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School of Management

Royal Holloway, University of London

A Critical Analysis of the Brand Resilience Framework


A study of and recommendations on managing brand risk and
resilience in the information age

MN5251
Master of Business Administration International Management

Kelliann M. McDonald
Candidate Number: 1402851
Supervisor
Prof. Justin OBrien, MBA Director

1 September 2014

This dissertation is submitted as part of the requirement for the award of


Master of Business Administration International Management

DECLARATION

This dissertation has been prepared on the basis of my own work and that where other published and
unpublished source materials have been used, these have been acknowledged.

Word Count: 16,468

Number of contacts with supervisor: 6

___________________________________________
Kelliann M. McDonald

___________________________________________
Date

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ABSTRACT
This study explores the feasibility of Copulskys (2011) brand resilience framework in an effort to
compare the theoretical framework to what typically occurs in the workplace. This was discerned
through in-depth discussions with mid and senior-level executives at global firms, highly concerned
with brand and reputational capital. A reflective practitioner approach to a semi-structured interview
methodology was employed to systematically analyze the use of the framework in practice. This
methodology lends itself well to use in business, as it is a flexible approach that can be used to evaluate
and improve workplace practices. The study found that while Copulskys framework was perceived as
functional and well codified, it fell victim to the common pitfalls of conceptual understandings when
transitioned into practice. The validity of the underlying assumption of the framework, the brand
fragility paradox, was called into question and the framework itself was found to be static and not
reflective of the dynamic conditions under which business decisions are made. Several managerial
recommendations, derived from the research findings and a review of relevant literature are provided,
including suggestions on how Copulskys framework may be tailored for practical use. Additionally, a
revised version of the brand resilience framework is presented in infographic form.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, without my mother, Leleith McDonald, none of this would be possible. Thank you,
Mom. I love you.
I would like to especially thank my dissertation supervisor Justin OBrien, MBA Director at Royal
Holloway, University of London for his guidance and support throughout the year and for his direction
and suggestions on the production of this my final project as an MBA candidate.
I would also like to thank all the faculty and staff at the School of Management, particularly Helen
McEwan, Jackie Brackenbury, and Dawn Fowle.
I would be remiss if I did not thank my mentors and Royal Holloway alumni, Matthew Clark and Nick
Hanbidge.
Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank the participants who so graciously shared their time
and expertise for the benefit of this study.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION

ABSTRACT

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Purpose of the Study

Research Objectives

Definition of Terms (Figure 1)

10

Structure of Dissertation

11

CHAPTER 2

12

Literature Review

12

Brand Fragility Paradox (Figure 2)

13

Brand Resilience Framework (Figure 3)

16

Gartners BI, Analytics & Performance Management Framework (Figure 4)

30

CHAPTER 3
Research Approach & Methodology
CHAPTER 4
Discussion and Analysis of Results
CHAPTER 5

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39
50

Recommendations

50

Integrated Organizational Change Strategy (Figure 5)

52

Conclusion

53

BIBLIOGRAPHY

55

APPENDICES

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Appendix A: Descriptions of Research Participants

62

Appendix B: Introduction & Semi-structured Interview Briefing Document

63

Appendix C: Themes Revealed by Research Results

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Appendix D: Revised Brand Resilience Framework (Infographic)

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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The pressure for business to respond to foreseeable change has never been greater (Abrahams,
2008). The world has been ushered into a knowledge-based society bounded by a high-tech global
economy that influences the efficiency of manufacturing processes and service methods. In a freemarket society, the information age has allowed individuals to simplify the way in which they make
decisions about the transactions they intend to make, increase the speed by which those decisions can
be made and acted upon, and has significantly reduced the associated costs of those transactions
(Humbert, 2007). These influences can be said to effect supply and demand on a massive and
irreversible level of an increasingly globalized and interconnected world. Change in the structure of
demand creates risk, as Sull (2006) describes, a kaleidoscope shifting numerous volatile variables, such
as regulation, technology competition, micro-economics and consumer preference (p. 2). Additionally,
the speed of response time needed to cater to more products and service offerings creates even more
risk (ibid). The development of product and service centered marketing strategies and the evaluation of
return on investment (ROI) on each alternative plan is likely to create further uncertainty for business
and its managers (Abrahams, 2008).
In tandem with the adjustments in societal behaviors and habits of consumption, the information
age has also had considerable impact on channels of communication, such as through web-based
content, cable television, and mobile smart phones, thus increasing audience fragmentation. This
fragmentation and subsequent coagulation of audiences based on their specific and nuanced interests
has profound implications for the ways in which organizations interact with individuals and which
business models are employed (Abrahams, 2008). The interactive nature of communication channels
including social media such at Facebook, Twitter, Pinterest, YouTube, WeChat (Chinese competitor to
WhatsApp) and Instagram means that marketers and business managers must grow accustomed to
marketing being a two-way, interactive conversation with individuals and online communities, as
opposed to previous eras where it was more simply a one-way broadcast to a captive audience (Macleod,
2004). Marketers and business managers must also acknowledge that due to the bearing of social media,
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these communities have an amplified voice and the potential to impact business processes, brands and
corporate reputation, such as in the quintessential case of United Break Guitars.
In this seminal example of social medias influence on business, Canadian musician Dave
Carroll chronicles a real-life experience of how his guitar was broken as a result of intentional rough
handling by United Airlines baggage handlers during a trip in 2008 and the subsequent series of
unsavory responses he received from the airline (Dunne, 2010; Soule, 2010). Ultimately, Carroll
authored a song and created three music videos about his experience. According to Carroll, his
negotiations with the airline for compensation lasted nine months before he decided to author the song,
which he posted to the video-sharing social media site YouTube on July 6, 2009. The music video
amassed 150,000 views within one day, prompting United Airlines to contact Carroll in hopes of
pacifying the issue. The video garnered over half a million hits by July 9, 2009, 5 million by mid-August
2009, and at the time of this report the video has over 14 million views and approximately 26-thousand
comments on YouTube (Cosh, 2009; CBC News, 2009; Jamieson, 2009; UPI Chicago, 2009).
Numerous media sources reported the story of the song's instant success and the public
relations nightmare for United Airlines (CNN, 2009). Sawhney (2009) reported that within four days
of the video being live, United Airlines' stock price fell 10%, costing stockholders about $180 million
USD in value. However, it is important to note that according to other notable sources, United's stock
prices had varied widely all that quarter, and actually rose after the videos came out in early July, but
fell after the airlines second quarter earnings were released (Huffington Post Business, 2009;
Consumerist, 2009). According to Carroll (2009):
United has demonstrated they know how to keep their airline in the forefront of their
customers minds and I wanted this project to expand upon that satirically I should thank
United. Theyve given me a creative outlet that has brought people together from around the
world If my guitar had to be smashed due to extreme negligence, Im glad it was you that
did it.
Word of mouth is increasingly seen as a legitimate measure of brand performance, which the
United Breaks Guitars case exemplifies. In the age of information and social media, marketers must
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become accustomed to a smarter conversation with their audiences and develop strategies to match.
According to Abrahams (2008), marketing managers can no longer look to a single outside agency to
satisfy traditional communication objectives and support them as the brain of the brand. Instead, a
greater share of the responsibility for overseeing the soundness of branding strategy and its coherence
across multiple audience touch points has to come from the internal marketing department. Without
compromising creativity or innovation, there is a new opportunity for marketing managers to
corroborate a boards escalating need to communicate effectively with external audiences. The
language of risk can become a common currency of communication and understanding between the
marketing function and the board of management that invests in its judgment (ibid, p. 12). Aligning
the interests of marketers and the board and the use of the tools and techniques of evaluating and
managing brand risk are designed to support cross-functional decision-making ultimately benefiting
company stakeholders.
Purpose of the Study
Consider that in the information age intangible assets such as brands add substantial value.
Companies used to derive most of its corporate value from tangible assets such as real estate and
equipment. However, in a contemporary, knowledge-based economy, sources for corporate profits are
more likely to originate from a variety of intangible assets. Product brands, marketing processes, and
the interconnection of key stakeholder relationships that constitute reputation capital belong to this asset
category (Dowling, 2006; OECD, 2005). As it is the duty of directors to promote the success of the
company, risks to the brand or company reputation must always be high on the agenda. If the brand is
a fundamental source of competitive advantage, it needs to be thoroughly understood. Yet at times, it is
challenging for non-marketers to fully consider the brand in risk analysis and decision-making (ibid).
Abrahams (2008) stated that the absence of a framework for brand thinking may mean that important
risk issues are not fully considered or adequately managed, however, Jonathan Copulsky, National
Managing Director, Brand and Eminence at Deloitte Consulting LLP, has brought forth an applicable
brand resilience framework in his most recent book (Copulsky, 2011). According to Deloitte (2014),
the largest in the world by revenue and by number of professionals of the Big Four professional

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services firms (Singh, 2012), Copulsky (2011) provides the tools and framework to help determine how
susceptible organizations are to brand sabotage and provides some actions that can be taken to reduce
the likelihood and impact of said sabotage.
The purpose of this study is to critically analyze elements of the seven step brand resilience
framework in an effort to compare this theoretical framework to what may actually occur in a practical
sense in the workplace, as discerned by primary research in the form of semi-structured interviews with
executives at global firms. This is done in an effort to bridge the gap that often times exist between the
theoretical and the practical and to provide more contemporary recommendations for managing brand
risk in the information age.
Research Objectives
Communications and marketing business managers are under immense pressure to increase
profits, boost sales, and to maximize shareholder value - all of which begins with having a clear
competitive advantage and superior corporate reputation. Nonetheless, managing a companys
reputation across a global network of stakeholders can often prove challenging. Still, employing small
steps to make reputation a business imperative, such as identifying key stakeholders or emphasizing the
importance of a reputation management strategy, can position an organization on the fast track to
attaining significant financial value. Research shows that corporate reputation is an indicator of equity
value, and reputable firms are more likely to sustain superior financial and market performance over
time (Dowling, 2001; Dowling, 2006; Tonello, 2007). Specifically, Obloj & Obloj (2006) show that
corporations ranking high in reputation are seen to benefit from an average annual stock price increase
of approximately 20.1 percent, whereas publicly traded shares of 10 companies that ranked at the bottom
in reputation suffered an average annual decline of approximately 1.9 percent. Additionally, it is proven
that strong reputation reflects on the economics of corporate dealings. Specifically, it lowers transaction
costs for all parties involved in the transaction and commands higher price premiums to the advantage
of the reputable firm (Obloj & Obloj, 2006). As brand reputation increasingly becomes a top business
priority for executives, leadership teams are faced with an array of challenges and questions on how to

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best manage and cultivate this critical intangible asset (Reputation Institute, 2014). In that light, the
research objectives of this report directly support these challenges and concerns and are as follows:
1. To critically analyze the steps and underlying assumptions suggested by the brand resilience
framework.
2. To evaluate and provide recommendations on how the brand resilience framework may be used
in a practical way to manage brand risk in a corporate setting.
It is the aim of this study to contribute to the public discourse on managing brand risk in the information
age by bridging the gap that may exsist between the theorectical brand resilience framework and the
practical applications of brand risk management in the workplace.
Definition of Terms
For purposes of this report, the following definitions and common understandings should be presumed.
These definitions are provided in an effort to standardize the concepts discussed and to frame the
findings presented in this report (see Figure 1).

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Figure 1: Definition of Terms

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Structure of Dissertation
Moving into chapter 2, this dissertation will delve into the literature relevant to the topic
at hand and will outline a general hypothesis that will introduce a new consideration related to
strategically managing brand risk in the information age. In chapter 3, the research methodology and
rationale will be described. The research questions and participants will be identified and the design of
the survey and data collection process will be discussed. In chapter 4, the research findings will be
highlighted and critically analyzed. Chapter 5 will provide recommendations derived from the research
findings and the report will conclude with final thoughts on the topic. A thorough bibliography and
several appendices supporting research offered in this report will be included at the end of this
dissertation.

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CHAPTER 2
Literature Review
As the purpose of this study is to critical analyze the elements of the Copulskys (2011) brand
resilience framework in an effort to parallel this theorectical framework with its practical implications
in the workplace, the book from which the framework is derived will be throughly outlined. The main
counterinsurgecy metaphor and brand paradox assumption argued by Copulsky (2011) will be
explained, and the seven steps in the managing brand risk and recovery framework will be disected. A
deep dive in to the literature and coceptual frameworks in crisis management, stakeholder management
and brand and reputational manangement will be examined. This review of revelvant literature will also
draw attention to any limitations or flawed assuptions made by Copulsky and will mention how the
work does or does not support the findings of other cited works.
Brand Fragility Paradox
Copulsky (2011) begins his narrative by insisting that the rise in the importance of brand trust
means that any breach of that faith in a brand could be fatal. The assumption goes on to state that if
our brand behaves in a manner that suggests our trust is misplaced, we terminate that relationshsip
quickly and decisively (p. 23). Unrepaired breaches are partciularly detrimental. The most vauable
brands would seem to enjoy strong relationships with their customers, but strong customer realtionships
depend on trust. The author goes on to describe how competitors are also quick to capitalize on
preceived breaches of trust. In the current state of the world, brands are now faced with incredible
schizophrenic consumer behavior. On diametrically opposed sides of the spectrum, consumers forge
incrediably loyal bonds with brands, but abandon those brands when they prove unworthy. The
supposition goes on to state that trust is fragile and that we are now in a world where brands can be
incedibly powerful, but more challenging and more expensive to create and maintain, and are less
resilient. Thus, building a resilient brand and defending it against both intended and unwitting acts of
brand sabotage needs to be a firms number one priority. Here the author introduces the brand fragility

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paradox (see Figure 2). According to Copulsky (2011), when brand value and brand fragility grow
simultaneously, the importance of trustworthiness is heightened accordingly.

Figure 2: Brand Fragility Paradox

Source: (Copulsky, et al., 2011)


Brands create enormous value for their owners by enabling premium pricing, high levels of customer
advocacy, and great permission to enter new markets, new customer segments, and new product
categories, all of which are crucial advantages in a saturated market. Nonetheless, these same qualities
make brands more vulnerable, particularly when considering the level of transparency todays
consumers demand (Copulsky, 2011).
The main counterinsurgecy metaphor used throughout the book links marketing efforts to win
market share and beat the competition to the U.S. Militarys Counterinsurgency Field Manual tactics
and mentions Tzus (1910) Art of War and Krieges (1832) On War as two military strategy books that
have become required readings for many marketers. An insurgency is the protection against a barrage
of potential attacks by saboteurs. Copulsky (2011) goes on to cite well-known marketing author,
professor and pundit, Kotler and Singhs (1981) as the seminal thought leaders in establishing the link
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between military strategy and marketing. According to Copulsky (2011), the marketing-as-warfare
metaphor works by creating a laser-like focus on destryoing the emeny, conveys a sense of decisiveness
and purpose with clear objective, plan, tactics and means of measuring success. Thirdly, the metaphor
implies that marketing, as well as military operations, can be organized around a series of tightly
coordinated and well-executed campaigns. Fourth, marketers need to carefully plan and orchestrate their
use of weaponry relying on the Four Ps of marketing rather then air, land, and sea power, as observed
in the military (Copulsky, et al., 2011).
The foundational premise of the marketing-as-warfare metaphor is that marketing is a zero-sum
game against known enemies (Copulsky, 2011, p. 32). One companys gain is another companys loss.
Success is measured in market share and if marketing efforts help increase the size of the market, thats
good, but if marketing efforts increase size and market share that is even better. Brand resilience is
about brand owners being more deliberate in protecting their investments by agressively playing defense
and having strong recovery strategies prepared. Marketing is now about the need for brand defense
since, as the brand fragility paradox dictates, brands are more valuable, but are also much more fragile
than ever before.
Copulsky (2011) goes on to question whether or not marketing warfare is still relevant by citing
Rindfleisch (1996), who argues that the assumptions underlying the warfare perspective are no longer
valid or applicable in a world in which traditional competitors often find themselves collaborating,
rather than head-to-head fighting. Copulsky (2011) validates this position by agreeing that every day at
Deloitte they see more and more examples of companies working closely together with their toughest
competitors. The author goes on to admit that the warfare metaphor is problematic because companies
cannot always afford to focus single-handedly on enaging and overwhelming a clearly discernible
opponent under well-defined conditions, governed by well-understood rules. Continuing with the same
warfare language and tone of argument, Copulsky (2011) admits that brand stewards today are
confronted by a myriad of issues, such as assaults to the the brand from unpredictable sources, assaults
to the brand as unintentional consequences of other activities and decisions, the increased frequency of
assaults, since brand activities have become more visible, the speed at which damage can be done, and

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the diversity of weaponry used in assaults to the brand in the age of social media. The author then goes
on to mention that any brand steward can learn a lot from The U.S. Army/ Marine Corps
Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Department of Army , 2006) as a brand resilence playbook.
Brand Resilience Framework
According to Copulsky (2011), managing brand risk with intelligence includes playing an active
role and consistent defense to threats to the brand inside the borders of the firm, such as brand
ambassadors losing credibility, employees creating viral video/blog, repeated product discounts or
boorish executive leadership behavior. Threats outside a firms borders include social media
impersonators, outsourced supplier quality, scathing blogger review or an irate customer. Copulsky
(2011) suggests that brand saboteurs are those who take part in acts that threaten the brand and include
accidental or seemingly random acts, but what matters is impact more than intent. He then goes on to
propose a seven step brand resilience and counterinsurgency framework (see Figure 3, p. 15) that has a
three pillar action component: 1. Plan, 2. Prepare and 3. Execute. This three pillar element then supports
a seven step sequence: 1. Assess brand risks, 2. Galvanize your brand troops, 3. Deploy your brand risk
early warning systems, 4. Repel the attacks on your brand, 5. Learn and adapt your brand defenses, 6.
Measure and track brand resilience, 7. Generate popular support for your brand resilience campaign.

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Figure 3: Brand Resilience Framework

Source: (Copulsky, et al., 2011)

STEP 1. Assess Brand Risks: The first section begins with The Enemy Within. Here Copulsky
(2011) speaks to being mindful of the saboteurs within or beyond the firms borders. The more intuitive
form of sabotage is external from competitors, disgruntled customer or activists, the author asserts.
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Other examples include employees blogging about their job dissatisfaction or leadership behaving
boorishly in public. The author urges companies to understand the motivations behind sabotage and the
potential impacts to help avoid them. It is made clear that much of the internally generated brand
sabotage is accidental, executives, employees and supply chain partners do inadvertent things to damage
the brand. Often, carelessness is the culprit, not malicious intent (p.73), but Copulsky (2011) makes it
clear that the outcome, not the intent is the most important factor. In this chapter, Copulsky (2011) also
suggests that brand risk does not begin and end in the marketing department, but can be a consequence
of operational decisions in engineering (product performance problems), finance (tightening of credit
policies), IT (inadvertent disclosure of customer information), legal (failure to protect copyrights), and
procurement (problematic offshore manufactures) to name a few.
In use of the phrase the The Enemy Within to refer to the internally generated brand sabotage
inflicted by executives, employees and supply chain partners, Copulsky (2011) seems to overlook
employees as the largest and strongest stakeholders in good brand reputation. To counter this view,
Tonello (2007) asserts, a company can hardly shield from its personnel any significant gap between
corporate identity, known to insiders, and public reputation a gap that inevitably translates into
employee dissatisfaction and skepticism about the business (p. 43). A favorable perception of the firm
by the public reflects on employee moral as well, by fostering a positive attitude in performance.
Specifically, a strong corporate reputation plays on employees desire to enhance their self-esteem and
social status by sharing the prestige of being part of a highly regarded group (ibid). Consequently, this
tends to augment employees identification with and commitment to the organization they are affiliated
with and increase the companys ability to attract and retain talent (Carmeli & Freund, 2002; Ellemers,
et al., 1999; Shelley & Zhao, 2006). It can thus be assumed that engaging employees as brand advocates
may reduce brand risk as result of intentional harm and increase resiliency.
Additionally, in contrast to the central claim of Copulskys (2011) view in Step 1, Tonello &
Brancato (2007) assert that a civil workplace centered on business ethics and a culture of integrity is
crucial to the employees impression about the company. As they work in the organization, employees
are more knowledgeable about the true identity of the firm than other category of stakeholders (p. 89).

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Tonello & Brancato (2007) go on to argue that the most valuable contribution that the board can provide
is to oversee the formation, implementation, and efficacy of a compliance and ethics program, inclusive
of a set of anonymous whistle-blowing procedures, to foster a climate of transparency and accountability
at every level of the organization. This valuable contribution by the corporate leadership suggested by
Tonello & Brancato (2007) aligns with Copulskys (2011) views mentioned in Step 2: Galvanize brand
troops, Step 6: Measure and track brand resilience, and particularly in Step 7: Generate popular support
for your brand resilience campaign, to be reviewed in detail later in this report. Surmise
The second section in the first step begins with Beyond Your Borders. Here Copulsky (2011)
discusses the enemies that live beyond the borders of the organization. This perspective is to supplement
The Enemy Within perspective, as it describes a raft of intentional brand insurgents, whose
motivations range from responding to real or perceived breaches of trust to inflicting legal and long
standing brand damage. The author then goes on to suggest that the four most obvious categories of
external insurgents are customers, reviewers, ideologues and competitors, whose tactics are often
unpredictable. According to Copulsky (2011), disappointment, anger and rage are the pivotal phases in
diminished customer trust, which could ultimately lead to the customers feeling of let down and then
them undermining the brand, if not addressed. United Breaks Guitars, as mentioned in the introduction
of the report, is just such an example of a customers disappointment transforming into anger and
ultimately rage that generated a socially viral negative result for the company and damaged the brand
(Dunne, 2010; CBC News, 2009). Volunteer reviewers, Copulsky (2011) suggests, are the second set
of external saboteurs who ultimately require more of a firms attention and can ultimately harm the
brand. While customers learn a lot about the brand from what the company communicates, much of
what they know also comes from information that is not internally generated or controlled. The author
goes on to reason that research about buying patterns suggest that looking at online reviews and ratings
prior to purchase is a major step for most consumers. He goes on to suggest that while professional
reviewers and analysts generally adhere to strict policies about reviewing, more and more online reviews
are now generated by web users, so constraints are virtually unenforceable. To corroborate this view we
can look to Moyer (2010) who calls into question the validity of crowdsourced online reviews and
suggests that online ranking systems suffer from a number of inherent biases such as the obvious: people
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who rate purchases have already made the purchase and the more bias: people tend not to review things
they find merely satisfactory. Moyer (2010) states that a controlled offline survey of seemingly
polarizing products revealed that individuals true opinions fit a bell-shaped curve - ratings cluster
around three or four (on a scale of one to five), with fewer scores of two and almost no ones and fives.
Self-selected online voting creates an artificial judgment gap; as in modern politics, only the loudest
voices at the furthest ends of the spectrum seem to get heard (ibid). Moyers standpoint falls in line
with Copulskys view that volunteer reviewers are external saboteurs who ultimately require more of a
firms attention and can ultimately harm the brand.
Ideologues are the third group of external saboteurs specified by Copulsky (2011). Here the
author offers a muckrakers metaphor, calling on the age of Theodore Roosevelt, the 26th President of
the United States during the progressive era that flourished from the 1890s to the 1920s (Buenker, et
al., 1986). The era called for reform of the political landscape and investigative journalist and authors
were particularly influential. These ideologue muckrakers are influential persons mainly concerned
with a common set of issues, such as the environment, excessive greed, health, labor conditions and
undue corporate influence on government officials. The difference between the enrage customer and
the contemporary muckraker lies in their motivation, Copulsky suggests. One is enrage by how he or
she may have been treated individually, while the other is broadly enraged by the firms principles and
practices. Michael Moore, an American filmmaker, author and social critic, has been accused of being
a muckraker for writing and producing cinematic works that criticize globalization, large corporations,
assault weapon ownership, former U.S. presidents, the Iraq War, the American health care system, and
capitalism. In 2005, Time magazine named Moore one of the world's 100 most influential people, and
his most famous documentary, Fahrenheit 9/11, grossed over $222 million USD total worldwide,
making the film one of the highest grossing of all time, thus corroborating Copulskys (2011) claim that
muckrakers are highly influential and potentially detrimental to brands (Mintz, 2005; Box Office Mojo,
2014; The New York Times, 2014).
The finally external saboteur examined by the author is the competitor, which he states is
increasing eager to capitalize when a firm stumbles. Copulsky (2011) then cites political dirty tricks

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as an example. Photoshopping images and creative editing are mentioned as questionable modern day
tactics used to make wrongdoings easier to commit and harder to conceal. In accordance with what
Copulsky (2011) asserts in step one, Oxenford (2011, p. 8) suggests that:
Internal factors can play just as an important part of building [the] external brand as the
other brand initiatives But brand is not simply good public relations or a strong
marketing campaign, but rather all the interactions and actions of an organization both
internally and externally.
However, in direct conflict with what Copulsky (2011) asserts in his brand fragility paradox (see Figure
2), Oxenford (2011) goes on to argue that, brand is part of reputation and a well developed brand can
help protect reputation in times of crisis and busines interuptions. Dowling (2001) adds that typically
reputation takes a long time to form, and once developed they work like a flywheel - delivering a
sustained stream of power to what ever they are attached to (p.3). This conflicts with Copulskys notion
that any breach of that faith in a brand could be fatal to said brand. Further, it can be said that the
underline supposition of Copulskys brand fragility view is based on the faulty assumption that the
brand is an externally devised construct of a company that is disposable, as opposed to an internally
developed holistic and authentic way of doing business with clear corproate governance implications.
To further illustrate this point, we look to Tonello (2007) who contends that empirical research
shows that companies that can rely on a solid corporate reputation proposition are better suited to face
a situation of reputational crisis. A notable example of this is Johnson & Johnson, which was able to
regain 95 percent of its market share within three months of its Tylenol/ cyanide scandal in the 1980s,
when 7 people in west-side Chicago died mysteriously (Harris, et al., 2002). Tylenol was the leading
pain-killer medicine in the United States at the time and enjoyed 37 percent market share, strong growth,
high profitability and was the major contributor to the financial success of its parent company Johnson
& Johnson (ibid). It was uncovered that Tylenol Extra-Strength capsules had been replaced with
cyanide-laced capsules, resealed in the packages and deposited back on the selves of at least a halfdozen pharmacies and food stores in the Chicago area (Collins, 2003). Once the connection was made
between the Tylenol capsules and the reported deaths, Johnson & Johnson chairman James Burke
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formed a strategy team charged with protecting consumers first, and saving the product secondly (ibid).
Johnson & Johnson was faced with the dilemma of the best way to deal with the problem without
destroying the reputation of the company and its most profitable product. The response was a product
recall from the entire country which amounted to about 31 million capsules and a loss of more than
$100 million USD, they halted all advertisement for the product, toll-free cosumer numbers were setup, and press conferences and media junkets with major news and talk shows were organized, so that
the chairman could address the situation publically (Kaplan, 1998; Susi, 2002). As a result McNeil
Cosumer Products Company and its parent company Johnson & Johnson introduced the tamper-proof
packaging that persists today. Johnson & Johnsons response in this instance is an strong example of
corporate social responsibility and keen stakeholder and crisis management strategy and is historically
considered an seminal illustration of what excellent companies do when confronted by brand sabotuers.
The company was able to effectively salvage its brand because of their immediate and thorough
response to crisis, supplemented by the strong market presense and reputation prior to the incident.
Further in Step 1, Copulsky refers to customers as one of the four most obvious categories of
external insurgents and brand saboteurs, however Tonello (2007) counters that the relationship with
customers may be only marginally affected by the reputation of the corporation. The author (Tonello,
2007, p. 16) asserts that in a variety of business sectors, especially in the consumer goods industry, what
really cultivates the relationship with customers is a powerful and dependable product brand:
Since customers may remain unaware of (and even be uninterested in) the maker of their
favorite products (many, for example, do not know that Ferrari is a Fiat brand or that
Mercedes is made by Daimler), companies in those sectors and with multiple brands may not
feel the need to associate the product with the brands owner by investing in overall corporate
reputation.
What is more, it may be concluded that the lack of a singular perception of the manufacturing firm
would help to isolate the negative effects of a brands potential deterioration in the consumer market.
In this view, minimizing corporate visibility and reputation can be a mindful risk management strategy.
However, there are a few notable examples of business models such as Anita Roddicks Body Shop,
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where the overall reputation of an organization, including how certain principles and beliefs influence
the firms production processes, employee talent selection, and operational style, is strategically
deployed to appeal to a segment of the market that identifies with those ideals (Argenti &
Druckenmiller, 2003). In other cases, overall corporate reputation can operate as a cohesive franchise
and lend credibility to new products and/or ventures such as in the case of the strategy pursued by Steve
Jobs to leverage Apples reputation as a designer of cutting-edge, alternative computer technology in
order to create new expectations in the marketplace and make an impact on the music and ITC industries
(Tonello, 2007).
STEP 2. Galvanize your brand troops: Here Copulsky (2011) suggests that preventing brand
sabotage begins with awareness of the threat and involves how to galvanize, or stimulate, employees to
take personal responsibility and detecting and preempting threats to the brand. The author warns that
this is the area in which strong leadership is warranted on the part of the executive team. A mission
must be defined, the climate and culture reinforced, and employee training and guidance provided. He
adds that there are three ingredients to the effective engagement of brand troops. They are a clear
mission that links the troops to the cause of the brand resilience, a purposeful and sustained outreach
program and a strategy for employee ownership of said mission. Copulsky (2011) suggests that a
companys actionable elements are to commit to sharing information with their employees about brand
value, including drivers of and the potential impacts of brand sabotage. Companys should also assess
whether they are engaging its employees in brand resilience efforts for the long term by developing a
clear strategy at all critical points during employee tenure, and creating clear policies and guidelines for
employee use of the brand and social media. Lastly, the company must focus on educational efforts on
giving employees the situational cognition of recognizing brand sabotage by providing them with a
platform and the motivation to share what they learn.
This step seems to present a slight divergence from Step 1 in that Copulsky (2011) moves from
labeling employees as internal saboteurs or The Enemy Within to wanting to galvanize troops, or
elicited excitement and support from said employees to benefit the brand. As mentioned above, in Step
1, Copulsky (2011) seems to overlook employees as the largest and strongest stakeholders in good brand

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reputation, but looks to recover from this faulty assumption with rhetoric, here in Step 2, focused on the
corporate mission, outreach programming and internal culture necessary to get employees to take
personal responsibility for enhancing brand resilience. In Step 2, Copulsky seemingly shifts gears to
acknowledge and suggest the utilization of Tonellos (2007) view that a strong corporate reputation
plays on employees desire to enhance their social status by being a part of a highly regarded group,
consequently, augmenting the employees commitment to the organization with which they are
affiliated. Additionally, in contrast to the foundational assumption of Step 1, in Step 2, Copulskys
seems to support Tonello & Brancatos (2007) assertion that a place of work centered on business ethics
and a culture of mission integrity is crucial to an employees impression about the company, which
ultimately helps he or she to take personal responsibility for detecting and preempting threats to the
brand. Here in Step 2, Copulsky also affirms Tonello & Brancatos (2007) notion that the most valuable
impact that company leadership can provide is to oversee the formation, implementation, and efficacy
of a compliance and ethics program.
In line with what Copulsky (2011) asserts in Step 2, Taylor (2010, p. 2) also embraces the
connection between brand and corporate culture:
Even the most creative business leaders I know recognize that success is not just about
marketing differently from other companies: more daring ads, more new products, more
aggressive use of Twitter and Facebook. It is also, and perhaps more important, about caring
more than other companies about customers, about colleagues, about how the organization
conducts itself in a world with endless opportunities to cut corners and compromise on values.
Taylor (2010) goes on to say that the new power couple inside the best companies are ironclad
partnerships between marketing leadership and HR leadership. The actions of the United Services
Automobile Association (USAA), a Texas-based Fortune 500 diversified financial services group of
companies, can be used to further illustrate this point and its close association with Copulskys (2011)
view in Step 2. The USAA only serves one customer base, active or retired members of the U.S. military
and their families. Its customer-loyalty rankings are superlative and it has become a legendary brand,
both in terms of technology innovation and service. One of the main reasons for its strong performance
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as a brand is the strong sense of identification between its front-line employees and its customers. The
company has a much-admired training program in which employees learn the technical skills they need
to work efficiently. What the employees learn deeply, through coaching and engagement efforts enacted
by company leadership, is to empathize with a soldier on active duty and all of the other pressures and
demands on its 7.4 million military members. The employees are tied to the mission of the brand. The
personal identification between employees and customers is what gives USAA the drive to provide great
service and to allow innovation. For example, USAA was the first financial-services company to allow
customers to deposit checks by iPhone. The point behind the success of the USAA is that companies
cannot be distinguishing and compelling in the marketplace unless they create something distinguishing
and compelling within the workplace by culture shaping (Taylor, 2010; Oxenford, 2011). This USAA
illustrates how the brand may shape the culture and how the culture may bring the brand to life and the
influence of internal stakeholders on external stakeholders. USAA demonstrates how to link the
employees to the cause of the brand resilience and how to purposefully develop and sustain a strategy
for employee ownership of said brand, as Copulsky (2011) asserts is necessary to galvanize troops in
the brand resilience efforts of Step 2.
STEP 3. Deploy your brand risk early warning systems: Here Copulsky (2011) urges companies to
build an early warning system to alert to rumblings of trouble, take steps to deter and minimize the
damage, build and test early warning systems, and evaluate available third-party solutions for assessing
and detecting potential threats. The author argues that predicting brand sabotage is hard at first, as the
company may not recognize that the brand is under attack, but by enlisting everyone to be part of the
early warning system in the fight against sabotage and listening carefully to the signs, threats can be
detected earlier. Copulsky (2011) then goes on to warn that listening does not have much value if the
processes to take action are not in place and operable. Copulsky suggests that a companys actionable
elements should acknowledge that not every possible incident of sabotage will be detected, but the goal
is to spend less time in defense mode. The author then suggestions that

the opportunities for

crowdsourcing information (a stakeholder engagement effort) about potential sources of brand sabotage
is another pivotal action task for which a company must assign responsibility.

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As mentioned above in Step 1, Moyer (2010, p. 1) calls into question the validity of
crowdsourcing by criticising the quality of the data and the motives of particularly influencial members
of the crowd, stating:
The philosophy behind this so-called crowdsourcing strategy holds that the truest and most
accurate evaluations will come from aggregating the opinions of a large and diverse group of
people. Yet a closer look reveals that the wisdom of crowds may neither be wise nor necessarily
made by a crowd. Its judgments are inaccurate at best, fraudulent at worst.
However, Brabham (2008) take issue with this position calling crowdsourcing is a valid and reliable
distributed problem-solving business model and a team-based multi-disciplinary practice. Brabham
(2008) goes further to describe crowdsourcing as a successful, alternative business model based on
aggregating talent, leveraging ingenuity while reducing the costs and time formerly needed to solve
problems. Similarly, Surowiecki (2004) examines several cases of crowd wisdom at work, where the
success of a resolution is dependent on its emergence from a large body of problem-solvers. Based on
his empirical investigations on estimating the weight of an ox and theories on the Columbia shuttle
disaster, Surowiecki (2004) finds that under the right circumstances, groups are remarkably intelligent,
and are often smarter than the smartest people in them (p. xiii). Brabham (2008) states that the wisdom
of crowds is derived from aggregating solutions, not averaging them. As with most things, the average
is mediocrity, however with decision-making, it is often excellence. This perspective aligns with
Copulskys (2011) view that in the fight against brand sabotage, everyone can play a part of the early
warning system and that one of the primary things a company should do to actively deploy brand risk
early warning systems is to consider opportunities for crowdsourcing information about potential
sources of brand sabotage from various stakeholders.
STEP 4. Repel the attacks on your brand: Here Copulsky (2011) suggests a course of action after a
brand attack to limit fallout, appease public trust and emerge stronger in the end (crisis management).
This involves actively responding to attacks in the appropriate timeframe on the appropriate level.
Kovoor-Misra & Nathan (2000) agree, arguing that post-crisis opportunity is time-sensitive and create
a critical period of learning readiness in organizations. Copulsky (2011) goes on to suggest that a brand
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attack be recognized as an event with the opportunity for pre- and post-actions, however Crandall, et al.
(2014) disagrees, arguing that crisis is more than just an event, it is a life cycle phenomenon that has a
birth, an acute stage - the crisis - and an aftermath. Copulsky (2011) also suggests to think of an apology
as an expression of regret, not as an admission of guilt. A sense of urgency should be displayed when
there is a bona fide problem and all corporate responses to said problem should be rehearsed and on
brand narrative.
Here Copulskys (2011) recommendations align with the case mentioned in Step 1 of Johnson
& Johnsons response to the Tylenol tampering and the subsequent Chicago area deaths, where the
company exhibited a strong corporate social responsibility and employed a keen stakeholder and crisis
management strategy allowing the company to salvange its brand, primarily because of their immediate
response to the crisis, supplemented by their strong market presence and corporate reputation (Harris,
et al., 2002; Kaplan, 1998). There are two broad approaches to managing crises: (1) Try to keep them
from reoccurring, and (2) mitigate or soften the impact of the crisis when it does occur (Crandall, et al.,
2014).
Copulsys (2011) Step 4 strategy (and much of his brand resilience framework) falls in line with
Crandall, et al.s (2014) four stage crisis management conceptual framework which invloves 1)
Landscape Survey: identifying potential crisis vulnerabilities, 2) Strategic Planning: organizing the
crisis management team and writing the plan, 3) Crisis Management: addressing the crisis when it
occurs, and 4) Organizational Learning: applying lessons from crises so they will be prevented or
mitigated in the future. Crandall, et al.s (2014) framework takes a new spin on traditional crisis
management frameworks by emphasizes the importance of managing both the internal landscape (those
stakeholders within the organization, such as the employees, owners, and management) and the external
landscape (those stakeholders outside of the organization, such as the media, customers, suppliers,
general public, government agencies, and special interest groups). The authors (Crandall, et al., 2014,
p. 4) offer this official definition:
A crisis is an event that has a low probability of occurring, but should it occur, can have a
vastly negative impact on the organization. The causes of the crisis, as well as the means to
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resolve it, may not be readily clear; nonetheless, its resolution should be approached as
quickly as possible. Finally, the crisis impact may not be initially obvious to all of the relevant
stakeholders of the organization.
To the contrary, Copulskys (2011) definitively defensive tone throughout his description of the brand
resilience framework (see Figure 3) (as evidenced by the use of the counterinsurgency metaphor)
deflects from that which is represented in Crandall, et al.s (2014) outlook above. Copulsky (2011)
implies that there is always a high likelihood of brand sabotage looming on the horizon, as a result of
the high-speed world within which business much function. Kovoor-Misra & Nathan (2000) take issue
with this assumption, pointing out that defensiveness inhibits openness to learning and negatively
affects the quality of information that is gathered in a crisis situation (p. 31). The authors go on to argue
that crises can be a valuable source of information and a motivator for change.
STEP 5. Learn and adapt your brand defenses: Here Copulsky (2011) urges brand stewards to learn
from each assault and adapt behavior and tactics accordingly. Sources of brand sabotage can be
opportunities for insight and growth. The author goes on to advise companies to translate one-off
responses into more systematic changes that reduce the likelihood of future attacks (organizational
change). An organization can move from complacency into action in the midst of a crisis (p. 151). The
role of a brand steward is to make sure the company takes a hard look at what actually happened and
not just simply fix it and move on, but mobilize to analyze what really happened. The author also
prompts the reader to the acknowledge that expectations for transparency are high when clarifying
policies implemented in response to attacks and brand shocks. Kovoor-Misra & Nathan (2000)
corroborate this view arguing that during a crisis there is confusion, and employees look to top
managers specifically to understand how they should behave (p. 31).
Again, this step closely aligns with Crandall, et al., (2014) crisis management conceptual
framework, particluarly Stage 4, Organizational Learning: applying lessons from crises so they will be
prevented or mitigated in the future, which suggests that after the crisis ends, the organization must take
time to learn from what has occurred. Crandall, et al. (2014) also suggests that one of the main keys to
learning from a crisis is timing, not to wait too long after the event has occurred to reflect and evaluate
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the occurrence. Kovoor-Misra & Nathan (2000) suggest that if too much time elapses, management
may reach a stage termed forgetfulness and the organization may return to normal operations without
the motivation to evaluate and learn from the crisis. Kovoor-Misra & Nathan (2000) go on to state that
there are three phases that organizations tend to go through once a crisis has occurred: first
defensiveness, then openness to learning, and finally forgetfulness. It is during the openness phase that
most learning can occur. At a minimum, management must assess how the crisis was handled and what
organizational changes need to be made in the crisis management blueprint. Pearson & Clair (1998)
suggest that this can be examined in terms of degrees of success and failure. For instance, an
organization may succeed at resuming timely operations, but fail at guarding its reputation. An
organization that is successful at learning will change its policies and procedures when necessary and
apply that new knowledge to future crisis events (ibid).
In the external landscape, industry regulators often reevaluate and renew their procedures
after a crisis. Certainly the airline industry has changed dramatically in terms of safety
regulations after Americas worst terrorist incident on September 11, 2001. Government
regulations are often implemented after a crisis, usually to increase the safety of stakeholders
in the affected industry (Crandall, et al., 201, p. 14).
We can look to a more recent instance of crisis and sabotage at Malaysian Airlines (MAS) to
further illustrate the widely held view of learning from each assault and adapting behavior and tactics
accordingly (Copulsky, 2011; Crandall, et al., 2014; Kovoor-Misra & Nathan, 2000; Pearson & Clair,
1998). In early 2014, the airline lost two Boeing 777 aircrafts within 131 days, with a total of 537
passengers and crew lost. Flight 370 disappeared in an unknown location, without a distress signal, most
likely in the Southern Indian Ocean, on March 8 with 239 persons on board. The second, Flight 17,
crashed near Donetsk in eastern Ukraine on July 17 with 298 passengers and crew on board. The plan
was shot out of the sky by a surface-to-air missile (Patterson, 2014). Even before the crash of Flight
17, many analysts and pundits suggested that MAS would need to rebrand and repair its image and/or
require government assistance to return to profitability. A month after the disappearance of the first
plane, MAS chief executive Ahmad Jauhari Yahya acknowledged that ticket sales had declined, but

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failed to provide specific details (displaying a lack to transparency). Mr. Ahmad stated in an interview
that the airline's primary focus is that we do take care of the families in terms of their emotional needs
and also their financial needs. It is important that we provide answers for them. It is important that the
world has answers, as well (Raghuvanshi & Ng, 2014).

In terms of crisis management and

organizational learning, MAS has been working over the last several months on consolidating flights,
preparing short-term capacity adjustments to mitigate losses and a restructuring plan aimed at adjusting
its strategy to the challenging market conditions and the impact of the crashes (Centre for Asia Pacific
Aviation, 2014; Zhang, 2014).
STEP 6. Measure and track brand resilience: Here Copulsky (2011) emphasizes the importance of
the using business intelligence (BI) information systems (IS) to measure and track brand resilience as
vigilantly as a firm would any other vital sign. The right measurement and tracking capabilities are
crucial to understanding whether your efforts to manage brand risks are working (p. 166). According
to the author, capturing the voice of the customer (VoC) is the first step in the evolution processes of
building brand resilience measurement capabilities. Getting information on what happens on the front
lines and including brand risk management in the scope of activities of executive leadership are of
pivotal importance, as well. To that end, the author emphasizes the importance of managements role,
responsibility and accountability for measuring and tracking brand resilience.
According to Subramaniam, et al., (2009), BI refers to methodologies and technologies for the
collection, integration, and analysis of all relevant information in a business, for the purpose of better
business decision-making. This is in essence discovering different variables crucial for business and
their correlation to variables that define success for the business. BI systems are widely used across
many industries, typically to track Key Performance Indicator (KPIs), aid decision support systems,
perform data mining and do predictive analysis based on the information acquired. Structured
information constitutes only a small portion of large volumes of information available in enterprises
(Gartner, 2011). It is widely accepted that structured data constitutes only about 20% of the complete
enterprise data, which includes communications from the customer or VoC (Berry, 2012; Gartner, Inc.,
2014; Subramaniam, et al., 2009). Subramaniam, et al. (2009) argues that VoC can enrich business

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insights, as suggested by Copulsky (2011) however, carrying out the collection process in an effective
manner requires effective BI systems for VoC. The authors go on to emphasize that there are three
major issues in using VoC for BI. The first challenge is data quality, the second major challenge is in
integrating the VoC with other enterprise structured and unstructured data, and the third challenge is in
storing and processing large volumes of data, as huge computational power is required to process VoC
(Subramaniam, et al., 2009). Copulsky (2011) himself acknowledges this issue, stating that critics and
advocates of IS management philosophies agree that success require significant changes in behavior
and processes, and it requires change in the structure of the organization using such systems.
Information is the platform for these changes, but does not ensure that an organization will achieve the
same results as those realized in organizations with successful BI IS implementations Copulsky (2011).
In line with Copulskys (2011) view of developing organizations with more mature brand
resilience measuring and tracking systems, Gartner (2011) offers a BI, analytics and performance
management framework (see Figure 4) that defines the people, processes and technologies that need to
be integrated and aligned to take a strategic approach to performance management (PM).

Figure 4: Gartner BI, Analytics and Performance Management Framework

Source: (Gartner, 2011)


Suggested by Gartner (2011), in a familiar defensive tone, there was a need for the framework, as:
Increased volatility, ongoing economic uncertainty driving first cost-cutting and the return-togrowth strategies and increasing stakeholder pressure has only increased demands for

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business executive seeking new or better ways to improve performance at all level of the
organization. (Gartner, 2011, p. 2).
However, fatal to the practicality of Copulskys (2011) recommendations, Gartner (2011) finds that a
strategic view requires defining decision-making and analytical processes, as well as the processes that
define information management, independently from the technology that will be used for
implementation. Additionally, the program management, technology and complexity of skills
associated with the strategic use of BI, analytics and PM increase dramatically as the scope of the
initiative widens across multiple business processes (Gartner, 2011), further highlighting the complexity
of enacting organizational change.
STEP 7. Generate popular support for your brand resilience campaign: Here Copulsky (2011)
suggests companies broaden its base of support. Brand advocates can be powerful additions to a firms
counterinsurgency arsenal. The author cautions that so long as a brand resilience campaign fails to attain
popular support, it will most likely not succeed, thus building in a plan for gaining popularity is
necessary. Additionally, Copulsky (2011) suggests that particular attention be paid to brand advocates
so that the company does not inadvertently turn them into brand saboteurs. The author then comes full
circle by suggesting that organization start developing a plan for contacting advocates in response to
brand shocks, including having the advocates play a role in early warning systems, as mentioned in Step
3, and develop solutions to repel attacks on the brand, as mentioned in Step 4.
Copulsky (2011) begins his description of brand advocates, individuals who preach the merits
of a given brand with or without prompting, by focusing his attention on secondary stakeholders and
potential brand advocates external to the organization. The author illustrates his strict external focus by
citing several real-world examples, such as in his description of the 2010 U.S. midterm elections where
President Barack Obama referred to convenience store 7-Elevens branded drink, the Slurpee, as a very
delicious drink and inadvertently became a global brand advocate for the brand. The Stakeholder theory
of organizational management suggests that primary stakeholders, (usually internal stakeholders, that
engage in economic transactions with the business e.g. stockholders, customers, suppliers, creditors,
and employees) and secondary stakeholders, (usually external stakeholders, who - although they do not
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engage in direct economic exchange with the business - are affected by or can affect its actions e.g. the
general public, communities, activist groups, business support groups, and the media) are both pivotal
to engagement efforts (Freeman, 1984).

There is substantial evidence in the stakeholder and

communication management literature to suggest that enlightened organizational strategy-making is


best informed by a process of continuous dialogue with stakeholders (Sinclair, 2011). According to
Miles (2012), stakeholder engagement is the process by which an organization involves people who
may be affected by the decisions it makes or can influence the implementation of its decisions. Further,
stakeholder engagement provides opportunities to further align business practices with societal
expectations, helping to drive long-term sustainability and shareholder value. Sinclair (2011) suggests
that the business benefits of effective engagement are well-known and well-documented and that a
number of studies have found a clear correlation between stakeholder relationship quality and financial
performance (Waddock & Graves, 1997), sustainable wealth/long-term value (Post, et al., 2002), and
corporate reputation (Dowling, 1994). Additionally, Botan & Hazleton (1989) and Grunig (1992) point
to the value of on-going stakeholder engagement in organizational decision-making. This engagement
process and its underlying organizational management implications are in line with Copulskys (2011)
recommendations for mobilizing popular support for brand resilience efforts by the identification and
utilization of brand advocates mentioned in the final step, however Copulskys seems to set his focus
primarily on secondary stakeholders as opposed to primary stakeholders, which may prove problematic.
In essence, there is substantial evidence in the brand and reputational management, stakeholder
management, performance management and crisis management literature to suggest that Copulskys
(2011) brand resilience framework (see Figure 3) has several valuable promptings. However, the
literature also suggests that the framework is hedged by several assumptions that call into question the
practicality of the framework in totality in a real-world setting. Copulsky (2011) may be overlooking
one of the most important groups of stakeholders - employees - in his brand resilience and risk-reducing
efforts, as he mainly focuses his efforts on sabotage external to the organization. The overwhelming
complexity of the framework, coupled with the defensive tone may be off-putting to executives looking
to employ this framework in a practical sense. Additionally, while business justifications for each step
were provided, a lack of clear and specified timeframes for each step, and levels of commitment for
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financial/ budgetary, staffing, and learning curve requirements may also prove problematic in the
deployment of this framework.

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CHAPTER 3
Research Approach & Methodology
A reflective practitioner and semi-structured interview methodology was undertaken to
systematically explore and assess the feasibility of the brand resilience framework (see Figure 3) in
global corporations with recognizable brands. In so doing, an attempt was made to compare this
theoretical framework to what typically occurs in the workplace. Bearing in mind the overall benefit of
effective brand resilience techniques, the overall design intent was to bridge the gap that often exists
between the theoretical and the practical, helping to provide contemporary recommendations for
managing brand risk in the information age.
The methodology lends itself well to use in business because it is a flexible approach that can
be used to evaluate and improve workplace practices. It can be an important tool in practice-based
professional learning settings where individuals are learning from their own professional experiences.
It involves the capacity to reflect on action so as to engage in a process of continuous learning and
involves paying critical attention to the practical values and theories which inform everyday actions
(Schon, 1983). Further, through reflection one is able to see and label schools of thought and theory
and enhance knowledge (McBrien, 2007). Since the intent of the research was to explore a framework,
a conversational semi-structured interview, with open-ended questions, was undertaken in order to build
a rapport with participants, allowing new ideas to be brought up during the interview and increasing the
depth of knowledge shared by the participants. This method gives the researcher the freedom to probe
the interviewee to elaborate or to follow a new line of inquiry introduced by what the interviewee is
saying (University of Surrey, 2014; Barriball & While, 1994). This method works best when the
interviewer has a number of areas he/she wants to be sure to address (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005), such as
in the case of this research endeavor. Strengths of this method include positive rapport between the
participant and interviewer which is an efficient, simple and practical way of attaining data that is not
easily observed. High validity is also considered a strength of this method, as participants are able to
discuss managing brand risk in detail and the justifications of perspectives may be revealed as the
interviewee is allowed to speak freely with little direction from the interviewer. This method has the
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potential to overcome the poor response rates of questionnaire surveys and it can facilitate comparability
by ensuring that all questions are answered by each respondent (Austin, 1981; Bailey, 1987; Barriball
& While, 1994). Finally, this method is ideal because the interviewer can hone in on information that
either had not occurred to the interviewer or of which the interviewer had no prior knowledge (Sociology
Central, 2012).
Eleven participants (see Appendix A) were selected to take part in the semi-structured interviews
based on the following criteria of eligibility:

1. Those who currently or formerly work in management or executive leadership roles at global
brands (any industry)

2. Those who have been in a managerial position for five years or more
3. Those willing to share their professional perspectives and experiences on managing brand risk
in a corporate environment
In order to obtain the most candid responses anonymity was guaranteed to all eligible participants.
Participants were recruited and selected based on public information provided on their LinkedIn profiles
suggesting that they fit the criteria above. Ultimately, six male and five female participants agreed to
take part. Four participants were based at multi-national companies headquartered in the U.K., six
participants were based at multi-national companies headquartered in the U.S. and one participant was
based at a multi-national company headquartered in Australia. Five participants had 20+ years of
managerial experience, five participants had approximately 10 years of managerial experience and one
participant at approximately 5 years of managerial experience. All participants had at least an
undergraduate degree. Participants from a diverse background of business categories were selected for
participation (primarily FMCG, hospitality, technology, professional services, mass media, and food
and beverage) as to gather diverse perspectives and insight and widen the base of applicability for the
research findings whilst maintaining the uniformity of the most pivotal variables, as mentioned in the
criteria of eligibility above. The reason for targeting this specific population was that, in terms of the
structure and objectives of the research, perspectives needed to be obtained from managers who had
acquired a certain level of corporate responsibility at global firms that are particularly interested in
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protecting and maintaining highly-visible and respected, global brand reputations. It therefore meant
that the participants would be able to provide information detailing the typical experiences of managers
in practice executing brand resilience efforts in the applicable corporate environments. Eleven persons
met the criteria and all of them were approached to form part of this study whilst adhering to ethical
principles. (Please see Appendix A for a description of each participant).
The steps in the research and data-collection process were as follows:
Initially, the contact information (valid email addresses) for 25 eligible professionals was
gathered from various online sources. These potential participants where then emailed and asked to
share their professional expertise by participating in the study. The introductory email explained the
general intent of the study (see Appendix B) and included an attachment with seven interview questions
listed, so that it was clear what was expected of each participant and so that the participants had time to
mentally prepare and recollect their first-hand professional experiences in the context of the study. The
attachment also included two figures, the first illustrating the brand fragility paradox (see Figure 2) and
the second illustrating the brand resilience framework (see Figure 3). The participants were asked their
thoughts on reliability, the strengths and weakness and utilization of the frameworks as it pertains to
their first-hand experience (see Appendix B for the full introduction and interview briefing document).
Immediate responses were received from just fewer than 50 percent of the contacted potential
participants. Once their eligibility was confirmed, interviews were scheduled with all of the potential
participants. Five interviews were conducted over the phone, three interviews conducted via Skype, two
interviews were conducted in person, and one interview was conducted in writing. The researcher acted
as the facilitator of the interviews.
Each interview (excluding the written interview, as timing could not be assessed) took 30 minutes
or greater, although 20 minutes was initially allotted for each. The open-ended questions allowed each
participant to elaborate as much as they would like and all participants took advantage of the
opportunity. Additionally, the research facilitator asked several probing questions based on the
responses given which also elongated the timeframes. Not more than three interviews were scheduled

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in one day as time zone differences as well as the unpredictable interview lengths complicated
scheduling a bit. Two interviews needed to be rescheduled due to timing conflicts.
Verbatim data was collected via laptop and iPhone recorders and the digital files of each interview
are available, but will be kept password protected and in the possession of the researcher as to protect
the identities of the participants. One participant requested not to be recorded, one participant responded
in writing as mentioned above, and three participants stated that they would be open to being named in
the final version of the report, so long as they can have final approval on the quotes used. The researcher
also reflected by keeping personal and observational notes during the interviews as well as on the
reflective process as a whole. Streubert Speziale, et al., (2007) suggest these personal notes may be
regarded as field notes to be used as reference when the verbatim data and narratives are analyzed.
Follow-up emails were sent to all participants clarifying disclosure information and thanking each
for his or her participation. Ethical considerations that were taken into account included human rights the right to self-determination, privacy, anonymity, confidentiality and fair treatment. Approval to
conduct the study was obtained from participants and the assigned research supervisor. Participation
was voluntary and each participant agreed to an informed consent and could withdraw at any time during
the study. The privacy, anonymity and confidentiality of the participants were protected by not linking
any names or the name of the institution to the collected data. Measures to ensure trustworthiness were
applied based on the evaluative model proposed by Lincoln & Guba (1985) and included credibility,
transferability, dependability and confirmability. Under the truth value (credibility) criteria, strategies
used in this research include reflective notes for reflexivity, verbatim audio for member checking,
reframing questions for interview techniques and integration of data in a logical manner for structural
coherence. For the transferability (applicability) criteria, strategies used in this research include
representativeness of all participants, for consistency (dependability) and neutrality (confirmability),
this research provides a dense description of the research methodology (Crabtree, 2006; De Swardt, et
al., 2012).
Limitations of this method include time intensiveness and the skill of the interviewer may come into
question - the ability to think of questions during the interview, and the articulacy of the respondent
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(Sociology Central, 2012). Adjusting each interview, for example, in order to obtain accurate and
complete data yet maintaining sufficient standardization to secure the validity and reliability of data is
a major challenge to interviewers and depends upon thorough training (Moser & Kalton, 1986; Barriball
& While, 1994). It is important to note that the interview facilitator in this research study has undergone
some professional interview training from a previous role in public relations and media relations. Also,
the researcher may have no way of knowing if the respondent is insincere, however in this case, the
researcher has no indication that untruths were provided by participants based on a review of the audio
recordings and field notes. Barriball & While (1994) argued that access to the nuances of the
interactions between respondent and interviewer (e.g. intonations, pauses) helps validate the accuracy
and completeness of the information collected and reduces the potential for interviewer error. Ornes
(1962) demand-characteristic effects of the personal interview was also considered in this research, as
several of the participants (see Appendix A) differed in ethnicity, gender, socio-economic background
and age from the interviewer. This dynamic could have had the potential to intimidate the interviewer
posing a potential for bias in the research (Bailey, 1987), however, the self-presentation of the
interviewer, in terms of dress, etiquette and manner largely overcame this potential for bias and went a
long way towards putting the respondents at ease (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Barriball & While, 1994).

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CHAPTER 4
Discussion and Analysis of Results
The results of this study are presented in terms of the themes addressed in the seven main
interview questions, namely (1) tangibility of risk associated with managing a global brand, (2) internal
versus external risk, (3) precautionary methods used to protect brand reputation, (4) perspectives on
Copulskys (2011) brand paradox framework, (5) perspectives on Copulskys (2011) brand resilience
framework, (6) internal leaderships concern with the safeguard of the brand, and (7) future implications
of brand risk in the information age.
Under the first theme, the tangibility of risk associated with managing a global brand, there was
wide consensus among all the participants that there was a true and present danger in managing the
brand of a global firm. Three subcategories emerged under this theme, namely the level of competition
in the market place, the speed at which crisis can escalate and the repercussions of corporate decisionmaking. The data confirms that the participants perceived the level of competition in the market, what
Sull (2006) describes as a volatile variable, to be the first subcategory of the real dangers in managing
brand risk and generally expressed the idea that the brands that seemed to get it right were the brands
that everyone tried to imitate. Often times this imitation attempt put into jeopardy the authenticity of
the original brand seeking to better its reputation. Participant 1 said, Everyone is trying to imitate the
ones that did it correctly. Everyone is trying to be like Starbucks. Brand manipulation and inauthenticity
is the result, as brands stay away from the original ideals of the firm in pursuit of the success associated
with the ideals of another brand. The data confirms that the participants perceived the speed at which
crisis can escalate to be the second subcategory of the real dangers in managing brand risk theme and
generally expressed the idea that Crisis can escalate in seconds (Participant 4). This coincides with
Abrahams (2008) who argues that the speed of response time needed...creates even more risk and
Copulsky (2011) who argues that brand stewards today are confronted by a myriad of issues such as the
speed at which damage can be done. The data confirms that the participants perceived the repercussions
of corporate decision-making to be the third subcategory of the real dangers in managing brand risk
theme and generally expressed the idea that decision-making from the executive level, actions of the
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employees and actions of the vendors and supply chain partners are main areas for risk. It was commonly
expressed that the repercussions of the actions of these stakeholders was harder to manage in the public
eye. These perspectives are in line with the widely held notion that it is challenging for non-marketers
to fully consider the brand in risk analysis and decision-making (Abrahams, 2008; Dowling, 2001;
OECD, 2005). Also, common was the contention that internal risk could be better controlled and
monitored, but that external risk was more challenging requiring constant investigation and shopping
(Participant 6) but that PR could be used to mitigate external risk (Participant 3). You can control
and manage internal risk, and you can mitigate external risk (Participant 5).
Under the second theme, internal versus external risk, there was generally a wide consensus that
internal risk was the bigger issue, however there were a few comments offered suggesting that internal
and external risk was inextricably linked (Participant 7) and that both internal and external risk were
equal (Participant 6 and 8). Two subcategories emerged under this theme, namely shared understanding
of the brand and controlling a large global workforce. The data confirms that the participants perceived
the importance of developing a shared understanding of the brand to be the first subcategory of the
internal versus external risk theme and generally expressed the idea that alignment of the different
internal definitions of the brand needed to be a priority and that individuals not supporting the brand
messaging needed to be identified (Participant 6 and 7). Perception of the brand by the employees was
also mentioned alongside shared understanding of the brand. Participant 1 said:
You have to get everyone on board, because your line staff have a different idea of the brand
and your executives have a different idea of the brand. [Line staff] are not selling the brand,
they are servicing it. Executives sell the beautiful picture. It doesn't relate with your line staff.
If everyone is not on board with selling the brand then theres a disconnect. You have to get
everyone to speak the same language.
Employee engagement was often mentioned as a way to gain the buy-in of the employees and to create
that shared understanding of the brand. Employee engagement through motivational coaching and
continuous training were common refrains. Participant 6 mentioned train, coach, counsel as an
employee engagement strategy and Participant 1 mentioned that there were all kinds of issues in
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ensuring

that

everyone

understood

that

brand,

but

that

employee

coaching

and

encouragement/motivation efforts to teach employees that, you can reach your potential, you belong
here, and you have everything under control can go a long way in unifying the shared understanding
of the brand. Participant 5 contended that training and culture are huge for managing internal risks.
These views are in line with Sinclair (2011) who suggests that the business benefits of effective
engagement are well-known and well-documented and that there is a clear correlation between
stakeholder relationship quality and financial performance (Waddock & Graves, 1997), sustainable
wealth/long-term value (Post, et al., 2002), and corporate reputation (Dowling, 1994). There was
however, one dissenting perspective on training worth mentioning, which Participant 2 provided:
There arent many safeguards. You can train and train all you want, but that doesn't safeguard
against someone accidently copying and pasting the wrong link or hitting the wrong email
address. Everyone is playing without a net. Training, yes, but there is nothing you can do to
prevent human error.
The data confirms that the participants agreed that controlling a large global workforce as the
second subcategory of the internal versus external risk theme and generally expressed that it was
challenging and risky. Participant 2 expressed that there is a great deal of risk in managing a large work
force and that it is relatively easy to tarnish your brand. The participant adds that you are one step away
from being a punch line for a joke and that:
There is little space for risk between the error and the public. That veil between what stays in
your company and what goes out is thinner than ever. It is so easy for one person, intentionally
or otherwise, to do something damaging to your company (ibid).
Additionally, as it relates to managing a global workforce, it emerged that the companies of the
participants do not want to be seen as purely capitalistic, particularly when managing brand and
corporate reputation in developing nations. Trust of the company and its employees becomes a huge
issue in this instance. Participant 3 shared a risk dynamic that was new to this study:

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When you [make an error] in your own backyard that's OK, but to do it in developing country
is not. Harm to the brand in a different country is a huge mess up. In the states, the benefit of
the doubt is there, in other counties, if you mess up, you are seen as careless. There is risk also
with the expectations [of the company]. XYZ company goes into town, but doesn't move
forward with the project and kills the hope in the community.
Participant 4 adds that social impact is an on-going issue. Youre guiding the business through that
minefield. One one-off huge mistake can spread like wild fire, then there is an on-going aspect.
Companies are human. Here the participants perspectives are in line with Copulskys (2011) notion
that much of the internally generated brand sabotage is accidental, executives, employees and supply
chain partners do inadvertent things to damage the brand. Often, carelessness is the culprit, not
malicious intent (p.73), but Copulsky (2011) makes it clear that the outcome, not the intent is the most
important risk factor.
Under the third theme, precautionary methods used to protect brand reputation, there were
conflicting accounts of what was typically encountered in a professional environment. Some
participants saw no, or vaguely developed precautionary methods, whilst others saw clear training,
induction and research methods employed. Some participants mentioned that there were no real
preventative methods, just damage control (Participant 2), that there were no systems that were
proactive there are more reactive responses in crisis management mode (Participant 7) or that
precautionary policies were vague. Participant 3 mentioned that precautionary protocol dictated that
approval from the PR team must be received for any employees needing to have contact with outside
media sources and that risk policy was clear and enforceable, but that the social media policy was
hazy they want the positive without the negative (ibid). Here participant 3 was implying that the
company wanted its employees to be vocal on social media when it came to advocating for the brand,
but that the company was leery of social media use by employees in other instances deemed risky by
the firm. Participant 3 also expressed that policy depended on whether or not the meter could be moved
by the comment, suggesting that firms selling perfect commodities seemed less concerned with social
media policy because they were not consumer-facing and could not be hit in the pocket (ibid). The

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lack of a clear social media policy is in conflict with Copulskys (2011) view that companys should
assess whether they are engaging employees in brand resilience efforts by creating clear policies and
guidelines for employee use of the brand and social media. This lack of precautionary devices also
conflicts with Brancato (2007) who argued that the most valuable contribution that a board can provide
is to oversee the efficacy of a compliance and ethics program to foster a climate of transparency and
accountability at every level of the organization.
Other participants mentioned that there were well documented policies on particular issues and
a clear chain of command (Participant 4) and that there were precautionary methods used by electronic
means to monitor and control inventory, [business] transactions and brand messaging (Participant 6)
in an attempt to control how people perceive the brand and to uphold luxury standards (ibid).
However, Participant 4 expressed that:
Risk management is more than just policy; it is ingrained in the DNA of the company. What
behaviors and successes we celebrate, how we lead from the top and the bottom, what kind of
stories we tell ourselves, and what type of values we uphold all feeds up into protecting and
advancing our reputation.
Participant 1 suggested that the hands-on training the participants company provided, in an attempt
to build brand loyalty internally, was a precautionary method, as did Participant 5, who mentioned a
culture of training, induction and continual professional development as precautionary techniques used
to mitigate brand risk. This is in line with Copulskys (2011) argument that in order to galvanize brand
troops against risk, a mission must be defined, the climate and culture reinforced, and employee training
and guidance provided with a purposeful and sustained outreach program and a strategy for employee
ownership of said mission. Taylor (2010) and Oxenford (2011) also suggest a similar training the
coaching strategy to help shape the culture of the organization to be distinguishing and compelling in
the marketplace. Finally, research was suggested as a precautionary tool by participant 9, who expressed
that research is used to stay innovative, to not be left behind and to mitigate external risk. Participant
8 similarly expressed that research is key to protect the brand in the eyes of the consumer, to discern
how the brand is perceived and to stay close to the consumer. It is the full intent of this study to add
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to commonly held view that research is useful and necessary in mitigating brand risk (Dowling, 2001;
Dowling, 2006; Tonello, 2007; Obloj & Obloj, 2006; Abrahams, 2008; Argenti & Druckenmiller, 2003).
Under the forth theme, perspectives on Copulskys (2011) brand fragility paradox (see Figure
2), there was consensus among the participants that the framework was somewhat correct (Participants
1, 2, and 3) or that it was an over simplification (Participant 7) or a bit more complicated than that,
its different for different industries (Participant 4). Most participants agreed that there was some
relationship evident between brand value and trustworthiness, but took issue with the idea that brand
fragility increased with brand value and that there was a greater willingness, on the part of the consumer,
to consider alternatives when high-value brands proved unworthy. Participant 7 expressed that, the
[brand fragility paradox] assumption was an over simplification and that more exposure and visibility
meant more opportunity for sabotage, but that it also meant more opportunity for forgiveness of wellloved brands, if they make a mistake (ibid). Participant 6 expressed that as brand value increases so
does brand strength, not fragility. Participant 1 added brand stability into the conversation:
An increase in brand visibility equals an increase in trust. The more visibility the brand has,
the more you can trust it because you know what to expect with the brand. Trust comes first,
then comfort. The more stability in the brand, the more trust.
Participant 3 remarked in regards to the reliability of the brand resilience framework:
Somewhat, depends. For a valuable brand, yes the more trustworthy it needs to be. The more
trust that is needed in the industry, the more fragile the particular brand is, if it is operating
in a trust-thirsty arena, where competitors are leveraging disadvantages.
Participant 2 expressed that trustworthiness was not the best criteria. Brand value is more tied to
engagement and relevancy.
Most of the participants observations conflicted with Copulskys (2011) argument that the rise
in the importance of brand trust means that any breach of that faith in a brand could be fatal or, if our
trust is misplaced, we terminate that relationshsip quickly and decisively (p. 23). On the other hand,
most participants did agree with Compulskys (2011) assertion that the most valuable brands would
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seem to enjoy strong relationships with their customers, but the participants generally did not agree that
trust is fragile (ibid). Most believed that trustworthiness created a more solid grounding for
forgiveness, if mistteps did occur, forgiveness is more probable (participant 8). This is in line with
Oxenford (2011) who argued that brand is part of reputation and a well developed brand can help
protect reputation in times of crisis and busines interuptions, Dowling (2001) who argued that typically
reputation takes a long time to form, and once developed they work like a flywheel - delivering a
sustained stream of power to what ever they are attached to (p.3), and Tonello (2007) who contends
that companies that can rely on a solid corporate reputation proposition are better suited to face a
situation of reputational crisis.
Under the fifth theme, perspectives on Copulskys (2011) brand resilience framework, there was
consensus among the participants that the framework was fairly sensible and well codified (Participant
4), but there were concerns about the tone (Participants 4, 6 and 8), the complexity (Participants 1, 2,
3, 4 and 9) and the practicality (Participants 5, 7 and 8) of the framework. Regarding the tone and
language used to describe the framework, participant 4 remarked that, It smacks of paranoia and
defensiveness. Flip it around and have a more positive tone. Participant 8 commented, Beware not to
knee-jerk to every perceived risk. Have faith in your consumer, and that, the biggest risk is not
being able to identify the risk (ibid.) Participant 6 commented on the harsh words used in the
framework and suggested that if it was to be put into practice, more positive language would have to be
used. The participants views support Kovoor-Misra & Nathans (2000) notion that defensiveness
inhibits openness to learning (p. 31).
Regarding the complexity of the framework, it was widely held that there were too many steps
(Participants 1, 2, 3 and 9) or that they got lost in the steps (Participant 6), or the framework seemed
to be a full time job (Participant 2 and 4). Participant 2 commented that:
The Devils in the details. It makes sense, but the actual implementation is foggy the actual
transition from conceptual to practice is foggy, it loses its way. A camel is a horse designed by
committee. Seven steps are too many.

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One participant suggested that the framework was intentionally complex (participant 5) considering
that it is the brainchild of Copulsky, a Deloitte partner, who may profit from the tone and complexity
of the framework. The participants expressed views confirming that the overwhelming complexity of
the framework, coupled with the defensive tone may be off-putting to executives looking to employ this
framework in a practical sense.
Regarding the practicality of the framework, Participant 7 commented that it was a good start,
but that it would be difficult to fit into everyday practice. Participant 8 commented that to put the
framework into a real world context, step one would be to include KPIs, step 2, tell people what you
want its a tanker, you have to turn around slowly. Participant 2 commented that 30-60-90-day
benchmarks needed to be added. Participant 5 mentioned that it was most important to plan, prepare
and execute and measure. It's all there, but people are what it is all about. Several participants named
specific steps that were perceived as the most practical:
I have definitely seen Step 7 in action, generate popular support, brand shepherding and
advocacy from employees. Steps 7 [generate popular support], 1 [assess brand risks] and 2
[galvanize your brand troops] are the best. Its good to have a practical plan in place. Most
companies do that very well, but Im not convinced on seven steps (Participant 3).
Similarly, Participant 1 expressed the following:
The most necessary is assessing [Step 1: assess brand risks], it is really a must. Number two
[Step 2: galvanize your brand troops] is good adapting brand defenses [Step 5] would be
tough. Most companys dont do a very good job of adapting. Plan, roll it out, but they don't
do a good job at adapting right now, because they don't know what to do. Number five [Step
5] would be the most challenging.
Here the participants comments support Abrahams (2008) assertion that the pressure for business to
respond to change has never been greater, but that enacting organizational change is complex (Gartner,
2011), particularly as the scope of the initiative widens across multiple business processes. It is clear
that the participants comments support Pearson & Clairs (1998) and Copulskys (2011) argument that

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an organization that is successful at learning will change its policies and procedures when necessary
and apply that new knowledge into more systematic changes that reduce the likelihood of future brand
attacks. However, it is also made clear that while planning and executing strategy is a strength for most
organizations, adapting behaviors and undertaking organizational change, as a result of new strategies
employed, is a major hurdle for organizations.
Under the sixth theme, internal leaderships concern with the safeguard of the brand, there was
wide consensus among all the participants that the upper echelons of executive leadership, or the CEO
(Participants 1, 4, 5, 6 and 11), was primarily concerned with safeguarding the brand. Participant 1
commented, the CEO, top down to the VP's of each brand and business unit. Participant 5 commented,
The CEO down has to, otherwise it doesnt work. The CEO will decide what the appetite for risk is.
Participants 2, 3 and 10 suggested the marketing department was primarily concerned, The marketing
department in 90 percent of the concerned on the ground. CEO, the president and HR is also concerned
(Participant 2). The legal department (Participant 3 and 7) was also mentioned. The participants
reflections on their practical observations, as it pertains to this theme, coincide with Copulskys (2011)
assertion that brand risk does not begin and end in the marketing department, but can involve several
facets of the business.
Under the seventh and final theme, future implications of brand risk in the information age, two
sub categories emerged, information security (Participants 2, 3 and 5 ) and user-generated content
(Participants 1, 4, 6, 9 and 10). The data confirms that information and data protection is perceived as a
high-risk arena for global brands.
Data security and information security is the single biggest threat for global organizations
moving forward. Budgets each year are increasing to combat people we dont even know, we
cant track, we cant trace, but we know they are out there trying to take our information. It is
a constant chase and heavy investment just to stay global players It just takes one breach of
security (Participant 5).
Also under this subcategory data integrity through email (Participant 2) and other casual internal
communication tools emerged as a brand risk concern: Employee communications, email, WikiLeaks,
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hackers and chat makes people more relaxed about what they are discussing. People don't use chat
very responsibly. It is risky and a waste of time (Participant 3).
The data confirms that user-generated content and social media transparency issues are also seen
as huge risks to the brand. Participant 4 commented, With user-generated content, there is no control
over our brand. Regarding social media and transparency risks, Participant 4 expressed the that
engaging in a meaningful, but cautious way was a concern for companies. The speed at which issues
can become crisis and the difficult task of ensuring that the company is relevant and authentic with
consumers were other concerns expressed by this participant. Several participants echoed this sentiment
expressing that companies are guilty of using jargon and that what companies say typically reflect the
language of the business and not necessarily the language of the consumers. The participants suggested
that how companies communicate with consumers versus other stakeholders is important and
challenging, as it is important they not come across in a detrimental way when engaging with the brand.
Participant 1 suggested that web branding was a strength for many firms, but that social media is blown
out of the water, companies cannot keep up with it:
To make matters worse in terms of workload, promoting the brand via social media gives
visibility to those who are disconnected with the brand and then the company has to deal
with those public and transparent grievances. That's a risks that we don't really want to
deal with.
Participants expressed that there is a lack of want for transparency and its repercussions (Participant
1) and that companies want to keep all the positives associated with social media, but discard all the
negatives because the negatives will cause trust to be called into question and that's a risk (ibid).
Therein lies a social media paradox where transparency and engagement builds communities
and nurtures brand advocates, who Copulsky (2011) calls powerful additions to a firms
counterinsurgency arsenal, but also creates a platform for those who are unhappy with the brand to
publically vocalize their discontent. As mentioned in the introduction of this study, due to the bearing
of social media, online communities have an amplified voice and the potential to impact business
processes, brands and corporate reputation, such as in the quintessential case of United Break Guitars.
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Abrahams (2008) argues that as a result of social media, marketing is now a two-way, interactive
conversation with individuals and online communities, as opposed to previous eras where it was more
simply a one-way broadcast to a captive audience (Macleod, 2004).
Contrary to the norm, but worth mentioning, Participants 1 and 7 mentioned a lack of diversity
as a future brand risk in the information age. Participant 1 remarked, Diversity is important. It's hard
for you to speak the language and come across in the right way when you are not employing the people
who speak the language of the majority. Participant 7 remarked, There is inherent risk without
boardroom diversity. The general lack of breadth of thinking and opinions creates risk. Copulsky
(2011) speaks of diversity only in terms of the diversity of weaponry used in assaults to the brand in the
age of social media.

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CHAPTER 5
Recommendations
The following managerial recommendations, derived from the research findings and a review
of relevant literature, include suggestions on how Copulskys (2011) brand resilience framework (see
Figure 3) can be used in a practical sense and ways in which the framework may be strengthen.
Recommendations on other potential areas of study will be highlighted and a revised brand resilience
framework will be introduced.
There is evidence to suggest that many of Copulskys (2011) arguments on brand risk and resilience
are valuable, such as the true and present danger associated with managing a global brand in a highspeed world, brand risk as a result of internal and external stakeholders, the understanding that brand
risk involves many facets of the business, not only marketing, and the need to galvanize brand troops
against risk with a clear and decisive plan. However, the literature and data also suggests that Copulskys
(2011) brand resilience framework is hedged by several flawed assumptions, primarily the brand
fragility paradox (see Figure 2), which ties brand value, fragility and trustworthiness together in a linear
pattern. Copulskys (2011) framework may be enhanced by rethinking the brand fragility paradox.
Research shows that there is indeed a relationship between brand value, brand fragility and the
heightened importance of trustworthiness, but that the relationship is more complicated than the brand
fragility paradox indicates. This study shows that brand value and visibility may actually relate more to
the opportunity for forgiveness, if brand missteps occur, which is contrary to what the brand fragility
paradox suggests.
This calls into question the validity and practicality of the framework in a real-world setting. It
is therefore recommended that the framework be used largely for preparatory discussions of brand risk
and resilience efforts and that a plan specific to the needs of the organization be developed. It is
recommended that a head of brand management and coaching be assigned to (1) identify the true and
present brand risk danger specific to the organization, (2) create a bespoke plan to combat this
danger, and (3) develop and coordinate continuous hands-on, experiential training to help embed brand

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risk awareness into the culture of the organization, not only at the executive level, but for the line and
support staff. This is in an effort to align the different perceptions of the brand internally, develop a
shared understanding, and allow the executives, who are selling the brand, to speak the same language
as the line and support staff, who are servicing the brand. This recommendation is a brand advocacy
and employee engagement effort aimed at reducing brand risk by gaining the buy-in of the employees,
an influential set of stakeholders, who are key players in identifying risk and protecting brand integrity.
It is also recommended that a strategic plan for information and data security be immediately
put in place and that the organization's social media engagement strategy be designed based on the
overall corporate strategy, vision, and voice of the organization, not solely on current market trends.
This will limit exposure and issues concerning transparency, while allowing the organization to engage
meaningfully, yet cautiously. This recommendation is in response to the finding that information
security and user-generated content are the primary concerns of the future implications of brand risk in
the information age. This is also based on the revelation that there is a widely-held corporate aversion
to transparency and its repercussions, confirmed by the participants in this study. (As reference, please
see Appendix D for the revised brand resilience framework infographic).
It is also recommended that the tone and language used to articulate the elements of the brand
resilience framework are reconsidered. The militaristic and defensive tone of the counterinsurgency
metaphor used for the framework was found to be off-putting and inhibitive to openness and learning
(Kovoor-Misra & Nathan, 2000), which amplifies the issue of organizational change and lack of
adaptiveness many firms face, as indicated by findings in this study. While the original framework was
found to be fairly sensible and well codified, it was also found to be too complex for practical use. It is
therefore recommended that the number of steps be reduced to the most fundamental and restated in the
following fashion: (1) Plan: Assess brand risk, (2) Prepare: Galvanize your internal brand advocates,
(3) Execute: Learn and adapt brand defences, and (4) Evaluate: Measure and track brand resilience
efforts. It is recommend that a head of brand management and coaching be assigned to develop this
approach, as stated above, and that a timeline with 30-60-90-day evaluation and recalibration

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benchmarks be integrated into each step, to further ground the framework in practicality. (As reference,
please see Appendix D for the full revised brand resilience framework infographic).

Figure 5: Integrated Organizational Change Strategy

Source: (Carson, 2011)


Findings in this study indicate that Step 5: Learn and adapt your brand defences (from the
original brand resilience framework) is the most challenging to employ in practice. This suggests that
further research is needed on how to effectively adapt organizational behaviours and enact
organizational change in a high-speed business environment in response to identified brand risks. It is
recommended that an integrated behavioural, structural and technical organizational change strategy
(see Figure 4 above) be developed to specifically reduce brand and reputational risk and improve brand
resilience.

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Conclusion
The shift into a high-tech, knowledge-based society where economies are interwoven globally
through efficient manufacturing and service processes has simplified the way we make decisions about
the transactions we intend to make, increased the speed by which we act upon those decisions, and has
dramatically reduced the costs of those transactions (Humbert, 2007). However, those benefits have not
come without a change in the structure of demand, increased demand for speedy response times, a need
for alternative marketing strategies and ROI evaluations, and a kaleidoscope of other volatile variables
(Sull, 2006, p. 2), thus amplifying risk and uncertainty for business and its managers (Abrahams, 2008).
In this contemporary economy, sources for corporate profits are more likely to originate from a range
of intangible assets, but primarily through branding and reputational capital (Dowling, 2006). Copulsky
(2011) argues that his brand resilience framework (see Figure 3) provides the tools to determine how
susceptible organizations are to brand sabotage and acts as a strategy to reduce the likelihood and impact
of said reputational damage. The purpose of this study was to critically analyze Copulskys brand
reslience framework and to liken it to what typically occurs in the workplace.
In the critical analysis of Copulskys (2011) brand resilience framework, it was found that while
the framework was functional and well codified, it fell victim to the common pitfalls of conceptual
understandings when transitioned into practice. The underlying assumption of the framework, the brand
fragility paradox (see Figure 2) was found to be overly simplistic, and in some instances, contrary to
what was actually experienced in a business setting. The framework itself was found to be static and
not reflective of the dynamic conditions under which business decisions are made. There were concerns
with the tone of language used with respect to the counterinsurgency metaphor, the complexity, the
somewhat conflicting messages delivered by the steps, and the general lack of pragmatism in the overall
framework.
Taken systematically, only a few of the arguments presented in each step of the framework
proved to be widely held views supported by both the literature and research findings, namely: (1)
Assess brand risks, (2) Galvanize your brand troops, (5) Learn and adapt your brand defences, and (6)
Measure and track brand resilience, as detailed in the literature review and research results of this study.
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Thus, the second aim of this study was accomplished by using these specific steps as the foundation for
the managerial recommendations and a revised framework (please see Appendix D for the full revised
brand resilience framework infographic) presented in this report. The revised framework takes into
account the strengths and weakness (based on a review of relevant literature and research findings) of
the original brand resilience framework and streamlines the framework into its most practical and
necessary stages. This study also revealed a need for further research into how organizational behaviours
can be adapted and organizational change effectively enacted in a high-speed business environment to
mitigate identified brand risk. The development of an integrated brand risk organizational change
strategy was recommended as a potential new approach (see Figure 4).
The reflective practitioner approach to the semi-structured interviews utilized in this study
proved to be the most appropriate, as it was highly useful in evaluating workplace practices and
obtaining data rich responses from the participants. The selection of the participants from global, wellbranded firms also served its purpose, as to give insight into the concerns and common practices of
managers and executives at firms highly concerned with brand risk and reputational capital. This
approach fully supported the aims of this study.
There is only one limitation of the study worth mentioning. Due to time constrains, one semistructured interview was done per participant. Multiple sessions could have generated richer data and a
greater understanding of the topic at hand. It should be noted however, that care was taken to ensure
that the view of each participant was thoroughly clarified, documented in writing and on audio
recording, and a responsive paraphrasing interview technique was successfully employed during each
conversation. As conventional wisdom dictates, companies are human, thus the intent of this study is
to improve the human condition, particularly within a business setting, and to further the public
discourse on brand risk and resilience in the information age.

Page | 54

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Appendix A Description of Research Paricipants

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Appendix B Introduction & Semi-Structured Interview Briefing Document (2 pgs)

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Appendix C Themes Revealed by Research Results

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Appendix D Revised Brand Resilience Framework (Infographic)

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