5) BRIG. GEN. (Ret.) JOSE RAMISCAL, JR. V.

SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. Nos. 172476-99
September 15, 2010
FACTS: Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. was a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), with the rank of Brigadier General, when he served as President of the AFP-Retirement and
Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS. During petitioners term as president of AFP-RSBS, the
Board of Trustees of AFP-RSBS approved the acquisition of 15,020 square meters of land situated
in General Santos City for development as housing projects.
On 1 August 1997, AFP-RSBS , represented by Petitioner and Atty. Flaviano, attorney-in-fact of 12
vendors executed and signed bilateral deeds of sale over subject property which caused the
payment of P10, 500 per square meter. However, Flaviano executed and signed a unilateral
deeds of sale over the same property which reflected a purchase price of P3 000 per square
meter instead the actual price of P10 500. This became the basis of TCT by Register of Deeds.
Thereafter, a complaint-affidavit was filed against him, along with 27 others, in the Ombudsman
(OMB) for (1) violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act; and (2) malversation of public funds or property through falsification of public
documents.
After Preliminary investigation OMB found petitioner guilty and thereafter filed in
Sandiganbayan an Information for violation of aforementioned offense. Petitioner filed his first
motion for reconsideration (MR) of OMB;s finding probable cause against him. Sandiganbayan
in its order gave the prosecution 60 days to evaluate the evidence. In a memorandum, the
Office of the Special Prosecutor (OMB-OSP) recommended that petitioner be excluded from the
informations. However, on review, the Office of Legal Affairs (OMB-OLA), in a memorandum
recommended the contrary, stressing that petitioner participated in and affixed his signature on
the contracts to sell. These was forwarded to OMB-Military where they recommend the dropping
of petitioner but this was not manifested before the Sandiganbayan as a final disposition of
petitioners first motion for reconsideration.
A panel of prosecutors was tasked to review the records of the case. They found
probable cause against petitioner and denied his first MR. upon receipt of final findings
Sandiganbayan scheduled the arraignment of petitioner. Meanwhile, Petitioner filed a second
MR. On arraignment. For refusal of petitioner to enter his plea, Sandiganbayan entered a plea of
not guilty for him. Pending his second MR, he filed a motionto set aside his arraignment which
was denied. The Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioners second motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him was a prohibited
pleading.hence, this special civil action for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners motion to set aside his arraignment pending resolution of his second motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him.
RULING: NO. An arraignment is that stage where, in the mode and manner required by the Rules,
an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that
confronts him. The accused is formally informed of the charges against him, to which he enters a
plea of guilty or not guilty (Albert v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 164015, 26 February 2009, 580
SCRA 279).Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court and the last clause of Section 7 of RA
8493 otherwise known as the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, mean the same thing, that the 30-day
period shall be counted from the time the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, which is when the accused appears before the court. The grounds for suspension of
arraignment are provided under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court applies suppletorily in
matters not provided under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman or the
Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner failed to show that any of the instances
constituting a valid ground for suspension of arraignment obtained in this case. Thus, the

Sandiganbayan committed no error when it proceeded with petitioners arraignment, as

mandated by Section 7 of RA 8493.
6) GLORIA PILAR S. AGUIRRE V. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MICHELINA S.
AGUIRRE-OLONDRIZ, PEDRO B. AGUIRRE, DR. JUVIDO AGATEP and DR. MARISSA B. PASCUAL
G. R. No. 170723
March 3, 2008
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
FACTS: On June 11,2002 petitioner Gloria Aguirre instituted a criminal complaint for the violation
of Revised Penal Code particularly Articles 172 and 262, both in relation to Republic Act No.7610
against respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz,Dr. Agatep, Dr. Pascual and several John/Jane Doe
alleging that John/Jane Doe upon the apparent instructions of respondents Michelina AguirreOlondriz and Pedro Aguirre actually scouted, prospected, facilitated solicited and/or procured
the medical services of respondents Dr. Pascual and Dr. Agatep on the intended mutilation via
bilateral vasectomy of Laureano Aguirre. Olondriz denied that the prospected, scouted,
facilitated, solicited and/or procured any false statement mutilatedor abused his common law
brother, Laureano Aguirre. She further contends that his common law brother went through a
vasectomy procedure but that does not amount to mutilation. Dr. Agatep contends that the
complainant has no legal personality to file a case since she is only a common law sister of Larry
who has a legal guardian in the person of Pedro Aguirre. He further contends that Vasectomy
does not in any way equate to castration and what is touched in vasectomy is not considered
an organ in the context of law and medicine.
The Assistant City Prosecutor held lack of probable cause that the facts alleged did not
amount to mutilation, the vasectomy operation did not deprived Larry of his reproductive organ.
Gloria Aguirre then appealed to the Secretary of the DOJ but Chief State Prosecutor dismissed
the petition stating that the Secretary of Justice may motu propio dismiss outright the petition if
there is no showing of any reversible error in the questioned resolution. Petitioner Gloria Aguirres
Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied with finality by the DOJ. Resolute in her belief,
petitioner Gloria Aguirre went to the Court of Appeals by means of a Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
However, it was dismissed by the CA for lack of merit. Hence this petition.
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre, however, contends that Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
the DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when the latter affirmed the public prosecutors finding of lack of probable cause for
respondents. In contrast, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for public respondent DOJ,
argues that the conduct of preliminary investigation to determine the existence of probable
cause for the purpose of filing (an) information is the function of the public prosecutor. [37] More
importantly, the element[s] of castration or mutilation of an organ necessary for generation is
completely absent as he was not deprived of any organ necessary for reproduction, much less
the destruction of such organ.
ISSUE: Whether the assailed executive determination of probable cause was done in excess of
jurisdiction resulting from a grave abuse of discretion.
RULING: No. Public prosecutors under the DOJ have a wide range of discretion, the discretion of
whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of
factors which are best appreciated by (public) prosecutors. And this Court has consistently
adhered to the policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to
leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of what
constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of an information
against the supposed offender.
But this is not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on the part of the
prosecutor. It is entirely possible that the investigating prosecutor may erroneously exercise the

discretion lodged in him by law. This, however, does not render his act amenable to correction
and annulment by the extraordinary remedy ofcertiorari, absent any showing of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
For courts of law to grant the extraordinary writ of certiorari, so as to justify the reversal of the
finding of whether or not there exists probable cause to file an information, the one seeking the
writ must be able to establish that the investigating prosecutor exercised his power in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be patent and gross
as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law. Grave abuse of discretion is not enough.[51] Excess of jurisdiction signifies
that he had jurisdiction over the case but has transcended the same or acted without authority.
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present petition, the reasons of the Assistant
City Prosecutor in dismissing the criminal complaints for falsification and mutilation, as affirmed
by the DOJ, is determinative of whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In ruling the way he did that no probable cause for falsification and mutilation exists the Assistant City Prosecutor deliberated on the factual and legal milieu of the case. He found
that there was no sufficient evidence to establish aprima facie case for the crimes complained
of as defined and punished under Articles 172, paragraph 2, and 262 of the Revised Penal Code
in relation to Republic Act No. 7610, respectively. Concerning the crime of falsification of a
private document, the Assistant City Prosecutor reasoned that the circumstances attendant to
the case did not amount to the crime complained of, that is, the lack of consent by Larry Aguirre
before he was vasectomized; or the fact that the latter was not consulted. The lack of the two
preceding attendant facts do not in any way amount to falsification, absent the contention that
it was made to appear in the assailed report that said consent was obtained. That would have
been an untruthful statement. Neither does the fact that the Psychiatric Report state that
Lourdes Aguirre has Bipolar Mood Disorder by the same token amount to falsification because
said report does not put forward that such finding arose after an examination of the concerned
patient. Apropos the charge of mutilation, he reasoned that though the vasectomy rendered
Larry unable to procreate, it was not the permanent damage contemplated under the
pertinent provision of the penal code.
7) BIENVENIDO DIO and RENATO COMPARATIVO V. PABLO OLIVAREZ
G.R. No. 170447
December 4, 2009
CHICO-NAZARIO, J
FACTS: Before the SC is a Motion for Reconsideration its Decision filed by respondent Pablo
Olivarez.
SC found that the public prosecutor, in filing the Amended Informations, did not exceed
the authority delegated by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). They likewise ruled that no
abuse of discretion could be attributed to Judge Fortunito L. Madrona (Madrona) when he
issued the Orders dated 9 March 2005 and 31 March 2005 for the arrest of respondent due to his
failure to be present for his arraignment and for the confiscation of his cash bond.
Petitioners instituted a complaint for vote buying against respondent Pablo
Olivarez. Based on the finding of probable cause in the Joint Resolution issued by Assistant City
Prosecutor Antonietta Pablo-Medina, with the approval of the city prosecutor of Paraaque,
two Informations were filed before the RTC. LEC) an [a]ppeal of [the] Joint Resolution of the
City Prosecutor of Paraaque City with Motion to Revoke Continuing Authority. Respondent
argued that the pendency of the appeal of the Joint Resolution before the COMELEC should
prevent the filing of the Informations before the RTC as there could be no final finding of
probable cause until the COMELEC had resolved the appeal. The Law Department of the

COMELEC directed the city prosecutor to transmit or elevate the entire records of the case and
to suspend further implementation of the Joint Resolution until final resolution of the said appeal
before the COMELEC en banc. Respondent filed a Motion to Quash the two criminal
informations. Before Judge Madrona could act on the motion to quash, Assistant Prosecutor
Pablo-Medina filed its opposition. The Amended Informations sought to be admitted charged
respondent with violation of only paragraph a, in relation to paragraph b, of Section 261, Article
XXII of the Omnibus Election Code. This was opposed by petitioner. On 12 January 2005, Judge
Madrona issued an order denying respondents Motion to Quash and admitted the Amended
Informations. Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for reconsideration. However, on 9 March 2005,
respondent failed to appear before the RTC. Thereupon, Judge Madrona, in open court,
denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying the Motion to Quash and admitting
the Amended Informations, and ordered the arrest of respondent and the confiscation of the
cash bond. Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Lift the Order of
Arrest of Accused Dr. Pablo Olivarez, which was denied in an Order dated 31 March 2005. The
Order directed that a bench warrant be issued for the arrest of respondent to ensure his
presence at his arraignment. The Law Department of the COMELEC filed before the RTC a
Manifestation and Motion wherein it alleged that pursuant to the COMELECs powers to
investigate and prosecute election offense cases, it had the power to revoke the delegation of
its authority to the city prosecutor. Thus, the Law Department of the COMELEC moved (1) that
the RTC hold in abeyance further proceedings in Criminal Cases No. 04-1104 and No. 04-1105
until the COMELEC has acted on respondents appeal; and (2) to revoke the authority of the city
prosecutor of Paraaque to prosecute the case.
On 8 April 2005, respondent filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals, assailing the Orders, dated 12 January 2005, 9 March 2005 and 31 March 2005 of the
RTC. The appellate court granted the appeal in a Decision dated 28 September 2005 declaring
that the COMELEC had the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of election
offenses and to prosecute the same. Hence the case.
Respondent argues that this Court erred in not construing the directive of the COMELEC
to the public prosecutor of Paraaque City -- to transmit the entire records of the case to the
COMELEC Law Department by the fastest means available and to suspend further
implementation of the questioned resolution until final resolution of the appeal by the
COMELEC En Banc -- as not a revocation of the public prosecutors delegated authority.
ISSUE: Whether the city prosecutor defied the order or directive of the COMELEC when it filed
the amended informations.
RULING: YES.Under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC, through its duly
authorized legal officers, has the exclusive power to conduct a preliminary investigation of all
election offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election Code, and to prosecute the
same. The COMELEC may avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the
government. Section 2, Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure details the continuing
delegation of authority to other prosecuting arms of the government, which authority the
COMELEC may revoke or withdraw anytime in the proper exercise of its judgment. Furthermore,
Section 10 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the COMELEC the power to motu
proprio revise, modify and reverse the resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor and/or
provincial/city prosecutors.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City
Fiscals, and/or their respective assistants have been given continuing authority, as deputies of
the Commission, to conduct a preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses
under the election laws and to prosecute the same. Such authority may be revoked or
withdrawn anytime by the COMELEC, either expressly or impliedly, when in its judgment such
revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the process to promote the

common good, or where it believes that successful prosecution of the case can be done by the
COMELEC. Moreover, being mere deputies or agents of the COMELEC, provincial or city
prosecutors deputized by it are expected to act in accord with and not contrary to or in
derogation of its resolutions, directives or orders in relation to election cases that such
prosecutors are deputized to investigate and prosecute.[9] Being mere deputies, provincial and
city prosecutors, acting on behalf of the COMELEC, must proceed within the lawful scope of
their delegated authority.
We stand by our ruling that it was COMELEC Resolution No. 7457 that revoked the
deputation of the City Prosecutor of Paraaque. However, when the COMELEC Law
Department directed the City Prosecutor of Paraaque to transmit the entire records of the case
to the Law Department, Commission on Elections, Intramuros, Manila, by the fastest means
available and to suspend further implementation of the questioned resolution until final
resolution of said appeal by the Comelec En Banc, it had the effect of SUSPENDING THE
AUTHORITY of the City Prosecutor to prosecute the case. This was what we did not consider in
our decision. We overlooked the fact that the order issued by the COMELEC Law Department
was with the authority of the COMELEC En Banc. In other words, it was as if the COMELEC En
Banc was the one that ordered the public prosecutor to transmit the entire records and to
suspend further implementation of the questioned resolution until it finally resolves the appeal. As
contained in the letter of the COMELEC Law Department, an appeal has been filed before the
COMELEC and has yet to be resolved. Since the COMELEC hasalready taken cognizance of the
appeal, and the public prosecutor has been directed to suspend further implementation of the
questioned resolution until final resolution of said appeal, it was but proper for the City
Prosecutor of Paraaque to have held in abeyance any action until after the resolution of the
appeal by the COMELEC En Banc. This suspension of delegated authority was made permanent
and this delegated authority was revoked upon issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 7457
because of the City Prosecutors willful disobedience of the order of the COMELEC En Banc,
through the COMELEC Law Department, to suspend further implementation of the questioned
resolution until final resolution of said appeal by the COMELEC En Banc.
It cannot also be disputed that the COMELEC Law Department has the authority to direct,
nay, order the public prosecutor to suspend further implementation of the questioned resolution
until final resolution of said appeal, for it is speaking on behalf of the COMELEC. The COMELEC
Law Department, without any doubt, is authorized to do this as shown by the pleadings it has
filed before the trial court. If the COMELEC Law Department is not authorized to issue any
directive/order or to file the pleadings on behalf of the COMELEC, the COMELEC En Banc itself
would have said so. This, the COMELEC En Banc did not do.
The records are likewise bereft of any evidence showing that the City Prosecutor of
Paraaque doubted such authority. It knew that the COMELEC Law Department could make
such an order, but the public prosecutor opted to disregard the same and still filed the
Amended Informations contrary to the order to hold the proceedings in abeyance until a final
resolution of said appeal was made by the COMELEC En Banc.
In filing the Amended Informations despite the order to hold the proceedings in
abeyance until final resolution of said appeal, the City Prosecutor of Paraaque clearly
exceeded the legal limit of its delegated authority. As a deputy of the COMELEC, the public
prosecutor acted on its own and wantonly defied the COMELECs directives/orders. For that
reason, we rule that any action made by the City Prosecutor of Paraaque in relation to the two
criminal cases subsequent to the issuance of the COMELEC order dated 11 October 2004, like the
filing of the amended informations and the amended informations themselves, is declared VOID
and of NO EFFECT.
8) LIGAYA SANTOS and ROBERT BUNDA V. DOMINGO I. ORDA, JR.
G.R. No. 189402
May 6, 2010

NACHURA, J.
FACTS: Francis Orda, son of Domingo Orda, was shot to death. A certatin Gina Azarcon (Gina)
stated that she saw three male person perpetrate the crime inside a car. Later, two of them was
identified as Rolly Tonion (Rolly) and Jhunrey Soriano (Jhunrey). Thus City Prosecutor of
Paraaque City filed an information for crime of muder. During arraignment, they pleaded not
guilty. Two more witnesses, Ernesto Regala (Ernesto) and his son, Dennis, surfaced. From them it
was said that certain Ligaya ordered Rolly to kill Francis. An amended information was thereafter
filed against Ligaya and a certain Edna Cortez.
Gina, Ernesto and Dennis later recanted their testimonies. The Department of Justice
(DOJ) issued a Joint Resolution directing the City Prosecutor to cause the withdrawal of the
Informations for murder against the accused, holding that the prosecution witnesses testimonies
were not credible. RTC issued an order allowing the withdrawal. Respondent elevated the
matter to CA. The CA nullified the aforesaid Order, declaring that RTC, Branch 258, committed
grave abuse of discretion in allowing the withdrawal of the Informations without making an
independent evaluation on the merits of the case. On final review, this Court affirmed the CA
decision. Unsatisfied, Ligaya filed a motion for reconsideration. Pending this, she filed a bail in
RTC, branch 257 which was opposed by prosecution who presented witnesses and as a result
RTC debunked the petition for bail.
Meanwhile, the Court finally resolved petitioners motion for reconsideration, holding that
the RTC, Branch 258, must make an independent evaluation of the records before allowing the
withdrawal of the Informations against petitioners. This impelled Ligaya to file before the RTC,
Branch 257, an Urgent Motion to Resolve Anew and on the Merits Previous Motion to Withdraw
Criminal Informations Pursuant to the DOJ Finding on Lack of Probable Cause. RTC issued an
Order dismissing the case for murder, ratiocinating that no probable cause existed to indict them
for their crime. Consequently, it lifted the warrants for their arrests and ordered their immediate
release from detention. The prosecutions motion for reconsideration was denied. Aggrieved,
respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, claiming that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in finding that no probable cause existed against the accused. CA granted
the petition. On motion of petitioners, the CA clarified that the reversal of the RTC Orders carried
with it the reversal of the trial courts finding that petitioners were entitled to bail. Hence, the
present petition.
ISSUE: whether the CA erred in finding that there was probable cause against petitioners.
RULING: YES. The task of the Presiding Judge when an Information is filed with the court is first
and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of
the accused. Probable cause is such set of facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information or
any offense included therein has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.
Moreover, when confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information on the ground of
lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the bounden duty of the
trial court is to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having acquired
jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by such resolution, but is required to
evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial and should embody such assessment in the
order disposing the motion.
A closer scrutiny of the Order of the RTC reveals that the Presiding Judge allowed the withdrawal
of the Informations, consequently dismissed the case against petitioners, and lifted the warrants
for their arrest on the following grounds: 1) the incredibility of the earlier statements of Gina,
Ernesto and Dennis because of their subsequent recantation;[ 2) the improbability that Dennis
and Ernesto saw and heard the conversations of the accused in view of the counter-evidence
submitted by Ligaya, showing the physical set-up of her residence or building, the kind of door
she maintained thereat, and the inner private room she had; 3) the lack or insufficiency of

evidence at the level of prosecution for purposes of determining probable cause; and 4) the
incredibility of the testimonies of Sabino and Jonas because of the absence of corroborating
evidence.
Given the foregoing, we find that the RTC did not err in finding that no probable cause
existed to indict the petitioners for the crime of murder. Neither did it gravely abuse its discretion
in making said conclusion. There was no hint of whimsicality, nor of gross and patent abuse of
discretion as would amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law on the part of the Presiding Judge. On
the contrary, he came to the conclusion that there was no probable cause for petitioners to
commit murder, by applying basic precepts of criminal law to the facts, allegations and
evidence on record. Said conclusion was thoroughly explained in detail in the lengthy Order
dated September 30, 2005. We would like to stress that the purpose of the mandate of the judge
to first determine probable cause is to insulate from the very start those falsely charged with
crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.