Democracy and The Lessons of Dictatorship

Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship
Author(s): Nancy Bermeo

Source: Comparative Politics, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Apr., 1992), pp. 273-291
Published by: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York
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Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship

Nancy Bermeo
Decades ago, the socialist GaetanoSalvemini wrote the following reflectionson his behavior
as a deputy in the troubleddemocracyof prefascistItaly.
. .. thatI wouldhavebeenwiserhadI beenmoremoderate
I mustacknowledge
in mycriticism
attacked
himfromtheLeft,accusinghim
of theGiolittiansystem.Forwhilewe Italiancrusaders
of Italiandemocracyin the making,othersassailedhimfrom
of being-as he was-a corrupter
fortheirtaste.Ourcriticismthusdid nothelpto
theRightbecausehe waseventoo democratic
directthe evolutionof Italianpubliclife towardless imperfectformsof democracybutrather
towardthevictoryof ... reactionary
groups.... As forthe resultsof the Fascistdictatorship
in contrastwiththoseof Italiandemocracy
in themaking,theyareherebeforeourveryeyes. Let
us hopethatthe Italianswill notbe the only ones to learnfromthatfrightfulexperience.1
What do we learn from the triumph of dictatorship?How does the experience of
authoritarianrule shape our views of democracy?Gaetano Salvemini's reflections show us
that the lessons of dictatorshipcan be profound. Dictatorshipcan force us to reevaluatethe
natureof particularregimes, our enemies, and our own goals and behavior. The experience
of dictatorshipcan produce importantcognitive change.
This process of cognitive change is the essence of what I call political learning. Political
learningmerits our attentionbecause it is key to the reconstructionof democracy. It is thus
an importantelement in our attemptsto understandthe process of redemocratization,though
understandingpolitical learningis not synonymouswith understandingredemocratizationas
a whole.
Redemocratizationinvolves three phases: the breakdownof a dictatorship,the creationor
reconstructionof a democracy, and the consolidationof a new regime. Political learning is
most importantduring the second phase of the redemocratizationprocess--at the critical
moment between the crisis of the old order and the consolidation of the new one-for it
helps explain why a new regime becomes democraticin the first place. It helps explain why,
in essence, a dictatorshipin crisis is replacedby a democracyratherthananotherdictatorial
regime. Whetherpolitical learningaffects the other phases of the redemocratizationprocess
remains an open question.
Thus, this essay makes no claims about the relationshipbetween political learning and
redemocratizationas a whole. Instead, it explains what political learning is, why political
learning is key to the reconstructionof democracy,and how the concept adds to our current
understandingsof empirical democratic theory. The last section of the essay presents a
general discussion of how political learningtakes place.2
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ComparativePolitics April 1992

Political Learning Defined
Political learning is the process through which people modify their political beliefs and
tactics as a result of severe crises, frustrations,and dramaticchanges in environment. All
people, followers and leaders alike, are capable of learningfrom experience, and political
actors rarelyweathereconomic depressions, internalwars, or the violent collapse of a form
of government unchanged. Nor do they, in more stable situations, meet with constant
political frustrationand always continue believing and behaving as they did before. As
RobertAxelrod observes in advocatingan "evolutionaryapproachto norms," "what works
out well . . . is likely to be used again while what turns out poorly is likely to be
discarded."3 The same can be said about the ideas one uses to guide one's behavior.
Crises often force people to reevaluatethe ideas that they have used as guides to action in
the past. The changed ideas may relate to tactics, parties, allies, enemies, or institutions.
The new ideas may be true or false, justified or unjustified, polarizing or compromising.
Their relevance to democratictheoryand to the constructionof democracyderives not from
their veracity but from the fact that they are believed and used as guidelines for behavior.
In the recent past, scholars argued that basic beliefs were the product of childhood
socialization in families and schools. If basic beliefs changed at all, they changed slowly,
over generations. As Sidney Verba wrote recently in reflecting on his own earlier work,
"what had not been clear" in the past, was "the degree to which political attitudes were
labile and could be affected by political events."'4
The concept of political learning is based on the premise that beliefs are not fixed
immutably in childhood and that they can be "affected by political events" such as the
replacementof one regime with another.The triumphof dictatorshipand the experience of
authoritarianrule can, under certain circumstances, change beliefs and leave normative
legacies that favor the creationof democracy.
It is importantto emphasize that political learningcan affect beliefs about tactics as well
as beliefs about more abstractphenomena. Tactics, or the conscious behaviorsone uses to
obtain a desired goal, may also be altered as a result of political shocks, crises, and
frustrations.Gaetano Salvemini expected that his opposition to Giolitti would lead to "a
more perfectform of democracy."Yet in retrospecthe came to believe thathis tactics led to
the triumphof fascism instead. His "basic beliefs" about what constituteda "more perfect
form of democracy"may have remainedmore or less the same, but his thinking on tactics
changed dramatically.
The cognitive changes involved in political learning can thus involve means or ends or
both. Political learning can affect basic, ideological beliefs about political structures,or it
can affect simply the means one prefers for achieving constantends. Political learningcan
take ideological or tactical forms.
What are the ideas that must be affected by political learning if democracy is to be
reconstructed?At the most basic level, critical elites must change their assessments of the
relative effectiveness of democraticinstitutionsfor the fulfillment of group goals. In order
for this to happen, at least one of four subsidiary changes must take place. Elites must
change their evaluations of the alternatives to democratic rule; they must change their
evaluationsof democracy itself; they must change the orderingor natureof group goals; or
they must change their perceptionsof one another.
274

Nancy Bermeo
These changes are all examples of political learning. Each takes place under certain
conditionsof authoritarianrule, as I shall illustratebelow. They may occur individually,but
they can also occur simultaneously, and the likelihood of reconstructing democracy
increases if they do. The likelihood of reconstructingdemocracyalso increases to the extent
that diverse sectors of the political elite undergo the same sorts of changes.
Several points of clarification are required to ensure that the nature of the changes
embodied in political learning is fully understood. First, it must be emphasized that
dictatorshipsdo not always create prodemocraticcognitive changes. If they did, democracy
would not be so rare. Moreover, there is a good argumentfor expecting dictatorshipand all
its horrorsto sharpendiscord, not to dull it. As LaurenceWhiteheadargues in his work on
the cycle of dictatorship in Bolivia, "a failed democratization [and thus a renewal of
dictatorship] teaches lessons that may be harmful to future endeavors." "It teaches
revolutionaryminoritiesnot to disarmand place their trust in civilian compacts." It teaches
the needy not to defer demandsbecause the game may be canceled at any minute. Finally,
it teaches the threateneddictators that force and "redoubledruthlessness" can defeat the
proponentsof a new order.5
Even when political learningtakes a prodemocraticform, it does not necessarily involve
the emergence of a deep normative commitment to democracy per se. This is a second
importantpoint of clarification. As stated earlier, political learning may lead only to an
alterationin tactics. Moreover, if elites simply "change their evaluationsof the alternatives
to democratic rule," they may reconstructdemocracy "by default." Elites may come to
tolerateand advocate liberal democracy, not because they have come to see intrinsicmerits
in a democraticpolitical system, but because they have come to believe that the dictatorial
alternativesare even less desirable.6Rejecting dictatorshipis not the ideal motive for the
resurrectionof democracy, but it is indeed a very common one. As Dankwart Rustow
argues, democracies can be built by people who are not truly democrats. "Circumstances
may force, trick, lure or cajole non-democratsinto democratic behavior." Circumstances
can force political elites to change their beliefs about the merits of dictatorshipand support
democracy as "a lesser evil."'7
A third point of clarification relates to the cumulative nature of the political learning
process. Political learning occurs at an individual level, and since the stimuli in each
individual's learning environmentdiffer, the timing and natureof the learning experience
may vary between individualsand between political groups. The scope of the sector of the
elite that undergoespolitical learningis an importantfactor in predictingwhetherand when
the reconstructionof democracy will take place. The likelihood that a democracy will be
reconstructedincreaseswith the diversityof the elite thatexperiencescognitive change. That
is, if leaders of capital and labor, on the left and the right, all undergo some sort of
prodemocratic learning, the likelihood of democratic reconstruction is greater than if
learningoccurs in just one group. Learningneed not occur across the political spectrum,but
a "criticalmass" of learnersmust develop before the risky game of building democracycan
begin.
Thus, the concept of political learningallows plenty of room for cynicism and skepticism.
Political learning does not occur uniformly within a polity. It may not involve a deep
commitment to democracy as an end in itself, and sometimes prodemocraticpolitical
275


learning may not occur at all. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of prodemocraticpolitical
learning is common enough and importantenough to merit close attention.
Elites and the Reconstructionof Democracy

Though political learningoccurs at all levels of society, the learningexperience of political
leaders is particularlyimportantfor the reconstructionof democracies. Mass actions such as
strikes, riots, and armed insurrectionscan bring down a dictatorialregime, but they do not
in themselves produce an alternative. Popular mobilization and mass struggles are key to
provokingcrises within dictatorshipsand are thus of great importancein the first phase of
the redemocratizationprocess. But duringthe second phase of the redemocratizationprocess
elite bargaining and accords become key. Liberal democracies are (among other things)
institutionalarrangements,and as such they must be designed and erected by a relatively
small sector of society. An electoral law can be endorsedby millions of people, but it must
be written by a select few. Likewise, a constitutioncan be celebratedin the streets, but it
must be draftedelsewhere. For betteror worse, the constructionof democracyis an occasion
where "the beliefs of some are more importantthan those of others."s Democracy is almost
always the fruit of popular struggle, and this must never be forgotten, but the design of
formal democraticinstitutionsis, of necessity, the work of a political elite.9
It thus makes sense to study elites in an exploratoryinquiry into the reconstructionof
democracies. But why focus on changes in elite beliefs? The answer is clear if we analyze
precisely what the recreationof democracyinvolves. We often readof the "reemergence"of
democracy. But the image is deceptive. Democracies do not "emerge" or reemerge as if
propelled by some naturalprocess. Nor are they anthropomorphic--theydo not rise up
under their own volition. They are recreatedpiece by piece, institutionby institution, and
the creatorsare usually old enemies.
Democraciesare recreatedonly where they have brokendown, and the breakdownusually
involves extreme hostility among national political leaders. Aside from the few cases in
which democracies are crushed by foreign invaders and the even fewer cases in which
democraciesare destroyedby militarymen with no supportfrom any political partyleaders,
democraciesusually breakdown with the active or passive supportof a substantialsector of
the civilian political elite. This is an unpalatablefact but a fact nevertheless. Thus, in cases
where democracies are being reconstructed,we have, at one time, a set of political leaders
who refuse to accept the outcome of the democraticgame and are willing to either condone
or actually participatein the political elimination of opponents, then, at another time, a
partiallyoverlapping(sometimes identical)set of leaderswho are willing to compromiseand
bargain.Across time, the opposing groups have often remainedthe same in name and basic
social composition, but the prioritiesof their leaders have changed radically.
Elites representinggroups who were willing to harass and perhapseven kill each other at
one time sit down and constructdemocraticaccordsat another.The fact that they are willing
to constructdemocraticaccords means that they are willing to reconstructa type of regime
thatfailed in the past. Ideas aboutthis type of regime and about the various opposing groups
that will operateinside it must change in orderfor the reconstructionto begin. Leadersmust
hold ideas at time B that they did not hold at time A.
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Nancy Bermeo
The nature of elite thinking is especially importantwhen the time comes to make a
commitmentto a democraticconstitution. Whetherthis means draftinga new document or
adopting an amended version of an older document, the occasion inevitably requires
compromise. In order for compromise to take place, the various factions within the elite
must not only assess their values but also rankthem. They must decide what is paramount,
what is negotiable, and what might be left to the essentially uncertainarenaof the legislative
process. Unless the range of negotiable issues expands, the divisions that produced the
breakdownof democracyin the first place will simply emerge again. This is why the change
of mind intrinsicto political learning is so important.
The importanceof changed ideas is well exemplified by the 1976 transitionto democracy
in Spain. There, leaders of the right and the left made dramaticconcessions, with the right
legalizing the Communist Party and the left accepting the monarchy. These were
nonnegotiableissues when the dictatorshipbegan. They were quite literally issues of life and
death during the Civil War, but by the time the dictatorship broke down, they were
negotiable. The reconstructionof democracyin Spain would have been impossible without
a change in elite ideas.'0 In fact, the reconstructionof democracy almost always requires
some form of prodemocraticpolitical learning."
The importanceof political learningbecomes very clear if we reflect upon the history of
the nations that have managed to reconstructdemocracy. The discourse of elites in these
concrete cases shows both the frequency and the nature of the political learning
phenomenon. R6mulo Betancourtpresents an excellent illustrationof political learning in
Latin America. As a leader of Venezuela's center-left Acci6n Democritica (AD),
Betancourtwas a major actor in the turbulence that led to the installation of the Perez
Jimenez militaryregime. In 1958, after ten years of dictatorship,he helped to engineer the
reconstructionof political democracyin Venezuela. Explainingthe change, not simply in his
own attitude, but in the attitudeof his political rivals as well, he stated:
The pessimisticforecastswere wrong.Interparty
discordhas been reducedto a minimum,
revealingthat[we], the partyleaders,have learnedthe hardlessonsthatdespotismtaughtall
Venezuelans.
in jail, in exile or at homewithonlythe mostprecarious
freedom,
Underground,
we cameto understand
thatit was [ourown]breechof civilityandculturethatopenedthedoor
to [thedictatorship].12
Betancourtconveys a sense of "lessons learned" that is reminiscentof Salvemini. Both
Betancourtand Salvemini acceptedresponsibilityfor provokingthe action of antidemocratic
forces, and both illustrate a change in attitude not only toward democracy, but toward
political opposition.
The idea that a reinforced desire for cooperation can emerge from the experience of
dictatorshipis mirroredagain and again in the writings and speeches of those who have
experienced dictatorshipfirst hand. Though writing as the head of a CommunistParty at a
different time in a different nation, PalmiroTogliatti's words were similar to Betancourt's.
work,of theSpecial
[Forthepeoplewhohave]survivedtheharshandheroictestsof clandestine
of theprisons,of theislandsof confinement,
of exile, of theSpanishWar... theneed
Tribunal,
to be liberatedfromverbalextremismandthe impotenceof maximalism
[is primary].13
277


This recognitionhelped to lead Togliatti (like Salvemini and Betancourt)to propose major
changes in party tactics. In describingwhat he called il partito nuovo--the new party--he
promised:
Thenewpartyis notonlya partyof theworkingclassbutof thepeople.It no longerlimitsitself
to a roleof criticismandpropaganda
butenterspositivelyandconstructively
intothe life of the
country.The workingclass thatin the pastlimiteditselfto a role of oppositionandcriticism
intendstodayto assumea positionof leadershipalong with otherconsistentlydemocratic
forces.'4
Evidence from Chile suggests that more recent dictatorshipscan leave legacies that are
similar to those of earlier regimes. As Jorge Arrate, a leader of the Chilean Socialist Party
(PSCH), wrote in 1982:
Theauthoritarianism
of antiauthoritarian[of thePinochetregime]hasmeanttheconsolidation
ism in the heartof the left. . . . The loss of democracyand its denigrationin the official
discourse[of the dictatorship]
inducea moreprofoundappreciation
of the value,meaningand
contentsof politicaldemocracy. .
...
The words of Gabriel Valdes, a leading Chilean Christian Democrat, illustrate that the
process of retrospectivereevaluationwas not confined to the Chilean Left. Suffering under
the same yoke of oppression, old enemies began to view both their past and one anotherin
different ways.
We arethefirstto engagein self-criticism.
It's certainlytruethatwe engagedin sectarianism,
withothers.We wantto
thatwe mademistakes.[Now]we wantto cometo an understanding
construct[a newtypeof democracy].
Whyshouldn'ttheSocialistsbe ableto change?Theyhave
changedin Europe.Today,the Socialistsin Spaindon'tkill priests.Theychangedin Portugal.
S. . Whyshouldn'twe acceptthatthe Socialistsin Chile[also]change?Theyhavechanged.
... If evenwe, theChristian
Democrats,havechanged,whyshouldn'twe recognizethatothers
havechanged?'6
The precedingquotationsillustratewhat evidence of political learninglooks like and how
often political actors themselves make explicit reference to the connection between the
experience of dictatorshipand cognitive change.
It is importantto add that evidence of political learning can not be gleaned from words
alone. The political actors discussed above provide good examples of political learningnot
simply because they made these statements,but because they acted in accordancewith them.
Betancourt"explicitly renouncedthe full effect of AD's mobilizationalcapacity" in orderto
secure opposition support for Venezuela's pacted democracy.17 Togliatti agreed to
participate in the Badoglio government, to include Mussolini's Concordat in the new
constitution, and to supporta law grantingpardonto certain Fascist leaders, illustratinga
remarkablewillingness to make concessions on even the most divisive issues.18 Likewise,
Arrateand Valdes were pivotal figures in engineering the concerted action that eventually
led to the legal ouster of Pinochet. Without a united opposition, and without figures like
278

Nancy Bermeo
Arrateand Valdes who were willing to argue for unity, the Chilean dictatorswould never
have been "beatenon their own playing field."'9
I am reluctant to dismiss the changes outlined above as idiosyncratic individual
transformations.These actors were differentenough in personalityand backgroundto make
a purely psychological explanation unlikely. More important,these are just a few of the
examples I might have used. We can find evidence of political learningin a wide variety of
cases.20
Political Learning and Empirical Democratic Theory

What does the concept of political learning add to empirical democratic theory? Scholars
have connected democracy with specific values and beliefs since at least the time of The
Republic. Whether the argument came from Tocqueville writing of "the habits of the
heart," from Ostrogorski writing of "democratic manners," from Plamenatz writing of
democratic "preferences," or from Almond and Verba writing of the "civic culture," an
interest in the culturalfoundationsof democracy appearsagain and again.
The recognition that attitudes and beliefs are an important factor in the making of
democracy even appears in the work of scholars who are classified as "structuralists."
BarringtonMoore, for example, argues that the establishmentof democracy in Britain was
advancedby "many subtle changes in attitude."The landed upper classes had to take on a
"bourgeois hue." What is essential in the making of democracy, he writes, is that
"bourgeoisattitudes""become stronger."21
The body of work that acknowledges the connection between democracy and particular
beliefs is thus quite sizable. Yet, despite its extensiveness, the literatureon the normative
foundationsof democracyprovides only the beginning of an answer to the question of how
democracies are reconstructed.There are several reasons for this. The first is that most of
this literaturefocuses, consciously or unconsciously, on the ideas that sustain and enrich
democracy.22This is a perfectlyworthwhiletopic of research,but it is not what concernsme
here. Questions about how democracy comes into being precede questions about
democracy's maintenanceand operation. The factors that explain the origins of democracy
must be separatedanalyticallyfrom the factors that explain democraticstability.
The second problem with existing work is what it says and fails to say about how ideas
emerge and change. There are two currentsin the literaturethat would have us believe that
political learning is extremely unlikely under any conditions.
At one extreme, we have scholarswho arguethatpeople simply do not make fundamental
changes in their beliefs. Paretobelieved that, thoughthe species "could slowly, very slowly
be modified, the individual changes very little indeed.'"23People who subscribe to this
position might arguethat the reconstructionof democracyderives from a change in the cast
of political actors rather than a change in the beliefs of individuals. Democracies are
reconstructed, not because of political learning, but because old leaders die and new
generationsof leaders take their place.
There can be little doubt that the death of intransigentleaders provides opportunitiesfor
elites with different beliefs, priorities, and styles to emerge. But there are at least two
reasons why we can not attributethe reconstructionof democracy solely to the passage of
279


time and the passing away of particularleaders. The first reason is that democracies are
often recreatedby the same leaders who witnessed or actuallyparticipatedin the destruction
of a previous democratic regime. (Colombia, Venezuela, and Uruguay provide good
examples to prove the point.) But even in cases where the time between the collapse of one
democracy and the creationof anotheris relatively lengthy, there is often some overlap of
old and new elites. Spain's transitionto democracywas engineeredby King JuanCarlos and
Adolfo Suarez, both membersof a new generationof leaders, but their task was made easier
by pivotal figures such as Santiago Carrillo and Jos6 Areilza, who were from a previous
generationand had been politically active in the second republic.24
Even if there are cases in which no majorpartyleaders survive the period of authoritarian
rule, there is a second problem with attributingthe successful reconstructionof democracy
to a simple change of leadership,for we still do not know how the more compromisingsets
of leadersemerge. If a new generationof leadersreally is more conciliatorythanthe last, we
must still explain why this is the case. Why were they chosen? Theories that assume
immutabilitybeg the question.
A second theme in the literature that proves problematic in the context of the
reconstructionof democracy is the argumentthat "like produces like." There is a strong
strainin empiricaldemocratictheory that would have us believe "thatauthoritarianregimes
are likely to . . . perpetuateauthoritarianpolitical cultures."25The relationshipbetween
political structuresand political attitudesand beliefs is often held to be not only reciprocal
but positive. Scholarsargue not only that ideas and institutionsoften affect one another, but
that when effects are felt, they produce matching. Democratic institutions produce
democraticattitudes, and authoritarianinstitutionsproduce authoritarianattitudes.
Harry Eckstein works with this assumption when he asserts that stable government is
possible only if authoritypatternsin the state are "congruent"with authoritypatternsin
families and schools. The drive for matchingpatternsof authorityis so naturaland strong
that leaders will either deliberatelyor "in some intuitive way" try to reshape incongruous
authoritypatternsin society. Likewise, citizens will try to cope with the "strains"arising
from incongruency "by changing the governmental patterns under which they live.'"26
Implicitin Eckstein's theory of congruenceis the idea that authoritarianinstitutionsproduce
real or would-be authoritariansand democratic institutions produce real or would-be
democrats.
Many scholarspresentan explicit version of a similartheme. T. B. Bottomorearguesthat
professional groups, voluntaryassociations, and vigorous local governmentsare important
foundationsof democracy because "they provide so many occasions and opportunitiesfor
DankwartRustow
ordinarymen and women to practicethe business of self-government.'"27
argues that "the very operation" of democratic procedures "will enlarge the area of
consensus step by step.
."28 And Myron Weiner, citing J. S. Mill, argues that
"authoritarianstructures ...
and democratic structures each breed particular kinds of
The acceptanceof this matchingtheme is not universal, but it is common
personalities.'"29
enough for scholars to be surprisedwhen citizens in authoritarianstates appear no more
authoritarianthan citizens in democracies.30
The idea that like produceslike has importantimplicationswhen it filters into analyses of
political history, for it leads to an emphasison continuitiesacross time. Sidney Verba writes
that "the political memories" and "historical experience" of a nation have an important
280

Nancy Bermeo
"impact on political beliefs," but he assumes that this impact is one which perpetuatesthe
beliefs and behaviorsof the past. Like many others, he argues that, when "politicalhistory
is a history of group conflict," "horizontalties among the citizens of the political system"
are bound to be weak.31
This type of reasoningis found in a broadrange of scholarly work. Verba is not alone in
assumingthat history leaves legacies that perpetuatepast beliefs and behaviors. Marx offers
a classic version of this argument, asserting that men are frustratedin "revolutionizing
themselves" because "the traditionof all the dead generationsweighs like a nightmareon
the brainof the living."'32Similarly,Moore emphasizesthat culture, "madeup from all sorts
of wants, expectationsand other ideas derived from the past," "screens out certainparts of
the objective situationand emphasizesother parts. [Thus], what looks like an opportunityor
temptationto one group will not necessarily seem so to another group with a different
historicalexperience. .
.."3
The differencebetween my argumentand these is in my emphasison discontinuity.Marx
used the nightmareimage to convey a sense of hauntingand repetition. For Marx, in this
context, the past was a recurringnightmare.Old regimes can certainlyhave these qualities.
But old regimes can be nightmaresof a different order. Old regimes can be the sort of
nightmarethat is simply so horrifying that it never leaves our consciousness. These old
regimes are not a source of continuitybut of discontinuity.They give rise to the feelings and
activities embodied in the slogan "Nunca Mas!"--"Never Again!" They are the lessons
learnedand the past mistakes to be avoided.
Hans Daalderand Arend Lijphartcapturedthe potentialfor discontinuityin their analyses
of consociationaldemocracy.Daaldercomes close to my own position when he remindsus
that "the traumaticmemory of past conflicts . . . may either perpetuateconflict or cause
parties to draw together."34Lijphart'sthesis that consociationalismis possible only when
"elites understandthe perils of political fragmentation"is also relevant, for I am arguing
that dictatorshipsometimes teaches leaders what the "perils of fragmentation"are.35
Ideas raised in passing by Guillermo O'Donnell constitute anothersource of inspiration
for my argument. In 1979, in the last few pages of a new edition of his classic work on
bureaucraticauthoritarianism,O'Donnell wrote that "politics is crucially affected by the
capacityto learn" and hoped that the "still fresh history" of authoritarianismwould provide
"the opportunityfor learning by the opposition."36He did not discuss what this learning
would entail or how it might take place, but his more recent work on redemocratization
gives us some leads. In Transitionsfrom AuthoritarianRule, he writes that "the ideological
'prestige' of political democracy"is higher now than ever before and attributesthis to two
factors, "the discreditingof the discoursesand groupsthatproposean immediateand violent
leap forward to . . . some form of socialism" and the "discrediting of the recent
authoritarianexperience."37
The process of "discrediting"old beliefs is what political learning is all about. Yet we
will surely overlook this process and misunderstandthe reconstructionof democracy if we
fail to recognize that dictatorshipscan leave legacies that marka discontinuitywith the past.
The concept of political learningproceedsfrom the assumptionthat authoritarianstates do
not necessarily perpetuateor expand authoritarianideas and behaviors. This is not to deny
that dictatorships will try to socialize and resocialize their citizenry. The histories of
authoritarianregimes throughoutthe world are replete with attemptsto do precisely this,
281


throughcontrols on media, educationalcurricula,and teaching faculties. But these attempts
do not always work. Indeed, the recent rejectionof Communismin easternEuropesuggests
that even the most elaborateattemptsat resocializationcan fail.
States may shape and create institutions with the hope of creating particularsorts of
citizens, but the outcome is rarely if ever certain. Ostrogorskiwas correct in arguingyears
ago that "there is always a gap" between a people's institutions and their "mannersand
customs."38 Incongruityis commonplace.
What are the forces that create gaps and incongruities?How do new beliefs emerge?
Aside from the sort of work just cited in the discussion of congruity, democratictheorists
have given little systematicattentionto how the beliefs which interestus here first develop.
The change in belief that is logically intrinsicto the reconstructionprocess has gone largely
unexplained.This is a third problem with the existing literatureand anotherarea in which
the study of political learningtakes us in new directions.
The tendency to "neglect sources of change in beliefs" has been noted by Robert Dahl.
He remindsus that "alien, esoteric and unorthodoxbeliefs in one periodmay become partof
the political culture at a later time" and thus that "the processes that make for changes in
beliefs are as importantas those . . . that make for stability." But he also cautions that
studies of political culture "tendto concentrateexclusively on stable and persistentoutlooks
producedby socialization into an ongoing system of beliefs." We tend to "neglect sources
of change in beliefs."39This is not helpful for those of us who want to understandchanges
in elite thinking and changes in regimes.
Dahl does somethingto remedythe shortcomingsof the literatureby attemptingto explain
how political actors acquiretheir beliefs. He argues that acquisition depends on the actor's
exposure to the belief, the influence that the bearers of the belief exert on the actor's
socialization, the personalprestigeof the belief's advocatesand antagonists,the success and
failureof the people and groupswho symbolize the belief, and finally the extent to which the
belief is consistent with the actor's presentbeliefs and experiences."
These formulationsare so general that they only prompt a new set of questions. What
determinesthe prestige and success of the bearersof the new belief? What determinestheir
effect on an actor's socialization?What are the experiences and presentbeliefs that must be
consistent with the new belief? Dahl is concerned with another, broader subject and
knowingly leaves these questions unanswered. Nevertheless, he comes closer than many
other theorists, for he recognizes the importanceof understandinghow democraticbeliefs
emerge.
Recent work has not gone beyond the insights that Dahl offered us in 1971. For example,
when a major 1987 cross-nationalstudy of thirdworld democracyposed the question, "what
then are the sources of . . . moderateand conciliatoryleadership?,"the answer was simply
"the largerpolitical culture."41 No one would argue that elite beliefs about moderationand
conciliation would not derive from the "largerpolitical culture," but the point is not very
helpful. It illustratesonly that we still know very little about how the beliefs associatedwith
democracy emerge. We still seem to know very little about the etiology of democratic
norms, beliefs, and behaviors, especially within the context of an authoritarianstate.
Yet the history of redemocratizedstates throughoutthe world shows us that beliefs about
democracydo change, even within the context of dictatorships.What causes these changes?
What, in other words, are the sources of political learning?This question requires much
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Nancy Bermeo
more attentionthan it can be given here but by way of a conclusion I offer some tentative
thoughtsthat might serve as a frameworkfor future research.
Some Possible Sources of Political Learning
In considering the origins of prodemocraticpolitical learning, we should first note that
certainaspects of the process are not predictable.We can not know in advance what a given
leader's experience in exile will be. Nor can we predict the effects of personality. Some
individuals will remain intransigentno matter what their environment, and others will
change but never admit to having erred in the past.42
The other point we should note is that no political culture is homogeneous. States with
some democratic experience in the past are very likely to have some citizens who have
prodemocraticbeliefs even when a dictatorshipseems quite secure. Thus, when we seek to
understandthe process of political learning, we are not asking how whole societies adopt
wholly new beliefs and tactics. We are asking instead about how a "critical mass" of
political actorscomes to adoptthe beliefs and attitudesthat only a smallerand less powerful
sector of society alreadyholds.
In general terms, the cognitive changes that affect this "critical mass" emerge from
processes of comparisonand interaction.The comparisonsthat give rise to political learning
can be historical and domestic or internationaland contemporary. Salvemini made a
historicalcomparisonwhen he contrasted"the results of fascist dictatorship"with "Italian
democracy in the making" and found the latter far superior. Political actors judge "what
works" with reference to what they have seen in their own nations in the recent past. The
appeal of democracy increases as the historical comparison between concrete national
experiences of democracy and dictatorshipfavor the former.
Internationalcomparisoncan be as illuminatingas historical comparison. Political elites
have much to learn from the successes and failuresof their counterpartsabroad,and though
some actors seem to focus exclusively on domestic politics, many pivotal actors do not.
Events in what one might call referencestates are an especially importantsource of political
learning. A reference state is a nation which serves as a point of comparisonfor political
actors in another state. Reference states serve as reference points because of geographic
proximity,culturalsimilarity,sharedhistory, or some combinationof the three.
Dictatorialand oppositionalelites often look abroadfor insights about "what works and
what does not." It is highly significant, for example, that the first postwar collapse of
dictatorship in western Europe took the form of social revolution. The sudden and
uncontrolleddisintegrationof the Salazar-Caetanoregime in Portugal-a disintegrationin
which the dictatorialelite lost not only power but property-provided an importantlesson
for empowered political elites in Spain, and to a lesser extent Brazil. As the alternativeof
social revolution emerged in a reference state, controlledreform and liberalizationseemed
more appealing.43
A similar phenomenon seems to have occurred in the Republic of Korea under the
administration of Roh Tae Woo. Roh's "wholesale acceptance of the [democratic]
opposition's demands" in June 1987 was due in partto events in the Philippines. Although
Roh opted for cooperationfor a varietyof reasons, he knew thatintransigencehad not staved
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off the February1986 revolutionin the Philippinesand acted in partto avoid the unpleasant
fate of FerdinandMarcos.44
Just as events in referencestates may affect the thinkingof dictatorialelites, so they may
affect the thinking of opposition groups. Leftist opposition leaders in Latin America were
greatly influenced by Marxistcritiquesof the Soviet model which took root in Francein the
mid 1970s.45On the other end of the political spectrum, many moderateopposition groups
saw the success of the reformist transition in Spain as an indication that even
well-establisheddictatorshipscould be dismantledwithoutbloodshed. As GabrielValdes put
it in 1983: "Spaindid it, why shouldn'twe be able to do it too? In Spain the divisions were
much deeper than ours. .. ."46
It would be naive to argue that comparisonleads all the pivotal actors in any dictatorship
to learn the same lessons. Indeed, given the long-standingpillarizationof the left and right
in certainstates, we might even doubt that they always looked to the same referencestates.
But what we can not doubt is thatpeople take cues from the experienceof their counterparts
abroadand that they use these cues as cognitive and behavioralguidelines. This is probably
especially true in situationsof instabilitywhen oppositionaland dictatorialelites are looking
for new tactics to alter the statusquo. It is then that "demonstrationeffects" are likely to be
most powerful.
Political learningthroughinteractioncan be as importantas learningthroughcomparison.
Ironically,one of the most potent sources of attitudinalchange duringdictatorshipemanates
from the very acts of coercion that the regime takes to ensure stability. When a dictatorship
forces a wide spectrum of its oppositional elite into exile and prison, it provides
opportunitiesfor interactionand identificationthatmay lead to a stronger,more unified, and
possibly more democraticopposition in the future. Francisco Weffort described the ironies
of state coercion in a powerful essay on the democratizationof Brazil. "State terror,"he
wrote, "reduced all its opponents, generally on the left, but also many liberals, to their
common denominatoras unprotectedand frightenedhuman beings. Civil society was born
out of this experience of fear," and democracy began to emerge as a "core value" in
Brazilian political culture.47 Focusing on political leaders specifically, Thanos Veremis
recalls how the forced interactionsbroughtabout by state terrorhad similar effects during
the colonels' dictatorshipin Greece.
Politiciansof theright,centerandleft, whohadbeenbitteropponents
before1967,metagainin
andthe islandsto whichtheyhadbeenexiled.Theirhatredof
prisoncells, policeheadquarters
the junta becamea point of consensuswhich led to a reappraisal
of past errors,some
modificationof politicalpassions, and an outrightdismissalof the civil war legacy of
Thusthe groundwas laidfor a postregimeprocessof civilianrenewal.48
polarization.
The "reappraisalof past errors"intrinsicto political learningcan come from othersorts of
interactionsas well. The interactionswhich occur during foreign exile often bring pivotal
actors into new networksof foreign politicians and intellectualswhere the diffusion of new
ideas is especially likely. It is widely recognized, for example, that the Chilean Socialist
Party was greatly affected by the experiences of party exiles in Europe. As Jorge Arrate
recalls: "It was [exile in] Rome that affected me most. Rome affected us as much as the
Cuban revolution or the government of Allende . . . in the past. It was there [reading
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Nancy Bermeo
Gramsci and cementing close ties to Eurocommunists] that I changed my political
perspective."49The fact that the directorateof the Socialist Partyinstalleditself officially in
East Berlin had the ironic effect of reinforcing the party's commitment to "bourgeois"
democracy.Partyleader Carlos Altamiranorecalls how he was "shocked by the absence of
Like RicardoNufiez, Erich Schnake, and others who sharedhis East
liberty" in the East.50o
Berlin experience, Altamirano became a principal force behind the renovation of the
PSCH.51
Interactionswhich occur domestically can also help to change attitudes, sometimes in
surprisingways. In Spain, Brazil, and even Argentina, for example, business elites who
interactedwith government-sanctionedlabor leadershipcame to learn that bargainingwith
more representativeleaders might have advantages, even for capital. This explains why
Spanish capitalists were willing to bargain with illegal unionists long before the
democratizationof Spain.52It also explains why "time and again, [Argentinian]employers
lamentedthe lack of representativespokesmenfor labour"duringthe last dictatorship,and
why Brazilian entrepreneursbegan to bypass the dictatorship'scorporatistunions after the
massive strikes of the late 1970s.53
Whether political learning takes place through interactionor comparison, its frequency
and content derive in large part from the natureof civil society and the dictatorialstate.
Dictatorshipsmight seek to be monolithicand all-powerful, but they are usually neither. On
the contrary,even underthe most ambitiousdictatorshipsthere are sometimes organizational
sectors within the state and organizationalspaces within society which serve as arenas for
the learning and diffusion of prodemocraticattitudesand tactics.
That arenasfor political learningcan emerge within sectors of the dictatorialstate itself is
nicely illustratedby the case of the Franco regime. In Spain, various branchesof the state
apparatusserved as conduits for liberalizing and democratizingideas. These emerged, for
example, in the ministry of education under Joaquin Ruiz Gimenez, in the ministry of
informationand tourismunderManuelFragaIribarne,and even in certaincircles of advisors
to Franco's "heir," JuanCarlos.54
The radicallydifferentcase of the People's Republic of China provides anotherexample.
Even there, in a dictatorshipwhich remainsmuch more intrusivethanthe right-wingregimes
I focus on here, an importantlearning forum grew up around an elite journal called the
World Economic Herald. Started by top party cadres and linked to both the Shanghai
Academy of Social Sciences and the Chinese Association of World Economics, the journal
"becamean importantsource of foreign ideas."55Throughlectures, conferences, articles by
foreign scholars, and politicians, it "helped set the agenda for the anti-government
demonstrations"of spring 1989. Significantly, the government'sfirst response to the mass
mobilization was not to crack down on student demonstratorsbut to suppress the World
Economic Herald.56
The example of the WorldEconomic Herald provides us with two importantreminders
aboutthe natureof dictatorship.First, arenasfor the diffusion of new ideas can emerge even
in situationsof relativelyhigh coercion. Second, organizationswhich are sanctionedfor one
function sometimes take on roles that sanctioningelites never imagined. A brief discussion
of some more concrete examples will show how the process works.
Of the many sanctioned organizations which have provided unexpected settings for
political learning, the Catholicchurchis probablythe best known. Whetherthroughits own
285


researchorganizations,church-sponsoredmedia, or Christianbase communitieswhich serve
as "schools for educating the exploited in their inalienablerights,'"57sectors of the church
have been key conduits for the diffusion of democraticideas.
Church organizationshave also fostered democratic learning by fostering unity among
opposition groups and by providingcommon groundon which old adversariesmight meet.
Organizationslike the Bishops' Businessmen's Conference in the Philippines provided an
importantsetting in which business elites and advocates for the poor united in common
opposition to dictatorship.58Organizationslike the National Council for the Restorationof
Democracy in Korea functioned similarly, bringing together a broad spectrum of groups
opposed to the Park regime in 1974.59 In Chile, the Academy of Christian Humanism
brought together "several importantresearchgroups of different political tendencies" and
providedan "umbrella"of protectionfor a broadspectrumof political actors."6In Uruguay,
the same function was served by CLAEH (the Latin American Center for Humanistic
Studies).61
Of course, church-relatedorganizationsdid not always provide arenasfor prodemocratic
political learning. But there can be little doubt that sectors of the churchhave allowed their
"sanctioned"political space to be occupied by a broadrange of actors and in so doing have
enhancedthe sort of dialogue and unity that the remakingof democracyrequires.
Although they have attracted less scholarly attention than the church in this regard,
professional associations have also provided importantarenas for political learning under
dictatorship.The roles of differentassociationshave varied from regime to regime, but there
can be little doubt that certain professional groups have played importantroles in both the
discreditingof dictatorshipand the diffusion of ideas supportiveof democracy.
Social science research groups evinced a surprisingdurability during the last wave of
dictatorshipin South America and served as importantlearningarenas in a varietyof states.
Funded and protectedby foundationsand political parties in the United States and Europe,
these groupsfosteredpolitical learningby promotingcontacts with prodemocraticassociates
in reference states. Most important, these organizations enhanced political learning by
promoting contacts between previously divided groups within domestic social science
communities. CEBRAP (Centro Brasileiro de Analise e Planejamento) in Brazil, CIESU
(Centro de Investigaciones e Estudios Sociales) in Uruguay, and FLACSO (Facultad
Latino-Americanode Ciencias Sociales) in Chile are but three of the associations thatplayed
this role in Latin America. The relations that were forged in these researchgroups became
especially importantas dictatorshipsliberalized, since many of the figures who were pivotal
in the transitionsto democracywere professionallyactive social scientists.
Lawyers' associations have also provided importantarenas for learning in a variety of
dictatorial regimes. Sanctioned out of necessity by regimes which sought a faqade of
rational-legallegitimacy, lawyers' associations often played surprisingroles in the face of
state coercion. In 1970 in Spain, for example, the NationalLegal Congress "converteditself
into something resembling a parliament"in which people "with diverse ideologies [were]
united by the democraticproject."62In Brazil, the nationalbar association, or OAB, played
a similar role. Beginning by defending political prisonersand then becoming a vociferous
advocate of human rights in general, the OAB was able to mobilize its politically diverse
membershipto "fight relentlesslyfor the rule of law."63Assertingpublicly that "the lawyers
of Brazil decry the illegitimate nature".of the military regime and that "no power is
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Nancy Bermeo
legitimate without the consent of the people," the OAB did a great deal to discredit the
military dictatorship.64Although a number of prominent OAB members sided with the
militarygovernmentin its early years, "one by one they abandonedthe regime."'65Thefact
that bar associations in both states were thought to representthe more conservative (and
propertied)sectors of society gave their political positions special resonance. A democratic
victory in these elite circles had repercussionsthroughoutsociety.
Journalists'associations, political parties, business groups, and human rights organizations are but a few of the other types of organizationsthat might merit attentionas forums
for political learning. The examples offered above are illustrativeand not exhaustive.
The key point to be made here is that civil society is never wholly obliterated by
authoritarianrule. This mattersgreatly. Dictatorsmight wish to suffocate civil society, but
the coercive structuresthey create function less like an opaque tarpaulinthan like a poorly
woven net. New ideas still filter into dictatorshipsfrom abroad,and citizens still have some
view of what goes on in the outside world. Often the world has some view of dictatorship,
too, as beatings, brutality,and assassinationsare caught on camera. Exiles move back into
systems of oppression through a variety of openings, and when they do, they carry new
experience and sometimes changed ideas.
Finally, there are the small free spaces that the net of dictatorshipleaves unfettered.It is
in those circles of society where state constraintis loosest that dictatorshipsso often find
their greatest challenge. Those who enjoy the limited freedom of association which
authoritarianregimes allow often use theirpolitical space as a forumfor the disseminationof
new and criticalideas. More important,perhaps,they often sharetheir space with those who
are accorded less freedom by the state.
The comparisons and the interactionsthat provide the bases for political learning take
place in a variety of settings, but these small free spaces are among the most important.As
stated in the introduction,the reconstructionof democracyrequireschanges in ideas about
dictatorship, democracy, group goals, and old enemies. Where civil society remains
politically alive, dictatorshipcan be criticized, goals and democracycan be reevaluated,and
old enemies and rivals can meet and build that minimumof trustthat the democraticgamble
requires.
Though authoritarianregimes do not smothercivil society altogether,the nets of coercion
which they craft vary greatly across nations. Different types of regimes startwith different
types of civil societies and then accord different degrees of freedom to different groups.
How much freedom exists and how it is used varies from case to case, and thus the content
and extent of political learningvaries as well. The variationbetween cases is greatlyaffected
by the natureof economic developmentand class relations in a particularstate, but we can
not study political learning through economic lenses alone. The existence or absence of
particularreligious, legal, or cultural traditionsaffects the possibilities for learning, too,
because these traditionsalso affect the natureof civil society under dictatorship.
As BarringtonMoore reminds us, political ideas "do not descend from heaven."66They
emerge from earthlyexperience and observationsin identifiable situationsand institutions.
Using biographical and historical sources to reconstruct what key elites observed and
experiencedcan enable us to understandwhen political learningtakes place and why it takes
a particularform. Understandinghow elite ideas change will not enable us to understandthe
287


whole process of redemocratization,but it will help us to understandwhen political leaders
can act in concert to craft democracyfrom dictatorialcrisis.
NOTES
The author thanks the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Center of InternationalStudies at
PrincetonUniversity for researchsupport.
1. A. William Salamone, Italy in the Giolittian Era: Italian Democracy in the Making, 1900-1914 (Philadelphia:
University of PennsylvaniaPress, 1960), p. xx.
2. The term democracy here connotes only polyarchy, an institutionalarrangementwhich guaranteesbasic civil
liberties and free elections. History has proven that even this minimalist form of democracy is extremely difficult to
constructand sustain. The terms belief and cognition are defined as in the Oxford English Dictionary. Belief is the
"mentalacceptanceof a proposition, statementor fact as true. . . . In modem use, often simply opinion." Cognition
is "the action or faculty of knowing in its widest sense including, sensation, perception, conception, etc."
3. Robert Axelrod, "An EvolutionaryApproachto Norms," American Political Science Review, 80 (December
1986), 1097. John Ikenberryargues similarlythat "new norms tend to spreadin the wake of failure or delegitimation.
." See "The Spreadof Norms in the InternationalSystem," paperpreparedfor the AnnualMeeting of the American
Political Science Association, 1987, p. 7.
4. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic CultureRevisited (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980), pp. 399-400;
Lucien Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton:Princeton University
Press, 1965), pp. 550-551.
5. Laurence Whitehead, "Bolivia's Failed Democratization," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and
Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitionsfrom AuthoritarianRule, vol. 2 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1986), p. 69 (emphasis mine).
6. The democracyby default option may be quite common in Latin Americatoday. For example, Brazilianbusiness
leaders' opposition to the military regime may have come less from a profounddemocraticconversion than from a
rejection of the dictatorship'seconomic policies. FernandoH. Cardoso, "Entrepreneursand the TransitionProcess:
The BrazilianCase," in O'Donnell et al., eds., Transitionsfrom AuthoritarianRule, vol. 3, pp. 137-153.
7. DankwartRustow, "Transitionsto Democracy," ComparativePolitics, 2 (April 1970), 344. See also Alain
Rouqui6, "O Misterio Democritico: Das Condiqres da Democracia as Democracias sem Condiq6es, " in Alain
Rouqui6, Bolivar Lamounier, and Jorge Schvarzer, eds., Como Renascem as Democracias (Sao Paulo: Editora
Brasilense, 1985), p. 45.
8. Almond and Verba, The Civic CultureRevisited, p. 404.
9. For other arguments about the role of elites, see Samuel Huntington, "Will More Countries Become
Democratic?"Political Science Quarterly,99 (Summer 1984), 212; Rustow, p. 356; and Rouqui6et al., eds., pp. 16,
39.
10. For excellent English language studies of the Spanish transition see Donald Share, The Making of Spanish
Democracy (New York:Praeger, 1986), and Paul Preston, The Triumphof Democracy in Spain (New York:Methuen,
1986).
11. This generalizationmight not hold in those very rare cases in which democracy is "imposed" by a conquering
militaryforce.
12. R6mulo Betancourt and R6mulo Gallegos, 40 Afios de Accidn Democrdtica 4 Presidents, vol. 1 (Caracas:
Ediciones de la Presidenciade la Republica, 1981), p. 112.
13. "PartitoNuovo," Rinascita (October-December1944).
14. "Che cose e il 'partito nuovo'?," Rinascita (October-December1944). For more on how the experience of
fascism changed Togliatti's views, see his Lezioni sul Fascismo (Rome: Riuniti, 1972).
15. Jorge Arrate, El Socialismo Chileno Rescate y Renovaci6n (Barcelona:Ediciones del Instituto Para el Nuevo
Chile, 1983), p. 93 (emphasis mine).
16. Gabriel Vald6s, Interview with Mahi Sierra, Cosas, Apr. 7, 1983, as reproducedin Gabriel Vald6s, Por la
Libertad(Santiago:Ediciones Chile y America, 1987), pp. 40-41 (emphasis mine).
17. Terry Karl, "Petroleumand Political Pacts: The Transitionto Democracy in Venezuela," in O'Donnell et al.,
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Nancy Bermeo
eds., vol. 2, p. 217. See also Daniel Levine, Conflict and Political Change in Venezuela (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1973).
18. It was not surprisingthat Prime Minister Parri wrote to Ugo La Malfa in July 1944: "Our relations with the
Communistshave much improved. ... Collaborationis being affected without friction and isolation; at center I find
them flexible and reasonable." See Joan Barth Urban, Moscow and the Italian CommunistParty (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1986), p. 204. Urban's carefully researchedstudy proves that the PCI's change in position was not
simply a kneejerkreaction to changed signals in Moscow.
19. The phraseis from PatricioAylwin's speech in the Chilean National Stadiumthe day after he replacedPinochet
as president.
20. I review more examples of political learningin "RethinkingRegime Change," ComparativePolitics, 22 (April
1990).
21. BarringtonMoore, The Social Origins of Dictatorshipand Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Makingof the
Modern World(Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 425. Moore's work is held up as a classic structuralistargument.
22. See, for example, Larry Diamond, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Juan Linz, "Developing and Sustaining
DemocraticGovernmentin the ThirdWorld," paperdelivered at the 1986 Annual Meeting of the AmericanPolitical
Science Association, Washington, D.C., p. 15; Ernest Griffith, John Plamenatz, and J. Roland Pennock, "Cultural
Prerequisitesto a Successfully Functioning Democracy: A Symposium," American Political Science Review, 50
(March 1956); Ian Budge, Agreementand the Stabilityof Democracy (Chicago:MarkhamPublishingCompany, 1970);
GabrielA. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture:Political Attitudesand Democracy in Five Nations (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1965), p. 366; and Giovanni Sartori, The Theoryof Democracy Revisited (Chatham:ChathamHouse,
1987), p.164.
23. Vilfredo Pareto, The Rise and Fall of the Elites (Totowa: BedminsterPress, 1968), p. 79.
24. Carrilloled the SpanishCommunistPartythroughoutthe transitionto democracyin the mid 1970s. His insistence
that the party was now prodemocraticand Eurocommunistlessened (for some) the threatof legalization. Areilza had
been a prominentfigure in the Falangebut broke with the regime after 1964 and became a pivotal figure on the liberal
right, convincing many members of the old political class to accept democracy.
25. Susan Tiano, "Authoritarianismand Political Culturein Argentinaand Chile in the mid-1960s," LatinAmerican
Research Review, 21 (1986), 73.
26. Harry Eckstein, Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway (Princeton:Princeton University
Press, 1966), p. 260. Eckstein claims that the Soviets' seemingly foolhardyattemptsto disrupttraditionalfamilial and
religious institutionswere a reflection of an intuitivedrive for congruity.
27. T. B. Bottomore, Elites and Society (London:Penguin, 1979), p. 126.
28. Rustow, p. 363.
29. Myron Weiner, "Empirical Democratic Theory," in Myron Weiner and Ergun Ozbudun, eds., Competitive
Elections in Developing Countries(Durham:Duke University Press, 1987), p. 15.
30. See for example, John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, "The Political Cultureof Authoritarianismin Mexico:
A Reexamination,"Latin AmericanResearch Review, 19 (1984), 106-24.
31. Sidney Verba, "ComparativePolitical Culture," in Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Cultureand
Political Development(Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press, 1965), p. 556.
32. Karl Marx, "The EighteenthBrumaireof Louis Bonaparte,"in Robert Tucker, ed., The Marx-EngelsReader
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), p. 437.
33. Moore, p. 485.
34. Hans Daalder, "Parties, Elites, and Political Developments in Western Europe," in Joseph LaPalombaraand
MyronWeiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1966), p. 69.
35. Arend Lijphart,"ConsociationalDemocracy," WorldPolitics (January1969), 216.
36. Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernizationand BureaucraticAuthoritarianism:Studies in South American Politics
(Berkeley: Instituteof InternationalStudies, University of California, 1979), p. 209.
37. GuillermoO'Donnell, "Introductionto the Latin AmericanCases," in O'Donnell et al., eds., Transitionsfrom
AuthoritarianRule, vol. 2, p. 17. For a more recentbut still undevelopedallusion to political learning, see O'Donnell,
"Challenges to Democratizationin Brazil," World Policy Journal (Spring 1988), 291. Lucian Pye discussed the
discrediting of dictatorshipin "Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism,"American Political Science
Review, 84 (March 1990), 3-16
38. Moisei Ostrogorski,Democracy and the Organizationof Political Parties (Chicago: QuadrangleBooks, 1964),
pp. 289-90.
289


39. Robert Dahl, Polyarchy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 167. There is a great deal of work on
attitudechange in social psychology and on culturalchange in sociology and anthropology.Unfortunately,this work
has yet to be integratedinto empiricaldemocratictheory.
40. Ibid., pp. 186-7.
41. Diamond, Lipset, and Linz, "Developing and SustainingDemocraticGovernment,"p. 59.
42. ConstantineKaramanlisof Greece became much more conciliatoryafter years of voluntaryexile in Paris and the
fall of the colonels' dictatorship.Thoughhe spoke of the need to overcome the divisions of the past, renamedhis party
"New Democracy," and surprisedthe Right by legalizing the CommunistParty,he never expressed any public regrets
concerninghis own actions. See Roger Massip, Caramanlis:Un grec hors du commun(Paris:Stock, 1982), and Eric
Rouleau, Le Monde, Nov. 29, 1967.
43. ThomasC. Bruneauarguesthatthe "completelyunanticipatedLisbon coup d'6tat served notice to rulingelites in
at least Spain and Brazil and possibly Peru and Uruguayas well that some degree of liberalizationwould have to be
initiatedin orderto avoid their own overthrows." See "Portugal'sUnexpected Transition,"in KennethMaxwell and
Michael Haltzel, eds., Portugal: Ancient Country, YoungDemocracy (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center
Press, 1990), pp. 9-10. In its first and purely political phase, the Portugueserevolutionenabled reactionaryforces in
Spain to scotch a mild liberalizationintended to keep the old order intact. See Stanley Payne, The Franco Years
(Madison:University of Wisconsin, 1989). As the revolutionentered its radical phase, it seems to have aided rather
than hamperedreformistforces in Spain. For more on Portugal'seffect on Spain, see Kenneth Maxwell, "Spain and
Portugal:A ComparativePerspective," in Stanley Payne, ed., The Politics of Democratic Spain (Chicago: Chicago
Council on Foreign Relations, 1986), p. 269.
44. S. J. Han, "South Korea in 1987: The Politics of Democratization,"Asian Survey, 28 (January1988), 54. For
evidence of the effects of the Philippinesas a referencestate, see JamesCotton, "FromAuthoritarianismto Democracy
in South Korea," Political Studies, 37 (1989), 252; Council on Foreign Relations, Korea at the Crossroads (New
York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1987), p. 13; and Kim Dae Jung, "Interview:Democracy and Dissidence in
South Korea," Journal of InternationalAffairs, 38 (Winter 1985), 183.
45. For evidence from Brazil, see Fernando Gabeira, O Que i Isso Companheiro? (Rio de Janeiro: Editore
CODECRI, 1979). Significantly,this autobiographicalessay from an importantBrazilianleftist begins with a quotation
from Romain Rolland and Jean Christophe: "What use is life if not to correct our errors and triumph over our
preconceivedideas ... ?" For a carefullyresearchedarticle on relatedissues, see RobertPackenham,"The Changing
Political Discourse in Brazil, 1964-1985," in Wayne Selcher, ed., Political Liberalization in Brazil (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1986), pp. 158-159. RobertBarrospoints out the importanceof "debateson the crisis of the Soviet
model" in "The Left and Democracy:Recent Debates in Latin America," Telos, 68 (Summer 1986), 50.
46. Vald6s, pp. 40-41.
47. Francisco Weffort, "Why Democracy?," in Alfred Stepan, ed., Democratizing Brazil (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1989), p. 348.
48. Thanos Veremis, "Greece: Veto and Impasse, 1967-1974," in ChristopherClaphamand George Phillip, eds.,
The Political Dilemmas of MilitaryRegimes (London:Croom Helm, 1985), p. 39.
49. Ignacio Walker's personal interview with Arrate as cited in Walker, Socialismo y Democracia (Santiago:
CIEPLANHachette, 1990). Walker's work provides a carefully researcheddiscussion of the relationbetween various
exile communitiesof the PSCH and the party's split.
50. Altamirano'swords as cited in ibid., p. 188.
51. Ibid., p. 182
52. Preston, p. 12, and RobertFishman, personalcommunication,April 1991.
53. Ronaldo Munck with Ricardo Falcon and Bernardo Galitelli, Argentina: From Anarchism to Peronism
1885-1985 (London:Zed Books, 1987), p. 218. On Brazil, see Amaury Guimarles de Souza, Os Efeitos da Nova
Polftica Salarial Na Nagociagdo Colectiva (Sao Paulo: Nobel, 1985). In English, see Thomas Skidmore, The Politics
of MilitaryRule in Brazil 1964-1985 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 214.
54. The key years in the ministryof educationwere 1951-53. Ricardode la Cierva has called this period "el primer
conjunto aperturista."See Ricardo Montoro Romero, La Universidad en la Espaiia de Franco, 1939-1970: Un
Analisis Socioldgico (Madrid:Centrode InvestigacionesSociologicas, 1981), p. 43. The key years in the ministryof
informationand tourism followed the press censorship liberalizationin 1966. Antonio Lopez Pifia and EduardoL.
Arangur6n,La CulturaPolftica de la Espalia de Franco (Madrid:Taurus, 1976), p. 89. See also Payne, The Franco
Regime, pp. 435-439, 508-512.
290

Nancy Bermeo
55. Li Cheng and Lynn White, "China's TechnocraticMovement and the WorldEconomic Herald," unpublished
manuscript,PrincetonUniversity, October 1990, p. 5.
56. Ibid., p. 6. Among the foreignersinterviewedwere Samuel Huntington,Milton Friedman,and George Schultz.
The fact that Rezso Nyers, the reformisteconomist from Hungary, was interviewed seven times between 1983 and
1986 illustratesthe importanceof reference states.
57. Ralph Della Cava, "The People's Church, the Vatican and Abertura,"in Stepan, ed., p. 144.
58. The Bishops' Businessmen's Conference held conferences, conducted public opinion polls, and even forged a
link with NAMFREL(the election supervisorycommittee that exposed the electoral fraudsof 1984 and 1986) when a
member of the organization became NAMFREL president. See David Rosenberg, "The Changing Structure of
Philippine Government from Marcos to Aquino," in Carl Lande, ed., Rebuilding a Nation (Washington, D.C.:
WashingtonInstitutePress, 1987), p. 343.
59. The NCRD was founded by seventy-one leading figures from various fields and "acquiredconsiderablepublic
credibility . . . due to the organizationaland financial foundationprovidedby the Catholic Church." Hak-kyuSohn,
Authoritarianismand Oppositionin South Korea (London:Routledge, 1989), p. 76.
60. ArturoValenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela, "PartyOppositions under the AuthoritarianRegime," in Arturo
Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., MilitaryRule in Chile (Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1986), p. 215.
61. Acting as individualsbut protectedby their high visibility, exemplaryhierarchsserved an importantunifying role
as well. Jaime CardinalSin convinced Corazon Aquino and Salvador Laurel to unite and run against Marcos on a
single ticket. The Cardinalof Santiago sponsoredthe multipartyNational Accord for a Transitionto Full Democracy
in Chile in 1982. The Cardinalof Sao Paulo promotedoppositionunity across classes, races, and partiesby sponsoring
an ecumenical funeralfor VladimirHerzog, a Jewish journalistwho was murderedby the Brazilianpolice in 1975.
62. Sergio Vilar, Historia del Anti-Franquismo1939-1975 (Barcelona:Plaza and Janes, 1984), p. 416.
63. James A. Gardner, Legal Imperialism: American Lawyers and Foreign Aid in Latin America (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1980), pp. 111-112. Membership in the OAB is obligatory, so the organization
embracesan especially broad political spectrum. See Maria Helena MoreiraAlves, State and Oppositionin Military
Brazil (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), pp. 160-162.
64. Ordemdos Advogados do Brasil, VIIIConferdnciaNacional da Ordemdos Advogadosdo Brasil (Manaus:May
1980), p. 7.
65. Skidmore, p. 185.
66. Moore, p. 486.
291


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