John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition vs.

Lim
[GR 119775, 24 October 2003]
En Banc, Carpio-Morales (J): 9 concur, 2 took no part
Facts: Republic Act 7227, entitled "An Act Accellerating the Convetsion of Military Reservations into
other Productive uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose,
Providing Funds Therefor and for other purposes," otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992," was enacted on 13 March 1992. The law set out the policy of the
government to accelerate the sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of the
former military bases under the 1947 Philippines-United States of America Military Bases Agreement,
namely, the Clark and Subic military reservations as well as their extensions including the John Hay
Station (Camp John Hay) in the City of Baguio. RA 7227 created the Bases Conversion and Development
Authority' (BCDA), vesting it with powers pertaining to the multifarious aspects of carrying out the
ultimate objective of utilizing the base areas in accordance with the declared government policy. RA
7227 likewise created the Subic Special Economic [and Free Port] Zone (Subic SEZ) the metes and
bounds of which were to be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the President of the
Philippines; and granted the Subic SEZ incentives ranging from tax and duty-free importations,
exemption of businesses therein from local and national taxes, to other hall-narks of a liberalized
financial and business climate. RA 7227 expressly gave authority to the President to create through
executive proclamation, subject to the concurrence of the local government units directly affected,
other Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the areas covered respectively by the Clark military reservation,
the Wallace Air Station in San Fernando, La Union, and Camp John Hay. On 16 August 1993, BCDA
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement and Escrow Agreement with Tuntex (B.V.L) Co., Ltd.
(TUNTEX) and Asiaworld Internationale Group, Inc. (ASIAWORLD), private corporations registered under
the laws of the British Virgin Islands, preparatory to the formation of a joint venture for the
development of Poro Point in La Union and Camp John Hay as premier tourist destinations and
recreation centers. 4 months later or on 16 December 16, 1993, BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD
executed a Joint Venture Agreements whereby they bound themselves to put up a joint venture
company known as the Baguio International Development and Management Corporation which would
lease areas within Camp John Hay and Poro Point for the purpose of turning such places into principal
tourist and recreation spots, as originally envisioned by the parties under their AZemorandmn of
Agreement. The Baguio City government meanwhile passed a number of resolutions in response to the
actions taken by BCDA as owner and administrator of Camp John Hay. By Resolution of 29 September
1993, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City officially asked BCDA to exclude all the barangays
partly or totally located within Camp John Hay from the reach or coverage of any plan or program for its
development. By a subsequent Resolution dated 19 January 1994, the sanggunian sought from BCDA an
abdication, waiver or quitclaim of its ownership over the home lots being occupied by residents of 9
barangays surrounding the military reservation. Still by another resolution passed on 21 February 1994,
the sanggunian adopted and submitted to BCDA a 15-point concept for the development of Camp John
Hay. The sanggunian's vision expressed, among other things, a kind of development that affords
protection to the environment, the making of a family-oriented type of tourist destination, priority in
employment opportunities for Baguio residents and free access to the base area, guaranteed
participation of the city government in the management and operation of the camp, exclusion of the
previously named nine barangays from the area for development, and liability for local taxes of
businesses to be established within the camp." BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD agreed to some, but

rejected or modified the other proposals of the sanggunian." They stressed the need to declare Camp
John Hay a SEZ as a condition precedent to its full development in accordance with the mandate of RA
7227. On 11 May 1994, the sanggunian passed a resolution requesting the Mayor to order the
determination of realty taxes which may otherwise be collected from real properties of Camp John Hay.
The resolution was intended to intelligently guide the sanggunian in determining its position on whether
Camp John Hay be declared a SEZ, the sanggunian being of the view that such declaration would exempt
the camp's property and the economic activity therein from local or national taxation. More than a
month later, however, the sanggunian passed Resolution 255, (Series of 1994)," seeking and supporting,
subject to its concurrence, the issuance by then President Ramos of a presidential proclamation
declaring an area of 285.1 hectares of the camp as a SEZ in accordance with the provisions of RA 7227.
Together with this resolution was submitted a draft of the proposed proclamation for consideration by
the President. On 5 July 1994 then President Ramos issued Proclamation 420 (series of 1994), "creating
and designating a portion of the area covered by the former Camp John Hay as the John Hay Special
Economic Zone pursuant to Republic Act 7227." The John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition, et. al. filed
the petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief with prayer for a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction on 25 April 1995 challenging, in the main, the
constitutionality or validity of Proclamation 420 as well as the legality of the Memorandum of
Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement between the BCDA, and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD.
Issue: Whether the petitioners have legal standing in filing the case questioning the validity of
Presidential Proclamation 420.
Held: It is settled that when questions of constitutional significance are raised, the court can exercise its
power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case." RA 7227 expressly requires the concurrence of the affected local
government units to the creation of SEZs out of all the base areas in the country.'" The grant by the law
on local government units of the right of concurrence on the bases' conversion is equivalent to vesting a
legal standing on them, for it is in effect a recognition of the real interests that communities nearby or
surrounding a particular base area have in its utilization. Thus, the interest of petitioners, being
inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing the legality of Proclamation 420, is personal and substantial such that
they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act being challenged."
Theirs is a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the proclamation and not merely an interest
in the question involved or an incidental interest," for what is at stake in the enforcement of
Proclamation 420 is the very economic and social existence of the people of Baguio City. Moreover,
Petitioners Edilberto T. Claravall and Lilia G. Yaranon were duly elected councilors of Baguio at the time,
engaged in the local governance of Baguio City and whose duties included deciding for and on behalf of
their constituents the question of whether to concur with the declaration of a portion of the area
covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ. Certainly then, Claravall and Yaranon, as city officials who voted
against" the sanggunian Resolution No. 255 (Series of 1994) supporting the issuance of the now
challenged Proclamation 420, have legal standing to bring the present petition.

G.R. No. L-5279 October 31, 1955

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, ETC
., petitioner,
vs.SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and the BOARD OF TEXTBOOKS,
respondents.
Manuel C. Briones, Vicente G. Sinco, Manuel V. Gallego and Enrique M. Fernando for petitioner.Office
of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Assistant Solicitor General FranciscoCarreon for respondents.
FACTS:The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities made a petition that ActsNo. 2706
otherwise known as the Act making the Inspection and Recognition of privateschools and colleges
obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction and wasamended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth
Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutionalon the grounds that 1) the act deprives the owner of the school
and colleges as well asteachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of Law; 2) it will
alsodeprive the parents of their Natural Rights and duty to rear their children for civicefficiency and 3)
its provisions conferred on the Secretary of Education unlimitedpowers and discretion to prescribe rules
and standards constitute towards unlawfuldelegation of Legislative powers.
Section 1 of Act No. 2706It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a general
standard of efficiency in all privateschools and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish
adequate instruction to the public, inaccordance with the class and grade of instruction given in them,
and for this purpose said Secretary or his dulyauthorized representative shall have authority to advise,
inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order todetermine the efficiency of instruction given in
the same,
The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the Secretary of Educationbefore opening a
school is not originally included in the original Act 2706. And insupport to the first proposition of the
petitioners they contended that the Constitutionguaranteed the right of a citizen to own and operate a
school and any law requiringprevious governmental approval or permit before such person could
exercise the saidright On the other hand, the defendant Legal Representative submitted a
memorandumcontending that 1) the matters presented no justiciable controversy
exhibitingunavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional question; 2) Petitioners are inestoppels to
challenge the validity of the said act and 3) the Act is constitutionally valid.Thus, the petition for
prohibition was dismissed by the court.ISSUE:Whether or not Act No. 2706 as amended by Act no. 3075
and Commonwealth Act no.180 may be declared void and unconstitutional?
RATIO DECIDENTI:The Petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs no relief inthe
form they seek to obtain. Moreover, there is no justiciable controversy presentedbefore the court. It is
an established principle that to entitle a private individualimmediately in danger of sustaining a direct
injury and it is not sufficient that he hasmerely invoke the judicial power to determined the validity of
executive and legislativeaction he must show that he has sustained common interest to all members of
thepublic. Furthermore, the power of the courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises onlywhen the
interest of litigant require the use of judicial authority for their protectionagainst actual interference. As
such, Judicial Power is limited to the decision of actualcases and controversies and the authority to pass

on the validity of statutes is incidentalto the decisions of such cases where conflicting claims under the
constitution and under the legislative act assailed as contrary to the constitution but it is legitimate only
in thelast resort and it must be necessary to determined a real and vital controversy betweenlitigants.
Thus, actions like this are brought for a positive purpose to obtain actualpositive relief and the court
does not sit to adjudicate a mere academic question tosatisfy scholarly interest therein. The court
however, finds the defendant position to besufficiently sustained and state that the petitioner remedy is
to challenge the regulationnot to invalidate the law because it needs no argument to show that abuse
by officialsentrusted with the execution of the statute does not per se demonstrate
theunconstitutionality of such statute. On this phase of the litigation the court conclude thatthere has
been no undue delegation of legislative power even if the petitionersappended a list of circulars and
memoranda issued by the Department of Educationthey fail to indicate which of such official documents
was constitutionally objectionablefor being capricious or pain nuisance. Therefore, the court denied the
petition for prohibition.

DUMLAO
Judicial Review Requisites
Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office and he has been
receiving retirement benefits therefrom. He filed for reelection to the same office for the 1980 local
elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao.
Dumlao assailed the BP averring that it is class legislation hence uncons titutional. His petitioned was
joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jt. These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and
Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of
office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign and the provision barring persons charged for
crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary
investigation would already disqualify them from office.
ISSUE: Whether or not the there is cause of action.
HELD: The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case would never have been
merged. Dumlaos cause is different from Igots. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not
meet all the requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be
followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate
case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the
constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. In this case, only the 3rd requisite
was met. The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for
public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would
already disqualify them from office as null and void.

G.R. No. L-35474 March 29, 1982

HONORATO C. PEREZ, petitioner,
vs.
PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NUEVA ECIJA, HON. EDUARDO L. JOSON, in his capacity as Governor of Nueva Ecija, and VALENTIN C.
ESCUADRO, in his capacity as Provincial Treasurer of Nueva Ecija, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:
This is an original action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to annul Resolution No. 228 of the respondent Provincial Board of
Nueva Ecija, dated August 21, 1972; to enjoin respondents from enforcing and implementing said Resolution; and to compel
respondents to recognize petitioner Honorato Perez as acting provincial fiscal of Nueva Ecija.
The factual antecedents which gave rise to this petition are not disputed. When former provincial fiscal of Nueva Ecija Celestino Juan
was appointed judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, the Secretary of Justice, in Administrative Order No. 388, dated
September 9, 1971, designated first assistant fiscal Emilio Cecilio of Nueva Ecija as acting provincial fiscal. 1
On May 10, 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos nominated petitioner Honorato Perez for appointment to the position of Provincial
Fiscal of Nueva Ecija. 2 It appears, however, that the nomination which was submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation was by-passed upon adjournment sine die of Congress on May 18, 1972. On the following day, May 19, President
Marcos designated petitioner as acting provincial fiscal. 3
Reacting to the said designation, respondent Provincial Board enacted Resolution No. 146 addressed to the Commission on
Appointments, manifesting its opposition to the confirmation of petitioner's appointment. 4 Respondent Governor Joson also filed a
formal protest with the Committee on Justice of the Commission on Appointments, making known his strong and emphatic
opposition to the confirmation. 5 After submission of the evidence in support of the opposition, the said Committee resolved not to
recommend the confirmation of petitioner's appointment. 6
On June 7, 1972, or during the sixth special session of Congress, petitioner was nominated anew for appointment to the office in
question; 7 but the same was likewise by-passed upon adjournment of Congress on June 22, 1972. 8
On August 11, 1972, petitioner took his oath of office as acting provincial fiscal 9 pursuant to the designation extended by the
President on May 19, 1972; and on August 14, 1972, he formally assumed formally assumed office. 10
On August 21, 1972, respondent Provincial Board passed Resolution No. 228, ordering respondent Provincial Treasurer to stop
payment of petitioner's salaries as acting provincial fiscal. 11
The dispute came to a head on August 28, 1972, when respondent treasurer disapproved petitioner's requisition for various office
supplies. His salary vouchers were likewise disapproved by the respondent Governor.
Hence, the instant petition, petitioner raising the following legal questions:
1) Whether or not respondent Provincial Board has the power to pass and enact a resolution not recognizing herein petitioner as
acting provincial fiscal despite the fact that the latter has assumed such office pursuant to a designation lawfully extended to him by
the President of the Philippines.
2) Whether or not respondent Provincial Board has the power to defy and/or pass judgment on the validity of the said designation
and assumption.

We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the issues raised, this petition having become moot and academic. We take cognizance of the
fact that petitioner Perez filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of mayor of Cabanatuan City in the local elections of January
30, 1980. 12 The mere filing of a certificate of candidacy constitutes forfeiture of his right to the controverted office under Section 29
of the Election Code of 1978 which provides:
SEC. 29. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Every person holding a public appointive office or position, including active
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall
ipso facto cease in his office or position on the date he files his certificate of candidacy. Members of the Cabinet shall continue in the
offices they presently hold notwithstanding the filing of certificate of candidacy, subject to the pleasure of the President of the
Philippines. (Emphasis supplied).
A petition instituted to establish petitioner's right to an appointive office is rendered moot and academic where his right to said office
has been forfeited by his filing of a certificate of candidacy to an elective office.
ACCORDINGLY, this petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, De Castro and Ericta, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr. and Abad Santos, JJ., took no part.

Province of Batangas vs. Romulo

Posted on November 20, 2012 by effinfabulous
GR 152774
May 27, 2004
FACTS:
In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the Program for Devolution Adjustment
and Equalization to enhance the capabilities of LGUs in the discharge of the functions and services
devolved to them through the LGC.
The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed Resolutions No. OCD-99005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which were approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The
guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee required the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for
funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit the project proposals and other requirements to the
DILG for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent release of the
corresponding funds.
Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare unconstitutional and void
certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as
they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of P5billion for the Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed conditions for
the release thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions infringe
the Constitution and the LGC of 1991.
HELD:
Yes.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions constitute a
withholding of a portion of the IRA they effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by
LGUs and must be struck down.
According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, the State shall ensure the local autonomy of local
governments. Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the Presidents
power over the LGUs to one of general supervision, which has been interpreted to exclude the power of
control. Drilon v. Lim distinguishes supervision from control: control lays down the rules in the doing of
an act the officer has the discretion to order his subordinate to do or redo the act, or decide to do it
himself; supervision merely sees to it that the rules are followed but has no authority to set down the
rules or the discretion to modify/replace them.
The entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible.
The LGSEF is part of the IRA or just share of the LGUs in the national taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the
Constitution mandates that the just share shall be automatically released to the LGUs. Since the
release is automatic, the LGUs arent required to perform any act to receive the just share it shall be
released to them without need of further action. To subject its distribution & release to the vagaries of

the implementing rules & regulations as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999-2001
and the OCD Resolutions would violate this constitutional mandate.
The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs IRA is if the national
internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40% of the collections of the 3rd
preceding fiscal year. The exception does not apply in this case.
The Oversight Committees authority is limited to the implementation of the LGC of 1991 not to supplant
or subvert the same, and neither can it exercise control over the IRA of the LGUs.
Congress may amend any of the provisions of the LGC but only through a separate law and not through
appropriations laws or GAAs. Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that
should be more properly enacted in a separate legislation.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of
money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit any provision therein which is intended
to amend another law is considered an inappropriate provision. Increasing/decreasing the IRA of LGUs
fixed in the LGC of 1991 are matters of general & substantive law. To permit the Congress to undertake
these amendments through the GAAs would unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs.
The value of LGUs as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy they enjoy.
Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions in local autonomy but
should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are based.