Wesleyan University

The End of Art?

Author(s): Nol Carroll
Source: History and Theory, Vol. 37, No. 4, Theme Issue 37: Danto and His Critics: Art
History, Historiography and After the End of Art (Dec., 1998), pp. 17-29
Published by: Blackwell Publishing for Wesleyan University
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2505393 .
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THE END OF ART?

NOELCARROLL

ABSTRACT
thatArthurDantohasadvancedforallegingthatthe
Thisarticlefocuseson thearguments
developmental
historyof artis over.The authoris skepticalof Danto'sconclusionand
thatarthistoryis necessarilyclosed.The
maintainsthatDantohas failedto demonstrate
thesisis betterconstruedas a specimenof art
authoralsocontendsthatDanto'send-of-art
criticismthanas anexampleof thespeculativephilosophyof arthistory.
In 1986, at a time when things looked bad-with Neo-Expressionismascendant
everywhereand appropriationflourishingas the artworld equivalentto the leveraged buyout-Arthur Danto had a scandalousidea.' He said that art history had
come to an end. Nor was this a passing journalisticjeremiad-a grumpy,cyclic
doldrumof pessimism meantto be forgottenand consigned to the kitty litterwith
the onset of better days. Danto's verdict came armoredin philosophical argumentationand apparentdeductivefinality.This really was the end of art.
Perhaps at first Danto greeted the conclusion of his own argument with
despair.The end of art appearedto be a fall from grace. But as time went on,
Danto learnedto live with his findings. He no longer thinks that the end of art is
such a bad thing. The end of art,by his account, has usheredin an age of pluralism where thousands of different flowers may bloom. For just at the moment
when art history was divested of its goals and direction,art acquireda plenitude
of new freedoms.
This is the story that ArthurDanto wishes to tell in After the End of Art.2He
intends to explain how art history came to an end, what it means to say that art
history is over, and why this is a good thing. But all of this, of course, presupposes that art history has come to an end. And yet it seems to me that not only
arethe alleged reasonsfor this almost neverinterrogatedin the literature,but also
thatDanto's own argumentson behalf of this conclusion are so hurriedand elliptical that they are easy to miss. This is at least surprising,since so much would
appearto hang upon them. Thus, in this essay, I would like to concentrateon the
questions of why Danto believes that art history is over and whetherhis reasons
are compelling.
1. ArthurDanto, "The End of Art,"in The Philosophical Disenfranchisementof Art (New York,
1986), 81-115.
2. ArthurDanto,After the End ofArt: ContemporaryArt and the Pale of History (Princeton,1997).

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NOtL CARROLL

Here it is importantto begin by clarifying what Danto does not mean by the
end of art. Frequently,when people hear Danto's conjecture,their first response
is to say that it is obviously wrong-for, as anyone can see, there are still lots of
artists making artworks.In fact, there are probablymore artists working today
thanin any otherperiod in history.There are certainlymore art schools, artfairs,
galleries, museums, shows, artists,and artworksthanever before. How could art
history be over when art is being produced at such a dizzying rate? But this
objectionrests on a misunderstanding.
For when Danto speaks of the end of art, that is an abbreviationfor the end of
the developmentalhistory of art. Historical accounts may be divided into two
sorts: narrativesand chronicles. A chronicle of events is a list of time-ordered
happenings.First x happens,then y happens,then zAand so on. But in a narrative, the events are connectedby more thantemporalsuccession: thereis a beginning that gives rise to complicationsthatconvergeon closure. Events compose a
story;they head towarda climax. When Danto says thatthe history of artis over,
he means a certain development-a certain narrativedevelopment-is finished.
He does not mean that the chronicle of art history is done. Artworkswill still be
createdad seriatim.What is over is a particularprocess of evolution.
Events follow each other helter-skelterin time. However,on occasion, events
coalesce in large-scaledevelopmentsor movements,In humanaffairs,this often
occurs when people embarkupon a project that has a determinategoal or end.
Human flight, for example. The history of flight can be told as a narrative.
Successive attempts,theories, and inventionscan be configuredas an evolutionary process culminatingin Kitty Hawk.
Similarly,large swathsof arthistorycan be told as a linear,developmentalnarrative. Beginning with the Greeks, artists embraced a project: verisimilitude.
That is, they aspired to render the appearanceof things with such surpassing
accuracythat any normalviewer could recognize what pictureswere picturesof
simply by looking. Artists aspired to pictorial realism-to making images that
bore greaterand greaterlikenesses to whateverthey were images of. This project
underwrotethe production of artworksfor centuries. It enabled writers from
Vasarito Gombrichto write narrativesof arthistory-developmental stories tracing impressive and more impressivefeats of realism (closer and closer approximations to the look of things).
Narrativeslike this have a definite structure.They posit a goal; events are
included in the story inasmuch as they contributeto the realizationof the goal.
Moreover,insofar as the goal is well-defined, it is conceivable that it could be
achieved.And if and when such a goal is achieved, the story-as a progressive,
developmentalnarrative-is over. Furthermore,Danto contends, this happened
to arthistorywhen, in the nineteenthcentury,photographyand cinema perfected
the mechanical means to render appearances-including the appearance of
movement-accurately. At thatpoint, a certainnarrativewas finished,though,of
course, pictures continue to be made. The chronicle of picture-makingis still

THE END OF ART?

19

being told, but the story-the evolutionarysaga of the conquestof visual appearances-is, for all intents and purposes,over.
But if film and photographyclosed one chapterof arthistory,they did not shut
the book. For eventuallyartistsfound otherprojectsto pursue,and at least one of
these was developmental.Verisimilitudeas the object of high artistic ambition
appearedotiose in a world of mechanicalreproduction.But artistscame to reconstruetheir aspirationin termsof anothertarget.Art-or at least serious art-was
no longer dedicatedto capturingthe appearancesof things, but to characterizing
something even more elusive-the nature of art itself. Art, that is, became
engaged in the projectof self-definition.
Recountedmagisteriallyby critics like ClementGreenberg,modern-or, more
aptly, modernist-art conceived of itself as a Kantiancritique of its own conditions of possibility. Step by step, the pictureplane contracted,putativelyto disclose its essential natureas a flat thing. Insofar as art has a determinatenature,
the project of self-definition, like the project of verisimilitude,had a developmental structure.And presumablythe projectcould be broughtto completion.
However, at this point, Danto introducesa complication to the story of modernism as it is traditionallytold. In 1964, as partof the continuingprojectof art's
self-definition,Andy Warhol,presaged by Duchamp and his readymades,presented his Brillo Box at the Stable Galleryin New York.For Danto, this work has
enormoustheoreticalrepercussions.On his account,Brillo Box demonstratesthat
something can be a work of art at the same time that its perceptually indiscernible, real-world counterparts are not. This raises the question of why
Warhol'sBrillo Box is art whereasidentical-lookingBrillo boxes by Proctorand
Gambleare not. Accordingto Danto, this is to pose the question"Whatis art?"the question of art's definition-in its properphilosophicalform.3
But, Danto continues, once artists like Warholposed the question "Whatis
art?"in its proper philosophical form (that is, as an indiscernibilityproblem),
they could make no furthertheoreticalcontribution.Answering thatquestionis a
job for philosophers,not artists. Danto writes: "The artists have made the way
open for philosophy and the momenthas arrivedat which the task must be transferredto philosophy.9'4
That is, once embarkedupon the projectof the definitionof art,therewas only
so far that artistsqua artistscould take it. They could visually focus the question
"What is art?" in its proper philosophical form-as the problem of indiscernibles-but they could pursue it no further as artists doing the things that
artistsdo. Any furtherprogresson the definitionof art would requirethe kind of
work typical of philosophers.5If artistswere to undertakethis chore, they would

3. It is a long-standingmetaphilosophicalconvictionof Danto's thatparadoxesof perceptualindiscernibilityare the naturaltopics of philosophicalresearch.

4. Danto, "TheEnd of Art," 111.
5. Presumably:framing theories in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions and arguing for
them.

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NOEL CARROLL

have to give up being artists-and workingin the mannertypical of artists-and

become somethingelse, namely,philosophers.
Thus the second developmentalnarrativeof art history comes to an end, as
artiststurnover the project of defining the natureof art to philosophers.Unlike
the end of the project of verisimilitude,the project of defining the natureof art
does not end in completing the job, but in assigning it elsewhere. Nevertheless,
with Warhol,art advances the plot as far as it can, and art history as a progressive linear narrativecomes to an end, or, at least, a stopping point. That is why
Danto calls the presentepoch of artmaking"post-historicalart"-it is artafterart
history,constructedas the progressive,developmentalnarrativeof art's self-definition.
Artworkswill continue to be made after the end of this story,but they will no
longer fall within the trajectoryof a linearevolution convergingon the discovery
of the natureof art.Nor, Danto consoles readers,is this so horrible,since artists,
now freed from the burdenof self-definition,can experimentin every which way,
liberated, as well, by Warhol'srevelation that art can look like anything. The
chronicle of future art productionwill be multifarious.But the narrativeof art
history as an evolutionary(teleologically driven)process is over.
This is a nice story.Not only does it have a happy ending-indeed, one quite
uplifting for a period like ours that consistently flattersitself for its pluralismbut it also appearsto do a serviceablejob of explainingthe stunningdiversityof
artpracticeson offer today.But the accountpretendsto do more than simply illuminate what has happened.It also predicts the future.Art history will never be
developmentalagain for reasons of philosophical necessity. But I am not really
certainthat we should believe this.
The crux of Danto's argumentis that artistscan only take the question of the
definitionof art so far.As anyone familiarwith artistsknows, this is like waving
a red flag at a bull. Modernartistsspecialize in exceeding the limitationsphilosophersof artattemptto foist upon them. So why is Danto so sure thathe has located a barrierthat contemporaryartists cannot breach?Danto is not always very
forthcomingaboutthis. However,his suggestion seems to be thatin orderto take
the projectof definingartfurtherthanposing the indiscernibilityquestion,artists
would have to give up being artistsand become somethingessentially differentphilosophers-where the underlyingassumptionis that one cannot be an artist
and a philosopherat the same time. But why not?
Danto must be presuming that not only is what artists and philosophers do
essentially different,but thatthe one activity precludesthe other.What artistsdo
is put painton canvasesand design visual appearances.And this is just the wrong
mediumfor framingdefinitions.Making definitionsis not what artistsqua artists
are trainedto do, and paintbrushesand canvasesare not the righttools for the job
in any case.
But if this is what Danto has in mind, there is a problemwith the argumentat
the outset. For this version of the argumentequates art with painting,and that is
surely an equivocation.Art, including visual art, today (and for many yester-

THE END OF ART?

21

days), is no longer a matterof paintingin the narrowsense of thatconcept.Visual

artistsengage in all sortsof inventions,includinginstallationsthatfrequentlymix
word and image in rebus-likestructureswhere text, context, and visuals operate
like cinematic montage,juxtaposingfragmentsin orderto elicit inferences from
spectators.Why can't verbal/visualarrayslike these be contrivedsuch thatviewers are broughtto an awarenessof the natureof art maieutically,after the fashion of Socraticpuzzles?
Perhapssome may be persuadedthatpaintersdoing what painterstraditionally do cannot advance insight into the definitionof art. But visual artists are not
just painters-they are rebus-makers,performanceartists,conceptualartists,language artists, collagists, and so on. Danto knows this; indeed, he commends
Warhol for making this proliferationof genres historically possible. But why
then suppose that these genres necessarily cannot contributeto the definitionof
art? Danto does not say. But without closing off these possibilities, there is no
reason to think that art history as the story of the self-definitionof art is necessarily over.
The place where to my knowledge Danto most explicitly and elaboratelypropounds the reasoning behind his end-of-artthesis is in the essay "Approaching
the End of Art."Because this argumentis so importantto his overall project, I
will quote it at length. Danto writes:
My sense is that with the traumato its own theory of itself, paintinghad to discover, or
try to discover, what its true identity was. With the trauma,it entered into a new level of
self-awareness.My view, again, is that painting had to become the avant-gardeartjust
because no artsustainedthe traumait did with the adventof cinema. But its quest for selfidentitywas limited by the fact that it was paintingthatwas the avant-gardeart, for painting remainsnonverbalactivity,even if more and more verbalitybegan to be incorporated
into works of art-"painted words"in TomWolfe's apt but shallow phrase.Withouttheory, who could see a blank canvas, a squarelead plate, a tilted beam, some droppedrope,
as works of art?Perhapsthe same question was being raised all across the face of the artworld but for me it became conspicuous at last in a show of Andy Warholat the Stable
Gallery in 1964 when the Brillo Box asked in effect, why it was art when somethingjust
like it was not. And with this, it seemed to me, the history of art attainedthat point where
it had to turn into its own philosophy.It has gone as art as far as it could go. In turning
into philosophy,arthad come to an end. From now on progresscould only be enacted on
a level of abstractself-consciousness of the kind which philosophy alone must consist in.
If artistswished to participatein this progress,they would have to undertakea study very
different from what art schools could prepare them for. They would have to become
philosophers.6

Here it is quite clear thatDanto is collapsing the prospectsof paintingwith artin

general-including all sorts of visual art-despite his reference to lead plates,
tilted beams and dropped ropes. Apparentlyhe does this on the grounds that
paintingis the avant-gardeart,and, therefore,a reliableindicatorof the possibilities and limitationsof art in general (That is just what it means to be the avantgardeart:to be in advanceof all the othersin pertinentrespects).But, since paint6. ArthurDanto, "Approachingthe End of Art,"in The State of the Art (New York, 1987), 216.

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NOEL CARROLL

ing is nonverbal(presumablyby definition), tradingessentially in appearances,

and since answering the question "Whatis art?"requiresa capacity for verbal
articulateness,Danto surmisesthatpainting-and, by extension, artin generalcan at best show forth (demonstrate)the problem of indiscernibility,but can
make, so to speak, no further"comment."Here Danto's view seems loosely analogous to Hegel's suggestion that Romantic art must cede pride of place to philosophy because in its aspirationto render an imperceivablerational idea perceivable, Romanticart aimed to do something that art was ill-suited to do, especially when comparedto philosophy (and religion).
Danto's argument,then, is roughly:
1) If x is the avant-gardeart, then the condition of x reveals the condition of
all the arts. (premise)
2) Paintingis the avant-gardeart. (premise)
3) If paintingis to advancethe projectof the self-definitionof art,then it must
be verbal. (premise)
4) Paintingis essentially not verbal. (premise)
5) Therefore,paintingcannot advancethe projectof the self-definitionof art.
(from 3 and 4)
6) If paintingcannot advancethe project of the self-definitionof art, then we
have reachedthe end of the art of painting. (premise)
7) Therefore,we have reachedthe end of the art of painting-such is the condition of painting. (from 5 and 6)
8) Therefore,we have reachedthe end of art-all the artshave ended. (from 1,
2 and 7)
This argumentis profferednot merely as an explanationof why it is the case
that artiststoday have in fact left off the modernistprojectof self-definition.It is
an argumentdesigned to prove that art-that is, the developmentalhistorythereof-is over. But thoughthe argumentis logically sound, most of its premises are
deeply controversial.
The firstpremise seems to me essentially definitional.It stipulatesthat if anything is the avant-gardeart, then it reveals the condition of all the other arts. It
does not claim that there is such an art, but only states the criterionsuch an art
form would have to meet, if there were one. Since this is a matterof stipulation,
I think we should grant Danto this premise for the purposes of argument.
However,furtherpremises in this argumentare less acceptable.
Danto maintainsthat paintingis the avant-gardeart.His reason is that cinema
broughtabout a epochal identity crisis for paintingin a way that was more traumatic thanthe identitycrisis sufferedby any otherart.This is a historicalhypothesis, one difficultto evaluate.Was the identity of paintingreally more shakenby
cinema than that of theater?But, in any case, there are also philosophicalproblems with Danto's claim.

THE END OF ART?

23

One would suppose that if anything were the avant-gardeart in Danto's

sense-an indicatorof the possibilities and limitationsof all the other arts-the
so-called avant-gardeart would be so in virtue of some propertyor set of properties that it sharedwith all the other arts.That is, the avant-gardeart will share
certainnecessaryconditions with the other arts, and variationsalong this dimension of correspondencewill predict variationsalong the same or similar dimensions in the otherarts.But by Danto's own account,thereare strongdisanalogies
between paintingand at least some of the otherarts.He claims, for example, that
painting is necessarily not verbal. But many other arts-like literatureand theater-are verbal.On the one hand,this leads us to ask why the prospectsfor verbal arts should be predictedon the basis of a putativelynonverbalart.But on the
other hand, with respect to the second premise of Danto's argument, it also
prompts one to suggest that perhaps Danto should not regard painting as the
avant-gardeart. For on his account, it is markedby a peculiarity-its allegedly
nonverbalnature-that it does not sharewith a numberof other art forms. Thus,
it will not be a reliableindicator,along certainpertinentdimensions(namely,the
capacity to articulate),of the condition of various other arts (including other
visual arts, like installations), and, therefore, it should not be taken to be the
avant-gardeart-that is, a predictorof the destiny of art in general.
In otherwords, the second premise of Danto's argumentmay be false in a way
thatindicatesthatone cannotinfer from the prospectsof paintingto the prospects
of artin general.In this respect, the second premise may be the origin of Danto's
tendency to equivocate between painting and art in general. But if painting is
nonverbalin the way that Danto alleges, then it cannot be the avant-gardeart in
his sense, since other arts may possess the verbal means to articulatethe problematic of self-definition in the way he requires. Other arts, like literature,are
articulatein the requisite sense. Indeed, in his "The Last Workof Art:Artworks
and Real Things,"Danto hints playfully that his article is an artwork;7but if his
articleis an artwork-perhaps an exercise in belles lettres-then surely artistsare
capable of doing philosophicalaesthetics.
Admittedly this a paradoxicalexample. Maybe Danto is just speaking ironically here. But thereare otherexamples of art-indeed, of visual art-that Danto
should accept and that are articulatein a way that Danto thinks painting is not.
These include installationart,conceptualart, language art,performanceart, collages, andrebusesof configurationsnot yet imagined.Possiblyjust because these
genres have the capacity or the potentialto take the problematicof the definition
of art furtherthan does painting, as Danto conceives it, they should be considered the avant-gardearts.8But then painting is not the avant-gardeart, and its
7. ArthurDanto, "The Last Work of Art: Artworks and Real Things," in Aesthetics: A Critical
Anthology,ed. George Dickie and RichardJ. Sclafani (New York, 1977), 551-562.
8. Here it is importantto emphasize that I am not claiming that these art forms have in fact
advancedresearchinto the definition of art, but only that Danto has not supplied any reason to suppose that, in principle, they cannot do so. Since they are not as remote from verbal expression as
Danto alleges painting to be, he at least owes us an explanationfor thinking that they cannot-as a
matterof logic-continue to contributeto the developmentalhistory of art (construedas a process of
self-definition).

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NOEL CARROLL

putativelynonverbalstatus has no implicationsabout whetherthe history of art,

including visual art, is necessarilyforeclosed.
The thirdpremiseof Danto's argumentclaims thatif paintingis to advancethe
projectof the self-definitionof art, then it must be verbal.This presupposesthat
if any artis to advancethe projectof self-definition,it must be verbal.This seems
to be pretty commonsensical; language appears to. be the naturalmedium for
framing definitions and for mounting the kinds of argumentsnecessary to support such definitions.Nevertheless, as art history richly illustrates,there may be
an aspect of the dialectic of the self-definitionof artwhich is not necessarilyverbal-not necessarily a matter of stating or defending a definition-to which
artistsmay contributewithout literally traffickingin words.
WhatI have in mind is the use of the artworkas a counterexample.Throughout
the twentieth century-from Duchamp's readymadesto Warhol'sBrillo Boxartistshave created problem cases designed to challenge prevailingart theories
and to provoke the formulationof new, more accommodatingtheories. A work
like Fountain,on the one hand,problematizedaesthetictheories of art, while, on
the otherhand,it also alertedphilosophersto the importancethatcontext, including institutionalframeworksand art history, might bear on art status. That is,
Fountainfunctionedboth as a putativerefutationof certainviews about particular necessary conditions for art status, while also contextually suggesting (conversationallyimplicating?)the need to consider other possible necessary conditions. In its role as a counterexampleor provocation,Fountainmade a contribution to the evolution of the project of the self-definitionof art and it did so in a
way that did not necessarilyrely on words. Posing a deft example-even a nonverbal one-then can advance the project of self-definition.Therefore,it is not
the case that artmust be verbalfor arthistoryto continueto move forwardphilosophically.
Of course, it is true that the preceding examples are just the ones that Danto
invokes to commend artistsfor raising the indiscernibilityproblem.And he adds
that artistscan go no furtherthan this. But why? In the past, artistsused telling
inventions to address theoreticalissues not reducible to indiscernibilityissues.
Paintersrefuted the representationaltheory of art by means of abstractions.On
what grounds can Danto argue that future "theoretical"examples, hailing from
the precincts of art, won't provoke furthertheoretical insight and refinement?
Perhapseven nonverbalartworkscan sometimes "test"theories,both in the sense
of contesting settled views and suggesting new lines of research.9
9. Danto may think that after Warhol'sindiscerniblesthere can be no furthercounterexamplesthat Warholmakes the last counterexample-not only because it is essentially visual but because it
has either said it all or because any otherindiscerniblewould say the same thing. The latteris not true,
as Danto himself has shown; differentsets of indiscernibles-such as Danto's own nine red canvases
and the Menardcase-make differentpoints. So, future indiscernibiliamay have something new to
say that is pertinentto the project of self-definition.Furthermore,there is no reason to think that art
world counterexamplescan only take the form of indiscernibles.Aleatoricmusic, poetry,and pictures
(The Exquisite Corpse) need not take the form of indiscernibles and yet they effectively challenge
expressiontheories of art.Thus artistsmay advancethe projectof self-definition-even in exclusively visual terms-without resortingto indiscernibles.Warhol'sindiscernibleshave not said it all nor
must all that remainsto be said be "phrased"in the idiom of indiscernibles.

THE END OF ART?

25

In After the End of Art, Danto presents a theory of art, but one that he admits
only proposestwo necessaryconditionsfor artstatuswhich, he concedes, are not
jointly sufficient.10This leaves room for the additionof furthernecessary conditions; even philosophy-or at least Danto's-hasn't completedthe projectof the
definitionof art. But why does Danto presumethat it is beyond the ingenuity of
nonverbalartiststo contrivehardcases of the sort that might reveal maieutically
furtheressential criteriaof art status?1
I do agree that there are profoundlimitationson the type of contributionthat
avant-gardeartworkscan make to producingarttheoryand thatmanyof the ways
in which art critics describe such works as "theoretical"are exorbitant.12 Insofar
as avant-gardeartworksare by definitiondisjunctiveand elliptical, they are not,
for example, functional vehicles for presenting detailed philosophical arguments."3But this concession does not preclude the possibility that avant-garde
works, even nonverbalones, can make some contributionto art theory,including
the definitionof art. For carefully chosen and/orcraftedhardcases can not only
undermine existing art theories; they can pointedly indicate new theoretical
directions.
If philosopherscan imagine and/ordescribe counterexamplesthat dialectically advance theoreticalbreakthroughs-such as the additionof a necessary condition to an essential definition-then artists, even nonverbal ones (even
painters), can make them. Counterexamplescan, so to say, be proposed either
abstractlyor concretely.Thus, it is too draconianto maintainthat only if art is
verbal can it advance the project of defining art. Consequently,even if painting
were essentially nonverbal,it would not, in principle,be debarredfrom continuing to contributeto the definitionof art,and, thereby,to keeping arthistoryin the
evolutionarysense a going concern. Logically, thatis, whetheror not paintingor
any other art is nonverbalprovides no groundsfor presupposingthat the project
of the definitionof art "frominside" art history has necessarily reached its ultimate limits of possibility.
The fourthpremise of Danto's argumentis thatpaintingis essentially not verbal. This is not strictly true, since paintingscan literally incorporatewords, and

10. Danto, After the End of Art, 195. I have discussed this theory in Noel Carroll,"Danto'sNew
Definition of Art and the Problemof Art Theories,"BritishJournal of Aesthetics 37 (October, 1997),
386-392.
11. One might suspect thatDanto believes thatthe projectof defining artis over because he thinks
he's come up with the definition,therebyleaving artistsnothingelse to do in this line than-at bestto illustrateit. But since Danto allows that he's only supplied two necessary conditions for art status
so far, there is still work to do, and, if the argumentsabove are right, there is nothing to stop artists
from pitching in.
12. For furtherargument,see Noel Carroll,"ContemporaryAvant-gardeArt and the Problem of
Theory,"Journal of Aesthetic Education29 (Fall, 1995), 1-13.
13. Of course, this observationdoes not entail that there cannot be artworksof a non-avant-garde,
verbal naturethat can pose philosophical definitions and argumentsin a coherent, classical manner.
PerhapsDanto's "The Last Workof Art" is one of them. But if this is so, then we have good reason
to believe that art faces no logical impedimentto advancingthe project of self-definitionfrom "the
inside."

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NOEL CARROLL

there can even be paintingsof words. Nor is the formermerely a modem possibility. It is a recurringfeatureof several establishedgenres, including religious,
didactic, and historicalpainting.Perhapsit is true thatpremodernpaintingnever
incorporatedwords for the purposeof making art theory outright.But inasmuch
as the traditionof painting provides a legitimate space for the use of words, it
cannotbe thatpaintingis essentially nonverbal,nor can it be said that,because it
is nonverbal,it provides no possibility to contributeto the definitionof art.
Moreover,if what is really at stake in this premise is the issue of whetheror
not visual art (or art in general) is verbal,then, as we have alreadyshown, many
forms of visual art,includingcollage and installationart, literallypossess verbal
resourcesand, therefore,cannot, without furtherargument,be alleged to be disqualifiedfrom the definitiongame.
And, of course, as Danto himself concedes, much modem painting (and visual art)is "verbal"in the extendedsense thatit occurs in an atmosphereof arttheory. As a result, many visual choices (such as emphasis on the shape of the support)can be "read"in charade-likefashion as implicatingtheoreticalpoints. This
is the "paintedword"phenomenonto which Danto alludes in the precedingquotation.But doesn't this affordpaintingenough of what Danto calls "verbality"(or
verboseness) to make it theoretically possible for painters (and other visual
artists)to continue to engage (in some sense) in the projectof the self-definition
of art?
Here it might be arguedthat insofar as paintersare verbose, they are not really paintersas such; they are not engaged in pure painting. But isn't this just a
modernistconceit? It begs the questionaboutthe natureof painting,and, anyway,
it is irrelevantwhen it comes to visual artistsin the extended sense of the term.
Perhapsit can be said that such a presuppositionconcerningpainterlypurism
supplies reasons internalto the modernistproject of why it could not carry its
conceptionof self-definitionfurtherafterthe arrivalof Brillo Box. Danto says as
much in After the End of Art.14But the limitations of modernistpainting on its
own termscannotbe mistakenfor the limitationsof eithervisual artor artin general. Modernism as conceived by Greenberg may be historically closed in
Danto's sense, but the possibilities for the developmentalhistory of art may still
be open. That is, the Greenbergianprojectfor purepaintingmay be finished,but
it is misleading to heraldthat as "the end of art history"-at least as that phrase
has been standardlytaken since Danto reintroducedit in 1984.'1
In After the End of Art, Danto writes:
My own sense of an ending suggests thatit was the remarkabledisjunctivenessof artistic activity across the entire sector,not the ratherreducedformulasof monochromepaint14. Danto, After the End of Art, 14-16.
15. 1 think that the phrase has generally been regardedas describing a condition that putatively
ranges across the arts. For example, Warhol'sachievementin visual art was paralleledby Cage's in
music and that of the Judson Dance Theaterwith respect to choreography.One naturallysupposed
that, as with the case of Warhol,these artistsalso broughtthe history of their forms to an endpoint.It
would come as a bit of a philosophicalletdown,then, to learnthatthe end-of-artthesis was only meant
as a commenton an episode, albeit an importantone, in Americanpainting.

THE END OF ART?

27

ing, that provided evidence that the Greenbergiannarrativewas over, and that art had
enteredwhat one might call a post-narrativeperiod. The disjunctivenessbecame internalized in works of art which also might have included painting.Whereas Crimp sees evidence of the "deathof painting"in paintersallowing their work to be "contaminatedwith
photography,"I see the end of the exclusivity of pure paintingas the vehicle of art history 16

But if this is Danto's currentinterpretationof the end-of-artthesis, then it is

not so dramatica claim as it has seemed for nearly a decade and a half. For it
only amountsto the assertionthat pure painting is no longer the best candidate
for the vehicle of art history. And that leaves open the logical possibility that
there may be other vehicles to do the job-other vehicles to carry the developmentalhistoryof artforward.Moreover,since talk of a task that only philosophy
can acquithas droppedout of the story,there is no reason in principleto suspect
that there are no other availablevehicles conceivable. The only limit here is the
ingenuity of artists,and that is a contingentmatter.
Danto also presupposesthat if paintingcannot advancethe projectof the selfdefinition of art, then art history-or the history of painting-in the developmental sense is over. This, in turn,presumesthat self-definitionis the only available engine for art history in the evolutionarysense. That is, if either painting,
visual art,or artin generalcan no longer play in the definitiongame, then arthistory as a progressive,linear narrativeis done for. But why is the projectof selfdefinitiontaken to be the only availableengine for art history?In earliertimes,
by Danto's own account, verisimilitude was sufficient to drive art history forward. So even if Danto has prescindedself-definitionas a possibility for art history, why does he think that no other projectcan propel art history onwards?
In a perhapsHegelian mood, Danto appearsto "privilege"self-definitionas the
highest goal that art history could have-the artistic variant of consciousness
becoming awareof itself throughan unfoldingprocess of self-disclosure.But his
argumentis about the prospects for the continuationof a linear, developmental
historyof art,and such a narrativelogically requiresonly that arthave a goal, not
that the goal be the allegedly highest one. Possibly artistsconvinced by Danto's
argumentsabout the project of self-definition will enlist in another projectalbeit not such a lofty one-and thatprojectwill yield a developmentalnarrative.
They might rededicate themselves to discovering the most effective means for
delivering visual pleasure. And, with the promise of evolutionarypsychology,
who is to say that there may not be some fairly determinatestrategiesto this end
that artists can approximatesuccessively as they did the rendering of visual
appearances?Thereis no a prioriargumentto show thatthereare no projectslike
this one to be embracedand, therefore,no reasonto suppose thatthere can be no
more developmentalhistories of the sort that the projects of representationand
self-definitionentailed.
It is interestingto note that Hegel himself-though agreeing with Danto that
art history is over-did not think that the engine of arthistory was the projectof
16. Danto, After the End of Art, 171.

28

NOEL CARROLL

self-definition.For Hegel, art was not about the self-disclosure of the natureof
art,but aboutthe revelationof the natureof consciousness to itself, an enterprise
he thoughtphilosophywas betterqualifiedto discharge.I do not wish to endorse
Hegel's viewpoint on this matter.However,the fact that he and Danto locate the
developmentalprospects for art in different projects illustrates the point that
therearemore groundsfor an evolutionaryhistoryof artthanself-definition.And
if there are more grounds for an evolutionaryhistory of art than self-definition,
they may remainin principleto be discoveredand implementedby artists.Thus,
even if Danto has shown that the project of self-definition is necessarily foreclosed to artists-a conclusion thatI resist-it still would not follow that arthistory is necessarily over.
Danto's argumentthatarthistoryis finishedis an ambitiousphilosophicalconjecture. It is philosophical because it pronounces finality of necessity. But if
premises 2), 3), 4) and 6) of the argument,and their underlyingpresuppositions,
are imperiled,then the case seems an unlikely one. Art, in an evolutionarysense,
is not over. It remains,at least in principle,open.
On the other hand, Danto's philosophy of art history might be "demythologized" in a way that reveals something importantabout the contemporarystate
of the visual arts.The prospectsfor the continuationof the developmentalhistory of art and the projectof self-definitionmay not be necessarily foreclosed, as I
hope thatI have shown. And yet, as a matterof contingentfact, it does seem that
for at least a decade or more, many serious artistsare no longer concerned-no
longer obsessed-with the projectof self-definition.Someone like RobertGober
is more preoccupiedwith the theme of traumathan he is with the essence of art,
and many of his peers care more about what they think of as politics than ontology. There has been a palpable shift in mainstreamartworldconcerns since the
early 1970s and the heyday of modernism,and maybe Danto's end-of-artthesis
can be reconstruedas a partialexplanationof this.
For Danto has, in effect, skillfully elucidatedthe way in which the puristmodernist project of the self-definitionof the mediumof painting faced limitations,
limitationsthatcannotbe surpassedby modernistpaintingfor reasons internalto
the Greenbergiandispensation. This, in turn, forced ambitious artists to look
elsewhere for their inspirationand many of the intereststhat they have taken up
in the wake of modernism'sdemise arenot congenial to the prospectsfor a developmentalhistory of art.And this accounts, in part,for why we find ourselves in
a momentwhere arthistoryconceived of as the pursuitof the projectof self-definition seems stalled.
But, as I have argued,thereis no reasonin principleto suppose thatthis is anything more than a hiatus, a resting point. Logically, it is possible that the project
of the self-definition of art could be revived, or that another suitably developmental end might be anointed.And yet Danto is right that something has happened; something has changed. The modernistproject has collapsed internally
for the reasons he brilliantly,if left-handedly,dissects, yielding the outbreakof
pluralismhe so astutely describes in After the End of Art. Thus, though the end-

THE END OF ART?

29

of-art thesis fails as an argumentin the speculativephilosophy of art history, as

art criticism, it is exemplary and important.What Danto calls "post-historical
art"is not a philosophicalcategory.Rather,it is a telling descriptionof a significant, though contingent,stylistic interlude.17
Universityof Wisconsin
Madison

17. I would like to thank ArthurDanto, David Bordwell, and Sally Banes for their help in the
preparationof this paper,though the flaws herein are my doing, not theirs.