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WIEGEL v. SEMPIO-DY
Facts:
Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage with Lilia Olivia Weigel celebrated on July 1978 on the
ground of Lilias previous existing marriage with Eduardo A. Maxion celebrated on June 1972.
Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the
first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union.
Lilia asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence
(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband; and
(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone else.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted on both parties of the first
marriage had already been agreed upon.

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Issue: WON there is a need to prove the existence of the first marriage of Lilia. NO.
WON a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is necessary. NO.
Held:
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because
assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until
annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to
her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they
married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact
and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage
with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the
law.

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TERRE v. TERRE
Facts:
Dorothy B. Terre charged Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with "grossly immoral conduct," consisting of
contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage with
complainant remained subsisting.
Dorothy Terres Narration of Facts:
She and respondent met for the first time in 1979 as fourth year high school classmates; she was then married to Merlito
Bercenilla, while respondent (Jordan) was single; respondent was aware of her marital status; it was then that respondent
started courting her; they [complainant and respondent] moved to Manila were they respectively pursued their education,
respondent as a law student; respondent continued courting her, this time with more persistence; he explained to her that her
marriage with Merlito was void ab initio since she and her first husband were first cousins; she agreed to marry him.
All through their married state up to the time he disappeared in 1981, complainant supported respondent, in addition to the
allowance the latter was getting from his parents; she was unaware of the reason for his disappearance until she found out
later that respondent married a certain Vilma Malicdem.
She filed the following cases: (1) Abandonment of Minor; (2) Bigamy; and (3) Administrative Case (moot and academic).

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Jordan Terres Answer:
He contracted marriage with Dorothy Terre on June 1977 upon her representation that she was single; he subsequently
learned that she was married to one Merlito A. Bercenilla in 1968; she told him that the child she was then carrying was the
son of Bercenilla; that believing in good faith that his marriage with Dorothy was null and void ab initio, he married Helina
Malicdem.
Summary of Facts:
Dorothy Terre and respondent Jordan Terre contracted marriage on 14 July 1977 before Judge Priscilla Mijares. There is
further no dispute over the fact that on 3 May 1981, respondent Jordan Terre married Helina Malicdem in Dasol, Pangasinan.
When the second marriage was entered into, respondent's prior marriage with complainant was subsisting, no judicial action
having been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with
complainant.
Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in good faith that his prior marriage with
complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initio and that no action for a judicial declaration of nullity was necessary.
Issue: WON a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is necessary. YES.

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Held:
Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this
Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. 8 Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that
Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own
argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to
Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.
That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply flawed is shown by other circumstances. As noted, he
convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio, that she was still legally single and
free to marry him. When complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent went through law school
while being supported by complainant, with some assistance from respondent's parents. After respondent had finished his law
course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant without support and without the wherewithal
for delivering his own child safely in a hospital.
The conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in inveigling complainant Dorothy Terre to contract a second marriage with him; in
abandoning complainant Dorothy Terre after she had cared for him and supported him through law school, leaving her without
means for the safe delivery of his own child; in contracting a second marriage with Helina Malicdem while his first marriage
with complainant Dorothy Terre was subsisting, constituted "grossly immoral conduct".

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MERCADO v. TAN
Facts:
Dr. Vincent Mercado and Ma. Consuelo Tan were married on June 27, 1991.
At the time of the celebration of the marriage, Mercado was married to Ma. Thelma Oliva on April 10, 1976.
On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by Tan against Mercado.
Mercado filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Tan, which was declared null and void.
RTC found Mercado guilty of bigamy.
When the second marriage was entered into with Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991, accuseds prior marriage with Ma.
Thelma V. Oliva was subsisting, no judicial action having yet been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity
of such prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva. Since no declaration of the nullity of his first marriage ha[d] yet been made at
the time of his second marriage, it is clear that accused was a married man when he contracted such second marriage with
complainant on June 27, 1991. He was still at the time validly married to his first wife.

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CA affirmed.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. But here, the final judgment declaring null and void
accuseds previous marriage came not before the celebration of the second marriage, but after, when the case for bigamy
against accused was already tried in court.
Mercados Contention:
When he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby rendering it
void ab initio. Unlike voidable marriages which are considered valid until set aside by a competent court, he argues that a void
[8]
marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. Thus, he concludes that there is no first marriage to speak of.
Issue: WON a subsequent pronouncement of a marriage negates the guilt of Mercado in the crime of bigamy. NO.
Held:
When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of bigamy were present. It is undisputed that petitioner
married Thelma G. Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu City. While that marriage was still subsisting, he contracted a second
marriage, this time with Respondent Ma. Consuelo Tan who subsequently filed the Complaint for bigamy.

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In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a lettercomplaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed the
acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime
had already been consummated by then.
Consuelo Tan is not the innocent victim that she claims to be; she was well aware of the existence of the previous marriage
when she contracted matrimony with Dr. Mercado.
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally
contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of
bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as void.

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CALISTERIO v. CALISTERIO
Facts:
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land with an estimated value of P604,750.00.
Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein respondent Marietta Calisterio.
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James William Bounds on 13 January
1946 at Caloocan City. James Bounds disappeared without a trace on 11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were
married eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having priorly secured a court declaration that James was
presumptively dead. Esmsc
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial
Court a petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas,
Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and
respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void.
Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter 's
absence, his whereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with
Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration of the estate of the
decedent.

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RTC declared petitioner Antonia Calisterio (sister) as the sole heir of the estate of Teodorico Calisterio.
CA reversed. Mariettas marriage to Teodorico remains valid.
Issue: WON a judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is necessary. NO.
Held:
The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta was solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in force at
that time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of the Family
[5]
Code itself limited its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 of the New Civil Code which provides:
"Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
"(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

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"(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is
generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in
any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court."
For the subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse
present (not the absentee spouse) so contracting the later marriage must have done so in good faith.
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed period of
absence is met.
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband, James William Bounds, had been absent
or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage in 1958 with the deceased
Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be
deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been adduced to indicate another property regime
between the spouses, pertains to them in common. Upon its dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the property should rightly
be divided in two equal portions -- one portion going to the surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the
deceased spouse.

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CARINO v. CARINO
Facts:
During the lifetime of SPO4 Santiago S. Carino, he contracted two marriages:
* June 20, 1969: Susan Nicdao (Peritioner)
* November 10, 1992: Susan Yee (Respondent) 10 years cohabitation
On November 23, 1992, Carino passed away under the care of Susan Yee.
Both Nicdao and Yee filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance. Nicdao received P146,000, while Yee
received P21,000.
Yee filed for a collection of sum of money against Nicdao praying that the latter be ordered to return to her at least one-half of
the P146,000.
Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a
judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no
knowledge of the previous marriage.

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Yee further contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized
without the required marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented:
1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number, and
2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar (no record of marriage license)
RTC ruled in favor of Susan Yee (respondent).
CA affirmed.
Issue:
Held:
Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.

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Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was
solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain
exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the
marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of
their marriage. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil
registrar enjoys probative value. Therefore, the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having
been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, is void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared
void ab initio, the death benefits under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article
40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner
Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains
that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab
initio.

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ARTICLE 148 SUSAN YEE
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships,
relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple
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alliances of the same married man, ... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ...
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and
PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police
officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property
or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the
deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate
succession, the said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of
the deceased is not one of them.

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ARTICLE 147 SUSAN NICDAO
This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license.
properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall
be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages
and the other did not contribute thereto. Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share
one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to
be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the
property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely,
his children with Susan Nicdao.
However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a
marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary.