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Author(s): H. R. Kedward
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Source: Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fifth Series, Vol. 32 (1982), pp. 175-192
Published by: Royal Historical Society
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I2 SEPTEMBER 198I
THERE are certain moments in history when major events, individual experience, and ideology coincide to such a remarkable extent
that historians have to pause and look up from their patient plotting
of the vagaries of humanity. One such moment was the summer of
I940 in France.
The event was the defeat and occupation of France in a mere six
weeks; the individual experience was that of the 'Exode', the flight of
millions of people from the north and east of France in an attempt to
avoid the German armies; and the ideology was that of the Nationalist
Right, in particular the Action Francaise led by Charles Maurras,
which had made a doctrine out of anti-Dreyfusism and for over forty
years had paraded the weakness and decadence of the Third Republic
and parliamentary democracy. All three coincided to produce the
phenomenon of Ptainism, an example of Gramscian hegemony if ever
there was one, though infinitely shorter in duration than such notable
modern hegemonies as laissez-faireliberalism, American frontier mentality, or the post-war planned economy. Like these, Petainism combined the voluntary conviction of ordinary people, the arguments of
common sense and the full force of every apparatus of persuasion;
education, church, police, courts and the media. Like these too it
stood as the embodiment of patriotism.
The triumph in I940 of the Nationalist doctrine was all the more
acute because it had been widely dismissed as anachronistic and
irrelevant in the France of the I920s and 1930s. The victory of France
over Germany in 198 had made the prophets of republican weakness
look foolish and hysterical, and by the mid 1920s the failure of Action
Francaise to work out an economic or social analysis to do justice to
the class struggle, was losing it the respect of the younger intellectuals
of the Right, who began to experiment with fascism.' In the 1930S the
process went even further; the Nationalists looked in grave danger of
submitting entirely to the newer forces of fascism, and even Charles
Maurras began to play down the anti-Germanism which had been
1See Pierre-Marie Dioudonnat, Je suis partout (La Table Ronde, I973), and J.
Plumyene et R. Lasierra. LesFascismesfranfais1923-63 (Editions du Seuil, I963).
I75
I76
central to his analysis of what constituted the true France. For him
the defeat of I940 came just in time: he could rescue the declining
funds of monarchism and invest them in Petain, and there was just
enough life in the Nationalist tradition to ensure that it was Petain,
Darlan, Lamirand, Vallat and Borotra who gave the ideological lead
to Vichy and not the brasher acolytes of fascism in Paris. What had
appeared to be a faded nostalgia for the past became the active power
of the present, and its very resilience and survival brought it converts
who felt forced to admit that it must have been right all along. This
was an important part of the contrition felt by many French people in
I940.
The constitutional pivot of Nationalism was a strong leader, unfettered by parliamentary democracy. Jacques Bainville, the royalist
historian with a gift for popularizing his elitist history, had rescued the
art of dictatorship from the outer darkness to which the Revolution
had condemned it, and although he died before the Vichy period, his
books were sold in enormous quantities during the reign of Petain.2
Maurras, a positivist to the end, instantly accepted the fact of Petain
and trimmed his monarchism accordingly, and although Alexander
Werth has successfully lampooned the meeting of Maurras and Petain,
conjured up by Rene Benjamin, essentially Benjamin was right. There
was a kind of Nationalist idyll in the first few months of Vichy in
which such exchanges could take place without any sense of selfparody.3
Subsequently Petain was raised to a Christ-like position, well above
the stature of modern kings. Gifts of local soil, carefully cut into small
sods and labelled from their place of origin, were laid in caskets at his
feet; his portrait was raised behind the high altars in front of the saints
of the reredos, and he entered the towns of the south to be hailed as
greater than Joan of Arc. In his first broadcast he could not have
offered his person as a gift to France had he not been aware at some
level that myth and history had crossed their respective thresholds.4
The language and imagery of Petainism have been so cleverly
presented and satirised by Gerard Miller that it has become a problem
to present them in any other way. Prefaced by the acclaim of Roland
Barthes, his book selects the richest texts from the Petainist canon of
2 W. R.
of Royalisthistoryin Twentiethcentury
Keylor, JacquesBainvilleandtheRenaissance
France(Louisiana, I979), pp. 527-8.
3A. Werth, France1940-55 (London, 1957), p. 66. Cf. R. Benjamin, Le Marichalet son
peuple(Plon, 1941), which begins: 'Quelle faveur de vivre au temps d'un homme dont on
sait, dont on est suirque, depassantl'histoire,il entrerad'emblee dansla legende, tellement
l'aventurede sa vie emporte les coeurs, tellement elle appelle le poete,plusque l'historien.
Haute destin6e! C'est celle du Mar6chal.'
4 'Je fais a la France le don de ma personnepour attenuerson malheur.' (Lesparoles
etles
ecritsduMarechalPetain.La Legion franqaise.n.d. Appel du 17juin 1940.)
I77
belief and shows their disdain for the very people they manipulate,
their deep patriarchal and racial prejudices, their fraudulence, and
their ultimate responsibilityfor all that was worst and most idiotic in
Vichy France.5But such is the absurdistforce of Miller's presentation
that we may well ask why any French person took any of it seriously.
Satire exposes but rarely explains, and despite Miller's perceptive
analysis there is still considerable need to explain the phenomenon of
Petainism, though American historians led by Hoffmann and Paxton
have done much of the hard work already.6Above all there is a need
to see Petainism as something which came from below, as well as from
above, and to analyse its failures in these terms. But before suggesting
ways in which this can be done there is an important perspective to
establish to the nature of Vichy France.
Of all the major European countries in the 1930S, France was the
only one to answer the twin challenge of economic depression and
fascism with a programme of socialist measures and a powerful reassertion of left-wing confidence. So great was the humiliation of France
in I940 that historians have been slow to acknowledge the unique
achievement of France in 1936. At a time when orthodox pressures
were to economize, to protect the owners of capital and to limit the
advance of social welfare, the Popular Front extracted a massive pay
increase from the employers, introduced the forty-hour week, and
establishedan immediate fortnightof paid holidays ('congespayes') for
all urban workers. These reformsdragged French industrial relations
into the twentieth century. The pay award severely curtailed the
individual power of the industrial and business employer; the 'conges
payes' made a substantial breach in the exclusive privileges of the
middle classes, and the forty-hour week expressed a new morality of
work backed by collective bargaining.
For a society whose long-entrenched social conservatism was a byword in Europe, contrasting oddly with its political radicalism, this
victory of the forces of the Left and their programme of social change
was a veritable revolution, producing a potent resentment and fear in
those who had campaigned for two years against the Popular Front
and had lost. In electoral terms they constituted almost half the adult
male population, and within that percentage were most of the repre-
I78
Petain, can be seen as a climax in the campaign to reversethe achievements of 1936. Petain was personally insistent that the leaders of the
Popular Front should be brought to trial for what he deemed was a
betrayal of the French nation, and in the process Leon Blum was
accused, inter alia, of a form of social treason. Within the Vichy
government itself, the world of high finance and capital enterprisewas
well represented, and Vichy's labour legislation, culminating in the
'Charte du Travail', was firmly weighted towards the employers
however it tried to disguise this fact in a make-believe language of
corporatism.7
In this perspective,Petainism and Vichy should be portrayed not so
much as the triumph of an anti-republican tradition, epitomized by
Maurras and the Action Fran~aise, as the reaction of a threatened
class against the recent encroachments of trade unionism and socialism. 1940 is less the death of the Third Republic than the final death
of the Popular Front. Structurally, it is possible to argue that Vichy
perpetuated the socially conservative nature of France, briefly challenged and interrupted by the changes of I936. Such indeed is the
conclusion of Communist historiography in France; it is also the
implicitjudgement of CharlesMoraze in his classicstudy of the French
bourgeoisie, published in 1946, and of the shrewd Catholic resister,
Charlesd'Aragon, in his observationsabout the south-west of France.8
It is also a justifiable conclusion to draw from the reports of Vichy
prefects sent to the Minister of the Interior from 1940-44.
The two great evils chastised by the new prefectswere the apparent
opposites, communism and egoism. Communism meant demanding
the higher wages and other socio-economic rights guaranteed by the
Popular Front but whittled away either before or during the war.
Egoism meant the same. Within a month or so of each prefect taking
up his position the reports begin to include a section headed 'Menees
antinationales' and increasingly the 'classe ouvriere' was either implicitly or explicitly associated with these devious activities. It need not
be a class or individuals named as such; it was often alluded to as a
traditional frame of mind. In the Tarn, the Prefect saw the problem
in the winter of I940-4I as one of holding down a working-class
traditionwhich had sentJeanJaures and Albert Thomas to the Chamber of Deputies, and which had registered its greatest success in the
Popular Front. The centre of disaffection, he reported, was Castres,
the birthplace ofJaures where unemployment in the textile industry
7The 'Charte du Travail' was finally enacted in October 1941, after more than fifteen
months deliberation. It can be seen as marking the last act in Vichy's 'Revolution
Nationale'. See Principesde la Renovation
Nationale,published by Vichy in 1941, Section
III, Travail.
8 Charles
Moraze, La FranceBourgeoise(Colin, 1946). Charles d'Aragon, La Resistance
sansHeroisme(Editions du Seuil, 1977).
I79
180
arrayed alongside proponents of the Ancien Regime. All one might add
is that in class terms their differences may be less striking.
The Petainism of 1940 thus appears to be composed of three
elements: the person of Petain with his charisma as father, leader and
martyr; the ideology of Nationalism; and the sectional interests of the
privileged classes presented as the interests of the nation. According to
the interpretation so convincingly advanced by Gerard Miller, the
demoralized people of France were manipulated by the patriotic
language of all three. True, they were. But manipulation as an explanation of public attitudes easily becomes an elitist position even
when the intention is quite the opposite. It tends to deny authentic
experience and language to ordinary people and to see those in power
as the only measurable source of language and ideology. There is, of
course, a great deal of truth in this, as the arguments of structuralists
and linguistic analysis have amply demonstrated, and no one can
easily deny that language structures imposed from above are manipulative. But even within these structures there is a relationship of
language to experience which can either cut across the process of
manipulation or exist alongside it, and through this relationship the
importance of events in human affairs is constantly reasserted.
This becomes an essential point to reaffirm when the experience of
a great mass of people is at issue, for their experience should receive
the same historical validation as the experience of those more able to
control the systems, ideologies and patterns of which so much is now
known. In I940 the most significant popular experience was the
'Exode' which involved almost all French people either as refugees or
as those affected by them. Gerard Miller sees the language and images
of the 'Exode' as an example of the manipulative power of Petainism,
even in the period before he became the head of the government.'2
But if the authenticity of the day-to-day experience of the 'Exode' is
asserted, the language and images become less a product of Petainism
than a formative element in its creation, a part of the historical
conjuncture which is so much a feature of 1940. And if this is the case,
then the very nature of Petainism has to be redefined in a way which
does justice to this element.
For a month from the middle of May 1940 the people of France lived
more on rumour than on factual information. Not surprisingly many
of the rumours reflected the deep public ambivalence towards authority which existed under the Third Republic, and still exists today, so
that on the one hand it was widely rumoured that the Prime Minister
Reynaud had run away with the Loterie Nationale, and that was all
one could expect from those in power, while on the other hand there
12
I8I
was the constant rumour that the authorities would soon take charge
of the situation and issue instructions. Rapidly, however, a more
consistent resentment towards the mayors, prefects, civil servants and
government of the day became the norm, fuelled by the information,
both rumoured and factual, that in many of the towns overrun by the
Germans the authorities had left first, leaving the people to their own
individual or collective devices. One of the most analytic surveys of
the 'Exode', undertaken shortly afterwards by a team of academics at
Rennes, explains much of the panic by reference to the failures of the
administration, and since it was not published until after the war it
was not designed as propaganda for Vichy.'3 What it says in measured
terms is duplicated by almost all the private memoirs of the 'Exode',
whether published under the Vichy regime or since. The language
varies in its intensity from writer to writer, but there is a consistent
indictment of what people felt to be the height of irresponsibility by
those in positions of authority. In Versailles on 13 June the 'mairie' is
said to have issued the bland instruction, 'Ordre d'evacuation. La
mairie invite tout le monde a fuir'14 and that was the extent of the
organization provided. Four days before, one of the local schoolteachers had said to his class of fourteen-year-olds, 'I1 faut partir. Prenez
votre bicyclette et fuyez. Les Allemands arretent et deportent lesjeunes
gens. Laissez vos parents s'il le faut, mais vous, partez!'l5
In a bitter account by a metal worker, Georges Adrey, who declared
himself in I941 to be a socialist and pacifist, the authorities from the
government downwards were accused of gross betrayal and negligence. After pushing his wheelbarrow of belongings from Paris to
Orleans, he claimed that in no town through which he had passed had
he found any French official giving either news or guidance. He
described the chaos and bewilderment, the looting and the fear which
have since been documented in endless detail, and summarized his
anger with the terse statement that the government had simply abandoned the population to the Germans.16 Writing after the Liberation,
Jerome Tharaud described the 'Exode' as a phenomenon unknown
since the barbarian invasions of the fourth century, saying that he was
no more than a leaf swept along by a whirlwind. On the way to Tours
the sense of futility and despair was heightened by the experience of
being sent endlessly round in circles: the crowds were moved on by
'gendarmes ou des civils armes de batons, qui nous refoulaient sans cesse
de la populationversla Bretagneen 1940-41 (Les
'3Andre Meynier, Les Deplacements
NourrituresTerrestres,Rennes, 1950), p. 36.
14Michel Bertrand, 'L'Exode juin 1940', Bibliotheque
du Travailn?489, 196I.
'5Ibid.
16Georges Adrey, Journald'unreplii.I juin-26juin 194o (Reni Debresse, I941), pp. 4748.
182
dans un dedale de boue, dont nous n'arrivons pas a sortir.'l7 The sense
Preface.
18Ibid.There are seventeen etchings, and the text is signed by both Jerome and Jean
Tharaud.
19Jeande la Hire, Les horreurs
(Tallendrier,
quenousavonsvues.Le crimedesevacuations
1940), p. 20. He later published Hitleret nous(1942) and MortauxAnglais.Vivela France
17 Abel Renault etJeromeTharaud, L'Exodemai-juin
I94o (Flammarion,I 944),
(1942).
I83
p. 98.
Meynier, LesDeplacements,
1969.
24 Roland
(EditionsVialetay, 1956), p.
Dorgeles, Vacancesforc6es
25Alice Wisler, Je suis uneIvacuee.Juin ig40 (n.d., n.l.).
26
Georges Adrey, Journald'unreplie,p. 48.
23 Author's interview, May
29.
I84
TRANSACTIONS
OF THE
ROYAL
HISTORICAL
SOCIETY
I85
tourisme populaire nous pourrons aller vers une meilleure organisation sociale.'30
The sentiments could easily be those of an ardent Petainist of 1940 and
may suggest that we should not make too much of the organic,
interdependent language produced by the 'Exode', not least because
it is often argued that any widening of personal and social horizons
leads to greater tolerance of other sections of society. But the opposite
is quite frequently the case, and it is when a comparison is made of the
antagonisms and animosities produced or strengthened by the 'conges
payes', and those expressed during the 'Exode', that a fundamental
difference can be found.
Despite Parant's enthusiastic corporatism of 1939, there is much
evidence that the 'conges payes' also intensified class antagonisms.
Workers, liberated for a fortnight by the Front Populaire, expressed a
certain class and political triumph in their enjoyment of the newlywon, and hard-won, right to an annual holiday at the employers'
expense. The C.G.T. created its own 'bureau de tourisme populaire'
for its members, and separate trade unions began to buy holiday
property for their workers, such as the chateau at Vouzeron bought by
the metalworkers. The youth hostels of France had been pioneered by
the left wing Catholic movement inspired by Marc Sangnier, but
despite the anti-capitalist credentials of Sangnier, supporters of the
Popular Front were encouraged to look for hostels and camp sites with
a working class clientele. Youth organisations belonging to the Socialist
party were organized by Georges Monnet and his wife, and in their
camps at Cap Breton the tents were divided into four villages called,
'L'Amitie', 'Espagne rouge', 'Frente popular', and 'Europe libre'.31
The arrival of these workers on beaches and in holiday towns previously monopolized by the bourgeoisie, provoked numerous protests
in the press which had opposed the Popular Front, and in Combat,a
magazine run by Thierry Maulnier andJean de Fabregue, the 'conges
payes' were described as 'le viol des loisirs par le Front Populaire'.32 In
Nice certain shops put up notices saying 'Interdit aux conges payes', and
the special reduced rail tickets ('billet Lagrange') offered to workers
could not be used on the days when the bulk of the bourgeoisie were
leaving or returning,33 a precaution which had a logistic rationale but
suggested a class separation of types ofholidaymakers. This suggestion
30J.-V. Parant, Le problemedu tourismepopulaire(Pichon et Durand-Auzias, 1939),
p. 207.
31 MauriceChavardes,
Et936. LaVictoiredu FrontPopulaire (Calmann-Levy, 1966),
p. 262.
32 Ibid.
33 Fran(oise Cribier,
d'etedescitadinsdeFrance
(Paris,C.N.R.S., 1969),
Lagrandemigration
p. 46.
186
I87
p. 13.
188
I89
If there were as many as forty million French people affected by
anything in I940,40 it was by the language and imagery which expressed the hopes of basic survival, words which were felt to be good,
simple, warm and protective: mere, famille, enfant, pere, nourriture,
gentillesse, ferme, village, terre, sante, dignite, courage, honneur,joie,
esprit, fraternite, relevement, renaissance, amour, paysans, la France
eternelle. In the summer of 1940, and arguably until the end of 1941,
Petainism monopolized these words through the conjuncture I have
tried to describe.
There was no historical determinism which made sure that this
conjuncture was permanent or even long lived. It was too much the
product of special circumstances which events had produced and
further events could alter. Neither Maurras in his dogmatism, nor
Petain in his narcissism,realized this.41Barresmight well have done so.
The mistake made by Petain and his disciples, was to assume that the
entry of the mass of the people into the imagery of Nationalism was
some sort of ideological conversion. It may have been for some, but
certainly not for forty millions.42A central dynamic of the years 194044 is the growing claim of Resistance individuals and movements on
the very language and imagery which the ideological Petainists believed was inalienably theirs. Resistance was initially as much a
struggle for words and consciousnessas a question of parachutes, arms
and clandestine operations. Still more, like the shaping of consciousness in 1940, it was far from being an imposition by intellectuals and
ideologues from above. Ordinary people, reacting to day-to-day situations, realigned the words which had so solidly buttressedPetain at the
height of his power, and transferredthem to Resistance.
By 1942 the poet Eluard could affirmthe gains made by Resistance
in this realignment of experience and consciousness. In homage to
Gabriel Peri he wrote:
'II y a des mots qui font vivre
Et ce sont des mots innocents
Le mot chaleur le mot confiance
Amourjustice et le mot liberte
Le mot enfant et le mot gentillesse
Et certains noms de fleurs et certains noms de fruits
PATRIOTS
AND
PATRIOTISM
IN VICHY
FRANCE
40Cf. Amouroux's much discussed title for the second volume of his GrandeHistoiredes
which he called Quarante
MillionsdePetainistes(Laffont, I977).
Franfaissousl'Occupation,
41 The blindnessof Maurras to
anything which could upset his ideological 'victory' of
1940is evident in the doctrinaireelitism of LaSeuleFrancepublishedin 194I (Lardanchet,
Lyon).
occitane(Flammarion, 1974). In his section on
42Cf. Robert Lafont, La Revendication
the war he points out that leading Occitanists sent a list of regional claims to Petain
in 1940, accompanied by a note of fidelity to the Marshal, but he continues,
'Cette dimarche correspond a un choix ideologique anterieur pour quelque-uns des
signataires ...; pour d'autres ... elle est purement conjoncturale' (p. 253).
I90
I9I
I92
no longer claimed
Petain.
By I944 its
imagery and its language were firmly associated elsewhere. The ultimate absurdity of Petainism is not its language of care, concern and
protection, nor even its imagery of rural life and peasant values. As is
evident from contemporary movements of ecology and regionalism, of
community care and local politics, this language has no inevitable
place on political Right or Left. The absurdity was that Petain could
not see that his monopoly of this language had gone, or could not
appreciate why.
There is more to patriotism in Vichy France than the protective,
defensive kind on which I have concentrated here. There was, of
course, the outward-going Resistance patriotism full of risks and uncertainties, which is what is normally meant by the word during this
period. But there is nothing shameful about the defensive kind until it
is used to promote the kind of insularity and racial phobia which
Vichy deliberately encouraged, and Petain did nothing to oppose.
Those who demanded protection in 1940 and felt Petain provided it,
and who then turned against him when his inactivity, his class and
racial prejudices and his government's collaboration betrayed their
trust, may not all have become the kind of Resisters, rightly referred
to as 'les patriotes'. But at least they showed discrimination in their
shift of patriotic allegiance. It may not be heroic, but it may well be
argued that this is an improvement on 'my country right or wrong'.
51A.N., FIC IlI I I48 (C6te-d'Or), 25 Aug. I941.
52Author's interview, April I980.