint
naval exercises with Russia. Russia and China appear to have decided that, to better
advance their own interests, they need to knock Washington down a peg or two.

Neither probably

wants to kick off a new cold war, let alone hot conflicts, and their actions in the case of Mr. Snowden show it. China allowed him into
Hong Kong, but gently nudged his departure, while Russia, after some provocative rhetoric, seems to have now softened its tone.
Still, both

countries are seeking greater diplomatic clout that they apparently reckon they can
acquire only by constraining the U nited S tates. And in world affairs, theres no better way to
flex ones muscles than to visibly diminish the strongest power . This new approach appears
based in part on a sense of their growing strength relative to America and their increasing
emphasis on differences over issues like Syria. Both Moscow and Beijing oppose the principle of international
action to interfere in a countrys sovereign affairs, much less overthrow a government, as happened in Libya in 2011. After all, that
principle could always backfire on them. They

also dont like watching the West take action against

leaders friendly to them, like President Bashar al-Assad of Syria. As this sense of common interests becomes entrenched,
increasing Russian-Chinese cooperation could pose grave risks for America and the world. Their
conduct suggests that they see less cost in challenging the United States and fewer rewards for acting as a partner. These
calculations stem from two dangerous perceptions. First, they see American decline and decadence. In their
view, the United States is on the wrong side of history, holding on to ties with Europe and parts of Asia, while losing economic
leverage and moral authority in the rest of the world. American

disengagement from Iraq and Afghanistan

without victory contributes to a related impression that Americas unquestioned military

superiority isnt worth much in terms of achieving policy objectives on the ground. Second,
many Russian and Chinese elites consider American foreign policy objectives fundamentally
hostile to their vital interests. Neither group views American democracy promotion as reflecting any genuine
commitment to freedom; instead, both perceive it as a selective crusade to undermine governments
that are hostile to the United States or too powerful for its comfort. Meanwhile, Russian and
Chinese leaders make clear that Washingtons support for their neighbors in practically every
dispute involving Beijing or Moscow is less a matter of respect for international law than a
form of dual containment that seeks to curtail the regional and global influence of these two
major powers. American backing for Georgia and the former Soviet republics of Central Asia bothers Russia. Likewise, China
views American support for Vietnam and the Philippines in their maritime disputes with Beijing as a menace. No wonder Xi Jinping
of China made his first international trip as Chinas president to Moscow, where he told his counterpart, Vladimir V. Putin, that
Beijing and Moscow should resolutely support each other in efforts to protect national sovereignty, security and development
interests and promised to closely coordinate on regional and international issues. Mr. Putin reciprocated by saying that the
strategic partnership between us is of great importance on both a bilateral and global scale. While the two leaders words may have
generated more of an impression of collusion than was necessary, its safe to assume they knew exactly the message they were
sending.

POLICY makers in Washington must carefully assess the growing chumminess

between China and Russia and what it means for America . To ignore it would be foolish. Yes, China and
Russia continue to be divided by a history of mutual distrust as well as by conflicting economic interests and Chinese territorial
ambitions. Chinas concerns about North Korea exceed Russias, and Moscows stake in Syria is greater than Beijings. And in Central
Asia, the two nations are outright competitors. Moreover, China is a rising superpower and Russia is fighting to stay in the big
leagues, which gives them different perspectives on world affairs. That said, both

countries share a strong interest

in maintaining partnerships with the United States and the European Union, their main
trading partners and the custodians of the international financial system, in which each has a major
stake. These are powerful reasons for staying on good working terms with Washington, but the United States should not
assume that they will halt the new anti-American tack in Beijing and Moscow. That would be a
dangerous misreading of history. Before World War I, many assumed that mutual economic entanglement and the
huge costs of war would prevent conflict among key European powers. On the eve of World War II, Communist Russia and Nazi
Germany seemed the unlikeliest of allies, until the two-year-long nonaggression treaty known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact left
Europe in ruins and many millions dead. President Obama should see China and Russia as neither enemies nor friends, but as
significant powers with their own interests, as the Snowden affair showed. Initially, Mr. Obama railed publicly and ineffectually at
both, urging them to extradite Mr. Snowden. Only when he softened his public stance and hardened his private line did Beijing and
Moscow begin to see the advantages of avoiding further confrontation. Washington needs to understand that most security threats
around the world from Syria to Iran to North Korea cant be managed safely and successfully without Russias and Chinas
cooperation. With respect to Syria, this approach would mean appreciating Moscows historical connection to the countrys Alawite
leaders as well as Russias concern over the fate of Syrias Christians, especially Orthodox Christians. In dealing with Beijing, it would
mean strongly protecting American trade interests while understanding that Chinese leaders face real obstacles in tackling their own
domestic economic problems.

To gain the respect of Russia and China, the White House must first
demonstrate that American leadership is essential to solving key world problems, including
those vital to China and Russia. America cant be seen as passive. Relations with Russia and
China deserve to be given priority, but the United States mustnt be afraid to stand firm in
some cases or, in others, to partner with these two authoritarian but ultimately pragmatic
powers. To do otherwise would be a folly of historic proportions.

American hegemony preserves the liberal order checks multiple scenarios for
war, genocide, and authoritarianism.
Kagan, 14 (Robert Kagan, senior fellow @ The Brookings Institute, Superpowers dont get to retire, The New Republic,
5/26/14, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117859/allure-normalcy-what-america-still-owes-world)
In fact, the

world as it is is a dangerous and often brutal place. There has been no transformation in human behavior or in
international relations. In the twenty-first century, no less than in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, force remains the ultima ratio. The
question, today as in the past, is not whether nations are willing to resort to force but whether they believe
they can get away with it when they do. If there has been less aggression, less ethnic cleansing, less territorial conquest over the past 70
years, it is because the United States and its allies have both punished and deterred aggression, have intervened, sometimes, to prevent ethnic

cleansing, and have gone to war to reverse territorial conquest. The restraint showed by other nations has not been a sign of human progress, the
strengthening of international institutions, or the triumph of the rule of law. It has been a response to a global configuration
of power that, until recently, has made restraint seem the safer course. When Vladimir Putin failed to achieve his goals in Ukraine through political and
economic means, he turned to force, because he believed that he could. He will continue to use force so long as he believes that the payoff exceeds the
cost. Nor is he unique in this respect. What might China do were it not hemmed in by a ring of powerful nations backed by the United States? For that
matter, what would Japan do if it were much more powerful and much less dependent on the United States for its security? We have not had to find
out the answers to these questions, not yet, because American

predominance, the American alliance system, and the economic,

political, and institutional aspects of the present order, all ultimately dependent on power, have mostly kept the lid closed on this
Pandoras box . Nor have we had to find out yet what the world as it is would do to the remarkable spread of democracy. Skeptics of
democracy promotion argue that the United States has often tried to plant democracy in infertile soil. They may be right. The widespread flowering
of democracy around the world in recent decades may prove to have been artificial and therefore tenuous. As Michael Ignatieff once observed, it may
be that liberal civilization itself runs deeply against the human grain and is achieved and sustained only by the most unremitting struggle against
human nature. Perhaps this

fragile democratic garden requires the protection of a liberal world order, with
the absence of such efforts, the weeds and
the jungle may sooner or later come back to reclaim the land. One wonders if even the current economic order reflects the
constant feeding, watering, weeding, and the fencing off of an ever-encroaching jungle. In

world as it is. A world in which autocracies make ever more ambitious attempts to control the flow of information, and in which autocratic
kleptocracies use national wealth and resources to further their private interests, may prove less hospitable to the kind of free flow of commerce the
world has come to appreciate in recent decades. In fact, from the time that Roosevelt and Truman first launched it, the whole project of promoting and
defending a liberal world order has been a concerted effort not to accept the world as it is. The American project has aimed at shaping a world
different from what had always been, taking advantage of Americas unique situation to do what no nation had ever been able to do. Today, however,
because many Americans

no longer recall what the world as it is really looks like, they cannot imagine it. They bemoan the burdens and
failures inherent in the grand strategy but take for granted all the remarkable benefits. Nor do they realize, perhaps, how quickly it can
all unravel.

The international system is an elaborate web of power relationships, in which every nation, from the biggest to the smallest, is

constantly feeling for shifts or disturbances. Since 1945, and especially since 1989, the web has been geared to respond primarily to the United States.
Allies observe American behavior and calculate Americas reliability. Nations hemmed in or threatened by American power watch

for
signs of growing or diminishing power and will. When the United States appears to retrench, allies necessarily become
anxious, while others look for opportunities. In recent years, the world has picked up unmistakable signals that Americans may
no longer want to carry the burden of global responsibility. Others read the polls, read the presidents speeches calling for nation-building at home,
see the declining defense budgets and defense capabilities, and note the extreme reticence, on the part of both American political parties, about using
force. The world judges that, were it not for American war-weariness, the United States probably would by now have used force in Syriajust as it did
in Kosovo, in Bosnia, and in Panama. President Obama himself recently acknowledged as much when he said, Its not that its not worth it. Its that
after a decade of war, you know, the United States has limits. Such statements set the web vibrating. In East Asia, nations living in close
proximity to an increasingly powerful China

want to know whether Americans will make a similar kind of calculation when
it comes to defending them; in the Middle East, nations worried about Iran wonder if they will be left to confront it alone; in
Eastern Europe and the Baltic states, American security guarantees are meaningless unless Americans are able and willing to meet them. Are they? No
one has taken a poll lately on whether the United States should come to the defense of its treaty allies in the event of a war between, say, China and
Japan; or whether it should come to the defense of Estonia in a Ukraine-like conflict with Russia. The answers might prove interesting. Meanwhile, the
signs of the global order breaking down are all around us. Russias invasion of Ukraine and seizure of Crimea was the first time since World War II that a
nation in Europe had engaged in territorial conquest. If

Iran manages to acquire a nuclear weapon, it will likely lead

other powers in the region to do the same, effectively undoing the nonproliferation regime, which, along with American power, has
managed to keep the number of nuclear-armed powers limited over the past half century. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Russia are engaged in a proxy war in
Syria that, in addition to the 150,000 dead and the millions displaced, has further destabilized a region that had already been in upheaval. In East Asia,
nervousness about Chinas rise, combined with uncertainty about Americas commitment, is exacerbating tensions. In recent years the number of

democracies around the world has been steadily declining, while the number of autocracies grows. If these
trends continue, in the near future we are likely to see increasing conflict, increasing wars over territory, greater
ethnic and sectarian violence, and a shrinking world of democracies. How will Americans respond? If the test is once again to be
national interests narrowly construed, then Americans may find all of this tolerable, or at least preferable to doing something to stop it. Could the
United States survive if Syria remains under the control of Assad or, more likely, disintegrates into a chaos of territories, some of which will be
controlled by jihadi terrorists? Could it survive if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, and if in turn Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt acquire nuclear
weapons? Or if North Korea launches a war on the South? Could it survive in a world where China dominates much of East Asia, or where China and
Japan resume their old conflict? Could it survive in a world where Russia dominates Eastern Europe, including not only Ukraine but the Baltic states and
perhaps even Poland? Of course it could. From the point of view of strict necessity and narrow national interest, the United States could survive all of
this. It could trade with a dominant China and work out a modus vivendi with a restored Russian empire. Those alarmed by such developments will be
hard-pressed, as Roosevelt was, to explain how each marginal setback would affect the parochial interests of the average American. As in the past,
Americans will be among the last to suffer grievously from a breakdown of world order. And by the time they do feel the effects, it may be very late in
the day. Looking back on the period before World War II, Robert Osgood, the most thoughtful of realist thinkers of the past century, discerned a critical
element missing from the strategic analyses of the day. Mere rational calculations of the national interest, he argued, proved inadequate.
Paradoxically, it was the idealists, those who were most sensitive to the Fascist menace to Western culture and civilization, who were among the
first to understand the necessity of undertaking revolutionary measures to sustain Americas first line of defense in Europe. Idealism, he concluded,
was an indispensable spur to reason in leading men to perceive and act upon the real imperatives of power politics. This was Roosevelts message,
too, when he asked Americans to defend not their homes alone, but the tenets of faith and humanity on which their churches, their governments, and

their very civilization are founded. Perhaps Americans can be inspired in this way again, without the threat of a Hitler or an attack on their homeland.
But this time they will not have 20 years to decide. The world will change much more quickly than they imagine. And there

is no
democratic superpower waiting in the wings to save the world if this democratic superpower
falters.

Best international relations theory proves that depictions of Russian in the

instance of the Arctic are true
Murray 12 (Robert, Department of Political Science , University of Alberta , Canada,
06/01/2012, The Polar Journal Volume 2, Issue 1, 2012)
As things presently stand, there are a variety of nations and institutions all seeking to claim governing authority over different parts of the circumpolar region. Nations making claims to parts of the Arctic Ocean or other northern waters include Canada, Russia, the
United States, Norway, Iceland and Denmark/Greenland. On the institutional side, Arctic governance has been debated and defined by bodies such as the United Nations, the European Union, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the

the situation is on the verge of becoming far more

competitive as nations such as Russia have resorted to asserting possible military solutions
Arctic Council.3 To date, no clear resolution to competing claims is in sight, and in some cases

to

contested Arctic issues to bolster their declarations. It is important to note the increased levels of interest over Arctic relations between states, but, on this point, little attention has been given to the influence of the international system over this situation. If the
unipolar moment has been defined as an era of relative stability and diplomatic coexistence, and tensions in the Arctic are already on the rise, what is to happen when the multipolar system finally emerges in the near future? Since 2005, the status of the United
States as systemic hegemon has been in decline due to economic, military and political strains placed on American power capabilities throughout the Bush era and beyond. This decrease in relative power preponderance has been even further exacerbated by the
economic recession starting in 2008 and the nations inability to stabilize its markets. As such, the predictions of those like Christopher Layne and John Mearsheimer are on the verge of coming to fruition, in that the unipolar moment is about to end.4 New great
powers are rising, the United States is no longer able to prevent these nations from balancing their power, and the once obvious prevalence of American power is far murkier than it was a decade ago. As the multipolar era becomes increasingly likely,

one must ponder the effects this shift might have on state foreign and defence strategymaking, especially towards the Arctic region. To date, though its relative power position has declined significantly in recent years, the United States remains

the emergence of a multipolar systemic

arrangement is very likely to increase security competition in the system as a whole, and the
Arctic will be at the epicentre of such conflict.
the hegemon of the international system, but it is contended here that such status is soon to evaporate. In this context, this article argues that

To lend support to this hypothesis, an examination of the impending shift from unipolarity to multipolarity will be made, as will an

account of current security dynamics in the circumpolar region. The article concludes with a stark warning that without some kind of real action towards settling competing Arctic claims, it will be left to states to secure their own territorial assertions through hard
power and forceful means. The system is unipolar for now In order to evaluate the polarity of the international system in a given historical period, one must identify the hierarchy of power in terms of the number of super or great powers dominating international
outcomes. Counting great or super powers can be somewhat difficult in contemporary international relations, as scholars have begun to expand the notions of power and capabilities, but the clearest guideline for being able to identify great powers is through
determining capabilities. The reason it is essential to understand the great powers in international relations is that they, above all other states, institutions, non-state actors and ideational forces, are responsible for the daily conduct of behaviour in the international
system, and they have been historically accountable for substantial alterations to power distribution since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. Measuring capabilities allows observers to explain which states are most likely to affect the behaviour of other states, to use
force or violence; also, the number of great powers in a given era determines how stable or unstable the international system will be. Identifying great powers is literally done by evaluating each states capabilities in essential areas of political life that can maximize
security or extend ones power. When discussing the distribution of power across states, there is a clear hierarchy of capabilities among states that leads observers to classify these utility maximizing, rational actors as super, great, major, middle or minor powers in
the international system. In terms of actual measurement, Kenneth Waltz argues: Their rank depends on how they score on all of the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and
competence.5 Once these various factors are taken into account, one can clearly determine the given polarity of the system a t a given moment in history. Why is polarity important? According to structural realist theory, the number of great powers in the system
determines how conflictual, violent or stable international politics will be. While the overall structure of the system remains anarchic, meaning a clear absence of a governing authority above states that can control their actions, there can be consequential variations
within the anarchic structure that can impact how states will evaluate their foreign and defence policy strategies and affect their overall behaviour. Waltz claims that consequential variations in number are changes of number that lead to different expectations
about the effect of structure on units.6 There are three types of structure within the system that have been determined throughout the history of the modern state system unipolarity, bipolarity and multipolarity. The consequential variations described by Waltz

state
inherently possess some offensive military capability, which gives them the wherewithal to
hurt and possibly destroy each other
take place when great powers either rise or fall, and induce shifts from one type of polarity to another. The rise and fall of great powers is perhaps the most important explanatory aspect of international politics because it is these

s that

.7 Though the primary motivation for all states is security maximization, great powers become the most important actors because while they are capable of

defending themselves, they also have the ability to extend their sphere of influence in offensive posturing. It is in this context that the polarity of the system becomes even more vital, in that the more great powers there are, the greater likelihood of violence and

All states
are like-units, in that they all strive for survival by making rational calculations about how to
best pursue their interests in an anarchic system
conflict there is. In each systemic arrangement, the abilities of great powers to pursue their ultimate goal, which is hegemony, dictates whether foreign and defence policy strategies will be overtly defensive or potentially offensive.

. Of course, strategies of states will differ greatly based on the distribution of power, meaning that great powers are able to

pursue their goals more freely than minor powers because they can operate without allies or institutions in achieving their goals. Lesser powers, however, typically try to increase their power position in world affairs through various alliance blocs and institutional
binding. In doing so, it is hoped that middle and minor powers are able to guarantee their survival by aligning themselves with powers larger than themselves. Given the arrangement of the system, the number of alliances or blocs of power will differ, which also

Conflict, or the possibility of it, is a constant problem in international

relations due to the anarchic structure of the international system
contributes to just how stable or violent the system will be.

. Anarchy, by its definition, denotes a lack of overarching authority and thus

states, especially the most powerful states, are able to behave as they would like, without any external body capable of controlling their actions. Robert Art and Robert Jervis aptly define anarchy by arguing: States can make commitments and treaties, but no
sovereign power ensures compliance and punished deviation. This the absence of a supreme power is what is meant by the anarchic environment of international politics.8 In anarchy, just as in the state of nature or war p rior to the establishment of civilized

there is no harmony and actors are left to their own inclinations to pursue their selfinterest.
The constant tensions between states, and the ability of
great powers to more freely pursue their national interests, contributes to a system where
security and survival are at a premium
human society,

The key elements of anarchy that precipitate conflict are the constant distrust of others motives, the assumption that other actors may not be as rational as oneself, and, as Waltz notes, a state will use force to attain its goals if, after

assessing the prospects for success, it values those goals more than it values the pleasures of peace.9

, and the polarity of the system matters to all states. By definition, bipolar systems are the most stable. According to Mearsheimer, this assumption is made

based on three criteria: First, the number of conflict dyads is fewer, leaving fewer possibilities for war. Second, deterrence is easier, because imbalances of power are fewer and more easily averted. Third, the prospects for deterrence are greater because

multipolar systems have a far greater probability of

conflict, tension and distrust among states. War is far more likely in multipolar systems
because major power dyads are more numerous, each posing the potential for conflict
miscalculations of relative power and opponents resolve are fewer and less likely.10 By contrast,

. Conflict could also

erupt across dyads involving major and minor powers. Dyads between minor powers could also lead to war *+. Wars in a multipolar world involving just minor powers or only one major power are not likely to be as devastating as a conflict between two major
powers. However, local wars tend to widen and escalate. Hence there is always a chance that a small war will trigger a general conflict.11 While bipolarity is considered to be the most stable arrangement, and multipolarity the least stable, there is also the rare time

unipolarity is also
a stable and peaceful arrangement: unipolarity favors the absence of war among the great
powers and comparatively low levels of competition for prestige or security for two reasons:
the leading states power advantage removes the problem of hegemonic rivalry from world
politics
when the system is unipolar in character. Put simply, unipolarity occurs when there is such a preponderance of power by one state that others are incapable of balancing against it. According to William Wohlforth,

, and it reduces the salience and stakes of balance-of-power politics among the major states.12 The status of the hegemonic power in a unipolar system allows for the expansion of its normative agenda, but also allows it to pacify international

affairs because it lacks both a hegemonic rival and the effects of balance of power politics.13 As such, unipolar systems can be stable, depending on whom the hegemon is and what its vision for dominance might be. Since the end of World War II, only two types of
polarity have been seen. Between 1945 and 1991, the system was bipolar, in that there were only two superpowers dominating the affairs of international politics. This bipolar arrangement was surprisingly stable and though smaller proxy wars erupted throughout
the years of the Cold War, the relations between the two dominant powers, namely the United States and the Soviet Union, never came to a head. There are various explanations for why this was the case, but John Mearsheimer provides perhaps the most concise
and accurate explanations as he contends that the absence of war in Europe and beyond throughout the Cold War can be attributed to three specific factors: the bipolar distribution of military power on the [European] Continent; the rough military equality between
the two states comprising the two poles in Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union; and the fact that each superpower was armed with a large nuclear arsenal.14 At the conclusion of the Cold War, there was a clear and major shift in the distribution of power
in the system, which translated into the unipolar moment. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States retained its superpower status and held a preponderance of power in virtually all areas of capabilities measurement. Christopher Layne contends that
American hegemony is contingent upon two factors: First, the United States enjoys a commanding preeminence in both military and economic power. Second, since the Soviet Unions disappearance, no other great power has emerged to challenge US
preponderance. In this sense, US hegemony is the result of objective material conditions.15 Throughout the Clinton and early years of the Bush administrations, the role of the United States as systemic hegemon was virtually unquestioned, and it seemed as if

American hegemony could last for a very long time. It was not until the latter years of the Bush administration that the waning of American hegemony began to become apparent. One of the key reasons the system remains unipolar is that there has yet to be a state
that can balance against US power in either the hard or soft power senses. That said, the main reason for the decline in American hegemony has been a costly set of irrational and ill-advised foreign policy decisions, combined with years of economic overvaluation
that eroded the hegemonic position of the worlds lone superpower.16 Both the intervention into Iraq, starting in 2003, and t he fallout of the 2008 recession have served to substantially weaken the United States in both the hard and soft power contexts, and thus it
is clear that a multipolar system is on the horizon. As Layne notes, although a new geopolitical balance has yet to emerge, there is considerable evidence that other states have been engaging in balancing against the United States including hard balancing.17

The emerging great powers, especially China and Russia, will have a profound impact on the
conduct of international relations in the years to come. Perhaps the most important area of
security competition that has gone underscrutinized from a systemic standpoint is the
increased level of interest in the Arctic

. Currently, the competing claims for the circumpolar region are mostly peaceful and focusing on diplomatic and legal battles, but recent trends suggest that

non-violent strategy may not continue. As the era of American hegemony comes to an end, and a multipolar system begins to emerge, the impact on the Arctic region is likely to be profound due to the militaristic nature of state security strategies, unpredictability
and a potential retreat from cooperation normally seen in multipolar structures. One of the cornerstones of Americas unipolar moment has been the remarkable decline in interstate conflict. Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the international system has not
been on the verge of any major war, nor have great powers aggressively pursued policies that would balance against American power in a way that would be taken seriously. According to many scholarly studies, the world since the end of the Cold War has become
far more secure in the interstate sense, and security and defence policies of states are now preoccupied more with humancentric and intrastate variables than anything else. Though it is difficult to deny that the world has become more stable at the systemic level,
the role of hard power and military capabilities did not disappear with the Soviet Union; instead, the use of militarism to achieve national goals in the unipolar moment greatly decreased as a direct result of the values and grand strategy of the United States. The
impact of a unipolar systemic arrangement on state behaviour is best explained by the hegemonic stability theory.18 According to this theory, a unipolar structure is able to pacify the relations of states because there is recognition of the hegemons ability to c ontrol

Wohlforth summarizes the basic precept of hegemonic stability

theory by contending: The theory stipulates that
hegemons foster international
orders that are stable until differential growth in power produces a dissatisfied state with the
capability to challenge the dominant state for leadership
or intervene in conflicts that may threaten its power, or the order of the system.

especially powerful states (

. The clearer and larger the concentration of power in the leading state, the more peaceful the

international order associated with it will be *+ If the system is unipolar, the great power hierarchy should be much more s table than any hierarchy lodged within a system of more than one pole. Because unipolarity is based on a historically unprecedented

It is essential to note two things about the

status of the United States as systemic hegemon throughout the immediate post-Cold War era
first, that its preponderance of power in every area of capability measurement created a
stable and less tense system in which states were able to interact; and second, that the United
States time as hegemon has fostered the growth of multilateral institutions and agreements
rather than a bullying type of unipolarity
concentration of power in the United States, a potentially important source of great power conflict hegemonic rivalry will be missing.19

.20 From a systemic standpoint, it would seem that there is little reason to be concerned about military aggression, arms racing and distrustful

competition in the modern system, but one vital concern to note is that much of the unipolar and hegeomic stability literature completely ignores the role of the Arctic in state security calculations. Throughout an era of institutional binding, regional integration,
humanitarianism and soft power growth, the competition for the Arctic was following much of the same pattern, with states preferring to make their claims in institutional or legal settings. Yet, as the unipolar moment has started to decline, and multipolarity is on
the horizon, the competition in the circumpolar region has taken on a very different tone. Competing claims over Arctic territories, such as the Northwest Passage, Beaufort Sea and other maritime boundaries, and the use of the region as a space for military
exercises are by no means new and they have not come to the forefront of the strategic security agendas of states since the post-9/11 era. Rather, throughout the Cold War, the Arctic was a realm of constant supervision, not because either superpower want ed to
develop the region, but more because of the mutual fear each side had of offensive attacks being launched over the pole. Even throughout the unipolar moment, the Arctic has been a space for sovereignty competition, but the nature of the competition had been
mostly legal, institutional or soft power focused.21 Worth noting as well is the very complex nature of reasons for state interests in the Arctic. Mark Nuttall effectively summarizes the complexities of the high north as he claims: In the post-Cold War world [the Arctic]
is seen as a natural scientific laboratory, understood as a homeland for indigenous peoples, a place of sovereignty conflicts, an emerging hydrocarbon province with which the world is coming to think of as one of the last major frontiers for oil and gas, and a region of

The start of Americas

hegemonic decline has allowed states to revisit their approaches to the Arctic as nations
jockey for position by balancing or rivalling American preferences.
dramatic environmental change.22 Though the intricacies of Arctic competition are intriguing to note, it is how states are strategically asserting their claims that is of particular importance.

As a result, the nature of Arctic competition has incorporated both soft power

and hard power elements. Further, the nature of militarism and hard power tension has increased due to the recent spending and strategic shifts by many Arctic states in recent years, including Canada, Norway, Sweden and Russia.23 The reasons for Americas
decline are relatively unsurprising military overextension in Afghanistan and Iraq; the lack of international support for American foreign policy objectives throughout the Bush era; the 2008 economic recession; and the utter distrust by most states, including close
American allies, of the United States political objectives.24 The system remains unipolar, of course, but as stated above, the preponderance of power capabilities has substantially diminished, opening the door for others to balance and rival American power in the
coming years. Coincidentally, it has also been the revelations of science in recent years that have also promoted a faster pace for those states making Arctic claims. The role of climate change and its impact over the Arctic has allowed for states to more freely move
into the region and pursue strategies previously unavailable.25 According to Lotta Numminen, climate change has recently affected states perceptions of the possible economic opportunities in the Arctic in four ways: first, that the subsurface of the Arctic Ocean
floor is assumed to contain substantial oil and gas reserves, to which there will be increased access; second, that melting waters will provide new waters for international fisheries; third, the increase in research strategies; and fourth, is the greater access to sea

26 One of the main reasons states see the Arctic region as such a lucrative area is the
potential for increasing their respective economic and natural resource capabilities.
passages.

Previously, the northern ice

caps prevented states from entering most of the Arctic Ocean and surrounding areas, but as these environmental situations change, states have readily identified the high north as a priority in both their security and economic strategies. Among the main reasons the
Arctic has not been more readily seen as a potential area for security competition and conflict is the interpretation that the United States has little or no interest in the circumpolar region at all. According to Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, American
hegemony throughout the post-Cold War era was seen as passive, stable and enduring because of the lack of counterpower being demonstrated in the system: Bounded by oceans to the east and west and weak, friendly powers to the north and south, the United
States is both less vulnerable than previous aspiring hegemons and also less threatening to others. The main potential challengers to its unipolarity, meanwhile China, Russia, Japan, and Germany are in the opposite position. They cannot augment their military
capabilities so as to balance the United States without simultaneously becoming an immediate threat to their neighbors. Politics, even international politics, is local. Although American power attracts a lot of attention globally, states are usually more concerned with
their own neighborhoods than with the global equilibrium. Were any of the potential challengers to make a serious run at the United States, regional balancing efforts would almost certainly help contain them, as would the massive latent power capabilities of the
United States, which could be mobilized as necessary to head off an emerging threat.27 Almost completely omitted from such interpretations, however, are Americas northern borders over Alaska and into the Arctic. Latitudinal thinking would seem to indicate that
Brooks and Wohlforth are correct in terms of Americas interests in many areas of the globe, but this ignores what has been happening at the top of the world in the high north. It is not as if the United States has been ignorant of its own decline in power, especially
regarding the Arctic. In 2009, the United States issued National Security Presidential Directive 66 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25 that deal exclusively with American Arctic policy. According to these directives, the alterations to national policies of
other states regarding the Arctic compelled the United States to clearly outline the security and development strategies they would use to protect its Arctic interests. Among the first, and most clear, elements of the directives is the clear intention of the United

The United States

is
prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard
these interests
States to defend their national security interests. According to Article III, subsection B 1 of the directives:

has broad and fundamental national security interests in the Arctic region and

. These interests include such matters as missile defense and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operations; and ensuring

freedom of navigation and overflight. The contemporary changes to the international system as the era of American hegemony has begun to wane, the effects of climate change and greater access, and the increasingly militaristic strategies of most every Arctic state
have led to a situation where tensions are at an all time high, and that legal or institutional processes are unlikely to res olve anything amicably. As the system continues its transition away from unipolarity, observers are left to ponder what might come next after an
era of relative interstate stability. In their 2002 article on the nature of United States primacy and the enduring aspects of American hegemony, Brooks and Wohlforth argue that the United States would have to act as a benevolent hegemon in order to prevent
counterbalancing and to be able to build effective regimes worldwide. They argue: Magnanimity and restraint in the face of temptation are tenets of successful statecraft that have proved their worth from classical Greece onward. Standing taller than leading states
of the past, the United States has unprecedented freedom to do as it pleases. It can play the game for itself alone or for the system as a whole; it can focus on small returns today or larger ones tomorrow. If the administration truly wants to be loved as well as
feared, the policy answers are not hard to find.29 The problem with such analyses of American hegemony is that the Bush administration chose to ignore utterly such warnings and, rather than acting magnanimously, post-9/11 American foreign policy did precisely
what it should not have. Pre-emption, coercion and irrational interventions, combined with a major economic recession, all serve to explain why American h egemony began to decline by 2005 in terms of both actual power levels and perceptions of legitimate
hegemonic status.30 The clearest sign that American exceptionalism has been decreasing is the aggressive and regional balancing dynamics taking place between states in the Arctic region. Security strategy in the circumpolar region has altered dramatically since
2005, with more states showing interest, hard power spending increasing, and legal processes being coupled by at times overtly offensive strategy.31 Russia, Canada and a number of European states, especially Norway and Sweden, exemplify this line of argument
about how sovereignty claims have become focused on traditional interstate arms racing and militarism while soft power components, like governance structures and legal processes, continually evolve.32 As mentioned previously, even the United States has woken
up to see that, as their hegemony declines, other states have begun to balance against them in the Arctic, thus provoking the 2009 Presidential Directives. Even so, Arctic interested nations have not yielded to American claims, nor has there been any evidence of
Americas closest allies backing down in the face of its Arctic assertions, most clearly evidenced by Canadas continued claims over the Northwest Passage.or defend northern claims, Canada has done the same. Worth noting as well in the Canadian context is that,
while great powers like Russia and the United States can easily defeat any middle or minor power, Canadas capabilities are being either rivalled or surpassed by European states like Norway.36 Canadas realization of the evolving security and environmental climate
in the Arctic has compelled changes to its domestic and foreign security policies, each seeking to assert Canadian sovereignty over areas of the Arctic, especially the Northwest Passage. One of the main components of now Prime Minister Harpers 200506 campaign
was to bolster Arctic security resources, as many Canadians have identified the region as an essential part of Canadas national security and identity.37 Rob Huebert argues: The Harper government has increasingly recognized the significance of maintaining a strong
presence in the Arctic and has vigorously begun to improve Canadas northern abilities *+ The Harper government has also made a series of promises to considerably expand Canadas northern capability *+ If these promises are implemented, Canada will have
significantly improved its ability to control activity in its Arctic.38 In virtually any other area of the world, Canadian na tional security cannot be divorced from the United States, which is a partial explanation for why Canada has traditionally been considered a middle
power since the end of World War II.39 Yet, since the start of American decline, the Canadian government has recognized that its fate in the Arctic will be its own, and not intrinsically tied to the protection of the United States, as the Americans have their own
interests in the region and have shown a complete disregard for Canadian claims over the Northwest Passage and the Beaufort S ea. As the world moves towards multipolarity, it has become increasingly obvious that the Arctic region represents an area of increased
security competition and a potentially conflictual region in the future. Multipolar systems are the most unstable, and hist ory has shown these to produce military conflict due to the natural effects brought by a larger number of self-interested powers vying for power
and security. Further, as new great powers begin to emerge, American strategic considerations will be spread so thin that they will be unable to prevent against their eventual loss of hegemony. The largest mistake being made at this time by international security
scholars and policymakers is their normal obsession with China, India and latitudinal thinking. The next area of major war is not likely to be the Middle East, the Indian Ocean or the South China Sea, due to traditional security balancing, deterrence and economic
interests in each of these areas. Multipolarity naturally brings the possibility of war. Mearsheimer contends that war is far more likely in multipolar systems for three reasons: First, there are more opportunities for war, because there are more potential conflict
dyads in a multipolar system. Second, imbalances of power are more commonplace in a multipolar world, and thus great powers are more likely to have the capability to win a war, making deterrence more difficult and war more likely. Third, the potential for
miscalculation is greater in multipolarity: states might think they have the capability to coerce or conquer another state when, in fact, they do not.40 Presently, there is little reason to believe that tension and strategic posturing will lead to the outbreak of war in the
near future. That said, as Americas influence continues to wane, other states have shown their desire to take full advantage of the United States inability to control northern affairs. If the United States does lose its hegemony, which many commentators believe is
inevitable, there will be at least four dyads in security calculations, with Russia, China and India entering the fray, and two of those states have Arctic borders and a historical legacy of conflict. Power imbalance in the Arctic is already apparent, with only Russia and
the United States as great powers, while the other Arctic states are middle or minor powers with no hope of preventing a great power from doing as it pleases. Lastly, miscalculation is evident in the present context, as Sweden and Norway are both arming for

the probability of northern

conflict is ever increasing
hard power strategies
climate change, and
multipolarity can increase tension and mistrust altering the currently stable nature of
possible Russian aggression, though Russia has shown little or no overtly aggressive tendencies towards Nordic nations. Unipolarity was not going to last forever, but as it fades
. The shift to

fact that

levels of

, the effects of
, thus

the decline of the United States all speak to the

Arctic affairs

. Efforts at Arctic governance through institutional binding or legal claims, as seen in the Arctic Council and UNCLOS, are able at present to mitigate the ongoing and ever increasing security competition in the high north, but as the

observers must be mindful of the systemic variables

at play when explaining and forecasting Arctic politics,
system changes from unipolarity to multipolarity, constraining state behaviour becomes increasingly difficult. As such,

as changes to the structure are very likely to translate into changes to state security strategies.

Contention 3 is Oil
Russian drilling is inevitable. Gazprom fields are declining and new resources
are needed.
Upton 13 (John Upton, a reporter for Grist news, Russia begins offshore drilling in Arctic, 23
Dec 2013, http://grist.org/news/russia-begins-offshore-drilling-in-arctic/)
The Greenpeace activists who scaled Russias first Arctic offshore oil rig during a September
demonstration have been given amnesty, but Russia is extending no such courtesies to the
Arctic environment or the climate. The rig that the Arctic 30 helped bring to the worlds
attention has begun pumping oil. From Agence France-Presse: The landmark announcement marked
the formal start of Russias long-planned effort to turn the vast oil and natural gas riches
believed to be buried in the frozen waters into profits for its ambitious government-run firms.
But it also outraged campaigners who see the Arctic as one of the worlds last pristine reserves whose damage by oil spills and other
disasters would be enormously difficult to contain. [State-owned oil company] Gazprom

made its announcement in a

statement that stressed the company also had rights to 29 other fields it planned to exploit in
Russias section of the Arctic seabed. [B]oth Gazprom and the Kremlin view [this drilling
endeavor] as a stepping stone in a much broader effort to turn the Arctic into the focus of
future exploration that makes up for Russias declining oil production at its Soviet-era Siberian
fields. Greenpeace reminds us that this is a dangerous gamble. From a press release: The offshore Arctic is
the most inhospitable operating environment imaginable. Freezing temperatures, thick ice, months of
perpetual twilight, giant storms and hurricane-force winds pose a unique technical risk to any oil company. There
is no proven way of cleaning oil spilled in ice and

even a small accident would have devastating

consequences on the Arctics fragile and little-understood environment . To realise its goal of opening up more
of the Arctic to oil exploration, which Russia aims to turn into its resource base of the 21st century,
Gazprom has signed an exploration deal with Shell that will provide it with new capital and much-needed expertise in offshore
drilling, even though Shells own attempts to drill in the Alaskan Arctic were hit by repeated accidents and embarrassing safety
blunders.

That makes spills a certainty.

Harvey and Walker, 13 (Fiona, writing for The Guardian (London) and Shaun, writing for The Guardian in Moscow,
Arctic oil spill is certain if drilling goes ahead, says top scientist, 11/19/13, The Guardian,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/19/arctic-oil-drilling-russia)

A serious oil spill in the Arctic is a "dead cert" if drilling goes ahead, with potentially
devastating consequences for the pristine region, according to a leading marine scientist who played a key role in analysis
of BP's Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The warning came as Russia filed court orders this week to have Greenpeace activists and
journalists kept in prison for a further three months in prison before their trial over a protest at Arctic oil drilling. Concerns

about the potentially dire consequences of drilling for oil in the region have intensified as the
Russian government and others have begun exploration under the Arctic seas. In such a cold region, any
spill would be much more troublesome, because the oil would not naturally disperse as it does in warmer
waters, and because of the difficulty of mounting a clean-up operation in hostile weather conditions. The "Arctic 30" comprising 28
activists and two journalists were arrested when Greenpeace's Arctic Sunrise vessel was boarded by Russian coastguards in
September and are facing lengthy jail terms if they are convicted. They have been kept in harsh conditions in freezing cold jail cells
with poor food, and are being moved 800 miles from Murmansk to St Petersburg. Simon Boxall, an oil spill expert from the
University of Southampton, told the Guardian exploring the region was inherently dangerous: "It is inevitable you will get a spill a

expect to see a major spill in the not too distant future . I would be astonished if you did
not see a major spill from this." The conditions in the Arctic would vastly compound the problem, he said. "It's
dead cert. I would

a completely different environment. In temperate climes, oil disperses quickly. Bacteria help [to digest the oil]. In the Arctic the oil
does not break down in this way it

can take decades before it breaks down. Nature will not help us."

Independently, Arctic species loss causes extinction

WWF, 10 (World Wildlife Foundation, December 1, 2010 Drilling for Oil in the Arctic: Too Soon, Too Risky World Wildlife
Fund http://www.worldwildlife.org/what/wherewework/arctic/WWFBinaryitem18711.pdf)
Planetary Keystone The

Arctic and the subarctic regions surrounding it are important for many
reasons. One is their enormous biological diversity: a kaleidoscopic array of land and seascapes supporting
millions of migrating birds and charismatic species such as polar bears, walruses, narwhals and sea otters. Economics is
another: Alaskan fisheries are among the richest in the world. Their $2.2 billion in annual catch fills the
frozen food sections and seafood counters of supermarkets across the nation. However, there is another reason why the Arctic
is not just important, but among the most important places on the face of the Earth. A
keystone species is generally defined as one whose removal from an ecosystem triggers a
cascade of changes affecting other species in that ecosystem. The same can be said of the
Arctic in relation to the rest of the world. With feedback mechanisms that affect ocean currents and influence
climate patterns, the Arctic functions like a global thermostat. Heat balance, ocean circulation
patterns and the carbon cycle are all related to its regulatory and carbon storage functions.
Disrupt these functions and we effect far-reaching changes in the conditions under which life
has existed on Earth for thousands of years. In the context of climate change, the Arctic is a keystone ecosystem
for the entire planet.

Arctic oil is vital to Gazprom and Russias economy they are at capacity
without it.
Golubkova and Soldatkin, 13 (Katya, and Vladimir, contributors to Reuters, Gazprom
launches Arctic oil field after a decade of delays, 12/20/13, Reuters,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/russia-arctic-field-idUSL6N0JZ2EF20131220)
Russia's first Arctic offshore field Prirazlomnoye, where Greenpeace activists were arrested in
September after a high seas clash with Russian authorities, has started production of oil, energy
company Gazprom said on Friday. The project is almost a decade behind its initial schedule and
is one of the most controversial energy projects, seen as dangerous for the environment by the
greens, who say that the drilling and storage platform is three decades old. "We became the
pioneers of Russia's Arctic development," Gazprom's Chief Executive Officer Alexei Miller said
in a statement. President Vladimir Putin has said Russia's Arctic offshore riches are of a
strategic importance for the country, which now is pumping an average of 10.6 million barrels
of oil per day (bpd), close to its current capacity . However, start of production had long been
delayed due to various challenges, including ageing equipment and a change in shareholders
structure. Difficulties obtaining official clearances and technical problems also hampered the
project. Russia, the world's second-biggest oil exporter, is vying with Canada, Denmark, Norway
and the United States for control of the oil, gas and precious metals that would become more
accessible if global warming shrinks the Arctic ice cap. STRATEGIC REGION Greenpeace has said
that oil production in the pristine region risks spills similar to the Mexican Gulf disaster at BP's
platform in 2010, saying that some of Prirazlomnaya platform's parts were used at another
offshore project some 30 years ago. The activists issued a statement on Friday, saying, the
launch of production is "a dark day for the Arctic". "Gazprom is the first company on Earth to
pump oil from beneath icy Arctic waters and yet its safety record on land is appalling. It is
impossible to trust them to drill safely in one of the most fragile and beautiful regions on Earth,"
Greenpeace said in a statement. Gazprom has said it has taken all necessary measures to
prevent any incidents. Russia detained 30 Greenpeace activists protesting against Arctic drilling
at the Prirazlomnaya platform in September. The protesters faced jail sentences of up to 7 years
although Putin later announced an amnesty, which covers the activists. The Arctic region is seen

as an important source of potential growth for Russia, the world's largest oil producer, in the
next decade, with global oil majors including ExxonMobil , Eni or Statoil clinching deals to enter
the Russian Arctic.

Gazprom key to Russias economy.

Kramer, 8 (Andrew E., writer for the New York Times, As Gazprom Goes, So Goes, Russia,
5/11/08, The New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/11/business/worldbusiness/11gaz.html?pagewanted=all)
Its hard to overemphasize Gazproms role in the Russian economy . Its a sprawling company
that raked in $91 billion last year; it employs 432,000 people, pays taxes equal to 20 percent of
the Russian budget and has subsidiaries in industries as disparate as farming and aviation.

And, Russia is on the brink of a recession now.

Pavliva, 14 (Halia Pavliva, Reporter for Bloomberg News Ruble Forwards Tumble as U.S.
Expands Sanctions, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-17/ruble-forwards-tumble-asu-s-expands-sanctions.html)
The ruble fell the most in two weeks in the offshore market as the U.S. imposed new sanctions on
companies including lenders and oil producers to punish Russia for President Vladimir Putins refusal to end
support for Ukrainian rebels. One-month non-deliverable forwards fell 0.5 percent 34.85 per dollar as of 5 p.m. in New York, the
lowest since June 17. The spot rate fell 0.1 percent before the Treasury Department released the list of companies and Putin allies
that are now facing penalties. The announcement came after the close of equity market trading in New York. The

U.S.
targeting of companies including lender OAO Gazprombank and oil producer OAO Rosneft goes
further than previous rounds of sanctions that included travel bans and asset freezes imposed on individuals who
are part of Putins inner circle. European Union governments also stiffened penalties against Russia, agreeing to
blacklist companies and halt lending for investment projects. The new sanctions may tip Russia into a
recession , said David Riedel of Riedel Research Group Inc. The country is teetering on the edge now and
this will be enough to push it over, Riedel, president and founder of the New York-based firm, said by e-mail yesterday. The
Russian market will go down but not as much as at the depths of the Crimea crisis. The Crimea situation took markets by
surprise, this time it is less of a surprise. The benchmark Micex Index entered a bear market on March 13 after Putin moved to
annex Crimea and before a referendum in which people in the Black Sea peninsula voted to break away from Ukraine. The gauge has
since advanced 18 percent.

Russian economic collapse causes nuclear war.

FILGER, 9 (Sheldon, author/writer for the Huffington Post, founder of
GlobalEconomicCrisis.com, books include Global Economic Forecast 2010-2015: Recession into
Depression, Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction
http://www.globaleconomiccrisis.com/blog/archives/356)
In Russia historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is
rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of
the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both
intimately acquainted with their nations history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect
that Russias economic crisis will endanger the nations political stability, achieved at great
cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests
are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their
salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and
Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have
been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate
attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic

collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an
outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even
more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived
decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a
nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that
reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at
nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and
destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack
Obamas national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major
economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national
intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that
the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States,
due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia,
security forces responsible for guarding the nations nuclear arsenal went without pay for
months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons
to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much
further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial
impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence .

Contention 4 is Solvency.
Russia says yes to scientific cooperation over oil exploration.
Clark and Millian, 14 (Meagan Clark is a reporter for the International Business Times with
Sergio Millian, President of the Russian-American Chamber of Commerce, 2.26.2014. Why
Russia Wants US Oil Companies To Explore, Produce Its Prospects: Q&A With Sergio Millian of
Russian-American Chamber Of Commerce http://www.ibtimes.com/why-russia-wants-us-oilcompanies-explore-produce-its-prospects-qa-sergio-millian-russian-american)
The Russian-American Chamber of Commerce is the only American sponsor of the second
annual Russian Oil and Gas Forum, which will take place from March 18 to March 20 in
Moscow. Sergio Millian, president of the chamber, is flying to Moscow early to prepare for the
forum, stopping in Kiev, Ukraine, along the way. He talked to IBTimes Wednesday about the
upcoming forum and why the Russian Oil Ministry wants U.S. technology to extract oil and gas
in previously unreachable areas. Whats on the agenda for the oil and gas forum? Its a
three-day conference on Russian energy strategy and energy efficiency. Several weeks ago, we
met with several top officials from the U.S. Department of Energy about the conference, and we
have received some other relevant information about the successful cooperation. We hope
that trade will increase between Russia and the U.S. Were hoping to attract investment of
about half a billion dollars into Russian exploration and investment into American refineries.
Whos going to be at the forum? Several companies. Chevron confirmed, Exxon Mobil
confirmed participation in the forum. Were talking to about 10 more companies. Im flying this
weekend to Moscow and will continue talking to them. Exxon Mobil has a contract already
and [represents] an example of successful cooperation with Russia. Rosneft is working with
Exxon. They signed an official agreement two years ago for several billion dollars. Theyre the
most successful recent example, and really the only example, of Russian-American cooperation
in oil. Is the Russian government looking to U.S. companies to invest in oil exploration in
Russia? Yes, basically the Russian government for the second time is hosting the oil and gas
forum, which means that since its conducted by the *Russian+ Minister of Energy, the idea is
make sure [U.S. companies] understand the guidelines after 2013. Some projects will be
discussed with substantial investments. American companies can benefit greatly. Why does
Russias energy ministry want help from American companies? They would like to partner
with the American companies because technologies from the shale revolution have been
developed here, and most of the European countries dont have this technology yet. They
want to explore the Arctic Sea and Eastern Siberia.

We have the tech to drill safely in the Arctic.

Ghoneim, 11 (G. Abdel Ghoeneim, principal engineer at Det Norske Veritas (the worlds
largest ship and offshore classification society and advisor of the maritime industry,
independent provider of risk management, technical advisory, and technical assurance services
to the upstream oil and gas industry) Ph.D in engineering from University of Calgary, Assessing
the state of arctic technology development, 2/1/11, Offshore-Mag, vol. 71, issue 2,
http://www.offshore-mag.com/articles/print/volume-71/issue-2/Arctic/assessing-the-state-ofarctic-technology-development.html)

The challenges are numerous and significant, but the associated risks are more manageable
now than ever. Todays technology makes it possible to monitor the condition of the arctic
facility and its associated systems in real time and remotely control sensitive equipment from
shore. Even with the considerable uncertainty associated with ice loading and the design
criteria, it is possible to mitigate these issues using probabilistic methods and to incorporate a
reliable monitoring system and innovative designs that allow ductile structural behavior and
fail-safe arrangement . Depending on the water depth and the ice conditions, many arctic
designs have been proven in the past, and that experience is going to be beneficial in designing
new structures for deeper waters and more severe ice conditions. The recently issued ISO 19906
standard does cover a very wide scope and will be invaluable to the designers and operators of
arctic structures. The document still lacks detail for ice load calculations especially for floating
systems. Also, the requirement that ice structure interaction should be performed using
probabilistic methods is too general and an alternative deterministic method should be defined.
However, the designers will be relying on class societies for more specific guidance. DNV is going
to produce such guidance in mid-2012 after work is completed on the JIP ICESTRUCT. The
definition of local ice pressure dependence on the contact area has been improved in the new
ISO standard. However, due to the sensitivity of the structural weight to the local pressure and
hence the feasibility of the design, it is important to optimize the design by employing plastic
and nonlinear design methods. The experience from existing arctic shipping, exploration, and
production has been successful to date. There is no doubt that existing technology can
produce year-round drilling and production systems in all the contemplated arctic regions
efficiently, with the same or better reliability than currently experienced in field
developments in deepwater and harsh environments.

Arctic cooperation solves US/Russian relations overcomes tensions.

Bernstein 14 (Leandra Bernstein, Washington correspondent and analyst for RIA Novosti,
Arctic Cooperation May Ease Russia-US Tensions Analyst, May 5, 2014, RIA Novosti,
http://en.ria.ru/world/20140522/190037278/Arctic-Cooperation-May-Ease-Russia-US-Tensions-Analyst.html)//MW
WASHINGTON, May 22 (RIA Novosti), Leandra Bernstein Tense relations between Russia and the US and NATO
could potentially be cooled through Arctic cooperation , according to the program director at the George
Washington Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. I think the Arctic is, today at least, one of the last
places for cooperation with Russia following the Ukrainian crisis, Marlene Laruelle said. US-Russia
[Arctic+ cooperation will probably be less directed to cooperation on security issues because of the Ukrainian crisis, she specified,
but there

are several other elements that are still open for discussion. Since 2011 the US has increased its
stake in Arctic security and development and currently holds the chairmanship for the Arctic Council. The US is
planning to invest $1.5 billion focusing on the Arctic, according to former State Department official Heather Conley. However, US
assets in the region are limited and they rely on dated technology and borrowed equipment from other Arctic nations. Russia is
currently the only country employing nuclear-powered icebreakers. The securitization trend we see in

the Arctic from

the Russian side is mostly not an issue of military aggressiveness, but it is a business issue , Laruelle said.
Concerning Russias delimitation of its continental shelf and control over the North Sea Pass, Laruelle said Russia is playing
by the rules. The demarcation of national and international waterways is contested within the Arctic Council, but the first
voyage of a Chinese merchant ship, Hong Xing, through the North Sea Pass last year set a precedent when the ship adhered to all
Russian requirements for passage. There are hopes that increased trade will take place through Arctic routes. The route is expected
to see between ten and twelve commercial trips this year. Laruelles remarks were part of a panel discussion at the Wilson Center
on the interests of the Arctic nations, and the increasing participation in the region by non-Arctic players, particularly China, Japan,
Korea, and Singapore.

Arctic cooperation spills over solves collaboration on other global affairs.

The Center for Climate and Security 13 [a nonprofit policy institute with a distinguished
Advisory Board of senior retired military leaders and security professionals, The United States
and Russia in a Changing Arctic, http://climateandsecurity.org/2013/08/16/the-united-statesand-russia-in-a-changing-arctic/]
It is important to pay close attention to the Russian point of view on the Arctic as ice melts, and sea
lanes open up. The United States will assume the presidency of the Arctic Council in 2015, and though that seems far away, serious

preparations for how to deal with the changing Arctic landscape will need to happen now. That includes
being prepared to deal with claims issues, sea lane problems, policing questions, and possible strains on cooperation emerging from both the economic
and climatic landscape. For example, both the United States and Russia face a greater need for ice breakers, as the navigable area of the Arctic
increases, leading to an increase in traffic, a greater need for policing, and a possible increase in search and rescue (or SAR) operations. But in a climate
of fiscal austerity, finding the funds for such expensive ships is very difficult. A lack of such capacities for the U.S and Russia in the Arctic could lead to a
largely unregulated Arctic space, and a greater likelihood of human and environmental disasters occurring. Though such issues are not at all likely to
lead to open conflict between Arctic nations, being

prepared to keep cooperation between them on track, in

the face of rapid changes, could go a long way, and not just in keeping the Arctic safe. The need for closer
cooperation in a melting north might also lead to improvements in other areas of diplomacy, such as over
Syria, Egypt, humanitarian intervention, international climate negotiations, and many others . U.S. ratification of the the UN Law of the Sea Convention,
which is supported by a broad consensus of stakeholders including the U.S. military, the Chamber of Commerce and a number of major U.S. oil
companies, has still not materialized. If it did, the scope of productive cooperation between the U.S. and Russia could expand significantly, in the Arctic
and beyond. The United States and Russia have a rocky relationship, to say the least. A rapidly-changing Arctic complicates that. However, with

adequate investments of political will and financial resources, the Arctic can continue to be a
relatively safe and cooperative space. Hopefully, that cooperation can help lay the foundation for
progress on pressing security, humanitarian and human rights questions across the globe.

Empirically, US and Russia can cooperate on the Arctic despite differences.

Rowe and Blakkisrud 12(Elana Wilson Rowe and Helge Blakkisrud, Elana Wilson Rowe (PhD) is a senior research
fellow at the Department of Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and adjunct
professor at the University of Nordland. Helge Blakkisrud is the Head of Department of Rus- sian of Eurasian Studies at the
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). He is also Editor in Chief of the peer-reviewed Nordic journal for East European
and post-Soviet studies Nordisk stforum since 1994. Volume 2/2012, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Policy Briefs,
Great Power, Arctic Power: Russias engagement in the High North , AW)

How the Arctic states decide to deal with Chinas increasing interest in the North will be
important. Russia is active in defending the privileges of Arc- tic states, while the US, in
particular, is for the idea of an open Arctic Council. An American failure to ratify UNCLOS could
have repercussions. As one Canadian interviewee put it, Might this be music to the ears of
some on the Security Council who would prefer to write rather than follow international
law?The 2007 flag planting shows us that there is still some room for a difference of opinion in
the pur- suit of Russias Arctic goals and that the political space remains for the expression of it.
However, the delimitation agreement, in that it required the involvement of the Russian
leadership, likely has more to say about dominant Russian domestic political commitments
and discourse. The Security Council has played an important role as a facilitator of the new
policy platform. This should not, how- ever, be seen as a step towards securitization of the
Arctic, but is rather a result of the council being a forum where all the major stakeholders are
rep- resented. We have, to the contrary, observed a widening of the political field, with the
relevant sector ministries playing a more active role in the Arctic debate. Several interviewees
(both Russian and Western) noted the importance of keeping budget constraints in mind when
interpreting Russias Arctic plans. Despite the stated Russian interest in developing Arctic
infrastructure (including the Northern Sea Route), one should be aware of the gap between
stated interests and the costs involved Russian policy declarations are often divorced from
fiscal realities and should not necessarily be taken at face value.Arctic cooperation has to
some extent been facili- tated by the reset in USRussia relations. Should a change in the
presidential administration in the US lead to a harder line towards Russia there could be

repercussions for international relations in the Arctic. However, that Arctic cooperation intensified at the same time as Russias relations with the West reached a new low due to the Georgian
war suggests that a policy or administration change in the US will not necessarily have serious
negative effects on regional Arctic cooperation. At any rate, one should not infer an automatic
spillover from one vector of Russias foreign policy to another.