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Research Policy
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a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history:
Received 1 June 2009
Received in revised form
24 November 2010
Accepted 13 January 2011
Available online 12 February 2011
Keywords:
Co-opetition
Innovation
S-LCD
Co-opetition capability
Case study
a b s t r a c t
We investigate why and how co-opetition (simultaneous pursuit of collaboration and competition)
between large rms occurs, evolves, and impacts the participating rms and the industry. We develop
a multi-level conceptual framework by combining literature-based conceptual arguments and insights
from an in-depth study of an exemplar case of co-opetition between Samsung Electronics and Sony Corporation. Our study demonstrates that co-opetition is challenging yet very helpful for rms to address
major technological challenges, to create benets for partnering rms, and to advance technological
innovation. We also show that co-opetition between giants causes subsequent co-opetition among other
rms and results in advanced technological development. Moreover, co-opetition capabilities of rms
play an important role in enhancing common benets as well as in gaining proportionately larger share
of the benets.
2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Scholarly attention to co-opetition, which we dene as a
strategy embodying simultaneous cooperation and competition
between rms (Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; Gnyawali et al.,
2008) has increased with its practical signicance (Brandenburger
and Nalebuff, 1996; Dagnino and Padula, 2002; Luo, 2004;
Walley, 2007). Co-opetition is more critical in high technology contexts because of several challenges such as shrinking
product life cycles, need for heavy investments in research and
development, convergence of multiple technologies, and importance of technological standards (Garud, 1994; Gnyawali and
Park, 2009; Gomes-Casseres, 1994). Because competing rms
possess relevant resources and face similar pressures, collaboration with competitors enables rms to acquire and create
new technological knowledge and use the knowledge in pursuit of innovations (Quintana-Garca and Benavides-Velasco,
2004; Ritala et al., 2009). Despite its increased importance, limited research has systematically examined why and how rms
engage in co-opetition and how co-opetition impacts innovation. This paper aims to address this critical gap by focusing
on the following questions: (a) what factors drive co-opetition
in the context of technological innovation? and (b) how does
Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 540 231 5021; fax: +1 540 231 3076.
E-mail addresses: devi@vt.edu (D.R. Gnyawali), bjpark@vt.edu (B.-J. Park).
1
Tel.: +1 540 231 2749; fax: +1 540 231 3076.
0048-7333/$ see front matter 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.respol.2011.01.009
651
652
653
Table 1
Comparison between Sony Corporation and Samsung Electronics.
Resources
Samsung
Electronicsa
Sony Corporation
2003
2008
2003
2008
32,751
54,114
5,258
4,978
2,900
5.36
1,306
25
83,771
96,495
4,799
4,686
5,489
5.69
4,237
21
83,786
67,178
1,188
790
4,590
6.83
1,513
20
126,260
77,688
(2,289)
(1,027)
4,998
6.43
1,723
25
Source: Annual Reports of Sony and Samsung Electronics, USPTO, Business Week.
a
Samsung Electronics data is based on consolidated nancial statements. In 2008,
Samsung Electronics R&D investment is 9.5% of parent company sales. Total assets
in 2003 are based on non-consolidated nancial data.
654
how the co-opetition evolved over time; and how this co-opetition
impacted the participating rms, other players, and the industry
as a whole. Data collected from the various sources noted above
are used to illustrate relevant points. We provide in the appendix
a summary of relevant quotes from the Factiva database and illustrate how they relate to the various aspects of our discussion in this
section.
4.1. Drivers of co-opetition
What made two large and erce rivals pursue the co-opetitive
partnership? Our examination showed that multi-level factors
were driving this relationship. In the TV industry, at panel displays
have replaced Cathode-ray tube (CRT), which was the predominant
display technology for a long time. In addition to the prominent
LCD and PDP, rms introduced other technologies such as electroluminescent display (ELD), light emitting diode (LED), and organic
light-emitting diode (OLED). Such efforts of rms to introduce
new technologies have shortened product life cycles. The industry shifted from analog to digital technology. The digital era also
required huge capital expenditures for the mass production of at
panel displays. Moreover, technological convergence forced rms
to develop new products, such as LED TV and 3D TV. Understanding complex technologies and engaging in mass production became
critical in the digital era (Sony Annual Report, 2008). Thus, at the
technology or industry levels, key forces leading to the formation of the S-LCD were rapid change in the technology, the cost
of developing new technologies, and the complicated nature of the
technology.
At the rm level, both Samsung and Sony are very aggressive and
proactive in terms of their technological development and marketing. Both are either leaders or close followers in many consumer
electronics technologies and products. The rms have not only
remained a step ahead of the competition but have also aimed to
lead in their major segments. They also established several technological standards. As a recent example, the Sony group, including
Samsung, won the DVD battle with the Blu-ray technology over
the Toshiba groups HD-DVD. The battle for the standard between
LCD and PDP is intriguing. PDP technology led by Matsushita (now
Panasonic) and LG Electronics was dominant in large screen TVs
(over 40 in.) segment until Samsung and Sony worked together to
produce large LCD panels through S-LCD. Samsung stated that SLCDs industry-leading production capacity will be leveraged to
standardize and popularize LCD TVs with panel sizes in both the
40 and 50 ranges (Samsung Electronics Annual Report, 2006, p.
47).
Feeling of vulnerability in the face of changing industry and
technological dynamics prompted the rms to join hands with
competitors possessing complementary resources. When it considered the alliance, Sony needed to address a critical gap. Sony
had leadership in the traditional CRT TV market for a long time,
but it lagged far behind in the rapidly growing at-screen TV market. Sony suffered a massive loss in 2003, which caused anxiety
in the stock market. The Sony Shock was attributed to the weak
performance of its main electronics business, which accounted for
about 66% of total sales (Uranaka, 2003). The TV business, which
accounted for about 20% of Sonys revenue, was undergoing massive restructuring to escape from the shock (Uranaka, 2003; Sony
Annual Report, 2004). In shifting its business focus to at panel TV,
Sony executives realized that a stable supply of LCD panels was
critical for it to quickly catch-up on the at-panel TV segment.
In 2003, Samsung was one of the strongest LCD panel producers
(Kim, 2006), even though it was not the largest LCD TV maker. For
Samsung, securing a large partner like Sony was critical to achieve
economies of scale and win the battle for the technological standard. Sonys precise and high standards for technology and product
quality helped to push Samsungs panel technology ahead of others. Each rm had unique characteristics and capabilities that the
other one needed. Sony beneted from Samsung in terms of strong
capability in the LCD technology, drive for pushing the LCD technology, and overall resource base. Samsung beneted from Sony in
terms of TV making expertise, brand name, and large and continued
demand for LCD panels (Dvorak and Ramstad, 2006).
In addition to the complementarities noted above, the two rivals
shared the massive capital investment needed to develop and
produce LCD panels. The total investment of approximately US$6
billion in 7th and 8th generation LCD panel plants was possible
because the two leading rms pursued the same goal of focusing
on large-size and high value-added models. It is hard to invest in
large-scale LCD facilities alone, and it holds a lot of attraction to
make investment in a place of strong infrastructure like this, said
Idei, CEO of Sony Corporation (Yonhap English News, 2004, refer to
Appendix A). Partnering with competitors with strong technological capabilities was critical as the rms also faced time pressure
and could not develop the technology on their own. By collaborating with Samsung, Sony could launch its Bravia series in the market
within one year after establishing S-LCD, and Samsung soon followed with its own Bordeaux series. In summary, main reasons
for the formation of this co-opetition relationship included important factors related to the industry and technology, the nature and
strategies of the rms, and resources and capabilities they had to
offer to each other. The rms not only felt that they could overcome their vulnerability but also enhance their individual strengths
and combine their strengths to create a positive impact on the LCD
technology and the at-screen TV industry.
4.2. Dynamics of SamsungSony co-opetition
As discussed in Section 2.3, dynamics relates to formation and
evolution of co-opetition. We observed that the governance mode
and the commitment of top management were important factors in
the formation of co-opetition. The rms established a joint venture,
a governance mode that provided strong safeguards and balance.
Each party owns 50% of the venture, with the CEO from Samsung and the CFO from Sony. Top management from the two rms
already had close relationships and made strong commitments to
the joint venture. For example, at Sonys request, Mr. Jae-Yong Lee,
the current vice president of Samsung Electronics and the eldest
son of the Samsung Group chairman, became a member of S-LCDs
board of directors. As Samsung was involved in both LCD and PDP
technologies, Sony wanted a strong commitment to S-LCD from
Samsungs top management.
The co-opetitive relationship has evolved over time. In Fig. 1,
we present areas of collaboration and competition mainly through
S-LCD and illustrate how the co-opetition between the two rivals
has evolved. The upper part of Fig. 1 illustrates areas of competition and the lower part illustrates collaboration; moving from left
to right provides the evolution of co-opetition over the period of
20032009.
Since the establishment of S-LCD in 2004, Samsung and Sony
have deepened their resource commitments to the venture. S-LCD
started 7th generation LCD panel production in April 2005 and the
production capacity increased from 60,000 to 100,000 panels per
month through additional investments. Based on their tremendous
success in the 7th generation technology, they have invested in
the 8th generation plant, which produces LCD panels of 46 in. and
larger. S-LCD started its 8th generation production in August 2007
with a production capacity of 50,000 substrates per month. In June
2009, S-LCD started production from its second 8th generation line
with a production capacity of 70,000 substrates per month.
While collaborating through the S-LCD, Samsung and Sony were
simultaneously competing ercely in the at screen TV market (and
655
also does not apply to TFT-LCD and OLED display patents. Crosslicensing not only facilitated knowledge sharing but also kept their
core knowledge protected.
4.3. Impact of SamsungSony co-opetition
Co-opetition between Samsung and Sony had a tremendous
impact on both rms, the LCD segment, and the TV industry as a
whole. We focus on how this co-opetition enabled the rms to both
create and appropriate value and how it changed the technological
and industry landscapes.
4.3.1. Value creation for the partners
SamsungSony co-opetition created a substantial value for the
rms. First, the success of S-LCD and its impact on the partners are evident when we look at the market shares (refer to
Figs. 2 and 3 for trends in market shares). Before S-LCD produced
LCD panels, Sony and Samsung were ranked as the 3rd and 4th
LCD TV makers (behind Sharp and Philips). In the 4th quarter of
2008, however, Samsung and Sony were ranked as the 1st and
25
in other aspects of their business but not depicted in Fig. 1). For
instance, while Sony was the rst one to introduce a LCD TV with
its Bravia model in summer 2005 and became the industry leader
(unseating Sharp Corporation), Samsung countered with its Bordeaux model and overtook Sony in the 3rd quarter of 2006. Since
then, competition between the two companies for market leadership has become more intense, which in turn caused Samsung
and Sony to emerge as leading TV makers. Further, they competed
in developing new technologies and products while cooperating
in LCD panel production. For example, in December 2007, Sony
launched rst 11 in. OLED TV in Japan and Samsung responded by
showing 31 in. OLED TV at the Consumer Electronics Show in January 2008. In February 2008, Sony announced a joint venture with
Sharp Corporation, the 3rd largest LCD TV maker at that time, for the
10th generation LCD panels. With an investment of around US$4.2
billion, the production capacity of the JV is planned to be 72,000
substrates per month and Sony plans to have 34% equity and Sharp
will have 66%.
We observed that in the dynamics of the co-opetitive relationship the two rivals followed the fundamental principle of
co-opetitioncreating a bigger value together while competing to
gain a larger portion of the value. They could create and share value
through cost sharing (US$6 billion investment), economies of scale,
and standard setting (LCD versus PDP). They also shared their interests through a strong governance mode (equity joint venture) and a
strong commitment to the venture. They also balanced competition
and cooperation. For example, they cross-licensed their patents
(11,000 patents from Samsung and 13,000 patents from Sony) in
November 2004, which facilitated knowledge sharing and product
development. On the other hand, they tried to maintain uniqueness
of each company and promote healthy competition in the market. So-called Differentiated Technology Patents, such as Sonys
PlayStation architecture and Samsungs home networking technology, are excluded in the cross-licensing agreement. The agreement
20
Samsung
Sony
Sharp
LGE
Philips
15
10
5
0
Q4 '04
Q4 '05
Q4 '06
Q4 '07
2008
Fig. 2. Market share (revenue basis) of top ve rms in the LCD TV segment.
Source: DisplaySearch.
656
45
40
35
Samsung + Sony
30
25
20
15
Total - Top5
10
5
0
Q3 '05
Q4 '08
Fig. 3. Samsung and Sonys combined market share in the LCD TV segment.
Source: DisplaySearch.
90
80
70
60
LCD TV
50
PDP TV
40
CRT TV
30
RP TV
20
10
0
Q3 '05
Q4 '08
657
Fig. 5. (a) Cooperative relationships among major competing rms in the at panel TV industry (as of December 2004). (b) Cooperative relationships among major competing
rms in the at panel TV industry (as of December 2009). Circles with solid line: Firms producing both LCD TVs and PDP TVs; Circles with dotted line: Firms producing mainly
LCD TVs; Shaded circles: Firms producing mainly PDP TVs; Boxes: JVs producing LCD panels; Solid line between circles: collaboration between rms.
the benets and have such an impact on the industry? While coopetition entails the risk of being out-learned and out-competed by
the competitor-partner, Samsung and Sony were able to manage
the risk and generate tremendous benets from the co-opetition.
We now turn to discuss the critical role of rm capabilities to deal
with co-opetition, which is rarely discussed in the co-opetition literature.
As noted earlier, each rm had resources and capabilities that
the other one needed, which helped to prompt the rms to
engage in co-opetition. However, each rms own internal capability played an important role in enabling the participating rms
to create greater common benets and appropriate a greater share
from the benets. The relationship has evolved with balance mainly
due to rm capabilities and subsequent strategic initiatives undertaken by the rms. Sony had internal strengths in TV making and
had achieved market leadership and technological prowess in the
industry. As a result, it was able to instantly introduce LCD TV and
gain leadership. Its internal strengths and reputation also helped
to attract other potential partners. Sonys strengths were instrumental in leading to its collaboration with Sharp mentioned earlier.
Sony was able to show to Samsung that it had other partners
(options); and therefore, the SamsungSony collaboration stayed
in balance. Even though such Sonys move raised questions about
S-LCDs future, the relationship continued because of mutual interdependence and gains. While Samsung needs Sonys market power
to get benets of economies of scale, Sony needs S-LCD because
8th generation is the most popular one for the time being. Also,
a win-win approach of open-minded executives was critical for
the success. Mr. Murayama says that, in consumer electronics, its
hard to keep secrets long anyway, and being open with Samsung is
key to making the joint venture work. If we put up barriers, theyll
close up too (WSJ, 2006, refer to Appendix B). The SonySamsung
alliance is certainly a win-win, declares Sang Wan Lee, president
of Samsungs LCD unit (BusinessWeek, 2006, refer to Appendix C).
While comparing the benets to Samsung and Sony, it appears
that Samsung beneted more from the co-opetition as shown
in Fig. 2. We suggest that Samsungs internal capability for coopetition contributed to its gain. Samsung has long tried to learn
from and cooperate with other rms. Samsung has evolved itself
from a rm producing key parts such as semiconductor to a major
manufacturer of consumer electronics. In the process, Samsung
had cooperated with customers that were competitors in the
nal products. Samsungs internal structure was also instrumental. Samsungs different businesses, such as semiconductor, mobile
communication, and LCD, compete with each other (Chang, 2008, p.
133). Further, Samsung Electronics LCD unit produces LCD panels
658
Drivers of co-opetition
between giants
Industry and technological
challenges & opportunities
Superior and relevant
partners resources &
capabilities
Firm strategies and
aspirations
Dynamics of co-opetition
between giants
Formation of co-opetitive
relationship
Evolution of co-opetitive
relationship
Outcomes of co-opetition
between giants
Partners value creation &
appropriation
Industry technological
development & standards
Industry competitive
dynamics
Co-opetition capability
Co-opetition mindset
Co-opetition experience
Resources & capabilities
The abovementioned drivers of co-opetition are also instrumental for the relationships to stay in balance and for co-opetition
to evolve over time. Continued expectations of greater benets
increase rms commitment to the relationship and work together
to create more benets as well as strive for a larger share of
the benets. As giants engage in co-opetition and evolve in their
relationships, they generate positive impacts for each other and
the entire industry. While rms can access the knowledge and
resources of partners and share the risks and costs, competitor partners benchmark each other and prepare for the consequences of
competition (Tsai, 2002) as well as foster a competitive culture for
developing distinctive competencies (Luo et al., 2007). The S-LCD
case clearly shows that two rival rms got benets from the coopetitive relationship (refer to Figs. 2 and 3). Further, co-opetition
between giants impacts the whole industry, in terms of technological development and competitive dynamics. The S-LCD case shows
that co-opetition between leading rms inuenced subsequent
co-opetition among other major players led to possible groupto-group competition. The new industry competitive landscape
shaped by rms engaged in co-opetition facilitates further innovation, thus providing support for Schumpeters (1942) argument
that innovative performance is enhanced when a small number of
large rms vigorously compete with each other to develop new
processes and products.
Our conceptual model also illuminates the importance of rm
capabilities in managing co-opetition. Co-opetition between strong
rivals is a very challenging relationship (Gnyawali et al., 2008) as
managers confront higher levels of tension, risk loss of knowledge to a competitor-partner, and might subsequently turn a
weak competitor-partner into a strong competitor. Managers
ability to anticipate and manage such a relationship by dealing with the paradoxical factors in co-opetition would therefore
be important in managing co-opetition and generating positive outcomes (Gnyawali et al., 2006). As evidenced in the
S-LCD case, co-opetition mindset of executives was critical for
the formation of co-opetition. In addition, superior and complementary resources and balance of such resources between
the partners were critical for rms to develop their relationship in a more balanced way, to maintain interdependence, and
subsequently generate substantial positive outcomes from the
relationship.
5.1. Contributions
This study contributes to both co-opetition and innovation literatures. First, we contribute to the innovation literature by showing
659
global markets. While cross-national co-opetition is more complex than domestic one, cross-national co-opetition with global
scope may offer more opportunities than domestic ones do. Future
researchers could compare two different cases, one global and one
domestic, to draw similarities and differences. Fourth, our case
study depended mainly on secondary data. Although we could
obtain ample data of the exemplar case and generated insights from
the secondary data, future research could conduct interviews and
collect rst-hand data to generate insights on the management of
co-opetition and the role of rm capability. Finally, future research
could examine our arguments and the model through large scale
empirical studies. Building on the conceptual arguments and ndings in this study, future research could develop and conduct
empirical studies related to the drivers, dynamics, and outcomes of
co-opetition.
Acknowledgements
We thank the anonymous reviewers and the editor for their
helpful comments and suggestions. An earlier version of this
research was presented at the 2008 EIASM Workshop on Coopetition Strategy: Stretching the Boundaries of Co-opetition held
in Madrid, Spain, and received the Best Paper Award. This paper
also beneted from the feedback received from the panel at the 5th
Annual Mid-Atlantic Strategy Colloquium held at the University of
Maryland, USA, in November 2010.
660
Appendix A. Summary quotes from Factiva news reports on key drivers of S-LCD formation
Date
Source
Quotes
Drivers
October 17 03
Nikkei
Shorten development
time
June 1 07
Nikkei Weekly
September 23 03
July 15 04
October 17 03
Reuters
March 8 04
Dow Jones
September 3 04
Nikkei Report
October 23 06
July 14 04
AFX UK Focus
July 16 04
Nikkei Report
August 28 07
Business Wire
November 22 05
AP Newswires
December 2 05
AP Newswires
January 3 06
February 9 07
Nikkei Report
April 24 03
Joins.com
October 17 03
Reuters
October 17 03
July 16 04
Nikkei Report
Vulnerability
Partners technological
capability
661
Appendix B. Summary quotes from Factiva news reports on the dynamics of co-opetition
Date
Source
Quotes
Process
January 3 06
Internal conicts
July 11 08
July 16 08
September 24 09
January 8 10
Korea Times
February 27 08
Korea Times
January 3 06
November 29 06
January 18 07
The new alliances dont come without conict. Inside Sony, some engineers
worried that Samsung will eventually use Sonys TV expertise to beat the
Japanese company. At Samsung, some executives wondered whether its smart
to help such a big rival . . . Executives at both companies had concerns about
working so closely with a direct rival. Would this joint venture help us, as a
company that is competing in the TV sector? Mr. Chang recalls wondering.
Sony, other rms team up to develop organic displays: Sony Corp. and nine
other domestic companies have decided to jointly develop with government
support technology by 2013 to mass produce large energy-efcient organic
at-panel screens.
Samsung companies join for OLED venture: Samsung Electronics Co. and its
display afliate Samsung SDI Co. are moving to set up a joint venture for
organic displays. . .
Samsung rides LED-backlit TVs to the bank: . . . referring to LED TVs, the
name Samsung has coined for its LCD TVs that use white light-emitting diodes
instead of uorescent tubes for the backlight . . . Samsung succeeded in
building an image of itself as a company with strong environmental
technologies. . .
Korean, Japanese TV Giants Renew Rivalry in 3D: Major manufacturers such
as Samsung Electronics, LG Electronics, and Sony have announced plans to sell
3D televisions to consumers in 2010. . .
Challenge or Opportunity? Samsung Electronics . . . is concerned over a
partnership between Sony and Sharp. The two Japanese rms announced a
plan to team up to make at panels for LCD television. . . . It can be interpreted
that efforts by Japanese companies to check the rise of their Korean rivals have
allegedly forced Sony to join hands with Sharp.
. . .Mr. Murayama . . . concedes that Samsung could eventually use Sonys
technology to compete against him. But he adds that in consumer electronics,
its hard to keep secrets long anyway, and being open with Samsung is key to
making the joint venture work. If we put up barriers, theyll close up too,
he says.
Our alliance with Sony allowed us to benet from a virtuous circle: Bravias
success boosted sales of LCD panels, and volume meant lower costs which fed
greater sales of LCD TVs, says Cho Yeong Duk, vice-president at Samsung.
At least Sonys success isnt necessarily bad news for Samsung. The two have
a joint venture in LCD panels, which means Sonys gains also benet its Korean
partner.
Open-minded/win-win approach
Appendix C. Summary quotes from Factiva news reports on the outcomes of co-opetition
Date
Source
Quotes
Outcomes
October 29 03
July 15 04
Industry:
Standardization battle
between LCD and PDP
TVs
November 29 06
August 21 07
September 22 03
Joins.com
October 20 03
Nikkei Weekly
June 30 04
Asia Pulse
July 15 04
AFX Asia
July 15 04
AFX Asia
August 29 07
September 20 07
The alliance.. should lead the way toward standardizing the global TV
monitor format, the companies said
The cooperation offers an opportunity to lead the rapidly growing LCD TV
market and standardization of glass substrate and LCD TV sizes, S.W. Lee,
president and chief executive of Samsungs LCD business said. . .
The alliance has also had an industry-wide impact, especially in the TV
market for sets in the 40-inch screen class. The large screen segment had
been dominated by plasma TVs until S-LCD started providing LCD screens . . .
In the third quarter of 2006, . . . for the rst time overtook plasma TV sets. . .
Currently, PDP technology is well suited for big at TV panel of over 40 inches,
but its competitive edge in that segment has been slipping as large LCD
screens become cheaper to produce.
A sense of alarm that they cannot survive without cooperation seems to have
encouraged Samsung and Sony to come together, the industry ofcial said.
There will be more alliances among rivals to ensure mutual survival.
Sonys move from being a corporate customer to a producer will likely force
smaller LCD makers into alliances.
As competition increases in the market, the companies will try to increase
their shares by cooperating with each other. Its a trend that can be seen in
other countries as well, an industry ofcial said.
He said that increased production of LCD panels will result in lower prices
and in turn boost demand for LCD TVs . . .
We are highly positive about our businesses outlook. If LCD TV prices fall to
levels, the LCD TV market will grow and the oversupply will change to a
supply shortage, Chang said.
In response, Samsung SDI announced that it developed the worlds rst
50-inch Full HD PDP using single scan technology . . . This technology enables
to reduce the manufacturing cost as much as 30 percent. . .
To win over LCD TVs, PDP TVs have evolved in technology, as well.
June 25 07
Samsung Electronics will create various applications to meet the demand and
become a market creator rather than a market leader,
Common: Market
creation
Industry: More
alliances among other
competitors
Industry:
Technological
development
662
Appendix C (Continued )
Date
Source
Quotes
Outcomes
June 13 05
Nikkei Weekly
November 5 06
AP Newswires
September 3 07
Korea Times
July 16 04
Korea
Common: Win-win
outcome
November 29 06
January 3 06
November 28 06
Business week
. . .the steep drop in LCD panel prices has made the retail cost of computer LCD
monitors and LCD TVs seem more reasonable to consumers, and this has
begun to stimulate demand.
We created the 40-inch LCD TV market with Sony . . . Sonys role in opening
that market and realizing growth in the market . . . is important.
According to DisplaySearch, the competition between LCD and PDP makers
would boost the demand for 50-inch LCDs. . .
The cooperation between Samsung and Sony is a win-win situation for both
companies, said Chang Won-kie, President and CEO of S-LCD Corp.
The Sony-Samsung alliance is certainly a win-win, declares Sang Wan Lee,
president of Samsungs LCD unit.
Mr. Chang (Samsung executive) says . . . competition with Sony is helping
Samsung hone its own TV designs.
. . .says Cho Yeong Duk, vice-president at Samsung in charge of the companys
LCD business strategy. The rivalry with Sony also helped Samsung to bring
out better LCD products to the market, he said.
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