Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict in South Asian Region,

edited by Omprakash Mishra and Sucheta Ghosh.

New Delhi, Manak Publications, 2003, ISBN 81-7827-073-0.

Many Pakistans within Pakistan:

The Case of Sectarian Conflicts in a Talibanised Context.
Ashok K. Behuria
On the trails of Musharrafs speech against terrorism on January 12, 2002, Pakistan witnessed
yet another series of sectarian clashes from January 29, with the murder of a former manager
of a foreign insurance company in Karachi. The worst face of sectarianism thus came to the
fore with official recognition of the fact that the state police could be divided along sectarian
lines. A police constable posted at a precinct in Orangi Town has been recently apprehended
who has admitted his crime and has said that he joined an extremist sectarian group after
coming under the influence of a maulvi. On February 26, armed terrorists killed 10 and
injured 16 others in an attack on namazists in the Shah-i-Najaf mosque, in Khayaban-i-Sir
Syed, Rawalpindi. The situations in Baluchistan and NWFP are no better. The entire region of
Hangu district and Kurram Agency in the north-west of Hangu and Orakzai Agency in the
north of lower Miranzai Valley have witnessed increasing Shia-Sunni sectarian violence since
the 80s. The disturbing cycle of violence in the wake of the hanging of Haq Nawaz a
militant associated with the Sipah-e-Shahba (Sunni militant outfit) accused of involvement in
the killing of an Iranian diplomat in 1991 reveals the way the sectarian differences have
spoilt the peace of the frontier cities.
The sway of the so-called religious gurus has fragmented Pakistan society during the last two
decades since the emphasis on Deoband variety of Islam during the rule of Zia ul Haq (19771988). The militarisation of one sect has led to militarisation of others. Apart from Shia-Sunni
conflicts, the intra-Sunni divides that have shown up in the last few years indicate that the
roots of sectarian conflict has gone deeper than it appears at the surface level. The murder of
a Deobandi cleric, Maulana Yusuf Ludhianvi on May 18, 2000 and the murder of Sunni
Tehrik Chief Maulana Saleem Qadri on May 18, 2001, exactly a year later, shows the way the
intra-sectarian divide has yawned during the past jehadi years, when Pakistan was acting as
the official high-priest of the jehad in Afghanistan.
It is in fact amazingly true that each of the sects has tried to define the Pakistani state and
society in its own exclusive way. The monolithic construction of Pakistani society as an
Islamic state fades away as one gets increasingly aware of the many Pakistans, conceptually
speaking, seeking to assert themselves at the peripheries. The paper seeks to throw light on
the sectarian conflicts in Pakistan and analyse its impact on Pakistani society and politics in
the coming years.
SECTARIAN DIVISIONS IN ISLAM
Sects signify diversity within a religion. They indeed hint at the different approaches to a
belief-system. Islam as a religion seeking to define, in comprehensive terms, every sphere of
human and social activity, had to have diverse approaches as far as the world-view of its
adherents were concerned. The adoption of the religion in non-Islamic societies through 7th

till 20th century had to imbue Islam with cross-cultural influences as well. This explains the
diversity within Islam.
It has often been remarked about all religions that there are as many versions of a religion as
there are believers within its fold. Every system of belief has a tendency to grow internal
differences as it develops through history. These differences, rather than signifying the
weaknesses of the religion concerned, reveal the resilience and strength of a belief-system.
But throughout the history of human civilizations, these diversities have been understood as
a weakness of a faith and the intra-religious conflicts have been bloodier than the crusades.
Coming to Islam, there are as many as 72 sects or sub-sects within Islam. The divisions within
Islam started shortly after the death of the Prophet. In fact, the Muslim world divided into
two sects shortly after the death of the Prophet in 632 AD. The issue at stake was who was a
more legitimate successor to the Prophet whether Ali, his paternal cousin and son-in-law or
Abu Bakr, his close confidante, who commanded the support of majority of the Muslims at
that time. Ali was chosen finally as the 4th Khalifa. The differences led to an open division
after Alis murder in 670 AD and subsequent irresoluble disagreements over acceptance of
Alis two sons as the next Khalifas. The followers of Ali were called Shias. But the Shias did
not stay united hereafter. They grew differences over the legitimacy of succession between
Hazrat Alis descendants on a hereditary basis. Different groups recognised one of the two
brothers as the Imam. This is how eventually the Shias had got internally divided into three
groups Zaidis, Ismaiilis and Ithna Asharis or Jafaris. The Ithna Asharis got later divided
into two ideological schools the Akhbaris and the Usulis. The Ismaili Shias too got divided
into two branches the Nizaris and the Mustalis, also known as Eastern and Western
Isma`ilis respectively.
The Sunnis were also divided among themselves once the principle of ijtihad use of
reason for interpreting situations not found in Quran and Sunnah led to evolution of
different schools of Islamic jurisprudence. Towards the end of the 7th century AD, Imam Abu
Hanifa in Kufa and Imam Malik in Medina came out with their two different mazahib
(schools) or religio-legal thought, named after them as the Hanafi and the Maliki schools. The
next century saw the development of two other great schools the Shafei school of Imam
Idris al-Shafei in Egypt and the Hanbali school of Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal in Baghdad.
The Ithna Ashari Shias too developed their separate school of fiqh now known as the Fiqh-eJafari. So did the other two Shia groups the Isma`ilis and the Zaidis. This is how seven
schools of Islamic law (mazahib-e-fiqh) had come into existence which still prevail around the
globe. All these schools of law, obviously, aimed at offering a variety of legal rules to enrich
the Muslim legal heritage, not any causes for quarrel to weaken the Muslim society.
In the Indian subcontinent the majority of Muslims are Sunni while the Shias constitute a
sizable minority. The majority among the Sunnis follow the Hanafi school of Islamic
jurisprudence, while many groups of them (especially in South and West) follow the Shafei
school. Among the Shias of India the Ithna-Asharis are in the majority while the Khojas and
Bohras of Western and Central India belong to the two internal divisions of the Isma`ili group
of Muslims. There are in this region no Malikis or Hanbalis among the Sunnis and no Zaidis
among the Shias. There is, however, a strong group of Sunni Muslims called the Ahle-eHadith who do not consider themselves bound by any particular school of law and rely
directly on the Prophets Sunnah.
THE SECTS IN PAKISTAN

Deobandi Sunni Groups

In Pakistan Sunnis constitute almost 74 percent of the population while Shias constitute 20
percent. The majority of the Sunni are followers of the Hanafi school. The main divisions
within the Sunnis are: Deobandis, Barelvis, Ahle-e-Hadiths and Wahabis and each of them
divide into multiple sub-sects. Among the Sunnis there are virtually two leading versions of
Islam one puritanical; the other eclectic. The former claims to represent original Islam as
found in the texts of Quran and authentic Sunnah, and the later allows and accommodates
things like veneration of graves and holding of various kinds of festivities on religious
occasions and at places of religious importance which are viewed by the adherents of the
former as bid`at [unauthorised innovation]. The former are sometimes called Wahhabis (after
Abd-ul-Wahhab of the Hanbali school even though they are not Hanbali), or Deobandi (after
the famous seminary of Deoband in UP, Dar-ul-Uloom or House of Knowledge), which
follows the puritan ideology. The latter is called Bid`ati (practitioners of innovations), or
Barelvi (after their religious leader, Imam Ahmad Raza Khan of Bareilly, in Uttar Pradesh in
India).
The Deobandis, the Wahabis, the Salafias, the Tablighi Jammats and the Ahle Hadiths
advocate a rigid and radical version of Islam, while the Barelvi groups like Dawat-e-Islami,
Punjab Suni Tehrik, Almi Tanzeem Ahle-e-Sunnat, Anjuman Tulaba-e-Islam, Jamaat-e-Ahl-eSunnat and Tehreek-e-Tahaffuz-e-Namoos-e-Risalat advocate a softer version of Islam. But
they are similar in their exclusionary principles and in their stand on guarding their cause
through violence. The Deobandis have militant outfits like Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan
(Guardians of the Friends of the Prophet) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, while the Barelvis have
militant outfits like Sunni Tehrik.
Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)
The Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) or roughly translated as the Conference of Ulema of Islam
is a right-wing religious party founded in 1945. The organisation was a splinter group of the
Ulema based in Deoband and broke away because of the Deobandi opposition to Pakistan
movement. The group supported the Muslim League and played a rather low-key role in the
immediate aftermath of the creation of Pakistan even though it continued as a mainstream
religious party. Because of its association with the conservative Deoband reform movement,
the JUI advocates an Islamic state based on Sunni teachings and has called for Islamic
revolution. The most popular of the parties functioning under the name JUI is led by Maulana
Fazlur Rahman and its power base is centred in the Pushtun areas of Baluchistan and NWFP.
The JUI has a fundamental connection with the Taliban of Afghanistan. The JUI-run
madrassas had supplied the Taliban with the bulk of its leaders and rank-and-file cadres in
the early 1990s. Recently too in the wake of the American war against terror, the JUI sent
many Pakistanis to fight along with the Talibans.
In December 1998, in the weeks leading up to the holy month of Ramadan, JUI(F) activists set
about enforcing their own version of sharia (Islamic law) in Quetta, a city of about 1.2 million
near the Afghan border. Armed with batons, large groups of JUI activists attacked video
rental shops, smashing VCRs and TVs; when the local administration did nothing to protect
the shop owners, stop the attackers or charge them, the attacks on video shops became an
everyday occurrence. Political observers in Quetta speculated that with seven very influential
members in the 43-strong Baluchistan provincial assembly, the JUI could have introduced
legislation to close video shops during Ramadan, but instead, following the example of the

Taliban, chose to employ force. Although notable both for inspiring and being inspired by the
Taliban, the JUI is also important for having spawned at least 11 factions, of which the Sipahe Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) is considered to be the most violent.
Another JUI faction, the JUI(S), is led by Maulana Sami-ul Haq. Maulana is credited with the
establishment of two large madrassas the Dar ul-Uloom Haqania in Akora Khattak,
Nowshehra (NWFP), and the Jamia Uloom-ul-Islamiya in Karachi. The Dar ul-Uloom
Haqania is a well-known breeding ground for the Taliban. The JUIs direct links with the
Taliban are rather too obvious to be missed during the recent months.
Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)
The Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) or roughly translated as the Guardians of the Friends of
the Prophet, was founded as a JUI sister organisation in Jhang district in Punjab in September
1984, where majority population were Sunni while the economy of area was in the hands of
the wealthy Shia landowners. It was established to counter the assertion of the Shia groups in
the wake of Zia-ul-Haqs policy of introducing an official version of Sunni Islam in Pakistan,
inspired by the Iranian revolution. The SSP reportedly was a relatively peaceful party so long
as was under the wing of its parent party, the JUI. But Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, then the
JUIs provincial president, broke away from the JUI soon after the SSP was founded and
emerged as its leader. While the JUI had broader views about how an Islamic state should be
run, the SSP advocated a purely Sunni state in which all other sects would be declared nonMuslim minorities.
The SSP grew rapidly from a limited presence in Jhang district in the 1980s to one of the
largest religious parties in Punjab by 1994, surpassing even the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). It was a
virulently anti-Shia party and the SSPs formal goals were to combat Shiism on all fronts
to have Shias declared a non-Muslim minority in Pakistan; to proscribe Muharram (Shiite
commemorative ceremony) processions, which it holds as the primary cause of sectarian
riots; and to have Sunni Islam declared the state religion of Pakistan. The SSP initiated a
guerrilla war against the Shias shortly after breaking away from the JUI, and militant Shia
organisations fought back with equal fury. One of the early casualties of the SSPs violent
methods was Jhangvi himself, who was assassinated in February 1990, as was his successor,
Isar al-Haq Qasimi, in January 1991.
Much of the support for the SSP comes from urban Sunni businessmen, many of whom
emigrated from India at the time of partition and settled in Jhang where the SSP was
founded. Associations of local traders in Jhang and other urban centres respond actively to
SSP strike calls and protest marches, the latter often originating in the main bazaars. The
party promotes its sectarian views through its official monthly organ, Khilifat-i Rashida (The
Rightly Guided Caliphate), which is published in Faisalabad, and through numerous
pamphlets and booklets reproduces what it terms objectionable material from the Shia
history books, and urges the public to get rid of such blasphemy. In addition to the support
enjoyed from its urban political constituency the party has wealthy donors in the Middle
East. The SSP also maintains strong links to both factions of the JUI(JUI-F and JUI-S),
reportedly differing with the JUI only over methodology, not beliefs, and to the Taliban, with
which it has links through the JUI and JUI-run madrassas. Many SSP militants are known to
have obtained their military experience fighting alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan , and
received their training at camps which were probably run by the Kashmiri militant group
Harkat-ul Ansar (HUA) in Afghanistan. The party reportedly maintains branches in the
Middle East, Europe and North America.

In late 1996, reports suggested that the SSP had shifted its headquarters from Jhang district to
Bahawalnagar district, bordering Indian Rajasthan. The move reportedly came after frequent
crackdowns by police had broken its power base in Jhang, provoking an unsuccessful attempt
to first shift its headquarters to Faisalabad, and then finally to Bahawalnagar district.
According to local sources who spoke to The Friday Times, the SSP located its headquarters
in the districts two largest Deobandi madrassas Jamiat-ul Aloom Eidgah in Bahawalnagar
city, and Dar-ul Aloom Deoband Faqirwali in Fort Abbas subdivision. In the months and
years preceding its move the SSP had been responsible for a rapid escalation in anti-Shia
agitation, violence and targeted killings in Bahawalnagar district, much of which also spilled
over to the adjacent districts of Bahawalpur, Vehari and Kanewal.
Arrested SSP members have also admitted to involvement in armed robberies, some of these
apparently carried out in collaboration with elements of the Mohajir Qaumi Movement
(MQM), the Karachi-based ethno-political party involved in much of the violence in urban
Sindh. Officials sources revealed close (the Karachi police force) in 1995 that the MQMs
Haqiqi faction (MQM-H) had 500 gunmen looking for work after being abandoned by an
intelligence agency, and thus allied itself with the SSP. The strategy was to try to split the
rival non-sectarian MQM-Altaf faction (MQM-A) group into Sunni and Shia factions, a goal
the SSP supported. The 1995 SSP-MQM-H alliance was temporary and situation-specific, and
the Shia groups reacted by forming a temporary alliance with the MQMs Altaf faction.
Recently General Musharraf banned SSP as an organisation and the step has not had
appreciable results, as the recent killings mentioned earlier, indicate.
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ)
The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ, Army of Jhangvi), named after assassinated SSP leader Maulana
Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, was formed in 1995 or 1996 when radical elements within the SSP split
from the party after the leadership opened a dialogue with the leaderships of militant Shia
organisations. This loose grouping of breakaway SSP men then established the LJ, led by Riaz
Basra, who first came to prominence following the killing of an Iranian diplomat in Lahore in
1990. Under Basras leadership the LJ has become one of the most dreaded militant
sectarian organisations in Pakistan in recent years. Considered by its membership to be a
jihadi organisation, the LJs main battlefield lies within Pakistan, where it has admitted
responsibility for numerous massacres of Shias and targeted killings of Shia religious and
community leaders, and in some cases Sunni officials. The group has carried out numerous
attacks against Iranian interests and Iranian nationals in Pakistan and was implicated in the 3
January 1999 assassination attempt on the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif near Lahore.
The LJ is said to be unique among militant sectarian groups as it is the only one that calls
newspaper offices to claim responsibility for its attacks. The groups actions and reasons for
committing various attacks are often detailed in its Urdu-language magazine Inteqame Haq
(Rightful Revenge), which reportedly is intended for top government leaders and highranking bureaucrats and police officials.
The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi is organised into small cells of five to eight militants that operate
independently of the others. Individual militants are reportedly unaware of the exact number
of cells similar to their own that might be operating in Punjab, or the nature of upcoming
operations. Militants are given cellular phones, which allow the cells to contact one another as
necessary. After carrying out an attack LJ hitmen are left to their own devices, often scattering
and then reassembling at HUA-run camps in Afghanistan to plan future operations. The LJ

terrorists were associated with the notorious Mominpura graveyard massacre on 11 January
1998.
Sources indicate the LJ has strong links to the Kashmiri militant group Harkat-ul
Mujahidin(earlier HUA), and that many key LJ militants received their military training in
HUA-run camps in Afghanistan. A confidential intelligence report to the Pakistan
government stated that in early 1999, 800 Pakistanis were under training at HUAs Khalid Bin
Waleed camp in Afghanistan, most of them connected to the SSP/LJ. According to the report,
the standard training period consists of 4-8 weeks during which the trainees are provided
extensive training in handling of sophisticated small arms, preparation and handling of
improvised explosive devices and handling of explosives, [and] hit-and-run tactics. The
report states that the 11 January 1998 Mominpura massacre was carried out by HUA-trained
LJ militants, as was the 3 January 1999 assassination attempt on the then PM Nawaz Sharif.
At the time the intelligence report was written, Riaz Basra and several other LJ leaders had
taken refuge in HUA (later Harkat ul Mujahideen) camps in Afghanistan.
Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM)
The Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM, Movement for the Defence of
Mohammads Law) is a militant, tribally based Wahabi party that first came to prominence in
1994 when it led an armed uprising in support of sharia in Malakand division, NWFP. The
groups call to arms drew large numbers of experienced Afghan fighters from nearby
Peshawar, Mohmand and Bajaur regions, and quickly went out of control. At least 40 people,
including a PPP MNA and more than a dozen paramilitary troops, were killed in a week of
fighting before the Sherpao government was able to reestablish law and order.
Led by Sufi Mohammed, the TNSM operates primarily in the tribal belt, such as in Swat and
the adjoining districts of NWFP, and continues to demand implementation of sharia. In an
August 1998 speech to thousands of supporters in Peshawar, Sufi Mohammed reportedly
declared that those opposing the imposition of sharia in Pakistan were wajib-ul-qatl (worthy
of death). Although well-established in NWFP, the TNSM has had only limited success in
expanding its activities beyond the tribal areas of the province (Abbas 26 May 1999).
According to Azhar Abbas, the TNSM is currently consolidating its position in NWFP and
seems uninterested in expansion.
Tehrik-e-Tulaba
Primarily a student organisation, the Tehrik-e-Tulaba (Movement of Students), like the
TNSM, is a Taliban-type organisation seeking to impose sharia in Pakistan. The group was
established in Orakzai Agency, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and thus far its
activities have been confined there. On 13 December 1998 a shariat court established by the
group fined six alleged accomplices for a murder and burned down their homes as
punishment; the murderer was publicly executed the same day.
Other Sunni Jihadi Groups
Although outside the scope of this report, as indicated earlier there are a number Pakistanbased jihadi organisations operating in Afghanistan and Kashmir. The top three such groups
are the Harkat-ul Mujahiden (earlier Harkat-ul Ansar HUA), Hizb-ul Mujahideen, Lashkare-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad. There may be a dozen or more groups operating in Kashmir
alone. The Government of Pakistan maintains that it opposes terrorism and does not

provide training or arms to sectarian militants fighting in Kashmir, but sources are in general
agreement that it does provide these groups with political, diplomatic and moral support.
However, sources do disagree over the nature and strength of links between jihadi
organisations and militant sectarian groups operating in Pakistan.
Barelvi Sunni Sectarian Groups
While the SSP, SMP and LJ are responsible for the vast majority of violent sectarian activity in
Pakistan, there are also a number of smaller, less prominent groups. Some of these are the
Sunni Tehrik, Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi and Tehrik-e-Tulaba.
Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP)
JUP is a fundamentalist political party established by left-wing mullahs in 1948 that
advocates an Islamic state based on progressive Sunni Islamic principles. The JUP represents
the Barelvi movement within Pakistani Islam and is especially strong in the small towns and
countryside of Punjab. The Barelvis, who are the largest Sunni stream in Pakistan perceive
themselves as members of the sawad-e-azam (great majority) and do not regard Shias as
Muslims. Another breakaway faction of the JUP is run by Allama Tahir-ul-Qadri. Apart from
the Minhaj-ul-Quran which is a forum for teaching the Quran. the political wings of his
establishment are Jamaat-e-Ahl-e-Sunnat and Tehreek-e-Tahaffuz-e-Namoos-e-Risalat.
Dawat e-Islami and Sunni Tehrik
In 1982, Maulana Ilyas Qadri (former Punjab president of Anjuman Tulaba-e-Islam, the JUPs
youth wing) declared himself Amir-e-Ahle-Sunnat and later in 1984 founded the organisation
Dawat-e-Islami in Karachi. Qadri founded Dawat-e-Islami in reaction to the rise of what
Imam Ahmed Raza Khan Barelvi had declared, over a hundred years ago, a heretical sect
namely Deobandis. The Ahle Hadith had yet to emerge on the horizons of the national and
jehadi politics. The Afghan jehad was at its peak but the monster of sectarian violence had not
reared its head as yet. The jehadi politics was restricted to small groups, which were
clandestinely engaged in Afghanistan. Though the Kalashnikov culture was already taking
roots, the politics of violence had not been institutionalised as yet. It was, however, an
already known fact that only Jamaat-e-Islami and Deobandi outfits were involved in the
Afghan jehad. It was also clear that Middle Eastern, particularly Saudi, money would help
prop up the Ahle Hadith sect and its related outfits. The rise of the Deobandi sect was,
moreover, visible in the way Tablighi Jamaat was making progress. The sects success in
Bangladesh was also a significant development.
In this scenario, the sense of being left behind was already there among the Ahle Sunnat but
the only model for a new reactive Islamist organisation available for them in 1984 was that of
a tablighi (proselyting) organisation. Ilyas Qadri has sworn allegiance (bayat) to all the four
principal mystic orders; Qadriya, Chistiyya, Naqshbandiyya, and Suharwardiyya. He,
however, continues to display his unlimited love and respect for Imam Ahmed Raza Brelvi in
his writings and speeches. This may be because he swore allegiance at the hands of Zia-udDin Ahmed Rizvi Qadri, a follower and successor of Imam Ahmed Raza Khan Brelvi.
Dawat-e-Islami is more of a mystic order than a political organisation that revolves around
the personality of its founder. It has no motive other than to cleanse the spirits of its cadres
and propagate its belief system. Its cadres do not overtly indulge in political or sectarian

issues and its peaceful style of preaching on the pattern of a mystic order has won it a large
number of followers.
The Dawat cadres are required to follow the path of the Prophet in a very narrow sense of the
word. Like their spiritual guide, they would wear white lose trousers and shirt (shalwarkurta) with a green turban. They always keep a twig (miswak) to clean their teeth and a comb
in their shirt pocket, near their heart. The Dawat adherents never wear black shoes because it
is, according to them, against the tradition set by the Prophet. They always keep a needle and
thread, a mirror, some oil, etc with them when they go to sleep or travel. As part of their
rigorous training, they are required to sleep on a mattress of jute or crushed cane, as was the
tradition of the Prophet. In short, the Dawat chief wants his followers to be a model of the
traditions of the Prophet, as interpreted and personified by Qadri himself. Dawat probably
has the broadest popular base of all other Ahle Sunnat organisations. The lower and lowermiddle classes form the bulk of its cadres. The number of madrassa-educated cadres,
however, is rapidly increasingly. Dawat is said to run nearly 200 madrassas only in Karachi.
This figure does not give a correct picture of the organisations strength at the national level
because there are districts where it controls as few as two madrassas, like in Rawalpindi
The Sunni Tehrik
The Sunni Tehrik began in early 1990s after Salim Qadri fell out with his mentor Illyas Qadri,
the founder of Dawat-e-Islami. The Tehrik is known for its efforts to establish Barelvi order in
Pakistan society. The Sunni Tehrik (Sunni Force), was led by Saleem Qadri prior to his
murder on 18 May 2001. It was the most violent of all Barelvi factions. The Sunni Tehrik
reportedly drew the bulk of its membership from disaffected former JUP members and a
huge network of Barelvi madrassas called Zia-ul Quran where the only subjects for debate are
the differences between Deobandis and Barelvis. Media reports suggest that some of the
groups leaders were suspected of involvement in criminal activities, including major armed
robberies in Faisalabad, Gujranwala, Sargodha and Sialkot, and of acting as musclemen for
small-time local landlords. In early April 1999, a former MQM unit chief was implicated in
the murder of a Sunni Tehrik activist in Karachi.
Almi Tanzeem Ahle Sunnat
In the recent years another Barelvi Sunnite organisation known as the Almi Tanzeem Ahle
Sunnat is making its presence felt in Pakistan. The Almi Tanzeem believes strongly that it is
impossible to contain the politics of jehad, which is a result of the Saudi influence without the
establishment of the system of Nizam-e-Mustafa in Paksitan. The Tanzeem has been
highlighting the threats Ahle Hadiths and Deobandis pose to Ahle Sunnat.
The Tanzeem was founded by Pir Afzal Qadri, a Pir (spiritual guide) of Mararian Sharif in
Gujrat, in Pakistan. In its earlier version the Tanzeem was known as Tanzeem Islah-eMuashra, which was set up in 1990. The organisation had a modest agenda of ushering in
social reformation and it continued to work till 1998 when the Pir changed its name to the
Almi Tanzeem Ahle Sunnat. It is believed that the Pir has a large following in the Pakistan
Army. The Pir hails from an area, which boasts of sending large numbers of junior personnel
to the Pakistani Army and has tried his best to expand his base in the lower rungs of the
Army.
The Tanzeem announced to launch a 313-day long campaign inviting Pakistan Army to
impose Nizam-e-Mustafa in the country last year in 200. Every morning for the 313 days, at

least one Islamic scholar from the Almi Tanzeem Ahle Sunnat was to display a placard asking
the General Headquarters (GHQ) to impose the Nizam. The campaign was later abandoned
after 25 days under pressure from the GHQ. However, the effect was electric, particularly
among the Ahle Sunnat cadres. The Tanzeem launched its latest campaign in the form of a
train march from Peshawar to Lahore on May 13, 2001. Pir Afzal Qadri addressed small
gatherings at every station the train stopped. One of the themes the emphasised during these
addresses was the growing obscenity and waywardness in the ranks of the army. The Pir
regretted the fact that his call for the imposition of a Islamic system within the army was
answered by holding mixed gatherings (Army Melas) around the country. He reportedly
stunned the gatherings by alleging that military officers would come to these gatherings only
to pick up girls of their choice;. The Tanzeem is reportedly gaining in popularity among the
Ahle Sunnat. It is expected to play a growing role in the Islamist politics in the country in
near future. The Tanzeem has already set up its traders wing and lawyers wing to widen its
base.
As a measure of its influence, the Tanzeem is trying hard to have some of its minor demands
accepted, before its demand for the introduction of Nizam-e-Musatafa is accepted. For
example, it wants the government to do away with all mixed gatherings in the armed forces
and cleanse them of all vices. At another level, the Tanzeem, like its predecessor Tanzeem
Islah-e-Muashra, continues harp on social reforms. The electronic media is its favorite target
in this regard and it regrets the fact that the government is patronising nudity and obscenity
on the television. Its foremost demand has been that the government allow the airing of
issues of faith and jurisprudence discussed only in accordance with the beliefs of the majority
sect of Pakistani Muslims.
The Shias
The Shias also have their political outfits. The major political outfit working for Shia interests
is the Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP) which grew out of the Tehrik-e Nefaz-e Fiqh-e Jafria
(TNFJ, Movement for the Implementation of Shia Law), a religious pressure group formed in
response to General Zia ul-Haqs Islamisation policies, which favoured Pakistans Sunni
majority.
Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP)
The main purpose of the TNFJ was to formulate an Islamic constitution based on Shia
principles as expounded by Irans Ayatollah Khomeini, unite the Shia community, protect
Shia rights in a Sunni-majority state, and actively involve Shias in Pakistani politics. The TNFJ
adopted an aggressive, confrontational style of politics in its early years, especially after
formation of the Sunni SSP in the early 1980s. The organisation split into two groups, both
swearing loyalty to Khomeinis principles, in 1984. One was a moderate, traditionalist group
and the other a militant reformist faction. In 1987 or 1988 the TNFJ changed its name to the
Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan(TJP) and registered itself as a political party. The TJP moved to a
more moderate stance after the assassination of its second leader, Allama Arif Al-Hussaini, in
Peshawar in August 1988. The move reportedly gave rise to several splinter groups, including
the Sipah-e-Muhammadi Pakistan(SMP), a violent anti-Sunni faction to counter SSP.
The TNFJ/TJP remained the main political organisation for Shias throughout the 1980s and
most of the 1990s. And it continued to operate as a moderate force. But reports in 1998
indicated that the party was divided deep within itself since 1995 and was unable to
discharge its role properly. Thus came the Shura-e-Wahdat-e-Islami (Council of Islamic

Unity) a Shia umbrella organisation claiming to represent all Shia political activists, in
August 1998. Shurae Wahdat-e Islami has generated very little media attention since its
founding, which many believe may mean that the council has never really established itself
and the TJP, under of Allama Sajid Naqvi, the TJP leader considered the undisputed
patriarch of Shia politics in Pakistan remains the main vehicle for Shia political activity in
Pakistan.
A second recent major development for the TJP and all militant Shia organisations in Pakistan
was the August 1998 defeat by the Taliban of the Hizb-e Wahdat, Afghanistans militant Shia
party. Based in the Hazara region of Afghanistan, the Hizb-e Wahdat has strong links to Shia
groups in Pakistan. Media reports indicated that thousands of predominantly Shia ethnic
Hazaras were massacred by ethnic Pashtun Taliban fighters following the capture of the
northern Afghan city of Mazar-e Sharif in August 1998. Pakistani Shias sympathy for their
fellow believers killed in Afghanistan added a new motivation to the sectarian battle in
Pakistan, and that a natural alliance was building between the fully trained Hazara guerrillas
and the Shiite militant groups of Pakistan.
Sipah-e-Mohammedi Pakistan (SMP)
The precise date of the founding of the Sipah-e-Mohammedi Pakistan (SMP, Guardians of the
Prophet) is unclear, with some sources indicating 1990 or 1991 and others 1994. The SMP was
formed after a TJP affiliate group, the Imamia Students Organisation (ISO), became too
violent and fragmented into smaller groups, with many of its most militant members joining
the SMP. While ISO reportedly advocated a tough line against Sunni extremism, by the late
1980s many ISO militants had become increasingly critical of their organisations close
connections to the TJP leadership, blaming the TJP leaders for the rapid growth of the Sipah-e
Sahaba Pakistan.
During the early and mid-1990s, the SMP was considered to be one of the most heavily armed
and violent terrorist groups in Punjab. Led by Ghulam Reza Naqvi and Murid Abbas
Yazdani, fellow scholars from the Hoza Ilmia at Qom, Iran, the SMP committed itself to
expunging the SSP from the history books. Its gunmen systematically attacked SSP
activists, Sunni clerics and the offices of any newspapers it deemed unfriendly. In addition to
its anti-Sunni operations, the SMP was also suspected of widespread criminal activities,
including large-scale gun-running to raise money for its activities. Like Reza Naqvi, most of
the SMP leadership shared rural or small-town backgrounds, religious educations at
madrassas in Punjab, elsewhere in Pakistan or Iran, and obtained much of their military
training in Afghanistan. Headquartered in Thokar Niaz Baig, a Shia stronghold in the
suburbs of Lahore, the SMP claimed it had thousands of supporters in Pakistan, and that it
had offices abroad. One source indicates the group also had influential supporters within the
police, military and security establishment, in particular the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
Sources (as they inform the media in Pakistan) indicate the SMP evolved an ambiguous
relationship with its parent organisation, the TJP, exactly like its Sunni counterpartsthe SSP
and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. It was an independent organisation for all practical purposes but
maintained links with the TJP leadership and in public at least was only mildly critical of the
partys inability to protect Shias from Sunni militancy. On its part the TJP maintained a
discreet distance from the SMP and avoided explicit, unambiguous criticism of the SMPs
violent activities. The rigid stance of SMP was revealed in the murder of former SMP chief
Murid Abbas Yazdani on September 1996 by a SMP activist, allegedly at the behest of Reza
Naqvi. The differences between Yazdani and Naqvi reportedly began in 1995, when the SMP

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joined the Milli Yakjehti Council (MYC), a government-initiated committee of 21 religious

organisations whose purpose was to work toward sectarian harmony in Punjab. An eightmonth squabble over the terms of joining the MYC split the SMP into two factions, with the
Yazdani group leaving Thokar Niaz Baig, establishing a new office in Islamabad, and starting
a movement against the Naqvi group. After Naqvi went into hiding following Yazdanis
assassination, a new leadership emerged and the two groups eventually resolved their
differences, merging into one group again, but in the meantime police had infiltrated the
SMPs network of armed militants, arresting 25 of their 48 targets. Many of the remaining
SMP militants, disgusted with the infighting among the leadership, went underground after
the arrests; freed of centralised command, they reportedly scattered across the country to
begin operations anew. By 1998, SMP was weakened by internal bickering, police infiltration
and attacks by the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and SMP had practically disintegrated. Its support from
outside sources, especially Iran, had dried up and its benefactors reportedly viewed the
SMPs continued existence as detrimental to the cause of Shias in Pakistan. Despite these
setbacks a number of SMP activists were still at large, and reports suggested that the group
had its new headquarters in the Imamia Colony in Shahdara, near Lahore, and was beginning
to reorganise.
Analysis
The sectarian scenario in Pakistan thus presents the researcher with a bewildering universe. It
is literally a fight of all against all except for temporary alliances. The temptation to
homegenise on the basis of a singular world-view has been the ruling passion with leaders in
all organisations. Thus one finds Pakistan struggling with itself to assume a religious identity.
Every religious political outfit starting from Jamiat-i-Islami (JI), JUI, JUP and their sister
militant groupings have sought to impose their brand of Islam on the people of Pakistan. It is
interesting to observe that the Pakistans of their imagination never add up to the Pakistan
often conceived in monolithic terms and unified form. Pakistans engagement with
Afghanistan during the Zia years and subsequently during the Taliban years has deepened
the sectarian faultlines and allowed them to explode. The nature of Pakistan-Afghanistan
equation has also changed during the Zia years, Pakistan reared the Afghan mujahideen
and Talban in Muridke, in Akora Khattak and in Binori mosque in Karachi. During the
Taliban years, it is the Taliban that defined the contour of intra-societal divisions in Pakistan.
The Talibanised context has been primarily responsible for sharpening the inter-sectarian and
intra-sectarian divides. In fact, it is slowly being realized in Pakistan that the consequence of
acting as a frontline state during the cold war times has proved disastrous for Pakistani
society. The Afghan Jihad years (1979 till 1989) saw the rise of Deobandis first and one saw
the pouring in of Saudi money to set up madrassas to propagate the aggressive Wahabism
that found echoes in the Deobandi ideology. The Deobandi assertion strained Sunni-Shia
relations with its emphasis on promoting a rather rigid version of Islam that had no respect
for Shias. Then came the Iranians in support of the Shias. Shias established their seminaries to
protect their culture and militant units to protect themselves against Sunni attack. The
sectarian divides thus widened. Later on came the Barelvi assertion against Saudi
sponsorship of the Deobandi madrassas. They even went to the extent of issuing warnings to
the Saudi government to stop meddling in the religious affairs within Pakistan. The Afghan
Jihad drove Pakistan deep into the morass it is in today.
During the Zia years, there was initially an official sponsorship of Sunni version of Islam.
Even Zia had come dangerously close to the idea of declaring Sunni Deobandi variety of

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Islam as the state religion. But the assertion of Shias reversed the process. But the efforts of
the Sunni zealots continued in the form of expanding their constituency and appeal
through religious schools that sought to infuse young and innocent minds with their version
of Islam. Thus one found official recognition to the Madrassa system in Pakistan since the
1980s.
A senior political commentator in Pakistan would say that the sectarian base of these
madrassas is officially sanctioned. The Deobandi madrassas are organised under the rubric
of Wafaqul Madaris, whereas the Barelvi madrassas are collectively run under the tile of
Nizamul Madaris. For the Ahl-i-Hadith the broad title is Wafaqul Madaris al Salfia. It is
evident from the way the madrassa system is structured that their students get their first
lesson of narrow-mindedness the moment they are registered with the system. That in turn
furnishes the very basis of intolerance and inflexibility the calling card of the Taliban.
The internal administration of these madrassas, especially those with big boarding schools, is
so designed that it further solidifies isolationist mindset. Because everything in the madrassa
is organised in the name of religion, everything is also justified in the name of religion. Most
of the madrassas have medieval curriculum and an exaggerated emphasis on theological
learning. The chief aim of the madrassa education seem to be providing recruits for the
ongoing separate jihads waged by separate religious organisations. The recent step of the
Musharrafs government to revamp the madrassa education system is a long overdue. The
Pakistani government will certainly face a terrible task to convince the madrassa people to toe
the governmental line.
The Pakistani government has to first negotiate with the Talibanised context and then only it
can implement its post-January-12 policy of anti-terrorism. The stance of Musharraf in this
regard deserves attention. He has sought to rein in the Jihadis, ban militant organisatins,
deweaponise Pakistani society and control the intelligence agency ISI. But the impact of all
this has been rather unimpressive on the sectarian front. Nothing short of a gradual deTalibanisation can only bring about lasting change in Pakistani society.
The government in Pakistan is thus slowly confronting the worst face of an armed society.
The years of Afghan war as well as the recent so-called jihad in Kashmir has had a disastrous
effect on the internal law and order situation in the Pakistani society. As the society is getting
increasingly violent, with every possible fault-line erupting in recent years. It is important to
contextualise the policy of progressive Islamisation of the Pakistani society, polity and
economy against this backdrop. The force of Islam has determined the nature of politics in
Pakistan very marginally many scholars would argue and they would hint at the poor
electoral performance of the religious parties in all the previous elections. But it is equally
true that almost all rulers of Pakistan, with a possible exception of Jinnah, have fallen easy
prey to the appeal of Islam. One has seen a socialist Bhutto succumbing to the Islamist lobby.
Even it was rumoured immediately before the September 11 terrorist act, that Musharraf was
coming out with some Hisba ordinance to convince the people of Pakistan about his devotion
to Islam.
The religious forces within Pakistani society have been competing among themselves for
influence ever since Pakistan came up as a confessional state- an Islamic state for the Muslims
of the Indian subcontinent. There are as many versions of Islam as there are groups fighting
for Islamisation in Pakistan. Perhaps such plurality has helped sustain the liberal context in a
country otherwise simmering with a militant zeal to establish a truly Islamic society, even
when there is no hope of a consensus ever regarding the bases of a true Islamic society. The

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Post-Afghan-war Pakistan has seen all hues of Islam getting militarised to defend their own
separate strands and the fight among themselves has left the space open for blossoming of
any brand of democracy the people wielding power would like to initiate in Pakistan. The
people at large, deeply Islamic though, seem to be largely keeping out of the over-all
hullabaloo raised on the streets in the name of Islam by outfits who never tire of
demonstrating their nuisance value on flimsy pretexts. They are more bothered about their
daily struggle for survival. The theological differences that separate the religious forces do
not appeal much to them. What they are more bothered about is a dispensation that can
deliver economic justice with political freedom to elect the government of their choice. And
the vain hopes of militant outfits to force their ideas on the state will wither away.
The fall of Taliban holds promise for future of Pakistan society even if the Taliban wind is still
blowing in the hinterland groaning under severe economic strain. The international economic
assistance together with the resolve of the Musharraf administration appear to usher Pakistan
to a socio-political order where the most nagging of fundamental inter-sectarian differences
will confront one another without seeking recourse to violence. The culture of violence that
Taliban had bred one hopes will slowly yield to a culture of tolerance. But much depends on
how Musharraf conducts himself in the transition to democracy, even with himself on the
saddle.
Notes and References
1. Hassan Mansoor, Karachi sees fresh sectarian violence, in the weekly The Friday
Times(Karachi), February 22-28, 2002. Mansoor quoting unofficial estimates says that figures
compiled by the Citizen-Police Liaison Committee (CPLC) show that at least 332 people 190
belonging to the Shiite sect and 142 Sunnis have been killed since 1994. The years 1994 and
1995 were the worst with 196 killings 98 each. 1996 was the best year and saw only one
killing. According to official sources, as many as 59 people fell victim to sectarian violence in
the city during 2001. This included 35 Shias, 20 Deobandis and 4 Brelvis. A total of 35 cases
were registered and the police arrested 22 accused. The number of doctors killed in sectarian
violence in the last decade stands at 77.
2. Reported in daily Dawn (Karachi), 27 February, 2002
3. Four sectarian belts account for practically all of the sectarian violence in Pakistan: Karachi
and Hyderabad in urban Sindh; Parachinar district in NWFP; Gilgit and Baltistan in the
northern areas; and the Multan-Jhang-Mianwali-Faisalabad belt in Punjab(According to India
Abroad, 23 Sept. 1994). Recent sources indicate that sectarian violence has escalated rapidly in
Bahawalnagar, Bahawalpur, Vehari and Khanewal districts of Punjab in recent years (The
Friday Times 21-27 Nov. 1996). In the wake of the rise of Taliban in the neighbourhood the
spate of violence spread to other regions as well.
4. htttp://www.irb.gc.ca/research/publications/pak17_e.stm
5. In fact, the first four leaders of the Muslim world did not call themselves Khalifa but the
usage came much later when the term was put to common use in the wake of the choice of
the term by Ottoman Emperors to set them apart from other rulers in the Islamic world.
6. See for details, Tahir Mahmood, Divisions in Islamic Society and the Indian Public Law,
http://www.milligazette.com/adbot.htm

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7. The Friday Times, 14-20 Aug. 1998

8. The Friday Times, 21-27 Nov. 1996
9. The News International, 4 March 1999
10. Dawn (Karachi), 3 April 1999
According to unofficial estimates there are around 50,000 madrassas much above the Official
estimate of 15,000. (Syed Talat Hussain in Dawn, 3 December 2001)
11. Syed Talat Hussain, Breeding Grounds of Terrorism in the daily Dawn (Karachi), 3
December 2001.

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