Rule 7 (Outline, Case Digest & Full Text) PDF

Outline: Rule 7 - Parts of a Pleading
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Lesson for August 23, 2014

Saturday
Parts of a Pleading
Parts of a pleading - Rule 7

a) Caption - Sec. 1, Rule 7
b) Signature and address - Sec. 3, Rule 7
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Republic v. Kenrick Development Corp., G.R. No. 149576, August 8, 2006
c) Verification and certification against forum shopping - Secs. 4 & 5, Rule 7

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Robern Development Corp. v. J. Quitain, G.R. No. 135042, September 23, 1999
Huibonhoa v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 153785, August 3, 2006
Montes v. CA, G.R. No. 143797, May 4, 2006
Far Eastern Shipping Co. v. CA, G.R. No. 130068, October 1, 1998
Valmonte v. Alcala, G.R. No. 168667, July 23, 2008
i.
Requirements of a corporation executing the verification/certification of non-forum shopping
National Steel Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 134468, August 29, 2002
Kaunlaran Lending Investors Inc. v. Uy, G.R. No. 154974, February 4, 2008
d) Effect of the signature of counsel in a pleading
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Case Digest: Rule 7 - Parts of a Pleading

Signature and address - Sec. 3, Rule 7
REPUBLIC vs KENRICK DEVELOPMENT CORP.
G.R. No. 149576, August 8, 2006
certiorari. It directed the lifting of the order of default

against respondent and ordered the RTC to proceed to
trial with dispatch. Hence, this petition.
Facts:
Issue:
Kenrick Development Corporation constructed a

concrete perimeter fence around some parcels of land
located behind the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air
Transportation Office (ATO). As a result, the ATO was
dispossessed of its land. Respondent justified its action
with a claim of ownership over the property. It presented
three TCTs issued in its name and which allegedly
originated from TCT registered in the name of Alfonso
Concepcion.
The Registrar of Deeds had no record of the
TCTs. The land covered by respondents titles was also
found to be within Villamor Air Base in Pasay City.
The OSG filed a complaint before the RTC for
revocation, annulment and cancellation of certificates of
title in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines (as
represented by the LRA) against respondent and Alfonso
Concepcion.
Respondent filed its answer which was
purportedly signed by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. as counsel
for respondent.
During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee and Committee on Justice and Human
Rights conducted a hearing in aid of legislation on the
matter of land registration and titling. The legislative
investigation looked into the issuance of fake titles and
focused on how respondent was able to acquire them.
Atty. Garlitos, respondents former counsel, was
summoned. He testified that he prepared respondents
answer and transmitted an unsigned draft to
respondents president, Victor Ong. The signature
appearing above his name was not his. He authorized no
one to sign in his behalf either. And he did not know who
finally signed it.
The Republic promptly filed an urgent motion on
to declare respondent in default due to its failure to file a
valid answer; since the person who signed the answer was
neither authorized by Atty. Garlitos nor even known to
him, the answer was effectively an unsigned pleading.
Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, it was
a mere scrap of paper and produced no legal effect.
RTC ordered the answer stricken from the
records and, declared respondent in default.
CA found Atty. Garlitos statements in the
legislative hearing to be unreliable since they were not
subjected to cross-examination. It concluded that he
assented to the signing of the answer by somebody in his
stead. This supposedly cured whatever defect the answer
may have had. CA granted respondents petition for
Whether or not the CA err in reversing the trial

courts order which declared respondent in default for its
failure to file a valid answer. Yes, it did.
Held:
A signed pleading is one that is signed either by
the party himself or his counsel. Section 3, Rule 7 is clear
on this matter. It requires that a pleading must
be signed by the party or counsel representing him.
Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself
or his counsel operates to validly convert a pleading from
one that is unsigned to one that is signed. Counsels
authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him.
He may not delegate it to just any person.
The signature of counsel constitutes an
assurance by him that he has read the pleading; that, to
the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is
a good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed
for delay. Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by
affixing his signature, who can certify to these matters.
The preparation and signing of a pleading
constitute legal work involving practice of law which is
reserved exclusively for the members of the legal
profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of a
pleading to another lawyer but cannot do so in favor of
one who is not. The Code of Professional Responsibility
provides: Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any
unqualified person the performance of any task which by
law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in
good standing.
A signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to
signing by unqualified persons, something the law
strongly proscribes. Therefore, the blanket authority
respondent claims Atty. Garlitos entrusted to just anyone
was void. Any act taken pursuant to that authority was
likewise void. There was no way it could have been cured
or ratified by Atty. Garlitos subsequent acts. No doubt,
Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket
authority for just anyone to sign the answer. RTC correctly
ruled that respondents answer was invalid and of no legal
effect as it was an unsigned pleading.
Respondent insists that even if it were true that
its answer was supposedly an unsigned pleading, the
defect was a mere technicality that could be set aside. To
summarily brush them aside may result in arbitrariness
and injustice. Like all rules, procedural rules should be
followed except only when they may be relaxed to relieve
a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the
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degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
prescribed procedure. In this case, respondent failed to
show any persuasive reason why it should be exempted
from strictly abiding by the rules.
As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to
the acts committed by Atty. Garlitos in violation of the
ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he should be made to
account for his possible misconduct.
Petition is hereby GRANTED.
Verification and certification against forum shopping Secs. 4 & 5, Rule 7

ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. J. QUITAIN
G.R. No. 135042, September 23, 1999
Facts:
Robern is the registered owner of a parcel of land
which the National Power Corporation (NPC) is seeking to
expropriate. The property forms part of a proposed lowcost housing project. NPC filed a Complaint for Eminent
Domain against Robern. Instead of filing an answer,
Robern countered with a Motion to Dismiss, alleging (a)
that the Complaint suffered a jurisdictional defect for not
showing that the action bore the approval of the NPC
board of directors; (b) that Nemesio S. Caete, who
signed the verification and certification in the Complaint,
was not the president, the general manager or an officer
specifically authorized under the NPC charter (RA 6395);
(c) that the choice of property to be expropriated was
improper, as it had already been intended for use in a
low-cost housing project, a public purpose within the
contemplation of law; and the choice was also arbitrary,
as there were similar properties available within the area.
NPC filed a Motion for the Issuance of Writ of
Possession based on PD No. 42. NPC deposited 6,121.20
at PNB.
RTC denied the petitioner's Motion to Dismiss.
Robern filed a Motion for Reconsideration, pointing out
that (a) the issues raised in the Motion to Dismiss could
be resolved without trial, as they could be readily
appreciated on the face of the Complaint itself vis--vis
the applicable provisions of law on the matter; and (b) the
grounds relied upon for dismissing the Complaint did not
require evidence aliunde. RTC denied the Motion.
Robern filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order arguing among others that Section 15-A of RA 6395
was virtually amended when Caete was allowed to
verify and sign the certificate of non-forum shopping in

regard to the Complaint for expropriation filed by NPC.
NPC filed a Motion to Implement the Writ of Possession.
In spite of Roberns opposition, RTC issued a Writ of
Possession. Before counsel for the petitioner received any
order from the trial court directing the implementation of
the Writ of Possession, NPC occupied the disputed
property.
Before the CA. Robern assailed the Writ on the
following grounds: (a) patent on the face of the
complaint were its jurisdictional defect, prematurity and
noncompliance with RA 6395; and (b) the issuance of the
Writ of Possession was irregular, arbitrary and
unconstitutional, as the trial court had yet to fix the
appropriate value for purposes of taking or entering
upon the property to be expropriated.
CA upheld the RTC. The verification and
certification of the Complaint by someone other than the
president or the general manager of NPC was not a fatal
jurisdictional defect. It was enough to allege that the
expropriating body had the right of eminent domain. The
issues of whether the expropriation was properly
authorized by the board of directors and whether
Caetes verification and certification of the Complaint
was likewise authorized were evidentiary and could be
ruled upon only after the reception of evidence.
Hence, this Petition.
Roberns argument: RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case because, (1) Atty. Caete who
signed the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping was neither the president nor the general
manager of NPC; and (2) under Section 15-A of RA 6395,
only the NPC chief legal counsel, under the supervision of
the OSG is authorized to handle legal matters affecting
the government power corporation.
NPCs argument: Caete, as its regional legal
counsel in Mindanao, is authorized to prepare the
Complaint on its behalf.
Issue:
Whether or not the verification and certification
by Atty. Caete is valid.
Held:
SC found the disputed verification and
certification to be sufficient in form.
Verification is intended to assure that the
allegations therein have been prepared in good faith or
are true and correct, not mere speculations. Lack of
verification is merely a formal defect that is neither
jurisdictional nor fatal. Its absence does not divest the
trial court of jurisdiction. The trial court may order the
correction of the pleading or act on the unverified
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pleading, if the attending circumstances are such that
strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in
order to serve the ends of justice.
The certificate of non-forum shopping directs the
plaintiff or principal party to attest under oath that (1)
no action or claim involving the same issues have been
filed or commenced in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency and that, to the best of the plaintiff's knowledge,
no such other action or claim is pending; (2) if there is
such other pending action or claim, a complete statement
of its present status shall be made; and (3) if it should be
learned that the same or a similar action or claim has
been filed or is pending, the plaintiff shall report this fact
to the court where the complaint or initiatory pleading
was filed. This rule is rooted in the principle that a partylitigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous
remedies in different forums, as this practice is
detrimental to orderly judicial procedure. Administrative
Circular No. 04-94, which came before the 1997 Rules of
Court, is deemed mandatory but not jurisdictional, as
jurisdiction over the subject or nature of the action is
conferred by law.
The questioned verification stated that Atty.
Caete was the acting regional legal counsel of NPC at the
Mindanao Regional Center in Iligan City. He was not
merely a retained lawyer, but an NPC in-house counsel
and officer, whose basic function was to prepare legal
pleadings and to represent NPC-Mindanao in legal
cases. As regional legal counsel for the Mindanao area,
he was the officer who was in the best position to verify
the truthfulness and the correctness of the allegations in
the Complaint for expropriation in Davao City. As internal
legal counsel, he was also in the best position to know
and to certify if an action for expropriation had already
been filed and pending with the courts.
Atty. Caete was not the only signatory to the
Complaint; he was joined by Doromal, OIC-assistant
general counsel; and Pablo -- both of the NPC Litigation &
Land and Land Rights Dept. They all signed on behalf of
the solicitor general in accordance with the NPC charter.
Their signatures prove that the NPC general counsel and
the solicitor general approved the filing of the Complaint
for expropriation. Clearly then, the CA did not err in
holding that the Complaint was not dismissible on its face,
simply because the person who had signed the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping was
not the president or the general manager of NPC.
CA decision, affirmed.

HUIBONHOA vs. CONCEPCION
G.R. No. 153785, August 3, 2006
Facts:
A complaint for accounting and damages was
filed by respondent Angel D. Concepcion, Sr. against
petitioner Veronique T. Huibonhoa with the RTC of
Cabanatuan City and prayed for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory
injunction to immediately restrain Huibonhoa from
performing her job as manager of Poulex Supermarket,
among others.
On the same day the complaint was filed, Judge
Annang issued a TRO effective for 72 hours.
Huibonhoa, along with fellow stockholders of
CHAS, Inc., filed an intra-corporate and derivative suit and
complaint for injunction with a prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to
prevent respondent Concepcion, Sr. and his agents from
interfering with the management and operations of the
Poulex Supermarket.
Then, Huibonhoa filed an Urgent Manifestation
and Motion Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam, seeking the
issuance of an order certifying the expiration of the TRO.
Thus, Judge Annang issued on the same day an order
declaring the expiration of the temporary restraining
order but at the same time directing the continuous
closure of the supermarket.
Respondent
Concepcions
complaint
for
accounting and damages was raffled to Branch 28 of the
RTC-Cabanatuan City. Huibonhoa filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which sought to
annul the orders of Judge Annang for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or
excess of jurisdiction.
Huibonhoas prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order was granted. The CA
Resolution enjoined respondents from implementing
and/or enforcing the assailed orders of Judge Annang,
including but not limited to the prevention of the breaking
of the padlock and reopening of Poulex Supermarket, and
interference by respondent Concepcion and his agents
with the operations of the supermarket.
CA- dismissed Huibonhoas petition for certiorari
assailing the twin orders of Judge Annang on the grounds
of pre-maturity and forum shopping. CA believed that the
two actions had the same object of nullifying the TRO
issued by Judge Annang.
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Petitioners arguments:
- Civil Case No. 4068-AF was filed not for the
purpose of defeating the TRO issued by Judge
Annang but on account of the acts of disturbance
and attempted forcible take-over by respondent.
- the petition for certiorari was filed with CA to
enjoin or prohibit acts pursuant to the
implementation of the orders of Judge Annang,
Issue:
Whether or not the filing of petition for certiorari
constitute forum shopping
Held:
No. There is forum shopping when, as a result of
an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion, other than by appeal or certiorari in
another. There can also be forum shopping when a party
institutes two or more suits in different courts, either
simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts
to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the
same or substantially the same reliefs on the supposition
that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition or increase a partys chances of obtaining a
favorable decision or action.
To determine whether a party violated the rule
against forum shopping, the most important question to
ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present
or whether a final judgment in one case will result to res
judicata in another. Otherwise stated, to determine forum
shopping, the test is to see whether in the two or more
cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes
of action, and reliefs sought.
A plain reading of the allegations in the
complaint in Civil Case No. 4068-AF and those in the
petition for certiorari filed with the CA would preclude
the Court from affirming the CA finding that petitioner
had engaged in forum shopping.
Not all the elements of litis pendentia concur.
Civil Case No. 4068-AF is a derivative suit and complaint
for injunction instituted by the stockholders of the
aforementioned corporations while the petition for
certiorari was instituted by petitioner in her capacity as
manager of Poulex Supermarket. The complaint in Civil
Case No. 4068-AF alleges different causes of action,
including those relating to interference by respondent
Concepcion in the operations of the supermarket and
causing damages to the corporations and the stockholders
arising from such unlawful interference. The petition for
certiorari aims to nullify the two orders of Judge Annang
on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of
discretion since only the designated special commercial
court has jurisdiction to hear and decide intra-corporate

controversies.
A resolution on the merits of the petition for
certiorari would necessarily have to discuss the authority
of respondent Judge Annang to take cognizance of the
case, which was allegedly an intra-corporate matter, and
the issuance of the mandatory injunction, which was
allegedly not sanctioned by any rule. These are the main
issues raised in the petition for certiorari but are not
raised as issues in Civil Case No. 4068-F.
The reliefs sought in the two actions are also
different. In Civil case 4068-F, aside from the main action
for a permanent injunction, complainants therein also
claimed damages. In the petition for certiorari, Huibonhoa
sought the prevention of the implementation of the
assailed orders of Judge Annang.
The only common thread between the two
actions is with respect to the TRO sought to prevent
respondent Concepcion from interfering with the
operations of the supermarket, but said relief is only
incidental and does not constitute the main cause of
action in both cases.
However, the Court cannot take favorable
action on the petition of Petitioner. In the light of the
supervening events, particularly the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 4065, the instant petition has clearly become
moot and academic and, therefore, deserves to be
dismissed.

MONTES vs CA
G.R. No. 143797, May 4, 2006
Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed by
complainants Imelda D. Rodriguez and Elizabeth
Fontanilla against Carlito L. Montes( petitioner), Chief of
the Legal Division of DOST, for grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service.
Rodriguez and Fontanilla alleged that while
Montes was in the process of adducing evidence against
Rodriguez and the DOST Secretary in the complaint for
misconduct he had filed against them before the
Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption
(PCAGC), Montes produced a tape recording of a private
conversation he had had with the DOST Secretary.
Montes admitted that he had taped the conversation at
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the DOST Secretarys Office without the DOST Secretarys
knowledge and consent. Montes publicly played the illegal
tape recording during the hearing. Montes likewise
admitted that he had also recorded a private conversation
he had with Fontanilla at the DOST Office in Taguig which
was without the knowledge and consent of Fontanilla.
The Ombudsman found Montes guilty of grave
misconduct and suspended him for 1 year without pay.
The Ombudsman held that Montes taping of his
conversations with Fontanilla was prohibited by the AntiWiretapping Law.
The Ombudsman denied Montes MR and
affirmed the decision. Hence, Montes filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure with prayer for temporary restraining order
before the Court of Appeals.
CA- dismissed outright Montes petition for being
procedurally infirm. Specifically, the appellate court noted
that Montes failed: a) to state the specific date when he
received a copy of the Ombudsmans Decision; b) to
attach duplicate originals or certified true copies of the
challenged Decision and Order; and c) to provide an
explanation why the copy of his petition was not served
personally upon therein respondent DOST Secretary.
On motion for reconsideration, however, the
appellate court issued a Resolution requiring the
Ombudsman to file his comment. Notably, the appellate
court considered Montes motion for reconsideration
abandoned in a Resolution in view of the commencement
of the instant petition. Meanwhile, the DOST Secretary
issued the assailed suspension order.
Petitioners argument:
- the implementation of the suspension order is
premature considering the pendency of his petition
before the appellate court. He further states that there is
no law or provision mandating the immediate execution
of the Ombudsmans decision in an administrative case
where the penalty imposed is suspension for 1 year.
Respondent Ombudsman and DOSTs argument:
- the filing of the instant petition is a violation of the
proscription against forum-shopping
- they argue that the execution of the suspension order
despite the pendency of an appeal is allowed under
Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 14-A-00.
Issue:
Whether or not the instant petition for
prohibition with prayer for TRO of Montes constitutes
forum shopping.
Held:
YES. We find that Montes transgressed the
proscription against forum shopping.
There is forum shopping when a party seeks to
obtain remedies in an action in one court, which had
already been solicited, and in other courts and other
proceedings in other tribunals. Forum shopping is also the
act of one party against another when an adverse
judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking
another and possibly favorable opinion in another forum
other than by appeal or the special civil action of
certiorari; or the institution of two or more acts or
proceedings grounded on the same cause on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition.
In the case at bar, when Montes filed the petition
for prohibition against the suspension order, his motion
for reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition for
certiorari was still pending before the CA. In fact, Montes
motion for reconsideration has not been fully resolved.
Montes petition for certiorari prayed, among
others, that the appellate court issue an order "restraining
the Honorable Secretary, Department of Science and
Technology from implementing the order.
Montes motion for reconsideration likewise
prayed that the implementation of the suspension for one
year from the service without pay of the herein petitioner
be restrained.
In the present petition, Montes prays that an
order be issued to restrain the Honorable Secretary, DOST
from implementing the Suspension Order on the herein
petitioner.
Clearly, the relief sought from the appellate court
is the same as the relief prayed for in the present
petitionthat is, that an order be issued restraining the
DOST Secretary from implementing the Ombudsmans
Order. In filing the instant petition without awaiting the
resolution of his pending motion before the appellate
court, Montes asked for simultaneous remedies in two
different fora. This act is censurable and serves as a
ground for the dismissal of the instant case with
prejudice.
In this regard, the Court notes that Montes
implicitly confirmed that he committed forum shopping
by stating that he had to file the instant petition before
this Court in view of the denial of his motion for
reconsideration before the appellate court. Montes failed
to consider that the same implementation of the
suspension order which impelled him to abandon his
motion for reconsideration also rendered the instant
petition academic.
As the present petition is one for prohibition
which is a preventive remedy, worthy of note is the fact,
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that the suspension order has already been
implemented. The act sought to be enjoined having
taken place already, there is nothing more to restrain.
Thus, the instant petition has been unmade as a mere
subject matter of purely theoretical interest.

FAR EASTERN SHIPPING CO. vs CA
G.R. No. 130068, October 1, 1998
Facts:
M/V PAVLODAR flying under the flagship of USSR,
owned and operated by Far Eastern Shipping Company
arrived at the port of Manila from Vancouver, British
Columbia.
Captain Abellana was tasked by Philippine Ports
Authority to supervise the berthing of the vessel.
Appellant Gavino was assigned by appellant MPA to
conduct docking maneuver for the safe berthing of the
vessel.
Gavino boarded the vessel and stationed himself
in the bridge with the master of the vessel, Victor
Kavankov, beside him.
When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet
from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped.
Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel.
The left anchor were dropped, however the anchor did
not take hold as expected. Before the right anchor and
additional shackles cold be dropped, the bow rammed
into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to
the pier. The vessel sustained damage too.
The PPA through the Sol Gen filed before the RTC
of Manila a complaint for sum of money against Far
Eastern Shipping, Captain Gavino and MPA praying that
they be held jointly and severally liable to pay the plaintiff
for damages.
RTC ordered the defendants jointly and
severally to pay the PPA.
Defendants appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed
the findings of the court a quo except that it found no
employer-employee relationship existing between private
respondents MPA and Captain Gavino.
Neither Far Eastern Shipping nor MPA was happy
with the decision of the CA and both of them elevated
their respective plaints to the Supreme Court via separate
petitions for review on certiorari.
In G.R No. 1300068 (separate petition of Far

Eastern), Far Eastern imputed that the CA seriously erred
in in not holding Captain Gavino and MPA as parties solely
responsible for the resulting damages sustained by the
pier.
On the other hand, in G.R No. 130150, MPA avers
that respondent courts error consisted in disregarding
and misinterpreting the Customs Admin Order which
limits the liability of MPA. The MPA asseverates that it
should not be held solidarily liable with Capt. Gavino as
there is no employee-employer relationship existing.
Upon motion by Far Eastern in G.R No 130150,
the case was consolidated with G.R No. 130068.
Note: Certification against non-forum shopping is
not part of the issues raised in this case. However, the
court
simply
expressed
its
displeasure
and
disappointment with the conduct of the parties as regards
to the certification. Thus, SC made a discussion on the
matter.
Held:
G.R No 130068 (petition of Far Eastern),
commenced with the filing by Far Eastern through counsel
on Aug. 22, 1997 of a verified motion for extension of
time to file its petition for thirty days. Said motion
contained a certification against forum shopping signed
by Atty. Tria as affiant with an undertaking that no action
or proceeding with the same issues is pending in other
court. Far Eastern filed its petition on September 26, 1997
bearing another verification and certification against
forum shopping executed by one Teodoro Lopez with the
same undertaking that no action of proceeding with the
same issues is pending in other court.
MPA in G.R No 130150 also filed a petition on
August 29, 1997 and revealed in its certification that it has
not commenced any other action of proceeding involving
the same issues with the court but there is an action or
proceeding pending in the court entitled Far Eastern
Shipping vs PPA
Inasmuch as MPAs petition in G.R No. 130150
was posted by registered mail on August 29, 1997 and
taking judicial notice of the average period of time it takes
local mail to reach its destination, by reasonable
estimation it would be fair to conclude that when Far
Easten filed its petition on Septermber 26, 1997, it would
already have received a copy of the former and would
then have knowledge of the pendency of the other
petition initially filed with the first division. It was
therefore incumbent upon Far Eastern to inform the court
of that fact through its certification against forum
shopping. For failure to make such disclosure, it would
appear the aforequoted certification in GR 130068 is
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defective and could have been a ground for dismissal
thereof.
Furthermore, the certification against forum
shopping is to be executed by the petitioner and not by
counsel. It is the petitioner who is in the best position to
know whether he or it actually filed or caused the filing of
a petition in that case. Hence, a certification against
forum shopping by counsel is a defective certification.
Clearly equivalent to non-compliance and constitutes a
valid cause for dismissal.
Hence, the initial certification appen ded to the
motion for extension of time to file petition executed in
behalf of Far Eastern by Atty. Tria is procedurally
deficient. But considering that it was a superfluity at that
stage of the proceeding, the court shall disregard the
error. Besides, the certification subsequently executed by
Teodoro Lopez in behalf of Far Eastern cures that defect
to a certain extent.
verification they were in the meantime submitting a

photostatic copy of the verification as the original was still
in the Philippine Consulate for authentication. Indeed, on
Apil 8, 2005 petitioners submitted to the CA the original
authenticated certification.
CA issued a resolution on the same day, April 8,
2005 dismissing the petition due to the failure of
petitioners to attach the complaint and other material
portions of the record.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration by the
CA denied the motion reasoning that while the
verification was executed on March 17, 2005, the petition
is dated March 31, 2005. Petitioners could not have
actually read and understood the petition or attested to
the truth of the contents because at the time they
executed the verification the petition was still inexistent.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in ruling that the
variance between the dates of the verification and the
petition mean that they did not actually read the petition
before it was filed in the court.
Held:

VALMONTE vs ALCALA
G.R. No. 168667, July 23, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner filed an ejectment suit against Alcala
before the MTC.
Petitioner alleged that they are the
unregistered owners of the Apartment located in Paco,
Manila, as the petitioner is one of the heirs and
successors-in-interests of the registered owners of the
property.
Since petitioners were migrating to the United
States they offered apartment no. 1411 for lease to the
respondent; the latter accepted the offer.
Due to respondents subsequent failure to pay
the agreed rentals despite written demand, petitioners
filed a complaint for unlawful detainer before the MTC.
As the petitioners were already a US resident,
they signed the required certification of non-forum
shopping before a notary public in the state of
Washington and had it authenticated by the Philippine
Consulate General.
MTC ruled in favour of the petitioners.
Respondent appealed the MTC decision to the RTC which
reversed the MTC ruling.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the
CA and formally manifested that to comply with the
Petition is meritorious. The CAs conclusion

results from an overly technical reading of the verification
and from a failure to appreciate the circumstances of the
parties litigating in Philippine courts while they are
overseas.
We should not lose sight of the reality that
pleadings are prepared and signed by the counsel at the
instructions of the client; the latter merely provides the
supporting facts of the pleading and, as needed, verifies
that the allegation are true and correct. In short, the
pleading and the verification are prepared separately and
a variance in their dates is a matter that may be
satisfactorily explained. To demand the litigants to read
the very same documents that is to be filed before the
courts is to rigorous a requirement. What the rules
require is for a party to read the contents of a pleading
without any specific requirement on the form or manner
in which the reading is to be done.
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE

Requirements of a corporation executing
verification/certification of non-forum shopping
NATIONAL STEEL CORP. vs CA
G.R. No. 134468, August 29, 2002
the
Facts:
Dispute arose between petitioner and
respondent union regarding the grant of Productivity and
Quality Bonus and Fiscal Year-End incentive award.
Representative of NSC and the union appeared
before a voluntary arbitrator. The latter issued a decision
ruling that the demand for productivity and quality bonus
is without merit while the demand for distribution of
year-end incentive award is in order.
The NSC filed a petition for review with the Court
of Appeals.
The CA issues a resolution dismissing the
companys petition for review on the ground that Atty.
Padilla, one of the counsels of record of the petitioner is
not a real party in interest but a retained counsel with
mere incidental interest and therefore not the petitioner
or principal party required by law to certify under oath to
the facts or undertakings.
Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the signature of petitioners
counsel be deemed sufficient for the purposes of Revised
Circular Nos. 28-91 and AO No. 04-49?
Held:
NSCs counsel of record was duly authorized to
represent them not only before the voluntary arbitrator
but also to prepare the petition for review filed before the
court of appeals.
The Corporation has no powers except those
expressly conferred on it by the corporation code. In turn,
a corporation exercises said powers through its board of
directors or authorized agents.
While it is admitted that the authorization of
petitioners counsel was submitted to the appellate court
only after the issuance of its resolution dismissing the
petition based on non-compliance with the aforesaid
circular, we hold that in view of the peculiar
circumstances of the present case and in the interest of
substantial justice, the procedural defect may be set
aside.
Requirements of a corporation executing

verification/certification of non-forum shopping
KAUNLARAN LENDING INVESTORS INC. vs. UY
G.R. No. 154974, February 4, 2008
the
Background of the case:

Sometime in 1987, her son Jose, nephew Virgilio,
and Wilfredo agreed to establish a business of buy and
sell of second-hand motor vehicles in which Virgilio would
be the manager, Wilfredo would scout for a financier, and
Jose would provide the security for any loan. Through the
efforts of Wilfredo, Lelia (Branch Manager of FEBTC and
owner of Kaunlaran [KLII]) agreed to arrange for the grant
of a loan. Wilfredo thus asked Jose (with SPA from his
mother) to turn over the TCTs of the 2 parcels of land in
Quezon City owned by Loreta to serve as security for the
loan.
Jose entrusted the TCTs to Wilfredo who then
turned it over to Lelia. The loan forms were sent by
Wilfredo to Loretas residence for her signature. After
Jose examined the forms, Loreta signed them.
While Jose and Virgilio were in Manila to canvass
prices of second-hand motor vehicles, Magno (manager of
KLII) brought to Loretas residence another set of loan
forms together with a blank Solidbank check drawn from
the account of KLII and a check voucher, explaining (in the
presence of Arlene, Joses wife) that the new set of loan
forms would be sent to Manila and that the proceeds
would be promptly delivered to her residence once she
affixes her signature on the said check and voucher. When
Jose learned about it, he confronted Magno and was told
that the documents were already sent to Lelia. Virgilio
and Jose tried to withdraw the application and the TCTs
but Lelia told them that it was no longer possible. Lelia
admitted having applied the loan proceeds amounting to
P800,000 to Wilfredos personal debt to her. Upon
verification with the RD, the loan was annotated on
Loretas TCTs. Hence, the complaint.
Facts:
Respondent Loreta filed a complaint before the
RTC Dagupan for annulment of real estate mortgage and
related documents plus damages against the petitioners,
along with WIlfredo and Magno. She alleged that said
documents were absolute nullities due to the absence of
consideration and vitiated consent.
After the defendants submitted their Answer
with Counterclaim, the trial court rendered judgment
declaring as valid and legal the subject documents.
All parties appealed except for Magno who died
in 1991, including Lelia. KLIIs appeal was only to the nonaward of damages to it.
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE
The CA reversed the trial court decision,

declaring the subject documents as null and void. MR
having been denied, hence, this petition filed by KLII and
Lelia.
Loreta moves for the dismissal of the petition
due to defective verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping.
Issue:
Whether or not the president of KLII was
authorized to sign the verification and certification of nonforum shopping on its behalf
Held:
NO. For failure of KLII to present proof that its
president, Rolando Tan, was authorized to sign the
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping on its
behalf, the petition must be denied.
In case of a corporation, it has long been settled
that the certificate [of non-forum shopping] must be
signed for and on its behalf by a specifically authorized
officer or agent who has personal knowledge of the facts
required to be disclosed.
xxxx
Consequently, without the needed proof from the board
of directors, the certificate would be considered
defective. Thus, xxx even the regular officers of a
corporation, like the chairman and president, may not
even know the details required in a certificate of nonforum shopping; they must therefore be authorized by
the board of directors just like any other officer or agent.
Disposition:
The merits of the petition, however, justify the
relaxation of the rule on verification and certificate of
non-forum shopping, for from a review of the records
Loreta has not proven by preponderance of evidence that
she was deceived into signing the documents required for
the release of the proceeds of the loan.
The petition is GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals dated April 11, 2002 is SET ASIDE, and
the decision of Branch 41 of the RTC Dagupan City in Civil
Case No. D-9136 dated March 3, 1994 is REINSTATED.
meikimouse
Full Text Cases: Rule 7 - Parts of a Pleading

G.R. No. 149576 August 8, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Land
Registration
Authority, Petitioner,
vs.
KENRICK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The Republic of the Philippines assails the May 31, 2001
1
decision and August 20, 2001 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 in this petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
This case stemmed from the construction by respondent Kenrick
Development Corporation of a concrete perimeter fence around
some parcels of land located behind the Civil Aviation Training
Center of the Air Transportation Office (ATO) in 1996. As a
result, the ATO was dispossessed of some 30,228 square meters
of prime land. Respondent justified its action with a claim of
ownership over the property. It presented Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) Nos. 135604, 135605 and 135606 issued in its name
and which allegedly originated from TCT No. 17508 registered in
the name of one Alfonso Concepcion.
ATO verified the authenticity of respondents titles with the
Land Registration Authority (LRA). On May 17, 1996, Atty. Jose
Loriega, head of the Land Title Verification Task Force of the
LRA, submitted his report. The Registrar of Deeds of Pasay City
had no record of TCT No. 17508 and its ascendant title, TCT No.
5450. The land allegedly covered by respondents titles was also
found to be within Villamor Air Base (headquarters of the
Philippine Air Force) in Pasay City.
By virtue of the report, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
on September 3, 1996, filed a complaint for revocation,
annulment and cancellation of certificates of title in behalf of
the Republic of the Philippines (as represented by the LRA)
against respondent and Alfonso Concepcion. It was raffled to
Branch 114 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. 96-1144.
On December 5, 1996, respondent filed its answer which was
purportedly signed by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. as counsel for
respondent.
Since Alfonso Concepcion could not be located and served with
summons, the trial court ordered the issuance of an alias
summons by publication against him on February 19, 1997.
The case was thereafter punctuated by various incidents relative
to modes of discovery, pre-trial, postponements or
continuances, motions to dismiss, motions to declare
defendants in default and other procedural matters.
During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee and Committee on Justice and Human Rights
conducted a hearing in aid of legislation on the matter of land
registration and titling. In particular, the legislative investigation
looked into the issuance of fake titles and focused on how
respondent was able to acquire TCT Nos. 135604, 135605 and
135606.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
During the congressional hearing held on November 26, 1998,
one of those summoned was Atty. Garlitos, respondents former
counsel. He testified that he prepared respondents answer and
transmitted an unsigned draft to respondents president, Mr.
Victor Ong. The signature appearing above his name was not his.
He authorized no one to sign in his behalf either. And he did not
know who finally signed it.
With Atty. Garlitos revelation, the Republic promptly filed an
urgent motion on December 3, 1998 to declare respondent in
2
default, predicated on its failure to file a valid answer. The
Republic argued that, since the person who signed the answer
was neither authorized by Atty. Garlitos nor even known to him,
the answer was effectively an unsigned pleading. Pursuant to
3
Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, it was a mere scrap of
paper and produced no legal effect.
On February 19, 1999, the trial court issued a resolution granting
4
the Republics motion. It found respondents answer to be
sham and false and intended to defeat the purpose of the rules.
The trial court ordered the answer stricken from the records,
declared respondent in default and allowed the Republic to
present its evidence ex parte.
The Republic presented its evidence ex parte, after which it
rested its case and formally offered its evidence.
Meanwhile, respondent sought reconsideration of the February
19, 1999 resolution but the trial court denied it.
Aggrieved, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of
5
Appeals via a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the
February 19, 1999 resolution of the trial court. Respondent
contended that the trial court erred in declaring it in default for
failure to file a valid and timely answer.
On May 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
decision. It found Atty. Garlitos statements in the legislative
hearing to be unreliable since they were not subjected to crossexamination. The appellate court also scrutinized Atty. Garlitos
6
acts after the filing of the answer and concluded that he
assented to the signing of the answer by somebody in his stead.
This supposedly cured whatever defect the answer may have
had. Hence, the appellate court granted respondents petition
for certiorari. It directed the lifting of the order of default
against respondent and ordered the trial court to proceed to
trial with dispatch. The Republic moved for reconsideration but
it was denied. Thus, this petition.
Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial courts order
which declared respondent in default for its failure to file a valid
answer? Yes, it did.
A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify
7
anothers statement. Where it appears that a party clearly and
unambiguously assented to or adopted the statements of
another, evidence of those statements is admissible against
8
him. This is the essence of the principle of adoptive admission.
An adoptive admission is a partys reaction to a statement or
action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the
partys reaction as an admission of something stated or implied
9
by the other person. By adoptive admission, a third persons
statement becomes the admission of the party embracing or
espousing it. Adoptive admission may occur when a party:
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE

(a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by
10
another;
(b) hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it;
11
(c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of

12
another;
(d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by
another but ignores further points which he or she has heard the
13
other make or
(e) reads and signs a written statement made by another.
Here, respondent accepted
Garlitos and built its case on
deny or contradict its former
great lengths to explain Atty.
implications, as follows:
14
the pronouncements of Atty.

them. At no instance did it ever
counsels statements. It went to
Garlitos testimony as well as its
1. While Atty. Garlitos denied signing the answer, the fact was
that the answer was signed. Hence, the pleading could not be
considered invalid for being an unsigned pleading. The fact that
the person who signed it was neither known to Atty. Garlitos nor
specifically authorized by him was immaterial. The important
thing was that the answer bore a signature.
2. While the Rules of Court requires that a pleading must be
signed by the party or his counsel, it does not prohibit a counsel
from giving a general authority for any person to sign the answer
for him which was what Atty. Garlitos did. The person who
actually signed the pleading was of no moment as long as
counsel knew that it would be signed by another. This was
similar to addressing an authorization letter "to whom it may
concern" such that any person could act on it even if he or she
was not known beforehand.
3. Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the answer; he never
disowned its contents and he resumed acting as counsel for
respondent subsequent to its filing. These circumstances show
that Atty. Garlitos conformed to or ratified the signing of the
answer by another.
Respondent repeated these statements of Atty. Garlitos in its
motion for reconsideration of the trial courts February 19, 1999
resolution. And again in the petition it filed in the Court of
15
Appeals as well as in the comment and memorandum it
submitted to this Court.
Evidently, respondent completely adopted Atty. Garlitos
statements as its own. Respondents adoptive admission
constituted a judicial admission which was conclusive on it.
Contrary to respondents position, a signed pleading is one that
is signed either by the party himself or his counsel. Section 3,
Rule 7 is clear on this matter. It requires that a pleading must
be signed by the party or counsel representing him.
Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself or his
counsel operates to validly convert a pleading from one that is
unsigned to one that is signed.
Counsels authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to
him. He may not delegate it to just any person.
The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he

has read the pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief, there is a good ground to support it; and
16
that it is not interposed for delay. Under the Rules of Court, it
is counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can certify to
these matters.
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work
involving practice of law which is reserved exclusively for the
members of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the
17
signing of a pleading to another lawyer but cannot do so
in favor of one who is not. The Code of Professional
Responsibility provides:
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified
person the performance of any task which by law may only be
performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing
18
by unqualified persons, something the law strongly proscribes.
Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty.
Garlitos entrusted to just anyone was void. Any act taken
pursuant to that authority was likewise void. There was no way
it could have been cured or ratified by Atty. Garlitos subsequent
acts.
Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate
hearing shows that Atty. Garlitos consented to the signing of the
answer by another "as long as it conformed to his draft." We
give no value whatsoever to such self-serving statement.
No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket
authority for just anyone to sign the answer. The trial court
correctly ruled that respondents answer was invalid and of no
legal effect as it was an unsigned pleading. Respondent was
properly declared in default and the Republic was rightly
allowed to present evidence ex parte.
Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It
maintains that even if it were true that its answer was
supposedly an unsigned pleading, the defect was a mere
technicality that could be set aside.
Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly
labeled as mere technicalities have their own validraison d
etre in the orderly administration of justice. To summarily brush
19
them aside may result in arbitrariness and injustice.
The Courts pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of Appeals
relevant:
20
is
Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the

adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus
[enjoined] to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in
some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the
rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for
erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in
the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in
proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is
equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance
with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice.
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only

when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed
to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
21
prescribed procedure. In this case, respondent failed to show
any persuasive reason why it should be exempted from strictly
abiding by the rules.
As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts
committed by Atty. Garlitos in violation of the ethics of the legal
profession. Thus, he should be made to account for his possible
misconduct.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The May 31,
2001 decision and August 20, 2001 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the February 19, 1999 resolution of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch 114 declaring respondent in default
is herebyREINSTATED.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the
commencement of disbarment proceedings against Atty. Onofre
Garlitos, Jr. for his possible unprofessional conduct not befitting
his position as an officer of the court.
SO ORDERED.
meikimouse

G.R. No. 135042 September 23, 1999
ROBERN
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE JESUS V. QUITAIN, Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
Br. 15; and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondents,
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Expropriation proceedings are governed by revised Rule 67 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which took effect on July 1,
1997. Previous doctrines inconsistent with this Rule are deemed
reversed or modified. Specifically, (1) an answer, not a motion to
dismiss, is the responsive pleading to a complaint in eminent
domain; (2) the trial court may issue a writ of possession once
the plaintiff deposits an amount equivalent to the assessed
value of the property, pursuant to Section 2 of said Rule, without
need of a hearing to determine the provisional sum to be
deposited; and (3) a final order of expropriation may not be
issued prior to a full hearing and resolution of the objections and
defenses of the property owner.
The Case
Before us is a Petition under Rule 45, challenging the Decision of
1
the Court of Appeals promulgated February 27, 1998 and its
Resolution promulgated July 23, 1998 in CA-GR SP-46002, which
(1) dismissed the action for certiorari and preliminary injunction
filed by Robern Development Corporation ("Robern" for brevity);
and (2) effectively affirmed the Orders (dated August 13, 1997;
September 11, 1997; and November 5, 1997) and the Writ of
Possession (dated September 19, 1997), all issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City in Civil Case No. 25356-97.
The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant

petition is ordered DISMISSED. Costs against
the petitioner.
In its assailed Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied
3
reconsideration in this manner:
There being no compelling reason to modify,
reverse or reconsider the Decision rendered
in the case dated February 27, 1998[;] the
Motion for Reconsideration posted by
petitioner on March 23, 1998 is DENIED, it
appearing further that the arguments raised
therein were already considered and passed
upon in the aforesaid Decision.
The Facts
The following facts are undisputed.
1. Robern is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an
area of about 17,746.50 square meters, which the National
Power Corporation ("NPC" for brevity) is seeking to expropriate.
The property forms part of a proposed low-cost housing project
in Inawayan, Binugao, Toril, Davao City.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
2. On June 6, 1997, NPC filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain
4
against Robern. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner
5
countered with a Motion to Dismiss, alleging (a) that the
Complaint suffered a jurisdictional defect for not showing that
the action bore the approval of the NPC board of directors; (b)
that Nemesio S. Caete, who signed the verification and
certification in the Complaint, was not the president, the general
manager or an officer specifically authorized under the NPC
charter (RA 6395); (c) that the choice of property to be
expropriated was improper, as it had already been intended for
use in a low-cost housing project, a public purpose within the
contemplation of law; and the choice was also arbitrary, as there
were similar properties available within the area.
3. Before this Motion could be resolved, NPC filed a Motion for
the Issuance of Writ of Possession based on Presidential Decree
No. 42. On July 9, 1997, NPC deposited P6,121.20 at the
Philippine National Bank, Davao Branch, as evidenced by PNB
6
Savings Account No. 385-560728-9.
4. In its Order of August 13, 1997, the trial court denied
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss in this wise:
This refers to the motion to dismiss. The
issues raised are matters that should be
dealt with during the trial proper. Suffice it
to say that [NPC] has the privilege as a utility
to use the power of eminent domain.
The motion is denied for lack of merit. The
pre-trial conference shall be on August 27,
7
1997 at 2:30 P.M.
5. On September 2, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, pointing out that (a) the issues raised in the
Motion to Dismiss could be resolved without trial, as they could
be readily appreciated on the face of the Complaint itself vis-visthe applicable provisions of law on the matter; and (b) the
grounds relied upon for dismissing the Complaint did not require
evidence aliunde.
6. On September 11, 1997, the trial court denied the Motion. as
follows:
The . . . motion [of the
petitioner]
for
reconsideration is denied
for lack of merit. Finding
the . . . motion [of NPC]
to be meritorious[,] let a
8
writ of possession issue.
7. On September 22, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of September 11, 1997, arguing
among others that Section 15-A of RA 6395 was virtually
"amended" when Caete was allowed to verify and sign the
certificate of non-forum shopping in regard to the Complaint for
expropriation filed by NPC.
8. Without awaiting the outcome of the Motion for
Reconsideration, NPC filed a Motion to Implement the Writ of
Possession.
9. On September 19, 1997, in spite of petitioner's opposition,
the trial court issued a Writ of Possession as follows:
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE

WHEREAS, the applicant National Power
Corporation in the above-titled case has
presented to this Court a petition praying for
the issuance of a Writ of Possession of the
affected property of the . . . Robern
Development
Corporation,
described
hereinbelow, as follows:
TCT No. Total Area in Area Affected in
Square Meter Square Meter
T-251558
(T-141754) 11,469.00 3,393.00
T-251559
(T-141755) 10,000.00 2,124.00
T-251556
(T-14152) 30,000.00 3,402.00
T-251555 45,000.00 8,827.50

TOTAL 97,371.00 17,746.50 Total
issuance of the Writ of Possession was irregular, arbitrary and

unconstitutional, as the trial court had yet to fix the
"appropriate value for purposes of taking or entering upon the
property to be expropriated."
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court on the following
grounds.
First, the verification and certification of the Complaint by
someone other than the president or the general manager of
NPC was not a fatal jurisdictional defect. It was enough to allege
that the expropriating body had the right of eminent domain.
The issues of whether the expropriation was properly authorized
by the board of directors and whether Caete's verification and
certification of the Complaint was likewise authorized were
evidentiary and could be ruled upon only after the reception of
evidence.
Second, whether the disputed property could still be
expropriated even if it had already been intended to be used in a
low-cost housing project and whether the choice of that lot was
arbitrary and erroneous, given the availability of similar
properties in the area, were factual issues that would entail
presentation of evidence by both parties.
Third, the allegation in the Complaint that NPC sought to acquire
an easement of right-of-way through the disputed property did
not preclude its expropriation. Section 3-A of the NPC charter
allowed the power company to acquire an easement of right-ofway or even the land itself if the servitude would injure the land.
affected area
WHEREAS, on September 11, 1997 the court
issued an Order granting the issuance of a
Writ of Possession in favor of the . . .
National Power Corporation for the
immediate possession and control of the
parcels of land owned by the [petitioner] as
aforestated for the construction MantanaoNew-Loon 138 KV Transmission Line Project
to be undertaken by the petitioner affecting
17,746.50 sq. m. of the 97,371.00 sq. meters
as shown above.
NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby
commanded to place [NPC] in possession
and control of the affected property
consisting 17,746.50 [s]quare [m]eters of the
total area of 97,371.00 square meters
described above and to eject therefrom all
adverse occupants, Robern Development
Corporation and [all other] persons . . .
9
claiming under it.
10. On November 5, 1997, before counsel for the petitioner
received any order from the trial court directing the
implementation of the Writ of Possession, NPC occupied the
disputed property.
11. In a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA),
Robern assailed the Writ on the following grounds: (a) patent on
the face of the complaint were its jurisdictional defect,
prematurity and noncompliance with RA 6395; and (b) the
Fourth, the issuance of the Writ of Possession was proper in

view of NPC's compliance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, by depositing with the Philippine
National Bank an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the
disputed property.
Fifth, certiorari was not the proper remedy, as the Order
sustaining the right to expropriate the property was not final
and could still be appealed by the aggrieved party. The
availability of appeal ruled out certiorari.
Hence, this Petition.
10
The Issues
In their Memorandum,
12
issues:
11
petitioner raises the following
I WHETHER OR NOT THE QUESTIONED

ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED
SEPTEMBER 11, 1997 DIRECTING THE
ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF POSSESSION IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, HIGHLY IRREGULAR,
ARBITRARY, AND DESPOTIC.
II WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT FILED
IN THE INSTANT CASE IS DISMISSIBLE ON ITS
FACE FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION, BEING
FLAWED
WITH
PREMATURITY,
AND
VIOLATIVE OF RA 6395.
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE

III WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS MADE A FINDING NOT BORNE OUT
BY THE COMPLAINT, THUS IT EXCEEDED ITS
JURISDICTION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION.
different forums, as this practice is detrimental to orderly

16
judicial procedure. Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which
came before the 1997 Rules of Court, is deemed mandatory but
not jurisdictional, as jurisdiction over the subject or nature of
17
the action is conferred by law.
IV WHETHER OR NOT THE CHOICE OF THE

PROPERTY TO BE EXPROPRIATED IS
ARBITRARY.
In this case, the questioned verification stated that Atty. Caete

was the acting regional legal counsel of NPC at the Mindanao
Regional Center in Iligan City. He was not merely a retained
lawyer, but an NPC in-house counsel and officer, whose basic
function was to prepare legal pleadings and to represent NPCMindanao in legal cases. As regional legal counsel for the
Mindanao area, he was the officer who was in the best position
to verify the truthfulness and the correctness of the allegations
in the Complaint for expropriation in Davao City. As internal
legal counsel, he was also in the best position to know and to
certify if an action for expropriation had already been filed and
pending with the courts.
Simply stated, the petition raises the following issues:

1. Were there valid grounds to dismiss the Complaint?
2. Was the Writ of Possession validly issued, considering that the
trial court had not conducted any hearing on the amount to be
deposited?
This Court's Ruling
The Court of Appeals was correct in its rulings, but in the interest
of substantial justice, the petitioner should be given an
opportunity to file its answer.
First Issue:
Grounds for Dismissal
Jurisdiction
Petitioner contends that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case because, first, Atty. Caete who signed
the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was
neither the president nor the general manager of NPC;
and second, under Section 15-A of RA 6395, only the NPC chief
legal counsel, under the supervision of the Office of the Solicitor
General is authorized to handle legal matters affecting the
government power corporation. On the other hand, NPC argues
that Caete, as its regional legal counsel in Mindanao, is
authorized to prepare the Complaint on its behalf.
We find the disputed verification and certification to be
sufficient in form. Verification is intended to assure that the
allegations therein have been prepared in good faith or are true
13
and correct, not mere speculations. Generally, lack of
verification is merely a formal defect that is neither jurisdictional
nor fatal. Its absence does not divest the trial court of
14
jurisdiction. The trial court may order the correction of the
pleading or act on the unverified pleading, if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rule may
be dispensed with in order to serve the ends of justice.
The certificate of non-forum shopping directs the "plaintiff or
principal party" to attest under oath that (1) no action or claim
involving the same issues have been filed or commenced in any
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and that, to the best of
the plaintiff's knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending; (2) if there is such other pending action or claim, a
complete statement of its present status shall be made; and (3)
if it should be learned that the same or a similar action or claim
has been filed or is pending, the plaintiff shall report this fact to
the court where the complaint or initiatory pleading was
15
filed. This rule is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant
shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in
Besides, Atty. Caete was not the only signatory to the

Complaint; he was joined by Comie P. Doromal, OIC-assistant
general counsel; and Catherine J. Pablo both of the NPC
Litigation & Land and Land Rights Department. They all signed
on behalf of the solicitor general in accordance with the NPC
18
charter. Their signatures prove that the NPC general counsel
and the solicitor general approved the filing of the Complaint for
expropriation. Clearly then, the CA did not err in holding that the
Complaint was not dismissible on its face, simply because the
person who had signed the verification and certification of nonforum shopping was not the president or the general manager
of NPC.
Legal Standing and
Condition Precedent
Next, petitioner asserts that NPC had no legal standing to file the
expropriation case, because the Complaint did not allege that its
board of directors had authorized its filing. It added that under
Section 6, RA 6395, only the board was vested with the
corporate power to sue and be sued.
The National Power Corporation explains that, like other
corporate officers and employees whose functions are defined
by the board, Atty. Caete is authorized to file the expropriation
case. Even if he is not the general counsel, he has residual
authority to prepare, verify and certify the Complaint for
expropriation.
We rule for the private respondent. Rule 67, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court, provides:
Sec. 1. The complaint. The right of
eminent domain shall be exercised by the
filing of a verified complaint which shall state
with certainty the right and purpose of
expropriation, describe the real or personal
property sought to be expropriated, and join
as defendants all persons owning or claiming
to own, or occupying, any part thereof or
interest therein, showing, so far as
practicable, the separate interest of each
defendant. . . . . .
meikimouse

The foregoing Rule does not require that the Complaint be
expressly approved by the board of directors of a corporation. In
any event, such authorization is a factual issue that can be
threshed out during the trial. As held by the appellate court,
"the issue of whether or not the expropriation proceedings
[were] authorized by the Board of Directors or that those who
signed the complaint [were] authorized representatives are
evidentiary in character determinable only in [the] trial proper."
Prematurity of the Complaint
The same ruling applies to the argument alleging prematurity of
the Complaint. Petitioner's insistence that NPC must secure the
approval of the provincial board and the municipal council is
unfounded. Section 3(j), RA 6395, merely requires that the
Complaint be filed in the same manner as an expropriation case
of the national, the provincial or the municipal government. At
bottom, all that is needed is compliance with Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court and the prevailing jurisprudence on
expropriation.
Defenses and Objections
Petitioner avers that the Complaint should be dismissed,
because the subject property was already committed to be used
in a low-cost housing project. Besides, there were other
available properties in the area. Finally, the Complaint allegedly
sought only an easement of a right-of-way, not essentially an
expropriation.
We disagree. Petitioner's argument in this case is premised on
the old rule. Before the 1997 amendment, Section 3 of Rule 67
allowed a defendant "in lieu of an answer, [to] present in a
single motion to dismiss or for other appropriate relief, all of his
objections and defenses to the right of the plaintiff to take his
property . . . ." A motion to dismiss was not governed by Rule 15
which covered ordinary motions. Such motion was the required
responsive pleading that took the place of an answer and put in
issue the plaintiffs right to expropriate the defendant's
19
property. Any relevant and material fact could be raised as a
defense in a condemnation proceeding, such as that which
tended to show that (1) the exercise of the power to condemn
was unauthorized, or (2) there was cause for not taking
defendant's property for the purpose alleged in the petition, or
20
(3) the purpose for the taking was not public in character.
This old rule found basis in the constitutional provisions on the
exercise of the power of eminent domain, which were deemed
to be for the protection of the individual property owner against
21
the aggressions of the government. Under the old rule, the
hearing of the motion and the presentation of evidence
followed.
However, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure no longer
requires such extraordinary motion to dismiss. Instead it
provides:
Sec. 3. Defenses and objections. . . . .
If a defendant has any objection to the filing
of or the allegations in the complaint, or any
objection or defense to the taking of his
property, he shall serve his answer within
the time stated in the summons. The answer
shall specifically designate or identify the
CIVIL PROCEDURE
property in which he claims to have an
interest, state the nature and extent of the
interest claimed, and adduce all his
objections and defenses to the taking of his
property. . . . . .
In his book on remedial law, Justice Florenz D. Regalado writes
that the old Rule was a "bit confusing as the previous holdings
under that former provision also allowed the filing of another
motion to dismiss, as that is understood in Rule 16, to raise
additionally the preliminary objections authorized by that Rule."
Further, an answer, which is now required, gives more
leeway. First, even if it still applies the omnibus motion rule, it
allows amendments to be made within ten days from its
22
filing. Second, the failure to file an answer does not produce
all the disastrous consequences of default in ordinary civil
actions, because the defendant may still present evidence as to
23
just compensation.
When petitioner filed its Motion to Dismiss, the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure had already taken effect. Statutes regulating
procedure in the courts are applicable to actions pending and
24
undetermined at the time those statutes were passed. New
court rules apply to proceedings that take place after the date of
25
their effectivity. On April 8, 1997, the Court en banc issued a
Resolution in Bar Matter No. 803, declaring that the revisions in
the Rules of Court were to become effective on July 1, 1997.
Accordingly, Rule 16, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, does not
consider as grounds for a motion to dismiss the allotment of the
disputed land for another public purpose or the petition for a
mere easement of right-of-way in the complaint for
expropriation. The grounds for dismissal are exclusive to those
specifically mentioned in Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court, and an action can be dismissed only on a ground
26
authorized by this provision.
To be exact, the issues raised by the petitioner are affirmative
defenses that should be alleged in an answer, since they require
27
presentation of evidence aliunde. Section 3 of Rule 67
provides that "if a defendant has any objection to the filing of or
the allegations in the complaint, or any objection or defense to
the taking of his property," he should include them in his
answer. Naturally, these issues will have to be fully ventilated in
a full-blown trial and hearing. It would be precipitate to dismiss
the Complaint on such grounds as claimed by the petitioner.
Dismissal of an action upon a motion to dismiss constitutes a
denial of due process if, from a consideration of the pleadings, it
appears that there are issues that cannot be decided without a
trial
of
the
case
on
the
28
merits.
Inasmuch as the 1997 Rules had just taken effect when this case
arose, we believe that in the interest of substantial justice, the
petitioner should be given an opportunity to file its answer to
the Complaint for expropriation in accordance with Section 3,
Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Order of Condemnation
The Court will now tackle the validity of the trial court's assailed
Order of August 13, 1997, which Respondent Court affirmed in
this wise:
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE

. . . . The denial of Robern's Motion to
Dismiss [is tantamount] to a confirmation or
a determination of the authority of NPC to
exercise the power of eminent domain and
the propriety of its exercise in the context of
the facts involved in the case. Under Section
4 of the present Rule 67, 1997 Rules, supra,
an order sustaining the right to expropriate
the property is a final one and may be
appealed
by
any
aggrieved
party
(Municipality of Bian v. Garcia, 180 SCRA
29
576 [1989]). . . . . .
was no hearing on the correct amount of just compensation for

the taking of the disputed property, as required in Panes
31
v. Visayas State College of Agriculture. We cannot uphold this
contention.
We clarify. Founded on common necessity and interest, eminent

domain is the inherent right of the stare (and of those entities to
which the power has been lawfully delegated) to condemn
private property to public use upon payment of just
compensation. It may appear to be harsh and encompassing, but
judicial review limits the exercise of eminent domain to the
following areas of concern: (1) the adequacy of the
compensation, (2) the necessity of the taking, and (3) the public30
use character of the purpose of the taking.
To start with, in Manila Railroad Company v. Paredes, the

Court held that the railway corporation had the right to enter
and possess the land involved in condemnation proceedings
34
under Section 1, Act No. 1592, immediately upon the filing of
a deposit fixed by order of the court.
If there are objections and defenses that require the

presentation of evidence and the hearing of arguments, the trial
court should not immediately issue an order of expropriation.
This is clearly implied in Section 4 of Rule 67, which mandates
that "[i]f the objections to and the defenses against the right of
the plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, or when
no party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court
may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff
has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint. . . . ."
The Court of Appeals ruled that there were issues that required
presentation of evidence during the trial proper; namely,
whether the expropriation proceeding was authorized by the
NPC board of directors, whether the property to be expropriated
was already devoted to public use, and whether the choice of
the property was arbitrary and erroneous in view of the other
properties available in the area. The necessity of the taking and
the public character of the purpose of the expropriation were
still in issue and pending resolution by the trial court. To these
we add the issue of whether the "taking" of the disputed
property would require only an easement of right-of-way or
would perpetually deprive Robern of its proprietary rights.
Therefore, the trial court should not have issued the assailed
Order of Expropriation which foreclosed any further objection to
the NPC's right to expropriate and to the public purpose of the
expropriation, leaving the matter of just compensation as the
only remaining substantial issue.
The nullity of the Order was glaring. While the trial court
correctly denied the Motion to Dismiss, as the issues raised by
the petitioner should be dealt with during the trial proper, it
nonetheless ruled that NPC had "the privilege as a [public] utility
to use the power of eminent domain."
Second Issue
Requisite of a Writ of Possession
Petitioner objects to the issuance of the Writ of Possession for
being "highly irregular, arbitrary and despotic," because the
Motion to Dismiss was yet to be resolved. It stresses that there
There is no prohibition against a procedure whereby immediate

possession of the land involved in expropriation proceedings
may be taken, provided always that due provision is made to
secure the prompt adjudication and payment of just
32
compensation to the owners. However, the requirements for
authorizing immediate entry in expropriation proceedings have
changed.
33
The Rules of Court of 1964

follows:
35
sanctioned this procedure as
Sec. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing

value with National or Provincial Treasurer.
Upon the filing of the complaint or at any
time thereafter the plaintiff shall have the
right to take or enter upon the possession of
the real or personal property involved if he
deposits with the National or Provincial
Treasurer its value, as provisionally and
promptly ascertained and fixed by the court
having jurisdiction of the proceedings, to be
held by such treasurer subject to the orders
and final disposition of the court. . . . . .
(emphasis ours.)
Subsequently, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos signed into
law Presidential Decree No. 42 and its companion decrees,
which removed the court's discretion in determining the amount
of the provisional value of the land to be expropriated and fixed
the provisional deposit at its assessed value for taxation
purposes. Hearings was not required; only notice to the owner
of the property sought to be condemned.
On the issue of the immediate possession, PD 42 (Authorizing
The Plaintiff In Eminent Domain Proceedings To Take Possession
Of The Property Involved Upon Depositing The Assessed Value,
For Purposes of Taxation) provided:
WHEREAS, the existing procedure for the
exercise of the right of eminent domain is
not expeditious enough to enable the
plaintiff to take or enter upon the possession
of the real property involved as soon as
possible, when needed for public purposes;
xxx xxx xxx
. . . [T]hat, upon filing in the proper court of
the complaint in eminent domain
proceedings or at anytime thereafter, and
after due notice to the defendant, plaintiff
shall have the right to take or enter upon the
possession of the real property involved if he
deposits with the Philippine National Bank, .
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE

. . an amount equivalent to the assessed
value of the property for purposes of
taxation, to be held by said bank subject to
the orders and final disposition of the court.
The provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court and of any other existing law contrary
to or inconsistent herewith are hereby
repealed.
Paragraph 3 of PD No. 1224 (Defining The Policy On The
Expropriation Of Private Property for Socialized Housing Upon
Payment Of Just Compensation) also authorized immediate
takeover of the property in this manner:
3. Upon the filing of the petition for
expropriation and the deposit of the amount
of just compensation as provided for herein,
the Government, or its authorized agency or
entity, shall immediately have possession,
control and disposition of the real property
and the improvements thereon even
pending resolution of the issues that may be
raised whether before the Court of First
Instance or the higher courts.
Where the "taking" was for "socialized housing," Section 3, PD
1259 (Amending Paragraphs 1, 2, And 3 Of PD No. 1224 Further
Defining The Policy On The Expropriation Of Private Property For
Socialized Housing Upon Payment Of Just Compensation),
amending the above-quoted paragraph, provided:
Upon the filing of the petition for
expropriation and the deposit of the amount
of the just compensation provided for in
Section 2 hereof, the Government, or its
authorized agency or entity, shall
immediately have possession, control and
disposition of the real property and the
improvements thereon even pending
resolution of the issues that may be raised
whether before the Court of First Instance,
Court of Agrarian Relations or the higher
courts.
Similarly, Section 1, PD No. 1313 (Further Amending Paragraph 3
Of Presidential Decree No. 1224 As Amended By Presidential
Decree No. 1259, Defining The Policy On The Expropriation Of
Private Property For Socialized Housing Upon Payment Of Just
Compensation), amending paragraph 3 of PD 1224, decreed:
expropriation and the deposit in the
Philippine National Bank at its main office or
any of its branches of the amount equivalent
to ten percent (10%) of the just
compensation provided for in Section 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 1259, the
government, or its authorized agency or
entity, shall immediately have possession,
control and disposition of the real property
and the improvements thereon with the
power of demolition, if necessary, even
pending resolution of the issues that may be
raised whether before the Court of First
Instance, Court of Agrarian Relations, or the

higher Courts.
In this connection, we also quote Section 7 of PD No. 1517
(Proclaiming Urban Land Reform In The Philippines And
Providing For The Implementing Machinery Thereof), which
reads:
xxx xxx xxx
any of its branches of the amount equivalent
to ten per cent (10%) of the declared
assessment value in 1975, the Government,
or its authorized agency or entity shall
immediately have possession, control and
disposition of the real property and the
improvements thereon with the power of
demolition, if necessary, even pending
resolution of the issues that may be raised
whether before the Court of First Instance,
Court of Agrarian Relations, or the higher
Courts.
Finally, PD 1533 (Establishing A Uniform Basis For Determining
Just Compensation And The Amount Of Deposit For Immediate
Possession Of The Property Involved In Eminent Domain
Proceedings) mandated the deposit of only ten percent (10%) of
the assessed value of the private property being sought to be
expropriated, after fixing the just compensation for it at a value
not exceeding that declared by the owner or determined by the
assessor, whichever is lower. Section 2 thereof reads:
Sec. 2. Upon the filing of the petition for
any of its branches of an amount equivalent
to ten per cent (10%) of the amount of
compensation provided in Section 1 hereof,
the government or its authorized
instrumentality agency or entity shall be
entitled to immediate possession, control
and disposition of the real property and the
improvements thereon, including the power
of demolition if necessary, notwithstanding
the pendency of the issues before the courts.
36
Accordingly, in San Diego v. Valdellon, Municipality of Daet

37
38
v. Court of Appeals, and Haguisan v. Emilia, the Court
reversed itself and ruled that Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1964
Rules, was repealed by Presidential Decree No. 42. The judicial
duty of ascertaining and fixing the provisional value of the
property was done away with, because the hearing on the
matter had not been "expeditious enough to enable the plaintiff
to take possession of the property involved as soon as possible,
39
when needed for public purpose."
In Daet, the Court clarified that the provisional value of the land
did not necessarily represent the true and correct one but only
tentatively served as the basis for immediate occupancy by the
condemnor. The just compensation for the property continued
to be based on its current and fair market value, not on its
assessed value which constituted only a percentage of its
current fair market value.
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE

However, these rulings were abandoned in Export Processing
40
Zone Authority v. Dulay, because "[t]he method of
ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees
constitute[d] impermissible encroachment on judicial
prerogatives. It tend[ed] to render this Court inutile in a matter
which under the Constitution [was] reserved to it for final
determination." The Court added:
We return to older and more sound
precedents. This Court has the duty to
formulate
guiding
and
controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines,
or rules. (See Salonga v. Cruz Pano, supra).
The determination of "just compensation" in
eminent domain cases is a judicial function.
The executive department or the legislature
may make the initial determinations but
when a party claims a violation of the
guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private
property may not be taken for public use
without just compensation, no statute,
decree, or executive order can mandate that
its own determination shall prevail over the
court's findings. Much less can the courts be
precluded from looking into the "just-ness"
of the decreed compensation.
41
In Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals, the Court

reaffirmed the unconstitutionality of the presidential decrees
that fixed the just compensation in an expropriation case at the
value given to the condemned property either by the owners or
by the assessor, whichever was lower.
More
precisely, Panes
v. Visayas
State
College
of
42
Agriculture ruled that the judicial determination of just
compensation included the determination of the provisional
deposit. In that case, the Court invalidated the Writ of
Possession because of lack of hearing on the provisional deposit,
as required under then Section 2 of Rule 67, pre-1997 Rules. In
the light of the declared unconstitutionality of PD Nos. 76, 1533
and 42, insofar as they sanctioned executive determination of
just compensation, any right to immediate possession of the
property must be firmly grounded on valid compliance with
Section 2 of Rule 67, pre-1997 Rules; that is, the value of the
subject property, as provisionally and promptly ascertained and
fixed by the court that has jurisdiction over the proceedings,
must be deposited with the national or the provincial
43
treasurer.
However, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure revised Section 2 of
Rule
67
and
clearly
reverted
to
the San
Diego, Daet and Haguisan rulings. Section 2 now reads:
Sec. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing
value with government depositary. Upon
the filing of the complaint or at any time
thereafter and after due notice to the
defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right
to take or enter upon the possession of the
real property involved if he deposits with the
authorized government depositary an
amount equivalent to the assessed value of
the property for purposes of taxation to be
held by such bank subject to the orders of
the court. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx

After such deposit is made the court shall
order the sheriff or other proper officer to
forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of
the property involved and promptly submit a
report thereof to the court with service of
copies to the parties. [Emphasis ours.]
In the present case, although the Complaint for expropriation
was filed on June 6, 1997, the Motion for the Issuance of the
Writ of Possession was filed on July 28, 1997; thus, the issuance
of the Writ is covered by the 1997 Rules. As earlier stated,
procedural rules are given immediate effect and are applicable
to actions pending and undetermined at the time they are
passed; new court rules apply to proceedings that take place
44
after the date of their effectivity. Therefore, Section 2, Rule 67
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is the prevailing and
45
governing law in this case.
With the revision of the Rules, the trial court's issuance of the
Writ of Possession becomes ministerial, once the provisional
compensation mentioned in the 1997 Rule is deposited. Thus, in
the instant case the trial court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when it granted the NPC's Motion for the issuance of
the Writ, despite the absence of hearing on the amount of the
provisional deposit.
The Court nonetheless hastens to add that PD 1533 is not being
revived.
Under Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules, the provisional
deposit should be in an amount equivalent to the full assessed
value of the property to be condemned, not merely ten percent
of it. Therefore, the provisional deposit of NPC is insufficient.
Since it seeks to expropriate portions, not the whole, of four
parcels of land owned by Robern, the provisional deposit should
be computed on the basis of the Tax Declarations of the
46
property:
TCT No. Total Area Area Affected Assessed
Provisional
in Sq. M. in Sq. M. Value Deposit
T-251558
(T-141754) 11,469.00 3,393.00 P4,250.00
P1,257.32
T-251559
(T-141755) 10,000.00 2,124.00 8,960.00
1,903.10
T-251556
(T-14152) 30,000.00 3,402.00 18,910.00
2,144.39
T-251555 45,000.00 8,827.50 18,450.00
3,619.28

meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE
TOTAL 97,371.00 17,746.50 P8,924.09

Hence, the amount of the provisional deposit should be
increased in order to conform to the requirement that it should
be equivalent to the assessed value of the property. In the
interest of justice, NPC should in the meantime pay Robern
reasonable rental, to be fixed by the trial court in its final
decision, for the use and occupation of the disputed property
from the date of entry until the deposit of the full assessed value
of the property, as mandated by Rule 67.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-GR SP-46002 are AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: (1) petitioner is granted a period of ten days
from the finality of this Decision within which to file its answer,
in accordance with Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Court; (2) NPC
shall deposit, also within ten days from the finality if this
Decision, the full amount required under the aforecited Rule;
and (3) the trial court shall, in its final decision, fix the rental for
the use and the occupation of the disputed property, from the
date of NPC's entry until its deposit of the full amount required
under the 1997 Rules. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE

G.R. No. 153785 August 3, 2006
VERONIQUE
T.
HUIBONHOA, Petitioner,
vs.
ANGEL D. CONCEPCION, and HON. RAYMUNDO Z. ANNANG, in
his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 86, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 65718 promulgated on March
12, 2002 and its Resolution dated May 27, 2002, denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration of said Decision. The CA
Decision denied the petition for certiorari filed by Veronique T.
Huibonhoa, herein petitioner, which assailed the Orders dated
July 13, 2001 and July 17, 2001 issued by Judge Raymundo
Annang in his capacity as Acting Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cabanatuan City.
The instant petition stemmed from a complaint for accounting
and damages filed by respondent Angel D. Concepcion, Sr.
against petitioner Veronique T. Huibonhoa. The complaint was
filed with the RTC of Cabanatuan City on July 13, 2001 and
prayed for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and
preliminary mandatory injunction to immediately restrain
Huibonhoa from performing her job as manager of Poulex
Supermarket, among others. On the same day the complaint
was filed, Judge Annang issued a temporary restraining order
(TRO) effective for seventy-two (72) hours. The pertinent
portion of the July 13, 2001 Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, temporary restraining order
is hereby issued effective for seventy two hours from this order
restraining and prohibiting defendant Veronique T. Huibonhoa
from occupying and performing her position as Manager of the
Poulex Supermarket and from suppressing, concealing and
falsifying the records; and, further, said defendant is hereby
ordered to submit formal turn-over of all cash and other cash
items and all management and accounting records accruing for
the business operation of the [sic] Poulex Supermarket for the
period of, from November, 2000 up to the present. Further,
defendant Sphinx Security Agency is hereby ordered to allow the
plaintiff or his authorized representative/s to enter the [sic]
Poulex Supermarket as Director of the CHAS, Inc., among others,
until further order from this Court. Likewise, Sphinx Security
Agency is hereby restrained from interfering and/or preventing
the implementation of the orders of Angel D. Concepcion, Sr. in
1
his capacity as Chairman-President of CHAS, Inc.
On July 16, 2001, Huibonhoa, along with fellow stockholders of
CHAS, Inc., CHAS Enterprise Corporation and CHAS Realty and
Development Corporation, filed an intra-corporate and
derivative suit and complaint for injunction with a prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction to prevent respondent Concepcion, Sr. and his agents
from interfering with the management and operations of the
Poulex Supermarket. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case
No. 4068-AF.
On July 17, 2001, Huibonhoa filed an Urgent Manifestation and
Motion Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam, seeking the issuance of an
order certifying the expiration of the TRO. Thus, Judge Annang

issued on the same day an order declaring the expiration of the
temporary restraining order but at the same time directing the
continuous closure of the supermarket. The July 17, 2001 Order
reads in part:
For being meritorious, it is hereby declared that the seventy-two
(72) hour TRO effective for only seventy-two hours from its
issuance has already expired on July 16, 2001 at 5:00 p.m.
Considering the fact that the [sic] Poulex Supermarket had
already been padlocked on July 16, 2001 after 5:00 P.M.
according to the said motion and manifestation of defendant
Veronique T. Huibonhoa, the same should remain closed in the
interest of justice and in order not to create further confusion.
Anyway, this case will be raffled tomorrow, July 18, 2001 at
2
10:00 A.M. in accordance with the Rules.
On July 18, 2001, respondent Concepcions complaint for
accounting and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 4065, was
raffled to Branch 28 of the RTC-Cabanatuan City, the branch
designated to decide cases formerly cognizable by the Securities
and Exchange Commission.
On July 20, 2001, Huibonhoa filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65718. The
petition sought to annul the July 13 and July 17 Orders of Judge
Annang for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction. Huibonhoas
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order was
granted in a Resolution issued on July 23, 2001. The CA
Resolution enjoined respondents from implementing and/or
enforcing the assailed orders of Judge Annang, including but not
limited to the prevention of the breaking of the padlock and
reopening of Poulex Supermarket, and interference by
respondent Concepcion and his agents with the operations of
the supermarket.
On March 12, 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed Huibonhoas
petition for certiorari assailing the twin orders of Judge Annang
on the grounds of pre-maturity and forum shopping. Huibonhoa
moved for its reconsideration but in the Resolution issued on
May 27, 2002, the Court of Appeals denied her motion.
Hence, Huibonhoa filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari imputing the following errors to the Court of Appeals:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE GROUNDS THAT: (A)
PETITIONER FAILED TO MOVE FOR THE DISSOLUTION OF THE
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER WITH THE TRIAL COURT
UNDER SECTION 6, RULE 58 OF THE RULES OF COURT; AND THAT
(B) PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING, CONSIDERING
THAT:
A. SECTION 6, RULE 58 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE.
B. THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 4068-AF
COULD NOT, AS IT DID NOT, CONSTITUTE FORUM SHOPPING.
C. THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI COULD NOT,
AND DID NOT CONSTITUTE FORUM SHOPPING.
meikimouse

II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ISSUING
THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO ANNUL THE 13 JULY 2001 AND 17
3
JULY 2001 ORDERS OF THE TRIAL COURT.
After respondent Concepcion and petitioner Huibonhoa filed a
Comment and a Reply, respectively, the Court issued a
Resolution on September 28, 2005, directing the former to show
cause why the instant petition should not be dismissed for
having become moot and academic. The resolution of the
petition is ultimately hinged on the propriety of the issuance of
the 72-hour restraining order, which should have expired ipso
jure on the twentieth day, a judicial declaration to that effect
not being necessary. Thus, the filing of the instant petition
almost a year after the issuance of the TRO would be
unnecessary.
Huibonhoa submitted a Compliance with Motion to Clarify dated
October 25, 2005, conveying the following: (1) Huibonhoa had
proposed a settlement for the parties to dismiss their respective
claims against each other; (2) upon a Joint Motion to Dismiss by
both petitioner Huibonhoa and respondent Concepcion, the trial
court issued an order dismissing Civil Case No. 4065, the
complaint for accounting and damages filed by respondent
Concepcion; (3) notwithstanding the dismissal of the pending
cases, the parties did not agree to cause the dismissal of the
instant petition; (4) petitioner Huibonhoa is still seeking the
reversal of the CA Decision insofar as it ruled that she was guilty
of forum shopping and a clarification on whether her counsel
will be exposed to administrative liability should the instant
4
petition be dismissed.
In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals
found petitioner Huibonhoa guilty of forum shopping when she
filed Civil Case No. 4068-AF with the trial court and, thereafter, a
petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65718, with
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court believed that the two
actions had the same object of nullifying the TRO issued by
Judge Annang in Civil Case No. 4065. Petitioner Huibonhoa urges
the Court to evaluate the Court of Appeals finding that she
engaged in forum shopping, especially that the appellate court
characterized said act as "deliberate." She stresses that said
finding and the accompanying characterization have exposed
5
her and her counsel to sanctions.
In her defense, Huibonhoa insists that Civil Case No. 4068-AF
was filed not for the purpose of defeating the TRO issued by
Judge Annang on July 13, 2001 but on account of the acts of
disturbance and attempted forcible take-over by respondent
Concepcion committed on July 6,7,12 and 13, 2001. She also
asserts that Civil Case No. 4068-AF, while filed on July 16, 2001,
was signed and verified on July 13, 2001 or before a copy of the
July 13, 2001 TRO was served on her counsel.
Furthermore, Huibonhoa contends that in contrast, the petition
for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals to enjoin or
prohibit acts pursuant to the implementation of the July 13 and
17 Orders of Judge Annang, although the TROs separately
prayed for in the complaint for injunction and in the petition for
certiorari effectively sought to address the interference in the
operations of the supermarket by respondent Concepcion.
There is forum shopping when, as a result of an adverse opinion
in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion, other than by
appeal or certiorari in another. There can also be forum
CIVIL PROCEDURE
shopping when a party institutes two or more suits in different
courts, either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the
courts to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the
same or substantially the same reliefs on the supposition that
one or the other court would make a favorable disposition or
increase a partys chances of obtaining a favorable decision or
6
action.
The rationale against forum shopping is that a party should not
be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different
fora. Filing multiple petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of
court processes, which tends to degrade the administration of
justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds
to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.
Thus, the rule proscribing forum shopping seeks to promote
candor and transparency among lawyers and their clients in the
pursuit of their cases before the courts to promote the orderly
administration of justice, prevent undue inconvenience upon the
other party, and save the precious time of the courts. It also
aims to prevent the embarrassing situation of two or more
courts or agencies rendering conflicting resolutions or decisions
7
upon the same issue.
To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum
shopping, the most important question to ask is whether the
elements of litis pendentia are present or whether a final
judgment in one case will result to res judicata in another.
Otherwise stated, to determine forum shopping, the test is to
see whether in the two or more cases pending, there is identity
8
of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought.
A plain reading of the allegations in the complaint in Civil Case
No. 4068-AF and those in the petition for certiorari filed with the
Court of Appeals would preclude the Court from affirming the
Court
of Appeals finding that Huibonhoa had engaged in forum
shopping. Not all the elements of litis pendentia concur. There is
no identity of parties, rights or causes of action between Civil
Case No. 4068-AF and the petition for certiorari. Civil Case No.
4068-AF is a derivative suit and complaint for injunction
instituted by the stockholders of the aforementioned
corporations while the petition for certiorari was instituted by
petitioner in her capacity as manager of Poulex Supermarket.
The complaint in Civil Case No. 4068-AF alleges different causes
of action, including those relating to interference by respondent
Concepcion in the operations of the supermarket and causing
damages to the corporations and the stockholders arising from
such unlawful interference. The petition for certiorari aims to
nullify the two orders of Judge Annang on the ground that they
were issued with grave abuse of discretion since only the
designated special commercial court has jurisdiction to hear and
decide intra-corporate controversies. A resolution on the merits
of the petition for certiorari would necessarily have to discuss
the authority of respondent Judge Annang to take cognizance of
the case, which was allegedly an intra-corporate matter, and the
issuance of the mandatory injunction, which was allegedly not
sanctioned by any rule. These are the main issues raised in the
petition for certiorari but are not raised as issues in Civil Case
No. 4068-F.
The reliefs sought in the two actions are also different. In Civil
Case No. 4068-F, aside from the main action for a permanent
injunction, complainants therein also claimed damages. In the
petition for certiorari, Huibonhoa sought the prevention of the
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE
implementation of the assailed orders of Judge Annang. The only

common thread
between the two actions is with respect to the TRO sought to
prevent respondent Concepcion from interfering with the
operations of the supermarket, but said relief is only incidental
and does not constitute the main cause of action in both cases.
All the foregoing points favorable to petitioners cause
notwithstanding, the Court cannot take favorable action on her
petition. In the light of the supervening events, particularly the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 4065, the instant petition has clearly
become moot and academic and, therefore, deserves to be
dismissed. With the termination of the case wherein the assailed
orders were issued, it is no longer necessary for this Court to
resolve whether the Court of Appeals had correctly upheld said
orders. In addition, one of said orders directed the issuance of a
TRO, which, by sheer force of law, should have expired and did
expire after 72 hours, without need of a judicial declaration to
that effect.
Likewise, with the settlement reached by the parties which
culminated in the dismissal of the cases filed by them against
each other, petitioner and her counsel have been liberated from
any risk of sanction for their supposed forum shopping.
Courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will
not consider questions where no actual interests are involved.
Thus, the well-settled rule that courts will not determine a moot
question.
Where the issues have become moot and academic, there
ceases to be any justiciable controversy, thus rendering the
resolution of the same of no practical value. Courts will decline
jurisdiction over moot cases because there is no substantial
relief to which petitioner will be entitled and which will anyway
be negated by the dismissal of the petition. This Court will
therefore abstain from expressing its opinion in a case where no
9
legal relief is needed or called for.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is
DENIED for being moot and academic. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE

G.R. No. 143797
May 4, 2006
recording during the hearing and subsequently marked it as

6
Exhibit "VV."
CARLITO
L.
MONTES, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Sixth Division, Office of the Ombudsman,
Department of Science and Technology,Respondents.
During cross-examination, Montes likewise admitted that he had

also recorded a private conversation he had with Fontanilla at
the DOST Office in Taguig sometime in November 1997. This was
7
without the knowledge and consent of Fontanilla.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.
In this Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary
1
Restraining Order under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, petitioner Carlito L. Montes (Montes) seeks to
prohibit the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Science
and Technology (DOST) from implementing the suspension
2
order dated 28 June 2000. The suspension order was issued in
3
relation to the Decision dated 17 January 2000 and
4
Order dated 2 March 2000, both of the Office of the
Ombudsman, in "Imelda D. Rodriguez and Elizabeth Fontanilla v.
Carlito L. Montes," docketed as OMB-ADM-0-98-0556. The
assailed suspension order reads as follows:
TO:
CARLITO
Chief, Legal Division, DOST
L.
MONTES
You are hereby directed to make the necessary turnover/clearance of property and monetary accountabilities and
submit all pending legal work to the Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Administrative and Legal Affairs.
AS ORDERED.
Taguig, Metro Manila, June 28, 2000.
A.
URIARTE,
In an Order dated 2 March 2000, the Ombudsman denied

Montes motion for reconsideration and affirmed the Decision
dated 17 January 2000. Hence, Montes filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
with prayer for temporary restraining order before the Court of
Appeals, docketed as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 58267.1avvphil.net
The Court of Appeals dismissed outright Montes petition in a
12
Resolution dated 4 May 2000 for being procedurally infirm.
Specifically, the appellate court noted that Montes failed: a) to
state the specific date when he received a copy of the
Ombudsmans Decision; b) to attach duplicate originals or
certified true copies of the challenged Decision and Order; and
c) to provide an explanation why the copy of his petition was not
served personally upon therein respondent DOST Secretary.
On motion for reconsideration, however, the appellate court
13
issued a Resolution dated 22 June 2000 requiring the
Ombudsman to file his comment. Notably, the appellate court
considered Montes motion for reconsideration abandoned in a
Resolution dated 8 August 2000, in view of the commencement
14
of the instant petition.
JR.
Meanwhile, on 28 June 2000, the DOST Secretary issued the

assailed suspension order.
OMB-ADM-0-98-0556 is the administrative complaint filed by

complainants therein Imelda D. Rodriguez and Elizabeth
Fontanilla against Carlito L. Montes, Chief of the Legal Division of
DOST, for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of service. Rodriguez and Fontanilla alleged that on 15
July 1999, while Montes was in the process of adducing evidence
against Rodriguez and the DOST Secretary in the complaint for
misconduct he had filed against them before the Presidential
Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), Montes
produced a tape recording of a private conversation he had had
with the DOST Secretary. Montes admitted that he had taped
the conversation at the DOST Secretarys Office without the
DOST Secretarys knowledge and consent a few days after 28
November 1993. Montes publicly played the illegal tape
Montes now argues in his petition before the Court that the
implementation of the suspension order is premature
considering the pendency of his petition before the appellate
15
court. Citing Lapid v. Court of Appeals, he further states that
16
there is no law or provision in R.A. 6770, the Ombudsman Law,
17
or in Administrative Order No. 7 mandating the immediate
execution of the Ombudsmans decision in an administrative
case where the penalty imposed is suspension for one (1) year.
Moreover, he asserts that the administrative complaint, which is
for a violation of R.A. 4200, is cognizable by the regular courts
considering the imposable penalty. Finally, he complains that he
was convicted of the alleged wire-tapping by mere substantial
evidence which is short of the quantum of evidence required for
18
conviction of a criminal offense.
FILEMON
The Ombudsman found Montes guilty of grave misconduct and

suspended him for one (1) year without pay. The Ombudsman
held that Montes taping of his conversations with Fontanilla
was prohibited by R.A. 4200, the Anti-Wiretapping Law. Montes
did not deny that he made the recording without the Fontanillas
10
consent.
11
In compliance with the 2nd Indorsement dated 29 March 2000

from the Office of the Ombudsman directing this Office the
implementation of the OMB Order dated 02 March 2000, in
relation to OMB Decision dated 17 January 2000, wherein you
were found guilty of violation of RA 4200 (THE ANTI-WIRE
TAPPING LAW) amounting to GROSS MISCONDUCT in OMBADM-0-98-0556 entitled "Imelda D. Rodriguez and Elizabeth
Fontanilla -versus- Carlito L. Montes," your (sic) are hereby
SUSPENDED FROM THE SERVICE FOR ONE YEAR WITHOUT PAY
EFFECTIVE JULY 16, 2000.
(sgd)
DR.
5
Secretary
Moreover, in two (2) missives Montes sent Pedro A. del

Rosario, Jr., the former mentioned the existence of the tape
recordings he had made of his conversations with other people.
Sometime in June 1998, Montes even re-played for Eduardo
Langara the taped conversations he had with Secretary William
G. Padolina and Fontanilla. In addition, PCAGC Prosecutor
Mariano C. Quintos, Jr., stated in his affidavit dated 30 April
1998 that Montes submitted to him the tape recordings of
9
Montes had made of his conversations with Fontanilla.
meikimouse

19
In their Comment dated 18 October 2000, the Ombudsman

and the DOST, through the Solicitor General, assert that the
filing of the instant petition is a violation of the proscription
against forum-shopping. Further, they argue that the execution
of the suspension order despite the pendency of an appeal is
20
allowed under Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 14-A-00.
21
In his Memorandum dated 16 January 2001, Montes reiterates

his previous submission that the Ombudsman should not have
proceeded to hear the administrative complaint considering that
22
an Information had already been filed against him before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 168.
The Ombudsman and the DOST, on the other hand, restate in
23
their Memorandum dated 19 January 2001 that the filing of
the instant petition constitutes forum-shopping. Moreover,
Montes failed to raise any valid reason which would warrant the
issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of
prohibition. Finally, they contend that a prohibitory injunction is
not proper as the act sought to be restrained is already fait
accompli.
The pivotal issue here is whether Montes is entitled to the
issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining the DOST Secretary
from enforcing the suspension order.
At the outset, we find that Montes transgressed the proscription
against forum shopping.
There is forum shopping when a party seeks to obtain remedies
in an action in one court, which had already been solicited, and
in other courts and other proceedings in other tribunals. Forum
shopping is also the act of one party against another when an
adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking
another and possibly favorable opinion in another forum other
than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari; or the
institution of two or more acts or proceedings grounded on the
same cause on the supposition that one or the other court
24
would make a favorable disposition.
Forumshopping is an act of malpractice, as the litigants trifle
with the courts and abuse their processes. It is improper
conduct and degrades the administration of justice. If the act of
the party or its counsel clearly constitutes willful and deliberate
forum-shopping, the same shall constitute direct contempt, and
a cause for administrative sanctions, as well as a ground for the
25
summary dismissal of the case with prejudice.
In the case at bar, when Montes filed the petition for prohibition
against the suspension order on 19 July 2000, his motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition for certiorari was
still pending before the appellate court. In fact, in a
26
Resolution dated 22 June 2000, the Court of Appeals directed
the Ombudsman to file his comment indicating that Montes
motion for reconsideration has not been fully resolved.
Montes petition for certiorari prayed, among others, that the
appellate court issue an order "restraining the Honorable
Secretary, Department of Science and Technology from
27
implementing the Order dated 02 March 2000." Montes
motion for reconsideration likewise prayed that "(t)he
implementation of the suspension for one year from the service
without pay of the herein petitioner be restrained (subject of
28
the assailed OMB Decision and Order). . ." In the present
petition, Montes prays that "(a)n order be issued to restrain the
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Honorable Secretary, DOST from implementing the Suspension
29
Order on the herein petitioner."
Clearly, the relief sought from the appellate court is the same as
the relief prayed for in the present petitionthat is, that an
order be issued restraining the DOST Secretary from
implementing the Ombudsmans Order. In filing the instant
petition without awaiting the resolution of his pending motion
before the appellate court, Montes asked for simultaneous
remedies in two different fora. This act is censurable and serves
as a ground for the dismissal of the instant case with prejudice.
Moreover, we find that Montes failed to adequately show that
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law to warrant the issuance of
a writ of prohibition.
For a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must
establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed against
a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions,
judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or
person has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
30
law.
A remedy is considered plain, speedy and adequate if it will
promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the
judgment or rule, order or resolution of the lower court or
31
agency.
When the DOST issued the assailed suspension order on 28 June
2000, Montes motion for reconsideration was still pending
before the appellate court. Montes thus had the remedy of filing
a petition for prohibition before the appellate court as an
incident of the petition for certiorari and motion for
reconsideration he had previously filed therewith. Had Montes
brought the instant petition before the Court of Appeals, the
same could, and would, have been consolidated with his petition
for certiorari, thereby bringing under the competence of the said
court all matters relative to the action, including the incidents
thereof.
Evidently too, Montes disregarded the doctrine of judicial
hierarchy which we enjoin litigants and lawyers to strictly
observe as a judicial policy. For this reason, the instant petition
32
should be dismissed. As we ruled in Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto, to
wit:
The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain
if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the
fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and
should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in
the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called
extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely
necessary or where serious and important reasons exist
therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised
relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals,
or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies
whose acts for some reason or another, are not controllable by
the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary
writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a
Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the
specific action for the writs procurement must be presented.
This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a
33
policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE
The Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,

prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with the
Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals. This concurrence
of jurisdiction however should not be taken to mean that the
parties have an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the
court to which they will file their application or petition. There is
an ordained sequence of recourse to courts vested with
concurrent jurisdiction, beginning from the lowest, on to the
next highest, and ultimately to the highest. This hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and is likewise
determinative of the proper forum for petitions for
extraordinary writs. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts
original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only
when there are special and important reasons therefore, clearly
and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy.
It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands
upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to
those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent
34
the further clogging of the Courts docket.
In this regard, the Court notes that Montes implicitly confirmed
that he committed forum shopping by stating that he had to file
the instant petition before this Court in view of the denial of his
motion for reconsideration before the appellate court. Montes
failed to consider that the same implementation of the
suspension order which impelled him to abandon his motion for
reconsideration also rendered the instant petition academic.
As the present petition is one for prohibition which is a
preventive remedy, worthy of note is the fact, as manifested by
the petitioner himself, that the suspension order has already
35
been implemented on 17 July 2000. The act sought to be
enjoined having taken place already, there is nothing more to
restrain. Thus, the instant petition has been unmade as a mere
subject matter of purely theoretical interest. Prohibition, as a
36
rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for
Prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE

G.R. No. 130068 October 1, 1998
FAR
EASTERN
SHIPPING
vs.
COURT
OF
APPEALS
and
AUTHORITY, respondents.
COMPANY, petitioner,
PHILIPPINE
PORTS
G.R. No. 130150 October, 1998

MANILA
PILOTS
ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY and FAR EASTERN SHIPPING
COMPANY, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
These consolidated petitions for review on certiorari seek in
1
unison to annul and set aside the decision of respondent Court
2
of Appeals of November 15, 1996 and its resolution dated July
31, 1997 in CA-G.R. CV No. 24072, entitled "Philippine Ports
Authority, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. Far Eastern Shipping Company,
Senen C. Gavino and Manila Pilots' Association, DefendantsAppellants," which affirmed with modification the judgment of
the trial court holding the defendants-appellants therein
solidarily liable for damages in favor of herein private
respondent.
There is no dispute about the facts as found by the appellate
court,
thus
. . . On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR,
flying under the flagship of the USSR, owned
and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping
Company (FESC for brevity's sake), arrived at
the Port of Manila from Vancouver, British
Columbia at about 7:00 o'clock in the
morning. The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of
the Manila International Port, as its berthing
space. Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked
by the Philippine Port Authority to supervise
the berthing of the vessel. Appellant Senen
Gavino was assigned by the Appellant Manila
Pilots' Association (MPA for brevity's sake) to
conduct docking maneuvers for the safe
berthing of the vessel to Berth No. 4.
Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine
anchorage and stationed himself in the
bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor
Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of
Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the
vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor
from the quarantine anchorage and
proceeded to the Manila International Port.
The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for
docking maneuvers.
When the vessel reached the landmark (the
big church by the Tondo North Harbor) onehalf mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the
engine stopped. When the vessel was
already about 2,000 feet from the pier,
Gavino ordered the anchor dropped.

Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of
the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with
two (2) shackles, were dropped. However,
the anchor did not take hold as expected.
The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A
commotion ensued between the crew
members. A brief conference ensued
between Kavankov and the crew members.
When Gavino inquired what was all the
commotion about, Kavankov assured Gavino
that there was nothing to it.
After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not
take hold, he ordered the engines halfastern. Abellana, who was then on the pier
apron, noticed that the vessel was
approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise
noticed that the anchor did not take hold.
Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern"
code. Before the right anchor and additional
shackles could be dropped, the bow of the
vessel rammed into the apron of the pier
causing considerable damage to the pier.
The vessel sustained damage too, (Exhibit "7Far Eastern Shipping). Kavankov filed his sea
protest
(Exhibit
"1-Vessel").
Gavino
submitted his report to the Chief Pilot
(Exhibit "1-Pilot") who referred the report to
the Philippine Ports Authority (Exhibit 2Pilot"). Abellana likewise submitted his
report of the incident (Exhibit "B").
Per contract and supplemental contract of
the Philippine Ports Authority and the
contractor for the rehabilitation of the
damaged pier, the same cost the Philippine
Ports Authority the amount of P1,126,132.25
3
(Exhibits "D" and "E").
On January 10, 1983, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA, for
brevity), through the Solicitor General, filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 39, a complaint for a sum of money
against Far Eastern Shipping Co., Capt. Senen C. Gavino and the
Manila Pilots' Association, docketed as Civil Case No. 834
14958, praying that the defendants therein be held jointly and
severally liable to pay the plaintiff actual and exemplary
damages plus costs of suit. In a decision dated August 1, 1985,
the trial court ordered the defendants therein jointly and
severally to pay the PPA the amount of P1,053,300.00
5
representing actual damages and the costs of suit.
The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals and raised the
following issues: (1) Is the pilot of a commercial vessel, under
compulsory pilotage, solely liable for the damage caused by the
vessel to the pier, at the port of destination, for his negligence?
and (2) Would the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the
damage is caused by the concurrent negligence of the master of
the vessel and the pilot under a compulsory pilotage?
As stated at the outset, respondent appellate court affirmed the
findings of the court a quo except that if found no employeremployee relationship existing between herein private
respondents Manila Pilots' Association (MPA, for short) and
6
Capt. Gavino. This being so, it ruled instead that the liability of
MPA is anchored, not on Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but on
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE

7
the provisions of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65, and

accordingly modified said decision of the trial court by holding
MPA, along with its co-defendants therein, still solidarily liable
to PPA but entitled MPA to reimbursement from Capt. Gavino
for such amount of the adjudged pecuniary liability in excess of
the amount equivalent to seventy-five percent (75%) of its
prescribed
reserve
8
fund.
Neither Far Eastern Shipping Co. (briefly, FESC) nor MPA was
happy with the decision of the Court of Appeals and both of
them elevated their respective plaints to us via separate
petitions for review on certiorari.
In G. R. No. 130068, which was assigned to the Second Division
of this Court, FESC imputed that the Court of Appeals seriously
erred:
1. in not holding Senen C. Gavino and the
Manila Pilots' Association as the parties
solely responsible for the resulting damages
sustained by the pier deliberately ignoring
the established jurisprudence on the matter;
2. in holding that the master had not
exercised the required diligence demanded
from him by the circumstances at the time
the incident happened;
3. in affirming the amount of damages
sustained by the respondent Philippine Ports
Authority despite a strong and convincing
evidence that the amount is clearly
exorbitant and unreasonable;
4. in not awarding any amount of
counterclaim prayed for by the petitioner in
its answer; and
5. in not granting herein petitioner's claim
against pilot Senen C. Gavino and Manila
Pilots' Association in the event that it be held
9
liable.
Petitioner asserts that since the MV PAVLODAR was under
compulsory pilotage at the time of the incident, it was the
compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino, who was in command and had
complete control in the navigation and docking of the vessel. It
is the pilot who supersedes the master for the time being in the
command and navigation of a ship and his orders must be
obeyed in all respects connected with her navigation.
Consequently, he was solely responsible for the damage caused
upon the pier apron, and not the owners of the vessel. It claims
that the master of the boat did not commit any act of negligence
when he failed to countermand or overrule the orders of the
pilot because he did not see any justifiable reason to do so. In
other words, the master cannot be faulted for relying absolutely
on the competence of the compulsory pilot. If the master does
not observe that a compulsory pilot is incompetent or physically
10
incapacitated, the master is justified in relying on the pilot.
Respondent PPA, in its comment, predictably in full agreement
with the ruling of respondent court on the solidary liability of
FESC, MPA and Capt. Gavino, stresses the concurrent negligence
of Capt. Gavino, the harbor pilot, and Capt. Viktor
Kabankov, * shipmaster of MV Pavlodar, as the basis of their

solidary liability for damages sustained by PPA. It posits that the
vessel was being piloted by Capt. Gavino with Capt. Kabankov
beside him all the while on the bridge of the vessel, as the
former took over the helm of MV Pavlodar when it rammed and
damaged the apron of the pier of Berth No. 4 of the Manila
International Port. Their concurrent negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of the collision between the
vessel and the pier Capt. Gavino, for his negligence in the
conduct of docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the
vessel; and Capt. Kabankov, for failing to countermand the
orders of the harbor pilot and to take over and steer the vessel
himself in the face of imminent danger, as well as for merely
11
relying on Capt. Gavino during the berthing procedure.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 130150, originally assigned to the
Court's First Division and later transferred to the Third Division.
MPA, now as petitioner in this case, avers that respondent
court's errors consisted in disregarding and misinterpreting
Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 which limits the liability
of MPA. Said pilots' association asseverates that it should not be
held solidarily liable with Capt. Gavino who, as held by
respondent court is only a member, not an employee, thereof.
There being no employer-employee relationship, neither can
MPA be held liable for any vicarious liability for the respective
exercise of profession by its members nor be considered a joint
12
tortfeasor as to be held jointly and severally liable. It further
argues that there was erroneous reliance on Customs
Administrative Order No. 15-65 and the constitution and by-laws
of MPA, instead of the provisions of the Civil Code on damages
which, being a substantive law, is higher in category than the
aforesaid constitution and by-laws of a professional organization
or an administrative order which bears no provision classifying
the nature of the liability of MPA for the negligence its member
13
pilots.
As for Capt. Gavino, counsel for MPA states that the former had
retired from active pilotage services since July 28, 1994 and has
ceased to be a member of petitioner pilots' association. He is not
joined as a petitioner in this case since his whereabouts are
14
unknown.
FESC's comment thereto relied on the competence of the Court
of Appeals in construing provisions of law or administrative
orders as bases for ascertaining the liability of MPA, and
expressed full accord with the appellate court's holding of
solidary liability among itself, MPA and Capt. Gavino. It further
avers that the disputed provisions of Customs Administrative
15
Order No. 15-65 clearly established MPA's solidary liability.
On the other hand, public respondent PPA, likewise through
representations by the Solicitor General, assumes the same
supportive stance it took in G.R. No. 130068 in declaring its total
accord with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that MPA is
solidarily liable with Capt. Gavino and FESC for damages, and in
its application to the fullest extent of the provisions of Customs
Administrative Order No. 15-65 in relation to MPA's constitution
and by-laws which spell out the conditions of and govern their
respective liabilities. These provisions are clear and
unambiguous as regards MPA's liability without need for
interpretation or construction. Although Customs Administrative
Order No. 15-65 is a mere regulation issued by an administrative
agency pursuant to delegated legislative authority to fix details
to implement the law, it is legally binding and has the same
16
statutory force as any valid statute.
meikimouse

17
Upon motion by FESC dated April 24, 1998 in G.R. No. 130150,
18
said case was consolidated with G.R. No. 130068.
Prefatorily, on matters of compliance with procedural
requirements, it must be mentioned that the conduct of the
respective counsel for FESC and PPA leaves much to be desired,
to the displeasure and disappointment of this Court.
Sec. 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
19
Procedure incorporates the former Circular No. 28-91 which
provided for what has come to be known as the certification
against forum shopping as an additional requisite for petitions
filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, aside
from the other requirements contained in pertinent provisions
of the Rules of Court therefor, with the end in view of
preventing the filing of multiple complaints involving the same
issues in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or different
divisions thereof or any other tribunal or agency.
More particularly, the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 42
provides:
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner shall also submit together
with the petition a certification under oath
that he has not theretofore commenced any
other action involving the same issues in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or
different divisions thereof, or any other
tribunal or agency; if there is such other
action or proceeding, he must state the
status of the same; and if he should
thereafter learn that a similar action or
proceeding has been filed or is pending
before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any
other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to
promptly inform the aforesaid courts and
other tribunal or agency thereof within five
(5) days therefrom. (Emphasis ours.)
For petitions for review filed before the Supreme
Court, Section 4(e), Rule 45 specifically requires that
such petition shall contain a sworn certification against
forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of
Section 2, Rule 42.
The records show that the law firm of Del Rosario and Del
Rosario through its associate, Atty. Herbert A. Tria, is the counsel
of record for FESC in both G.R. No. 130068 and G.R. No. 130150.
G.R. No. 130068, which is assigned to the Court's Second
Division, commenced with the filing by FESC through counsel on
August 22, 1997 of a verified motion for extension of time to file
its petition for thirty (30) days from August 28, 1997 or until
20
September 27, 1997. Said motion contained the following
21
certification against forum shopping signed by Atty. Herbert A.
Tria as affiant:
CERTIFICATION
AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING
CIVIL PROCEDURE
I/we hereby certify that I/we have not
commenced any other action or proceeding
involving the same issues in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other
tribunal or agency; that to the best of my
own knowledge, no such action or
proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or
agency; that if I/we should thereafter learn
that a similar action or proceeding has been
filed or is pending before the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other
tribunal or agency, I/we undertake to report
that fact within five (5) days therefrom to
this Honorable Court.
This motion having been granted, FESC subsequently
filed its petition on September 26, 1997, this time
bearing a "verification and certification against forumshopping" executed by one Teodoro P. Lopez on
22
September 24, 1997, to wit:
VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION
AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING
in compliance with Section 4(e), Rule 45 in
relation
to Section 2, Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure
I, Teodoro P. Lopez, of legal age, after being
duly sworn, depose and state:
1. That I am the Manager, Claims
Department of Filsov Shipping Company, the
local agent of petitioner in this case.
2. That I have caused the preparation of this
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
3. That I have read the same and the
allegations therein contained are true and
correct based on the records of this case.
4. That I certify that petitioner has not
commenced any other action or proceeding
involving the same issues in the Supreme
Court or Court of Appeals, or any other
tribunal or agency, that to the best of my
own knowledge, no such action or
proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals or any other tribunal or
agency, that if I should thereafter learn that
a similar action or proceeding has been filed
or is pending before the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or
agency, I undertake to report the fact within
five (5) days therefrom to this Honorable
Court. (Italics supplied for emphasis.)
Reviewing the records, we find that the petition filed by MPA in
G.R. No. 130150 then pending with the Third Division was duly
filed on August 29, 1997 with a copy thereof furnished on the
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE

23
same date by registered mail to counsel for FESC. Counsel of

record for MPA. Atty. Jesus P. Amparo, in his verification
accompanying said petition dutifully revealed to the Court that
xxx xxx xxx

3. Petitioner has not commenced any other
action or proceeding involving the same
issues in this Honorable Court, the Court of
Appeals or different Divisions thereof, or any
other tribunal or agency,but to the best of
his knowledge, there is an action or
proceeding pending in this Honorable Court,
entitled Far Eastern Shipping Co., Petitioner,
vs. Philippine Ports Authority and Court of
Appeals with a Motion for Extension of time
to file Petition For Review by Certiorari filed
sometime on August 18, 1987. If
undersigned counsel will come to know of
any other pending action or claim filed or
pending he undertakes to report such fact
within five (5) days to this Honorable
24
Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Inasmuch as MPA's petition in G.R. No. 130150 was posted by
registered mail on August 29, 1997 and taking judicial notice of
the average period of time it takes local mail to reach its
destination, by reasonable estimation it would be fair to
conclude that when FESC filed its petition in G.R. No. 130068 on
September 26, 1997, it would already have received a copy of
the former and would then have knowledge of the pendency of
the other petition initially filed with the First Division. It was
therefore incumbent upon FESC to inform the Court of that fact
through its certification against forum shopping. For failure to
make such disclosure, it would appear that the aforequoted
certification accompanying the petition in G.R. No. 130068 is
defective and could have been a ground for dismissal thereof.
Even assuming that FESC had not yet received its copy of MPA's
petition at the time it filed its own petition and executed said
certification, its signatory did state "that if I should thereafter
learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is
pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or any
other tribunal or agency, I undertake to report the fact within
25
five (5) days therefrom to this Honorable Court." Scouring the
records page by page in this case, we find that no manifestation
concordant with such undertaking was then or at any other time
thereafter ever filed by FESC nor was there any attempt to bring
such matter to the attention of the Court. Moreover, it cannot
feign non-knowledge of the existence of such other petition
because FESC itself filed the motion for consolidation in G.R. No.
130150 of these two cases on April 24, 1998.
It is disturbing to note that counsel for FESC, the law firm of Del
Rosario and Del Rosario, displays an unprofessional tendency of
taking the Rules for granted, in this instance exemplified by
its pro forma compliance therewith but apparently without full
comprehension of and with less than faithful commitment to its
undertakings to this Court in the interest of just, speedy and
orderly administration of court proceedings.
As between the lawyer and the courts, a lawyer owes candor,
26
fairness and good faith to the court. He is an officer of the
court exercising a privilege which is indispensable in the
27
administration of justice. Candidness, especially towards the
courts, is essential for the expeditious administration of justice.

Courts are entitled to expect only complete honesty from
28
lawyers appearing and pleading before them. Candor in all
dealings is the very essence of honorable membership in the
29
legal profession. More specifically, a lawyer is obliged to
observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to
30
defeat the ends of justice. It behooves a lawyer, therefore, to
exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy
31
and efficient administration of justice. Being an officer of the
court, a lawyer has a responsibility in the proper administration
of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its
ends the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive
adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final
judgments. A lawyer should not only help attain these objectives
but should likewise avoid any unethical or improper practices
that impede, obstruct or prevent their realization, charged as he
is with the primary task of assisting in the speedy and efficient
32
Sad to say, the members of said law firm sorely failed to observe
their duties as responsible members of the Bar. Their actuations
are indicative of their predisposition to take lightly the avowed
duties of officers of the Court to promote respect for law and for
33
legal processes. We cannot allow this state of things to pass
judicial muster.
In view of the fact that at around the time these petitions were
commenced, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure had just taken
effect, the Court treated infractions of the new Rules then with
relative liberality in evaluating full compliance therewith.
Nevertheless, it would do well to remind all concerned that the
penal provisions of Circular No. 28-91 which remain operative
provides, inter alia:
3. Penalties.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) The submission of a false certification
under Par. 2 of the Circular shall likewise
constitute contempt of court, without
prejudice to the filing of criminal action
against the guilty party. The lawyer may also
be subjected to disciplinary proceedings.
It must be stressed that the certification against forum shopping
ordained under the Rules is to be executed by thepetitioner, and
not by counsel. Obviously it is the petitioner, and not always the
counsel whose professional services have been retained for a
particular case, who is in the best position to know whether he
or it actually filed or caused the filing of a petition in that case.
Hence, a certification against forum shopping by counsel is a
defective certification. It is clearly equivalent to non-compliance
with the requirement under Section 2, Rule 42 in relation to
Section 4, Rule 45, and constitutes a valid cause for dismissal of
the petition.
Hence, the initial certification appended to the motion for
extension of time to file petition in G.R. No. 130068 executed in
behalf of FESC by Atty. Tria is procedurally deficient. But
considering that it was a superfluity at that stage of the
proceeding, it being unnecessary to file such a certification with
a mere motion for extension, we shall disregard such error.
Besides, the certification subsequently executed by Teodoro P.
Lopez in behalf of FESC cures that defect to a certain extent,
despite the inaccuracies earlier pointed out. In the same vein,
meikimouse

we shall consider the verification signed in behalf of MPA by its
counsel, Atty. Amparo, in G.R. No. 130150 as substantial
compliance inasmuch as it served the purpose of the Rules of
informing the Court of the pendency of another action or
proceeding involving the same issues.
It bears stressing that procedural rules are instruments in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice. They should be
34
used to achieve such end and not to derail it.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
the case before the respondent Court of
Appeals, has taken a separate appeal from
the said decision to this Honorable Court,
which was docketed as G.R. No. 130150 and
entitled
"Manila
Pilots'
Association,
Petitioner, versus Philippine Ports Authority
and
Far
Eastern
Shipping
Co.,
41
Respondents."
Similarly, in G.R. No. 130150, it states
Counsel for PPA did not make matters any better. Despite the
fact that, save for the Solicitor General at the time, the same
legal team of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG, for short)
composed of Assistant Solicitor General Roman G. Del Rosario
and Solicitor Luis F. Simon, with the addition of Assistant
Solicitor General Pio C. Guerrero very much later in the
proceedings, represented PPA throughout the appellate
proceedings in both G.R. No. 130068 and G.R. No. 130150 and
was presumably fully acquainted with the facts and issues of the
case, it took the OSG an inordinately and almost unreasonably
long period of time to file its comment, thus unduly delaying the
resolution of these cases. It took several changes of leadership in
the OSG from Silvestre H. Bello III to Romeo C. dela Cruz and,
finally, Ricardo P. Galvez before the comment in behalf of PPA
was finally filed.
In G.R. No. 130068, it took eight (8) motions for extension of
time totaling 210 days, a warning that no further extensions
shall be granted, and personal service on the Solicitor General
himself of the resolution requiring the filing of such comment
before the OSG indulged the Court with the long required
35
comment on July 10, 1998. This, despite the fact that said
office was required to file its comment way back on November
36
12, 1997. A closer scrutiny of the records likewise indicates
that petitoner FESC was not even furnished a copy of said
comment as required by Section 5, Rule 42. Instead, a copy
thereof was inadvertently furnished to MPA which, from the
37
point of view of G.R. No. 130068, was a non-party. The OSG
fared slightly better in G.R. No. 130150 in that it took only six (6)
extensions, or a total of 180 days, before the comment was
38
finally filed. And while it properly furnished petitioner MPA
with a copy of its comment, it would have been more desirable
and expedient in this case to have furnished its therein corespondent FESC with a copy thereof, if only as a matter of
39
professional courtesy.
This undeniably dilatory disinclination of the OSG to seasonably
file required pleadings constitutes deplorable disservice to the
tax-paying public and can only be categorized as censurable
inefficiency on the part of the government law office. This is
most certainly professionally unbecoming of the OSG.
Another thing that baffles the Court is why the OSG did not take
the inititive of filing a motion for consolidation in either G.R. No.
130068 or G.R. No. 130150, considering its familiarity with the
background of the case and if only to make its job easier by
having to prepare and file only one comment. It could not have
been unaware of the pendency of one or the other petition
because, being counsel for respondent in both cases, petitioner
is required to furnish it with a copy of the petition under pain of
40
dismissal of the petition for failure otherwise.
Besides, in G.R. 130068, it prefaces its discussions thus
Incidentally, the Manila Pilots' Association
(MPA), one of the defendants-appellants in
Incidentally, respondent Far Eastern

Shipping Co. (FESC) had also taken an appeal
from the said decision to this Honorable
Court, docketed as G.R. No. 130068, entitled
"Far Eastern Shipping Co. vs. Court of
42
Appeals and Philippine Ports Authority."
We find here a lackadaisical attitude and complacency on the
part of the OSG in the handling of its cases and an almost
reflexive propensity to move for countless extensions, as if to
test the patience of the Court, before favoring it with the timely
submission of required pleadings.
It must be emphasized that the Court can resolve cases only as
fast as the respective parties in a case file the necessary
pleadings. The OSG, by needlessly extending the pendency of
these cases through its numerous motions for extension, came
very close to exhausting this Court's forbearance and has
regrettably fallen short of its duties as the People's Tribune.
The OSG is reminded that just like other members of the Bar, the
canons under the Code of Professional Responsibility apply with
equal force on lawyers in government service in the discharge of
43
their official tasks. These ethical duties are rendered even
more exacting as to them because, as government counsel, they
have the added duty to abide by the policy of the State to
promote
a
high
standard
of
ethics
in
public
44
service. Furthermore, it is incumbent upon the OSG, as part of
the government bureaucracy, to perform and discharge its
duties with the highest degree of professionalism, intelligence
45
and skill and to extend prompt, courteous and adequate
46
service to the public.
Now, on the merits of the case. After a judicious examination of
the records of this case, the pleadings filed, and the evidence
presented by the parties in the two petitions, we find no cogent
reason to reverse and set aside the questioned decision. While
not entirely a case of first impression, we shall discuss the
issues seriatim and, correlatively by way of a judicial once-over,
inasmuch as the matters raised in both petitions beg for
validation and updating of well-worn maritime jurisprudence.
Thereby, we shall write finis to the endless finger-pointing in this
shipping mishap which has been stretched beyond the limits of
judicial tolerance.
The Port of Manila is within the Manila Pilotage District which is
under compulsory pilotage pursuant to Section 8, Article III of
Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. 0347
85, which provides that:
Sec. 8. Compulsor Pilotage Service. For
entering a harbor and anchoring thereat, or
passing through rivers or straits within a
pilotage district, as well as docking and
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE

undocking at any pier/wharf, or shifting from
one berth or another, every vessel engaged
in coastwise and foreign trade shall be under
compulsory pilotage. . . .
moment the master neglects or refuses to

carry out his instructions.
In case of compulsory pilotage, the respective duties and

responsibilities of the compulsory pilot and the master have
been specified by the same regulation in this wise:
Par. XLIV. Pilots shall properly and safely

secure or anchor vessels under their control
when requested to do so by the master of
such vessels.
Sec. 11. Control of vessels and liability for

damage. On compulsory pilotage
grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the
service to a vessel shall be responsible for
the damage caused to a vessel or to life and
property at ports due to his negligence or
fault. He can only be absolved from liability if
the accident is caused by force majeure or
natural calamities provided he has exercised
prudence and extra diligence to prevent or
minimize damage.
The Master shall retain overall command of
the vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby
he can countermand or overrule the order or
command of the Harbor Pilot on beard. In
such event, any damage caused to a vessel
or to life and property at ports by reason of
the fault or negligence of the Master shall be
the responsibility and liability of the
registered owner of the vessel concerned
without prejudice to recourse against said
Master.
Such liability of the owner or Master of the
vessel or its pilots shall be determined by
competent
authority
in
appropriate
proceedings in the light of the facts and
circumstances of each particular case.
Sec. 32. Duties and responsibilities of the
Pilot or Pilots' Association. The duties and
responsibilities of the Harbor Pilot shall be as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
f) a pilot shall be held responsible for the
direction of a vessel from the time he
assumes his work as a pilot thereof until he
leaves
it
anchored
or
berthed
safely; Provided,
however,
that
his
responsibility shall cease at the moment the
Master neglects or refuses to carry out
hisorder.
Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 issued twenty years
earlier likewise provided in Chapter I thereof for the
responsibilities of pilots:
Par. XXXIX. A Pilot shall be held
responsible for the direction of a vessel from
the time he assumes control thereof until he
leaves it anchored free from shoal: Provided,
That his responsibility shall cease at the
xxx xxx xxx
I. G.R. No. 130068

Petitioner FESC faults the respondent court with serious error in
not holding MPA and Capt. Gavino solely responsible for the
damages cause to the pier. It avers that since the vessel was
under compulsory pilotage at the time with Capt. Gavino in
command and having exclusive control of the vessel during the
docking maneuvers, then the latter should be responsible for
48
damages caused to the pier. It likewise holds the appellate
court in error for holding that the master of the ship, Capt.
Kabankov, did not exercise the required diligence demanded by
49
the circumstances.
We start our discussion of the successive issues bearing in mind
the evidentiary rule in American jurisprudence that there is a
presumption of fault against a moving vessel that strikes a
stationary object such as a dock or navigational aid. In admiralty,
this presumption does more than merely require the ship to go
forward and produce some evidence on the presumptive
matter. The moving vessel must show that it was without fault
or that the collision was occasioned by the fault of the stationary
object or was the result of inevitable accident. It has been held
that such vessel must exhaust every reasonable possibility which
the circumstances admit and show that in each, they did all that
50
reasonable care required. In the absence of sufficient proof in
rebuttal, the presumption of fault attaches to a moving vessel
which collides with a fixed object and makes a prima facie case
51
of fault against the vessel. Logic and experience support this
presumption:
The common sense behind the rule makes
the burden a heavy one. Such accidents
simply do not occur in the ordinary course of
things unless the vessel has been
mismanaged in some way. It is nor sufficient
for the respondent to produce witnesses
who testify that as soon as the danger
became apparent everything possible was
done to avoid an accident. The question
remains, How then did the collision occur?
The answer must be either that, in spite of
the testimony of the witnesses, what was
done was too little or too late or, if not, then
the vessel was at fault for being in a position
in which an unavoidable collision would
52
occur.
The task, therefore, in these cases is to pinpoint who
was negligent the master of the ship, the harbor
pilot or both.
A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly qualified, and licensed,
to conduct a vessel into or out of ports, or in certain waters. In a
broad sense, the term "pilot" includes both (1) those whose duty
it is to guide vessels into or out of ports, or in particular waters
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE

and (2) those entrusted with the navigation of vessels on the
53
high seas. However, the term "pilot" is more generally
understood as a person taken on board at a particular place for
the purpose of conducting a ship through a river, road or
54
channel, or from a port.
expert in his profession. Under extraordinary circumstancesm, a

58
pilot must exercise extraordinary care.
Under English and American authorities, generally speaking, the

pilot supersedes the master for the time being in the command
and navigation of the ship, and his orders must be obeyed in all
matters connected with her navigation. He becomes the
master pro hac vice and should give all directions as to speed,
course, stopping and reversing anchoring, towing and the like.
And when a licensed pilot is employed in a place where pilotage
is compulsory, it is his duty to insist on having effective control
of the vessel, or to decline to act as pilot. Under certain systems
of foreign law, the pilot does not take entire charge of the
vessel, but is deemed merely the adviser of the master, who
retains command and control of the navigation even in localities
55
where pilotage is compulsory.
. . . (T)he pilot of a river steamer, like the

harbor pilot, is selected for his personal
knowledge of the topography through which
he steers his vessel. In the long course of a
thousand miles in one of these rivers, he
must be familiar with the appearance of the
shore on each side of the river as he goes
along. Its banks, towns, its landings, its
houses and trees, are all landmarks by which
he steers his vessel. The compass is of little
use to him. He must know where the
navigable channel is, in its relation to all
these external objects, especially in the
night. He must also be familiar with all
dangers that are permanently located in the
course of the river, as sand-bars, snags,
sunken rocks or trees or abandoned vessels
orbarges. All this he must know and
remember and avoid. To do this, he must be
constantly informed of the changes in the
current of the river, of the sand-bars newly
made,of logs or snags, or other objects
newly presented, against which his vessel
might be injured.
It is quite common for states and localities to provide for

compulsory pilotage, and safety laws have been enacted
requiring vessels approaching their ports, with certain
exceptions, to take on board pilots duly licensed under local law.
The purpose of these laws is to create a body of seamen
thoroughly acquainted with the harbor, to pilot vessels seeking
to enter or depart, and thus protect life and property from the
56
dangers of navigation.
In line with such established doctrines, Chapter II of Customs
Administrative Order No. 15-65 prescribes the rules for
compulsory pilotage in the covered pilotage districts, among
which
is
the
Manila
Pilotage
District,
viz.
PARAGRAPH I. Pilotage for entering a
harbor and anchoring thereat, as well as
docking and undocking in any pier or shifting
from one berth to another shall be
compulsory, except Government vessels and
vessels of foreign governments entitled to
courtesy, and other vessels engaged solely in
river or harbor work, or in a daily ferry
service between ports which shall be exempt
from compulsory pilotage provisions of these
regulations: provided,
however,
that
compulsory pilotage shall not apply in
pilotage districts whose optional pilotage is
allowed under these regulations.
Pursuant thereto, Capt. Gavino was assigned to pilot MV
Pavlodar into Berth 4 of the Manila International Port. Upon
assuming such office as compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to
the universally accepted high standards of care and diligence
required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill and
knowledge in respect to navigation in the particular waters over
which his license extends superior to and more to be trusted
57
than that of the master. A pilot 57 should have a thorough
knowledge of general and local regulations and physical
conditions affecting the vessel in his charge and the waters for
which he is licensed, such as a particular harbor or river.
He is not held to the highest possible degree of skill and care,
but must have and exercise the ordinary skill and care
demanded by the circumstances, and usually shown by an
59
In Atlee vs. The Northwesrern Union Packet Company. Mr.

Justice Miller spelled out in great detail the duties of a pilot:
xxx xxx xxx

It may be said that this is exacting a very high
order of ability in a pilot. But when we
consider the value of the lives and property
committed to their control, for in this they
are absolute masters, the high compensation
they receive, the care which Congress has
taken to secure by rigid and frequent
examinations and renewal of licenses, this
very class of skill, we do not think we fix the
standard too high.
Tested thereby, we affirm respondent court's finding that Capt.
Gavino failed to measure up to such strict standard of care and
diligence required of pilots in the performance of their duties.
Witness this testimony of Capt. Gavino:
Court: You have testified
before that the reason
why the vessel bumped
the pier was because the
anchor was not released
immediately or as soon
as you have given the
order. Do you remember
having srated that?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q And you gave this
order to the captain of
the vessel?
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE

A Yes, your Honor.
Q By that testimony, you
are leading the Court to
understand that if that
anchor was released
immediately at the time
you gave the order, the
incident would not have
happened.
Is
that
correct?
A Yes, sir, but actually it
was only a presumption
on my part because
there was a commotion
between the officers
who are in charge of the
dropping of the anchor
and the captain. I could
not understand their
language, it was in
Russian, so I presumed
the anchor was not
dropped on time.
Q So, you are not sure
whether it was really
dropped on time or not?
A I am not sure, your
Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You are not even sure
what could have caused
the incident. What factor
could have caused the
incident?
A Well, in this case now,
because
either
the
anchor was not dropped
on time or the anchor did
not hold, that was the
cause of the incident,
60
your Honor.
It is disconcertingly riddled with too much incertitude and
manifests a seeming indifference for the possibly injurious
consequences his commands as pilot may have. Prudence
required that he, as pilot, should have made sure that his
directions were promptly and strictly followed. As correctly
noted by the trial court
Moreover, assuming that he did indeed give
the command to drop the anchor on time, as
pilot he should have seen to it that the order
was carried out, and he could have done this
in a number of ways, one of which was to
inspect the bow of the vessel where the
anchor mechanism was installed. Of course,
Captain Gavino makes reference to a
commotion among the crew members which
supposedly caused the delay in the

execution of the command. This account was
reflected in the pilot's report prepared four
hours later, but Capt. Kavankov, while not
admitting whether or not such a commotion
occurred, maintained that the command to
drop anchor was followed "immediately and
precisely." Hence, the Court cannot give
much weight or consideration to this portion
61
of Gavino's testimony."
An act may be negligent if it is done without the competence
that a reasonable person in the position of the actor would
recognize as necessary to prevent it from creating an
62
unreasonable risk of harm to another. Those who undertake
any work calling for special skills are required not only to
exercise reasonable care in what they do but also possess a
63
standard minimum of special knowledge and ability.
Every man who offers his services to another, and is employed,
assumes to exercise in the employment such skills he possesses,
with a reasonable degree of diligence. In all these employments
where peculiar skill is requisite, if one offers his services he is
understood as holding himself out to the public as possessing
the degree of skill commonly possessed by others in the same
employment, and if his pretensions are unfounded he commits a
species of fraud on every man who employs him in reliance on
64
his public profession.
Furthermore, there is an obligation on all persons to take the
care which, under ordinary circumstances of the case, a
reasonable and prudent man would take, and the omission of
65
that care constitutes negligence. Generally, the degree of care
required is graduated according to the danger a person or
property attendant upon the activity which the actor pursues or
the instrumentality which he uses. The greater the danger the
greater the degree of care required. What is ordinary under
extraordinary of conditions is dictated by those conditions;
extraordinary risk demands extraordinary care. Similarly, the
66
more imminent the danger, the higher the degree of care.
We give our imprimatur to the bases for the conclusion of the
Court of Appeals that Capt. Gavino was indeed negligent in the
performance of his duties:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . As can be gleaned from the logbook,
Gavino ordered the left anchor and two (2)
shackles dropped at 8:30 o'clock in the
morning. He ordered the engines of the
vessel stopped at 8:31 o'clock. By
then,Gavino must have realized that the
anchor did not hit a hard object and was not
clawed so as to reduce the momentum of
the vessel. In point of fact, the vessel
continued travelling towards the pier at the
same speed. Gavino failed to react, At 8:32
o'clock, the two (2) tugboats began to push
the stern part of the vessel from the port
side bur the momentum of the vessel was
not contained. Still, Gavino did not react. He
did not even order the other anchor and two
(2) more shackles dropped to arrest the
momentum of the vessel. Neither did he
order full-astern. It was only at 8:34
meikimouse

o'clock, or four (4) minutes, after the anchor
was dropped that Gavino reacted. But his
reaction was even (haphazard) because
instead of arresting fully the momentum of
the vessel with the help of the tugboats,
Gavino ordered merely "half-astern". It took
Gavino another minute to order a "fullastern". By then, it was too late. The vessel's
momentum could no longer be arrested and,
barely a minute thereafter, the bow of the
vessel hit the apron of the pier. Patently,
Gavino miscalculated. He failed to react and
undertake adequate measures to arrest fully
the momentum of the vessel after the
anchor failed to claw to the seabed. When
he reacted, the same was even (haphazard).
Gavino failed to reckon the bulk of the
vessel, its size and its cargo. He erroneously
believed that only one (1) anchor would
suffice and even when the anchor failed to
claw into the seabed or against a hard object
in the seabed, Gavino failed to order the
other anchor dropped immediately. His
claim that the anchor was dropped when the
vessel was only 1,000 feet from the pier is
but a belated attempt to extricate himself
from the quagmire of his own insouciance
and negligence. In sum, then, Appellants'
claim that the incident was caused by "force
majeure" is barren of factual basis.
xxx xxx xxx
The harbor pilots are especially trained for
this job. In the Philippines, one may not be a
harbor pilot unless he passed the required
examination and training conducted then by
the Bureau of Custom, under Customs
Administrative Order No. 15-65, now under
the Philippine Ports Authority under PPA
Administrative Order 63-85, Paragraph XXXIX
of the Customs Administrative Order No. 1565 provides that "the pilot shall be held
responsible for the direction of the vessel
from the time he assumes control thereof,
until he leaves it anchored free from
shoal: Provided, that his responsibility shall
cease at the.moment the master neglects or
refuse(s) to carry out his instructions." The
overall direction regarding the procedure for
docking and undocking the vessel emanates
from the harbor pilot. In the present
recourse, Gavino failed to live up to his
responsibilities and exercise reasonable care
or that degree of care required by the
exigencies of the occasion. Failure on his
part to exercise the degree of care
demanded by the circumstances is
negligence (Reese versus Philadelphia & RR
Co. 239 US 363, 60 L ed. 384, 57 Am Jur, 2d
67
page 418).
This affirms the findings of the trial court regarding Capt.
Gavino's negligence:
This discussion should not however, divert
the court from the fact that negligence in
CIVIL PROCEDURE
manuevering the vessel must be attributed
to Capt. Senen Gavino. He was an
experienced pilot and by this time should
have long familiarized himself with the depth
of the port and the distance he could keep
between the vessel and port in order to
68
berth safely.
The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt.
Kabancov is no less responsible for the allision. His unconcerned
lethargy as master of the ship in the face of troublous exigence
constitutes negligence.
While it is indubitable that in exercising his functions a pilot is in
69
sole command of the ship and supersedes the master for the
time being in the command and navigation of a ship and that he
70
becomes master pro hac vice of a vessel piloted by him, there
is overwhelming authority to the effect that the master does not
surrender his vessel to the pilot and the pilot is not the master.
The master is still in command of the vessel notwithstanding the
presence of a pilot. There are occasions when the master may
and should interfere and even displace the pilot, as when the
pilot is obviously incompetent or intoxicated and the
circumstances may require the master to displace a compulsory
pilot because of incompetency or physical incapacity. If,
however, the master does nor observe that a compulsory pilot is
incompetent or physically incapacitated, the master is justified
71
in relying on the pilot, but not blindly.
The master is not wholly absolved from his duties while a pilot is
on board his vessel, and may advise with or offer suggestions to
him. He is still in command of the vessel, except so far as her
navigation is concerned, and must cause the ordinary work of
the vessel to be properly carried on and the usual precaution
taken. Thus, in particular, he is bound to see that there is
sufficient watch on deck, and that the men are attentive to their
duties, also that engines are stopped, towlines cast off, and the
72
anchors clear and ready to go at the pilot's order.
A perusal of Capt. Kabankov's testimony makes it apparent that
he was remiss in the discharge of his duties as master of the
ship, leaving the entire docking procedure up to the pilot,
instead of maintaining watchful vigilance over this risky
maneuver:
Q Will you please tell us
whether you have the
right to intervene in
docking of your ship in
the harbor?
A No sir, I have no right
to intervene in time of
docking, only in case
there is imminent danger
to the vessel and to the
pier.
Q Did you ever intervene
during the time that your
ship was being docked by
Capt. Gavino?
A No sir, I did not
intervene at the time
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE

when the pilot
docking my ship.
was
A You mean the action of

Capt. Gavino or his
condition?
Q Up to the time it was

actually docked at the
pier, is that correct?
Court:
Q Not the actuation that
conform to the safety
maneuver of the ship to
the harbor?
A No sir, I did not

intervene up to the very
moment when the vessel
was docked.
A No sir, it was a usual

docking.
xxx xxx xxx

Atty. Del Rosario (to the
witness)
Q By that statement of
yours, you are leading
the court to understand
that there was nothing
irregular in the docking
of the ship?
Q Mr. Witness, what

happened, if any, or was
there anything unusual
that happened during
the docking?
A Yes sir, during

initial period of
docking,
there
nothing unusual
happened.
A Yes sir, our ship

touched ihe pier and the
pier was damaged.
the
the
was
that
Q What about in the last

portion of the docking of
the ship, was there
anything unusual or
abnormal
that
happened?
Court (to the witness)

Q When you said
touched the pier, are you
leading the court to
understand that your
ship bumped the pier?
A None Your Honor, I

believe that Capt. Gavino
thought that the anchor
could keep or hold the
vessel.
A I believe that my vessel

only touched the pier but
the impact was very
weak.
Q You want us to
understand, Mr. Witness,
that the dropping of the
anchor of the vessel was
nor timely?
Q Do you know whether

the pier was damaged as
a result of that slight or
weak impact?
A Yes sir, after the pier
was damaged.
A I don't know the depth

of this port but I think, if
the anchor was dropped
earlier and with more
shackles, there could not
have been an incident.
xxx xxx xxx

Q Being most concerned
with the safety of your
vessel,
in
the
maneuvering of your
vessel to the port, did
you observe anything
irregular
in
the
maneuvering by Capt.
Gavino at the time he
was trying to cause the
vessel to be docked at
the pier?
Q So you could not

precisely tell the court
that the dropping of the
anchor
was
timery
because you are not well
aware of the seabed, is
that correct?
A Yes sir, that is right.
xxx xxx xxx
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE

Q
Alright,
Capt.
Kavankov, did you come
to know later whether
the anchor held its
ground so much so that
the vessel could not
travel?
A It is difficult for me to
say definitely. I believe
that the anchor did not
hold the ship.
Q You mean you don't
know
whether
the
anchor blades stuck to
the ground to stop the
ship
from
further
moving?
A Yes sir, it is possible.
Q What is possible?
A I think, the 2 shackles
were not enough to hold
the vessel.
Q Did you know that the
2
shackles
were
dropped?
A Yes sir, I knew that.
Q If you knew that the
shackles
were
not
enough to hold the ship,
did you not make any
protest to the pilot?
A No sir, after the
incident, that was my
assumption.
aware as to the depths of

the harbor and the
ground and I was
confident in his actions.
xxx xxx xxx
Solicitor Abad (to the
witness)
Q Now, you were
standing with the pilot
on the bridge of the
vessel
before
the
inicident happened, were
you not?
A Yes sir, all the time, I
was standing with the
pilot.
Q And so whatever the
pilot saw, you could also
see from that point of
view?
A That is right.
Q Whatever the piler can
read from the panel of
the bridge, you also
could read, is that
correct?
A What is the meaning of
panel?
Q
All
indications
necessary for men on the
bridge to be informed of
the movements of the
ship?
A That is right.
Q Did you come to know

later
whether
that
presumption is correct?
A I still don't know the
ground in the harbor or
the depths.
Q And whatever sound

the captain . . . Capt.
Gavino would hear from
the bridge, you could
also hear?
A That is right.
Q So from the beginning,

you were not competent
whether the 2 shackles
were also dropped to
hold the ship?
A No sir, at the
beginning, I did not
doubt it because I
believe Capt. Gavino to
be an experienced pilot
and he should be more
Q Now, you said that

when the command to
lower the anchor was
given, it was obeyed, is
that right?
A This command was
executed by the third
mate and boatswain.
meikimouse

Q Mr. Witness, earlier in
today's hearing, you said
that
you
did
not
intervene with the duties
of the pilot and that, in
your opinion, you can
only intervene if the ship
is placed in imminent
danger, is that correct?
A That is right, I did say
that.
Q In your observation
before
the
incident
actually happened, did
you observe whether or
not the ship, before the
actual incident, the ship
was placed in imminent
danger?
A No sir, I did not
observe.
Q By that answer, are
you leading the court to
understand that because
you did not intervene
and
because
you
believed that it was your
duty to intervene when
the vessel is placed in
imminent danger to
which you did not
observe any imminent
danger thereof, you have
not intervened in any
manner to the command
of the pilot?
A That is right, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Assuminp that you
disagreed with the pilot
regarding the step being
taken by the pilot in
maneuvering the vessel,
whose command will
prevail, in case of
imminent danger to the
vessel?
A I did nor consider the
situation as having an
imminent
danger.
I
believed that the vessel
will dock alongside the
pier.
Q You want us to
understand that you did
not see an imminent
CIVIL PROCEDURE
danger to your ship, is
that what you mean?
A Yes sir, up to the very
last moment, I believed
that there was no
imminent danger.
Q Because of that, did
you ever intervene in the
command of the pilot?
A Yes sir, I did not
intervene because I
believed
that
the
command of the pilot to
be correct.
witness)
Q As a captain of M/V
Pavlodar, you consider
docking maneuvers a
serious matter, is it not?
Q Since it affects not only
the safety of the port or
pier, but also the safety
of the vessel and the
cargo, is it not?
A That is right.
Q So that, I assume that
you were watching Capt.
Gavino very closely at
the time he was making
his commands?
A I was close to him, I
was
hearing
his
command and being
executed.
Q And that you were also
alert for any possible
mistakes
he
might
commit
in
the
maneuvering of the
vessel?
Q But at no time during
the maneuver did you
issue order contrary to
the orders Capt. Gavino
made?
A No sir.
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE

Q So that you were in full
accord with all of Capt.
Gavino's orders?
bur not done (sic), as you

expected, you already
were alerted that there
was danger to the ship, is
that correct?
A Yes sir.
A Yes sir, I was alerted

but there was no danger.
Q Because, otherwise,
you would have issued
order
that
would
supersede
his
own
order?
Q And you were alerted

that somebody was
wrong?
A In that case, I should

t,ke him away from his
command or remove the
command from him.
A Yes sir, I was alerted.

Q And this alert vou
assumed
was
the
ordinary alertness that
you have for normal
docking?

Q You were in full accord
with the steps being
taken by Capt. Gavino
because you relied on his
knowledge,
on
his
familiarity of the seabed
and shoals and other
surroundings
or
conditions under the sea,
is that correct?
A Yes sir, I mean that it

was usual condition of
any man in time of
docking to be alert.
Q And that is the same

alertness
when
the
anchor did not hold onto
the ground, is that
correct?

witness)
A Yes sir, me and Capt.

Gavino (thought) that
the anchor will hold the
ground.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Since, as you said that

you agreed all the while
with the orders of Capt.
Gavino,
you
also
therefore agreed with
him in his failure to take
necessary
precaution
against the eventuality
that the anchor will not
hold as expected?
Q And so after the

anchors were ordered
dropped and they did not
take hold of the seabed,
you were alerted that
there was danger already
on hand?
A No sir, there was no
imminent danger to the
vessel.
Atty. Del Rosario:
Q Do you mean to tell us

that even if the anchor
was supposed to take
hold of the bottom and it
did not, there was no
danger to the ship?
A Yes sir, because the
anchor dragged on the
ground later.
Q And after a few
moments when the
anchor should have
taken hold the seabed
May I ask that the

question . . .
Solicitor Abad:
Never mind, I will reform
the question.
xxx xxx xxx
witness)
meikimouse

Q Is it not a fact that the
vessel bumped the pier?
A That is right, it bumped
the pier.
Q For the main reason
that the anchor of the
vessel did not hold the
ground as expected?
A Yes sir, that is my
73
opinion.
Further, on redirect examination, Capt. Kabankov fortified his
apathetic assessment of the situation:
Q Now, after the anchor
was dropped, was there
any point in time that
you felt that the vessel
was in imminent danger.
A No, at that time, the
vessel was not in
74
imminent, danger, sir.
This cavalier appraisal of the event by Capt. Kabankov is
disturbingly antipodal to Capt. Gavino's anxious assessment of
the situation:
Q When a pilot is on
board a vessel, it is the
piler's command which
should be followed at
that moment until the
vessel is, or goes to port
or reaches port?
A Yes, your Honor, but it
does not take away from
the
Captain
his
prerogative
to
countermand the pilot.
Q In what way?
A In any case, which he
thinks the pilot is not
maneuvering correctly,
the Captain always has
the
prerogative
to
countermand the pilot's
order.
Q
But
insofar
as
competence, efficiency
and
functional
knowledee of the seabed
which are vital or
decisive in the safety (sic)
bringing of a vessel to
the port, he is not
competent?
CIVIL PROCEDURE
A Yes, your Honor. That
is why they hire a pilot in
an advisory capacity, but
still, the safety of the
vessel rest(s) upon the
Captain, the Master of
the vessel.
Q In this case, there was
not a disagreement
between you and the
Captain of the vessel in
the bringing of the vessel
to port?
A No, your Honor.
Court:
May proceed.
Atty. Catris:
In fact, the Master of the
vessel testified here that
he was all along in
conformity with the
orders you, gave to him,
and, as matter of fact, as
he said, he obeyed all
your orders. Can you tell,
if in the course of giving
such normal orders for
the saf(e) docking of the
MV Pavlodar, do you
remember
of
any
instance that the Master
of the vessel did not
obey your command for
the safety docking of the
MV Pavlodar?
Atty. del Rosario:
Already answered,
already said yes sir.
he
Court:
Yes,
he
has
just
answered yes sir to the
Court that there was no
disagreement insofar as
the bringing of the vessel
safely to the port.
Atty. Catris:
But in this instance of
docking of the MV
Pavlodar,
do
you
remember of a time
during the course of the
docking that the MV
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE

Pavlodar
was
imminent danger
bumping the pier?
in
of
A When we were about

more than one thousand
meters from the pier, I
think, the anchor was not
holding, so I immediately
ordered to push the bow
at a fourth quarter, at
the back of the vessel in
order to swing the bow
away from the pier and
at the same time, I
ordered for a full astern
75
of the engine.
These conflicting reactions can only imply, at the very
least, unmindful disregard or, worse, neglectful
relinquishment of duty by the shipmaster, tantamount
to negligence.
The findings of the trial court on this aspect is noteworthy:
For, while the pilot Gavino may indeed have
been charged with the task of docking the
vessel in the berthing space, it is undisputed
that the master of the vessel had the
corresponding duty to countermand any of
the orders made by the pilot, and even
maneuver the vessel himself, in case of
imminent danger to the vessel and the port.
In fact, in his testimony, Capt. Kavankov
admitted
that
all
throughour
the
man(eu)vering procedures he did not notice
anything was going wrong, and even
observed that the order given to drop the
anchor was done at the proper time. He
even ventured the opinion that the accident
occurred because the anchor failed to take
hold but that this did not alarm him
because.there was still time to drop a
second anchor.
Under
normal
circumstances,
the
abovementioned facts would have caused
the master of a vessel to take charge of the
situation and see to the man(eu)vering of
the vessel himself. Instead, Capt. Kavankov
chose to rely blindly upon his pilot, who by
this time was proven ill-equipped to cope
with the situation.
skills, to the point that despite being

appraised of a notice of alert he continued to
relinquish control of the vessel to Gavino,
shows indubitably that he was not
performing his duties with the diligence
required of him and therefore may be
charged with negligence along with
76
defend;int Gavino.
As correctly affirmed by the Court of Appeals
We are in full accord with the findings and
disquisitions of the Court a quo.
In the present recourse, Captain Viktor
Kavankov had been a mariner for thirty-two
years before the incident. When Gavino was
(in) the command of the vessel, Kavankov
was beside Gavino, relaying the commands
or orders of Gavino to the crewmembersofficers of the vessel concerned. He was thus
fully aware of the docking maneuvers and
procedure Gavino undertook to dock the
vessel. Irrefragably, Kavankov was fully
aware of the bulk and size of the vessel and
its cargo as well as the weight of the vessel.
Kavankov categorically admitted that, when
the anchor and two (2) shackles were
dropped to the sea floor, the claws of the
anchor did not hitch on to any hard object in
the seabed. The momentum of the vessel
was not arrested. The use of the two (2)
tugboats was insufficient. The momentum of
the vessel, although a little bit arrested,
continued
(sic)
the
vessel
going
straightforward with its bow towards the
port (Exhibit "A-1 ). There was thus a need
for the vessel to move "full-astern" and to
drop the other anchor with another shackle
or two (2), for the vessel to avoid hitting the
pier. Kavankov refused to act even as Gavino
failed to act. Even as Gavino gave mere "halfastern" order, Kavankov supinely stood by.
The vessel was already about twenty (20)
meters away from the pier when Gavino
gave the "full-astern" order. Even then,
Kavankov did nothing to prevent the vessel
from hitting the pier simply because he
relied on the competence and plan of
Gavino. While the "full-astern'' maneuver
momentarily arrested the momentum of the
vessel, it was, by then, too late. All along,
Kavankov stood supinely beside Gavino,
doing nothing but relay the commands of
Gavino. Inscrutably, then, Kavankov was
negligent.
xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx
It is apparent that Gavino was negligent but
Far Eastern's employee Capt. Kavankov was
no lesss responsible for as master of the
vessel he stood by the pilot during the
man(eu)vering procedures and was privy to
every move the latter made, as well as the
vessel's response to each of the commands.
His choice to rely blindly upon the pilot's
The stark incompetence of Kavankov is

competent evidence to prove the
unseaworthiness of the vessel. It has been
held that the incompetence of the navigator,
the master of the vessel or its crew makes
the vessel unseaworthy (Tug Ocean Prince
versus United States of America, 584 F. 2nd,
meikimouse

page 1151). Hence, the Appellant FESC is
likewise liable for the damage sustained by
77
the Appellee.
We find strong and well-reasoned support in time-tested
American maritime jurisprudence, on which much of our laws
and jurisprudence on the matter are based, for the conclusions
of the Court of Appeals adjudging both Capt. Gavino and Capt.
Kabankov negligent.
As early as 1869, the U.S. Supreme Court declared, through Mr.
78
Justice Swayne, in The Steamship China vs. Walsh, that it is the
duty of the master to interfere in cases of the pilot's intoxication
or manifest incapacity, in cases of danger which he does not
foresee, and in all cases of great necessity. The master has the
same power to displace the pilot that he has to remove any
subordinate officer of the vessel, at his discretion.
In 1895, the U.S. Supreme Court, this time through Mr. Justice
Brown, emphatically ruled that:
Nor are rye satisfied with the conduct of the
master in leaving the pilot in sole charge of
the vessel. While the pilot doubtless
supersedes the master for the time being in
the command and navigation of the ship,
and his orders must be obeyed in all matters
connected with her navigation, the master is
not wholly absolved from his duties while
the pilot is on board, and may advise with
him, and even displace him in case he is
intoxicated or manifestly incompetent. He is
still in command of the vessel, except so far
as her navigation is concerned, and bound to
see that there is a sufficient watch on deck,
and that the men are attentive to their
duties.
. . . (N)orwithstanding the pilot has charge, it
is the duty of the master to prevent accident,
and not to abandon the vessel entirely to the
pilot; but that there are certain duties he has
to discharge (notwithstanding there is a pilot
on board) for the benefit of the owners. . . .
that in well conducted ships the master does
not regard the presence of a duly licensed
pilot in compulsory pilot waters as freeing
him from every, obligation to attend to the
safety of the vessel; but that, while the
master sees that his officers and crew duly
attend to the pilot's orders, he himself is
bound to keep a vigilant eye on the
navigation of the vessel, and, when
exceptional circumstances exist, not only to
urge upon the pilot to use every precaution,
79
but to insist upon such being taken. (Italics
for emphasis.)
80
In Jure vs. United Fruit Co., which, like the present petitions,
involved compulsory pilotage, with a similar scenario where at
and prior to the time of injury, the vessel was in the charge of a
pilot with the master on the bridge of the vessel beside said
pilot, the court therein ruled:
The authority of the master of a vessel is not
in complete abeyance while a pilot, who is
CIVIL PROCEDURE
required by law to be accepted, is in
discharge of his functions. . . . It is the duty of
the master to interfere in cases of the pilot's
intoxication or manifest incapacity, in cases
of danger which he does not foresee, and in
all cases of great necessity. The master has
the same power to displace the pilot that he
has to remove any subordinate officer of the
vessel. He may exercise it, or not, according
to his discretion. There was evidence to
support findings that piaintiff's injury was
due to the negligent operation of the Atenas,
and that the master of that vessel was
negligent in failing to take action to avoid
endangering a vessel situated as the City of
Canton was and persons or property
thereon.
A phase of the evidence furnished support
for the inferences . . . that he negligently
failed to suggest to the pilot the danger
which was disclosed, and means of avoiding
such danger; and that the master's
negligence in failing to give timelt
admonition to the pilot proximately
contributed to the injury complained of. We
are of opinion that the evidence mentioned
tended to prove conduct of the pilot, known
to the master, giving rise to a case of danger
or great necessity, calling for the
intervention of the master. A master of a
vessel is not without fault in acquiescing in
canduct of a pilot which involves apparent
and avoidable danger, whether such danger
is to the vessel upon which the pilot is, or to
another vessel, or persons or property
thereon or on shore. (Emphasis ours.)
Still in another case involving a nearly identical setting, the
captain of a vessel alongside the compulsory pilot was deemed
to be negligent, since, in the words of the court, "he was in a
position to exercise his superior authority if he had deemed the
speed excessive on the occasion in question. I think it was clearly
negligent of him not to have recognized the danger to any craft
moored at Gravell Dock and that he should have directed the
pilot to reduce his speed as required by the local governmental
regulations. His failure amounted to negligence and renders the
81
respondent liable." (Emphasis supplied.) Though a compulsory
pilot might be regarded as an independent contractor, he is at
82
all times subject to the ultimate control of the ship's master.
In sum, where a compulsory pilot is in charge of a ship, the
master being required to permit him to navigate it, if the master
observes that the pilot is incompetent or physically incapable,
then it is the dury of the master to refuse to permit the pilot to
act. But if no such reasons are present, then the master is
justified in relying upon the pilot, but not blindly. Under the
circumstances of this case, if a situation arose where the master,
exercising that reasonable vigilance which the master of a ship
should exercise, observed, or should have observed, that the
pilot was so navigating the vessel that she was going, or was
likely to go, into danger, and there was in the exercise of
reasonable care and vigilance an opportunity for the master to
intervene so as to save the ship from danger, the master should
83
have acted accordingly. The master of a vessel must exercise a
84
degree of vigilance commensurate with the circumstances.
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CIVIL PROCEDURE

85
Inasmuch as the matter of negligence is a question of fact, we

defer to the findings of the trial court, especially as this is
86
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. But even beyond that, our
own evaluation is that Capt. Kabankov's shared liability is due
mainly to the fact that he failed to act when the perilous
situation should have spurred him into quick and decisive action
as master of the ship. In the face of imminent or actual danger,
he did not have to wait for the happenstance to occur before
countermanding or overruling the pilot. By his own admission,
Capt. Kabankov concurred with Capt. Gavino's decisions, and
this is precisely the reason why he decided not to countermand
any of the latter's orders. Inasmuch as both lower courts found
Capt. Gavino negligent, by expressing full agreement therewith
Capt. Kabankov was just as negligent as Capt. Gavino.
In general, a pilot is personally liable for damages caused by his
own negligence or default to the owners of the vessel, and to
third parties for damages sustained in a collision. Such
negligence of the pilot in the performance of duty constitutes a
87
maritime tort. At common law, a shipowner is not liable for
injuries inflicted exclusively by the negligence of a pilot accepted
88
by a vessel compulsorily. The exemption from liability for such
negligence shall apply if the pilot is actually in charge and solely
in fault. Since, a pilot is responsible only for his own personal
negligence, he cannot be held accountable for damages
89
proximately caused by the default of others, or, if there be
anything which concurred with the fault of the pilot in producing
the accident, the vessel master and owners are liable.
Since the colliding vessel is prima facie responsible, the burden
of proof is upon the party claiming benefit of the exemption
from liability. It must be shown affirmatively that the pilot was
at fault, and that there was no fault on the part of the officers or
crew, which might have been conducive to the damage. The fact
that the law compelled the master to take the pilot does not
exonerate the vessel from liability. The parties who suffer are
entitled to have their remedy against the vessel that occasioned
the damage, and are not under necessity to look to the pilot
from whom redress is not always had for compensation. The
owners of the vessel are responsible to the injured party for the
acts of the pilot, and they must be left to recover the amount as
well as they can against him. It cannot be maintained that the
circumstance of having a pilot on board, and acting in
conformity to his directions operate as a discharge of
90
responsibility of the owners. Except insofar as their liability is
limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or her owner are
liable for all damages caused by the negligence or other wrongs
of the owners or those in charge of the vessel. Where the pilot
of a vessel is not a compulsory one in the sense that the owner
or master of the vessel are bound to accept him, but is
employed voluntarily, the owners of the vessel are, all the more,
91
liable for his negligent act.
In the United States, the owners of a vessel are not personally
liable for the negligent acts of a compulsory pilot, but by
admiralty law, the fault or negligence of a compulsory pilot is
imputable to the vessel and it may be held liable therefor in rem.
Where, however, by the provisions of the statute the pilot is
compulsory only in the sense that his fee must be paid, and is
not in compulsory charge of the vessel, there is no exemption
from liability. Even though the pilot is compulsory, if his
negligence was not the sole cause of the injury, but the
negligence of the master or crew contributed thereto, the
92
owners are liable. But the liability of the ship in rem does not
release the pilot from the consequences of his own
93
negligence. The rationale for this rule is that the master is not
entirely absolved of responsibility with respect to navigation

94
when a compulsory pilot is in charge.
By way of validation and in light of the aforecited guidepost
rulings in American maritime cases, we declare that our rulings
during the early years of this century in City of Manila vs.
95
96
Gambe, China Navigation Co., Ltd. vs. Vidal, and Yap Tica &
97
Co. vs. Anderson, et al. have withstood the proverbial test of
time and remain good and relevant case law to this day.
City of Manila stands for the doctrine that the pilot who was in
command and complete control of a vessel, and not the owners,
must be held responsible for an accident which was solely the
result of the mistake of the pilot in not giving proper orders, and
which did not result from the failure of the owners to equip the
vessel with the most modern and improved machinery. In China
Navigation Co., the pilot deviated from the ordinary and safe
course, without heeding the warnings of the ship captain. It was
this careless deviation that caused the vessel to collide with a
pinnacle rock which, though uncharted, was known to pilots and
local navigators. Obviously, the captain was blameless. It was
the negligence of the pilot alone which was the proximate cause
of the collision. The Court could not but then rule that
The pilot in the case at bar having deviated
from the usual and ordinary course followed
by navigators in passing through the strait in
question, without a substantial reason, was
guilty of negligence, and that negligence
having been the proximate cause of the
damages, he is liable for such damages as
usually and naturally flow therefrom. . . .
. . . (T)he defendant should have known of
the existence and location of the rock upon
which the vessel struck while under his
control and management. . . . .
Consistent with the pronouncements in these two earlier cases,
but on a slightly different tack, the Court in Yap Tico & Co.
exonerated the pilot from liability for the accident where the
orders of the pilot in the handling of the ship were disregarded
by the officers and crew of the ship. According to the Court, a
pilot is ". . . responsible for a full knowledge of the channel and
the navigation only so far as he can accomplish it through the
officers and crew of the ship, and I don't see chat he can be held
responsible for damage when the evidence shows, as it does in
this case, that the officers and crew of the ship failed to obey his
orders." Nonetheless, it is possible for a compulsory pilot and
the master of the vessel to be concurrently negligent and thus
share the blame for the resulting damage as joint
98
tortfeasors, but only under the circumstances obtaining in and
demonstrated by the instant petitions.
It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to
render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It
is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more
efficient causes other than piaintiff's, is the proximate cause of
the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to
produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because
he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the
negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause
without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an
extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person
injured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that
the injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone,
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CIVIL PROCEDURE

without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent
99
rortfeasor. Where several causes producing an injury are
concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the
injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to
all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or
all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances
of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable,
and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not
the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause
merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other
actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is
100
liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.
P1,124,627.40 and the

final
one
is
P1,300,999.77.
Q
Yes,
but
that
P1,300,999.77 included
the additional two new
posts.
A It was increased.
Q Why was it increased?
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose

liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total
damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or
omissions of two or more persons, although acting
independently, are in combination the direct and proximate
cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to
determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and
either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their
concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third
party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for
101
102
the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.
A The original was 48 and

the actual was 46.
Q Now, the damage was
somewhere in 1980. It
took place in 1980 and
you started the repair
and reconstruction in
1982, that took almost
two years?
As for the amount of damages awarded by the trial court, we

find the same to be reasonable. The testimony of Mr. Pascual
Barral, witness for PPA, on cross and redirect examination,
appears to be grounded on practical considerations:
A Yes sir.
Q May it not happen that
by natural factors, the
existing damage in 1980
was aggravated for the 2
year period that the
damage portion was not
repaired?
Q So that the cost of the

two additional piles as
well as the (two) square
meters
is
already
included
in
this
P1,300,999.77.
A I don't think so
because that area was at
once marked and no
vehicles can park, it was
closed.
A Yes sir, everything. It is

(the) final cost already.
Q For the eight piles.
Q Even if or even natural

elements cannot affect
the damage?
A Including the reduced

areas
and
other
reductions.
A Cannot, sir.
Q (A)nd the two square
meters.
A Yes sir.
Q In other words, this
P1,300,999.77 does not
represent only for the six
piles that was damaged
as
well
as
the
corresponding two piles.
A
The
area
was
corresponding,
was
increased by almost two
in the actual payment.
That was why the
contract was decreased,
the real amount was
xxx xxx xxx

Q You said in the crossexamination that there
were six piles damaged
by the accident, but that
in the reconstruction of
the pier, PPA drove and
constructed 8 piles. Will
you explain to us why
there was change in the
number of piles from the
original number?
A In piers where the piles
are withdrawn or pulled
out, you cannot re-drive
or drive piles at the same
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CIVIL PROCEDURE

point. You have to
redesign the driving of
the piles. We cannot
drive the piles at the
same point where the
piles are broken or
damaged or pulled out.
We have to redesign, and
you will note that in the
reconstruction,
we
redesigned such that it
necessitated 8 plies.
Q Why not, why could
you not drive the same
number of piles and on
the same spot?
A The original location
was already disturbed.
We cannot get required
bearing capacity. The
area is already disturbed.
Except insofar as their liability is limited or exempted by statute,

the vessel or her owners are liable for all damages caused by the
negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those in charge of
the vessel. As a general rule, the owners or those in possession
and control of a vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural
and proximate damages caused to persons or property by
106
reason of her negligent management or navigation.
FESC's imputation of PPA's failure to provide a safe and reliable
berthing place is obtuse, not only because it appears to be a
mere afterthought, being tardily raised only in this petition, but
also because there is no allegation or evidence on record about
Berth No. 4 being unsafe and unreliable, although perhaps it is a
modest pier by international standards. There was, therefore, no
error on the part of the Court of Appeals in dismissing FESC's
counterclaim.
II. G.R. No. 130150
Q Nonetheless, if you
drove
the
original
number of piles, six, on
different places, would
not that have sustained
the same load?
This consolidated case treats on whether the Court of Appeals

erred in holding MPA jointly and solidarily liable with its member
pilot. Capt. Gavino, in the absence of employer-employee
relationship and in applying Customs Administrative Order No.
15-65, as basis for the adjudged solidary liability of MPA and
Capt. Gavino.
A It will not suffice,

103
sir.
The pertinent provisions in Chapter I of Customs Administrative

Order No. 15-65 are:
We quote the findings of the lower court with

approval.
PAR. XXVII. In all pilotage districts where

pilotage is compulsory, there shall be
created and maintained by the pilots or
pilots' association, in the manner hereinafter
prescribed, a reserve fund equal to
P1,000.00 for each pilot thereof for the
purpose of paying claims for damages to
vessels or property caused through acts or
omissions of its members while rendered in
compulsory pilotage service. In Manila, the
reserve fund shall be P2,000.00 for each
pilot.
With regards to the amount of damages that

is to be awarded to plaintiff, the Court finds
that the amount of P1,053,300.00 is justified.
Firstly, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur best
expounded upon in the landmark case
of Republic vs. Luzon Stevedoring Corp. (21
SCRA 279) establishes the presumption that
in the ordinary course of events the ramming
of the dock would not have occurred if
proper care was used.
Secondly, the various estimates and plans
justify the cost of the port construction
price. The new structure constructed not
only replaced the damaged one but was built
of stronger materials to forestall the
possibility of any similar accidents in the
future.
The Court inevitably finds that the plaintiff is
entitled to an award of P1,053,300.00 which
represents actual damages caused by the
damage to Berth 4 of the Manila
International Port. Co-defendants Far
Eastern Shipping, Capt. Senen Gavino and
Manila Pilots Association are solidariiy liable
104
to pay this amount to plaintiff.
The Solicitor General rightly commented that the

adjudicated amount of damages represents the
proportional cost of repair and rehabilitation of the
105
damaged section of the pier.
PAR. XXVIII. A pilots' association shall not

be liable under these regulations for damage
to any vessel, or other property, resulting
from acts of a member of an association in
the actual performance of his duty for a
greater amount than seventy-five per
centum (75%) of its prescribed reserve fund;
it being understood that if the association is
held liable for an amount greater than the
amount above-stated, the excess shall be
paid by the personal funds of the member
concerned.
PAR. XXXI. If a payment is made from the
reserve fund of an association on account of
damages caused by a member thereof, and
he shall have been found at fault, such
member shall reimburse the association in
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the amount so paid as soon as practicable;
and for this purpose, not less than twentyfive per centum of his dividends shall be
retained each month until the full amount
has been returned to the reserve fund.
PAR. XXXIV. Nothing in these regulations
shall relieve any pilots' association or
members thereof, individually or collectively,
from civil responsibility for damages to life or
property resulting from the acts of members
in the performance of their duties.
Correlatively, the relevant provisions of PPA Administrative
Order No. 03-85, which timery amended this applicable
maritime regulation, state:
Art. IV
Sec. 17. Pilots' Association The Pilots in a
Pilotage District shall organize themselves
into a Pilots' Association or firm, the
members of which shall promulgate their
own By-Laws not in conflict with the rules
and regulations promulgated by the
Authority. These By-Laws shall be submitted
not later than one (1) month after the
organization of the Pilots' Association for
approval by the General Manager of the
Authority. Subsequent amendments thereto
shall likewise be submitted for approval.
The Court of Appeals, while affirming the trial court's finding of
solidary liability on the part of FESC, MPA and Capt. Gavino,
correctly based MPA' s liability not on the concept of employeremployee relationship between Capt. Gavino and itself, but on
the provisions of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65:
The Appellant MPA avers that, contrary to
the findings and disquisitions of the Court a
quo, the Appellant Gavino was not and has
never been an employee of the MPA but was
only a member thereof. The Court a quo, it is
noteworthy, did not state the factual basis
on which it anchored its finding that Gavino
was the employee of MPA. We are in accord
with MPA's pose. Case law teaches Us that,
for an employer-employee relationship to
exist, the confluence of the following
elements must be established: (1) selection
and engagement of employees; (2) the
payment of wages; (3) the power of
dismissal; (4) the employer's power to
control the employees with respect to the
means and method by which the work is to
be performed (Ruga versus NLRC, 181 SCRA
266).
xxx xxx xxx
The liability of MPA for damages is not
anchored on Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code as erroneously found and declared by
the Court a quo but under the provisions of
Customs Administrative Order No. 15-
CIVIL PROCEDURE
65, supra, in tandem with the by-laws of the
107
MPA.
There being no employer-employee relationship, clearly Article
108
2180 of the Civil Code is inapplicable since there is no
vicarious liability of an employer to speak of. It is so stated in
American law, as follows:
The well established rule is that pilot
associations are immune to vicarious liability
for the tort of their members. They are not
the employer of their members and exercise
no control over them once they take the
helm of the vessel. They are also not
partnerships because the members do not
function as agents for the association or for
each other. Pilots' associations are also not
liable for negligently assuring the
competence of their members because as
professional associations they made no
guarantee of the professional conduct of
109
their members to the general public.
Where under local statutes and regulations, pilot associations
lack the necessary legal incidents of responsibility, they have
been held not liable for damages caused by the default of a
110
member pilot. Whether or not the members of a pilots'
association are in legal effect a copartnership depends wholly on
the powers and duties of the members in relation to one
another under the provisions of the governing statutes and
regulations. The relation of a pilot to his association is not that
of a servant to the master, but of an associate assisting and
participating in a common purpose. Ultimately, the rights and
liabilities between a pilots' association and an individual
member depend largely upon the constitution, articles or bylaws of the association, subject to appropriate government
111
regulations.
No reliance can be placed by MPA on the cited American rulings
as to immunity from liability of a pilots' association in ljght of
existing positive regulation under Philippine law. The Court of
Appeals properly applied the clear and unequivocal provisions of
Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65. In doing so, it was just
being consistent with its finding of the non-existence of
employer-employee relationship between MPA and Capt.
Gavino which precludes the application of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code.
True. Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 does not
categorically characterize or label MPA's liability as solidary in
nature. Nevertheless, a careful reading and proper analysis of
the correlated provisions lead to the conclusion that MPA is
solidarily liable for the negligence of its member pilots, without
prejudice to subsequent reimbursement from the pilot at fault.
Art. 1207 of the Civil Code provides that there is solidary liability
only when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or
the nature of the obligation requires solidarity. Plainly, Customs
Administrative Order No. 15-65, which as an implementing rule
has the force and effect of law, can validly provide for solidary
liability.We note the Solicitor General's comment hereon, to wit:
. . . Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65
may be a mere rule and regulation issued by
an administrative agency pursuant to a
delegated authority to fix "the details" in the
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CIVIL PROCEDURE

execution or enforcement of a policy set out
in the law itself. Nonetheless, said
administrative order, which adds to the
procedural or enforcing provisions of
substantive law, is legally binding and
receives the same statutory force upon going
into effect. In that sense, it has equal, not
lower, statutory force and effect as a regular
112
statute passed by the legislature.
Let copies of this decision be spread upon the personal records

of the lawyers named herein in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
MPA's prayer for modification of the appellate court's decision

under review by exculpating petitioner MPA "from liability
beyond seventy-five percent (75 %) of Reserve Fund" is
unnecessary because the liability of MPA under Par. XXVIII of
Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 is in fact limited to
seventy-five percent (75 %) of its prescribed reserve fund, any
amount of liability beyond that being for the personal account of
the erring pilot and subject to reimbursement in case of a
finding of fault by the member concerned. This is clarified by the
Solicitor General:
Moreover,
contrary
to
petitioner's
pretensions, the provisions of Customs
Administrative Order No. 15-65 do not limit
the liability of petitioner as a pilots'
association to an absurdly small amount of
seventy-five per centum (75 %) of the
member pilots' contribution of P2,000.00 to
the reserve fund. The law speaks of the
entire reserve fund required to be
maintained by the pilots' association to
answer (for) whatever liability arising from
the tortious act of its members. And even if
the association is held liable for an amount
greater than the reserve fund, the
association may not resist the liability by
claiming to be liable only up to seventy-five
per centum (75 %) of the reserve fund
because in such instance it has the right to
be reimbursed by the offending member
113
pilot for the excess.
WHEREFORE, in view of all of the foregoing, the consolidated
petitions for review are DENIED and the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.
Counsel for FESC, the law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario,
specifically its associate, Atty. Herbert A. Tria, is REPRIMANDED
and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts of
heedless disregard of its undertakings under the Rules shall be
dealt with more severely.
The original members of the legal team of the Office of the
Solicitor General assigned to this case, namely, Assistant
Solicitor General Roman G. Del Rosario and Solicitor Luis F.
Simon, are ADMONISHED and WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar acts of unduly delaying proceedings due to
delayed filing of required pleadings shall also be dealt with more
stringently.
The Solicitor Genral is DIRECTED to look into the circumstances
of this case and to adopt provident measures to avoid a
repetition of this incident and which would ensure prompt
compliance with orders of this Court regarding the timely filing
of requisite pleadings, in the interest of just, speedy and orderly
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE

G.R. No. 168667
July 23, 2008
SPOUSES ALFREDO D. VALMONTE and MARIA LOURDES A.

VALMONTE, Petitioners,
vs.
CLARITA ALCALA, JOHN DOE or JANE DOE, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
1
under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court they

were in the meantime submitting a photostatic copy of
the Verification/Certification (executed and notarized in the
State of Washington on March 17, 2005) as the original was still
in the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco for authentication.
They promised to submit the original document as soon as the
consulate completed the authentication process. Indeed, on
April 8, 2005, petitioners submitted to the CA the original
authenticated Verification/Certification and moved that the
appellate court consider the submission as full compliance with
15
the verification requirements of the Rules.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari asks us to set aside two

Court of Appeals (CA) resolutions issued in CAG.R. No. 88918:
2
the first, issued on April 8, 2005, dismissed the Petition for
Review filed by the spouses Alfredo Valmonte and Maria
Lourdes Valmonte (the petitioners); and the second, issued on
3
June 20, 2005, denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Meanwhile, the CA issued a Resolution dated April 8, 2005 (April

8 Resolution) dismissing the petition due to the petitioners
failure to attach the complaint, the answer, the position papers
filed with the MTC, the memorandum filed with the RTC, and
other material portions of the record supporting the allegations
of the petition. The petitioners received a copy of this April 8
Resolution on April 15, 2005.
BACKGROUND FACTS
On April 28, 2005, the petitioners moved for the

16
reconsideration of the April 8 Resolution, attaching thereto the
missing pleadings. The CA denied the motion in its Resolution
17
dated June 20, 2005 reasoning that:
The present controversy traces its roots to the ejectment suit

filed by the petitioners against Clarita Alcala (the respondent)
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 4, in Manila.
The petitioners alleged that they are the unregistered owners of
Apartment No. 1411 located at Echabelita Street, Paco, Manila,
as the petitioner Maria Lourdes is one of the heirs and
successors-in-interests of Cornelio Arreola and Antonina Pascua,
4
the registered owners of the property.
Since the petitioners were migrating to the United States, they
offered Apartment No. 1411 for lease to the respondent at the
rate of P1,500.00 per month beginning January 1980; the latter
accepted the offer. The lease contract, initially verbal, was
consummated by the respondents payment of two (2) months
rental fees and the petitioners delivery to the respondent of the
5
keys to Apartment No.1411.
Due to the respondents subsequent failure to pay the agreed
rentals despite written demand, the petitioners filed a complaint
for unlawful detainer against her on April 26, 2002 before the
6
MTC. As the petitioners were already US residents at that time,
they signed the required Verification/Certification of Non-Forum
7
Shopping of their complaint before a notary public in the state
of Washington on March 18, 2002, and had this
Verification/Certification authenticated by the Philippine
8
Consulate General in San Francisco on March 27, 2002.
The respondent contended in her defense that the petitioners
had no cause of action against her; she was already the rightful
owner of Apartment No. 1411 by virtue of a sale between her
9
and petitioners, as evidenced by the Memorandum of
10
Agreement dated August 8, 1987.
11
On April 25, 2003, the MTC ruled in the petitioners favor. The
respondent appealed the MTC decision to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 50, Manila, which reversed the MTC ruling
12
in its decision dated November 3, 2004.
The petitioners responded to the reversal by filing a Petition for
13
Review (CA Petition) with the CA on March 31, 2005. On the
14
same date, they also formally manifested with the CA that to
comply with the verification and certification requirements
Notwithstanding the petitioners superficial explanation for their

failure to attach the pertinent portions of the record, this Court
could have granted the motion since petitioners attached,
nonetheless, other relevant documents to the Motion, if not for
the observation that while the verification/certification was
purportedly executed on March 17, 2005, the petition is dated
March 31, 2005. Petitioners could not have actually read and
understood the petition or attested to the truth of the contents
thereof because at the time they executed the
verification/certification, the petition was still inexistent.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
[Emphasis supplied]
The petitioners now come before this Court on the claim that
the dismissal of their petition by the CA is a reversible error that
we should rectify.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The petitioners assert that the CAs conclusion, drawn from the
variance between the dates of the Verification/Certification they
executed abroad and the CA Petition, is erroneous; the variance
does not mean that they did not actually read the petition
before this was filed in court.
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition meritorious. The CAs conclusion results
from
an overly technical reading of the verification requirements, and
from a failure to appreciate the circumstances of parties
litigating in Philippine courts while they are overseas.
Generally, a pleading is not required to be verified unless
18
required by law or by the Rules of Court. One such
requirement is found in Section 1 of Rule 42 which requires a
party appealing from a decision of the RTC rendered in the
meikimouse

exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to file a verified petition for
review with the CA.
Verification, when required, is intended to secure an assurance
that the allegations of a pleading are true and correct; are not
speculative or merely imagined; and have been made in good
19
faith. To achieve this purpose, the verification of a pleading is
made through an affidavit or sworn statement confirming that
the affiant has read the pleading whose allegations are true and
correct of the affiants personal knowledge or based on
20
authentic records.
Apparently, the CA concluded that no real verification, as above
required, had been undertaken since the CA Petition was dated
March 31, 2005 while the Verification/Certification carried an
earlier date March 17, 2005; the petition "was still inexistent"
when the Verification/Certification was executed.1avvphi1
We find this conclusion erroneous for the following reasons:
First, the variance in dates does not necessarily contradict the
categorical declaration made by petitioners in their affidavit that
they read and understood the contents of the pleading. The
petitioners claim in this regard is that they read a copy of the CA
Petition through an electronic mail (e-mail) sent to them by their
21
lawyers. We find this claim, under the circumstances more
fully discussed below, to be a reasonable explanation of why a
variance in dates existed. We should not lose sight of the reality
that pleadings are prepared and signed by the counsel at the
instructions of the client; the latter merely provides the
supporting facts of the pleading and, as needed, verifies that the
allegations are true and correct. In short, the pleading and the
verification are prepared separately and a variance in their dates
is a matter that may satisfactorily be explained. To demand the
litigants to read the very same document that is to be filed
before the courts is too rigorous a requirement; what the Rules
require is for a party to read the contents of a pleading without
any specific requirement on the form or manner in which the
reading is to be done. That a client may read the contents of a
pleading without seeing the same pleading to be actually filed
with the court is, in these days of e-mails and other
technological advances in communication, not an explanation
that is hard to believe. Apparently in this case, counsel sent a
copy of the draft petition by e-mail and finalized it as soon as it
was approved by the petitioners. The latter, on the other hand,
complied with their end not only by approving the terms of the
petition, but also by sending a copy of their sworn statement (as
yet unauthenticated) in order to file the petition soonest,
thereby complying with the required timeliness for the filing of
the petition. To our mind, beyond the manner of these
exchanges, what is important is that efforts were made to satisfy
the objective of the Rule to ensure good faith and veracity in
the allegations of a pleading thereby allowing the courts to act
on the case with reasonable certainty that the petitioners real
22
positions have been pleaded.
Second, the "circumstances" we mentioned above refer to the
petitioners unique situation as parties residing overseas who
are litigating locally through their local counsel. While these
overseas litigants are not excused from complying with our
Rules such as the strict observance of the periods for appeal and
the verification requirement, we must take into account the
attendant realities brought into play because they are suing
from overseas or via long distance communications with their
counsel. In the verification requirement, there are added
formalities required for the acceptance in the Philippines of
CIVIL PROCEDURE
statements sworn overseas before foreign notaries; we require
23
their authentication by our consulates. This is a process whose
completion time may vary depending, among others, on various
factors such as the location of the requesting party from the
consulate; the peculiarities of foreign laws on notaries; the
volume of transactions in a consulate, noting particularly the
time of year when the authentication is requested; and the
mode of sending the authenticated documents to the
Philippines. Apparently compelled by one or a combination of
these reasons, the petitioners in fact manifested when they filed
their petition (on March 31, 2005) that they were submitting a
photostatic copy of the Verification/Certification executed in
Washington on March 17, 2005 since the original was still with
the
Philippine
Consulate
in
San
Francisco
for
24
authentication. We take judicial notice that the petitioners
request for authentication coincided with the observance of the
Holy Week a traditional period of prayer and holidays in the
Philippines, for the Philippines foreign embassies and
25
consulates, and even for Filipinos overseas. We find it
significant that, conformably with their Manifestation, the
petitioners counsel filed on April 8, 2005 the duly sworn and
authenticated Verification as soon as counsel received it. Under
these circumstances, there is every reason for an equitable and
relaxed application of the rules to the petitioners situation.
Third, we discern utmost good faith on the part of the
petitioners when they filed their Manifestation about their
problem, intent, and plan of compliance with the verification
requirement. They in fact stated early on through this
Manifestation that their verification had been executed on
March 17, 2005 in Washington, that is, at a date much earlier
than the filing of their petition and manifestation.
Unfortunately, the CA failed to note the variance in dates at the
earliest opportunity; thus, the CA dismissed the petition on
26
some other ground, only to hark back later on to the variance
in dates in their reconsideration of the earlier dismissal. Given
this good faith and the early disclosure, it was basically unfair for
the CA who had earlier overlooked the variance in dates to
subsequently make this ground the basis of yet another
dismissal of the petition. The CA after overlooking the variance
in dates at the first opportunity should have at least asked for
the petitioners explanation on why the variance should not be
an additional ground for the dismissal of the petition, instead of
reflecting in their order on reconsideration that it could have
granted the motion for reconsideration based on attachments
already made, but there existed another reason the variance in
dates for maintaining the dismissal of the petition.
Fourth, we note that most of the material allegations set forth
by petitioners in their CA Petition are already in their complaint
for unlawful detainer filed before the MTC on April 26, 2002.
Attached
to
the
complaint
was
a
27
Verification/Certification dated March 18, 2002 (authenticated
by the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco on March 27, 2002)
in which petitioners declared under oath that they had caused
the preparation of the complaint through their lawyers and had
read and understood the allegations of the complaint. The
material facts alleged in the CA Petition are likewise stated in
the records of the case, as part of the findings of facts made by
the MTC and the RTC. Verification as to the truth of these facts
in the petition for review before the CA was, therefore, strictly a
redundancy; its filing remained a necessity only because the
Rules on the filing of a petition for review before the CA require
it. This consideration could have led to a more equitable
treatment of the petitioners failure to strictly comply with the
Rules, additionally justified by the fact that the failure to comply
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE
with the rules on verification is a formal rather than a

28
jurisdictional defect.
In sum, we find sufficient justification to rule under the
circumstances of this case that the CA committed a reversible
error when it dismissed the petition for failure to strictly follow
the verification requirements. Stated otherwise, we do not
consider the variance between the dates as fatal to the
petitioners case because the variance did not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that no verification was made, or that the
verification was false. More importantly, the variance totally lost
significance after the petitioners sent from the US and
submitted to the CA the required Verification/Certification in
compliance with their previously manifested intent. As this Court
noted in a case where compliance with a certificate of nonforum shopping was at issue, the fact that the Rules require
strict compliance merely underscores its mandatory nature; it
cannot be dispensed with or its requirements altogether
disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict substantial
compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances,
29
as we find in this case.
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the Petition. The CA
Resolutions dated April 8, 2005 and June 20, 2005 in CA G.R. No.
88918 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to
the CA for appropriate proceedings under CA-GR No. 88918.
SO ORDERED.
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE

G.R. No. 134468
August 29, 2002
NATIONAL
STEEL
CORPORATION petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FORMER FIFTH DIVISION, RENE OFRENEO,
in his capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, and NSC-HDCTC
MONTHLY-DAILY
EMPLOYEES
ORGANIZATIONFFW, respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Resolution of the
1
Court of Appeals dated November 25, 1997 which dismissed
National Steel Corporations petition for review on the ground
that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping
were signed not by the petitioner but by its counsel of record, as
2
well as the subsequent Resolution dated July 2, 1998 which
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
end incentive award traditionally granted by the

4
COMPANY."
The union claimed that these benefits were demandable
because the granting of such benefits was not only provided for
by the CBA but had also become the practice in the firm from
1989 to 1993. Also, the incentive pay was not dependent on the
profit situation of the company since the company gave the
incentive pay in 1989 and 1990 despite the latters admission of
5
difficult financial operations.
The company on the other hand contended that the matter of
granting productivity and quality bonus was discretionary on its
part consistent with its exercise of management prerogatives
and assessment of production targets, while the distribution of
the Fiscal Year-End Incentive Award was dependent on
6
corporate performance.
On July 19, 1996 public respondent Voluntary Arbitrator Ofreneo
issued a decision ruling as follows:
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

In December of 1993, a dispute arose between petitioner
National Steel Corporation (NSC) and respondent NSC-HDCTC
Monthly/Daily Employees Organization-FFW (union) regarding
the grant of Productivity and Quality Bonus and the Fiscal YearEnd Incentive Award in the company. Both parties agreed to
submit the case for voluntary arbitration.
On April 3, 1995, representatives of NSC and the union appeared
before Voluntary Arbitrator Rene Ofreneo and defined the
issues of their dispute thus:
"Whether or not there was a diminution of the 1993
Fiscal Year-End Productivity and Quality Profit-Sharing
Incentive Benefit annually granted by the Company,
per CBA, and if there was, whether or not there was
just cause for the diminution of this benefit by
management, and if without just cause, what should
3
be the remedy."
The union was of the position that the company violated Article
XII, Section 3 of their CBA when it stopped, since 1993, giving
Productivity and Quality Bonus and Fiscal Year-End Incentive
Award. Said CBA provision provides:
"ARTICLE XII
ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENTS
xxx
"SECTION 3. Productivity and Quality Bonus The
COMPANY shall grant productivity and quality bonus
whenever, in the exclusive determination of the
COMPANY, the production and quality targets for the
immediately preceding period justify the granting of
such bonus. The amount of the bonus shall be left to
the sole discretion of the COMPANY.
"The productivity and quality bonus provided herein
shall be separate from and in addition to the
th
13 month pay provided by law and the fiscal year-
" 1. There is no merit in the demand of the Union for a

productivity and quality bonus in 1993.
" 2. The demand of the Union for the distribution of
the year-end incentive award is in order.
" 3. The said incentive award shall be computed based
on the Companys past practice in the determination
of such award.
"SO ORDERED."
On August 2, 1996, the NSC filed a Partial Motion for

8
Reconsideration with respect to the award of the year-end
9
incentive which was denied by Arbitrator Ofreneo. On October
31, 1996, the NSC filed a petition for review with the Court of
10
Appeals.
On November 25, 1997, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution
dismissing the companys petition for review on the ground that
it failed to comply with the requirements of Revised Circular No.
28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94 on forum shopping.
The pertinent portions of the decision read:
"xxx We hold that Atty. Roberto C. Padilla, one of the
counsels of record, then, of the petitioner is not a real
party in interest or the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit but a retained
counsel with mere incidental interest and therefore,
not the petitioner or plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or
principal party seeking relief required by law to certify
under oath to the facts and/or undertakings stated in
Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular
No. 04-94."
"Consequently, the Court hereby RESOLVES to GRANT
the `Motion to Dismiss Appellants Petition for
Review.
"SO ORDERED."
11
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE

On December 17, 1997, NSC filed a Motion for
12
Reconsideration of the resolution. But this was denied in a
13
Resolution dated July 2, 1998 where the appellate court found
that:
"x x x absent any authority from the petitioner
corporations board of directors to sue in its behalf,
the counsel of record is without personality to sue x x
x.
"xxx
xxx
xxx
"ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration filed

by the petitioner NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION is
DENIED.
"SO ORDERED."
14
Hence this petition raising the following grounds:

"A. NSCS COUNSEL OF RECORD WAS DULY
AUTHORIZED TO REPRESENT NSC IN THE
PREPARATION OF THE PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED
BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS.
"B. THE VERIFICATION CUM CERTIFICATION OF
PETITIONERS COUNSEL OF RECORD WAS TRUTHFUL IN
ALL RESPECTS.
"C. THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION FOR REVIEW
BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS ON A PURELY
TECHNICAL GROUND VIOLATES PETITIONERS RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS AND OPPRESSIVELY DEPRIVED THE
15
LATTER OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE."
Simply stated, the pertinent issues of this case are as follows: (1)
May the signature of petitioners counsel be deemed sufficient
for the purposes of Revised Circular No. 28-91 and
Administrative Circular No. 04-94; and (2) granting that the
petition a quo should have been allowed, did the voluntary
arbitrator commit any error in granting the demand of the union
for the distribution of the year-end incentive award?
We will first resolve the issue on the certification against forum
shopping.
Circular No. 28-91 was put in place to deter the practice of some
party-litigants of simultaneously pursuing remedies in different
forums for such practice works havoc upon orderly judicial
16
procedure.
In the case at bar, the certification was signed by petitioners
counsel. Petitioner argues that contrary to the findings of the
Court of Appeals, NSCs counsel of record was duly authorized to
represent them not only before the Voluntary Arbitrator but
also to prepare the petition for review filed before the Court of
Appeals. To support this claim, petitioner attached to its petition
before this Court a Secretarys Certificate dated December 16,
1997 which states that:
authorized to represent the latter and to act on its

behalf in several cases, including "National Steel
Corporation v. Rene E. Ofreneo and NSC-HDCTC
Monthly-Daily
Employees
Organization-FFW",
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 42431 before the Fifth
17
Division of the Court of Appeals."
Counsel of petitioner, Atty. Padilla also submitted a Verification
cum Certification where he stated that he prepared the petition
upon the explicit instructions of the VP-Marketing & Resident
18
Manager of petitioner corporation.
Petitioner explains that powers of corporations organized under
the Corporation Code shall be exercised by the board of
directors; that the exercise of such powers may be done
indirectly through delegation; that pursuant to the exercise of its
powers, the corporation through its Board of Directors, may
employ such persons as it may need to carry on the operations
of the corporate business; that hence, with the express
authorization by NSCs board of directors, Atty. Padilla was
conferred with enough authority to sign the Verification cum
Certification in the petition for review filed before the Court of
19
Appeals; that assuming arguendo there is no express
authorization from NSC, still Atty. Padilla is impliedly authorized
to file the petition for review before the Court of Appeals in line
with its obligation to take all steps or do all acts necessary or
incidental to the regular and orderly prosecution or
management of the suit; that respondent union never
questioned the authority of Atty. Padilla to represent NSC in the
proceedings before the Voluntary Arbitrator; that the union is
therefore absolutely estopped from questioning Atty. Padillas
authority to file the petition for review before the Court of
20
Appeals; that the dismissal of the petition for review on a
purely technical ground violated petitioners right to due process
and oppressively deprived it of substantive justice as enunciated
in Section 6, Rule 1, as well as previous rulings of this Court
which upheld the primacy of substantial justice over technical
21
rules of procedure.
For its part, respondent union claims that petitioner violated
Rule 13, Section 11 of the Rules of Court anent the priorities in
22
modes of service and filing; that the Court of Appeals did not
err in dismissing NSCs petition for review because it was not
duly verified by the petitioner as required by the rules; that the
petition filed before the appellate court did not have a
Secretarys Certificate stating the authority of Atty. Padilla to
represent petitioner corporation; and that it was only after the
Court of Appeals dismissed their petition in a Resolution dated
November 25, 1997 that petitioner attached said Certificate
23
dated December 16, 1997.
We rule in favor of petitioner and hold that the Court of Appeals
erred in dismissing the petition.
24
In the case of BA Savings Bank vs. Sia, this Court has ruled that
the certificate of non-forum shopping required by Supreme
Court Circular No. 28-91 may be signed, for and on behalf of a
corporation, by a specifically authorized lawyer who has
personal knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed in such
document.
The reason is that:
"x x x [B]ased on the records of the Corporation, Atty.

nd
Roberto C. Padilla, with office address at the 2 floor,
Chere Bldg., Del Pilar St., Iligan City is the legal counsel
of the Corporation on a general retainer and is duly
"Unlike natural persons, corporations may perform

physical actions only through properly delegated
individuals; namely, its officers and/or agents.
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE

"xxx
xxx
xxx
"The corporation, such as the petitioner, has no

powers except those expressly conferred on it by the
Corporation Code and those that are implied by or are
incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation
exercises said powers through its board of directors
and / or its duly authorized officers and agents.
Physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be
performed only by natural persons duly authorized for
the purpose by corporate by-laws or by specific act of
the board of directors. `All acts within the powers of a
corporation may be performed by agents of its
selection; and, except so far as limitations or
restrictions which may be imposed by special "charter,
by-law, or statutory provisions, the same general
principles of law which govern the relation of agency
for a natural person govern the officer or agent of a
corporation, of whatever status or rank, in respect to
his power to act for the corporation; and agents once
appointed, or members acting in their stead, are
subject to the same rules, liabilities and incapacities as
are agents of individuals and private persons.
"xxx
xxx
xxx
"x x x For who else knows of the circumstances

required in the Certificate but its own retained
counsel. Its regular officers, like its board chairman
and president, may not even know the details required
25
therein."
While it is admitted that the authorization of petitioners
counsel was submitted to the appellate court only after the
issuance of its Resolution dismissing the petition based on noncompliance with the aforesaid Circular, we hold that in view of
the peculiar circumstances of the present case and in the
interest of substantial justice, the procedural defect may be set
aside, pro hac vice. As held by the Court: "Technical rules of
procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate, justice.
While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable
objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even more
26
urgent ideal." By recognizing the signature of the authorized
counsel in the certification, no circumvention of the rationale,
27
that is to prevent the ills of forum shopping, is committed. As
we have held in many cases:
"x x x Circular No. 28-91 was designed to serve as an
instrument to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice and should not be so
interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert
its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of
all rules of procedure --which is to achieve substantial
justice as expeditiously as possible.
"The fact that the Circular requires that it be strictly
complied with merely underscores its mandatory
nature in that it cannot be dispensed with or its
requirements altogether disregarded, but it does not
thereby interdict substantial compliance with its
28
provisions under justifiable circumstances."
Petitioner NSC assails the following portions of the award of the

Voluntary Arbitrator:
"In view of the foregoing, therefore, the Voluntary
Arbitrator rules as follows:
"xxx
xxx
xxx
"2. The demand of the Union for the distribution of the

year-end incentive award is in order.
"3. The said incentive award shall be computed based
on the Companys past practice in the determination
of such award.
"SO ORDERED."
29
Petitioner claims that the Voluntary Arbitrator erred when he

ordered petitioner to pay private respondent the 1993 fiscal
year-end incentive award despite his own findings that the midyear incentive pay already paid by the petitioner is an advance
30
payment of the fiscal year-end incentive award; that the "Midyear Incentive Pay" granted to private respondent is itself a
bonus not demandable upon NSC as it is not provided for in the
CBA; that this notwithstanding, it has granted the Mid-year
Incentive Pay to members of respondent union every year in the
years 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1993; that in every instance
of the grant, petitioner expressly stated that the Mid-year
Incentive Pay is an advance against the Fiscal Year-end Incentive
Pay; that petitioners express reservation that the payment of
the Mid-year Incentive Pay is an advance payment of the fiscal
year-end incentive award has been repeatedly brought to the
31
attention of the Voluntary Arbitrator; that the Voluntary
Arbitrator committed serious misapprehension of facts when he
ruled that the grant of the fiscal year-end incentive award has
become traditional and has therefore ripened into a
32
demandable right of private respondent; and that for a period
of four (4) years i.e., from 1990 through 1993, the fiscal year-end
incentive award has been granted only twice -- in 1991 and in
33
1992.
In his Award, the Voluntary Arbitrator established as a fact that:
"x x x the Company gave the following benefits to the
workers:
"1. Mid-Year Incentive Pay, which was usually given as
an "advance" for the Year-End Incentive Bonus. The
Company announced the Mid-Year Incentive Pay
through memos issued on the following dates:
August 25, 1989,
August 1, 1990,
August 2, 1991,
August 24,1992, and
August 31, 1993."
34
We will now delve into the merits of the case.

Yet, petitioner complains that despite the above findings that
the Mid-year Incentive Awards were given as advances to the
Year-End Incentive Awards, the Voluntary Arbitrator still ruled
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE

that the NSC was liable to pay respondent Union the Year-End
Incentive Pay, explaining that:
"xxx
xxx
petitioner to pay again the same incentive pay at the year-end of

1993 is obviously a great injustice that would be committed
against petitioner.
xxx
"In the case of the fiscal year-end incentive award, the

CBA provision has a general proviso which reads: `The
productivity and quality bonus provided herein shall
th
be separate from and in addition to the 13 month
pay provided by law and the fiscal year-end incentive
award traditionally granted by the COMPANY. Thus,
unlike in the productivity and quality bonus, the CBA
simply recognizes the fiscal year-end incentive award
as one of the benefits accorded to the workers, just
th
like the 13 month pay. It even added the phrase
`traditionally granted by the COMPANY. There were
no qualifications or conditions specified for the
granting of this benefit similar to those governing the
granting of the productivity and quality bonus. The
Company argued that like the productivity and quality
bonus, the granting of year-end incentive award is a
management prerogative and is guided by the same
conditions, e.g., actual performance versus production
targets, that it uses when it decides on the granting of
productivity and quality bonus. As "pointed out, the
CBA is silent on this. And if there are doubts on the
interpretation of the manner by which benefits like
year-end incentive award shall be given, the Labor
Code has long ago decided that all such doubts shall be
interpreted in favor of Labor.
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Resolutions dated November

25, 1997 and July 2, 1998 of the Court of Appeals.
The Award of Voluntary Arbitrator Ofreneo dated July 19, 1996
is modified to the effect that the grant of the claim for the
distribution of the 1993 year-end incentive award is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
"Moreover, the capacity of the Company to grant this

incentive pay is also not at issue. A closer scrutiny of
the Company loss for 1993 shows that the net loss of
P36 million registered for that year was due to the
deduction of `expenses paid in retained earnings
amounting to P358 "million from the original P322
million net income. The audited data gathered by the
Union from the Commission on Audit also show that
while earnings and incomes declined from 1992 to
1993, the Company still registered a healthy level of
35
profitability."
We rule in favor of petitioner.
This Court has stressed that voluntary arbitrators, by the nature
of their functions, act in quasi-judicial capacity. Hence, as a rule,
findings of facts by quasi-judicial bodies which have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific
matters, are accorded not only respect but even finality if they
are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming
36
or preponderant. However, in spite of statutory provisions
making "final" the decisions of certain administrative agencies,
we have taken cognizance of petitions questioning such
decisions where want of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion,
violation of due process, denial of substantial justice, or
erroneous interpretation of the law were brought to our
37
attention.
In the present petition for review on certiorari, we find the
award of the 1993 year-end incentive to be patently erroneous
which amounts not only to grave abuse of discretion but also to
denial of substantial justice. The Voluntary Arbitrator himself
found that the mid-year incentive pay for 1993 was given by
petitioner as an advance payment of the fiscal year-end
incentive award for the same year. Indubitably, to require
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE

G.R. No. 154974
February 4, 2008
KAUNLARAN LENDING INVESTORS, INC. AND LELIA CHUA

SY, petitioners,
vs.
LORETA UY, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
From the Court of Appeals' decision reversing that of the trial
court which dismissed respondent's complaint, petitioners come
to this Court.
Respondent Loreta Uy (Loreta) filed on September 12, 1988
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City a
1
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. D-9136, for annulment of
real estate mortgage and related documents plus damages
against petitioners Kaunlaran Lending Investors, Inc. (KLII) and
Lelia Chua Sy (Lelia), along with Wilfredo Chua (Wilfredo) and
Magno Zareno (Magno).
3. To sign such documents, papers and other

2
papers [sic] relative thereto. (Underscoring
supplied),
to turn over the land titles of two parcels of land located in
3
Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
78622 and 78623 in the name of his (Jose's) mother Loreta, to
serve as security for the loan.
Jose thus entrusted his mother's land titles and related
documents to Wilfredo who in turn delivered them to Lelia. Lelia
thereafter sent Jose to Manila, together with a certain Ed and a
certain Doc of KLII, to have the lands appraised at the main
office of FEBTC.
Wilfredo subsequently brought to Loreta's residence loan forms
consisting of a promissory note he had pre-signed as co-maker, a
real estate mortgage, and a loan disclosure for Loreta's
signature. After Jose examined the forms, Loreta signed them.
Sometime in 1987, her son Jose U. Sim (Jose), her nephew

Virgilio Sim (Virgilio), and Wilfredo agreed to establish a business
of buy and sell of second-hand motor vehicles in which Virgilio
would be the manager, Wilfredo would scout for a financier, and
Jose would provide the security for any loan.
Soon Jose and Virgilio went to Manila to canvass prices of

second-hand motor vehicles. While the two were in Manila,
Magno, then the manager of KLII, brought to Loreta's residence
the loan forms she had earlier signed and another set of loan
forms, together with a blank Solidbank check drawn from the
account of KLII and a check voucher. Magno explained to Loreta,
in the presence of her daughter-in-law Arlene A. Sim (Arlene)wife of Jose, that the new set of loan forms would be sent to
Manila and that the proceeds of the loan would be promptly
delivered to her residence once she affixes her signature on the
said check and voucher.
Through the efforts of Wilfredo, Lelia, then a Branch Manager of

the Far East Bank and Trust Co., Inc. (FEBTC) in Dagupan City
who was alleged to be the owner of the controlling interest in
KLII, agreed to arrange for the grant of a loan. Wilfredo thus
asked Jose in whose favor his mother Loreta issued a Special
Power of Attorney reading:
When Jose returned home and learned about what transpired

during his absence, he confronted Magno at the KLII office and
was told that the documents bearing on the loan application
were already sent to Lelia and that Loreta's signatures on the
blank Solidbank check and the check voucher were procured on
Lelia's instructions.
That I, LORETA Q. UY, of legal age, Filipino, widow and

a resident of Dagupan City, by these presents, do
hereby NAME, CONSTITUTE and APPOINT my son JOSE
U. SIM, likewise of legal age, Filipino, married and a
resident of Dagupan City, to be my true and lawful
attorney-in-fact, for me in my name, place and stead,
to do the following acts, to wit:
Virgilio and Jose later tried to withdraw the loan application and
the titles to Loreta's properties but Lelia told them that it was no
longer possible.
In Loreta's complaint, she alleged as follows:
1. To obtain a loan from any bank, financial

institutions [sic] or person in such amount as
may be extended, and to secure the
payment thereof by constituting in favor of
the creditor a real estate mortgage on the
herein-below described parcels of land and
all improvements thereon, to wit:
TCT NO. 78622
TCT NO. 78623
Continuing, Loreta alleged:

A verification from the Register of Deeds of Quezon
4
City revealed that the real estate mortgage in favor of KLII to
secure a P800,000 loan was annotated on Loreta's titles. The
copy of the document on file at the office of the Register of
Deeds bore only Loreta's signature and it was notarized in the
absence of Loreta.
Loreta and Jose thus sent telegrams to KLII and to the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City requesting the setting aside of the
transaction and the denial of registration of the mortgage,
respectively, but to no avail.
xxxx
2. To receive the check

proceeds of the loan; and,
In a subsequent conference among Lelia, Jose, Virgilio, and

Wilfredo, Lelia admitted having applied the loan proceeds
amounting to P800,000 to Wilfredo's personal debt to her.
and/or
cash
Concluding that the real estate mortgage, promissory note,

Solidbank check and "the other documents related thereto"
were absolute nullities due to the absence of consideration and
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE

5
vitiated consent, Loreta prayed for their annulment and for

6
damages.
In a related move, Loreta instituted a criminal complaint for
estafa against Lelia, Wilfredo, and Magno, docketed as I.S. No.
7
88-498 at the Office of the City Fiscal of Dagupan City. An
Information for Estafa against the three was subsequently filed
before the Dagupan City RTC, which was raffled to Branch 41
8
thereof and docketed as Criminal Case No. D-9840.
The three defendants surmised that Loreta filed Civil Case No. D14
9136 upon the "malicious instigation" of Jose. They thus
counterclaimed for actual, moral and exemplary damages,
15
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and the costs of the suit.
Magno and KLII corroborated Lelia's denial of being the owner of
the controlling interest in the company, she being merely the
lessor of the building where KLII holds office.
16
In her Answer with Counterclaim, Lelia denied being the owner

of the controlling interest of KLII, claiming that she was only the
lessor of the building which housed KLII's office. And she denied
knowledge of the P800,000 loan of Loreta from KLII, she claiming
that
The instant complaint is baseless and false, and was
maliciously instigated by Jose U. Sim, using his mother
as the complainant, purposely to harass and
embarrass the herein defendant for having been
slighted when the lat[t]er rejected his loan application
and his request to intercede in his behalf in influencing
the Kaunlaran Lending Investors to agree in the
10
restructure of his alleged overdue account with it.
Lelia thus prayed for the award of actual, moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and the costs of
11
the suit.
12
In his Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, Wilfredo claimed

that his only participation in the transaction was to introduce
Jose to Lelia and to sign as co-maker of the loan application.
While he admitted that he had already signed the loan
documents when they were brought to Loreta's residence for
her signature, he claimed that it was Jose, not he, who brought
them to Loreta.
13
In their joint Answer with Counterclaim, KLII and Magno gave

the following version:
After the application for loan was approved, Wilfredo and Loreta
signed the promissory note and Loreta signed the real estate
mortgage in the presence of Magno, Gonzales, Atty. Teofilo
Guadiz III (Atty. Guadiz) who notarized the same, and other
employees.
Atty. Guadiz and Rolando Tan, president and treasurer of KLII,
respectively, thereupon signed and issued Solid Bank Check No.
0232250 for the amount of P800,000 in favor of Loreta who
immediately endorsed it to KLII which changed it with cash.
After Wilfredo and Loreta received the cash proceeds of the
check, Loreta signed a discount statement and the check as
proof of the receipt.
In the meantime, Jose, who had a pending long overdue loan
with KLII, requested Magno for a restructuring of his loan
account, but Magno informed him that the request could not be
granted without Jose paying at least 50% of the principal
amount and the interests and penalties in full. It appears that
Jose could not comply with the condition; hence, his request
was denied.
KLII later filed a petition to extra-judicially foreclose the
mortgage executed by Jose.
On joint motion of the prosecution and Loreta, Branch 41 of

the Dagupan City RTC, by Order dated March 12, 1991,
consolidated Criminal Case No. D-9840 with Civil Case No. D17
9136.
By Decision of March 3, 1994, the trial court dismissed the civil
18
case in light of the following findings:
1. That defendant Lelia Chua Sy is a part owner of
Kaunlaran Lending Investors, Inc. is negated by the fact
that the KLI[I] Board of Directors, were: Atty. Teofilo
Guadiz III, Helen Siquiat, Joseph Lee, Rolando Tan,
Adson Chua and Jose Sy. Kaunlaran Lending Investors,
Inc. is a lessee of [Lelia Chua Sy's] property. x x x
2. That Kaunlaran Lending Investors, Inc. had no
money for the loan of P800,000.00 is negated by the
fact that on January 28, 1988, KLI[I] financier Salome
Cenidoza extended a loan to KLI[I] in the same amount
of P800,000.00; and the books of Kaunlaran Lending
Investors, Inc. indicated that KLI[I] had P1,700,288.10
cash on hand, as testified by Aurelia Lambino, KLI[I]
book keeper. Before January 28, 1988, KLI[I] had
granted loans of P1.5 million to Susan Go; P800,000.00
to Maramba; and P300,000.00 to Jose Sim.
3. That the check in question was not actually funded;
was never encashed to the Solid bank and not a
bonafide check; is negated by the fact that said check
was encashed with the drawer KLI[I], which is a normal
practice[,] and the discount disclosure xxx showing
that she received P800,000.00 cash.
The evidence is clear that on January 28, 1988, Loreta
Uy and Wilfredo Chua received P800,00.00 cash from
Kaunlaran Lending Investors, Inc. What happened to
the money after that[,] has not been clarified.
Granting arguendo, that Loreta Uy did not benefit with
the amount of P800,000.00, then where is the
money? Since defendant Wilfredo Chua was with
Loreta Uy when the latter received the loan proceeds,
the disputable presumption is that he appropriated
the amount for his own benefit. Thus defraud[ing]
Loreta Uy in said amount. But Wilfredo Chua did not
testify to refute or dispute thepresumption; thus, he
can be held [liable] for damages.
xxxx
There is no iota of evidence to show that defendant
Lelia Chua Sy ever conspired with defendant
WilfredoChua, so she cannot be liable for
19
damages. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus the trial court disposed:
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Dismissing the complaint as against
defendants Kaunlaran Lending Investors,
Inc., Lelia Chua Sy and Magno F. Zareno;
2. Declaring the Real Estate Mortgage,
Promissory Note and related documents in
question valid and legal;
3. Ordering the plaintiff to pay to
defendant Kaunlaran Lending Investors, Inc.
the principal amount of P800,000.00, plus
interest at 48% per annum starting March
28, 1988 until fully paid;
2. erred in giving more credence to the witnesses for

the private respondent, in direct contrast to the
findings of [the trial court] which heard the witnesses
and observed their demeanor[;]
3. erred in awarding attorney's fees of P100,000.00,
when the award of moral and exemplary damages are
not awarded. Moreover, the reason for the award was
not explained in the decision.
27
4. Ordering defendant Wilfredo Chua to pay

to plaintiff:
In her Comment, Loreta moves for the dismissal of the petition

due to defective verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping, adding that the petition raises factual issues.
a. the amount of P800,000.00, plus

interest at 12% per annum starting
March 28, 1988, until fully paid;
Meanwhile, Loreta died on September 29, 2002 and has been

substituted by her heirs Jose and her daughter Rosalia Sim
29
Reate.
b. P100,000.00, as moral damages;
For failure of KLII to present proof that its president, Rolando

Tan, was authorized to sign the verification and certificate of
non-forum shopping on its behalf, the petition must be denied.
Petitioners' argument that
c. P50,000.00,
damages;
as
exemplary
d. P20,000.00, as attorney's fees;

and
e.
P3,000.00,
expenses.
as
litigation
20
SO ORDERED. (Underscoring supplied)

Parenthetically, the records of the case before this Court do not
show how the trial court decided the criminal case.
All parties, except Magno who died on October 7,
21
22
1991, appealed including Lelia. KLII's appeal was only with
respect to the non-award to it of damages, litigation expenses,
and attorney's fees.
23
The Court of Appeals, by Decision of April 11, 2002, reversed

the trial court's decision, declaring the real estate mortgage and
promissory note null and void. Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and another is rendered declaring null and
void the promissory note and deed of real estate
mortgage in dispute, and ordering thedefendantsappellants to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiff the
amount of P100,000.00 for and as attorney's fees,
inclusive of expenses of litigation. Costs against the
appellants.
24
SO ORDERED. (Underscoring supplied)

25
Lelia, Wilfredo, and KLII moved for reconsideration which was

26
denied, prompting KLII and Lelia to file before this Court the
present petition which faults the appellate court to have
1.
gravely
abused
its
discretion
and
evidently misappreciated the testimony of Magno
Zareno by giving it credence, contrary to the findings
of [the trial court] which heard and saw him testify;
28
the certification was made by the President, who is

given general supervision and control as chief
executive officer from which [it] is to be inferred that
contracts or acts done by the President in the ordinary
course of business are presumed to be duly
authorized, unless the contrary appears. In fact the bylaws of the Petitioner KLI[I] xxx gives him that
30
authority.
fails in light of this Court's ruling that
In case of a corporation, it has long been settled that
the certificate [of non-forum shopping] must be signed
for and on its behalf by a specifically authorized officer
or agent who has personal knowledge of the facts
required to be disclosed.
xxxx
Consequently, without the needed proof from the
board of directors, the certificate would be considered
defective. Thus, xxx even the regular officers of a
corporation, like the chairman and president, may not
even know the details required in a certificate of nonforum shopping; they must therefore be authorized by
the board of directors just like any other officer or
31
agent. (Italics in the original)
The merits of the petition, however, justify the relaxation of the
rule on verification and certificate of non-forum shopping, for
from a review of the records Loreta has not proven by
preponderance of evidence that she was deceived into signing
the documents required for the release of the proceeds of the
loan.
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE
In overturning the finding of the trial court, the Court of Appeals

credited the testimony of Magno, who testified as a hostile
witness for Loreta, that Lelia sent him to Loreta's house to
secure her signature on the loan documents in blank, and that
32
Loreta did not receive any proceeds of the loan. The Court of
Appeals did not proffer any reason, however, for deviating from
33
the trial court's assessment of Magno's credibility, despite the
oft-repeated doctrine that "findings of fact of the trial court
carry great weight and are entitled to respect on appeal absent
any strong and cogent reason to the contrary, since, it is in a
better position to decide the question of credibility of
34
witnesses." Furthermore, Magno's testimony should be
received with caution because it contradicts the earlier
statements he had made under oath, such as the Counter35
36
Affidavit and Rejoinder he filed in I.S. No. 88-498 and his
verification of the joint Answer with Counterclaim he and KLII
37
filed in Civil Case No. D-9136.
x x x [C]ourts do not generally look with favor on any
retraction or recanted testimony, for it could have
been secured by considerations other than to tell the
truth and would make solemn trials a mockery and
place the investigation of the truth at the mercy of
unscrupulous witnesses. A recantation does not
necessarily cancel an earlier declaration, but like any
other testimony the same is subject to the test of
38
credibility and should be received with caution.
x x x The mere fact that a witness says that what he
had declared is false and what he now says is true, is
not sufficient ground for concluding that the previous
testimony is false. No such reasoning has ever
crystallized into a rule of credulity. The rule is that a
witness may be impeached by a previous contradictory
statement (Section 13, Rule 132, Rules of Court): not
that a previous testimony is presumed to be false
merely because a witness now says that the same is
39
false. (Underscoring supplied)
The Court of Appeals credited too the testimony of Jacobo
Malicdem, a bookkeeper of Solidbank against which
theP800,000.00 KLII check payable to Loreta was drawn, that
KLII did not have the said amount in the bank as of January and
40
February 1988. Gratuitously assuming that to have been the
case, it is irrelevant given the factual finding of the trial court
that the check was converted to cash by the drawer-KLII
41
itself, which cash was received by Loreta as proven by her
signature on the check and on the discount statement
42
acknowledging receipt thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court
of Appeals dated April 11, 2002 is SET ASIDE, and the decision of
Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City in Civil
Case No. D-9136 dated March 3, 1994 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
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Outline: Rule 7 - Parts of a Pleading

Lesson for August 23, 2014

Parts of a pleading - Rule 7

Republic v. Kenrick Development Corp., G.R. No. 149576, August 8, 2006

c) Verification and certification against forum shopping - Secs. 4 & 5, Rule 7

Huibonhoa v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 153785, August 3, 2006

Montes v. CA, G.R. No. 143797, May 4, 2006

Valmonte v. Alcala, G.R. No. 168667, July 23, 2008

Requirements of a corporation executing the verification/certification of non-forum shopping

d) Effect of the signature of counsel in a pleading

Case Digest: Rule 7 - Parts of a Pleading

certiorari. It directed the lifting of the order of default

Kenrick Development Corporation constructed a

Whether or not the CA err in reversing the trial

Case Digest: Rule 7 - Parts of a Pleading

Verification and certification against forum shopping Secs. 4 & 5, Rule 7

verify and sign the certificate of non-forum shopping in

Case Digest: Rule 7 - Parts of a Pleading

Verification and certification against forum shopping Secs. 4 & 5, Rule 7

Case Digest: Rule 7 - Parts of a Pleading

court has jurisdiction to hear and decide intra-corporate

Verification and certification against forum shopping Secs. 4 & 5, Rule 7

Case Digest: Rule 7 - Parts of a Pleading

Case Digest: Rule 7 - Parts of a Pleading

Verification and certification against forum shopping Secs. 4 & 5, Rule 7

In G.R No. 1300068 (separate petition of Far

Case Digest: Rule 7 - Parts of a Pleading

verification they were in the meantime submitting a

Verification and certification against forum shopping Secs. 4 & 5, Rule 7

Petition is meritorious. The CAs conclusion

Case Digest: Rule 7 - Parts of a Pleading

Requirements of a corporation executing

Background of the case:

Case Digest: Rule 7 - Parts of a Pleading

The CA reversed the trial court decision,

Full Text Cases: Rule 7 - Parts of a Pleading

Full Text Cases: Rule 7 - Parts of a Pleading

(c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of

the pronouncements of Atty.

The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he

Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the

Full Text Cases: Rule 7 - Parts of a Pleading

Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only

Full Text Cases: Rule 7 - Parts of a Pleading

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant

Full Text Cases: Rule 7 - Parts of a Pleading

issuance of the Writ of Possession was irregular, arbitrary and

Fourth, the issuance of the Writ of Possession was proper in

petitioner raises the following

I WHETHER OR NOT THE QUESTIONED

Full Text Cases: Rule 7 - Parts of a Pleading

different forums, as this practice is detrimental to orderly

IV WHETHER OR NOT THE CHOICE OF THE

In this case, the questioned verification stated that Atty. Caete

Simply stated, the petition raises the following issues:

Besides, Atty. Caete was not the only signatory to the

Full Text Cases: Rule 7 - Parts of a Pleading

Full Text Cases: Rule 7 - Parts of a Pleading

was no hearing on the correct amount of just compensation for

We clarify. Founded on common necessity and interest, eminent

To start with, in Manila Railroad Company v. Paredes, the

If there are objections and defenses that require the

There is no prohibition against a procedure whereby immediate