Dialogues with the Dead

Author(s): Edwin Curley

Source: Synthese, Vol. 67, No. 1, The Role of History in and for Philosophy (Apr., 1986), pp.
33-49
Published by: Springer
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EDWIN

DIALOGUES

CURLEY

WITH

THE DEAD

of philosophy
work
in history
Serious
very
doing
something
requires
a hypothetical
to
Is itworth devoting
dialogue with dead philosophers.
conducting
to
of
from
the
intrinsic
interest
it
Yes.
do
well?
it the time and energy
Quite
apart
required
toward solving philosophical
the past, making
progress
problems
requires a
understanding

ABSTRACT.
difficult:

to those problems
and of the arguments
which
solutions
good grasp of the range of possible
a grasp we can only have ifwe understand
well philosophy's
motivate
alternative
positions,
too much on the present are apt to assume
too simple a
who concentrate
past. Philosophers
view

of alternative

offer

instructive

historical

theories
examples

and of
of how

important
it is possible

philosophical
to go wrong

arguments.
by ignoring

and Austin
Ryle
or misrepresenting

figures.

My aim here is to reflect on the nature of what I do and to consider

it is worth doing. Not everyone will agree that the history of
whether
I find, often have
is worth bothering
with. Philosophers,
philosophy
towards historians of their subject a disdain matched
only by that which
the systems of
creative writers often have for literary critics. Studying
for apprentices, who have yet
dead philosophers may be a fit occupation
to learn their trade, or for others
any serious
incapable of making
to philosophy
contribution
proper, but no philosopher worth his salt will
a dialogue with the dead.
want to spend much
time conducting
in a
the following words of Michael
contained
Consider
Scriven,
sensible
generally
their enrollments.
of

'two-track'

on how to increase
to departments
piece of advice
In this passage Scriven is recommending
the creation

major,

... one via

.... Of course,
courses
via problems
the history bears on
history courses
but so do the problems
bear on the history...
and the fact remains
that
the problems,
take on that heavy
students
many
today won't
history
trip and you can't act as if all
with
in the back
them_Some
disagree
history will come
philosophers
professional
courses - so be it. But don't be a slave to the fact that most of your
door of the problems
and hence,
the history of philosophy
(a) find it easy to
faculty know a great deal about
one

Like the formal logic requirement,

its importance.
this is
(b) tend to rationalize
...
a case of those who went
to justify
initiations
through
needing
fraternity
- or
taste
their own idiosyncratic
about its necessity.
the hardship
The
by generalizing
not good history of philosophy.
test of a good major
is that s/he does good philosophy,

teach, and
all-too-often

Few

great

philosophers

are noted

for their work

in the history

of philosophy

Synthese 67 (1986) 33-49

? 1986 byD. Reidel Publishing Company

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and many

EDWIN

34
were

deficient

matter

for

or disinterested

investigation

are a barrier

(1977,

whether

CURLEY

in it. They were

into the problems.
Let
are necessary;
the history
requirements

it be
they

at

least

certainly

p. 233)

to
If he did not exist, it would be necessary
Professor
Scriven.
so
to
itwould be hard
find displayed
in
invent him, for otherwise
short a
so
indefensible
space
many
prejudices.
Is it really true, for example,
to
that an undergraduate
choosing
on
a
in philosophy
is typically embarking
major
"heavy history trip"?
Not inmy experience.
is required to
the undergraduate
Typically
major
or three-quarter
take the standard two-semester
survey of the history of
Thus

from Tha?es
philosophy
surveys of 19th and 20th
that do not have graduate
are
figures or movements
rarely
tematic

required.
or

Typically

to Kant,

supplemented,
by similar
perhaps,
But at most
institutions
century philosophy.
courses in particular
few advanced
programs,
are
available; where
available,
they
they are
the undergraduate
takes mainly
sys
major
courses.

problem-oriented

know a
Is it really
departments
faculty in philosophy
some
in
schools
great deal about the history of philosophy?
Perhaps
- not if
they do, but not inmany
"knowing a great deal" about a subject
set of accurate
and well-founded
beliefs.
implies having an extensive
How could they? What
kind of training have most
faculty had in the
history of philosophy?
As undergraduates
they will no doubt have had the standard survey
we
cannot
assume that they will have learned much
but
from
courses,
course
some
I went
that
of
that experience.
When
kind
through
true that most

twenty-five

years

ago,

we

read

secondary

accounts

of

Plato,

Aristotle,

is paid to primary
textbook. Now more
attention
etc., in a massive
sources. No one should be under any illusions about how much can be
in a course of that scope within
achieved
the time constraints
of one
who knows Plato and Aristotle
academic year. The undergraduate
only
from that kind of course will not know much about Plato and Aristotle.
As graduate
students they will no doubt have taken some advanced
in
seminars
Plato, Aristotle,
Descartes,
Kant, and perhaps one or more
of the British empiricists. Here
they will actually have read intensively
texts and been exposed
to some fairly
the whole
of some primary
literature. But art is long, life is short, and they
sophisticated
secondary
to "know a great deal" about Plato,
will not have read nearly enough
to
have chosen him as the subject of their
say, unless
they happen
At best they will know one figure or movement
dissertation.
really well.

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DIALOGUES

WITH

THE

DEAD

35

a great
as knowing
an
seems
if that
unrealistic

deal about the history of

or,
goal, what would count as
philosophy,
I
the history of philosophy
knowing
tolerably well? At a minimum,
someone
who knew the history of philosophy
suppose,
tolerably well
would have read enough of the primary texts of the most
important
figures to know what those figures thought about the central problems
of philosophy,
under
and would know enough about the circumstances
to place them in some kind of relation
which those texts were written
say,
ship to each other. This would mean, with respect to Descartes,
on Method,
the Meditations,
and the
having read at least the Discourse
more general portions of the Principles
some
of Philosophy,
knowing
were
and for what purpose,
those works
composed
thing about when
What

would

count

and knowing how they are related to each other and to the similar works
contem
of (at least the more
important of) Descartes'
predecessors,
poraries, and successors. But itwould also mean, not just knowing what
Descartes
said in these works, but knowing what he meant by what he
said.

It is one thing to know

with the sentence:

that in 1637 Descartes

wrote

a work which

opened

car chacun pense en ?tre si bien

la mieux
bon sens est la chose du monde
partag?e:
en toute autre chose, n'ont
? contenter
pourvue,
que ceux m?me
qui sont les plus difficiles
en
ont.
coutume
d?sirer
d'en
point
plus qu'ils

Le

to know what
that is, what
It is quite another
this sentence means,
means
not just of
Descartes
by using this sentence. This is a matter
into English
of deciding whether
knowing how to translate the French
"most equitably distributed'
is a fair translation of "la mieux partag?e"
or whether any tolerably brief English expression will adequately
render
- but of
when he
"bon sens"
deciding how seriously to take Descartes
for making
says this. On the face of it, the capacity
good judgments
seems to mean by "bon
about truth and falsity, which
iswhat Descartes
official
sens," is not very evenly distributed
among men. Descartes'
reason for saying that it is evenly distributed
sounds ironic. Is it? Even if
is being
ironic in the reason he offers, might
Descartes
he not
to
nevertheless
be serious about the proposition
it is supposed
be a
reason

for? What would be the consequences

for other things Descartes
of the fact
is the significance
says if he were not serious about it?What
so paradoxical
as a
to us, is cited by Montaigne
that this statement,
common opinion, and defended by the same ironic sounding reasoning?

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36

EDWIN

CURLEY

what a philospher means by what he says requires, at the

Knowing
some well-founded
beliefs
about how he would
least, having
very
to
and objections
he may never have explicitly
respond
questions
considered. This may in turn require knowing not just how he did in fact
and objections
he did explicitly
consider, but
respond to the questions
also knowing
of the historical
context within which he was
something
the possible
influences on him by previous
and contemporary
working:
the
effects of developments
outside of philoso
philosophers,
possible
and science. And
I would
phy, in politics,
religion,
say that it also
requires the ability to analyse the structure of a text, to see what the
central conclusion
is and what reasons are offered for it, or suggested by
implication.
were
a contemporary,
If our philosopher
still alive, active,
and
we
cooperative,
might, of course, simply ask him what he means. But I
have been assuming
that an essential
feature of the history of philos
is
that
it
deals
with the work of dead philosophers,
or at least of
ophy
who for some reason are no longer willing
or able to
philosophers
about what they mean.
It is this fact that calls for
respond to questions
to exercise
the historian
the special skills of imaginative
reconstruction
which
a great deal
characterize
the best work
in the field. Knowing
about the history of philosophy,
if I am right, calls for a lot more
than
wide reading and a good memory.
I cannot believe
that such knowledge
as Scriven suggests.
is as widely distributed
But if knowing much about the history of philosophy
is as difficult as I
think it is, is itworth the trouble? No doubt some people of antiquarian
tastes will always be drawn to the study of philosophy's
past, but is it
wise to encourage
this by requiring such study? Isn't it in fact true, as
are noted for their work in
Scriven
says, that "few great philosophers
the history of philosophy
and [that] many were deficient or disinterested
in it."
We had better concede
that there have been a number
straightaway,
of great philosophers
who were,
to say the least, disinterested
in the
One point on which Descartes,
Hobbes,
Locke,
history of philosophy.
all seem to have agreed was that in their own
Kant, and Wittgenstein
as undone
time philosophy
to "consider
in Kant's words,
all
needed,
or from a
that has been done," and to start afresh from new foundations
new perspective.1
this attitude has not been rare, I do not
Still, while
think
Spinoza,

it has

been

Leibniz

typical. Certainly
and Hegel,
Dewey,

Plato,
Russell

Aristotle

and Aquinas,
not to

and Whitehead,

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DIALOGUES

THE

WITH

DEAD

37

all found itworth their while to devote

mention
Jaspers and Heidegger,
to one or more of their predecessors.
attention
serious and extensive
were
as to whether
these philosophers
There
is room for disagreement
our
I
that
most
of
of
historians
standards,
suspect
By
good
philosophy.
than
their interests seem more polemical
them were not. Sometimes
and sometimes
historical:2
by a desire to
they seem to be motivated
of history has been leading inevitably
that the dialectic
demonstrate
towards the truth represented
by their own system.3 But frequently even
a desire simply to
demonstrate
and
great
highly original philosophers
to their own, and a joy in the
work out the logic of a position alternative
insight this can bring.4
Are they misusing
their time and talents when they do this? I take it
that
is the conviction
that what underlies
like Scriven's
attitudes
not
of
in
the
humanities.
Great
works
is
like other disciplines
philosophy
even
literature retain their validity
though modern writers may prefer to
is a
like the sciences,
do something
But philosophy,
quite different.
problem solving discipline, which must make progress, which must get
results, if it is to be worth doing at all. So the history of philosophy must
be either a history of error, or more charitably, a history of successively
to the truth we now possess or are about
less imperfect approximations
to reach. If we are really moved
by a concern for truth, and not merely
by

antiquarian

curiosity,

we

want

the

most

up-to-date

answers,

in

A friend of mine once asked

all the latest improvements.
corporating
me: "Why waste your time reading Hume on causation, when you can
on causation?"
In part this paper is intended as a response
read Mackie
to that friend.
to reply to this progressivist
It is tempting for the historian
assump
tion by taking a pessimistic
view of the philosopher's
ability to get
results. In the past, philosophers
have often held high hopes for some
new methodology:
Plato hopes to find philosophical
truth dialectically,
on mathematics,
Hume by introduc
by modeling
philosophy
Kant by a Copernican
into philosophy,
ing experimental
reasoning
some of our contemporaries
to the nuances of
revolution,
by attending
or
a
or
of meaningfulness
criterion
language
developing
ordinary
as
it seems, these hopes have
Just
often,
practising
phenomenology.

Descartes

of the classical
of
been
The
problems
disappointed.
persistence
to any solution commanding
and their apparent resistance
philosophy,
lessons the historian
universal
assent, is one of the most discouraging
has for the philosopher.
the history of philosophy
lends itself to
Because

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38

EDWIN

CURLEY

this kind of lesson, it frequently attracts people of a skeptical

tempera
to regard the philosopher's
to solve
ambition
ment, who are content
an
as
to
and
the
of
varieties
problems
amusing presumption,
catalogue
human

what Hume
and
folly.5 Determining
thought about causality,
as
a
can
seem
more
he
difficult
this
it,
may be,
why
thought
easily
tractable
than determining
what
account
the correct
of
problem
is.
causality
Iwould not want to base my defense of the study of the
Nevertheless,
on skepticism
of
about the possibility
of progress,
in
history
philosophy
In my heart, I suppose,
I agree with
I
the view which
philosophy.
assumes:
that
Scriven
that
does make progress,
conjecture
philosophy
that it does sometimes
solve problems,
that even its more persistent
to the right approach. Without
riddles may someday succumb
claiming
that any of our contemporaries
as Hume,6
or
is as good a philosopher
that any contemporary
to
solution
the problems of causality
is the right
one, it does seem to me that there is a perfectly good sense in which the
discussion
of causality inMackie's
Cement of the Universe
is superior to
a
that inHume.
I do think that Mackie
clearer grasp of the
probably had
that
issues
raises
and
the truth about
many
that, whatever
causality
closer to it than Hume was.7
is, he was probably
causality
But it's worth asking ourselves why
that before he set himself to write on
lot of time reading Hume,
along with
some of them now dead, and that he

this should be so. I would suggest

causation Mackie
clearly spent a
on causation,
other
writers
many
clearly profited greatly from that

that his familiarity with the dialogue

have been
reading,
philosophers
on
a
this
since
of
the
time
did
Hume
conducting
great deal to
topic
his
of
of
the
the
of
issues,
sharpen
range
perception
possible positions,
and of the advantages
and disadvantages
of each position.
This would seem to me to be good general advice on how to proceed
in philosophy:
given a problem,
acquaint yourself with a wide range of
to that problem and try to understand why someone
solutions
possible
to that solution, and repelled by others. Sometimes
be
attracted
it
might
is said that no philosophic
doctrine originates
in any other way than as a
some previous
an
of or polemic
refutation
As
doctrine.8
against
about
the
of
unrestricted
theories,
generalization
origin
philosophical
this must surely be false, if only because
it involves a vicious
regress.
true that philosophers
But it is certainly
regularly argue for their views
to the problem
at hand, enu
alternative
solutions
by first surveying
of
the
defects
these
and
then
alternatives,
many
merating
presenting

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WITH

DIALOGUES

THE

DEAD

39

those difficulties.
their own view as the only, or best, way of avoiding
us
too many exam
with
The current literature in philosophy
presents
to
for
of
of
there
be
this
kind
any point in enumerating
procedure
ples
that philosophers
it does seem to me
them. But
lacking historical
use
of
in
this
their
procedure.
sensitivity
frequently go astray
a
for example, a work which, 25 years ago, was generating
Consider,
in our field, Gilbert Ryle's Concept of Mind.
which
he called,
his
book
by describing
something
began
Ryle
or
or
"the
"Descartes'
"the
official
doctrine,"
dogma
myth,"
variously,
thus stigmatized
had both a
of the ghost in the machine."
The doctrine
side.
side and an epistemological
metaphysical
a
was
human being is a composite,
it
the view that
Metaphysically,
a
the body, and an in>
of
extended
substance,
material,
consisting
are
two substances
These
the
mind.
nonextended
substance,
material,
great deal

of excitement

the other. And they regularly interact

capable of existing without
one
in perception,
and the
the body acting on the mind
with
another,
on
from
in
its
actions.
these
But apart
the body
mind acting
voluntary
are
actions
determined
the body's
interferences
solely by
by the mind,
whereas
the mind's actions are not determined
the laws of mechanics,
each

by

any

cause.

is
On the epistemological
side, the dogma of the ghost in the machine
that the mind has a highly privileged
characterized
by the doctrine
access to its own workings:
it knows, directly,
infallibly, and automa
own
it
is
all
of
whereas
its
states,
only partially and tenuously
tically,
states
of
about
the
and totally and invincibly
bodies,
knowledgeable
of
states
of
minds.
Our
beliefs
about the contents, or
the
other
ignorant
even the existence
than shaky inferences
of other minds are no more
from the behavior of other bodies, inferences whose conclusions we can
never directly verify, and hence can never have any real confidence
in.
to
of
of
in
machine
the
the
the
attributes
the
dogma
ghost
origin
Ryle
Descartes'
science

As

a man

concern

with

the apparent

implications

of the mechanistic

of his time:

of scientific

and moral
religious
... that human
claims

genius,
man,
nature

he could
he

not but endorse

could

differs

only

not

accept

in degree

the claims
the

of mechanics;
rider

discouraging
from
of complexity

yet as a
to those

clockwork.9

a "paramechanical
So he invented
according
hypothesis,"
some of the movements
of human bodies have a nonmechanical,

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to which
mental

40

EDWIN

cause,

and all acts of the mind

CURLEY

are outside

the network

of mechanical

causation.

note (pp. 23-4),

in a historical
that the "official
Ryle admits,
not
concern with
from
derive
and
his
does
Descartes
theory"
entirely
was
of 17th century mechanics,
that in part Descartes
the implications
in
doctrines
the
and
reformulating
merely
already existing
philosophies
to
of
his
But
this
concession
historical
fact
theologies
predecessors.
not
not
far
Not
the
does
go nearly
enough.
originate
only did Descartes
Now

in important respects he did not

"dogma of the ghost in the machine."
even subscribe
to it.
to the whole
He did, so far as I can see, subscribe
of what I have
of
the
side
the
this
is the part of
called
doctrine,
metaphysical
though
since the
the doctrine which
is least aptly called "Descartes'
myth,"
of the mind and body as two radically distinct
substances
conception
which
interact goes back at least to Plato. But he did not, so far as I can
to the most
in the epistemological
see, subscribe
important elements
of the
side of the doctrine. He did, of course, hold that our knowledge
is tenuous and imperfect,
and that the
existence
and states of bodies
mind is better known than the body. But so far as I can see, he did not
with respect to its own states. Nor so
think that the mind is omniscient
to the claim that we are
far as I can see, did he ever commit himself
states
of other minds. What
of
the
existence
and
ignorant
completely
the claim that the mind is better known than the body comes to, I think,
we
think we have a piece of knowledge
about
is that, whenever
some body, we in fact have a piece of knowledge
about our own mind
which
is far more certain than what we think we know about the body.
To claim that is to fall far short of claiming that we are omniscient
with
own
our
to
contents
of
minds.
the
respect
in a Platonic-Augustinian
Descartes
tradition
was, in fact, working
to metaphysical
dualism
and to the
while
firmly committed
an
as
of
immaterial
understood
knowledge
priority of self-knowledge,
of self-knowledge.
of the difficulties
substance, was acutely conscious
on Method,
in the Discourse
writes
that he
So, for example, Descartes

which,

has made a resolution

their words

to pay more

attention

to people's

actions

not only because,

in our state of moral
corruption,
some don't themselves
know what
also because
by which one believes
the one often occurs

a thing
without

is different

from

than to

but
few wish to say all that they believe,
For since the act of thought
they believe.
that by which one knows that he believes
in,

the other.10

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DIALOGUES

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41

There
is, of course, a 17th century philosopher who does clearly commit
But that philosopher
himself to the position Ryle ascribes to Descartes.
is Locke, and it is a matter of some interest that when Locke
invokes the
that there is nothing in the mind of which the mind is unaware,
doctrine
he typically does so in the course of an attack on Cartesian
doctrines,
that the soul always
of innate ideas or the doctrine
like the doctrine
that thinking is
contention
thinks, the latter an implication of Descartes'
to the
had been committed
the essence of the mind. So if Descartes
access to its own states, it would have caused trouble
mind's privileged
in his philosophy.
doctrines
for some very fundamental
The situation is similar with regard to the issue of privacy. So far as I
never thought much about, and
can see, this is an issue which Descartes
even seems to say that no one
it is hard to find texts in which Descartes
a good scholar,
knows the contents of other minds. Kenny,
generally
in his interpretation
but very Rylean
does cite a letter in which Descartes

of Descartes'
says that

philosophy

of mind,

can show anyone who examines

actions
them that our body is not
of our external
a soul with thoughts, with the exception
of words,
machine
but contains
just a self-moving
or other signs that are relevant
to particular
any passion.11
expressing
topics without

None

Kenny
No
even

comments

bodily behavior
the utterance

that
therefore
T

am

can establish
in pain,'

would

the occurrence
'have

reference

of the thought which

is pain;
to a passion,'
and so be

disqualified (1973, p. 122)

No doubt this is true, but Kenny's
preoccupation
neo-Wittgensteinian
main point in
with the example of pain serves him ill here. Descartes'
to attribute
that it is a mistake
this passage
is to defend his doctrine
case
to
to
wants
of
contrast
animals.
He
the
animals, whose
thought
does not show that they have
of pseudo-linguistic
behavior
exhibition
thoughts, with the case of human beings, whose exhibition of genuinely
does show that they have thoughts.12 A generalized
linguistic behavior,
is the furthest
about the existence
and states of other minds
skepticism
as
to discover,
from
far
I
have
able
Descartes'
intentions.
So
been
thing
a
was
to
such
the first philosopher
entertain
Malebranche,
skepticism
in this by Locke.13
though he was followed
on
Ryle bases his refutation of the dogma of the ghost in the machine
a very misleading
account of Descartes'
does
of mind, and
philosophy
not care enough

about

the accuracy

of that account

to try to document

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42

EDWIN

of The
ten years before
the publication
in his Autobiography.
had written

it. Some

Concept

of Mind,

wood

Colling
From

CURLEY

a
was
I decided
that one
Oxford
needed
first,
thing which
philosophy
such a habit of mind as would make
it impossible
for an
of sound scholarship:
or Cook
to be deceived
of Berkeley,
student
'refutation'
by Moore's
never
I therefore
of Bradley.
that they must
any
accept
taught my pupils...

the

background
Oxford-trained
Wilson's
criticism
themselves
they must
understood

of

anybody's
by first-hand
always defer

which
hear or read, without
philosophy
satisfying
they might
that
he actually
study that this was the philosophy
expounded;
sure they
of their own until they were
any criticism
absolutely

the text they were

not

greatly

It

is a pity

matter

(1978,

criticizing;

and

that if the postponement

was

sine die,

it did

pp. 26-27)

at Oxford,
that, in all the years
together
they were
not
did
teach Ryle that lesson.14
Collingwood
At
this point I can imagine Scriven
that none of this
protesting
as such, is interested
matters. The philosopher,
not
in general doctrines,
in the individuals who may or may not have held those doctrines.
If
not

in fact subscribe
to 'Descartes' Myth,'
then that
but it remains a doctrine which
ill-named,
others,
to be
held, and which
is, in any case, interesting enough
perhaps,
discussed
in its own right. If Ryle's misreadings
of Descartes
become
in the secondary
entrenched
from a
literature, that may be unfortunate
no
a
from
historical
of
it
of
is
view, but
strictly
point
importance
of
view.
philosophical
point
to discredit
But this answer will not do. Ryle's procedure
requires him
to his own view as a preliminary
to rescuing us
the main alternative

Descartes
doctrine

did

may
have

be

from the quandaries

into which that view leads us. If his prime example
of a major philosopher
who held the alternative
view turns out not to
have held it, then we must ask whether we are in fact forced to choose
and Ryle's
the
between
the "official
indeed
theory. And
theory"
a
to
historical Descartes
offer
third
illustrates
He
alternative.
appears
the fact that there is no evident
connection
the
between
necessary
metaphysical

side of the "official theory" and its epistemological

side. A
are
two
may hold that mind and body
radically distinct
and still not hold that the mind has privileged
access to its

philosopher
substances
own states and is invincibly
and states of other
ignorant of the existence
If he does take that road, then insofar as Ryle's
is
minds.15
polemic
directed against the epistemological
side of the "official theory," he will
be untouched
by it. And indeed, readers of The Concept ofMind will be
aware that Ryle's most effective
ridicule is directed against the doctrine

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DIALOGUES

WITH

THE

DEAD

43

is a reminder that we know far less about our own

access,
to
than we are supposed
far more
about other minds,
to
In
to
this
has
little
"official
the
end
do
the
very
theory."
according
dualism.
with a genuinely Cartesian
to go astray by doing
it is possible
Ryle illustrates one way in which
own
as the only reason
view
ahistorically:
setting up your
philosophy
the main alternatives.
able solution to a problem after first caricaturing

of privileged
and
minds,

Oxford philosopher,
whose
My second exhibit is another distinguished
later than The Concept ofMind,
and
work took its final form a decade
the past as ignoring it. The
whose
sin is not so much misrepresenting
work I refer to is J. L. Austin's
Sense and Sensibilia.
concern
in this work is to refute the doctrine
that we never
Austin's
or
never
see or otherwise
at
any rate,
directly perceive,
perceive,
material
but only sense data, or our own ideas, impressions,
objects,
sense perceptions,
is
this docrine

or whatever.

His

book

is a sustained

with a few ... words, whose

first to an obsession
or carefully
or
understood
studied
described,
really
carefully
with a few ... half-studied
'facts'_(1962,
p. 3)
attributable

argument

that

uses are oversimplified,

not
to an obsession
and second,

his book
is almost
illusions. Unlike
about perceptual
Ryle's,
not
to
set
does
alternative
up any positive
attempt
entirely critical. He
the doctrine
that we do perceive material
view. He explicitly disavows
a similar over
since he feels that that doctrine
involves
objects,
we
no
one
of
but many: the
kind
is
There
thing
perceive,
simplification.
to
contrast
term "sense
term "material object" has meaning
in
the
only
one
we
we
term
must
also
if
the
the
other.
Austin
datum";
reject
reject
we
I
in
that
what
the
doctrine
interested
is,
think,
always directly
are sense data, not because
to replace
it by an
he wants
perceive
a
as
sees
to
it
he
but
because
alternative,
leading inevitably
skepticism
which he ismost anxious to avoid.16
that the doctrine he is attacking
is a very old one,
Austin emphasises
facts

to A. J. Ayer. But he
from the Greeks
by many philosophers,
as the main
of
his
attack
chooses
three
contemporary
target
philoso
for doing
His
this is
Price and Warnock.
justification
phers, Ayer,
held

interesting:
I find
their

in these

texts a good

deficiencies;
reasons
approved

deal to criticise,
but I choose
them for their merits,
and not for
to me
to provide
of the
the best available
they seem
exposition
- more
are at least as old as Heraclitus
for holding
theories which
full,

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44

EDWIN

and

coherent
(1962,

p.

terminologically

exact

CURLEY

than you find,

for example,

in Descartes

or Berkeley.

I)17

are better
that Austin
thinks Ayer, Price and Warnock
or
than
Descartes
is that
his
view
Presumably
Berkeley.
philosophers
a
come
at
of
the
end
their
of
because
version
the
long tradition,
they
doctrine under attack will build on past work,
whatever
incorporating
there is in Descartes
and Berkeley which has so far proven capable of
as well as the latest improvements.
criticism,
surviving
if
after
Nevertheless,
you return to these opening words of Austin's
having finished his book, it is difficult to take this praise quite seriously.
I don't

suppose

the last virtues you would be tempted to find in these modern

Certainly
after reading Austin's
writers,
critique, would be fullness, coherence
on Descartes,
If Ayer is an improvement
and terminological
exactitude.
must
if
But
then Descartes
be shockingly
bad.
you then go back to read
inmind, you may find it hard
Descartes
with Austin's
criticisms of Ayer
to apply them.
sees the argument
from illusion as the main prop of the theory
Austin
of perception
he is criticising. One of his principal criticisms of Ayer
is
use
of the argument
from illusion, Ayer begins by discussing
in
his
that,
the stick which
various
standard cases of perceptual
illusion
looks
in
immersed
reflections
and
that
when
he
bent
water, mirages,
partly
as
to
from
these
illusions
characterising
gradually
slips
characterising
them as delusions. And Austin argues that this is verbal sleight-of-hand,
are not the same thing. "Illusion,"
in a
that illusion and delusion
context, does not suggest that something
totally unreal has
perceptual
"delusion"
does suggest something
been conjured up, whereas
totally
not there at all. And
the argument
from illusion
unreal,
something
on treating
between
trades on not distinguishing
illusions and delusions,
illusions as if they were delusions.
it
Whatever
the merits of this criticism may be when applied to Ayer,
In Descartes,
for
does not work when you try to apply it to Descartes.
from illusion is not to support a
the main use of the argument
example,
to
to a skeptical
conclusion
but
argue directly
theory of perception,
we
our
to
of the things
take
be around us. Whereas
about
knowledge
with a small
Austin
can, perhaps,
charge Ayer with being obsessed
Descartes
is really not much
in those
of examples,
interested
at
In
First
all.
the
Meditation,
they are mentioned
examples
only to be
as not providing
dismissed
adequate grounds for doubting
immediately
range

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DIALOGUES

WITH

THE

DEAD

45

our beliefs about things which are neither very small nor very distant
from us. Descartes'
central case is the dream, a case where
it is very
natural to think of something
unreal
totally
being conjured up. Austin,
as he iswith Ayer, has relatively
concerned
little to say about dreaming,
and the passages
in which he discusses
dreams are among
the least
as
in
his
book.
if
He
writes
the
of
the
dream
proponent
satisfactory
to hold that all (or nearly all) dreams were intrinsically
from waking
But Descartes'
version of
indistinguishable
experiences.
the dream argument makes no such assumption.
I argue this in more
detail in my 1978, ch. III.
I draw from this is that it is a mistake
The moral
to be too
our
with
A
20th
preoccupied
contemporaries.
century philosopher,
an argument
or theory which
has a long history, may
expounding
it with greater
and exactness
than his 17th
expound
sophistication
he
But
because
he
is building on
may also, perhaps
century counterpart.
a long tradition and dealing with so familiar a theme, or because he is
not a good enough
to have
and philosopher
historian
learned
the
lessons of that tradition,
or fully or
fail to state it as accurately
as an earlier philosopher,
who cannot take so much
for
suggestively
or
a
who
have
better
of
the
fundamental
issues.
granted
just may
grasp
we dismiss
Before
as superseded
the work of past philosophers
by
we should recognize
that it is not alj that
subsequent
developments,
clear that we know, even at this late date, what a philosopher
like
was saying. We may know well enough what words he wrote.
Descartes
But knowing what he meant by those words, I've been suggesting,
is a
matter of knowing
to
how he would
certain
about
respond
questions
as we develop new theories
those words. And as philosophy
progresses,
and arguments,
the questions we want to address to past philosophers
can never be a permanent
So
the history of philosophy
keep changing.
must
but
be
written
in
afresh
each
acquisition,
generation.
I suppose
that it may
to write
be possible
timeless
of
history
argument

had

which
is not altered by changing
history of philosophy
of philosophic
truth. But I suggest that timeless history of
or useful. As soon as the
to be very interesting
is unlikely
philosophy
historian departs from giving us merely
factual information
about, say,
Hobbes'
dates and writings,
and from summarising Hobbes'
views in
own language,
what
as soon as he tries to
is pretty much Hobbes'
philosophy,
conceptions

express what Hobbes

or to decide which

own language,
thought in his (i.e., the historian's)
Hobbes
to reach the
needed
assumptions
really

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46

EDWIN

conclusions

he reached,
which Hobbes
objection
contradiction
in Hobbes
teristic

line for Hobbes

CURLEY

or construct
a possible Hobbesian
reply to
seems not to have considered,
or identify a
and decide which
is the best or most charac
as
soon
as the historian does any of
to take

these necessary
things, what he writes will be very much subject to time
and chance.
Its value will depend very much on his own philosophical
he is capable of seeing, and on
ability, on the philosophical
possibilities
the level of sophistication

and

intelligence

of the period

in which

he

lives.

need also to recognize

that a label, like "the argument
from
or "the social contract
an entirely mislead
theory," conveys
of definiteness.
Such labels refer really to a family of
ing impression
related arguments
and theories advanced
in
by various philosophers
as it is unclear what
various forms over the centuries. And in proportion
each of those philosophers
may have held, it will be unclear what the
from illusion, or the social contract theory is. Someone
argument
doing
a really thorough study of an argument
like the argument
from illusion
would have to look at it in an historical dimension,
taking account of its
We

illusion,"

various

forms and the interpretive

issues each author may raise, and
some attention
to the question:
if this argument
is
giving
"Why,
fallacious, has it had such a strong appeal to so many people over such a
at the history of the
long period of time?" If he did look seriously
to come
he would
to the conclusion
be unlikely
that its
argument,
and a few badly misunderstood
appeal rests merely on verbal confusions
facts.18

When
Passmore

I was

a student
in my
a neighboring
visited

first year

of graduate
John
school,
to give a paper on the
university
for philosophers
of studying the history of their discipline.
I
importance
recall being much
and recommendations.
impressed by his arguments
to specialise
decision
They were an important factor in my subsequent
in the history of philosophy.
It would be pleasant
if I could now recall
were which
the arguments
I then found so convincing,
but
the intervening
years have erased everything
unfortunately
except my
of being impressed by them. Some years later, when
I found
memory
of his department
in Australia,
I asked him about that
myself a member
it, did not think he had a copy of it,
paper, but he had never published
what

and could not recall the detail of its argument any better than I can. In
to John Passmore,
this essay, intended partly as a homage
I have tried to
reconstruct
what would
have been a satisfactory
for his
argument

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WITH

DIALOGUES

THE

DEAD

47

is in fact anything
But I have no idea whether my argument
conclusion.
or
he would even
on
whether
that occasion,
like the one he offered
it as

regard

a satisfactory

argument.19

NOTES
1
On

see Passmore
(1965).
Plato, who is particularly
open to this charge,
of the need for historical
Consider
accuracy.

this theme

Though
on behalf

his Socrates
imagines
Protagoras
speech which
of all things:
that man
is the measure
doctrine
You

is this: when
too easily, Socrates.
The
truth of the matter
some opinion
to canvass
and he is found
of mine

take

things much
in
questions
then I am refuted only
is refuted,
it is he who

someone

mean.

to the article

this reference

of Plato's

the polemical
side
use of
Passmore's
concrete

ask

you

order

tripping,
if they are different,
if his answers are such as I should have given;
what I actually
not I....
Show a more
generous
spirit by attacking
Cornford
tr.,
modified)
166a-d,
slightly

(Theaetetus,

I owe

making

is capable of speaking
eloquently
from the
the following
excerpt
to his attack on the
in response

the

term,

cited above,
by Passmore
in his predecessors.
interest
more
in general
is interested

who

have
may
of philosophy
does
under consideration.
here, not only Hegel,

individuals

held

those positions.
care whether
any

rather
though he emphasises
in
The polemical
historian,
than in the
of view
points
In

its most

extreme

form

ever
history
polemical
held the position
3
but also Aristotle.
I have
in mind
4
to his
in the preface
of the excitement
I think here particularly
Russell
expressed
at his discovery
that "this seemingly
Critical
of Leibniz
Exposition
of the Philosophy
but for the
could be deduced
fantastic
from a few simple premisses,
which,
system
would
if not most,
conclusions
which Leibniz
had drawn from them, many,
philosophers
to admit"
have been willing
(p. xiv).
5
who writes:
historian Martial
As an example we might
cite the French
Gueroult,
not

identifiable

individual

... unlike
as acquired
do
considered
truths at present
the positive
In philosophy
sciences,
as if this
contradicts
in the tradition which
revoke everything
present-day
philosophy,
a definitely
Nor
were
truth subsisting
non-temporally.
acquired
philosophy
present-day
not

a process
to do with
be
have
of acquisition,
would
which
philosophy
anything
no matter
science whose
in time a growing
regular progress we could follow,
developing
to undergo.
itself in effect as a
crises itwere
what revolutionary
past presents
Philosophy's
to
their pretensions
without
of doctrines
which
succession
reject each other reciprocally,
does

a timeless,

universally

valid

and permanently

acquired

truth ever

triumphing.

(1969,

p.

572)
6
We

The

simile

attributed

are like dwarfs

and things more

seated

distant,

to Bernard

of Chartres

on the shoulders
but

of giants; we see more

things than the ancients
of our own sight, nor to the
to the sharpness

this is due neither

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EDWIN

48

stature, but because we are raised and borne aloft on that giant mass,
to have been the subject of a whole
book. Cf. Robert Merton
enough
1965.
the Shoulders
Free Press,
of Giants.
of Gueroult,
be clear here that I reject not only the skepticism
but also the

of our own

greatness
has been

used

(1965), On
7
It should
relativism
were

often

of Collingwood,

1978,

pp.

who

in different
that the theories of philosophers
periods
answers
to different
(Cf. Colling
questions.
they were
one
is not to be deceived
task of the historian
by
Certainly
and certainly
there are enormous
differences
(to take Colling
held

because

incommensurable,

wood

CURLEY

60-68.)

resemblances,
superficial
wood's
between
the political
prime example)
wrote
and that in which Hobbes
the Republic,

in which Plato was working

when he
was working
the Leviathan.
when he wrote
to
do not arise for the other.
So each will confront
which
(Plato did not have
questions
to political
worry about the threat posed
insight
authority
special
by citizens who claimed
some of
into a higher,
that they will not also confront
divine
law.) But it does not follow
to create
nature which
the same questions
is there about human
leads men
(e.g., what
political

institutions?

political

authority

context

to obey
to show that itmay be rational
for men
arguments
to self-interest?)
of a
it seems contrary
If itwere
the business
to give a reasoned
statement
of the ideal of human
society

are there
even when

simply
political
philosopher
held by his fellow citizens
(as Collingwood
ideals had changed
would
imply theories

the fact that

assumes,
p. 63), then of course
to change
of society
with
them. But
ought
that as the task of a political
should)
accept

nor Hobbes
neither
Plato
would
(or
are eternal
it does not follow
that none
From
the fact that not all problems
philosopher.
of different
have a long enough
life to make
between
dialogue
possible
philosophers
periods.
8
Gueroult
9
G. Ryle,
10
AT VI,

dal Pra to this effect, with apparent

(1969, p. 574) cites Mario
approval.
York,
p. 19.
inmore detail in ch. 7
23; HR I, 95. The issues I touch on briefly here, I discuss
which
of my
1978. The
textual situation
there are passages
is, in fact, highly
complex:
he could have cited had he thought
tend to support Ryle's
passages
reading of Descartes,
in his

New

took

all of
his

conflicting

this. His

history

history
seriously
textual evidence?
distinctions?

appropriate
Descartes'
But
thought?
11
to the Marquess
Letter
in Kenny's
1981,
12
Cf. the similar
(1981,

are other passages

is unconcerned
cut against
which
it. Ryle
who
is a priori and need not bother with texts. A philosopher
to ask himself:
of this
have
what
is the significance
would

to do so; there

it worthwhile
with

can

the apparent
be reconciled
contradictions
by making
to
of the conflicting
ismore
fundamental
positions

if not, which

quite possibly
of Newcastle,

is not
Ryle
23 November

even

aware

1646.1

that

quote

there is a difficulty.
the text as translated

p. 206.

of 5 February
1649. In Kenny's
translation
in the letter toMore
passage
runs: "real speech
the key passage
[i.e., the use of words or signs to indicate
to pure thought
is the only certain
and not to natural
pertaining
impulse]...

p. 245)

something
in a body." Behaviorists
may find
sign of thought hidden
should not let that blind them to the fact that Descartes

this unduly
restrictive,
at least recognize

does

uses of language
as certain signs of thought.
13
see The Search After Truth, Bk, III, Pt. ii, ch. 7, sec.
For Malebranche,
see the Essay,
IV, xi, 12.
14
sensed
sketch he contributed
this. In the autobiographical
Perhaps Ryle
a collection
the following
Ryle,
of critical essays, he expresses
regret:
R. G.

Collingwood,

philosophical

despite
had
writings,

but

they
certain

5. For Locke,
to Pitcher's

of some of his
merits
the great, but belatedly
recognised
or I think, on most
at all on me,
of my
influence

no

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DIALOGUES

WITH

DEAD

THE

49

... I think, in
his colleagues
either in our student days or after we became
was at fault in not ever
that my generation
our remote
retrospect,
trying to cultivate
senior.
15
illustrate the same point in a different way. For while he does seem to hold
Locke would
to 'Descartes'
central
doctrines
he is careful
not to commit
the epistemological
Myth,'

contemporaries,

to metaphysical
dualism. At best it is probable
that God has given matter
the possibility
exclude

himself
cannot
6.
16

that the sofcl is immaterial,

the power to think. Essay,

but we
IV,

iii.

on Warnock
in the final chapter.
an oppressive
create a sense that they are battling
both Ryle
and Austin
of an "official doctrine,"
the one by speaking
the other by speaking
regularly
orthodoxy,
a doctrine,
as if there were
for holding
some
sort of
of the "approved
reasons"
Cf.

17

his remarks

Notice

how

to certify philosophical
business
it was
bureau whose
and whose
theories,
government
dictates
rebelling
against.
they were
18
I think I should acknowledge
been this hard on Ryle and Austin,
that neither
Having
some
as a Plato
the history of philosophy.
has
of them entirely neglected
Ryle
standing
not only wrote on Aristotle,
but also initiated
the Clarendon
Aristotle
scholar, and Austin
as ignorant of history
as Scriven
about them is not that they were
series. My complaint
wish us to be, but that such historical
and interests as they had did not
knowledge
in contemporary
inform their work
sufficiently
philosophy.
19
for presentation
at the meeting
written
This paper was originally
of the Australian
in
of
the
and
I
Humanities
have
read various
versions
of it at a
1976,
May
Academy
would

of American

number

the organizers
I would
which

universities
(Wisconsin,
of the Blackburg
Conference
to see it published.
be content

Marquette,
for forcing

me

and Chicago).
to finally get

I am grateful
it into a form

to
in

REFERENCES
J.: 1962, Sense and Sensibilia,
Oxford,
R. G.:
1978, An Autobiography,

Austin,

Oxford.

Oxford.
Oxford,
Mass.
the Skeptics, Harvard,
1978, Descartes
Against
Cambridge,
as a Philosophical
of Philosophy
M.:
The Monist,
1969, The History
Problem',

Collingwood,
E.:
Curley,
Gueroult,
53, 572.

A.:

Kenny,

1981,

Minneapolis.
A.:
1973,
Kenny,
R.: 1965,
Merton,

G.:

Scriven,
Better

Letters,

University

of Minnesota

in The Anatomy
of the Soul, Blackwell,
Privacy',
Free Press, Glencoe.
the Shoulders
of Giants,
of Philosophy',
'The Idea of a History
and Theory,
History

'Cartesian

Barnes
and Noble,
1949, The Concept
of Mind,
M.:
Enrollments
1977,
'Increasing
Philosophy
and Addresses
Proceedings
Teaching',
Philosophy

Association,

Dept.

Philosophical

Press,
London.

On

J.: 1965,

Passmore,
1-32.
Ryle,

Descartes,

vol.

50. pp.

232-244,

New

vol.

5, pp.

York.

and Appointments
Through
of the American
Philosophical

326-328.

of Philosophy
of Illinois

University
Chicago

IL 60680
U.S.A.

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