Philippines Current Issues

Philippines Current Issues
Integration of southern and northern Filipinos

Exploit fertile and unused land in the south .
A Long History of Injustice Ignored: The Moros of the Philippines

Sheila Musaji
The name Moros was given by the Spanish meaning Moors or Muslims.
Since the terrorism word is now being used against the Moros, and the
Philippines is promoting a local anti-terrorism bill with sweeping implications,
I felt the need to do a little research.
There are about 12 million indigenous peoples in the Philippines - groups
which have not been Christianized or Hispanicized - the Moros and the
Igorots are the two most important because of their numerical size,
demographic concentration, and political organization.
There are twelve peoples whose shared religion, Islam, and shared historical
experience, persecution by Spaniards and later Filipinos, have formed a
distinct nation called the Bangsamoro. They are located primarily in Basilan,
Mindanao, Palawan, and the Sulu Archipelago.
The Muslim Moros in the South of the Philippines see themselves as involved
in a continuing rebellion against outside forces which has gone on for 450
years - first Spain, then America, then the Central Philippine Government,
and now America again.
It appears that in the year 1380 the first Mohammedan missionary, a noted
Arabian judge named Makdum introduced the religion to the Philippines. The
ruins of the mosque he built at Tubig-Indangan on the island of Simunul are
still to be seen. Later, about 1400, the Rajah Baguinda continued the work
of Makdum. The remarkable campaign of this missioner ended on Sibutu
Island where he lies buried today in the village of Tandu-Banak. The work of
Baguinda appears to have been confined to the islands of the Sulu
Archipelago. To Shereef Kabungsuwan is credited the conversion of
Mindanao. ... A Mohammedan settlement was established in Borneo as early
as 1400, and Malacca was penetrated in 1276. The Portuguese Moluccas was
converted by 1456. The Swish of the Kris, Vic Hurley
The Muslims were set up under a series of Sultanates, for example the
Sultanate of Mindanao and the Sultanate of Sulu. By the time the Spanish
arrived in the 1500s the Sultan of Sulu was the sixth sultan to rule.
THE SPANISH
Read the Swish of the Kris for a history of how after the Spanish conquest
gave them a foothold in the north of the Philippines, the Moros withdrew to
their strongholds in the South to continue fighting to retain their
independence. In the north, the Spanish brought Christianity in much the
same way they brought it to North and South Americathrough subjugation,
forced labor and the sword.
The struggle of the Moro people for freedom and self-determination is one of
the longest, if not the longest, struggles in the history of mankind. Their
struggle began with the discovery of the Philippines by Ferdinand Magellan
in 1521, who claimed the island for Spain. The Moros rejected his claim, and
Lapu Lapu subsequently killed him, a Moro Muslim leader. From then on, the
Moros were in a fight for their independence and freedom.
The Spanish differentiated the two natives of the archipelago into pagan
Malays (Indios) and Muslim Malays (named Moros after the Spanish Moors).
Their policy was simply to convert the Indios to Christianity and kill the
Moros. The military resistance against the Spanish lasted over 350 years,
until the Spanish were defeated by the Americans in the 1898 SpanishAmerican war. Despite the fact the Spanish had never colonized the
Morolands, Spain included Mindanao in the Treaty of Paris, which transferred
sovereignty to the United States.
The US then attempted to subdue and disarm the Moros. Such was the
resistance, that the US Army ordered the upgrade of the standard issue Colt
.38-caliber pistol to the more powerful Colt .45-caliber, in order to stop the
knife-wielding Moros. Their frenetic and oft suicidal style of fighting gave us
the expression, running amok. The colonial administration then began
passing laws that would quell Moro aspirations of independence by migrating
large numbers of Christian Indios to the region.
In 1903, all Moro land holdings were declared null and void and made open
to land grabbing. In 1913, law was passed allowing Christians to own up to
16 hectares, whereas a Muslim could only own 8. In 1919, Christian land
entitlement was generously extended to 24 hectares. An Enduring Freedom
For the Moros, Amir Butler
PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN WAR
The Philippines were ceded to America by Spain at the end of the Spanish
American War, although the Philippines had declared their Independence
from Spain in 1896. The U.S. fought the Philippine-American War between
1899 and 1913 in order to make the Philippines which had only recently
declared its independence from Spain an American colony. Like other
wars we have fought there was never any formal declaration of war,
although this didnt make the dead any less dead. This undeclared war
ended in 1902 in the North, although the Muslim Moros in the South refused
to submit and continued fighting until 1916. In America this was known as
the Moro Rebellion.
Mark Twain wrote about one incident in this war with the Moros in an article
entitled Incident in the Philippines In this article he describes 600 Moros
hiding out in the bottom of a crater and how they were surrounded by Gen.
Leonard Woods forces who ringed the top of this crater and shot down into it
until The enemy numbered six hundred-including women and children-and
we abolished them utterly, leaving not even a baby alive to cry for its dead
mother. This is incomparably the greatest victory that was ever achieved by
the Christian soldiers of the United States.
Twain knew that his view of this atrocity went against the prevailing mood of
his fellow countrymen and so this was among the many essays he requested
be published after his death.
Although the final draft of the peace treaty which Madrid did sign provided
for the sale of the Philippines, including Moroland, to the United States for
20 million Mexican dollars, President William McKinley had doubts as to
Spains legal right to dispose of Moroland. He, therefore, instructed the
Schurman Commission - the first U.S. government body to administer the
Philippines - to investigate the legal status of the Moros. If it was determined
that the Moros were independent of the Philippines, bilateral treaties were to
be negotiated especially with the Sultanate of Sulu. A commercial treaty had
already existed between the U.S. and Sulu since 1842.
The result was the Bates Treaty. Negotiated between two, equal, sovereign
states - the United States and the Sultanate of Sulu - the treaty was signed
on August 20, 1899. This was eight months after the Treaty of Paris had
been signed ending the Spanish-American War. By this document - which
officially states that any subsequent changes to the treaty could only occur
by mutual consent - Washington officially acknowledged that the Moros were

not part of the Philippines and specifically guaranteed to respect the identity
and the integrity of the Sulu Sultanate. In return, the sultan recognized U.S.
sovereignty.
On March 21, 1904, the U.S. government unilaterally, and illegally,
abrogated the Bates Treaty. The sultan responded by officially expressing his
surprise and sadness by Washingtons action. The abrogation of the Bates
Treaty provoked a war with the Moros which lasted until 1913. The
subsequent Carpenter Agreement of 1915 by which the Sultan of Sulu
formally relinquished all political authority was illegal as it was signed under
American military coercion. This document, however, relinquished political
power only to the United States government not to the Philippines. Igorot
and Moro National Re-emergence, Joseph E. Fallon
WWII
On Dec. 8, 1941, the islands were invaded by Japanese troops. Following
the fall of Gen. Douglas MacArthurs forces at Bataan and Corregidor,
Quezon established a government-in-exile that he headed until his death in
1944. He was succeeded by Vice President Sergio Osmea. U.S. forces under
MacArthur reinvaded the Philippines in Oct. 1944 and, after the liberation of
Manila in Feb. 1945, Osmea reestablished the government. The Philippines
When independence from the US was imminent, the Moro leadership pled
not to be included in the new Independent Philippines. Yet, on July 4,
1946, when independence was proclaimed, the Morolands were incorporated
against their wishes, as they had been with the handover from Spain to the
US. An Enduring Freedom For the Moros, Amir Butler
But the region, and its six million Muslims, remain apart and distinct from
the rest of the 71 million Christian Filipinos. During the 1960s and 1970s,
Christian settlers, backed by the Manila government, began pushing into the
economically backward, long-neglected south, in many cases stealing land
and driving out its Muslim owners in a campaign of ethnic cleansing. Civil
war erupted and the Muslim farmers fought back. During the regime of
Ferdinand Marcos, the Philippine army and the gangs of paramilitary thugs
killed an estimated 50,000 Muslims from 1969-1971 - without a peep of
protest from Marcos American sponsors.
Two years later, the Moro National Liberation Front was formed in response
to Marcos imposition of martial law. The MNLF, which was financed by Libya,
called for an independent Muslim state - Bangsomoro. Three years of heavy
fighting between the MNLF and the US-armed Manila regime left over
100,000 Muslims dead; 250,000 were driven from their homes. The world
again ignored this massacre.In the mid-1970s, Libya brokered a peace
between Manila, the MNLF, and a breakaway group, the MILF. The MNLF
leader, Nur Misuari, joined the government, and rebel forces were integrated
into the national army. The Muslim regions of southern Philippines were
granted autonomy. But tensions simmered on. Christian settlers continued
to press the south; Moro factions battled with one another and failed to
develop effective local government.Philippines: Next Target of Bushs War,
Eric Margolis
The pattern of migrating Christians to Moro lands continued. In the 1950s,
Northern peasants formed the New Peoples Army and staged a Maoist
rebellion. In order to defuse the situation, the government, under the
auspices of the Economic Development Corp (EDCOR) began migrating these
peasants to the Moro south and giving them seized parcels of Moro land.
In 1968, anger at Manilla reached a new level, when the US-backed
Ferdinand Marcos executed nearly 70 Muslim commando recruits to keep
secret an aborted plan to invade Sabah, in Malaysias Borneo. When Marcos
declared martial law on September 21, 1972, the Moros went to war after a
quarter of a century of relative dormancy. Shortly afterwards, the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) was formed, which called for an
independent Moro state - Bangsamoro. They fought the US-armed Manilla

regime for twenty-five years, leaving at least 100,000 Moros dead, and
250,000 driven from their homes. In 1996, the MNLF signed a peace deal
with the Philippine government. An Enduring Freedom For the Moros, Amir
Butler
INTO THE 21ST CENTURY
In a war that has been criticized for its double-standards, this latest US
military adventure (Operation Enduring Freedom in 2002) will do little to
change perceptions.
America is helping fight the 800-strong Abu Sayyaf, whilst overlooking the
New Peoples Army, who represents a force of over 12,000 fighters. Theyve
been staging a communist insurgency in the north for the last 30 years, and
have killed over 40,000 people so far ...
The problems in the Morolands have little to do with international terrorism,
but have everything to do with the injustices meted out to the Moro people
for centuries. The solution to the Moro problem is the same as the solution
to the East Timor problem. There must be a referendum under UN
supervision similar to the one conducted in the former Portuguese colony.
After over 450 continuous years of struggling for independence, the
Moros dont need Operation Enduring Freedom, they just need
freedom. An Enduring Freedom For the Moros, Amir The second-phase of
Operation Enduring Freedom was launched last week: To hunt Abu Sayyaf in
the jungles of Basilan and Sulu. Whilst originally a breakaway from the Moro
(Muslims of the southern Philippines) independence movement, the 800strong Abu Sayyaf has devolved into a gang of bandits whose primary
objective seems to be lining their pockets with the proceeds of kidnapping
tourists and missionaries. They are hardly international terrorists.
Yet, like India with its maneuverings against Kashmiri militants, or Russia with
its war against Chechen separatists, the Philippine President knew which
button to press to get US sympathy. She termed her opponents "terrorists",
and linked them to Bin Laden. This was based only on a 1995 meeting with
Bin Laden's brother-in-law, Muhammad Jamal Khalifah, and some contact
with Ramzi Yusuf, the 1993 World Trade Center bomber.
So, once again, the West is entering into conflict in a region whose
complexities most of us know little about.
struggle began with the "discovery" of the Philippines by Ferdinand Magellan
Their policy was simply to convert the Indios to Christianity and kill the Moros.
The military resistance against the Spanish lasted over 350 years, until the
Spanish were defeated by the Americans in the 1898 Spanish-American war.
Despite the fact the Spanish had never colonized the Morolands, Spain
included Mindanao in the Treaty of Paris, which transferred sovereignty to the
United States.
the expression, "running amok". The colonial administration then began
In 1903, all Moro land holdings were declared null and void and made open to
land grabbing. In 1913, law was passed allowing Christians to own up to 16
hectares, whereas a Muslim could only own 8. In 1919, Christian land
entitlement was generously extended to 24 hectares.
When independence from the US was imminent, the Moro leadership pled not
to be included in the new "Independent Philippines". Yet, on July 4, 1946,
when independence was proclaimed, the Morolands were incorporated
US.

Northern peasants formed the New People's Army and staged a Maoist
rebellion. In order to defuse the situation, the government, under the auspices
of the Economic Development Corp (EDCOR) began migrating these
secret an aborted plan to invade Sabah, in Malaysia's Borneo. When Marcos
250,000 driven from their homes. In 1996, the MNLF signed a peace deal with
the Philippine government.
In a war that has been criticized for it's double-standards, this latest US
military adventure will do little to change perceptions.
New People's Army, who represents a force of over 12,000 fighters. They've
have killed over 40,000 people so far, including an American hiker and his
German companion killed last week.
but have everything to do with the injustices meted out to the Moro people for
centuries. The solution to the Moro problem is the same as the solution to the
East Timor problem. There must be a referendum under UN supervision
similar to the one conducted in the former Portuguese colony.
After over 450 continuous years of struggling for independence, the Moros
don't need "Operation Enduring Freedom", they just need freedom.
--BThe second-phase of Operation Enduring Freedom was launched last week:
To hunt Abu Sayyaf in the jungles of Basilan and Sulu. Whilst originally a
breakaway from the Moro (Muslims of the southern Philippines) independence
movement, the 800-strong Abu Sayyaf has devolved into a gang of bandits
whose primary objective seems to be lining their pockets with the proceeds of
kidnapping tourists and missionaries. They are hardly international terrorists.
Yet, like India with its maneuverings against Kashmiri militants, or Russia with
its war against Chechen separatists, the Philippine President knew which
button to press to get US sympathy. She termed her opponents "terrorists",
and linked them to Bin Laden. This was based only on a 1995 meeting with
Bin Laden's brother-in-law, Muhammad Jamal Khalifah, and some contact
with Ramzi Yusuf, the 1993 World Trade Center bomber.
So, once again, the West is entering into conflict in a region whose
complexities most of us know little about.
struggle began with the "discovery" of the Philippines by Ferdinand Magellan
Their policy was simply to convert the Indios to Christianity and kill the Moros.
The military resistance against the Spanish lasted over 350 years, until the
Spanish were defeated by the Americans in the 1898 Spanish-American war.
Despite the fact the Spanish had never colonized the Morolands, Spain
included Mindanao in the Treaty of Paris, which transferred sovereignty to the
United States.
the expression, "running amok". The colonial administration then began
In 1903, all Moro land holdings were declared null and void and made open to
land grabbing. In 1913, law was passed allowing Christians to own up to 16
hectares, whereas a Muslim could only own 8. In 1919, Christian land
entitlement was generously extended to 24 hectares.
When independence from the US was imminent, the Moro leadership pled not
to be included in the new "Independent Philippines". Yet, on July 4, 1946,
when independence was proclaimed, the Morolands were incorporated
US.
Northern peasants formed the New People's Army and staged a Maoist
rebellion. In order to defuse the situation, the government, under the auspices
of the Economic Development Corp (EDCOR) began migrating these
secret an aborted plan to invade Sabah, in Malaysia's Borneo. When Marcos
250,000 driven from their homes. In 1996, the MNLF signed a peace deal with
the Philippine government.
In a war that has been criticized for it's double-standards, this latest US
military adventure will do little to change perceptions.
New People's Army, who represents a force of over 12,000 fighters. They've
have killed over 40,000 people so far, including an American hiker and his
German companion killed last week.
but have everything to do with the injustices meted out to the Moro people for
centuries. The solution to the Moro problem is the same as the solution to the
East Timor problem. There must be a referendum under UN supervision
similar to the one conducted in the former Portuguese colony.
After over 450 continuous years of struggling for independence, the Moros
don't need "Operation Enduring Freedom", they just need freedom.
--- utler
t is now over half a century since the issue of autonomy has become a part of the yearly preoccupation of the Government Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Organization of
Islamic Conference (OIC), nevertheless, the Moro peoples fundamental right for freedom,
sovereignty and independence has never been achieved. The Moro people, historically, separate
and distinct from the Filipino nation, remain perpetually in chain, attached helplessly and
mercilessly to the apron string of the Philippine government. This clearly shows that the MNLF
signing of the 1974 Kuala Lumpur Resolution, accepting autonomy, placed the Moro people in a
trap - keeping in storage their struggle for total liberation. For all its good virtues, the 1974
Kuala Lumpur Resolution has derailed the MNLF from the correct path to freedom and
independence.
For many centuries, the Moro people were a free, sovereign and independent nation. But owing
to the centuries of turmoil wrought by endless waves of foreign conspiracy and aggressions, the
Moro people lost their freedom. Consequently, people other than themselves are exercising the
Moro peoples sovereignty. Indeed, by the 4th of July 1946, the Moro homeland was annexed
and gobbled up by the newly formed and newly independent Republic of the Philippines. Since
then and in vindication of our peoples right to freedom, sovereignty and independence, the
Moro people were embroiled in a never-ending war for total liberation. The word secession is
a misnomer and cannot be applied to the Moro peoples struggle because it is a just and
legitimate struggle for total liberation based on the fundamental principles of independence of
non-governing people of nations of the world. The MNLF struggle should have been the
paramount fulfillment of the total liberation of the Moro homeland had it not accepted autonomy.
Indeed, at the present moment only the MNLF remains faithful and steadfast in upholding the
OIC Resolutions and the 1996 GRP-MNLF-OIC Final Peace Agreement. Even the Philippine
government does not exude any sign of sincerity and seriousness in complying with the Peace
Accord in letter and spirit. Otherwise why the prolonged delay. A half century of dilly-dallying
on the part of the government from President Marcos to Macapagal-Arroyo, should be enough
eye-opener to the MNLF. While the cause of freedom and independence tends to unite all of the
Moro people under one single banner as happened in the beginning of the MNLF struggle,
autonomy, on the other hand, creates dissension and division and disunity and weakness among
the Moro people. Perhaps, autonomy is much more difficult to achieve than independence.
The MNLF has given more than enough chances to the Philippine government to demonstrate its
sincere commitment to uphold and implement the agreement in letter and spirit, however, all the
MNLF got are alibis and downright lies, let alone the character demolition of the MNLF
leadership, not only from the government but also the Philippine media and government
officials.
The dissatisfaction of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) with the implementation of
the 1996 GRP-MNLF-OIC Final Peace Agreement can no longer be hidden under any cloak of
goodwill.
Nearly half century of waiting for the implementation of genuine autonomy, which should be
founded on the mutual approval of GRP and MNLF, has made weary and disgruntled the
overwhelming majority of MNLF forces, communities, supporters and sympathizers. It is not a
far-fetched scenario that time will come when some MNLF cannot contain their disappointment.
The MNLF, even at the risk of alienating its people struggling for independence, silenced their
guns and uphold peace for over ten (10) years now. All it asks is for the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines to fulfill its part of the bargain, without evasion, deceit or
procrastination.
It seems that in the arena of this 1996 GRP-MNLF-OIC Final Peace Agreement, we are not
actually at peace with our partner but still at war performing the battle of the wits.
The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) had shown utmost sincerity in upholding the Peace
Covenants, this being manifested by silencing our guns, even to the extent of our partners
continuous genocidal attacks in our camps and communities.
Yet, for fourteen long years, we still exert much effort in finding ways and means to negotiate
peacefully, solutions to the major violations of our partner, the GRP.
However, we wish to reiterate, that all negotiations have their limits and this kind of situation
cannot go on forever. There will always come a time that we in the Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF) have to choose an option that will not, never again, chain our people to
oppression.
An option, that will ultimately lead our people to regain our inherent rights and freedom as one
moro nation
TOTAL LIBERATION OF THE BANGSAMORO PEOPLE IN THIS HOMELAND!
THE MORO PEOPLE CURRENT SITUATION
Posted by Aishah Fatima on November 1, 2010 at 8:34 AM
A. Broken Pieces of Dreams (Post Agreement scenario)

The 1996 Final Peace Agreement was the third of its kind: first, the December 23, 1976 Tripoli
Agreement; second, the least heralded Jeddah Accord signed in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in
April 1987; third, the now 1996 GRP-MNLF-OIC Final Peace Agreement signed September 2,
1996 in Malacanang Palace, Philippines, except that this agreement was to flesh up the mother
agreement that the MNLF signed under the aegis of the defunct Quadripartite Ministerial
Committee in Tripoli, Libya in December 23, 1976. Recalling the Quadripartite Ministerial
Committee was enlarged into what is now the Ministerial Committee of the Eight at the outset of
this latest phase in the GRP-MNLF-OIC peace process.
In the wake of the signing of this latest Peace Agreement, people were animated and exuberant
in their enthusiasm to welcome and support it. Except for a few, everyone thought that indeed
that long-sought-after peace was just around the corner; and with that peace, a floodgate of
economic activities and development and rehabilitation would follow. Lo! What a rosy picture it
was that was dangled before the Moro peoples eyes. Who would not be mesmerized by what
one heard coming repeatedly to ones eagerly receptive ears, like an endless repertoire of sweet
melodious songs. Even the MNLF leadership, were taken in and literally swept off their feet. In
three years time, at the end of the three-year transitional period of mechanism, all the vestiges of
the long and disastrous war, result of nearly three solid decades of mindless bloodletting, the
MNLF were swept away. What with pledges by the tens of billions of pesos to be earmarked for
reconstruction and rehabilitation. Who would not pander to the spectre of a Mini-Marshall Plan
of Reconstruction and Rehabilitation, akin in some ways to the great spectacle that came at the
end of the Second World War in Europe? Everyone was coming in throngs to picture a beautiful
and attractive scenario to dazzle the Moro peoples eyes and ears.
So optimistic, indeed, was the air that no less than the Peace Prize Committee of the Felix
Houphoet Boigny-UNESCO, in awarding the 1997 Nobel Peace prize to President Fidel Ramos
and MNLF Chairman Prof. Nur Misuari, was expressing its hope that the 1996 GRP-MNLF-OIC
Final Peace Agreement would set as a model for other revolutionary movements to emulate and
follow.
The MNLF Chairman Prof Nur Misuari was very enthusiastic that peace between the MNLF
Bangsamoro Armed Forces and the Armed Forces of the Philippines has been achieved and put
in place. That is because, the MNLF have been faithful and fastidious in upholding and
implementing their treaty commitment, for the sake of peace. The integration of the MNLF
combatants to AFP and PNP has been successfully on the move and the MNLF Chairman
instructed all the other combatants in the 14 provinces and ten cities to prepare for the formation
of the so-called Regional Internal Security Forces (RISF).
The 1996 Peace Agreement provides that the Regional Internal Security Forces (RISF) shall be
formed and based as it is in rural areas, including the lush forest and mountainous regions of
Mindanao and its islands, to complement and support the peace and order efforts of the AFP and
PNP. Together or separately, they will strengthen and sustain the momentum of peace in the
Bangsamoro homeland.
The MNLF Chairman even went to the extent of meeting the MILF Chairman, to work out a
mechanism or a joint coordinating body, to prevent possible recrudescence of animosity and
armed clashes between the two Mujahideen forces, either individually or organizationally. They
also agreed in principle to join hands or separately to prevent recurrence of fighting or war in any
part of the Bangsamoro homeland, in order to ensure the safety of the Bangsamoro people and
others from any danger of their lives, honour and property.
Further, so overwhelmed was the MNLF Chairman, that the great exquisite beauty of this
homeland and its white sandy beaches, coupled with its excellent climate almost throughout the
year, reinforced by the vast, teeming and seemingly inexhaustible aquatic and mineral and
agricultural resources, much of which remain basically still untapped up to these days, would
make the Moro homeland at once compelling and irresistible indeed both to tourists and
investors worldwide. And this could easily enable the Moro people to overcome the devastating
effect of the long war; and in a short period of time enable them to catch up and even outstrip
other nations of the world economically. This way the Moro people can plant the seeds of a
durable and lasting peace in the Moro homeland, thereby ensuring the success of the Peace
Agreement for themselves and for their posterity.
What a wonderful future the MNLF Chairman had envisioned for his people and homeland. Too
late for him to realize it all became broken pieces of a dream.
B. Unfulfilled Promises
The prospects, however, is not as encouraging let alone as bright. All because of the flawed and
erratic implementation of the Peace Agreement. As there has been unnecessary dilly-dallying
with the development funds, thereby procrastinating and delaying the development and
rehabilitation program to uncertain date in the future. Thus, nothing meaningful and visible that
can touch the life of the Moro people and society have transpired since the MNLF embarked on
their governance and supervision of the autonomous region and the Southern Philippines Council
for Peace and Development for nearly three years. Even such highly laudable program like the
anti-poverty program of the government has not been adequately funded, let alone sustained.
Although some of the MNLF have derived modest benefits from foreign donors i.e. United
Nations Development Program (UNDP), World Bank Social Fund, USA-Emergency Livelihood
Assistance Program (ELAP), Canadian International Development Assistance (CIDA), Japanese
International Cooperation Assistance (JICA), United Nations Population Fund, ADB Adult
Literacy Program, the Belgian, the Australian, the German and other foreign-funded
humanitarian assistance, all of these are in the forms of stop-gap measures and incidental to the
socio-economic obligations created by the 1996 Final Peace Agreements and imposed
unequivocally on the contracting parties, particularly, the Philippine Government. Hence, theyll
encompass only so much number of clienteles among depressed people victims of the untold
consequences and devastation of the war. Besides, theyll carry on their activities only while the
program lasts; and this depends solely on the mood and temperament of the donor organizations
or countries.
The entry of the foreign assistance did not play a dramatic role in the rehabilitation of postconflict communities. This was caused by the practice of foreign donor agencies to spend so
much on consultancy fees and salaries of personnel majority are non-Muslims from Metro
Manila and Visayas. The MNLF acknowledge the bail out role of foreign donor communities
in the implementation of the socio-economic aspect of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement,
however, it has been noted that it has only negatively contributed to widening the wealth gap
between Muslims and Christians in the ARMM. Further, the unequal distribution of projects by
foreign donors among the communities of the MNLF and the Moro people caused disagreements
in the ground and worst of all, the foreign donors utilized and exploit the Moro people as their
handyman for free.
Two analysts at the RAND Graduate School based in Sta. Monica, California, writing for the
Summer 2002 edition of the RAND Review (page 24), has this to state:
A negative example is the Southern Philippines, where social and economic aid totaled only
$6.00 per person per year over a period of five years. This meager sum helps to explain the
dismal failure of most of the development policies instituted in Mindanao to inhibit support for
terrorism. Compounding the situation, most of the money was channeled to Christian-populated
areas, merely exacerbating the already existing wealth differentials between Christian and
Muslim communities. The combined effect has been to nurture and, in certain cases, intensify
support for local insurgent and terrorist groups.
The flow of funds and financial assistance both local and international could hardly be accounted
for, that is, while the national government and foreign donor states flood the newspapers and
radio media outlets of funds downpour into the area, the Bangsamoro homeland and people
could hardly see where such downpours occur.
It has been observed that the GRP Report on the Implementation of the 1996 Final Peace
Agreement (FPA) has been suffused with heavy details of projects so as to create the impression
that a beehive of socio-economic activities has been unleashed in Mindanao. However, the larger
picture of the economic and social conditions of the Moros belies what these details of projects
hope to create in the minds of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).
The truth is: the bulk of downpours of funds claimed by the national government did not pass
through the administrative hands of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).
Until now, the so-called Mini Marshall Plan for Mindanao is not yet realized and the approach
remains to be on a piecemeal basis. Undisputable poverty continues to be the unfortunate lot of
the majority in spite of these projects.
Because of the paucity and limitation in the benefits that the Peace Agreement has wrought, the
MNLF only have thus far succeeded in sowing the seeds of rancor and demoralization in the
hearts and consciousness of the Moro people, especially, the MNLF rank and file. Instead of the
much-vaunted progress and development that have been vociferously promised the people to
mobilize their full support behind the 1996 Final Peace Agreement, all that the Moro people have
so far got during much of the ten years has been an endless throng of unfulfilled promises, apart
from the foreign charities and handouts and the anti-poverty program that has since been
discontinued for lack of funds.
Serious as this failure to comply with the economic and financial components of the 1996 Final
Peace Agreement may be, but worse off still have been the violation in the sphere of political
commitments and obligations.
Time and again, the MNLF have stressed the need for a trilateral (GRP-MNLF-OIC)
consultation especially in the political aspect. Ironically, even at the occasional pleading of the
OIC, the GRP has proceeded unilaterally in interpreting and executing its obligations under the
FPA. A case in point, and something which move backward the pace of the FPA, was the August
14, 2001 Plebiscite called by the GRP for the purpose of ratifying Republic Act of 9054, or An
Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Muslim Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act 6734, Entitled An Act Providing for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, As Amended.
On this score, the November 24, 2001 letter of the OIC Secretary General to the Chairman of the
OIC Ministerial Committee of Eight did not fail to observe that:
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines has unilaterally fixed a time-table to
conduct a plebiscite in the Autonomous Region in the Southern Philippines August 14.It also
unilaterally set the date of November 25 next without taking account of the resolutions of Islamic
Conferences appealing to the Government of the Philippines not to unilaterally conduct the
plebiscite and to extend the deadline for the elections of the Autonomous Region in 2003.
The ratification of RA 9054, even at the expressed opposition of the MNLF and OIC, is pregnant
with negative implications. With it, the GRP is claiming that it is the amendatory law
contemplated in the 1996 Final Peace Agreement. As with usual electoral processes in the
Philippines, the people of the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) were made to
ratify a very important law without them understanding its contents. As we always say, the merit
of autonomy is always defeated by the tyranny of numbers. Uninformed and prejudiced people
are forced to accept or reject something they do not understand at all. The GRP is to be blamed
for the consequences of RA 9054 because even the law provided for massive information
dissemination prior to a plebiscite, but which it has miserably failed to do.
All constitutional and democratic processes, which the peace agreement is noted for, are marred
with questionable political maneuvers and horse-trades. The plebiscite of August 14, 2001,
which ratified Republic Act 9054 and decided for the additional areas that favored autonomy,
was advertised only for three (3) days absent of any substantial participation of Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF) leaders who were then in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The Bangsamoro
people were not sufficiently apprised of the pros and cons of the issue. It was compounded by the
notorious performance of the electoral commission acting all the time at the instance and
command of Malacanang.
RA 9054 is also replete with provisions that run counter to the intent and text of the FPA. The
new law either omitted or modified important provisions explicitly written in the 1996 FPA. For
instance, Item No. 2, paragraph b of FPA provides that:
The new area of autonomy shall then be determined by the provinces and cities that will
vote/choose to join the said autonomy. It may be provided by the Congress in a law that clusters
of contiguous Muslim-dominated municipalities voting in favor of autonomy be merged and
constituted into a new province(s) which shall become part of the new autonomous region.
It took the Philippine Congress 5 years to enact the self-styled amendatory law which was agreed
to be passed within two years from the establishment of the then Southern Philippines Council
for Peace and Development (SPCPD), the implementing mechanism for Phase I of the FPA. As
such, there is no assurance that a law for the clustering of Muslim-dominated municipalities will
be given priority by a snail-paced Congress. The makers of RA 9054 did not take the chance,
wittingly or unwittingly, to incorporate such vital provision.
The ensuing elections of Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) officials on

November 2001 and May 2005 showed how the filths of Philippine politics threaten the very
political culture of the Bangsamoro people. What Malacanang wants, Malacanang gets.
At the outset, and by the look of events that unfolded in our midst all is well that ends well. But
no, not to the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the very struggle they fought for
decades.
While a peace agreement is in place, its terms and conditions are waywardly implemented, at
least, to one who is keen at looking at things more objectively. How could there be peace when
the very players involved in the process have already been deceived, emasculated --nowhere to
be found now?
It baffles now every normal mind to see Mujahideens hardly allowed to share and partake of its
blessings as against those who from out of the blues are taking command and propelling the
wheels of their destiny as a people. For ten (10) years after said agreement had been forged, their
lives and that of their communities experience no change for the better; in fact, worse.
One will find now a Mujahid who spent the prime of his life fighting for decades, looking for
back-up patron (patronage politics) just to land a job in the autonomous government. Even the
few appointed MNLF officials to key positions could hardly pass for confirmation by the
commission on appointments composed mostly of non-fighters but permanently occupying
professional and affluent status in the community.
And this unbreakable misery cannot be well presented in the circles of power in the national
government because Muslim representation does not emanate from genuine stakeholders.
Appointees to national positions are usually made without the expressed consent of the MNLF
Leadership as contained in the GRP. Upon meticulous examination of the Muslims in the
echelons of government including ARMM, majority are traditional politicians and has long been
in government even before the signing of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement (FPA).
In the field of justice, the Shariah Courts are still weak administratively as only one (1) District
Court is created with the remaining four District Courts still vacant. In the Shariah Circuit
Courts, only 19 judges have been appointed while 32 positions are still unfilled inspite of the big
number of Muslims who passed the Shariah Bar Exams.
Lastly, but definitely not the least of issues, the integration of MNLF combatants in to the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and Philippine National Police (PNP) calls remedial actions. The
separate unit for the MNLF Integrees has not been created since 1996 and while the position of
Deputy Commander for Separate Units was created, it is purely ministerial and symbolic. Being
loosely deployed, these MNLF Integrees are now being used in combat operations against other
Muslim groups. This practice runs counter to the 1996 FPA and may only rekindle deep-seated
resentment against the military and police.
Unfortunately, however, the Bangsamoro people have yet to see the dawn of economic
prosperity and political stability the peace accord had vowed to fulfill.
THE PARLIAMENTARY STRUGGLE of the

BANGSAMORO
Posted by Aishah Fatima on November 1, 2010 at 8:17 AM
A. Stalemate (The Negotiation)

Two struggles had the MNLF entered into: first, the armed struggle; second, the parliamentary
struggle. Both have different forms of battle used, the former performing the battle of arms, the
latter a negotiating table using the battle of wits. In the armed struggle, the MNLF won the
war. However, in times of cessation of hostilities or what we call temporary peace, the MNLF,
unexpectedly, made its biggest blunder because the enemies outwitted them.
Reminiscing the past, what are the enemys objectives when they agreed to resolve war in a
round table? Is it really peace the enemies want to achieve or merely used it as a weapon to gain
time to accumulate resources and consolidate power for the next round of battles?
Negotiation does not always happen between the two warring parties. Its occurrence is
contingent on the concrete realities recognized by both sides and their willingness to undertake
it. The government can refuse a peace deal if it can beat the other side on the battlefield.
However, it can be over-eager to negotiate, if the other party indicates a weakness that can be
exploited over the negotiation table, or can be tricked into capitulation. The government can also
use negotiation as a weapon to miss-represent itself as the just and reasonable side, to sow
intrigue in the ranks of the rebels and to fool the people.
War is costly, while the negotiation is cheap. A day in war is usually costlier than a month of
talking. In negotiation, there are no lives lost, properties destroyed or people rendered homeless.
And as the negotiation drags on, the status quo of disengagement or non-engagement is given
more and more a sense of reality and the hope of becoming permanent.
In many instances, it is true that talking is better than not talking at all. But talking as if the
whole peace process revolves around it only validates the charge that negotiation is mere
exercise in futility. It is not meant to reach anything lofty. It is an end in itself.
However, a sincere quest for peace a just and lasting one through negotiation, is a different
story. It is a slow process and has no or few shortcuts. Its soul is the identification of the root
causes of conflict and its primary objective is to carry out an urgent agenda of change by the
agreeing parties that would resolve the problems underlying the conflict.
However, there is little reason to doubt that when the government agreed to sit down with the
MNLF to talk, it was resorting to the time-tested tactic: when hard=pressed, negotiate. The grand
design of the MNLF to carve an empire known as the Bangsa Moro Republik was high on its
agenda. Fighting was raging everywhere and a sizeable portion of Mindanao and Sulu was in
rebel hands. The government also knew that peace achieved by violence will not last and
represented only a part of the solution to the rebellion.
B. Islamic Countries On the Move for MNLF
International support for the MNLF cause started as early as the late 1960s when reports of
Muslim massacres hit world headlines. The first to react openly was Col. Muammar Ghaddafi,
President of Libya, who said that his government would come to the rescue of the Muslim Moros
in Mindanao and Sulu if the mass killings of his brethren did not stop. He was not alone in
expressing such serious concern. Many other Muslim leaders in Asia and Africa shared the same
sentiments. The worldwide reactions pushed the Philippines and the Marcos regime into a
precarious position, because many of these states did not need the Philippines as much as this
country needed them. Many of these states were producers of oil, which the Philippines needed
very much. Consequently, Marcos began to look for scapegoats. He accused foreign agents of
blowing up the conflict out of proportion.
The first foreign leader, at the state level, to extend concrete help to the Muslim Moros was Tun
Datu Mustapha, Chief Minister of Sabah. There were many reasons why he came to the rescue of
the Muslims. One of these was his biological, emotional and historical connection with the
Muslim Moros of Mindanao and Sulu. His mother was a Tausog and therefore he was much of a
Moro as the rest of his brethren. He allowed Sabah to be used as training camp, supply depot,
communication center and sanctuary.
Tun Datu Mustapha Harons stance and later also that of Kuala Lumpur Sabah is part of the
Federation of Malaysia was a major irritant between the two neighbors. The Philippines had a
long-standing claim over Sabah that at one time almost led to open warfare. Sabah came to be
regarded by the Philippine as part of her territory on the strength of the ownership claim of the
ancient Sulu Sultanate.
Kuala Lumpur never admitted aiding the Muslim Moros. The official position of Malaysia
regarding the Mindanao crisis was confined only to actively supporting resolutions passed by the
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).
In 1971, Libyan President Muammar Ghaddafi openly declared his support for the Muslim
Moros, who were apparently the object of a genocide campaign. In the same year, Libyan
Foreign Minister Saleh Bouyasser came to the Philippines with a US $1 million pledge of his
government to bankroll the on-going guerilla training of 300 Muslim Moro recruits in Malaysia.
A year later, when Martial Law was declared, Libyan money, weapons and other materials
started to flow into the frontlines in Mindanao and Sulu.
In May 1971, the Organization of Islamic Conference was founded. One of its aims, as set
clearly in its Charter, is to strengthen the struggle of all Muslim people to safeguard their dignity,
independence and national rights. It so happened that Tunku Abdul Rahman, the founding father
and first Prime Minister of Malaysia became the first Secretary General of the powerful panIslamic body. As head of the OIC, he was instrumental in the support extended to the Muslim
Moros by the OIC member states especially Libya and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
From February 29 to March 4, 1972, the third Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in
Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, passed a resolution calling for the review of the plight of the
Muslims living in the Philippines, especially in Mindanao and Sulu.
On March 24-26, 1973, the Fourth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers meeting in
Benghazi, Libya, expressed deep concern over the reported repression and mass extermination of
Muslims in South Philippines and decided to send a delegation of Foreign Ministers from Libya,
Senegal, Somalia and Saudi Arabia. The Conference also created a voluntary fund from memberstates to help the Muslims in South Philippines. If further passed a resolution requesting
Indonesia and Malaysia to exert their good offices, within the framework of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to help find a solution to the problem.
In August of the same year, the four-nation delegation visited Mindanao and Sulu. Members of
the delegation were Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Omar Al-Shakaff, Libyan Foreign Minister
Abdulati Al-Obeidi, Somalian Foreign Minister Arteh Ghalib and Senegal Ambassador to Egypt
Moustapha Cisse. The fact-finding mission took note of the steps taken by the Philippines to
improve the condition of the Muslims. These steps however were considered insufficient to solve
the whole problem, as reflected in the resolution of the succeeding meeting of the Islamic
Conference of Foreign Ministers in Kuala Lumpur the following year.
On March 9-13, 1974, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Omar Al-Shakaff again visited the
Philippines in a bid to follow up earlier efforts to monitor the condition of the Muslim Moros.
President Marcos told him that the government was doing everything to attend to the needs of the
Muslim Moro communities which included the setting aside of wide tracts of land for
resettlement.
On May 29, 1974, President Marcos and President Suharto met at Menado, North Sulawesi,
Indonesia to discuss among other vital ASEAN concerns, the Muslim Moro rebellion. But unlike
Malaysia and Libya, Indonesia was more concerned with regional unity, as expressed in the
ASEAN, of which both Malaysia and the Philippines were members.
On June 21-25, 1974, the Fifth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers was held in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia. The conference called upon the Philippine government to desist from all
measures, which may result in the killing of Muslims and the destruction of their properties and
places of worship in Southern Philippines. It urged the government to find a political and
peaceful solution through negotiation with Muslim leaders, particularly, with the representatives
of the Moro National Liberation Front, in order to arrive at a just solution to the plight of the
Filipino Muslims, within the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Philippines. It also created a welfare agency, known as Filipino Muslim Welfare and Relief
Agency, for the purpose of extending welfare and relief aid directly to Muslims in the Southern
Philippines.
C. Rounding Up The Table for Initial Talks
On the basis of Resolution No. 18 approved in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, follow-up efforts to
bring the two warring parties to the negotiating table rose high on the OIC agenda. At the
invitation of the Philippine government, Dr. Mohammad Hassan Al-Tohamy, the new OIC
Secretary General, visited the Philippines to discuss matters in connection with the resolution.
He succeeded in bringing the MNLF and the Philippine government to the negotiating table in
Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on January 18-19, 1975. The MNLF formally abandoned the
pursuit of independence, in favor of a strong autonomous region with internal security forces.
The GRP and MNLF panels met in the presence of the OIC Secretary General. The talks,
however, did not materialize because both sides presented demands that could not be met by
either side. The MNLF panel was composed of Nur Misuari, MNLF Chairman; Salamat Hashim,
MNLF Deputy Chairman; Abdulbaki Abubakar, Hamid Lukman and Abdulrasad Asani. On the
government side was Executive Secretary, Alejandro Melchor, who headed the government
panel. The members were Rear Admiral Romulo Espaldon, Ambassador Liningding
Pangandaman, Col. Jose Almonte and four others.
The aborted talks, after further consultations, were re-scheduled to take place on April 7, 1975. It
did not take place, because President Marcos instead called a dialogue In Zamboanga City from
April 17 to June 30, 1975. Those he invited to this dialogue were handpicked by the President
among the Muslim leaders, government officials and rebels, who are among those who rejected
the nine-point agenda proposed by the OIC Quadripartite Ministerial Committee for the
resumption of the stalled negotiation.
The Sixth Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference convened in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
on July 12-15, 1975. The conference approved the nine-point proposal for the resumption of
talks and urged both the MNLF and the Philippine government to resume the negotiation, as
early as possible.
On May 6, 1976, Dr. Karim Gaye of Senegal, the new OIC Secretary General, met President
Marcos in Nairobi, Kenya. The OIC Chief told the President of the need for the resumption of
the talks between the MNLF and the Philippine government.
A week later, on May 13-16, 1976 the Seventh Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference held
session in Istanbul, Turkey. As usual, the conference reiterated its call for the immediate
resumption of the talks between the MNLF and the Philippine government.
On October 1, 1976, the Islamic solidarity Fund donated US $1 million to the Agency for
Development and Welfare of the Muslim in the Philippines. However, this fund was coursed
through the Philippine government, which had the discretion over the manner of disbursement
and programming.
D. Ink on Paper (The Clowns Betrayal)
In the meantime, Imelda Marcos, the first lady of President Marcos, was designated Special
Envoy of her husband. This brought her to Egypt, Algeria, New York, Saudi Arabia and then to
Libya. At the United Nations, she had an occasion to discuss the Mindanao crisis with Algerian
Foreign Minister Abdul Aziz Bouteflika, then President of the UN General Assembly and
through him with the Arab delegates to the world body. From there, she proceeded to Tripoli,
Libya where she had a lengthy dialogue with President Muammar Ghaddafi on the Mindanao
crisis.
On December 15-23, 1976, the second round of negotiation between the MNLF and the
Philippine government took place in Tripoli, Libya. The talks were conducted in the presence of
the Quadripartite Ministerial Committee. Dr. Ali Treki, the Libyan Foreign Minister, presided
over the series of meetings between the two panels, which culminated in the signing of the
covenant now known as the Tripoli Agreement of December 23, 1976. The agreement provided
for the establishment of autonomy for thirteen specified provinces and nine cities in Mindanao
and Sulu.
Undersecretary Carmelo Barbero chaired the government panel, with the following as members:
Liningding Pangandaman, Simeon Datumanong, Karim Sidri, Pacifico Castro and Col. Eduardo
Ermita. The MNLF panel again was composed of Nur Misuari, Salamat Hashim, Abdulbaki
Abubakar and Abdulrasad Asani. Also with the group, as legal counsels, were Atty. Zacaria
Candao and Atty. Pangalian Balindong of Lanao del Sur.
Subsequently a formal ceasefire agreement between the two warring parties was signed on
January 20, 1977. A committee was organized, composed of the MNLF, the Philippine
government and the Quadripartite Committee to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire.
Provincial ceasefire committees were also set up in the thirteen provinces to help monitor and
maintain the observance of the accord.
The philosophy behind the declaration of a ceasefire is simple. Heads must cool off, shooting
must stop before the talking can proceed. It is only in an atmosphere of understanding and
serenity that the search for real peace can proceed.
The ceasefire agreement was generally holding during the early months of 1977, but it collapsed
completely towards the end of the year when the government troops mounted massive offensives
against all known MNLF strongholds. Even the mutually agreed bivouac areas in Mindanao, as
earlier depicted, were also attacked almost simultaneously.
The Tripoli Agreement was lacking in sufficient detail and therefore the two panels agreed to
meet first in Libya, from February 9 to March 3, 1977 and then in Manila from April 21 to 30,
1977 to finalize it. However, on both occasions, they bogged down owing to the over emphasis
on the side issues, rather than on the substantive points, by representatives of the Philippine
government.
The meeting in Libya first stalemated and then bogged down. The two panels simply could not
agree on the degree of autonomy to be handed to the Moros and the definite role the MNLF had
to play in it. More time had been expended on the side issues than on the substantive points.
National Defense Undersecretary Carmelo Barbero, head of the GRP panel even brought up the
issue of a plebiscite, which was nowhere to be located in the entire text of the agreement.
Again the First Lady was sent to Libya to thresh out matters with President Muammar Ghaddafi.
The result was the exchange of cables between President Marcos and President Ghaddafi on
March 17-18. The communiqu contained their consensus on the declaration of autonomy, a
provisional government, and the holding of a referendum or consultation.
The meeting in Manila, like the first, was tense. There was a heated discussion between the
Philippine panel and representatives of the Quadripartite Committee, particularly Dr. Ali Treki.
The talks failed, as had been predicted right at the outset. Firstly, President Marcos hastily went
to Japan in an obvious attempt to escape any role in a negotiation he may have maneuvered
towards collapse. Secondly, the Philippine delegation was engaging in too many questions over
technicalities, virtually reducing the talks into a grammar class. Even a single article like the or
of sent the Philippine side composed mostly of ministers like Foreign Minister Carlos P.
Romulo and Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile to gang up on and lock horns with the OIC
representatives. And thirdly, as in the first negotiation in Tripoli, Libya, the Philippine panel
showed its bad faith and sinister attempt to obstruct the path to peace in Mindanao.
E. Again Another Betrayal

Capitalizing on the stalled negotiations, which later degenerated into a no-peace all-war
situation, President Marcos unleashed a multi-faceted, multi-pronged counter insurgency
program, which was implemented at an exceptionally rapid pace. Militarization continued to
increase and identified MNLF areas were flooded with bloodthirsty military regulars and
irregulars. Under the veneer of his socio-economic and infrastructure agenda, he built roads,
bridges, dikes and ports, dredged rivers and canals, reclaimed marshes, etc. With his land reform
program, he further dispossessed the Muslim Moros of their remaining landholdings. New waves
of emigrants from the North, at government expense, kept pouring in, which resulted in the
creation of fresh settlements and colonies.
One may be led to believe that all these programs were executed in the names of peace, security
and progress. But in reality they were in the nature of sugar-coated bullets. All were intended
to defeat the MNLF, deny it of its favorable natural sanctuaries and to penetrate into the hearts
and minds of the people.
The governments unusual interests in promoting Islam and the study of the Arabic language
did not fail to intrigue inquisitive minds. These culminated in the creation of the so-called
Ministry of Muslim Affairs. A similar approach was instituted during the American colonial
regime in the Philippines. The study of the Holy Quran was introduced, obviously as part of
their pacification campaign. Thousands of Moro kids, as a result, filled schoolhouses.
The hypocritical bid to promote Islam cannot be discerned unless one viewed this as part of the
wide-ranging counter insurgency scheme of the government. This country is strictly secular. The
church and state are separated. Both the 1935 and 1973 Philippine Constitutions also the 1987
Charter explicitly prohibit the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities from
promoting, assisting or uplifting any one religion in the Philippines, directly or indirectly.
The appointment of erstwhile Rear Admiral Romulo Espaldon as head of this Ministry of
Muslim Affairs was offensive to the Muslims of this country. During his stint with the
SOUTHCOM, the Admirals hands had dripped with much Moro blood. He renounced
Catholicism or was made to renounce it in order to qualify for the job, as being a Muslim was
obviously its first criterion. Was there no full-blooded Muslim at the time that could fit the job
squarely?
The air of optimism that greeted the diplomatic breakthrough in Tripoli, Libya, at the signing of
the agreement was but analgesic. Even after the lapse of almost a decade since the signing on
December 23, 1976 and the subsequent ouster of Marcos on February 25, 1986, many eyebrows
were still being raised in wonder whether Marcos was really sincere or had merely played a catand-mouse game. However, those who had a commanding grasp of the Philippine history
especially that segment which is focused on the interludes of peace negotiations and true
agreements --- simply view the Tripoli Agreement as another Kiram-Bates Treaty of 1899. That
treaty was signed between Sultan Jamalul Kiram II of the Sulu Sultanate and Brig. Gen. John C.
Bates, representing the United States. The Sultan signed the treaty in the firm belief that it
signaled the safety of the homeland and the explulsion of the American colonialist. The
Americans had a different motive in mind. They made use of the treaty to usher in eventual
occupation of the Moro country.
A close scrutiny of the circumstances leading to the conclusion of both agreements would reveal
striking similarities. As pointed out earlier, the Kiram-Bates Treaty was chiefly used by the
Americans to prevent the opening of another battlefront in Mindanao and Sulu while they were
battling the forces of Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo in Luzon. It was indeed a matter of temporary
exigency that this treaty was conceived. Eight decades later, history seemed to have repeated
itself. The pre-1977 period was really a precarious one for the Marcos regime.
Metropolitan Manila, the state nerve center, was becoming vulnerable to communist forces
because most of the AFP combat forces were deployed in Mindanao and Sulu. The years of
confrontations in the South allowed the Communist New peoples Army (NPA) to grow in size
and strength. In fact, NPA forces were already scoring many remarkable victories in many areas
in the north. And for some time the island of Samar in the Visayas was practically a liberated
area. This was why some army contingents were shipped back to Luzon and the Visayas
immediately after the signing of the Tripoli Agreement.
Until the last moment of the American regime in the Philippines, the Kiram-Bates Treaty was no
more than a scrap of paper. It was not recognized or observed faithfully by the Americans. The
case of the Tripoli Agreement was no much different. Up to the disgrace of Present Marcos in
early 1986, the agreement was just a scrap of paper. One Mindanao leader, Reuben Canoy,
who figured prominently in the move for the island to secede from the Philippines, observed:
The Tripoli Agreement was soon reduced to a mere scrap of paper. Perhaps this was bound
to, for like most diplomatic documents the pact was couched in imprecise language liable to all
sorts of miss-interpretation by the signatories.
The Eight Foreign Ministers Conference convened in Tripoli, Libya on May 16-22, 1977. A
historic decision was passed granting special observer status to the MNLF, an action clearly
conveying additional political clout in dealing with the Philippine government. The conference
also held the government solely responsible for the failure of the negotiations in Tripoli, Libya in
February 1977 and in Manila in April 1977.
The republic of Senegal hosted the Ninth Foreign Ministers Conference at its capital, Dhakar, on
April 24-28, 1978. Hence the OIC denounced the Philippines for the massacres committed
against the Muslim Moros and for reneging on her international obligations to honor the Tripoli
Agreement. The Conference also called upon both parties to come to a ceasefire and resume
negotiations.
After a year, on May 8-12, 1979, the tenth Islamic Conference for Foreign Ministers assembled
in Fez, Kingdom of Morocco. Again the OIC called on the government to implement the
agreement.
In February 1980, the new OIC Secretary General, Habib Chatti, paid a visit to Manila to bring
up the issue once again. But again, the government reacted negatively on the issue.
Sometime in 1981, Indonesia, the most populous Muslim state, offered her good offices as an
honest broker to arbitrate the conflict or at least to restart the stalled negotiations. There was
no concrete reply.
On March 21-23, 1982, Saudi Arabia tried to give the precarious peace another lease on life. The
late King Khaled Ibn Saud personally brought up the case with President Marcos during his visit
to the Kingdom. But, smart as ever, the latter placated his host by assuring him that autonomy
was already in place in Mindanao and Sulu.
Then came the big bang in 1983. Former Senator Benigno Aquino Jr. was shot dead on the
tarmac of the Manila International Airport on August 21. Aquino was their bitterest political
rival. No one person or group had a greater motive to execute the assassination.
Thenceforth, the Moro issue was relegated to the sidelines. The Marcoses were busy shielding
themselves against the backlash of the assassination.
The years 1985 came and went. They glided away almost unnoticed as far as the Mindanao
problem was concerned. President Marcos was not only holding on to power by a hairline; he
was also very ill, extremely ill.
Then another big bang occurred. The dynasty came to an end. President Marcos was ousted from
power on February 26,1986. The widow of the slain Senator, Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino, was
installed President of the Philippines, not on the basis of the 1935 or 1973 Constitution, but
through the EDSA People Power Revolution. As a revolutionary government at least of the
right, center, and right-of-center it functioned without a regular constitution for about a year.
In the meantime, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Muslim World
League (MWL), both based in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, were undertaking efforts the
resume of the MNLF talks with the new administration of Pres. Corazon Aquino.
But in a surprise move, President Aquino, setting aside protocol and security concerns, met with
MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari in Maimbung, Sulu, on September 5, 1986. This so-called historic
meeting resulted in an agreement to cease hostilities and lay the groundwork for formal
negotiations. One writer commented on this meeting:
All of a sudden, after the EDSA revolution in 1986, the new Administration, deliriously
overjoyed by its victory, brought back Nur Misuari like a hero. Nur Misuari came back with him
full with rising expectations of triumph. He brought back with him a more complicated package
of the problems in Mindanao to ensure that victory would be theirs.
Meeting in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the GRP and MNLF panels forged an agreement,
now known as the Jeddah Accord, on January 3, 1987. The two sides agreed to continue
discussion of the proposal for the grant of full autonomy to Mindanao and Sulu, Basilan, TawiTawi and Palawan. It was further agreed that substantive talks would be held in the Philippines.
On February 9-20, 1987, the GRP-MNLF-OIC Peace Talks proceeded in Manila and Zamboanga
City, respectively. It became apparent, even at the outset that the talks would collapse due to
fundamental differences in the proposals submitted by both panels. The MNLF wanted full
autonomy for the 23 provinces in Mindanao, on the ground that the government had already
agreed to its as mentioned in the Jeddah Accord. The government, on the other hand, refused to
toe this line, because the Tripoli Agreement only speaks of 13 provinces and 9 cities.
After the breakdown of the talks, the government proceeded to devise the necessary processes to
implement the so-called mandate in the 1987 Constitutions to grant autonomy to Muslim
Mindanao. Accordingly, in October 1987, President Aquino started to lay the groundwork for the
creation of the Mindanao Regional Consultative Commission (MRCC), which was tasked by
Congress to assist in drafting an organic act intended for an autonomous Muslim Mindanao.
On the other hand, MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari, bitterly criticizing the creation of the MRCC,
once again renewed his bid for full MNLF membership with the Organization of Islamic
Conference (OIC). Observer status had been conferred on the MNLF on May 1977.
On October 3-5, 1992, the first round of exploratory talks between the MNLF and the
government was again held in Tripoli, Libya. The response of the MNLF on this was positive.
The second round of GRP-MNLF Exploratory Talks was convened in Cipanas, West Java,
Indonesia on October 2-4, 1992 to finalize the agenda of the proposed formal negotiations.
From October 25, 1992 to November 7, 1993, the First Round of Formal Negotiations between
the MNLF and the GRP began in Jakarta, Indonesia. An Interim Ceasefire Agreement was inked
between both parties. The MNLF and GRP also signed a Memorandum of Agreement providing
for the reactivation of the Mixed Committee, creation of five support committees:
1-National Defense and Security;
2-Education;
3-Economic and Financial System, Mines and Minerals;
4-Administrative System, Right of Representation and Participation in the National Government,
and in all Organs of the State;
5-Shariah and Judiciary, Ad-Hoc Working Groups and other matters.
On December 20, 1993, the First Mixed Committee Meeting was held in Jolo, Sulu. It was
followed in Zamboanga City on April 6-7, 1994; the third was in Jakarta, Indonesia on August
31, 1994; the fourth in Zamboanga City on January 29-31, 1995; the fifth in Davao City on June
19-23, 1995; the sixth in General Santos City on July 26-28, 1995; the seventh in Zamboanga
City on March 1-2, 1995; the eight in Davao City on June 21-23, 1996; and the ninth in Jakarta,
Indonesia on August 30, 1996.
The Second Round of Formal Talks between the MNLF and GRP was held in Jakarta, Indonesia
on September 1-5, 1994. The Third Round of Formal Talks was again held in Jakarta, Indonesia
on November 28 to December 2, 1995. An Interim Agreement was signed between the MNLF
and the GRP containing the points of consensus reached during the earlier negotiations. Finally,
on August 30, 1996, the Fourth Round of Formal Talks was again held in Jakarta, Indonesia,
which led to the inking of the MNLF-GRP Final Peace Agreement.
F. Finally, MNLF Chained to Oblivion (Signing the 1996 Final Peace Agreement)
Exactly, 28 years, five months and 15 days of the MNLF struggle for total liberation, the 1996
GRP-MNLF-OIC Final Peace Agreement was culminated in Malacanang Palace, Metro Manila,
Philippines by and between the MNLF Chairman, Prof. Nurulaji Misuari and President of the
Republic of the Philippines, H.E. Fidel V. Ramos witnessed by the Chairman of the OIC
Ministerial Committee of the Six, H.E. Mr. Ali Alatas and the OIC Secretary General, H.E. Dr.
Hamid Al-Gabid.
Peace at Last was everybodys catchphrase. President Ramos said:
Today we have come closer to becoming that nation of our dreams. Today we not only witness
history: We make it. Today with the formal signing of the final peace agreement between the
Government Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF), we bring to a close almost 30 years of conflict at the cost of more than 120,000 Filipino
lives.
MNLF Chairman Prof. Nur Misuari corroborated this statement by saying:

We have agreed to end the war and restore peace. This is a very momentous, very historic
occasion. This will be written in the golden pages of history.
While on the other hand, the Chairman of the OIC Ministerial Committee of the Six, Hon. Ali
Alatas, made the following statement:
It may be worth reiterating that real hard work begins after the signing of the Agreement. For a
Peace Agreement, or any other agreement for that matter, does not implement itself: it assumes
concrete reality only on accretion of activities completed.
Following the line of argument, all non-conforming views concerning the final solution to the
Mindanao problem are peremptorily rendered wrong, fallacious or simply untenable or utopian.
But who sets the standards of evaluation? Who gives authority to evaluate or pass judgment? By
whose mutual or common agreement, and for whom? For what and for whom is this prescription
intended? Who knows this problem better the government, the MNLF, the OIC or the people
themselves?
After the signing of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement, the clock of the day of reckoning has
already started ticking.
The Peace Accord has been under scrutiny from day one of its signing until today. Soon history
will give its verdict on whether the agreement is the solution or would become part of the
Mindanao problem. Another agreement is in the offing: the GRP-MILF Agreement.
The MILF, a splinter group of the MNLF when it started its table negotiation and considered to
be the ones who continued the struggle for total liberation, is again following suit the footsteps of
the MNLF, signing an agreement.
Again, another agreement, another blunder for the Bangsamoro people. The Bangsamoro people,
brave fighters as they are, should have known by now that agreements are only for a while.
Freedom is still what is best for Muslims in this homeland south of Philippines.
MORO STRUGGLE AGAINST FILIPINO

GOVERNMENT
Posted by Aishah Fatima on October 29, 2010 at 7:34 PM
3. The Moro Struggle against Filipino Government

The Travails of the past and the chilling fears over an uncertain future aroused the Moros to
activity. Led by the studentry, professionals and some political leaders, the Moros looked for
alternatives that could secure or at least defend the survival of the Moros as a people. The Manila
government was to them still a government of outsiders and was not only indifferent but, even
more so, appeared to be the main force behind a move to liquidate them, as revealed in the
Jabidah Massacre in 1968 and the series of mass slaughters in Mindanao by the ILAGA- PC
tandem in the early 1970s.
The old Moro leaders, nationalists or collaborators, had tried to secure Mindanao and Sulu
from the control of the outsiders but failed miserably. One major reason for their failure was lipservice they offered to what was generally perceived to be a real and serious problem requiring
immediate and concrete action. Evidently, they had become too preoccupied with the present,
since most of them were either politician of highly government officials, to refresh the hard
lessons of the past and warn of the threats in the offing. Such lackluster mentality must have
been the consequence of having made too many compromises. This ultimately led to surrender,
or what we may mildly term as subservience. In addition, the lure of the world and the
inability of these aristocratic leaders most of them belonged to the so-called royal class to shed
off their traditional privileges, must have contributed a lot to this unfortunate frame of mind. As
virtual captives of this leadership crisis, the Moro people apparently could only had become
unproductive and uncreative, and thence, generally passive, if not indolent almost like the
indios of the past Spanish regime.
As the conflict hardened and intensified against the backdrop of deepening Islamic
consciousness the Moros had to find ways to survive and at the same time to make true their
distinct national identity. This necessity found expressions in the rise of the Moro organizations
in Manila, organized by the Moro traditional political leaders. Its main objective was the
complete establishment of Islam in all aspect of life. However, many eyebrows were raised as to
why, during the hard conflict that followed in Mindanao and Sulu, the Moro organizations failed
to rise to the occasion when its services were most needed by the Moro people. If there was any
organization that evoked much terror in the power circle in Manila, the Mindanao Independence
Movement (MIM) under Cotabato Governor Datu Udtog Matalam in 1968 must have been that
organization. But after many rumblings, the MIM itself may have succumbed to the threats and
enticements of the government. In December 1971, Pres, Ferdinand E. Marcos and Datu Udtog
Matalam met in Manila, after which only the name was left of this organization.
The years from the early second half of the sixties to the early seventies marked the height of the
student militant activism and unrest. There was widespread agitation, violence and disturbance,
both national and international, which stirred student activism, manifested through the
"parliamentary of the streets", demonstrations, rallies, pickets, teach-ins and other forms of
radical protest. The Moro students and even the professionals were not remiss in moving space
with this world phenomenon.
In the case of the Moro students both in manila and in Cairo, Egypt, there were seven eventual
episodes, three foreign and four national, which had the greatest impact upon their lives and the
trend of events in Mindanao and Sulu. The three foreign incidents were as follows : 1) the June
5, 1067 Arab- Israeli war; 2) the 1968 aborted but bloody coup attempt in Indonesia; and 3) to a
lesser degree, the rise of student demonstration in Indonesia and Malaysia in 1968. And in the
national scene, the 1968 Jabidah Massacre easily was the main eye-opener, which evoked
much disgust that revived the old fears that under Filipino rule the Moros were not safe. It was
followed by the founding of the Mindanao Independence Movement ( MIM ) by Datu Udtog
Matalam in 1968, the 1970-1971 series of Massacres of Muslims in Mindanao, and finally by the
declaration of martial Law in 1972. All these incidents were highly momentous circumstances
that no rational persons, lest of all a Moro, could ignore and abandon altogether to chance.
Initially, the studentry, professionals and, to some extend, the Moro politicians were locked in
debate over what course of action to pursue for the Moros, as a whole, to survive. There were
three options before them :
1) adopt a collaborationist line, as did most of the old nationalist leaders;
2) assume a risk-less but dishonorable stance of acquiescence and leave the rest to fate, and
3) subscribe to the view that man, as the best of creations, has the relative capability to make
or unmake his own destiny. All the three options student activism, especially in Manila, but were
mostly nowhere to be found when the sailing got rough in Mindanao and Sulu.
Those who picked option No. 3 generally assumed supporting roles in the parliamentary of the
streets, but became the ones who personally led the revolutionary war later. Takers of No. 2
were the slaves of the insatiable self and remained in the cities; many married Christians and
raised their families outside the moral realm of Islam.
In the language of the day, the aroused students or professionals were branded activists or
radicals and were more likely declared subversives. Despite the so-called policy of
maximum tolerance issued as orders to anti-riot policemen and Metrocom soldiers, not a few
Moro student activists were injured during rallies and demonstrations. Cases in point were the
violent demonstrations against the visit of Israel Foreign Minister Abba Eban in 1967 and the
coming of Gen. Abdul Harris Nasution of Indonesia in 1968. The demonstrations protested
against the Israel Foreign Minister and the pro-Israel policy of the Marcos regime. Some of the
demonstrators managed to barge into the Israeli Embassy in Makati and pulled the Israel flag
down.
The Confrontation in 1968 was not pre-planned. The Moro students were set to welcome General
Abdul Harris Nasution, the man who was highly regarded as the successor to President Ahmad
Soekarno. While the Moro students were at the Manila International Airport waiting for General
Nasution to disembark, another group of militant students identified with the pro-communist
Kabataang Makabayan ( KM) protested his visit and the started hurling invectives, such as
Nasution: Butcher of Indonesia, US puppet, go home! and other stinging insults.
Consequently, the pro-Nasution and the anti Nasution demonstrators clashed, hurling stones,
bottles and Molotov bombs that resulted in several injuries on both sides.
In the beginning, both Moro and Christian students jointly denounced the prevalent evils of the
day. They organized demonstrations against the prevailing political and economic frustrations of
the people, the widespread graft and corruption, elitism in the social and political structure, and
so forth. Gradually, however, the Moro activists began to realize, albeit quite late, that although
there were common serious national issues confronting the Moros and Christians that they could
both cry about, the fact was that the Moros themselves had their particular issues and demand to
liberate the Bangsamoro people. They, therefore, started to speak of the issues of the Moros, in
particular, how they would fare in a predominantly Christians State, what would be their destiny
under the Filipino Flag, should they have to work for reforms within the realm of national
politics, etc.
It was not long after that many Moro student organizations began to sprout in metropolitan
manila, the nerve- center of the student activism. Some of these organizations were the Union of
Islamic Forces and Organization ( UIFO ) under student leader and later lawyer Macapanton
Abbas Jr.; The Muslim Progress Movement ( MPM) led by Dr. Alunan C, Glang; the Philippine
Muslim Nationalist League ( PMNL) spearhead by UP Instructor Prof. Nur Misuari; the students
Supreme Council of the Philippines; the Muslim Students Association of the Philippines (
MUSAPHIL); the Muslim Lawyers League; the Muslim Youth Assembly; the Bismillah
Brotherhood; the Al Muslimin Fraternity; and the Sulu Muslim League Students in the provinces
also formed organizations, two of which were the Mambarul Islam based in Cotabato City and
the Sulu Islamic Congress in Jolo, Sulu.
Very soon the disillusionment of these activists came to surface, in early 1970. They were
particularly cynical of and disheartened by the continued lip-service of their leaders, both of the
traditional and political stripes. In May 1970, the Moro Youth activists convened the first
Muslim Youth Assembly in Zamboanga City, where they denounced the evils of the day. They
exhibited an anti-government posture and called on the Moro Youths to take the lead of the
struggle.
Overseas, the Moro students in Cairo and Egypt despite being detached from their homeland by
thousands of miles were also organized themselves and form an organization, initially in
response to their basic requirements as students. This later developed into a vehicle for bringing
forth to the international forum the sad plight of the Moro People in South of Philippines
(Bangsamoro Homeland). In 1962, the Philippine Students Union (PSU) was formed in Cairo
and Egypt by UZ. Salamat Hashim of Cotabato and Uz. Abdulbaki Abubakar of Sulu, Mahid
Mutilan of Lanao, Ibrahim Abdulrahman and Khalifa Nando, also of Cotabato.
On several occasions, the PSU staged rallies to denounce the persecution of the Moros back
home. Their presence in what was considered the most influential Arab capital under the able
leadership pf President Jamal Abdul Nasser, as well as their proximity to other Muslim capitals
in the Middle East and Africa, was conducive to the forging of contacts with other Muslims also
working for their emancipation. Such contacts, especially with the Palestinians, buttressed in no
small way their early revolutionary inclination and motivation. These contacts facilitated the
support from many Muslims states and leaders.
MORO STRUGGLE AGAINST AMERICAN INVADERS
2. The Moro Struggle against the American Invaders

When the Americans first appeared in the northern horizon in 1898, the Filipino revolution was
in full swing. As a young and emerging world power, the United States had to find excuse to
realize her vast interests in Cuba, which was then under Spain. The sinking of the American
warship Maine at Havana Harbor on February 15, 1898 resulting in the death of 246 men
provided the US government the necessary pretext to declare war on Spain on February 25,
1898. In due course Admiral George Dewey was ordered to proceed to Manila to attack the
Spanish squadron under Admiral Patricio Montojo. This was the May 1, 1898 Battle of Manila
Bay pitting a modern navy versus veritable leaking tubs. With the Filipino revolutionaries allied
with the Americans, the former won victory after victory against the Spanish forces until on June
12, 1898, after the last Spanish soldier had surrendered, Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, unmindful of or
notwithstanding the American mind set, proceeded to declare Philippine Independence at Kawit,
Cavite.
If Aguinaldo did not really misread the American intention, but deliberately played a calculated
game, then he had blundered. The Americans never had the slightest intention of recognizing his
declaration of independence. As a matter of fact, American troops began to occupy strategic
areas vacated or surrendered to them by the retreating Spaniards, to the exclusion of the Filipino
revolutionaries. As soon as they had gained enough strategic grounds, the Americans
intentionally provoked the Filipinos into a shooting war which set-off the start of the FilipinoAmerican War.
At the outset. The Filipinos were made to believe that the Americans came to help to liberate
their lands from the Spaniards, after which they would become an independent nation. Untrue to
their words, the Americans did not really come to liberate the Philippines for the Filipinos but to
acquire a colony in the furtherance of their own imperialist scheme.
In the meantime, in the interval between the Spanish evacuation of the Philippines and the arrival
of American troops in Mindanao and Sulu, anarchy ruled. Moro warriors began to attack the
Spanish garrisons in Cotabato, Zamboanga, Sulu and Lanao and sometimes wiped out the
defenders to the last man.
In Cotabato, Moro warriors began to assault the Spanish garrisons in Pikit, Reina Regente,
Tumbao, Cotabato and Tamontaka. One by one, they captured these garrisons. Leading the
Moros were Datu Utto, Datu Piang (Amai Mingka), former minister of Datu Utto, Datu Ali
Bayao, Piangs son-in-law and Rajahmuda of Salunayan; Datu Ampatuan or Bapa in Mangacop
and Datu Inok or Amani Giday.
These datus, all of the Buayan dynasty, were conspiring to reassert their supremacy over the
region vacated by the Spaniards. The plot was to overthrow the Filipinos who had grabbed power
to side with Kaitpuneros. Eventually this situation led to the fighting along Paseo de Villaeron in
Cotabato on January 6, 1899, resulting in the killing of Roman Vilo, Esteban Ortouste, and a few
others.
As in Cotabato, chaos also reigned in Zamboanga after the last Spaniards left. The organization
of the council that handled the affairs of the district also disintegrated. The church at Zamboanga
was ransacked. People complained of widespread robbery and destruction of property. ProKatipuneros and those who were not distrusted one another. A known Filipino revolutionary,
Melanio Calixto, was murdered by a pro-American named Isidro Midel. Fighting soon flared up
between the Filipino insurgents and followers of Datu Mandi, easily the most powerful chief in
the district.
The upheaval in Sulu, although not as extensive was even worse. The Spanish garrisons suffered
terribly and many were decimated to the last soldier like what happened in the garrison at Tataan
in Tawi-Tawi. Harassments were also severe in the other islands like Bongao and Siasi. The
Moro warriors were clearing every island of Spanish troops except in Jolo where the Spanish
have a strong garrison.
In Lanao, a similar scenario was unfolding although in a lesser scale. Spanish garrisons
especially in Marahui were in a state of siege and sporadic attacks and ambuscades became the
rule. As a matter of fact, these garrisons were among the first to be evacuated to escape the wrath
of the lake Moros.
The Americans claimed that they had a mandate in coming to Mindanao and Sulu. But who gave
this mandate? Was this an offshoot of the so-called mandate that justified or made to justify their
colonization of the Philippines? Again, who gave this right to fight the Spaniards, rob the
Filipinos of their right to self-rule and consequently dispossess the Moros of their homeland?
From God, the ultimate source of morality form the American people in keeping the Western
democracy the source of authority to rule from the American capitalists who actually control the
stomachs of the majority and ergo their heads or simply from the naked greed and avarice of
President William Mckinley?
Pres. William McKinley after contemplating what to do with the Philippines told a group of
Protestant clergymen at the White House in November 1899:
"I walked the floor of the White House night after night until midnight; and I am not shamed to
tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and
guidance more than one night.
And one night late it came to me this way dont know how it was but it came That we could
not give them back to Spain that would be cowardly and dishonorable"
Was this the mandate and was it from God? Why did President McKinley kneel before his
God only after the destruction of the Spanish armada in Manila and not before he gave the order
to Admiral Dewey to attack Manila?
In the early years of his life, President McKinley had attended seminary in a small town in his
native Ohio and this might explain his pietism and afterward his pious imperialism. It is a
strange coincidence, however, that all colonizing powers rationalized their expansionist policies
by calling to the gods or by citing ethnocentric missions. France was also fulfilling her
mission civilisatrice when she laid siege on her Indochinese colonies.
In his policy speech to the U.S. Congress in 1899, Pres. William McKinley succinctly expressed:
"The Philippines are not ours to exploit, but to develop, to civilize to educate to train in the
science of self-government. This is the path we must follow or be recreant to a mighty trust
committed to us."
Again, the cloak of benevolence and the white mans burden were central to this policy. But
for twenty years or so, even after the grant of independence, the Americans still enjoyed the
economic parity rights under the Laurel-Langley Agreement, which was only terminated on July
4, 1974.
Let us go back to what had transpired before the final decision to acquire the Philippines as a
colony was made and examine how the maneuvering in the American capital progressed. It is
said that for a full six months, debates on what to do with the Philippines had been going on in
Washington. The choice was whether to grant it immediate self-rule or to make it a colony. In
the end, a compromise was sealed. The imperialist Republicans and the so-called anti-imperialist
Democrats met halfway, and the result was to colonize the Philippines but grant her self-rule at
the earliest feasible time. This pledge took the United States forty eight years to fulfill on July
4, 1946 when Philippine independence was granted.
If there was indeed a mandate from the god of President McKinley and from the politiciancapitalists, this would have applied only to the Filipinas, then comprising only Luzon and the
Visayas. The territory of the Moros or Moroland should have been excluded. As the facts of
history showed, Mindanao and Sulu had always been a foreign territory, for Spain had never
really acquired these islands either by conquest, purchase or any other means. Her sovereignty
was never enforced, except inside the confines of her garrisons and fortifications. How on earth
could a nation sell a territory she never owned or conquered? One renowned writer, Dr. Onofre
Corpuz, had this to say on this point:
"By the time treaty negotiators were parleying in Paris there was no longer any vestige of
Spanish control, possession or government in Filipinas (that is to say, the Christian part of the
archipelago). And Spain never had control, government, nor possession of the Moro territory. It
did not have any suspended sovereignty because its sovereignty had been terminated."
On the eve of the signing of the Kiram-Bates Agreement, there were three hard postulates that
were molesting the minds of the Americans. First, there were still 34,000 armed Moros in the
Moro country and the various islands were in such a dangerous condition that no place could be
safe for outsiders. The swish of the kris, said an American author, Victor Hurley, was
unrestrained. Second, the American occupation forces had a hard time containing the onslaught
of the Filipino revolutionaries led by Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo when the Filipino-American War
flared up in Luzon and some parts of the Visayas. The Americans feared any strategical or
tactical tie-up between the northern insurgents and the southern (Moro) warriors. Such an
eventuality would have been too hot to handle, even for the best of the American generals. And
third, even President McKinley had entertained serious skepticism on the sovereignty of Spain
over the Moro country, particularly the Sulu sultanate.
The negotiation with the Sulu sultan was not an easy task for the Americans. The American
negotiators had to use earnest and tactful diplomacy in order not to antagonize the sultan, who
was expecting the surrender of the Spanish garrisons to them not to the Americans. The Sultan
was skeptical how the Americans had any claim over his realm which was never conquered by
the Spaniards. For over a month, unnerving bargaining and using a gunboat diplomacy, the
Sultan gave the Americans a proposal which is unacceptable to the latter.
However, after thorough discussion of the proposal with thirteen articles, it was signed in two
versions: English and Moro (Tausug). The agreement embodied provisions on issues of
sovereignty, non-interference of religion, curbing of piracy and grant of pension to the sultan and
his top aides.
On April 9, 1900 General Bates informed the Sulu sultan that the agreement was confirmed by
the President of the United States except for Article X regarding the practice of slavery. For its
part, the US congress did not ratify the agreement on the irrelevant pretext that the Sulu monarch
and his people were polygamous.
However, in the course of time, disputes arose over the interpretations of the provisions of the
treaty especially on the aspect of sovereignty. The English and Moro versions differed
significantly with each other. The Americans insisted that sovereignty was recognized and
established in Sulu but the native version did not clearly state so, except as an affirmation in
vague generalities of close friendship with America for mutual benefit, with the grant of special
privileges and rights by the sultan to the Americans. On the side of the sultan, the use of the term
sovereignty was not only alien to the Moro political terminology but was complex and
intricate that he failed to appreciate the far-reaching implications of its western connotation.
On the other, the Americans may have deliberately left it that way as part of their ruse to buy
time and enough reason to abrogate it later. It is so perplexing to note why there were no mutual
efforts, by the Americans in particular, to the effect that in case the two versions are in conflict,
which of the two shall prevail.
Hereunder are the comparisons of both versions and it can be noted that although the Americans
and Moros are sincere to abide by the terms of the agreement, one version runs counter with the
other.
Article in the English versions states:
The sovereignty of the United States over the whole archipelago of Jolo, and its dependencies is
declared and acknowledged.
On the contrary, the Moro version (translated) provides:
The support, the aid, and the protection of the Sulu Island and archipelago are in the American
nation.
One can notice the discrepancies of the two versions. The native version does not mention any
recognition of American sovereignty. It merely establishes the obligation of the Americans to
support, aid, and protect Sulu in reciprocation to the special privileges extended to them by the
sultan.
In Article III of the English version, it says:
The rights and the dignities of His Highness the Sultan and datos shall be fully respected; The
Moros shall not be interfered with on account of their religions; all their religious customs shall
be respected and no one shall be persecuted on account of his religion.
The same article in the Moro version is as follows:

The rank of the Sultan of Sulu and the Datus shall be fully respected by the Americans. They
shall not interfere with the affairs of the Mohammedans or with their customs; more especially
the religion of the Sulus, they shall not change.
Take note of the technicality in the clause no one shall be persecuted on account of his religion
in the American version. This is an implied authority of disguised sovereignty. In the native
version, there is no implied sovereignty but, rather, it states clearly the intact rights and prestige
of the sultan and datus.
On the issue of slavery, Article X of the English version states:
Any slave in the archipelago shall have the right to purchase his freedom by paying to the master
the usual market value.
In the native version. It runs thus:
In case a slave refuses to return to his master and desires to purchase his freedom it would be
right for him to pay the proper value.
The American version treats slavery as absolutely evil and made it mandatory on the master to
free his slave and give his liberty after the slave has paid a corresponding value. In the Moro
version, both the practice of slavery and the freedom of slaves are conditional.
Because of the contrary meanings and connotations on the two versions, the treaty was rejected
and the American occupation of Sulu.
As previously stated, the presence of the Americans in Mindanao and Sulu was a direct challenge
to the independence and authority of the still unconquered Moros, with an estimate number of
335,000 during those times. The Americans moved for integration was met with hostile
confrontation by the Moros because they viewed it as the white mans renewed attempt to
subjugate and Christianize the Moros even if they had to go to war, as their forebears had done
for many centuries.
Since the Moros perceived the threat seriously and they were trained not to bow down in shame,
the Americans had to decide whether they should back out or dare continue forward with their
attempt. There are two struggles of the Moros against Americans during their regime: the armed
struggle and the parliamentary struggle. The parliamentary struggle was explained well in the
American colonialism. Hereunder will be discussed extensively the Moro armed struggle against
the Americans.
The armed struggle of the Moros against the Americans was ignited by the following reasons:
First, by the Moros repudiation against foreign encroachment;

Second, the Americans total disregard of the policy of non-interference wherein the Moros could
not accept being commanded by outsiders;
Third, the two conflicting world of realities wherein the Americans are called by the Moros
infidels, secularists and invaders while the Americans called the Moros fanatics and
pirates which became one source of early conflicts because they considered each as threats;
Fourth, the Moros opposed the different activities performed by the Americans such as land
surveys, census, curtailment of slavery and disarmament.
In summation, the Moros wanted to preserve their independence and sovereignty over their lands
from foreign interference the reason why they bravely opposed the Americans.
On May 1899, despite the Kiram-Bates Treaty, hostilities erupted in Mindanao and Sulu. This
was due to the assertiveness of the next-level chiefs to intervene because the sultan is very
tolerant to the dictates of the Americans. What follows next was a serious military confrontation
in various areas of Mindanao and Sulu.
One American writer, J. Ralston Hayden commented that never during the entire continental
expansion of the United States had armed encounters been frequent and serious as that between
the Moros and American troops. The Moros bold display of heroism, bravery and determination,
even against formidable odds, spoke of their undying spirits to fight for their religion, people and
land. The living legacy to this was the invention of the 1911 .45 caliber revolver which was
specially designed to stop the juramentado dead on his track.
Earlier, American soldiers used the .38 caliber revolver as sidearm but, although it was effective
against the Cubans, it was not sufficient against the Moro warriors who could still lunge at their
adversaries with their kris and inflict casualties. The extent of the ferocity of combat and the
distraught condition of the American occupation forces was reflected by one of their most
favorite expressions: The only good Moro is a dead Moro. No less than 20,000 Moros were
killed in action from 1899 to 1916. From 1904 to the end of General Woods term as Governor
of the Moro Province in 1906, the Moros suffered 3,000 dead as against 70 Americans.
On April 1902, a large-scale engagement occurred between 1,200 American troops and 600
warriors of the sultan of Bayang and nearby settlements. The Moros were encamped in their
cottas (forts) with brass canons emplacements. For the first time, the Americans taste the horrors
of on-rushing juramentados who simply refused to fall after being hit repeatedly. The fighting
protracted until May 3, 1902 where the US troops suffered 10 dead and 41 wounded against 300400 Moros slain including the sultans of Bayang and Pandapatan.
Later, Capt. John Pershing was appointed the new commanding officer of the camp who was
nicknamed Black Jack. He immediately started to implement plans for the eventual recognition
of US sovereignty over the Moros of Lake Lanao, however, this was interpreted by the Moros as
an act to subjugate and convert them to Christianity.
The Moros warned the Americans to leave immediately or face dire consequences. A series of
bitter engagements followed that lasted up to February 1908. So beleaguered were the Americans
that in Dansalan (Marawi) they could not cross Keithley Road without being shot at. At one time,
District Governor Allan Gard, the first civilian Governor of Lanao was wounded in an ambush at
Maciu on February 1908. But due to the vast resources, superior weaponry and battle tactics of
the Americans, these engagements were won by the newcomers with 30 Americans dead
compared to 300 Moro casualties.
Leading the Lanao resistance was the shrewd and brave Datu Ampuan Agaus who outwitted the
Americans several times and despite his many reversals, was still up in arms until the middle of
1916.
In Cotabato, the most celebrated anti-American resistance was spearheaded by Datu Ali Bayao,
Rajahmuda of Salunayan and later of Buayan and his brother Jambangan. Datu Ali was supposed
to succeed Sultan Anwaruddin Utto as chief of the Buayan sultanate but for some reasons Datu
Piang or Tuya Tan, his father-in-law, had become the most popular chieftain in Cotabato when
the Americans arrived in December 1899. Mingka, the daughter of Datu Piang, was however
married to Datu Ali, who was raising the flag of resistance against the cedula tax and anti-slavery
campaign of the Americans. Datu Alis bravery and determination became known far and wide.
He did not only succeed raising the flag of resistance over the entire Cotabato Valley but also
attempted to persuade the Lanao Moros to join hands with him in fighting the Americans.
In early March 1904, General Wood personally led the attack on Datu Alis main cotta at
Kudarangan which according to one account, was the largest ever constructed and could garrison
4,000-5,000 men and was defended by 85 pieces of artillery, including one of 3-51/2 inches
caliber. After heavy clashes, the fort was captured and Datu Ali and 260 followers retreated to
Salunayan.
In May 1904, Datu Ali had even the score with the Americans, who were lost because they were
not familiar with the terrain of the marshland and the terrible bites of mosquitoes. In his diary
General Wood recorded their experienced with mosquitoes:
I dont think anywhere in the world have I ever seen mosquitoes as thick as they were at this
place. The men were almost crazy. There were countless millions of mosquitoes so thick it was
impossible to protect oneself against them, or sleep. Some wrapped their hands in blankets and
others sat over the fire until the smoke so hurt their eyes and nostrils that they had to get away,
and as soon as they left the fire the mosquitoes attacked them. I think two nights here would have
destroyed the efficiency of the command and probably resulted in several cases of temporary
madness."
In a classic example of guerrilla tactics, Ali and his men succeeded in luring the American troops
into the Liguasan Marsh where a well-laid ambush led to the massacre of nineteen soldiers,
including two officers, and the capture of several others. The captives were later released.
Finally on October 22, 1905, Capt. Frank R. McCoy led an expedition of combined army and
scouts of the 22nd Infantry and Philippine Scouts under cover of darkness and sneaked deep into
Datu Alis hideout near Malala River not far from Buluan to surprise him and his men. Datu Ali
and scores of others perished in this attack. What made the mission easier was the treachery of
Datu Inok or Amani Giday, husband of Bagungan, who tipped off the Americans on Datu Alis
hideout. Earlier, Bagungan was abducted by Datu Ali, which enraged the husband and made him
turn against his former companion in the resistance.
Even before 1903, a series of confrontations raged in the Sulu archipelago. The most serious
were those led by Panglima Hassan in alliance with many minor datus in October of that year.
Panglima Hassan was of humble origin but he was gifted with intelligence and determination. He
was so influential that he could easily muster 500 warriors within hours notice and many more
within days. The Americans accused him of slavery and banditry, the normal crimes imputed to
other anti-American campaigners elsewhere in Mindanao and Sulu.
Eventually Panglima Hassan, already fed up with the Americans hostile ways, decided to
confront the Americans anew. With about 400 followers, including women and children, he
assaulted the American troops stationed in Jolo. The fighting lasted the whole day resulting in
heavy casualties on both sides, especially to the attackers. By then reinforcements under the
command of General Wood arrived in Sulu. Soon the Americans mounted counter-offensives.
The main fort of Panglima Hassan near a lake was besieged from all directions and a gory handto-hand fight followed. After days of continuous fighting, the fort was overran, Hassan
overwhelmed and captured. But after a masterly stroke of genius, Hassan escaped, leaving
behind many casualties among his captors, including Maj. Hugh Scott, who was wounded.
The struggle of Panglima Hassan was short-lived. On March 4, 1904, he was martyred at his
hideout atop Bud Bagsak. But the Americans found in him a ferocious fighter who never
hesitated to throw himself into battle, even against a superior enemy. After his martyrdom, his
followers led by Datu Pala continued the resistance until November 1905 and declared a jihad to
drive out the infidel Americans.
Many more resistance fighters came forward. One was the famous Jikiri, known as the terror of
the Sulu Sea. He was branded by the Americans as a bandit and was considered as Robin
Hood of the Moros because he slashed the throats of the Americans and their local lackeys and
gets their properties and distributes them to the people and his men.
Like Panglima Hassan, Jikiri had a lowly beginning. He once served the Sulu sultan as a betelnut bearer. Early in his rebel life, he had a small band of followers of just seven, but in due time
this grew in size. In 1907, his fame as a pirate began to cause much trouble to the Americans
in Sulu, then under Governor Alexander Rogers, who soon raised the reward money to P4, 000
to get him dead or alive. Jikiri was not only brave; he was elusive to his pursuers and lusted to
hit back at them with rage and impunity. He was particularly a terror to the pearling rights
grabbers; in fact, they were the main reason for his resistance. No less than Sultan Jamalul Kiram
II, on his visit to Washington in September 1910, told Pres. William Taft that Jikiris banditry
was due to the violation of the traditional rights of the people over the pearl beds of Sulu.
After two years of hit-and-run confrontations, the end of the road for Jikiri came on July 4, 1909.
A combined American cavalry, infantry and artillery force assaulted his cave at Patian Island, ten
miles from Jolo, where he and his men perished after a fierce hand-to-hand fight.
In August 1913, the Moros of Talipao on Jolo Island refused to pay the road tax imposed on
them by the Americans. Led by Datu Sabtal, they fortified themselves around the slopes of
Mount Talipao. Their refusal led to a series of engagements between the group of Datu Sabtal
and the Philippine Scouts.
In 1914, Datu Alamada Macog or Amani Boliok of Pedatan, near Parang, defied the Americans.
With a following of 3,000 men, women and children and possibly even more, the slippery Moro
chieftain fought many engagements with the Philippine Scouts and Constabulary troops. In his
many skirmishes with Captain Allen Fletcher, the commanding officer of the American outfit,
Alamada was always on his feet and on the run. His feats were very colorful in the beginning,
but Moro culture would not give credit to those who bowed down in shame by surrendering to
the enemy. Datu Alamada Macog surrendered to the Americans on May 19, 1914.
As can be noted, serious armed confrontations with the Americans continued after 1914. Datu
Ampuan Agaus was still fighting the Americans up to 1916. Military operations failed to break
up his determined effort to fight colonial rule.
In 1923, armed confrontation exploded in Tugaya, Lanao when a group of Moros revolted
against forced education imposed upon their children, who were compelled to attend American
schools, which they suspected to be an instrument of conversion to Christianity. The resistance
was cut short upon the death of the leader and 54 of his followers in the series of armed
engagements that followed.
The same year, Datu Santiago and some Constabulary deserters who joined him created much
unrest in the Parang region of Cotabato. Resorting to hit-and-run fighting, Datu Santiago and his
men were able to inflict considerable casualties on pursuing government troops, now already
under Filipino leadership. Like any resistance leader, Datu Santiago could not understand why he
had to pay the cedula tax for staying in his own ancestral place. He was also bitter about forced
education and the excesses of the Constabulary troops. Fighting in very favorable terrain, he was
able to hold out until 1925, when a fierce encounter took place resulting in the loss of several
hundreds of his followers. Unable to sustain the resistance indefinitely, he finally surrendered to
the government.
Again, trouble erupted in Sulu in 1927, Datu Tahil, a veteran of the Bud Bagsak incident, where
he lost his wife and child, refortified the hills of Patikul. After many encounters that started in
January and claimed the lives of forty of his men and after a brief escape, he decided to make
peace with the government even against the wishes of his clan. This angered even his own sister
who wished him death.
In the meantime, the Philippine Commonwealth Government was established on November 15,
1935 with Manuel L. Quezon as the first President. Barely six months after, in June 1936, the
most serious armed rebellion took place in Lanao. It was spearheaded by Hadji Abdulhamid
Bongabong, a religious leader of Unayan, Lanao. The fighting lasted for many years and took
place around the lake, where a chain of Moro cottas was erected in defiance. This is recorded in
history as the great cotta fights. The grievances were contained in a petition letter addressed to
the President of the United States. Succinctly put, the issues raised were:
1. Moros had become second class citizens;

2. The Moro Province be segregated once independence is given to the Filipinos;
3. Acquisitions of lands in the Moro Province be reserved for the Moros; and
4. Islam must not be curtailed in any manner.
The uprising lasted up to 1941, just a few months before the invasion by the Japanese Imperial
Army.
The listing of the names of Moro resistance leaders and their engagements with the occupation
forces, first against the Americans and then against the Filipinos, cannot be made complete here.
What we have is just the tip of the iceberg, so to speak. One fact of history is that even after the
exit of Spain, hardly months or a year passed without one Moro leader or another taking the field
to resist whoever was in power.
But a great many passed into oblivion and their exploits have not been properly recorded, if they
were not, in fact, systematically omitted or ignored. Even the greatest, like Panglima Hassan,
Datu Ali Bayao, Datu Ampuan Agaus, and Jikiri, whose names are classics in Moro History, had
been villainously blackened by the Americans and their puppets, because these Moro heroes had
been regarded as the villains. They have ceased to exist now, yes! As for their legacy of struggle,
it is still very much within us; and certainly, others will pick up the flag of resistance exactly
where they had halted, as thousands upon thousands now are marching forward, following their
footsteps, until final victory shall be achieved!
MORO STRUGGLE AGAINST SPANISH INVADERS
1. The Moro Struggle against Spanish Invaders

There are two points that need clarification as we discuss the struggle of the Moro people against
the Spanish invaders: one, on 1570 the Moros referred to by the Spaniards were the Muslim
inhabitants of Selurong, now called Metro Manila, including the nearby towns; two, the first
battle of the Moro against Spaniards was fought in the island of Mactan where Rajah Lapulapu
killed Magellan on 1521 then followed by the battle right in the heart of Metro Manila.
Selurong (Manila) was ruled by Rajah Sulaiman Mahmud and Rajah Matanda and Tondo was
under Rajah Lakandula. All these Rajahs were of Bornean origin and closely related to the sultan
of Brunei.
The fall of Granada in 1492 was the last time the Muslims and Spaniards have their battle. Both
are simmering with anger since then. Both have a big score to settle. The Spaniards hated the
Muslims for their rule of Spain for 800 years. On the other hand, the Muslims could not condone
the Spaniards massacre of more than 3,000,000 Muslims when they recaptured Spain. With the
entry of Spanish troops led by Captain Martin de Goiti to Manila, reckoning has begun. Rajah
Sulaiman leading the Muslim defenders made his stand clear:
We wish to be friends of all nations. But they must understand that we cannot tolerate any
abuse. On the contrary, we will repay with death the least thing that touches our honor.
This was the first foreign policy declaration by a Muslim chief against an alien power. True to
his words, Rajah Sulaiman preferred martyrdom than to submit to the Spaniards during the
famous Battle of Bangkusay off Tondos shore on June 3, 1571. Rajah Sulaiman died a martyr,
but the memory of what he did remained, thus, the famous Islamic slogan Victory or
Martyrdom.
The fall of Manila led to the defeat of all resistance in Luzon and Visayas except those fought in
Mindoro on 1574 and the so-called Magat Salamat Conspiracy on 1587. For a span of eleven
years, the Spaniards became the new ruler of the entire Luzon and Visayas which lasted for 327
years. On 1571, all the Muslim natives were converted to Christianity and the two islands
formally became the Spanish Empire, dubbed the New Spain, with Manila as the colonys
capital.
Afterwards, the next task were to secure the new territory from external threat and to push
further their colonial designs which was to acquire gold and monopolize the spice trade
formerly dominated by the Muslims. Because of too much greed to monopolize and control the
spice trade, Spain marshaled the largest expedition ever on 1578 to attack the Brunei Sultanate,
believing that it was in alliance with the Portuguese and it lay within Spains sphere of influence.
They defeated the Sultanate, albeit temporarily.
After the defeat of the Brunei sultanate, the Spaniards began to focus its greedy eyes on the Sulu
Sultanate which they again suspected to be in alliance of the Brunei sultanate. Unknown to them,
the Sulu sultanate and the Brunei Sultans are related by series of intermarriages. That same year,
Spain prepared a large expedition under the command of Captain Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa
to attack Sulu. The attack was resisted by the reigning sultan of Sulu, Sultan Buddiman Pangiran.
This was the first virtual declaration of war by Spain against the Moros of Mindanao and Sulu
which was to drag on and remain undecided for 320 long years even until the Spaniards were
ejected by the Americans in 1898.
The Spaniards war against the Moros was to subdue pagan people, to curb piracy, to stop the
Moros from establishing alliances with European powers and to forestall the entry of rivals into
their spice trade. On the other hand, the Moros war against Spain was in defense of their
people, their homeland and their religion Islam.
On June 1578, Governor General Francisco de Sande gave orders to Captain Esteban Rodriguez
de Figueroa and instructed him the following:
You shall order them (Moros) that there be not among them anymore preachers of the doctrines
of Mahoma (Muhammad) since it is evil and false and that of the Christian alone is good.
And because we have been in these islands so short a time, the lord of Bindanao has been
deceived by the preachers of Borney, and the people have become Moros. You shall tell that our
object is that he be converted to Christianity; and that he must allow us freely to preach the law
of the Christian, and the natives must be allowed to go to hear the preaching and be converted,
without receiving harm from the chiefs.
And you shall try to ascertain who are the preachers of the sect of Mahoma, and shall burn or
destroy the house where that accursed doctrine has been preached, and you shall see that it be not
rebuilt.
On January 15, 1579, Governor General Francisco de Sande gave the same orders to Captain
Gabriel de Rivera who was ordered to establish contact with the chief of Pulangi (River) in
Maguindanao.
Meanwhile, the Spanish government in Manila adopted an official policy to permanently
colonize Mindanao and Sulu. The government, for this purpose, signed and agreement with
Captain Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa, whereby the latter in exchange of the agreement will
have enormous benefits and position to be inherited by his son or heir if he succeeds in pacifying
the island of Mindanao and establish a colony in Pulangi.
On April 1, 1956, Captain Figueroa sailed for Mindanao with 50 war vessels, 214 Spaniards and
1,500 native allies. They voyage lasted for three weeks until the fleet reached the mouth of
Pulangi (Rio Grande de Mindanao) and started cruising upstream till they landed Tampakan
where he lined up his troops in preparation for battle saying:
Soldiers of Felipe! We stand upon the newest soil of Spain. To subdue this dark forest and rid
the soil of the infidel Moslem is our aim. They submit as vassals and converts or fall before the
Spanish blades. Forward to our duty for King and country.
The battle began. Rajah Silongan and Datu Ubal leading the Maguindanao warriors and on the
other side Captain Figueroa aided by Juan de Lara. However, Captain Figueroa barely had step
forward when his head was cleft in two by a Kampilan, a long and straight-edged Moro cutlass,
wielded by Datu Ubal. The death of Captain Figueroa demoralized the Spaniards and was
defeated while Juan de Lara hurriedly left for Manila to report what happened.
The death of Captain Figueroa spread like a prairie fire in Manila and the Spaniards were so
furious. Among those much aggrieved by his death were the Jesuits because they have varied
interests in the conquest of Mindanao and they branded the Moros traitors.
On 1599, the Moros launched various offensive attacks into the enemies territories famously
known the Moro piracy with the sole purpose of crippling the enemies power base, exact
tribute and take advantage of the critical situation faced by Spaniards due to the threat posed by
the Dutch.
For a year, the different attacks conducted by the Moros deluged the natives in the different
territories held by the Spaniards with fear, despair and anxiety. Tens of thousands prisoners were
held by the Moros including valuable possessions like jewelry, precious ornaments, cannons and
other materials. The Spaniards realized the high price they have to pay in engaging a bloody
venture with the Moros, a retreat at this point in time was too late.
On 1603, a Jesuit priest Melchor Hurtado, was captured by Datu Buisan of Leyte wherein an
interesting dialogue took place with him and the other datus of Leyte. Datu Buisan asked the
datus if they and their people and all those located in Panay, Mindoro and Batangas had been
protected by the Spaniards which they responded negatively. Datu Buisan urged the other datus
to joined hands with him so it would be easy to cast off the Spanish yoke. As a result, Datu
Buisan and the datus performed a blood compact that made them ritual brothers.
On 1627, another raid was led by Sultan Bungsu with a fleet of 30 boats of various sizes and
2,000 men wherein they attacked the Spanish shipyard in Camarines. The garrison was captured
and they take possession all its artillery, guns, ammunitions, iron and brass pieces, and 300
prisoners including a Spanish lady named Dona Lucia. After emptying the garrison, they burned
it to the ground.
Factors that contributed to the victory of Moros in all their attacks against the Spaniards are the
following: first, the Moros are reputedly master sailors and can fight well both in land and high
seas; second, the Christian natives under the Spanish-controlled areas are unarmed because of the
Spains policy prohibiting them to possess any form of arms for fear of natives uprising; third,
the Moros are established various bases or rancherias in many places of Luzon and Visayas
which they used in attacking nearby coastal towns. These bases are found in Mindoro,
Marinduque, Panay, Albay, Sorsogon, Antique, Masbate, Samar, Leyte, Burias, Polillio, and
Palawan and in many other islands. In Rio Daraga, Masbate alone, the Moro base of 200 huts
had 5,000 warriors and 113 big and small boats.
On 1619, Sultan Dipatuan Muhammad Qudarat ascended the throne of the Maguindanao
sultanate. During his reign, he was able to hold at bay the Spaniards for half a century and
outlasted eight governor generals. Because of his victory over the Spaniards, the friars described
him thunderbolt of Lucifer, the scourge of Catholicism and the Atilla of the evangelical
ministers. The natives in the Spanish-held territories were ready to do whatever Spain wanted
them except to take up arms against Sultan Qudarat.Spain considered him as the single greatest
obstacle in the efforts to subjugate the whole of Mindanao. Sultan Qudarats sphere of power and
influence, aside from his traditional dominion over the whole of Cotabato, Lanao, Davao,
Misamis, Bukidnon and Zamboanga, was so extensive that he was able to collect tributes from
the seafaring inhabitants of the coast of Borneo and some areas of Basilan and the Visayas.
During his time, the Maguindanao sultanate achieved its golden age.
In view of this awesome situation in the northern islands caused by the Moros under Sultan
Qudarat, the Spanish Crown decided to shift the battle arena to Mindanao. Mindanao was
ordered to be pacified at all cost. This was in response to the series of victories inflicted by the
Moro raiders. In fewer than thirty years, no less than 20,000 persons were taken captive by the
Moro marauders and sold to the markets of Batavia, Ternate, Amboina, Makassar, Java and
Madras.
On 1635, the task of pacifying Mindanao fell on Gov. Gen. Hurtado de Corcuera. On March 13,
1637, Corcuera left Zamboanga and landed at Lamitan and immediately started with the assault.
He encountered initially minor oppositions, but as he and 800 soldiers kept pressing inland and
towards the heavily fortified capital, fighting intensified, causing wanton sacrifice of lives.
Sultan Qudarat himself was wounded and was on the verge of capture, but owing to some
magical powers attributed to him he was able to slip past the ranks of the Spaniards. One of his
wives holding an infant, threw herself into a cliff to avoid becoming a captive. Lamitan was
razed to the ground. Sultan Qudarat lost eight bronze cannons, 27 lantaka (small brass cannon)
and 100 muskets, in addition to heavy casualties including 27 followers whose heads were
propped up on spikes.
The brief victory of Spain over Sultan Qudarat became the origin of the Moro-Moro, a bloodand-thunder play in which the Christians always emerged victorious over the Moros. Since that
time the play has become an integral part of all Filipino folk and religious festivals. Corcuera
became an instant hero and his return to Manila, amidst pompous and colorful preparations,
occasioned unending jubilations over the Spanish victory.
The defeat of Qudarat at Lamitan did not weaken his resolve to drive out the Spaniards. To him,
this was only temporary and no more than years harvest. In the meantime, he took refuge at
the Lake Lanao region, and it was here that he delivered his most famous speech, exhorting the
Maranao datus and sultans to carry on the fight:
You men of the lake, forgetting your ancient liberty, have submitted to the Castillians.
Submission is sheer stupidity.
You cannot realize to what your surrender binds you. You are selling yourselves to toil for the
benefit of these foreigners.
Look at the regions that have already submitted to them. Note how abject the state to which their
people are reduced is. Behold the condition of the Tagalogs and of the Visayas whose chiefs are
trampled upon by the meanest Castillans. If you are no better in spirit than them, then you must
expect similar treatment. You, like them, will be obliged to row the galleys. Just as they do, you
will have to toil at the ship-building and labor without ceasing on the other public works. You
can see for yourselves that you will experience the hardest treatment thus employed.
Be men, let me aid you to resist. All the strength of my sultanate, I promise you, shall be in your
defense. What matters if the Castillians at first are successful? That means only the loss of a
years harvest. Do you think that is too dear a price to pay for liberty?"
The exhortation found its mark and the lake Moros were back into fighting form and, shortly
after, they attacked and succeeded in capturing the Spanish fort and set it ablaze. The garrison
was evacuated and the Spaniards did not return until after two centuries later.
Barely a year after his victory over Sultan Qudarat, Gov. Gen. Sebastian Hurtado de Corcuera
led the invasion of Sulu. On January 4, 1638, some 500 Spaniards and 1,000 native allies landed
in Sulu. Committed to defend Jolo, the Sulu capital, were warriors who numbered 4,000
including allies from Borneo and Makassar. The confrontation started immediately, and after
more than three months pf continued fighting, neither side could claim victory. Both suffered
heavy losses. On the side of attackers, five of their finest officers were slain, including an
undetermined number of their men. In the end, the conclusion was a negotiated settlement.
Sultan Bongsu agreed to the truce, considering the hopeless situation facing his defenders. They
were struck by epidemics, possibly cholera or dysentery.
Sultan Qudarat, after a decade, succeeded in 1637 to extend his political sway to almost the
whole of Mindanao. This time, even the northern part including Caraga was under his sphere of
influence. Sultan Qudarat declared jihad against Spain and invited the rulers of Brunei, Sulu,
Ternate and Makassar to unite and join forces with his sultanate in defense of Islam. In response,
all succeeding wars with Spain witnessed Borneans, Ternatans, Makassars, and Sulus rallying
together for the cause. Thenceforth all expeditions against his sultanate ended in failure. Qudarat
died of old age at 90 in 1671.
In the intervening 50 years from 1663, first in the face of the Dutch victories in the Moluccas and
the resultant threat to Manila and second, by the corsair Koxingas impending invasion threat,
the Spanish Crown found it most imperative to consolidate home defense. Spanish troops serving
in the various Mindanao garrisons were recalled to Manila. The main fort in Zamboanga was
also abandoned. And as a tactical move, they again negotiated treaties with the sultanates of Sulu
and Maguindanao, obviously to neutralize the Moros while the dangers were still there.
After the twin threats of the Dutch and the Chinese had passed, the Spanish Crown decided to
refortify Zamboanga in 1718. Spain also retrieves other garrisons in Mindanao and Sulu to
include Labo in Palawan because of the insistence of the Recollects. During their times, the
Spaniards adopted a new approach in dealing with the Moros. They showed friendly gestures and
abandoned the conversion to Christianity of the Moros provided their missionaries are allowed to
stay in their areas and establish commercial partnership. However, the policy they introduced
was rejected by the Moros because they do not trust the Spaniards. These resulted to renewed
hostilities with more fury and bloodshed.
On 1751, a Royal Decree was passed by Spain known as the Privateer System which provided
for the encouragement and enlistment of private individuals to organize expeditions against
Moros wherein large incentives are attached to it. It stipulated the total extermination of the
Moros, razing to the ground all things combustible they owned and the destruction of all their
crops and farmlands. All those enlisted were exempted from paying tribute and criminals who
enlisted are given unconditional pardon and all are entitled to 4/5 of the war booty. As a result,
thousands enlisted for the mercenary expeditions.
The Moros on the other hand, had anticipated this to happen so they toughened their war
machines and moved into action. The Moros did not wait for their adversaries to invade their
homeland, they launched attacks on the enemies territories. This time there were no exceptions.
No place, either in Luzon and Visayas, were exempted from the attacks of the Moro raiders:
Ilocos, Catanduanes, Batangas, Manila, Iloilo, Mindoro and other points. Watch-towers and
belfries began to dot the coastlines of the Spanish-held territories to keep a round-a-clock watch
for approaching Moro raiders, whose approach brought the terrible cry: Moros en la costa.
Mothers frightened their children to sleep by the mere mention of the word Moro. The name
became so dreaded that it evoked such offensive meaning as pirate, traitor or heathen. For
a span of a decade during this period, now fewer than 50,000 captives were taken and many
coastal towns were totally destroyed, their population greatly reduced.
Roughly the same degree of destruction against the Moros also took place from both the
offensives and counter-offensives of the Spaniards. There were many tales of decimation of lives
and property. Sometimes a whole Moro settlement would be depopulated.
On February 27, 1851, Spain launched a massive assault on Jolo, employing of a fleet of one
corvette, one brigantine, three steamboats, two gunboats, nine transports, 21 barangays and other
boats of different sizes. The attacking force was composed of 142 officers, 2,876 men and about
a thousand native volunteers. On the defenders side were about 10,000 Moro warriors. As usual,
Jolo was bombarded first and then the ground assault followed. In the ensuing fighting, the
Spaniards reported 34 dead and the Moros 300. Jolo was razed to the ground. However, the Sulu
sultan disputed this by saying that only 100 Moros died.
More than any factor, the introduction of the steamboat in the Spanish navy was the greatest plus
factor that turned the tide against the Moros. The Moros caracoa, however swift, was no match to
the Spanish steamship equipped with heavy artillery. Consequently, Spain was able to conduct
bigger and more sustained operations against the Moros of Mindanao and Sulu. The period
witnessed the defeat of the Moros in Basilan, Malabang and Jolo. One such reversal was scored
in Balangingi, Basilan in 1845, against the Balangingi Samals, sometimes referred to by the
Spaniards as the fiercest pirates of the Sulu seas. After a gallant but futile stand, the Balangingi
Samals were routed after seventeen days of bloody combat, and the survivors, mostly women
and children, were exiled to Luzon. Many of their descendants are still found in the town of
Tomauini, Isabela, but what is only left to them is their ability to recite the Islamic formula of
faith: There is no God except Allah and Muhammad is the last Prophet of Allah.
In the meantime, the Sulu and Maguindanao sultanates were besieged by dynastic dissensions.
On 1862, after the death of Pulalun, the Sulu throne was a toss-up between Jamalul Alam, son of
Pulalun and Datu Jamalul Kiram, a grandson of sultan Shakirullah. Spain, having knowledge of
the split up, issued a certificate of recognition to Datu Jamalul Kiram. On 1884, a power struggle
was apparent between Ali ud-Din and Amirul Kiram contesting to the throne. Spain favored
Amirul Kiram but later on began making negotiation with Ali ud-Din.
In the Maguindanao sultanate, the dynastic quarrel was equally disastrous. About 1731, the
reigning Sultan Bayan ul-Anwar was opposed by his younger brother, Jaafar Sadiq, who had
earlier in 1710 fled to Tamontaka. Jaafar Sadiq had excellent relations with the Spaniards. He
was credited with having allowed the Spaniards to build the first Catholic Church in
Maguindanao which still stands today. The Sultan had a son, Malinug, who by all indications
would succeed his father and therefore could frustrate the ambition of the uncle. A series of
clashes ensued which culminated in the second week of March 1733, when Malinug with 700
warriors attacked his uncles capital at Tamontaka and slew him.
In a bid to break all forms of resistance and to settle once and for all the issue of sovereignty over
the Moros, Spain launched on February 21, 1876 what became as the final Jolo campaign.
Governor Gen. Jose Malcampo personally led the campaign involving 9,000 troops, ten
steamboats, eleven gunboats and eleven transports. Public approval, especially on the religious
enmity, was carefully sought to support the campaign. In the forefront of this campaign were the
friars of the various denominations: Recollects, Jesuits, Dominicans and Augustinians. Together,
they heralded: The war in Jolo is now just a war, a holy war in the name of religion, or war
and war without quarters or rest for the wicked sons of the Quran; war to the death with blood
and fire.
As in the past, the action was preceded by intense bombardment and followed by infantry
assaults from all directions. One cotta after another fell in intense and bloody fighting and was
put to the torch. In the face of these assaults, the Sultan, warriors and retainers retired to the
interior to fight another day.
The decline of the sultanate, its inability to provide centralized and effective defense of the state
and religion, paved the way for the emergence of another form of resistance. The task became a
matter of individual obligation. This practice was what hostile writers called the juramentado.
The term juramentado was derived from the Spanish verb juramentar, meaning to swear an
oath. It was sarcastically used by the Spaniards and their hirelings to refer to anyone committing
suicide or running amuck. Others presented the image of a rushing Moro warrior with shaven
hair, fiery eyes and plucked eyebrows, brandishing kris or kampilan to attack infidels until he
was slain.
Actually this greatly maligned juramentado was a person who had chosen to fight in the way of
Allah in his individual capacity since, as stated above, the sultanate had ceased to put up an
organized resistance against the Spaniards. He was what in the Moro viewpoint was called
Sabilillah. The juramentado, after some initiation rituals and proper prayers and manifesting the
resolve to die for the cause, acted out his part as a sacred duty and when he died in the course, of
his attack, he became shahid or martyr with paradise as his ultimate reward. As with any real
Muslim warrior, the juramentado loved martyrdom more than life.
The juramentado was the exact opposite of running amuck or committing suicide. The
juramentado was a volunteer of conscience, with a strong will to fight and to die and was
rightly guided by the Islamic requirements to strive in the way of Allah. It is a conscious
undertaking and the one committing himself to the task had full certainty of the Almightys
promise of eternal bliss in paradise. In suicide or in running amuck, one become senseless and
falls into a trance or into the trap of Satan. It is an almost unconscious action resulting from
hopelessness. If hostile writers likened the juramentado to the second category, then they not
only committed a grave offense against him and Islam but also against the rules of good
scholarship.
During the closing years of the Spanish regime, there were radical changes in the state of affairs
of Mindanao and Sulu. In 1861, the Spaniards garrisoned Cotabato, which became the capital of
Mindanao ten years after. In 1872, fire and earthquake hit Cotabato and they decided to return as
capital Zamboanga. During this year, Sultan Muhammad Makakua was on the throne with the
blessing of the Spanish crown but had lost much of his territory. In Sulu, although Jamalul Kiram
II was ruling with previous powers intact, chiefs at second level were beginning to assert
themselves in the affairs of the realm which hampers the decision making of the sultan.
The decline of the Maguindanao sultanate led to the rise of minor sultanates in Iranun areas and
Pulangi. The Iranuns of Malabang, Balabagan and nearby areas now looked up to the Sultan of
Ganassi in the Lanao region as their new master. In the Pulangi, many of these sub-sultanates
pledged loyalty to the Sultan of Buayan, Sultan Marajanuddin, who was in turn succeeded in
1865 by his brother, Sultan Bayao of Kudarangan. In 1875, Datu Utto or Sultan Anwaruddin
Utto, son of Sultan Marajanuddin, took over as Sultan of Buayan. Datu Utto was married to
Rajah Putri, daughter of Sultan Qudaratullah Muhammad Jamalul Alam or simply Sultan
Untong. Datu Utto also maneuvered to be declared jointly as Sultan of Maguindanao. Openly, he
was supporting the bid of his brother-n-law, Datu Mamaku, brother of Rajah Putri, to become the
new Sultan of Maguindanao. But the Spaniards opposed his inclination vehemently. They saw in
Datu Utto the making of a second Qudarat. Datu Utto was able to unite the minor sultanates
along the Pulangi, including those of Talayan, Buluan and Kabuntalan. Although he suffered
many reversals from the hands of the Spaniards, he remained unconquered up to the coming of
the Americans.
In 1888, Gov. Gen. Valeriano Weyler succeeded Gov. Gen. Emilio Terrero. Instead of pursuing
the military campaign against Datu Utto, the new Governor trained his attention on the Iranuns
and Maranaos. In January 1889, Spanish troops landed in Parang and Malabang. In April 1891,
Spanish troops reoccupied Parang, Baras and Malabang and after fierce clashes especially in the
latter, decided in August to resume the campaign against the Maranaos. Thrown into action in
this two-prolonged attack were 1,242 officers and men. Fierce encounters followed, especially in
the cotta commanded by Amai Pakpak. In September, the campaign was terminated without
conquering the lake Moros.
In March 1894, even after Weyler had left for Manila, the Spaniards pursued the campaign
without letup. Pantar, near Marahui, (Marawi), was occupied. The datus of Taraca, Ramain,
Maciu and Rumayan threatened and consequently they cooperated in fortifying their positions
around the Agus River. Ambushes of Spanish soldiers and native allies became frequent and, at
one time, 65 Spanish soldiers were killed, including one captain. The Spaniards retaliated by
killing 35 Maranaos, including five datus. On June 24, about 500 Maranaos attacked 200
Spaniards, losing 200 of their own men.
On March 10, 1895, this time under Gov. Gen. Ramon Blanco, the Spaniards decided to bring
the war back to Marahui and again, they encountered the same Amai Pakpak. In one of the
cottas, 175 Moros perished including Amai Pakpak, his son and 23 datus. The Spaniards lost
eighteen soldiers, including two officers and the wounded reached 197 soldiers including 21
officers. In this bit of action, about 3,000 Spanish troops and native allies were involved.
In Sulu, Sultan Jamalul Kiram II tried to honor the peace agreement with the Spaniards. This
contributed largely to the lack of widespread fighting in his realm, although he kept on procuring
arms from Borneo. However, in 1895, the celebrated brothers, Datu Kalbi and Julkarnain, who
figured prominently during the American regime, led about a thousand Moros in the attack of
Jolo. After some bitter fighting, the attack was contained.
This was the state of affairs during the last years of the Spanish presence in Mindanao and Sulu.
If Spain was unsuccessful in completely putting down the Moros, it was not the result of faulty
planning or the lack of genuine interest. On the contrary, her entire firepower, resources and
manpower were all utilized to subjugate Mindanao and Sulu and the Moros were still on their
feet, not on their knees. As a fitting tribute to their gallantry and determination to resist even
against formidable odds, history has appropriately referred to the Moros as the unconquered.
Spain came to the Philippines not much for the cross. In most instances, as the facts of her
actuations were gradually exposed, religion was merely used to justify what otherwise was a
satanic lust for worldly gain and glory. If she had firmly planted the Cross in the Philippines, she
was no less successful in sowing the seed of hatred and animosity between the Moros and the
Indios. Even if the Christianized natives absorbed the greater part of the misfortune that befell
the entire inhabitants of Luzon and Visayas, this was the consequence of collaboration, even if
they did this against their wishes. The long list of Spanish invasions in Mindanao and Sulu
showed the participants of thousands of these natives, and their racial brothers the Moros
found it almost impossible to distinguish the proselytized subjects from the colonial masters.
Both were one in creating havoc in Mindanao and Sulu.
THE BANGSAMORO STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION
The Bangsamoro Struggle for Liberation

There are two important vital issues that need be reconsidered before proceeding to the different
articles that describe the Bangsamoro (moro nation) people south of Philippines: first, what led
to the emergence of the Muslim Moros armed struggle; and second, why do the Muslim Moros
continue their armed struggle. Hereunder are the different views that we attempt to portray
regarding the issues on hand:
What led to the emergence of the Muslim Moro armed struggle?
The Muslim Moros resorted to armed struggle because of the long period of oppression,
exploitation, neglect and discrimination they suffered with their incorporation into the Philippine
polity and certain triggering incidents. This suggests that the struggle was not cause by the
Muslim Moros but by the unbearable conditions they were in. It was not because of the casual
factors of their personal chemistry, culture and social structure. Nor it was caused by some kind
of an inherently flawed Moro personality, alleged Islamic culture of terrorism or a warrior
religion. Either it was caused by ethnic rivalries among Moro elites, hunger for power or
passionate desire to grab political power from older leaders.
What precipitated the struggle are the Muslim Moros sufferings and insecurities associated with
their economic marginalization and destitution, political domination and incapacity, the inroads
and constraints to their identity (which includes their faith, territory and culture), and the threats
(consummated and potential) to their individual and collective physical existence or security.
Other factors are their perception of the insincerity of the Philippine government towards them,
which is objectively tenable, and their perception of a more gloomy future awaiting them. Even
without provocation, the Muslim Moros struggle in the seventies was by then ripe for an armed
revolution. Although during these times, the Muslim Moros were not prepared, they launched the
biggest revolution in history.
Comparing the then situation with the current one, the same scenarios are unfolding in the eyes
of the Muslim Moros south of Philippines: economic marginalization, rampant land grabbing,
massacres and bombardments of Muslim communities, salvaging, warantless arrests, central
government dictated corruption on Moro traditional politicians to further aggravate their
destitution, etc
Why do the Muslim Moro continue their armed struggle?
Generations and generations of the Muslim Moros will come, armed struggle will always be a
continuing process for as long as the territorial homeland of the Bangsamoro people is not
returned to them and total freedom and independence is finally achieved. The Philippine
government can craft millions of strategies to dazzle the eyes of the Moro people: promises of
position, wealth, power, etc. but it will never stop the heart and mind of the Muslim Moros from
achieving their aspirations and dreams for freedom and independence. After all, it is what is best
for all Muslims in this homeland south of Philippines, Insha Allah.
A. The Struggle against Foreign Invaders

Retrospect
The discovery of the islands of Philippines by Ferdinand Magellan was incidental. On September
20, 1519, by orders of King Charles I, Ferdinand Magellan shepherded an expedition of 250 men
and five (5) galleons in search for the spice islands he believed was located in the Pacific
Ocean near America. From San Lucar, Spain they cruised around Cape of Good Hope, south of
Africa then journeyed west around South America through the Strait of Magellan (a passage
bearing his name), they traveled relentlessly for four months with no land in sight.
On March 16, 1521, they spotted Samar Island which they called Archipelago of St. Lazarus
and stopped by an islet, later on called Homonhon Island before they disembarked at the island
of Limasawa, south of Leyte. The first Catholic mass was celebrated by Magellan in Limasawa
on March 31, 1521 and since then the conquest and conversion to Christianity of the natives of
the various islands began. Most of the natives, because of fear for their lives, agreed to be
baptized into Christianity. However, the natives who resisted the baptism were beheaded or
made slaves by the Spaniards. Magellan almost succeeded in converting all the natives to
Christianity except the island of Mactan where Rajah Lapulapu ruled. Rajah Lapulapu refused to
give up his island and compromise his freedom. Thus, started the first heavy gun battle between
the forces of Magellan and Rajah Lapulapu. It was during this bloody engagement where Rajah
Lapulapu killed Magellan with his own bare hands. This was the very first armed struggle of the
Moro people against foreign invaders in defense of their homeland.
Charles I sent three more expeditions: 1525, 1526 and 1527, after the death of Magellan but it all
ended in defeat that made him disheartened and bankrupt. On April 22, 1529, Charles I signed
the Treaty of Zaragosa with Portugal which provides: a demarcation line in the Pacific at
297.5 leagues east of the Moluccas be drawn rendering all lands west of line belongs to Portugal
including Philippines and on the west line belongs to Spain.
But Charles I became so greedy that he made a last-ditch attempt to establish a foothold in the
east. He maneuvered an expedition under the command of Ruy de Villalobos specifically
ordering him to establish a permanent settlement in the Islas del Poniente or Western Islands
now called Philippines. For one year, they sailed the ocean until they reached the island of
Sarangani, south of Mindanao. Villalobos and four Augustinian priests who accompanied him in
the voyage tried to land on the island but were met by the hostilities of the Moro people so they
hurriedly left the island. On their voyage home, they passed the islands of Samar, Leyte one of
the crew, Bernardo dela Torre, named these islands Filipinas in honor of Philip, then the
Spanish crown prince which later on became King Philip II, who succeeded Charles I. In 1556,
King Philip II made it an official policy to colonize Filipinas. The name was later applied to the
entire archipelago and was anglicized by the Americans to its present form, Philippines.
On November 1564, the expedition headed by Miguel Lopez de Legazpi left Mexico with his
chief adviser and navigator, Fray Andres de Urdaneta, a scholar priest and veteran of the former
Loaysa Expedition, sailed east to Philippines on orders of King Philip II to make it a permanent
colony of Spain. Urdaneta refuses at first because the Treaty of Zaragoza was till in force but
Legazpi ignored his advice. On April 27, 1565, they landed Panay Island and from there
grappled all the islands from various Moro chieftains. Afterwards, Legazpi sent Captain Martin
De Goiti to Luzon to seize a fortified town named Selurong now called Manila.
COLONIALISM in BANGSAMORO HOMELAND
Posted by Aishah Fatima on October 28, 2010 at 12:04 AM
The Colonialism
Colonialism contributed significantly to the emergence of the struggle. It set the stage or the
historical foundation of the struggle. Spains efforts to subjugate the Moros not only crippled or
depleted the then relatively stable material infrastructure of the Moro society but also sowed the
seed of the still persistent Christian-Muslim antagonism through the enlistment of the services of
the Christianized Filipinos (Indios) in its brutality campaigns against the Moros, and several
efforts designed to condition the former to hate the latter. In addition, although Spain had failed
to effectively conquer the Moros after more than three centuries, it had provided a crucial
beachhead for the subsequent outside penetration into Moroland. Spains aggressive military
campaigns drove the Moros from most of the coastal parts of mainland Mindanao and
established some forts and mission stations that housed Spanish soldiers and priests and their
Indio collaborators or workers. The sites of these forts and mission stations served as the nuclei
of the Christian settlements that started to burgeon in Mindanao towards the end of the 19th
century.
On the other hand, American colonialism was the most decisive in the 20th century incorporation
of the Moros and Moroland into the Philippine state. It was a coup de grace to Moro freedom and
independence. The American military campaigns that involved wholesale massacre of the
resisting Moros efficaciously cleared Moroland for its subsequent penetration and exploitation
by foreign (largely American) and Indio capitalists and big northern Filipinos who migrated
there after the beginning of the 20th century.
American colonialism ushered in the systematic plunder of Morolands resources. The
enforcement of several capitalistic land laws dispossessed the Moros of most their agricultural
lands. Foreign plantations (largely American) were among the first principal beneficiaries of the
opening of Mindanao and the enforcement of capitalist land laws. Aside from the vast lands
made available to plantation owners (foreigners and Indios), the then abundant timber and
mineral resources of Moroland were also opened for exploitation by the same enterprising
capitalists. In these frenetic efforts to fully exploit the resources of Mindanao, Moros were
completely excluded and their rights to such lands and other resources trampled upon.
A. Spanish Colonialism
1. Inherited Colonial Dilemma

The basic character of Spanish colonization had to be prescriptive to sustain the colonial theory
that evangelization and hispanization was practically one and the same thing. In consequence,
this view becomes more meaningful when we read it in the light of what the natives were made
to understand what becoming a Spanish subject meant. As a principle, the natives were to
perceive that in becoming Christians they were becoming Spaniards, and that upon ceasing to be
Subanos, Manobos, Maguindanaos, Tausogs, Samals or Maranaos, they were at one and the
same time acquiring the status of wards of the Catholic Church as well as vassals of Spanish
Monarch.
Spanish colonialism thus presented a challenge to the Moros of the Mindanao and Sulu. As far as
the Moros perceived the situation, Spanish policy aimed at the undoing of such an organism as
Moroism constituted. To the extent that there was a common identity by which the Islamized
Philippine ethnic groups were given official recognition as Moros, they were people outside the
Spanish national integrity and colonial hegemony. In the end, as the Jesuit Superior Pio Pi
concluded at the beginning of the present century, Moroism subsisted as an element, which
insured that race its cohesion and duration in the islands.
There was a view long held by the Spanish missionaries and exemplified by Pio Pi that
Moroism constituted a nucleus of population, which is nationality or state within sovereignty,
systematically and obstinately opposed to the rulers civilizing aims. In the opinion of the
missionaries, the proper understanding of what constitutes Moroism was essential in
overcoming this obstacle to the reduction (i.e. conversion) and civilization of Mindanao and
Sulu. On this subject Pio Pi declared in a memorandum to the Papal Delegate Msgr. Placidus
Louis Chapelle in 1900:
It will be of great interest to the country, and something to which the Government ought to
direct its political labors with decision, to proceed to the reduction of Moroism as it exists in the
Philippines to a perfect assimilation with the remaining population under a common law, and
this under the penalty of driving it out from the territory by means of war, unless, perhaps the
Government should prefer to concentrate it in some specified spot (a particular island or group
of islands, for example), where the Moros might live with more or less autonomy and protection
or with total independence. Otherwise the Mohammedan-Malay race will be ever in the
Philippines, not merely in Mindanao and Jolo, a powerful element of disturbance.
Let us note that the Spaniards cast the Moros as the out-group. This fact marked their sociopolitical existence as a direct minority group enabling the Americans, who took over from the
Spaniards, to localize the Moros into a separate unit from the rest of the inhabitants of the
Philippines. We have no intention of inquiring into how much the memorandum of the Jesuit
Superior had influenced American colonial strategy in dealing with Moroism; but it should be
mentioned that Pio Pis ideas caught the attention of the Americans and articulated for them the
Spaniards conditioned attitude towards the Moros. Some Americans regarded Fr. Pis remarks
as replete with sensible observations.
When the Americans assumed sovereignty over the archipelago they were ill prepared to face the
question of Moroism, as it had existed under their Spanish predecessors. The geographical
concentration of the Moro elements and the antagonism between them and the new colonial
power prompted the American to regard the Moros as substantially different from the Christian
population. The ambiguous terms Christian Filipinos and non-Christian tribes soon acquired
official stamp in the population census. This ambiguity, however, provided the rationale for
Americans to establish a somewhat different government for the Moros in the early part of their
colonial administration.
In the first two decades of this century, American officials and Filipino nationalists argued over
whether or not the inhabitants of the Philippines constituted a homogenous people. The
Americans believed not, and held that therefore the Philippines was not ready to be governed or
granted political independence as a single entity. Indeed, to the very end of the American regime
the Moro problem persisted as a political factor in the Philippine Independence Question. Critics
of Philippine Independence contended that Christian Filipinos could not establish a government
of their own because of the existence of the wild tribes, including the Moros, whom they have
no right to govern or were incapable of governing. In short, a sense of nationhood had not
developed. This absence of national identity prompted the Thompson Mission, which
investigated conditions in the islands in 1926 to report to President Coolidge, that the Moro were
a unit against independence.
The inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth Government in 1935 rapidly institutionalized

a government of and by Filipinos. But it did not completely alter the pre-nationalistic situation.
Nor did political independence in 1946 prove to be an integrative event eliminating the so-called
Moro problem. In the post-independence period the problem of administering the Moros
assumed merely new forms and strands inherited from the colonial dilemma.
2. The Spanish Reduction Policy
Having shown that a Filipino national identity had not yet fully developed before the
achievement of formal independence, we shall now return to our central theme of continuity with
past policies. It is important to note that until 1578 there was no thought at high Spanish policy
levels of a coordinated administration of Muslim affairs. Spanish colonial policy was no more
than continuing the just wars against all Muslim peoples (Moros) and expanding Spanish
territorial conquest. But in 1578 Governor Francisco de Sande outlined a more precise Spanish
policy toward the Moros. In a Letter of Instruction to the Figueroa Expedition to Mindanao and
Sulu, he proclaimed a policy designed (1) to reduce the overlord of Sulu and his subjects to
vassals of the Spanish King; (2) to reduce the overlord of the Great River (Pulangi) of Mindanao
and his subordinate to subjects of the King of Spain; (3) to exercise control over trade and
commerce in the islands and exact tribute from the inhabitants; (4) to stop the annual Moro raids
against the Visayan islands which were under Spanish dominion; and (5) to inform the Moro
chiefs that Spains aim was their conversion and to order them to allow the Spaniards freely to
preach Christianity among the natives and to prohibit any further admission of preachers of Islam
to their domains.
This might be termed as the Spanish policy of reduction which was of historical significance for
the development of subsequent colonial policy towards the Moros. It draws attention to the fact
that the establishment of Spanish sovereignty in the Islands also involved the propagation of the
Catholic religion. It is undeniable that the Spanish governance of the Philippines was organically
intertwined with the position of the Catholic Church in the Spanish State, and missionaries were
included in all Spanish expeditions dispatched to the Philippines. Moreover, as a matter of
policy, missionaries usually accompanied military expeditions within the Philippines, whether to
the northern end of the archipelago or to the southern islands.
Now the historical continuity in which we are interested is that quite consistently the Catholic
religion came to the Muslim south as an integral part of military expeditions and of the colonial
government. This participation of the Church in the Spanish penetration of the Muslim south was
perfectly consistent with Catholic mission theory and was also a concomitant of the union of
church and state in Catholic Spain. Despite occasional strains and stresses, Church and State in
the Philippines were mutually supportive. Toward the end of the Spanish regime, Governor
Valeriano Weyler admitted in a confidential memorial:
Religion can and should be in Luzon and the Visayas a means of government which is to be
taken advantage of, and which justifies the necessity of the religious orders.
This applied with equal force in Mindanao and Sulu, since the political and religious
environment created by the Spanish colonial administration manifested a uniform pattern. What
is consistent about this pattern was the way in which missionary activity had been interlocked
with governmental authority.
The whole system of Spanish colonial administration depended upon the religious orders that
were in actuality the direct transmitters of government policies among the Filipino villagers. In
an era when the colonizers were no more than a handful of Spanish civil officials and soldiers,
the practicability of utilizing the clergy in administrative matters was understandable enough. It
became an implied principle of Spanish administrative control over the colony. But it was often
abused and triggered an anti-clerical movement in the closing years of Spanish rule.
The Moros, reacting against the imposition of a monolithic colonial administration, nurtured
throughout a psychological attitude of associating colonial domination with missionary activities.
Thus, if anything was imbedded in the mind of the Moros it was the fact that they became
acquainted with Christianity through the methods of Spanish reduction and pacification
campaigns. Spanish attempts at the colonial subjugation of the Moros resulted in a variety of
responses, all of them based on a deeply unfavorable impression of the transmitters of
Christianity. Moreover, the Moros made no distinction between the Spanish colonists and the
hispanized natives who were in the colonial administrative and military service. For all that, the
task of subjugating the Moros proved futile and not surprisingly. Moro cultural sub-national
tendencies came to be centered on fear against alienation from Islam and not just on all forms of
domination.
3. The Civilization Policy

We have seen thus far that the Spaniards used Christianity as a symbol of social cohesion and
political allegiance with the colonial administration. We shall not take the time here to recount
the Spanish missionary activities in Mindanao and Sulu; it properly belongs to the history of the
Church. However, we should emphasize the tremendous influence, which the religious mission
had on Spanish strategies in dealing with the Moro population. The coming of the Jesuits to
Mindanao in the mid-nineteenth century was, for instance, a significant event in itself, and
coincided with the period when the colonial government was implementing a specialized
political organization of Mindanao and its adjacent islands.
Phelan in his Hispanization of the Philippines makes the point that in the second-half of the
nineteenth century the Spanish government had begun to distinguish between the adoption of
Catholicism and the acceptance of political control. The Spanish decision evolved from a
complex of motives. It was only in 1860 that by royal order the politico-Military Government for
Mindanao and its adjacent islands was organized, and its structure was to become the forerunner
of the administrative organization of the region into territorial units and political subdivisions.
By the same royal directive the Society of Jesus was assigned to look after the spiritual wants of
the Islands and at the same time it was commissioned to secure the conversion of the races
which have not yet been subjected. Spains determination to assert itself in the Mindanao-Sulu
region was partly in response to the claims of other colonial powers, and it marked a new policy
toward the Moros. Both Spanish administrative techniques and religious measures were aimed at
an expansionist drive, which included the emancipation of other natives from Moro
domination. Moreover, the Spaniards were convinced that the region must be opened to
civilization and its natural resources exploited. A policy was implemented which looked to the
systematic occupation of Mindanao by Christians from the North, and the development of the
natural resources of the region. Spain aimed at accelerating the increase of Christian souls in
the region and at assimilating the whole of Mindanao.
At first the Moro Wars rendered ineffectual the settlement and colonization of Mindanao. But
in the second quarter of the 19th century, Spanish missionaries began successfully to utilize the
colonization policy and brought large numbers of Christians from the overpopulated and poorer
islands of the Visayas and Luzon to Mindanao. The first enclaves of Christian native colonists
from Bohol and Siquijor were resettled at northern coastal points on Mindanao. The project was
well advanced but far from complete by the end of the Spanish regime.
The Americans, possibly drawing ideas from the Spaniards or inspired by their own history of
westward expansion, continued the colonization strategy to full advantage. In 1914, the first
agricultural colonies were set up in Pikit, Cotabato, under the administration of Governor
Frank Carpenter. The previous year, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2254 to provide
the sum of P400, 000.00 for the establishment of such colonies as a means of affording
opportunities to colonists to become landed proprietors and to bring under cultivation wild
public lands as well as to equalize the distribution of population.
Government-sponsored organized land settlement, with very little concern for the Moros rights
of prior possession or for their landholding concepts, thus became a pattern. Act 4197 of the
Philippine Legislature, commonly known as the Quirino-Recto Colonization Act, followed the
first law in the Commonwealth period and it soon became the organic charter of organized land
settlement work. This was to be followed after World War II by the LASEDECO, NARRA and
the EDCOR programs.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the increase in the Christian population in Mindanao
and Sulu gave the Jesuit missions a new impetus for the liberation of the hill and pagan tribes
from Moro domination. It was calculated that the tribal groups more docile and susceptible to
Christian conversion. Fr. Pablo Pastellas, S.J. arrived in Mindanao in 1876, and began the work
of organizing the highland tribes into townships (pueblos), enlisting the cooperation of their
chieftains. In some instances, the pueblo scheme enabled the missionaries to separate the Moros
from the pagan groups.
The strategy of gathering scattered people together into pueblos was also designed for
application to pacified and submissive Moro elements. The modus operandi called for a census
of the Moros so as to determine who were subject to taxes and personal cedula, successful
collection of which was an indication of Moro recognition of Spanish sovereignty. The execution
of the plan was to proceed after placing the Moros under their own chosen governadorcillo (petty
governors). According to Pastellas, afterwards:
gently and by means of their own justices, will follow the grouping of their settlements,
district pueblos being raised among them, the obligation being place upon themselves of
planning the streets and squares, with their corresponding public buildings, tribunal, schools,
convent, and a small church. In this manner, a new form of government and of justice, our
legislation and codes would continue to be observed, and moral culture are formented and
established, and impulse given to the advancement of agriculture, industry, commerce, primary
instruction, and solid maxims of the gospel.
This is an early statement of the concept of assimilation of the Moros into the body politic, under
a structure and law common to the mainstream of Spains Philippine colony. In bringing this
about, it was the idea that through the habit of obedience to law learned from a peaceful
Christian education which it was the missionarys task to provide, it would be easy to transform
the lives and change the customs of the Moros.
Of special interest is the fact that Catholic missionaries were encouraged to revise their
conventional techniques of conversion and of socio-economic penetration without hinting at
Christianization. Once this was attained, it was hoped that there might be planted among their
pueblos a system of leadership similar to that in other parts of the archipelago. This point needs
emphasis, for the fact is the role of the traditional and religious leadership in Moro society has
provided considerable continuity between the different periods of Moro history.
The Spaniards long recognized that the success of their colonial objectives as applied to the
Moros required the alienation of the Moro peasantry from their traditional and religious leaders.
The inability of the Spanish missionaries to infiltrate the Muslim power structure led them to
identify the panditas and datus as the real obstacles to Christian reduction and Spanish
civilization, precisely because they were the real guardians of tradition and repositories of
traditional authority. The key ideas were suggested as early as 1885 by F. Quirico More, S.J.
who recommended to his Jesuit Superior that Spanish control of the Moros required at least the
following:
1. Eliminate the offices of dato and pandita, implanting in their stead in the Moro villages the
legislation in force in the Christian villages by naming municipalities with which the government
will deal directly.
2. The exclusion from holding offices of those who have been datos or panditas, and their
children.
3. Absolute prohibition to the datos to continue collection of tribute from their own people and
the heathens of other races.
The hostile disposition of the Moro aristocracy toward Spanish civilizing aims moved the
missionaries to attempt to undermine the traditional authority. Their effort was a concommitment
of the type of colonial rule favored by the Spaniards that is, direct rule.
4. The Direct Rule System
Unlike the British system of indirect rule (applied in Malaya) which kept traditional authorities
in their positions of influence, the Spanish colonial system of direct rule required the elimination
of native socio-political structures and the traditional power elites functioning in their customary
roles. The rationale of this policy was the system of direct rule hastened the implantation of
Christian or Western principles and institutions. In short the system of direct rule served the
Spanish objective more effectively.
With the advent of the American colonial adventure in the Philippines this policy was reversed
initially with respect to the Moros. American pluralistic background at first impelled the United
States to draw from her Federal American Indian policies in dealing with Moro affairs. Features
of American Indian Policy were applied in the Philippines by President McKinley in his
instructions to the First Philippine Commission in 1900:
in dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the islands, the Commission should adopt the same
course followed by the Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to
maintain their tribal organization and government and under which many of these tribes are now
living in peace and contentment, surrounded by a civilization to which they are unable or
unwilling to conform.
The American version of indirect rule seemed to recognized ethnicity as a valid basis for an
administrative unit. Early American policy, negotiated through a treaty, enhanced the position
of the ruling datus as in the case of Bates Treaty of 1899. Between the abrogation of the Bates
Treaty, in 1905, and the passage of the Jones Law in 1916, the American authorities concerned
themselves with establishing an administrative system for Mindanao and Sulu. The system they
devised seemed torn between a policy of indirect and a policy of direct rule. In 1903 the Moro
Province was created; it gave an important administrative role to tribal wards and permitted
traditional authorities to carry out certain administrative tasks under government supervision.
Moreover, the structure of the Moro Province with its own Governor and Legislative Council
provided for a time (until it was abolished in 1913) a considerable de facto autonomy for
Mindanao and Sulu.
In an essay on the history and solution of the problems of the government on the Moros of the
Philippines, Najeeb Saleeby declared:
By the Moro problem is meant that method or form of administration by which the Moros and
other non-Christian who are living among them, can be governed to their best interest and
welfare in the most peaceful way possible, and can at the same time be provided with
appropriate measures for their gradual advancement in culture and civilization, so that in the
course of a reasonable time they can be admitted into the general government of the Philippine
Islands as qualified members of a republican organization.
Echoing President McKinleys statement of American Mandate in the Philippines that the United
States came not to exploit but to develop, to civilize, to educate, to train in the science of selfgovernment, Saleeby considered the government of Moro land a sacred trust. He insisted that
the principle of the Philippines for the Filipinos was meant to apply to Mindanao and Sulu in
the same sense in which it was applied to the Visayas and Luzon. Underscoring the value of a
policy of indirect rule in Moro affairs, Dr. Saleeby concluded that Well organized datuships
properly provided with Moro courts and datuship councils mark the main basic structure on
which rests the whole solution of the Moro problem. He added that a Moro community thus
organized can be admitted into the general family of civilized Filipino tribes and may in a short
time occupy a fairly respectable position in the fellowship of nations.
But Saleebys advocacy of indirect rule for the Moros was not heeded as the central
administration in Manila geared all its efforts in preparation for national self-government. In
1914 the Philippine Commission replaced the Moro Province with the Department of Mindanao
and Sulu and it became conscious policy to weld the culturally diverse elements of the
population into a Filipino nation. This objective can be perceived in the following sentences
from the act creating the Department of Mindanao and Sulu.
Whereas it is the desire of the people of the Islands to promote the most rapid moral, material,
social, and political development of the inhabitants of said department in order to accomplish
their complete unification with the inhabitants of other provinces of the Archipelago; and
Whereas for the accomplishment of this purpose the extension thereto of the general laws of this
country and of the forms and procedures of government followed in other provinces, under
certain limitations in harmony with the special conditions now prevailing in said department, is
among other measures advisable and necessary, but always with the understanding that such
limitations are temporary and that it is the firm and decided purpose of the Philippine
Commission to abolish such limitations together with the departmental government as soon as
the several districts of said region shall have been converted into regularly organized provinces;
In effect this constituted a structural approach to the Mindanao and Sulu situation. There has
been no set of ideas more influential in providing the direction of policies and objectives in the
government of Moro affairs than the above sentences from the preamble to the Department of
Mindanao and Sulu Act. For instance, the Commission on National Integration (established in
1957) was profoundly indebted to the thinking which had been behind the Department of
Mindanao and Sulu in 1914. The CNI assumed the identical objective to effectuate in a more
rapid and complete manner the economic, social, moral and political advancement of the national
cultural minorities and also to render real, complete and permanent the integration of all said
national minorities into the body politic.
5. The Wardship Policy of the United States
There was another feature of American government of the Moros which is often overlooked: the
ward ship policy. The marked difference in culture and civilization of the Moros and the
Christianized Filipinos made it difficult to govern them alike in the beginning. Two forms of
government thus developed along parallel lines, one for the Moros and the other for the
Christianized Filipinos, although it was expected that the structure employed in Moro land would
eventually evolve into the structures common to the rest of the Philippines.
The phrase wards of the government was first used by Chief Justice Marshall in the Supreme
Court of the United States when describing the Federal-Indian relationship as analogous to that
between a guardian and his ward. As the legal status of the Moros was tied up conceptually with
the American policy of federal responsibility for the welfare of the American Indians tribes, the
Moro elements were thought as being in a position analogous to the Indians. This had the effect
of making inhabitants subject to certain legal constraints. We should note that it was the various
Moro ethnic groups, officially labeled non-Christian tribes, and not the individual
Maguindanaon, Maranao of Tausug which were contemplated under wardship.
Evidently, wardship applied not to individual persons as the government did not mean to assume
responsibility over Moro individual activities. But it was felt necessary to exercise trusteeship
over the territorial possessions of Moro groups. This distinction becomes significant when we
consider that in the conduct of Moro affairs the United States acknowledged the possessor rights
of the tribes of the geographic areas which they occupied, but it regulated eventually the right
of alienation by requiring government approval. The differential legal status of the Moros was
thus symptomatic of their segregation in keeping with the extent to which they were culturally
different from the Christianized elements.
One result of this situation was that wardship made a contribution to the growth of Moro
cultural sub-nationalism. Indeed, the idea was seriously proposed by some Americans and Moros
that the grant of political independence to Filipinos should not include Moros. This notion
culminated in the proposal under the Bacon Bill of 1924 which sought to remove Mindanao and
Sulu homeland of the Moros from the Philippine national government. It would seem
however that this proposal was tied to the projected development of rubber and other resources
in Mindanao and Sulu. There was a brief period from 1920 to 1928 when foreign economic
interests supported Moro apprehensions about Christian Filipino rule as a rationale for the
retention of American jurisdiction over Mindanao and Sulu.
The Japanese seemed to have developed commercial interests in the southern Philippines even
prior to the Second World War. During the Commonwealth era there was a continuous influx of
Japanese settlers in Davao. Soon after the Japanese occupation began, the Imperial Research
Commission considered a plan to divide the Philippines by severing Mindanao and Sulu from it.
But at the January 6, 1943 session of the Commission, Murata Shozo, the chairman, registered a
remarkable objection:
I know there is a plan to detach Mindanao from the Philippines and develop it into a base for
southward expansion. The navy is interested in some such plan. General Tojo has no such plan.
It is indeed preposterous for us to declare we are in favor of granting independence to the

Philippines, on the one hand, and then to detach Mindanao from them and hold it as a Japanese
territory. I am opposed to such a plan
Mindanao has remained a tempting lure to foreign nations and it can still be said that as
historian J.R. Hayden once remarked Mindanao is either a treasure-house of national wealth
or an island of national peril for the future Philippine Republic.
B. American Colonialism
At the turn of this century, the United States joined the European powers in the colonial ventures
overseas. Behind the American expansionist designs in the Pacific Islands and the Philippines
was an outgrowth of the competition for empire traced to the events of the 1890s. Under these
circumstances, the possession of the Philippine Islands as a U.S. tropical colony brought the
Moros in contact with the Americans. But the ironic twist in that encounter has been that the
repeated clashes between the American troops in Mindanao and the Moros gave publicity to the
Moros as the problem.
1. Two Faces of American Presence
The Spanish government in the Philippines created complex dilemma for the Moros which was
defined by the religious and politico-military conduct of affairs that the Americans inherited
from Spain. The Moros absorbed that problem image but the Americans institutionalized that
state of affairs in the reality of the Moro problem. That image might best be qualified by two
corresponding faces of American presence in Mindanao and Sulu. Interestingly, the idea that
Mindanao as the land of promise derived from the American myth of the frontier as the
promised land. What a promising land Mindanao must have appeared to the colonists who were
taken by the alluring slogan: Young Man, Go South!
From one angle this conjures up the parallel of the winning of the West that lured American
pioneers to seek adventure with the promises of abundance. Thus, early in his term the first
governor of the Moro province, Gen. Leonard Wood, noted that what was needed in Mindanao
was an influx of such people as built up the West. Likewise, the District Governor of Cotabato,
boasting about the great possibility of the valley, declared in 1907 that all we need now is a few
bustling Americans to go there to make it the most productive region in this archipelago.
In another spectrum, Mindanao as a frontier resembled the Wild, Wild West a land of violence
and lawlessness. Actually, one of the dangers in the Philippine Independence Question
convincing even pro-independence American leaders like William Jennings Bryan was the
reputed menace of the war-like Moro to his more peaceful northern brother. This appealed also
as a convincing argument against independence, when played up in the press. In fact, complained
one Filipino journalist: certain American correspondents in Manila made names for themselves
in the United States and gained notoriety in the Philippines by yellowing, inflating insignificant
troubles or disorders in Mindanao and shooting them to the Metropolis as horrible carnages,
notoriety debaucheries and appalling massacres.
2. Evolution of Administration of Moro Affairs
The march of events from 1898 to 1916 may be seen as the evolution of American administration
of Moro affairs. As we view the relations between the Americans and the Maguindanao Muslims
along the Moro Gulf to the Cotabato Valley we need to recognize one point. And that is, the
official pattern of relationship which results from the American presence in Mindanao was
variegated as the local conditions prevailing in each region. The American military strategy itself
sharply differentiated the pattern of relations as follows:
First, operations under the Bates Treaty in the Jolo archipelago; second, operations on the
north coast of Mindanao against hostile insurgents; third, operations on the south and east of
Mindanao to reestablish good order and government, to regulate the intercourse between
Filipinos and Moros, and to secure and maintain the confidence of the alien races inhabiting this
section.
The first American to set foot on Cotabato attempted to achieve the third strategy without much
resistance. The initial efforts of winning over the confidence of the Chinese population
complemented the regulation of intercourse between the Moros and the Christian elements in
Cotabato. As the Petition to the Provost-Marshal-General in the Philippine Islands indicates,
American contact with the Chinese element in Cotabato was made as early as May 28, 1899, or
at least attempt was made to verify the state of affairs. In January, that year, the Spanish
Government in the district had evacuated to Zamboanga. The petition described the condition:
To the end that the moral and material order of this community might be preserved, there was
organized a body of volunteer soldiers, under the command of a single officer, who, under the
orders of the former chief dato, has rendered valuable services, to the great satisfaction of the
community, which efforts are supported by the Chinese commercial interests in the subject by
reason of their having established here their industries and commerce, owning property, etc.,
which represents a very large sum of money, and especially as they have in the district their
families.
Clearly, the Capitan de Chinos through tact and competence tried to invite the American troops.
It was to their business interest that the Chinese acknowledged as well the protection they
received from Datu Piang who was a half-bred Chinese.
On February 1, 1900, the first visit was made to Datu Piang at his settlement, in Dulawan, by the
American commanding officer and his men on the US gunboat Panay. Datu Piang peacefully and
easily made friends with the American authorities. Thus, the Philippine Commission sent to
investigate conditions succeeded in bringing about an orderly transition of control. As Daniel

Williams noted in his diary of April 1, 1901, the Commission was greeted by as heterogeneous
a crowd as imagination can conceived. Advised of the coming of the Commission the upriver
Moro datus and their following came to Cotabato. It having been the initial American policy for
military authorities to occupy merely the role of counselors and arbitrators in Moro Affairs, no
efforts were made to establish local government.
The American authorities instituted between 1898 and 1903 a government by military districts. It
became the principal business of the commanding officers to hear and decide complaints. As this
procedure became cumbersome, it was decided on December 7, 1901, to organize a board of
arbitration chosen by the Moros themselves to hear all such complaints of a purely civil nature.
The policy of going among the people and allowing officers to go among them alone and
unarmed became a feature of buying goodwill. The result had been satisfactory in Cotabato and
the response can be gleaned from this account:
For the first three years or so the army got along very well with the Moros of the Rio Grande.
From Cotabato and outposts at old Spanish forts and block-houses, exploring parties traveled up
and down the river, stopped at villages on the riverbank, and made friends with Moros of high
and low degree.
Under the military administration, as the army was charged with maintaining communication
lines, telegraph was extended from Cotabato to Davao during the same period. It was later
connected to Tamontaka by telephone, and then followed by Taviran, Kudarangan and Reina
Regente. Significantly, during a hearing before the US Senate Committee on Philippine
Problems on April 10, 1902, recommendation was made for the extension of a road around the
Lake Lanao to and across the divide to Parang which would be the base ultimately and
commercial port for all southern Mindanao, the road to be extended to Cotabato. But it was not
until 1937 that the main outline of the Mindanao highway was completed. From Cagayan a first
class road connected Dansalan (Marawi) to Iligan; from Dansalan, a second road connected
Cotabato via Malabang and Parang; from Cotabato, the road continued through the valley, across
the Davao mountains to the Gulf. By 1938, there were in Mindanao and Sulu 1,092.9 kilometers
of first class road, 1,115.1 kilometers of second class road, and 581.3 kilometers of third class
road or a total of 2,789.3 kilometers of roads.
3. Government of the Moro Province

This brings us to the period from 1903 to 1919. Reviewing the historic sweep of changes in
American Moro policy gives perspectives on the government dilemma of today. A summary of
past methods bears repeating here in part: The Americans looked at Moro Affairs as a form of
administrative concern to admit the Moros as qualified members of a republican national
organization. The Commonwealth faced it as problem of national identity, and placed the
administration of Moro Affairs under the Department of Interior with a Commissioner of
Mindanao and Sulu. The decision to abolish the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes that had
supervision over the special provinces was contained in the message of President Quezon to the
First National Assembly on July 16, 1936, for reasons of fostering the social and economic
development of the regions under that bureau. The Bureau was replaced by the Commission on
Mindanao and Sulu.
As we gather from various reports and studies on the government of the Moro province, it
remains debatable whether its abolition in 1913 in favor of the Department of Mindanao and
Sulu (1914-1919) was a step backward or forward in Filipino self-government as it related to
Moro affairs. At least, even as early as 1905, a Philippine Commission report perceived the
complex problem as follows:
It was recognized that any effort in the direction of establishing government among the Moros
must in the nature of things be tentative and experimental, and that in all probability it would be
necessary subsequently to modify any government established. It was not deemed wise or just,
except to the extent absolute necessary, to impose upon them the system of laws and of
administration of justice which was well adapted to the Christian Filipinos, but which must
prove burdensome and odious to them.
The Moro Act of 1903 (Act No. 787), therefore, instituted a government with a governor, a
legislative council given broad autonomous powers, and created certain necessary executive
offices. Likewise created was a constabulary force to be composed of Moros commanded by
white officers, under the direction of an assistant chief of constabulary. Provision was also made
for the establishment of a public school system. In addition, the Legislative Council of the Moro
Province was specifically enjoined by the Philippine Commission to enact a law which shall
collect and codify the customary laws of the Moros.
Despite the special problems that Muslim Mindanao presented, Peter Gowing, an American
scholar of Moro affairs, sees the shaping of American Moro policy as an extension of the policy
formulated for the Christian population. Along with this common purpose, the Americans
recognized as well Mindanaos economic potentials. As Theodore Friend has shown, the
historical discussion of the Philippine Independence acts was centered obsessively on American
economic interests. In the process, according to Ralph Thomas, the development of Mindanao
had been delayed by Christian fears that substantial American investment might contribute to
the alienation of those southern areas from the rest of the Philippines. And nowhere has the
brutalizing effects of colonial policy manifested Christian colonization than in Cotabato even as
the Americans charted the political future of Mindanao.
4. Early American Economic Policy for Mindanao

a) Moro Trade
Over the centuries the Moros were masters of their own maritime trade. Noticeable decline in
commerce for the Maguindanao traders began to affect Cotabatos economy towards the second
part of the nineteenth century. In 1845 Sultan Untong Qudratullah entered into a treaty with
the Spaniards allowing a trading house at Cotabato to arrest the declining volume of business in
the region. The American entry entailed a new commercial policy for Mindanao. In 1901, the
Philippine Commission was informed that rice, coffee, gutta-percha (rubber), almaciga and beeswax were the major exports of Cotabato sent by the Chinese to Singapore. The volume that could
be gathered was 500 to 600 piculs every two months with an aggregate of about $150,000
(Mexican dollars). The Moro traders of the Pulangi dealt in gutta-percha because they controlled
the lands in which these trees grew. The Chinese were the ones who held the bulk of the trade
because they maintained friendly relations with the Moros. An interview with Alejandro
Doroteo, a Filipino Christian resident of Cotabato, impressed the Philippine Commission in 1901
that the Filipinos kept little shops in the town.
The annual Report for 1906 of the Moro province reflected that the commerce of the Cotabato
district was still largely in the hands of the Chinese. The value of exports from the port of
Cotabato amounted to $83,600.00 for the past year. This accounted for the value of exports from
the ports of Cotabato alone and did not include those from other parts of the districts as from
Tamontaka via the south branch of the Rio Grande to other districts. At the close of 1906, the
Government considered the establishment of a commercial boat on the Cotabato River, which
was flat-bottom, stern-wheel affair drawing eighteen inches to two feet. Coastwise shipping
seemed to have expanded by 1919 providing sufficient tonnage for the waters of Mindanao and
Sulu.
Comparison of economic statistics under the Moro Province and the Department of Mindanao
and Sulu represent a steady increase in the volume of exports. By 1911, Cotabato exports valued
at P138, 892.13 leaped to P391, 135.78 in 1913, the year ending the term of the Moro Province.
Department figures indicate that in the Province of Cotabato exports jumped from P448, 800.39
to P760, 426.42, owing to the expanded production of both food crops and cash crops.
The intention to protect Moro and other native inhabitants from unscrupulous businessmen was
accented by the setting up of industrial trading stations in 1910 which had replaced the Moro
exchanges. The Legislative Council also passed in 1913 an Itinerant Traders Law to protect the
non-Christians from unscrupulous traders. The law obliged traders to secure license at the district
governor level, thus relieving a problem which had become particularly serious in the Cotabato
and Davao district. By an act regulating the trading system in the Department of Mindanao and
Sulu passed in 1916 by the Philippine Commission, the Insular Government extended new
trading systems to the regions lacking trade facilities.
b) Land Tenure System
American land policy as effected in the Cotabato district began to take shape between 1905 and
1913. As illustrated by General Woods recommendation at the end of his term to which his
successor General Tasker Bliss agreed, in the Moro ProvinceLand should neither be homestead, leased, nor sold to individuals or corporation in those
districts occupied by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, except on a certificate by the district
governor that the land is actually unoccupied, or that being occupied, a satisfactory
arrangement has been entered into between the native occupant and the would-be settler,
purchaser, or lessee. A simple arrangement of this description will prevent the crowding out of
natives and will do much, to give them a feeling of security, thereby tending to establish friendly
relations with their white neighbors. Above all, it will help them to hold on to their present
holdings to the extent authorized by the land law until they can be regularly surveyed
In a certain way the Wood and Pershing administrations resembled each other in their approach
to the land problems. In General John Pershings report for 1913, what General Wood
anticipated is mentioned again:
The effect to fix Moros upon their land is a very important step forward their civilization and
should continue until the head of every Moro family becomes settled down on land that will pass
from father to son in perpetuity. When this is accomplished, there will be reasons to hope that
the common individual Moro may eventually achieve industrial emancipation.
Beginning in 1905 the Philippine Commission, by resolution, extended the application of The
Land Act or portions thereof, as recommended by the Legislative Council of the Moro Province.
The Act was effected in its entirety throughout Zamboanga, parts of Davao, the Lanao district,
excluding that portion of the basin of the Lake. The provision relating to leases of the public
domain was applied to the entire district of Cotabato, with the exception of the island on which
the town of Cotabato, is situated, the island of Tamontaka, and certain immediate areas about the
forts of Reina Regente and Pikit, and in the island of Tawi-Tawi in the district of Sulu. The part
of the Act relating to homesteads on the public domain was made applicable to the portions
excepted in the districts of Cotabato and Davao, and the immediate vicinities of the town of Jolo
and of Siasi, in the district of Sulu.
If it was not complete physical isolation, transportation costs did much to handicap the surveys
of land for registration under the Moro Province. In Cotabato, the district governor distributed a
few hundred blank forms, but white businessmen had challenged Maguindanao claims over the
valley before many could register their lands. The Maguindanao farmers and other native
inhabitants generally did not care much about the surveys for two reasons. First, because perhaps
the Moros refused to come completely under the influence of the government, or on account of
conflicting attitudes on the nature of the land system. The Moros adhered to the pusaka
(ancestral) land tenure. Second, it seems instructive to keep in mind that the settlement of the
Moros in severality was the ultimate aim but it was another question whether they were prepared
for such a change in their condition of communal ownership.
And yet, General Pershing had perceived by 1910 some changes. As he explained it, in the
District of Cotabato conditions are entirely peaceful, as they have generally since American
occupation, with the exception of the time (of) Datu Ali. In the main, he added, the Moros of
this district are less inclined to be nomadic than those of other localities, and that he believed
that the time had come when they may be included to settle down permanently and occupy land
in severality. In retrospect, the town sites survey of Dulawan, Dansalan, Parang-Parang and
Cotabato were competed in 1908. By 1911 soil tests had been competed also which showed that
the Cotabato Valley was well suited for hemp, rubber, coconut, sugar cane, rice, corn and sweet
potatoes in that order; Pikit and its environs were found to be favorable for the growth of rubber
trees. It was apparent, however, that American concern for individualizing land ownership did
not catch on with the average Moro minds. As of 1913, or seven years after the extension of the
provisions of the Land Act to the Moro Province, only the land of about 1,000 Moros was
surveyed in the Cotabato District.
Owing in fact to the length of time before lands could be accurately surveyed for registration the
Moros defaulted in settling claims upon definite parcels of agricultural farms. Thus, when the
American began a cadastral survey and introduced procedures for registering claims, the
Maguindanaons lagged far behind in taking up disposable and alienable lands. This opened the
avenues for speculations and land grabbing. The survey party, instead of making definite
arrangements for the non-Christian natives to protect their rights, merely gave these people
verbal assurance that their rights would be protected. So that, according to Karl Pelzer, land
grabbers exploited the fact that the bureau of lands based priority of claim upon priority of
filing instead of priority occupancy.
c) Moro Dependency Economy
In the development of agriculture in Cotabato the concern for land registration was a factor, but
it was also tied to the problem of people. As in the pre-American period, the hold of the datus on
the masses of the Maguindanao people was a function of the dependency economy. The situation
was put forward in the historical context of the anti-slavery question. The economics of
slavery among Maguindanao datus traced its root to the mangiaio (raid) system during the
Spanish period. As an industry slave-raid was the productive activity itself.
But the slave traffic had changed by the time the Americans intervened in Mindanao for it had
become economically unsound. A shift in manpower needs may have been the cause for the new
profitability of slave-holding. Describing the process, Maj. Lea Febiger, who was the
commanding officer of the Cotabato district in 1902, had this to say:
The subject of slavery among the Moros is a difficult one to discuss, as the word does not define
the condition that exists, and when it approaches slavery as understood by us (Americans) it has
so many and indefinite side issues and ramifications that a white man can not grasp it. The socalled slaves, taken as a whole, are more like peons of the soil, vassals or serfs of feudal times.
There is hardly a single follower of any dato that is not in his debt for money, supplies, or
material advanced, and his vassalage is due to such debt.
In more accurate terms the relationship was one of debt-bondsman.
At the start of the American period, the Philippine Commission found that about one-eight of the
Moro population were debt-bondsmen. The Moros were estimated to number about 300,000 at
the turn of the century but a 1903 census placed them at 250,000. In an interview, Datu Piang
informed the Americans that in Cotabato not more than a quarter of the Maguindanao inhabitants
were slaves. They were of two categories: (a) those that were purchase from other slaveholders
and (b) those who sold themselves for debt. Most of the slaves were held for $40 to $50
(Mexican dollars) for which they did all kinds of work in the field and in the house. Presumably
an economically viable system was beginning to develop when the Legislative Council enacted
on September 24, 1903 the anti-slavery act (Act No. 8).
The difficulty in the way of the strategy that, hopefully, the abolition of slavery would lead to
independent farming was that the Moro peasants had been cut off from access to direct credits
which the dependency economy had been able to provide through the datu system. As it was, the
Americans tried to impart individual industry and private acquisitiveness among the Moros in
anticipation of getting them acquainted with the western economy. As titled properties, it was
rationalized; land would turn into saleable and disposable commodity by individuals. The ironic
twist was that the Moro farmer continued to occupy their traditional landholding through the
datus; for, the novel element of banking system (as a capital source) was not introduced in the
area until 1919. Where some favored the individual patents as opposed to communal ownership
they proceeded to part with their lands or ended up mortgaging them rather than farm the area
themselves.
Ill-prepared to participate in the new economic order, with its differing values and standards, the
Moro sense of communal enterprise was blighted. As Datu Piang afterwards reflected:
From a situation simple, clear, understandable to us, set up by the first government, when all
was moving towards order, contentment and happiness we were plunged into one of confusion,
which began in disorder, and for thirteen years turmoil, chaos, tyranny has marked its every
step.
By 1916 it was obvious that the change in the parameters of government control over Moro
affairs was becoming complicated for the Muslims as it was not matched by political tutelage.
But more comprehensible was the Christian Filipino policy of colonizing Mindanao as this has
operated on the Moro land tenure system. Thus, Datu Piang complained:
The Moro has witnessed many of the choice parts of his country parceled out to (Christian)
Filipinos.
He has seen the shrines once his ancestors gathered in solemn worship now converted into pigwallows or drinking shops two abominations to the Moslem.
He has been pushed from his better villages and towns and these sites given over largely to
(Christian) Filipinos.
American responsibility for bridging the transition had called for certain ward ship
protectionism. For instance, in1913 the Legislative council passed Act No. 304 to prevent the
Moros from unwisely disposing their land or other valuable holding without the direct, written
approval of the district governor. This cumbersome but necessary extension of government
assistance in conveyances or transactions found its way eventually into Chapter II of the
Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu.
Soon demographic considerations tinged the problem before the Moros could be firmly settled
and acquainted with the capitalist economy. For example, drought in 1913 caused serious
decrease in rice supply in other parts of the Philippines so that it was decided to bring
homesteaders from the overpopulated parts of the country to Cotabato. Pursuant to 2254
Christian Filipinos were settled in the upper part of Cotabato. Five agricultural colonies were
initially set up in Cotabato Colony No. 1 at Pikit; Colony No. 2 at Silik; Colony No. 3 at PaidoPulangi; Colony No. 5 at Pagalungan; Colony No. 7 at Talitay; and in 1919, Colony No. 9 at
Glan was established.
Between 1913 and 1930 there were a total of 4,194 families of colonists and home seekers or
19,441 immigrants. From 19
INSIDE BANGSAMORO
Inside Bangsamoro
Muslim society had already attained a fairly high level of social organization and
material prosperity even before the existence of the Filipino nation. It already
possessed human and material resources and built-in cultural defenses against any
foreign intrusion. Before the coming of the Spaniards, Mindanao and Sulu was an
active participant in an international trading system. It was the epicenter of two
trade routes: one was towards Java and the Moluccas; the other was towards China
via Manila, with the Muslims fort in Mindoro in Luzon guaranteeing Muslim monopoly
in domestic distribution.
Jolo (the present capital of Sulu Province), before the arrival of Spaniards, was
already serving as one of the international trading ports in the Malayan world,
frequented by Arab, Chinese and other Asian traders. Moro trade then extended from
china to Japan, at one extreme, to Malacca, Sumatra and Java at the other. Before
Metro Manila became the business district center, it was first Jolo who was playing
the center of economic trading system for Manila and Cebu and was the richest and
foremost settlement in the Philippine islands.
Other countries already recognized the Moros society sovereignty and independence:
Spain, France, Netherlands, Britain and United States of America, long before the
name Philippines ever existed, as evidenced by the different treaty relations signed
by and between the Maguindanao and Sulu Sultanates and these countries.
Therefore, historically, the Bangsamoro people were free and independent and
Mindanao and Sulu is their homeland.
A. People, Territory and Juridical Entity
Imaginative writers have given varied descriptions and labels to the Bangsamoro
people and their homeland. Not a few have described them as princess in pearls and
warriors in silk, parading to the rhythm of the agong and kulintang, or seafarers
with the sail of their vinta outriggers slashing multi-colored triangles from the
horizon.
As may be expected, others are rather unkind and unpleasant in describing the social
manner of the Bangsamoro tribes. But whatever wrong connotations some writers may
describe of the Bangsamoro people, honed by their historical and cultural
experiences, they are much fortunate to be heirs of a distinct social and moral values
which characterized them as a nation, proud of its own heritage and followers of the
true religion, Islam.
Originally, the term Moro was used by colonialists meant to perpetuate an image of
the Muslim people of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan as savage and treacherous, a
word derived from the Moors of late Mauritania and later applied on the Berbers of
North Africa who came and conquered Spain. In a larger context, the name is not
confined to a group of people, or a nationality, but applied rather to a religious
affiliation, transcending the barriers of geography, race and time. A simple daring and
tenacious defense of their homeland and faith, the Spaniards brand the Moros as
savage and treacherous and all monickers they can think of in order to justify their
invasion of the homeland.
To cleanse the bad connotation attached to the Moros, the Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF) propagated a more correct view that the tenacity with which they
conducted their war of resistance against foreign invaders was a classic exercise of
heroism. Hence, the MNLF adopted Bangsa (nation) Moro as a national identity
and implants it in the consciousness of the masses.
Today, it is rooted in the heart of every man and woman and the defense of its
integrity has become a national duty.
1. Origins of the Moro Identity
The three and one-third centuries that covered the Spanish colonization of the
Philippines were years of struggle between Islam and Christianity for the allegiance of
the native inhabitants of the archipelago, particularly Mindanao and Sulu. This
struggle was the continuation of the reconquista, which had begun in the Iberian
Peninsula, and the northern coast of the African continent. This age-long struggle has
come full circle in Muslim-Christian dialogues both in Spain and Tunisia. About the
same time that Islam was consolidating its new foothold in the southern islands of
Philippines, the last Moorish kingdom in southern Spain fell to Catholic arms. Given
the spirit of reconquista and crusade, Catholic Spain would formulate her policies
towards the Moros of Mindanao and Sulu from her own experience with the Moors.
This brings us to the origins of Moro identity.
In the early colonial period there was a Spanish conciliatory policy influenced by
Dominican theologians in the first half of the sixteenth century, notably Vitoria and
Las Casas. It was Vitoria who posited that the Indios were at least as rational as
some of the people of Spain and he developed the thesis that certain rights are
inherent to them which should be respected by the Christian sovereign-patrons of
Europe seeking to subjugate them. It will be recalled that the Vitoria position
received support in the Papal Bull of 1537, which proclaimed the Indios to be persons
capable of understanding the Catholic faith. As such, these Indios and all other
peoples who might rightfully be discovered by Christians were by no means to be
deprived of their liberty or the possession of their property, even though they are
outside the faith of Prophet Isha (Jesus Christ).
It was thus that the Spaniards first recognized the necessity to work out Christian laws
to govern their relations with the natives they had discovered. There is no doubt
that the motive behind the guiding principle was incorporated into the Spanish Laws
of the Indies, which were later applied in governing Spanish colonies. Partly due to
the fact that the founding of Philippine colony coincided with the adoption of this
Dominican-led ideal of pacification, Spain determined that her oriental possessions
should become objects of a new policy of conquest that sought to avoid repetition of
the bloody conquests of Mexico and Peru.
The curious fact is that in what might be termed as Spains first official policy
statement towards the Moro people south of Philippines, Philip II in 1566 instructed
Miguel Lopez de Legazpi as follows:
We have been petitioned in your behalf concerning the Moro Islands. You are
warned that you can make such Moros slaves only if the said Moro are such by birth
and choice, and if they come to preach their Mohammedan doctrines or to make war
against you or against the Indios, who are our subjects and in our royal service."
It was here that the divisive element of identities for the indigenous inhabitants of
the Philippines received its official stamp into Indios and Moros. All throughout
the Spanish colonial administration of the archipelago it would be carried into her
policy statements concerning the Muslim natives and the Christianized natives.
A Spanish observer writing in the mid-nineteenth century was at last willing to
concede to this point:
It has always been a fatal error to consider the Moros of the archipelago as an
independent nation because its special constitution established an insuperable
antagonism between them and the Christian civilized nation. The treaties and
conventions that have been made with the Spaniards in different languages or
written only to have been violated was hardly enforced or observed.
But the disparate identities had to be so; for indeed, the Spaniards were able to give
the natives an identity which they effected not so much for the interest of the natives
themselves, but rather for interest of Spanish colonial and ecclesiastical superiors;
interests that were often diametrically opposed to those of the natives.
2. Population
The Moro people belong to one racial stock: the Indo-Malayan. And all the indigenous
dialects of the Moros, together with all those in Luzon and Visayas, are related in
varying degrees to one another and find common root in one parent-stock: the
Austronesian or Malayo-Polynesian language.
The population of the Bangsamoro homeland has become a subject of controversial
claims and counter-claims on the part of the Philippine government and the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF).
The Muslim population group, in particular, is the main focus of controversy because
of the governments intent to isolate them from the other tribal groups especially the
Filipino Christians. Aside from using bullets, officials of the Philippine government and
their sycophants are engaged in a systematic and persistent attempt to reduce the
number of Muslims or make it appear small. These diabolical attempts are stigmatized
by MNLF as statistical genocide.
Before examining the population figures given in official consensus conducted by the
Philippine government, it is well to classify them:
First, there are the Muslims and indigenous non-Christian tribal groups together with
the Christianized natives who comprised the Bangsamoro people before and during
the time of the homelands annexation to Philippines in 1946.
Second, there are the colonial settlers who were encouraged and supported by the
government to move in hordes from Luzon and Visayas into the Bangsamoro homeland
before and after annexation. These are what the government refers to as internal
migrants.
Since 1946, three national population censuses have been undertaken by the
Philippine government: in 1948, 1960 and 1970. In the 1948 census the population of
the Bangsamoro was 3,049,593 (table 1). Of this figure, the Muslims were more than
80% of the inhabitants or about 2,500,000. In any case, no one could honestly deny
that they were the majority. The rest of the 1948 figure represent indigenous tribal
groups and a few thousand pre-annexation colonial settlers scattered here and there.
The fact that the first group of settlers amounted to only 100 families brought in by
Gen. John Pershing from Cebu to the Cotabato Valley in 1912. From 1912 to 1939
there were no significant arrivals of new settlers. The National Land Settlement
Administration created in 1939 had only 8,300 families in three settlement colonies,
only two of which were in Mindanao with about 5,573 families (the other one being in
the northern province of Isabela).
Based on the national average increase of 3.2 percent the Muslim population of 1948
must have naturally grown to about 5 million by 1970 and the indigenous nonChristian tribal groups to about 1.2 million for a total of 6.2 million. Of this total the
number of pre-annexation colonial settlers did not exceed 100,000. The actual total
Bangsamoro population as per 1970 census is 8,200,567. This means that by 1970 the
difference of 2,000,567 consist of the number of internal migrants/colonial settlers
brought or encouraged to move into the Bangsamoro homeland.
The Bangsamoro people concurrently has a total population of 24,270,754: 13 Muslim

Ethnic Groups of 8,885,898 and 21 Non-Muslim Ethnic Groups of 15,384,856
concentrated in Mindanao and scattered in the other two islands: Visayas and Luzon.
The Moro Muslim Ethnolinguistic Groups are: 1-Maranao (Lanao provinces); 2Maguindanaon (Cotabato provinces); 3-Tausug (Sulu province); 4-Samal (Tawi-Tawi
province); 5-Yakan (Basilan province); 6-Sangil (South Cotabato); 7-Palawani (Palawan
province); 8-Badjao (Zamboanga provinces/South Cotabato province); 9-Kalibugan
(Zamboanga provinces); 10-Jama-Mapun (Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi); 11-Iranun (Lanao
provinces/Cotabato provinces); 12-Kalagan (Davao provinces); 13-Molbag (Zamboanga
provinces).
The Moro Non-Muslim Ethnolinguisitc Groups are: 1-Subanon (Davao provinces); 2Manobo (Bukidnon province); 3-Bilaan (South Cotabato province); 4-Tiboli (Sultan
Kudarat); 5-Higaonon (Misamis Oriental province); 6-Tiruray (Davao provinces); 7Bagobo (Lanao provinces); 8-Barwaon (North Cotabato province); 9-Tagakaolo (Davao
provinces); 10-Ubo (Agusan provinces); 11-Manguangan (Zamboanga provinces/Davao
provinces); 12-Mandaya/Mansaka (Zamboanga provinces/Davao provinces); 13Bukidnon (Bukidnon province); 14-Dibabawon (Davao provinces); 15-Mamanwa
(Surigao provinces/Agusan del Norte); 16-Ata (Davao provinces); 17-Tagbanua
(Palawan province); 18-Batak (Palawan province); 19-Kalamias (Kalamias province);
20-Ken Uy (Palawan province); 21-Cuyonin (Palawan province).
3. Arrival of Islam in the Bangsamoro Homeland
After the death of Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.) in 623 AD, a general expansion of
Islam ensued. Through missionary efforts and military victories, the Islamic world
expanded to dominate the Middle East, North Africa, Spain, Central Asia and Eastern
Europe. The spread of Islam continued towards the sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast
Asia and then to Mindanao and Sulu.
Islam in the Philippine islands came via trade routes in a roundabout way that
originated from Arabia overland through Central Asia and then overseas to India,
China and thence to Southeast Asia and Africa. And Islam to Mindanao and Sulu was
the result of the missionary activities of Arab traders and teachers or Sufis who came
along the trade routes.
Although, there was no concrete evidence to support the theory that Islam was
introduced in Mindanao and Sulu much earlier than 14th century, there was one piece
of archeological information that may support the theory that Islam may have arrived
earlier. There was a discovery of a tombstone on the slope of Bud Datu bearing,
among other entries, the year of the death of the deceased: 710 AH, which
corresponds to 1310 AD in the Gregorian calendar. The deceased was someone bearing
the name of TUHAN MUQBALU or MAQBALU. The title Tuhan, according to Muslim
Scholar Cesar Adib Majul of the University of the Philippines, inferred that the
deceased was a chief or a person of high authority.
In Sulu, an Arab locally known as Tuan Mashaika founded the first Muslim community
where he married a local maiden and raised his children as Muslims. Later in 1380,
another Arab Makhdum Karim reverently called Sharif Awliya, arrived and converted
a large number of inhabitants to Islam. Makhdum built the first mosque in Tubig
Indangan on Simunul Island, the very first mosque established in the Philippine
islands.
Again, in the year 1390, Rajah Baguinda arrived and continued the works of Makhdum
Karim. During this time a flourishing Muslim community in Sulu evolved and by the
middle of the following century the Sulu sultanate was established. The first crowned
sultan was Syed Abubakar, an Arab from South Arabia, who was said to be a direct
descendant of Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.). Upon his ascension to the throne,
Abubakar used the regal name Sharif Hashim.
In 1475, Sharif Muhammad Kabungsuan arrived in Mindanao. He was of Hashemite

descent. He landed first at Malabang (now one of the municipalities of Lanao del Sur)
and subsequently proceeded to Cotabato where he firmly propagated and planted the
seed of Islam. Out of his marital union with the local maidens, the Maguindanao and
Buayan Sultanate came into existence and where succeeding sultanates claim lineage
from him.
In 1515, another Arab from Johore arrived and landed at a settlement called Slangan,
the vicinity of the present post office of Cotabato City. He was Sharif Maraja who
soon married Paramisuli, the daughter of Sharif Awliya.
In Lanao Province, an Arab also came by way of Maguindanao to Lanao and up to the
mouth of Tagoloan River of the present-day Misamis Oriental, then proceeded to
Bukidnon. He was Sharif Alawi. The pockets of Muslim communities on these areas are
scant evidences that will prove his journey to these places.
And with Islam came a new world outlook and power structure, and the cleansing
force in weeding out pagan rituals and ceremonies. These pagan practices gave way
to the uncompromising belief in one Supreme Being, Allah (s.w.t.), in the equality and
brotherhood of the faithful, and in the establishment of goodwill and prosperity for
all the Moro people. Islam revolutionized the lifestyles of the Moro people in all
spheres of existence. As proof, Islam gained new adherents on the Moro people who
proved to be among its ablest and bravest defenders in the succeeding three centuries
of continuous warfare with colonizers.
Islam moves north
There is evidence that as early as 15th century, Islam was already gaining headway in
Luzon and Visayas. Islam had already gained ground in Batangas, Pampanga, Cagayan
Valley, Mindoro, Palawan, Catanduanes, Bonbon, Cebu, Oton, Laguna and other
districts. Preachers of Islam, all reportedly coming from Borneo, came to teach the
natives the rudiments of the new religion. Such Islamic practices as circumcision,
reading the Holy Quran, avoidance of pork and the use of Muslim names found early
acceptance among the natives of these districts.
What is metropolitan Manila (known before as Selurong) today was formerly the
bastion of Islam. Manila was ruled by Rajah Sulaiman Mahmud, assisted by Rajah
Matanda, his uncle. Tondo was under the rule of Rajah Lakandula. Manila was not only
the commercial center but a powerful fort (cotta) built near the mouth of the Pasig
River in defense of the realm. As one writer said:
It is hard to believe that Manila was once firmly under Muslim heel, Muslims
controlled the seat of government, the wealth and the trade up and down the Pasig
and around Bai Lake and Batangas as well as sea lanes to Mindanao and Borneo.
The Muslims were the ruling class in Luzon, the rich traders, cultural leaders and
missionaries, the ones with know how and the right connections, the literacy and
whats more, the right religion.
In Cebu and Mactan, it was Rajah Humabon and Rajah Lapulapu who ruled these
places. And they are two chieftains deeply influenced by Islam. In fact, it was Rajah
Lapulapu who killed the notorious Spanish colonizer, Ferdinand Magellan.
In many instances, global politics affected directly or indirectly the turn of events
even in faraway places. Had not the Moors been defeated by the Spaniards in 1492,
the Spaniards could not have come in 1521 and conquered the Philippines. Or had the
Spaniards delayed their coming to the Philippines for just half a century, there would
be no such thing as the only Christian country in Asia. There could have been an
entirely different story to tell regarding the spread of Islam in Luzon and the Visayas.
The word Moro was derived from the ancient Mauri or Mauritania and was later on
applied on the Berbers of North Africa and those who came and conquered Spain. The
name, therefore, did not exclude the Arabs themselves especially the Umayyad
princes who founded the Umayyad kingdom of Spain. In a larger context, the name is
not confined to a group of people, or a nationality, but applied rather to a religious
affiliation, transcending the barriers of geography, race and time.
The history of the Moro people neither began at the coming of the Spaniards nor
stopped at their exit. Their arrival was merely an accident in history and an
interlude in the long and colorful annals of the Moro. Before the Spaniards, they were
already on their own and on the verge of claiming more territories and people, not
through the force of arms and trickery but through the charms of the faith and the
love of a brother for a common race. In centuries, the Moro defended their faith,
Islam, their people and their homeland.
4. Moro Nation Separate and Distinct from Filipinos
Historically, the Moro people already were a nation during the 14th century acquiring
a unifying ideology, Islam, before the existence of the Filipino nation in 1521.
Throughout the centuries of the Spanish conquest, the Moro people continued to
assert their identity and in Islam only.
To constitute a nation, it must have the following characteristics: 1-a community of

people composed of one or more nationalities possessing a more or less defined
territory and government; 2-a territorial division containing a body of people usually
characterized by relatively size and independent status; 3- has related blood,
common language, common religion, common historical tradition and common
customs and habits. The Moro people, having all these foregoing characteristics,
therefore, already constitute a nation long before the existence of the Filipino nation
and with only one religion, Islam.
On the other hand, the term Filipino was originally applied to Spaniards born in the
Philippines. However, in 1898, when Gov. Gen. Basilio Agustin sought the aid and
loyalty of Spain against the United States, they began to include the natives who were
referred to as indios with all the most disparaging and hostile connotations. Why?
Because the Spaniards describes the indios as a machine that walks, eats, sleeps
and exists, inferior race, racial savages and someone with limited intelligence.
The Filipino nation, actually, has no culture of their own. All their roots belong to
western civilization: their music and dance, their arts, their traits and attitudes and
their religion. And even the Philippines national language Pilipino has 18,000
Spanish words in its lexicon. This is how extensive and deep-rooted was the
hispanization of the Filipinos. Even the political and educational systems of the
Filipinos are all patterned from the Americans. It is difficult, therefore, if not
impossible to define what a Filipino is. All that can be done is to pick out some traits
common to its averaged Filipinos and to separate those that are obviously Spanish or
American. And worst of all, their religion is Christianity which runs counter to the
religion of the Moro people: Islam, the very reason why the Moro people could never
accept the appellation that they were Filipinos, then and now.
Unlike the Moro people, they belong to one racial stock: the Indo-Malayan. And all the
indigenous dialects of the Moros, together with all those in Luzon and Visayas, are
related in varying degrees to one another and find common root in one parent-stock:
the Austronesian or Malayo-Polynesian language.
They have one centralized government patterned after the Arabian model and later,
on the Turkish example. The realm was headed by the sultan (hence the political
institution called sultanate, who inherited his position by direct descent in a royal
bloodline of Hashemite root). Below the sultan was the heir-apparent or Rajamuda or
crown prince, and in the lower tier of the hierarchy were the administrative officers
or ministers, the judge or qadi as head of the judiciary or agama court, the naval
commander or rajah laut or kapitan laut and the council of elders or Ruma Bichara in
Sulu or Bichara Atas in Maguindanao.
With regards to religion, the Moros accepted Islam without reservation. Despite the
differences in the degree of their Islamic acculturation, all the thirteen ethnolinguistic groups chose Islam as their religion where they tenaciously clung to it.

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Philippines Current Issues

Integration of southern and northern Filipinos

A Long History of Injustice Ignored: The Moros of the Philippines

by mutual consent - Washington officially acknowledged that the Moros were

independent Moro state - Bangsamoro. They fought the US-armed Manilla

The pattern of migrating Christians to Moro lands continued. In the 1950s,

TOTAL LIBERATION OF THE BANGSAMORO PEOPLE IN THIS HOMELAND!

THE MORO PEOPLE CURRENT SITUATION

Posted by Aishah Fatima on November 1, 2010 at 8:34 AM

A. Broken Pieces of Dreams (Post Agreement scenario)

The ensuing elections of Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) officials on

THE PARLIAMENTARY STRUGGLE of the

Posted by Aishah Fatima on November 1, 2010 at 8:17 AM

A. Stalemate (The Negotiation)

B. Islamic Countries On the Move for MNLF

C. Rounding Up The Table for Initial Talks

E. Again Another Betrayal

MNLF Chairman Prof. Nur Misuari corroborated this statement by saying:

MORO STRUGGLE AGAINST FILIPINO

Posted by Aishah Fatima on October 29, 2010 at 7:34 PM

3. The Moro Struggle against Filipino Government

MORO STRUGGLE AGAINST AMERICAN INVADERS

Posted by Aishah Fatima on October 29, 2010 at 7:19 PM

2. The Moro Struggle against the American Invaders

Article in the English versions states:

On the contrary, the Moro version (translated) provides:

In Article III of the English version, it says:

The same article in the Moro version is as follows:

On the issue of slavery, Article X of the English version states:

In the native version. It runs thus:

First, by the Moros repudiation against foreign encroachment;

1. Moros had become second class citizens;

MORO STRUGGLE AGAINST SPANISH INVADERS

Posted by Aishah Fatima on October 29, 2010 at 7:08 PM

1. The Moro Struggle against Spanish Invaders

THE BANGSAMORO STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION

Posted by Aishah Fatima on October 29, 2010 at 6:23 PM

The Bangsamoro Struggle for Liberation

A. The Struggle against Foreign Invaders

COLONIALISM in BANGSAMORO HOMELAND

Posted by Aishah Fatima on October 28, 2010 at 12:04 AM

1. Inherited Colonial Dilemma

The inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth Government in 1935 rapidly institutionalized

3. The Civilization Policy

It is indeed preposterous for us to declare we are in favor of granting independence to the

investigate conditions succeeded in bringing about an orderly transition of control. As Daniel

3. Government of the Moro Province

4. Early American Economic Policy for Mindanao

c) Moro Dependency Economy

In more accurate terms the relationship was one of debt-bondsman.

Posted by Aishah Fatima on October 20, 2010 at 7:59 PM

The Bangsamoro people concurrently has a total population of 24,270,754: 13 Muslim

3. Arrival of Islam in the Bangsamoro Homeland

In 1475, Sharif Muhammad Kabungsuan arrived in Mindanao. He was of Hashemite

Islam moves north

To constitute a nation, it must have the following characteristics: 1-a community of

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