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Four-Dimensionalism and Psychological Reductionism: The

Champions of Personal Identity

Richard Bielawa
Metaphysics 420
Term Paper

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Introduction
Personal Identity is a major issue in metaphysics. Personal identity is concerned with
what accounts for the fact, if it is a fact, that we remain the same person over time and through
various changes (Martin 124) .When we were reading about personal identity, most of the
people writing on the subject began with a short scenario to illustrate personal identity. I believe
it would only be appropriate if I begin the same way. When I was born, I weighed six pounds
and seven ounces. I couldnt walk, talk, or read. My hair was blonde until I was 3 years old. The
person typing these words right now weighs 270 pounds. I can talk, walk, and read at least semiproficiently. My hair is now very dark brown. The person typing this paper is a drastically
different person than that young child. What makes these two drastically different people the
same person? This is the question of personal identity. Besides just answering why that baby and
the person typing this paper are the same person, personal identity is important for normative
reasons. Personal identity affects how we view morality. Personal identity affects whom we can
punish. It also plays a role in moral feelings of anticipation, regret, and remorse.
Some important terms when thinking about personal identity are: qualitative sameness
and numerical sameness. Things that constitute qualitative sameness are physical or
psychological characteristics. For example, my having brown hair and being jolly are qualitative
characteristics. Numerical sameness is the total or absolute part of identity that does not change.
Numerical sameness is the aspect of a person that makes a person at one time and a person at
another time the same person despite qualitative changes. Many personal identity theories
cannot seem to overcome the scenarios of the prince and the cobbler, and fission cases. I will
show the combination of the two personal identity theories, four-dimensionalism and

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psychological reductionism, makes for a solid account of personhood that holds up to these two
scenarios as well as other critiques.

Methodology
I will begin by giving an overview of the four-dimensionalist theory of persons. I will
then provide justification for this theory in two ways. I will show that a four-dimensionalist
theory is accurate because time seems to be like space. I will prove how a four dimensionalist
theory (4D) overcomes the major problem in personal identity of fission cases. I will then show
how 4D lacks, in some aspect, as a theory of personal identity. By pairing 4D with the personal
identity theory called psychological reductionism, a comprehensive view of personal identity is
formed. I will provide one major reason why psychological reductionism is the best pairing with
4D. I will do so by showing how psychological reductionism overcomes the other major problem
in personal identity: the prince and the cobbler. Both of these theories have strong objections
against them. Firstly, I will present an objection against psychological reductionism, and defend
psychological reductionism in light of this objection. Next, two objections against 4D will be
presented, and defenses of 4D will be provided in light of the two objections. After the battle
against these two views is over, they will rise above the ashes as victors. Their prize is being
titled the most solid account of personal identity. Let us begin looking at four-dimensionalism.

Four-Dimensionalism
Four-dimensionalism is not just a theory of personal identity, but a theory of the nature of
time. 4D is a view which is strongly endorsed by Theodore Sider. 4D holds that time is similar

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to space. 4D holds that objects have spatial parts (the trunk, and tail of an elephant), as well as
having temporal parts. One temporal part of the elephant is her at the watering hole. Another
temporal part of the elephant is her giving birth. This is a general view of 4D. I will now show
how it applies to personal identity.
In 4D, what constitutes a person are the person stages beginning with the person stage
that came into being at a persons birth and ending with the person-stage that existed when the
person died (Martin 137). I would argue against Martin that a person begins with conception,
and ends when decomposition begins, but you get the point. Regardless of when the person
starts, the person is never fully present at any given moment. What is being experienced at any
given time is a person stage, or temporal slice of a person. This view makes people the sum of
their temporal parts. A person becomes a space-time worm. What is experienced in day to day
interactions with people is a slice of this space-time worm. Now that the theory has been defined,
we can begin looking at justifications for 4D.
This first justification for 4D is found in the similarities between time and space. Once it
is seen how similar time and space are, it is hard to deny this view. Typically, people think of
there being three dimensions: height, length, and depth. In Four-Dimensionalism, a fourth
dimension is added to the typical three: time. Time belongs amongst the spatial dimensions
because it is similar to them in three ways. There are objects that are distant from earth, so
distant in fact we may not see them. This distance does not mean, however, that these distant
objects do not exist. These objects just arent able to be viewed by my current standpoint in
space; this is analogous of time in regards to the past or future. Just because Im not currently
able to experience a given point in time, does not mean that the past or present are not in
existence; it is just too distant for me to experience. The second way time is like space is in

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terms of parts (Sider 51). Parts of my body can occupy different points in space, just as my
body can occupy different points in time. This makes the current moment a part of me instead of
fully being me, just as my fingers on the space of the keyboard, are a part of me and not all me.
The third way which time is like space is in terms of here and now (Sider 51). In Chapter 3 of
Riddles of Existence, Sider points out that here is a subjective term. Here is reliant on where
the reporter is located in space, there is no true here. The relativity of here is analogous to
when someone says it is now. The reporter of now is really just reporting their given
position in time and no objective now.
Richard Bielawa is all the temporal stages from his conception to his death. The person
typing this paper is just a series of temporal parts of Richard and not fully him. It seems weird to
not think of people as being wholly present, but the three ways which Sider makes time seem
like space are very convincing. Also, Sider points out how physics diagrams already assert that
time is space-like. If science is on the side of something, I am much more strongly inclined to
believe that theory. Time being space-like is a good reason to hold four-dimensionalism as
applying to all objects; including persons. There is another good reason to support 4D. This new
reason, however, does not apply to all objects just to persons. It is that 4D overcomes the major
issue in personal identity of fission cases.
You have just received some bad news. You have cancer. The cancer appears to be
terminal. The cancer has spread all throughout your body, except your brain. A doctor enters the
room and offers a radical solution to your problem. He says that that each half of the brain stores
all the information that makes you, you. Each of these halves can produce a person that is
identical to you. The operation only has a 10% chance of survival for each half of the brain.
Since the chance of success is so low, each half is put in a body identical to your own with the

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hope that one of these bodies and brains will emerge identical to you. You agree to the operation.
The surgery takes place, but both of the bodies and brains survive. There are now two identical
versions of you in the world! Now the question arises, why is this a problem?
The fission case becomes a problem because it leads to the original person ceasing to
exist. This happens because identity is a transitive relationship (Martin 133). This means that
since one person is identical to the donor, both fission descendants are identical to the donor. It
would be arbitrary to call one person the donor and not the other. As a result of this, both fission
descendants have to be different from the brain donor. This causes the donor to cease to exist.
This is a problem! The whole point of the operation was to have the donor to continue to exist.
This is also a very counter-intuitive claim. If only one of the patients survived, we would still
think the donor existed. The only theory of personal identity that can provide a good explanation
to this is four-dimensionalism.
Four-dimensionalism can solve the problem of fission using its key element, temporal
parts. Remember, temporal parts are slices of a whole person. This makes the pre-fission donor a
series of temporal slices. The series of pre-fission slices that composed the donor are temporal
slices that both fission descendants share. The pre-fission person was never really a person, just a
sub-set that two people share. The counter-intuitive claim that the donor ceases to exist has been
dispelled thanks to 4D. Although 4D can overcome the problem of fission exceptionally well, it
is still lacking as a comprehensive theory of personal identity.
Four-dimensionalism has one major problem, if it is the only way a person justifies what
makes a person the same person overtime. Merricks says 4D denies that the relation in the
analysis is numerical identity-perhaps it is psychological continuity (Merricks 987). Four-

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dimensionalism is incompatible with positing the relation between slices as numerical identity
because the person is not wholly present. All that is being experienced is a person slice.
Numerical identity is applied to persons not person slices. The slices do not persist so there is no
other slices in a different time for a given slice to be strictly identical to. The slices themselves
do not have numerical identity. Since the slices themselves have no numerical identity, they
cannot be related to other slices via numerical identity. Instead, numerical identity is found in the
complete series of temporal slices, the space-time worm. How does one determine which slices
belong to the space-time worm? There has been no way provided so far. 4D denies individual
slices having numerical identity, so it cant be that. Four-Dimensionalism needs a way to justify
a series of person-slices as belonging to the same whole.

Psychological Reductionism
We need some criteria that can let us know how certain temporal slices of a person
belong to an overall persons space-time worm. We need to find a theory that lends itself
particularly well to a four-dimensionalist view, and also lacks major problems. Merricks can help
us. He says It is inconsistent with the endurantists analysis of personal identity over time to
maintain that it is some relation other than numerical identity holding between a person existing
wholly present at one time and a person existing wholly present at another time(Merricks 988989). An endurantist is someone who holds that there are only the three spatial dimensions. They
hold that time is flowing. A consequence of the endurantists view, or possibly the motivation, is
that persons are fully present at any given time. Since people are fully present in an endurantists
view, they can take a fully present person at T1s numerical identity and see it is the same as
another person who is fully present at T2s numerical identity. This allows them to see person at
T1 and T2 as the same person.

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A relational view, however, is not compatible with an endurantist/ three-dimensionalist

view. Merricks says the endurantist holds personal identity over time just is-is nothing other
than, is analyzed as, is the very same thing as numerical identitys holding between a person
wholly present at one time and a person existing wholly present at another (Merricks 987).
Psychological reductionism posits what makes a person the same over time is something besides
numerical sameness, and therefore is incompatible with 3D
Psychological reductionism holds that what makes a person, a person, can be reduced to
psychological qualitative features like, memories, feelings, thoughts, character traits, etc. This
view was originally held by Locke but made stronger by Parfit. It is explained in Martins paper
as holding that What binds us are psychological connections, overlapping like strands in a
rope (Parfit, 1984, 222) (Martin 134). This is like if person-stage C at t3 is psychologically
connected to person-stage B at t2, and person stage B is connected to person-stage A at t1, but
person-stage C is lacking connection with person stage A, person-stage C and A are the same
person because A is indirectly connected to C through B. This makes it a relational view instead
of numerical identity. Person-stages can be viewed as belonging to a whole if they are related to
each other. Since psychological reductionism is a relational view, and relational views of
personal identity are not compatible with a 3D view, it follows that psychological reductionism
is only compatible with a 4D view.
Now that we see why a relational view lends itself well to a 4D view, and understand
this particular relational theory, psychological reductionism, we can analyze why it is the best
relational view to hold with 4D. The other possible relational view is spatiotemporal continuity.
This view holds that (in a 4D view) that temporal slices belong to the same whole if they are
related in such a way that they follow a continual path through space and time. This seems like a

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compatible theory with 4D, but as I will show it is flawed because of the other big problematic
scenario in personal identity, The Prince and The Cobbler.
In the prince and the cobbler, a prince and a cobbler have their entire psychologies
swapped. According to the spatiotemporal view the prince is still in his body, and the cobbler is
still in his body even though their psychologies are swapped. This is because there was still a
spatiotemporally continuous path. The prince, in anticipation of the swap, murdered someone
right before the swap. The swap takes place; the princes psychologies are in the cobblers body.
The cobblers psychologies are in princes body. Who gets arrested? According to the
spatiotemporal continuity view, the cobblers psychology in the princes body gets arrested. This
seems seriously wrong. According to psychological reductionism, the prince in the cobblers
body gets arrested. This is because in psychological reductionism what constitutes a person are
their psychologies. The prince may not have a spatiotemporally continuous path, but it seems
what makes up a person is their psychology and not their spatiotemporally continuous path. 4D
stands up to the major problem of the prince and the cobbler, and four-dimensionalism stands up
to the major problem of the fission cases, however, major criticisms still stand against each of
these theories of personhood. Lets first examine a major criticism against psychological
reductionism, and defend it against the criticism.

Criticisms and defense

The major criticism against psychological reductionism comes from Christine Korsgaard.
Korsgaard disagrees with psychological reductionism because it views people primarily as a
locus of experience, and agency as a form of experience (Korsgaard 103) Korsgaard views this
as a flawed way to look at persons. She believes looking at people primarily as agents leads to a

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better theory of personal identity. If you remember, a reason to be concerned about personal
identity is because it has moral implications. Korsgaard thinks an acceptable moral theory needs
to account for agency primarily, so moral responsibility can be held. I believe there is still a
place for an agent in psychological reductionism.
Even if agency is just a form of experience, what would be so bad about that?
People could still be held accountable for their actions. Agency as a form of experience is the
view held by Hume and spelled out in Martins paper. In Humes view, the commonsense belief
that we experience ourselves as selves is based on our mistaking a bundle of perceptions for a
perceiver (Martin 131) This makes the perceiver an illusion, but this does not mean we dont
really experience it. Hume argues that perceptions succeed each other so rapidly it gives rise to
an illusion of a self, or an agent. I do not see any good reasons provided by Korsgaard why this
agent, even though illusionary, cannot be held responsible. Even if Hume is wrong and the agent
is not an illusion, I do not see a reason why the agent cannot be reduced to the brain. Korsgaard
seems to hold that the agent must be some irreducible entity; I see no good reason for this.
Korsgaard says It is important not to reduce agency to a mere form of experience(Korsgaard
103). I believe it is very plausible that the agent brings with it nothing irreducible. It is plausible
that agency is just a common brain function amongst humans that becomes individualized
through personal memories and other psychological features. Psychological reductionism has
faced its critique and held up as a good theory of personal identity. Now we must analyze claims
against the four-dimensionalist view, and provide rebuttals. If this is done successfully, fourdimensionalism combined with psychological reductionism will remain the strongest theory of
personal identity.

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The theory of personal identity that has been presented could become extremely fragile if
time is not like space. All of the ways in which time is analogous of space only work in a nonmoving time view. 4D is a view in which the present is not fully reality, but past present, and
future make up reality. If one does not accept a confined time in which past, present, and future
are all in existence, then the notion of the past or present being too distant to experience
crumbles. It crumbles because if past and future are not in existence, then there is nothing to be
experienced. The relativity of now crumbles because if the past and future are not in existence,
then now is not a relative term; it is a true term. Lastly, an object having parts crumbles,
because if only the present exists, then any supposed parts would be gone; making an object
wholly present at any given moment. Looking at time as not being a dimension is called ThreeDimensionalism.
If three-dimensionalism is right then the whole view of personal identity I have presented
is wrong. Psychological continuity is incompatible with a three-dimensionalist view, and of
course 4D and 3D cannot both be correct. I believe there is good reason, however, to not take a
three-dimensionalist view of time seriously at all. My reason is because of Occams razor.
Occams razor holds that among competing theories, the one that makes the fewest assumptions
and is just as explanatory should be selected. A three-dimensionalist has to believe in a moving
time if they want to have a coherent theory. If the three-dimensionalist denies a moving time,
they endorse a fixed time, which is what the four-dimensionalist holds true. A threedimensionalist has to make an infinite number of assumptions to justify a moving-time view.
The infinite assumptions three-dimensionalism has to make can be shown in Theodore
Siders idea of hyper-times. Time is the standard by which motion is defined; how could time
itself move? This is metaphysics at its best (Sider 44). Sider is saying that time would need a

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standard to define its motion. This is how sider introduces the idea of hyper-times. Hyper-time
would be the standard by which times motion is defined. Since time is moving, however, you
would need a hyper-hyper time to define hyper-times motion. This would then bring in a hyperhyper hyper time. The number of hyper-times needed would be infinite. Since hyper-time is an
assumption, and there would have to be infinite hyper-times, the three-dimensionalist would
have to make an infinite number of assumptions. Having time analogous of space is much
simpler and more desirable than the mess of hyper-times needed in 3D and just as explanatory.
This makes 4D the stronger theory. There is, however, more critique of four-dimensionalism.
The final critique that must be overcome before four-dimensionalism and psychological
reductionism can be crowned the strongest theories of personal identity comes from Sally
Haslanger. Haslanger provides the intuitive claim PER which hold there are some objects which
persist through alteration (Haslanger 4). Haslanger argues that for this to be true there must be
some sort of causal connection between two different temporal parts. Haslanger says we cannot
reject something that makes rational theorizing possible. Haslanger is saying that fourdimensionalism rejects a causal connection between slices. Therefore, four-dimensionalism
alone is not acceptable because it rejects the causal connections that make rational theorizing
possible.
This critique would be highly problematic for four-dimensionalism on its own. Since
four-dimensionalism has been paired with psychological reductionism, this is no longer a
problem. Haslangers argument is that we need a connection between temporal slices for fourdimensionalism to be an acceptable theory. Pairing psychological reductionism with fourdimensionalism gives us this causal connection between slices. Psychological reductionism
casually connects two temporal person slices by looking at the psychological relationship

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between two slices. The psychological states of one temporal slice, affects the succeeding slices
that belong to the same space-time worm. This leaves us with an unscathed theory of personal
identity.
Four-dimensionalism and psychological reductionism have stood up to the two major
problems of the prince and the cobbler and fission cases by combining with each other to make a
comprehensive view of personal identity. This new view that combines the two, provides us with
a strong theory of personal identity that stands up to each individual theorys major criticisms.
Four-dimensionalism and psychological reductionism have rose above the ashes as victors of
personal identity.

Works Cited
Conee, Earl and Sider, Theodore. Riddles of Existence: A Guided Tour of Metaphysics. Oxford:
Clarendon, 2005. Print.
Haslanger, Sally. "Persistence, Change, and Explanation." Philosophical Studies 56.1 (1989): 128. Print.
Korsgaard, Christine M. "Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to
Parfit." Philosophy & Public Affairs 18.2 (1989): 101-32. Web.
Martin, Raymond. Personal Identity from Plato to Parfit. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Print.
Merricks, Trenton. "Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal
Identity." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59.4 (1999): 983-97-

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