Professional Documents
Culture Documents
- independent dealer
"the element of control is absent; where a person who works for another does so
more or less at his own pleasure and is not subject to definite hours or conditions of
work, and in turn is compensated according to the result of his efforts and not the
amount thereof, we should not find that the relationship of employer and employee
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exists. In fine, there is nothing in the records to show or would "indicate that
complainant was under the control of the petitioner" in respect of the means and
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methods in the performance of complainant's work.
he is free to conduct his work, and free to engage in other means of
livelihood
independent dealer, president of the bank
- The contracts she had willingly and knowingly signed with Sun Life repeatedly and
clearly provided that said agreements were terminable by either party by written
notice with or without cause.
- Noteworthy is that this last agreement, it was emphasized, like the "Career Agent's
(or Unit Manager's) Agreement" first signed by her, that in the performance of her
duties defined herein. Carungcong would be considered an independent contractor
and not . . an employee of Sun Life," and that "(u)nder no circumstance shall the New
Business Manager and/or his employees be considered employees of Sun Life."
(d) The employers power to control the employee on the means and methods
by which the work is accomplished - The control test is the most important
test. This test is based on the extent of control the hirer exercises over a worker.
The greater the supervision and control the hirer exercises, the more likely the
worker is deemed an employee. The converse holds true as well the less
control the hirer exercises, the more likely the worker is considered an
independent contractor.
First, ABS-CBN engaged SONZAs services specifically to co-host the "Mel &
Jay" programs. ABS-CBN did not assign any other work to SONZA. To perform
his work, SONZA only needed his skills and talent. How SONZA delivered his
lines, appeared on television, and sounded on radio were outside ABS-CBNs
control. SONZA did not have to render eight hours of work per day. The
Agreement required SONZA to attend only rehearsals and tapings of the shows,
as well as pre- and post-production staff meetings. ABS-CBN could not dictate
the contents of SONZAs script. However, the Agreement prohibited SONZA
from criticizing in his shows ABS-CBN or its interests. The clear implication is
that SONZA had a free hand on what to say or discuss in his shows provided he
did not attack ABS-CBN or its interests.
Second, The Agreement stipulates that SONZA shall abide with the rules and
standards of performance "covering talents" of ABS-CBN. The Agreement
does not require SONZA to comply with the rules and standards of performance
prescribed for employees of ABS-CBN. The code of conduct imposed on
SONZA under the Agreement refers to the "Television and Radio Code of the
Kapisanan ng mga Broadcaster sa Pilipinas (KBP), which has been adopted by
the COMPANY (ABS-CBN) as its Code of Ethics." The KBP code applies to
broadcasters, not to employees of radio and television stations. Broadcasters
are not necessarily employees of radio and television stations. Clearly, the rules
and standards of performance referred to in the Agreement are those applicable
to talents and not to employees of ABS-CBN.
Lastly, being an exclusive talent does not by itself mean that SONZA is an
employee of ABS-CBN. Even an independent contractor can validly provide his
services exclusively to the hiring party. In the broadcast industry, exclusivity is
not necessarily the same as control. The hiring of exclusive talents is a
widespread and accepted practice in the entertainment industry. This practice is
not designed to control the means and methods of work of the talent, but simply
to protect the investment of the broadcast station. The broadcast station
normally spends substantial amounts of money, time and effort "in building up
its talents as well as the programs they appear in and thus expects that said
talents remain exclusive with the station for a commensurate period of time."
Normally, a much higher fee is paid to talents who agree to work exclusively for
a particular radio or television station. In short, the huge talent fees partially
compensates for exclusivity.
- production assistant
Respondents are considered regular employees of ABS-CBN and are entitled to the
benefits granted to all regular employees.
The employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondents has been
proven by the ff:
By applying the control test, there is no doubt that petitioner is an employee of Kasei
Corporation because she was under the direct control and supervision of Seiji
Kamura, the corporations Technical Consultant. It is therefore apparent that
petitioner is economically dependent on respondent corporation for her continued
employment in the latters line of business.
There can be no other conclusion that petitioner is an employee of respondent Kasei
Corporation. She was selected and engaged by the company for compensation, and
is economically dependent upon respondent for her continued employment in that
line of business. Her main job function involved accounting and tax services
rendered to Respondent Corporation on a regular basis over an indefinite period of
engagement.
Respondent Corporation hired and engaged petitioner for
compensation, with the power to dismiss her for cause. More importantly,
Respondent Corporation had the power to control petitioner with the means and
methods by which the work is to be accomplished.
June 7, 2005
February 5, 2007
RAMOS vs. CA, DE LOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER, DR. HOSAKA and DR.
GUTIERREZ
- kato ning namatay na asawa kay dugay na operahan 9 ang schedule niabot 12
No employer-employee between the doctors and hospital.
Private Hospitals hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and
visiting consultant staff. While consultants are not technically employees, the
control exercised, the hiring and the right to terminate consultants fulfill the
hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship with the exception of payment
of wages. The control test is determining.
The hospital does not hire consultants but it accredits and grants him the
privilege of maintaining a clinic and/or admitting patients. It is the patient who
pays the consultants. The hospital cannot dismiss the consultant but he may
lose his privileges granted by the hospital. The hospitals obligation is limited to
providing the patient with the preferred room accommodation and other things
that will ensure that the doctors orders are carried out.
The court finds that there is no employer-employee relationship between the
doctors and the hospital.
There was no showing that CMC had a part in diagnosing Corazon's condition. While
Dr. Estrada enjoyed staff privileges at CMC, such fact alone did not make him an
employee of CMC. CMC merely allowed Dr. Estrada to use its facilities when Corazon
was about to give birth, which CMC considered an emergency. Considering these
circumstances, Dr. Estrada is not an employee of CMC, but an independent
contractor.
In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractorphysician. There is, however, an exception to this principle. The hospital may be
liable if the physician is the "ostensible" agent of the hospital. This exception is also
known as the "doctrine of apparent authority." In Gilbert v. Sycamore Municipal
Hospital, the Illinois Supreme Court explained the doctrine of apparent authority in
this wise:
Under the doctrine of apparent authority a hospital can be held vicariously
liable for the negligent acts of a physician providing care at the hospital,
regardless of whether the physician is an independent contractor, unless the
patient knows, or should have known, that the physician is an independent
contractor. The elements of the action have been set out as follows:
"For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, a
plaintiff must show that:
(1) the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable
person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was
an employee or agent of the hospital;
(2) where the acts of the agent create the appearance of authority, the
plaintiff must also prove that the hospital had knowledge of and acquiesced
in them; and
(3) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent,
consistent with ordinary care and prudence."
The element of "holding out" on the part of the hospital does not require an
express representation by the hospital that the person alleged to be negligent
is an employee. Rather, the element is satisfied if the hospital holds itself out
as a provider of emergency room care without informing the patient that the
care is provided by independent contractors.
The doctrine of apparent authority essentially involves two factors to
determine the liability of an independent-contractor physician.
The first factor focuses on the hospital's manifestations and is sometimes
described as an inquiry whether the hospital acted in a manner which would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent
was an employee or agent of the hospital. In this regard, the hospital need not
make express representations to the patient that the treating physician is an
employee of the hospital; rather a representation may be general and implied.
In the instant case, CMC impliedly held out Dr. Estrada as a member of its medical
staff. Through CMC's acts, CMC clothed Dr. Estrada with apparent authority thereby
leading the Spouses Nogales to believe that Dr. Estrada was an employee or agent
of CMC. CMC cannot now repudiate such authority.
The second factor focuses on the patient's reliance. It is sometimes
characterized as an inquiry on whether the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the
conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.
The records show that the Spouses Nogales relied upon a perceived employment
relationship with CMC in accepting Dr. Estrada's services. Rogelio testified that he
and his wife specifically chose Dr. Estrada to handle Corazon's delivery not only
because of their friend's recommendation, but more importantly because of Dr.
Estrada's "connection with a reputable hospital, the [CMC]." In other words, Dr.
Estrada's relationship with CMC played a significant role in the Spouses Nogales'
decision in accepting Dr. Estrada's services as the obstetrician-gynecologist for
Corazon's delivery. Moreover, as earlier stated, there is no showing that before and
during Corazon's confinement at CMC, the Spouses Nogales knew or should have
known that Dr. Estrada was not an employee of CMC.
Even simple negligence is not subject to blanket release in favor of establishments
like hospitals but may only mitigate liability depending on the circumstances. When a
person needing urgent medical attention rushes to a hospital, he cannot bargain on
equal footing with the hospital on the terms of admission and operation. Such a
person is literally at the mercy of the hospital. There can be no clearer example of a
contract of adhesion than one arising from such a dire situation. Thus, the release
forms of CMC cannot relieve CMC from liability for the negligent medical treatment of
Corazon.
petitioner or its medical director, no operations can be undertaken in those areas. For
control test to apply, it is not essential for the employer to actually supervise the
performance of duties of the employee, it being enough that it has the right to wield
the power.
That petitioner exercised control over respondents gains light from the undisputed
fact that in the emergency room, the operating room, or any department or ward for
that matter, respondents' work is monitored through its nursing supervisors, charge
nurses and orderlies. Without the approval or consent of petitioner or its medical
director, no operations can be undertaken in those areas. For control test to apply, it
is not essential for the employer to actually supervise the performance of duties of
the employee, it being enough that it has the right to wield the power.
Payment of wages
She presented a petty cash voucher showing that she received an allowance for five
(5) days.
However, this solitary petty cash voucher did not prove that she had been receiving
salary from respondents or that she had been respondents' employee for 10 years. If
she was really an employee of respondents for that length of time, she should have
been able to present salary vouchers or pay slips and not just a single petty cash
voucher.
With respect to respondents' sharing in some hospital fees, this scheme does not
sever the employment tie between them and petitioner as this merely mirrors
additional form or another form of compensation or incentive similar to what
commission-based employees receive as contemplated in Article 97 (f) of the Labor
Code.
Moreover, respondents were made subject to petitioner-hospital's Code of Ethics, the
provisions of which cover administrative and disciplinary measures on negligence of
duties, personnel conduct and behavior, and offenses against persons, property and
the hospital's interest.
More importantly, petitioner itself provided incontrovertible proof of the employment
status of respondents, namely, the identification cards it issued them, the
payslips and BIR W-2 (now 2316) Forms which reflect their status as employees, and
the classification as "salary" of their remuneration. Moreover, it enrolled respondents
in the SSS and Medicare (Philhealth) program. It bears noting at this juncture that
mandatory coverage under the SSS Law is premised on the existence of an
employer-employee relationship, except in cases of compulsory coverage of the selfemployed.
------That petitioner exercised control over respondents gains light from the
undisputed fact that in the emergency room, the operating room, or any department
or ward for that matter, respondents' work is monitored through its nursing
supervisors, charge nurses and orderlies. Without the approval or consent of
September 3, 2007
- lady keeper
Lastly, the Court finds that the elements of selection and engagement as well as the
power of dismissal are not present in the instant case.
SEMBLANTE vs. CA
- masiador
- no element of control
As found by both the NLRC and the CA, respondents had no part in petitioners
selection and management; petitioners compensation was paid out of the arriba
(which is a percentage deducted from the total bets), not by petitioners; and
petitioners performed their functions as masiador and sentenciador free from the
direction and control of respondents. In the conduct of their work, petitioners relied
mainly on their "expertise that is characteristic of the cockfight gambling," and were
never given by respondents any tool needed for the performance of their work.
March 4, 2009
- jeepney drivers
The term "full-time" in Art. 157 cannot be construed as referring to the type of
employment of the person engaged to provide the services, for Article 157 must not
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be read alongside Art. 280 in order to vest employer-employee relationship on the
employer and the person so engaged. So De Vera teaches:
Under a boundary scheme, the driver remits the "boundary," which is a fixed amount,
to the owner/operator and gets to earn the amount in excess thereof. Thus, on a day
when there are many passengers along the route, it is the driver who actually
benefits from it. It would be unfair then if, during the times when passengers are
scarce, the owner/operator will be made to suffer by not getting the full amount of the
boundary. Unless clearly shown or explained by an event that irregularly and
negatively affected the usual number of passengers within the route, the scarcity of
passengers should not excuse the driver from paying the full amount of the
boundary.
x x x For, we take it that any agreement may provide that one party shall render
services for and in behalf of another, no matter how necessary for the latters
business, even without being hired as an employee. This set-up is precisely true in
the case of an independent contractorship as well as in an agency agreement.
Indeed, Article 280 of the Labor Code, quoted by the appellate court, is not the
yardstick for determining the existence of an employment relationship. As it is, the
provision merely distinguishes between two (2) kinds of employees, i.e., regular and
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casual. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
August 8, 2011
Article 280 of the Labor Code, in which the lower court used to buttress its findings
that respondent became a regular employee of the petitioner, is not applicable in the
case at bar. Indeed, the Court has ruled that said provision is not the yardstick for
determining the existence of an employment relationship because it merely
distinguishes between two kinds of employees, i.e., regular employees and casual
employees, for purposes of determining the right of an employee to certain benefits,
to join or form a union, or to security of tenure; it does not apply where the existence
of an employment relationship is in dispute.[24] It is, therefore, erroneous on the part
of the Court of Appeals to rely on Article 280 in determining whether an employeremployee relationship exists between respondent and the petitioner.
Considering that there is no employer-employee relationship between the parties, the
termination of respondent's services by the petitioner after due notice did not
constitute illegal dismissal warranting his reinstatement and the payment of full
backwages, allowances and other benefits.
LIRIO, doing business under the name and style of CELKOR AD SONICMIX
vs.GENOVIA
- respondent hired as studio manager by petitioner
Petitioner wielded the power to dismiss as respondent stated that he was verbally
dismissed by petitioner, and respondent, thereafter, filed an action for illegal
dismissal against petitioner. The power of control refers merely to the existence of
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the power. It is not essential for the employer to actually supervise the performance
of duties of the employee, as it is sufficient that the former has a right to wield the
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power. Nevertheless, petitioner stated in his Position Paper that it was agreed that
he would help and teach respondent how to use the studio equipment. In such case,
petitioner certainly had the power to check on the progress and work of respondent.
On the other hand, petitioner failed to prove that his relationship with respondent was
one of partnership
Based on the foregoing, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the evidence
presented by the parties showed that an employer-employee relationship existed
between petitioner and respondent.
We agree with respondents that once in the playing court, the referees exercise their
own independent judgment, based on the rules of the game, as to when and how a
call or decision is to be made. The referees decide whether an infraction was
committed, and the PBA cannot overrule them once the decision is made on the
playing court. The referees are the only, absolute, and final authority on the playing
court. Respondents or any of the PBA officers cannot and do not determine which
calls to make or not to make and cannot control the referee when he blows the
whistle because such authority exclusively belongs to the referees. The very nature
of petitioners job of officiating a professional basketball game undoubtedly calls for
freedom of control by respondents.
In other words, unlike regular employees who ordinarily report for work eight hours
per day for five days a week, petitioner is required to report for work only when PBA
games are scheduled or three times a week at two hours per game. In addition, there
are no deductions for contributions to the Social Security System, Philhealth or PagIbig, which are the usual deductions from employees salaries. These undisputed
circumstances buttress the fact that petitioner is an independent contractor, and not
an employee of respondents.
without corroborative evidence. On the pretext that records prior to the July 16, 1990
earthquake were lost or destroyed, respondent failed to produce payroll records,
receipts and other relevant documents, where he could have, as has been pointed
out in the Solicitor General's manifestation, "secured certified copies thereof from the
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nearest regional office of the Department of Labor, the SSS or the BIR."
More significantly, the food and lodging, or the electricity and water consumed by the
petitioner were not facilities but supplements. A benefit or privilege granted to an
employee for the convenience of the employer is not a facility. The criterion in making
a distinction between the two not so much lies in the kind (food, lodging) but the
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purpose. Considering, therefore, that hotel workers are required to work different
shifts and are expected to be available at various odd hours, their ready availability is
a necessary matter in the operations of a small hotel, such as the private
respondent's hotel.