Mimamsa

Epistemology[edit]
In the field of epistemology, later Mimskas made some notable contributions. Unlike
the Nyaya or the Vaisheshika systems, the Prbhkara school recognizes five means of valid
knowledge (Skt. prama) and the Bha school recognizes six. In addition to the four means
of valid knowledge accepted by the Nyaya school (pratyaka, anumna, upamna and abda),
the Prbhkara school recognizes presumption (Skt. arthpatti) and the Bha school
recognizes both presumption and non-apprehension (anuapalabdhi) as additional valid means
of knowledge. Another interesting feature of the Mims school of philosophy is its unique
epistemological theory of the intrinsic validity of all cognition as such. It is held that all
knowledge is ipso facto true (Skt. sataprmyavda). Thus, what is to be proven is not the
truth of a cognition, but its falsity. The Mimskas advocate the self-validity of knowledge
both in respect of its origin (utpatti) and ascertainment (japti). Not only did the Mimskas
make the very great use of this theory to establish the unchallengeable validity of the Vedas,
but later Vedantists also drew freely upon this particular Mims contribution.

Dharma[edit]
Dharma as understood by Prva Mms can be loosely translated into English as "virtue",
"morality" or "duty". The Prva Mms school traces the source of the knowledge of dharma
neither to sense-experience nor inference, but to verbal cognition (i.e. knowledge of words and
meanings) according to Vedas. In this respect it is related to the Nyya school, the latter,
however, accepts only four sources of knowledge (prama) as valid.[5]

Vaisheshika
Where Nyaya accepted four sources of valid knowledge, the Vaishesika accepted only
perception and inference

The Categories or Padrtha

According to the Vaisheshika school, all things which exist, which can be cognised, and which
can be named are padrthas (literal meaning: the meaning of a word), the objects of
experience. All objects of experience can be classified into six categories
, dravya(substance), gua (quality), karma (activity), smnya (generality), viea
(particularity) and samavya (inherence). Later Vaieikas (rdhara and Udayana
and ivditya) added one more category abhava (non-existence). The first three categories are
defined asartha (which can perceived) and they have real objective existence. The last three
categories are defined as budhyapekam (product of intellectual discrimination) and they are
logical categories.[4]

1.Dravya (substance): The substances are conceived as 9 in number. They

are, pthv (earth), ap (water), tejas (fire), vyu (air), kaa (ether), kla (time), dik (space), tm
an (self or soul) and manas (mind). The first five are called bhtas, the substances having
some specific qualities so that they could be perceived by one or the other external senses.[5]
2.Gua (quality): The Vaieika Stra mentions 17 guas (qualities), to
which Praastapda added another 7. While a substance is capable of existing independently
by itself, a gua(quality) cannot exist so. The original 17 guas (qualities)
are, rpa (colour), rasa(taste), gandha (smell), spara (touch), sakhy (number), parima (si
ze/dimension/quantity), pthaktva (individuality), sayoga (conjunction/accompaniments), vibh
ga (disjunction), paratva (priority), aparatva (posteriority), buddhi (knowledge), sukha (pleasur
e),dukha (pain), icch (desire), dvea (aversion) and prayatna (effort). To
these Praastapda added gurutva (heaviness), dravatva (fluidity), sneha (viscosity), dharma (
merit), adharma (demerit), abda (sound) and saskra (faculty).[6]
3.Karma (activity): The karmas (activities) like guas (qualities) have no separate existence,
they belong to the substances. But while a quality is a permanent feature of a substance, an
activity is a transient one. ka (ether), kla (time), dik (space) and tman(self), though
substances, are devoid of karma (activity).[7]
4.Smnya (generality): Since there are plurality of substances, there will be relations among
them. When a property is found common to many substances, it is called smnya.[8]
5.Viea (particularity): By means of viea, we are able to perceive substances as different
from one another. As the ultimate atoms are innumerable so are the vieas.[9]
6.Samavya (inherence): Kada defined samavya as the relation between the cause and
the effect. Praastapda defined it as the relationship existing between the substances that are
inseparable, standing to one another in the relation of the container and the contained. The
relation of samavya is not perceivable but only inferable from the inseparable connection of
the substances.[10]

Epistemology and syllogism[edit]

The early Vaieika epistemology considered only pratyaka (perception)
and anumna (inference) as the pramas (means of valid knowledge). The other two means
of valid knowledge accepted by the Nyya school, upamna (comparison) and abda (verbal
testimony) were considered as included in anumna

The atomic theory[edit]

The early Vaieika texts presented the following syllogism to prove that all objects i.e. the
four bhtas, pthv (earth), ap (water), tejas (fire) and vyu (air) are made of
indivisible paramus (atoms): Assume that the matter is not made of indivisible atoms, and

that it is continuous. Take a stone. One can divide this up into infinitely many pieces (since
matter is continuous). Now, the Himalayan mountain range also has infinitely many pieces, so
one may build another Himalayan mountain range with the infinite number of pieces that one
has. One begins with a stone and ends up with the Himalayas, which is a paradox - so the
original assumption that matter is continuous must be wrong, and so all objects must be made
up of a finite number of paramus (atoms).
According to the Vaieika school, the trasareu (dust particles visible in the sunbeam coming
through a small window hole) are the smallest mahat (perceivable) particles and defined
as tryaukas (triads). These are made of three parts, each of which are defined
as dvyauka (dyad). The dvyaukas are conceived as made of two parts, each of which are
defined as paramu (atom). The paramus (atoms) are indivisible and eternal, they can
neither be created nor destroyed.[13] Each paramu (atom) possesses its own
distinct viea (individuality).[14]
The measure of the partless atoms is known as parimaala parima. It is eternal and it
cannot generate the measure of any other substance. Its measure is its own absolutely.[15]

Nyaya
According to the Nyaya school, there are exactly four sources of knowledge (pramas):
perception, inference, comparison, and testimony. Knowledge obtained through each of these
can, of course, still be either valid or invalid. As a result, Nyaya scholars again went to great
pains to identify, in each case, what it took to make knowledge valid, in the process creating a
number of explanatory schemes.

Sixteen Padrthas or Categories[edit]

The Nyaya metaphysics recognizes sixteen padarthas or categories and includes all six (or
seven) categories of the Vaisheshika in the second one of them, called prameya.[2] These
sixteen categories are prama (valid means of knowledge), prameya (objects of valid
knowledge), saaya (doubt), prayojana (aim), dnta (example), siddhnta (conclusion), av
ayava (members of syllogism), tarka (hypothetical
reasoning), niraya (settlement), vda (discussion), jalpa (wrangling), vita (cavilling), hetv
bhsa (fallacy),chala (quibbling), jti (sophisticated refutation) and nigrahasthna (point of
defeat).[3][4]

Epistemology[edit]
The Nyaya epistemology considers knowledge (jna) or cognition (buddhi) as apprehension
(upalabdhi) or consciousness (anubhava). Knowledge may be valid or invalid. The Naiyayikas
(the Nyaya scholars) accepted four valid means (pramaa) of obtaining valid knowledge
(prama) - perception (pratyaka), inference (anumna), comparison (upamna) and verbal
testimony (abda). Invalid knowledge includes memory (smti), doubt (saaya), error
(viparyaya) and hypothetical reasoning (tarka).[5]

Perception[edit]
Pratyaka (perception) occupies the foremost position in the Nyaya epistemology. Perception
is defined by Akapda Gautama in his Nyaya Sutra (I,i.4) as a 'non-erroneous cognition which
is produced by the intercourse of sense-organs with the objects, which is not associated with a
name and well-defined'.[5] Perception can be of two types, laukika (ordinary)
and alaukika (extraordinary).
Ordinary perception[edit]
Ordinary (Laukika or Sadharana) perception is of six types - visual-by eyes, olfactory-by nose,
auditory-by ears, tactile-by skin, gustatory-by tongue and mental-by mind.
Extra-ordinary perception[edit]
Extraordinary (Alaukika or Asadharana) perception is of three types,
viz., Samanyalakshana (perceiving generality from a particular object), Janalakshana (when
one sense organ can also perceive qualities not attributable to it, as when seeing a chili, one
knows that it would be bitter or hot), and Yogaja (when certain human beings, from the power
of Yoga, can perceive past, present and future and have supernatural abilities, either complete
or some).
Determinate and indeterminate perception[edit]
The Naiyayika maintains two modes or stages in perception. The first is
called nirvikalpa (indeterminate), when one just perceives an object without being able to know
its features, and the second savikalpa (determinate), when one is able to clearly know an
object. All laukika and alaukika pratyakshas are savikalpa, but it is necessarily preceded by an
earlier stage when it is indeterminate. Vtsyana says that if an object is perceived with its
name we have determinate perception but if it is perceived without a name, we have
indeterminate perception. Jayanta Bhatta says that indeterminate perception apprehends
substance, qualities and actions and universals as separate and indistinct something and also
it does not have any association with name, while determinate perception aprrehends all these
together with a name.[5] There is yet another stage calledPratyabhij, when one is able to rerecognise something on the basis of memory.

Inference[edit]
Anumna (inference) is one of the most important contributions of the Nyaya. It can be of two
types: inference for oneself (Svarthanumana, where one does not need any formal procedure,
and at the most the last three of their 5 steps), and inference for others (Parathanumana, which
requires a systematic methodology of 5 steps). Inference can also be classified into 3
types: Purvavat (inferring an unperceived effect from a perceived cause), Sheshavat (inferring
an unperceived cause from a perceived effect) and Samanyatodrishta (when inference is not
based on causation but on uniformity of co-existence). A detailed anaysis of error is also given,
explaining when anumana could be false.

Comparison[edit]
Upamna, which can be roughly translated as comparison is the knowledge of the relationship
between a word and the object denoted by the word. It is produced by the knowledge of
resemblance or similarity, given some pre-description of the new object beforehand.

Verbal testimony[edit]
abda or verbal testimony is defined as the statement of a trustworthy person (ptavkya), and
consists in understanding its meaning. It can be of two types, Vaidika (Vedic), which are the
words of the four sacred Vedas, and are described as the Word of God, having been
composed by God, and Laukika, or words and writings of trustworthy human
beings. Vaidika testimony is preferred as the infallible word of God, and Laukika testimony
must by its nature be questioned and overruled by more trustworthy knowledge if such
becomes available.

inference[edit]
The methodology of inference involves a combination of induction and deduction by moving
from particular to particular via generality. It has five steps, as in the example shown:

There is fire on the hill (called Pratij, required to be proved)

Because there is smoke there (called Hetu, reason)

Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, e.g. in a kitchen (called Udhrana, example of
vypti)

The hill has smoke that is pervaded by fire (called Upanaya, reaffirmation or application)

Therefore there is fire on the hill (called Nigamana, conclusion)

In Nyya terminology for this example, the hill would be called as paksha (minor term), the fire
is called as sdhya (major term), the smoke is called as hetu, and the relationship between the
smoke and the fire is called as vyapti (middle term). Hetu further has five characteristics: (1) It
must be present in the Paksha, (2) It must be present in all positive instances, (3) It must be

absent in all negative instances, (4) It must not incompatible with the minor term or Paksha and
(5) All other contradictions by other means of knowledge should be absent. The fallacies in
Anumana (hetvbhasa) may occur due to the following:
1. Asiddha: It is the unproved hetu that results in this fallacy. [Paksadharmata]
Ashrayasiddha: If Paksha [minor term] itself is unreal, then there cannot be locus
of the hetu. e.g. The sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is a lotus like any other lotus.
Svarupasiddha: Hetu cannot exist in paksa at all. E.g. Sound is a quality, because
it is visible.
Vyapyatvasiddha: Conditional hetu. `Wherever there is fire, there is smoke'. The
presence of smoke is due to wet fuel.
2. Savyabhichara: This is the fallacy of irregular hetu.
Sadharana: The hetu is too wide. It is present in both sapaksa and vipaksa. `The
hill has fire because it is knowable'.
Asadharana: The hetu is too narrow. It is only present in the Paksha, it is not
present in the Sapaksa and in the Vipaksha. `Sound is eternal because it is
audible'.
Anupasamhari: Here the hetu is non-exclusive. The hetu is all-inclusive and leaves
nothing by way of sapaksha or vipaksha. e.g. 'All things are non-ternal, because
they are knowable'.
3. Satpratipaksa: Here the hetu is contradicted by another hetu. If both have equal force,
then nothing follows. 'Sound is eternal, because it is audible', and 'Sound is noneternal, because it is produced'. Here 'audible' is counterbalanced by 'produced' and
both are of equal force.
4. Badhita: When another proof (as by perception) definitely contradicts and disproves the
middle term (hetu). 'Fire is cold because it is a substance'.
5. Viruddha: Instead of proving something it is proving the opposite. 'Sound is eternal
because it is produced'.

causation[edit]
A cause is defined as an unconditional and invariable antecedent of an effect and an effect as
an unconditional and invariable consequent of a cause. The same cause produces the same
effect; and the same effect is produced by the same cause. The cause is notpresent in any
hidden form whatsoever in its effect.
The following conditions should be met:
1. The cause must be antecedent [Purvavrtti]
2. Invariability [Niyatapurvavrtti]
3. Unconditionality [Ananyathasiddha]
Nyaya recognizes five kinds of accidental antecedents [Anyathasiddha]

1. Mere accidental antecedent. E.g., The colour of the potter's cloth.

2. Remote cause is not a cause because it is not unconditional. E.g., The father of the
potter.
3. The co-effects of a cause are not causally related.
4. Eternal substances, or eternal conditions are not unconditional antecedents, e.g.
space.
5. Unnecessary things, e.g. the donkey of the potter.
Nyaya recognizes three kinds of cause:
1. Samavayi, material cause, e.g. thread of a cloth.
2. Asamavayi, colour of the thread which gives the colour of the cloth.
3. Nimitta, efficient cause, e.g. the weaver of the cloth.

Anyathakyativada of Nyaya[edit]
The Nyaya theory of error is similar to that of Kumarila's Viparita-khyati (see Mimamsa). The
Naiyayikas also believe like Kumarila that error is due to a wrong synthesis of the presented
and the represented objects. The represented object is confused with the presented one. The
word 'anyatha' means 'elsewise' and 'elsewhere' and both these meanings are brought out in
error. The presented object is perceived elsewise and the represented object exists elsewhere.
They further maintain that knowledge is not intrinsically valid but becomes so on account of
extraneous conditions (paratah pramana during both validity and invalidity).