Recruitment and Mobilisation for the

Islamist Militant Movement in Europe

A study carried out by Kings College London for the European Commission
(Directorate General Justice, Freedom and Security).

Disclaimer This study does not necessarily reflect the opinions and
views of the European Commission nor is it bound by its conclusions.
Copyright clause Reproduction is authorised, except for commercial
purposes, provided the source is acknowledged and the following text
accompanies any reproduction: This study was carried out by Kings
College London for the European Commission (Directorate General
Justice, Freedom and Security). This study does not necessarily reflect
the opinions and views of the European Commission nor is it bound by
its conclusions.

This research was commissioned by the Directorate General for

Justice, Freedom and Security of the European Commission. We
gratefully acknowledge the encouragement and support
received from Commission officials, especially Andr Rizzo,
Hans-Christian Jasch and Angela Liberatore.

The project was carried out by the International Centre for the
Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) at Kings
College London with the help of the Centre dtudes et de
Recherches Internationales (Paris) and the Universidad Rey Juan
Carlos (Madrid).

The authors of this report are Peter R. Neumann and Brooke

Rogers. It draws on contributions from Rogelio Alonso (Spain)
and Luis Martinez (France).

The final version of this report was submitted in December

2007.

For questions and queries, please contact:

ICSR
Kings College London
138-142 Strand
London WC2R 1HH
United Kingdom
Phone:
Fax:
Email:

+44 207 848 2065

+44 207 848 2748
peter.neumann@kcl.ac.uk

Executive Summary
This report presents a comprehensive overview of the methods
through which Islamist militants in Europe mobilise their supporters
and find new recruits. It finds that Islamist militant recruitment efforts
have largely been driven underground, with little overt propagation
and recruitment now occurring at mosques. Prisons and other places
of vulnerability continue to be a great cause of concern. Rather than
radical imams, who have lost some influence, the report points out
that activists are now the engines of Islamist militant recruitment.
They often draw on recruits from so-called gateway organisations
which prepare individuals ideologically and socialise them into the
extremist milieu. It also shows how Islamist militants skilfully exploit
young Muslims identity conflicts between Western society and the
cultural Islam of their parents. Furthermore, the report highlights the
role of the Internet which has come to play an increasingly important
role in Islamist militant recruitment, either in support of real-world
recruitment or in entirely new forms of militant activism described as
virtual self-recruitment.
The reports finds there to be clear differences between countries in
Southern Europe, where Muslim immigration is recent, and those in
which the second and third generation of European Muslims is
reaching adolescence. In countries with no second or third generation
of European Muslims, language is less of an issue, nor is the conflict of
identity between Western society and traditional culture as pivotal.
Across all countries, however, the environment in which Islamist
militants seek support has changed. Especially after the attacks in
Madrid and London, open recruitment has become difficult. The
authorities and many Muslim communities have become more vigilant
and willing to confront extremism, yet there are no indications at all
that the pressure of radicalisation has ebbed away. Based on these
observations, the report argues that the trend towards seekers and
self-starter groups will continue. It also predicts that, given the
constraints now faced by Islamist militants in the open environment,
the significance of the Internet as a virtual recruitment place will
grow, with new forms of Islamist militant activism becoming more
important.
The report proposes a series of measures aimed at countering
recruitment. In the short term, governments need to prevent the
emergence of recruitment magnets which allow seekers and selfstarters to find links to the jihad and deepen their involvement in the
Islamist militant movement. Governments also need to pay urgent
attention to the situation in European prisons, which are likely to
become major hubs for radicalisation and recruitment. Intelligence and

law enforcement strategies have to be geared towards identifying the

activist leaders of cells. The report challenges governments to tackle
the problem posed by gateway organisations, and to be clear and
consistent in doing so. It also calls for more attention to be paid to
extremist activities on the Internet. In the longer term, mainstream
Muslim communities need to be re-vitalised and empowered. Law
enforcement agencies need to build and/or re-establish trust with
Muslim communities. It is also vital for schools to address the
narratives used by violent extremists as well as the ways in which they
are likely to be drawn into their circles. A similar effort is required on
the Internet. The report concludes by saying that even longer term
measures aimed at resolving the drivers of recruitment will not bear
fruit unless the causes of radicalisation are successfully addressed.

Contents
Figures
Case Studies
1
1.1
1.2
1.3

Introduction
Definitions
Social movement theory
Methodology

2
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4

The Islamist Militant Movement

Modelling Al Qaeda?
Cell structures in Europe
National differences
Trends and dynamics

3
3.1
3.2
3.3

Recruitment Grounds
Mosques
Prisons
Other locations

4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4

The Recruiters
The role of communities
Gateway organisations
Radical imams
Activists

5
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4

The Message
Cognitive openings
Group dynamics
Frame alignment
Justifying violence

6
6.1
6.2

The Internet
Internet-supported recruitment
Virtual self-recruitment

Summary and Recommendations

Interviewees
Bibliography

Figures
Chapter 2
Figure 1: Typology of Islamist militant cells in Europe
Chapter 3
Figure 2: Typology of Recruitment Grounds
Chapter 4
Figure 3: Functions of recruitment agents
Chapter 5
Figure 4: The process of message dissemination

Case Studies
(Embedded in text)

Chapter 3
Mosques: Network of the 19th arrondissement (France)
Chapter 4
Radical imams: Abdul Jabbar van de Ven (Netherlands)
Activists: Karin Abdelselam Mohamed (Spain)
Chapter 5
Kinship connections: the Madrid network (Spain)
Chapter 6
Virtual self-recruitment: Younis Tsouli (UK)
Virtual self-recruitment: Irfan Raja (UK)

Introduction

This report deals with one of the least understood issues in the debate
about terrorism and counter-terrorism. In recent years, much attention
has focused on what people do once they have become members of a
terrorist group. Equally, experts have arrived at a better understanding
of the kinds of conditions and conflicts that prompt people to drift
into political extremism (that is, radicalisation). Yet there continues to
be little systematic insight into the mechanisms that connect the latter
with the former. With notable exceptions, which can be found in the
more general extremist/cult literature in social psychology, scholars
have had little to say about the mechanisms through which radicalised
individuals become members of a violent extremist group. There is no
fully developed theory of terrorist recruitment, nor have analysts
attempted to derive a full conceptual framework within which to
understand the issue.

This study seeks to address this omission by exploring the methods

through which violent radicals mobilise support for terrorism and, in
particular, the ways and means through which they find recruits.
Empirically, our study focuses on the situation in the European Union
(EU), and it concentrates on groups that could be described as
Islamist militant in approach and ideology, though conscious efforts
have been undertaken to situate the research within the broader
framework of what is known about recruitment into violent extremism
more generally as well as with reference to groups of different
ideological dispositions.

The objectives of this study are threefold. The first is to establish the
nature of the process through which individuals in Europe become
involved in Islamist militant groups and networks. The second is to
trace developments and trends that have impacted on the process of

recruitment. Finally, we aim to identify a series of recommendations

through which emerging trends can be countered and recruitment into
violent extremism curbed. As a result, we hope to provide the most
comprehensive and up to date overview of the dynamics and
structures that underlie recruitment into Islamist militancy in Europe.

The structure of this report follows the research questions and aims
set out above. Chapter 2 explains the changing structures of Islamist
militancy in Europe. In Chapter 3, we examine the question of where
recruitment into violent extremism takes place. Chapter 4 deals with
the agents that are significant in the recruitment process and shows
how they contribute to the process of joining up. Chapter 5 looks at
the nature of the message and the (social) process through which it is
disseminated. Chapter 6 highlights the role of the Internet and other
kinds of new media in facilitating the process of recruitment. In
Chapter 7, we summarise the findings of our study and develop a
series of recommendations that may help policymakers in developing
counter-strategies.

Before doing so, however, it is necessary to clarify the terminology as

well as explain the theory and methods that have been used in our
research.

1.1

Definitions

Some of the terms and expressions used in this report refer to

concepts that are widely contested. In order to avoid confusion and
misinterpretations as well as in order to make it possible for the
report to be read in a focused way it is essential to be clear about
how they have been understood by the authors of this report.

10

The key variable which this study hopes to investigate is recruitment.

A popular understanding would suggest that recruitment describes the
ways and methods through which organisations seek to gain members
or active supporters. In the context of this study, this would mean the
process

by

which

individuals

are

spotted

monitored

and

manipulated with the final purpose of having these people

participate in the jihad.1 However, while this may represent one way of
conceptualising recruitment into violent extremism, most analysts
would agree that it is too top-down to understand the phenomenon
in its full complexity. As Marc Sageman and others have argued, the
process of joining the jihad is more of a bottom-up than a top-down
activity, with individuals actively seeking out opportunities to be
recruited rather than being brainwashed or manipulated into joining
up.2 Without wanting to make prior assumptions about whether the
former or the latter is more accurate, we believe that the aims and
objectives of this study are most likely to be met by conceiving
recruitment in the broadest possible terms, that is, as the process
through which individuals join entities engaged in violent extremism.

Furthermore, for reasons of conceptual clarity, we believe it is

important to distinguish between recruitment and radicalisation.
Although

the

two

concepts

are

related,

they

denote

distinct

phenomena in that recruitment involves practical steps towards

[joining a violent group], whereas radicalisation describes the changes
in attitude that lead towards sanctioning and, ultimately, the
involvement in the use of violence for a political aim.3 Simply put,
recruitment is situated at the interface between radicalisation and the

This definition was adopted by the Dutch domestic intelligence service in its 2002
study of recruitment. See AIVD, Recruitment for the Jihad in the Netherlands (The
Hague: AIVD, 2002), p. 7.
2
See Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia, PA: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2004), p. 122
3
Michael Taarnby, Jihad in Denmark: An Overview and Analysis of Jihadi Activity in
Denmark, 1990-2006, Danish Institute of International Affairs Working Paper,
2006/35, p. 62.

11

pursuit of violence. It represents, in the words of Michael Taarnby, the

bridge between personal belief and violent activism.4

Another term frequently used in this study is extremism. Typically, this

expression refers to political ideologies that are opposed to a societys
core (constitutional) values and principles. In the European context,
this could be said to apply to ideologies that are supremacist in nature
and disregard basic principles of democracy and human dignity.5
However, the term has also been used to describe the methods
through which political actors attempt to realise their aims, that is, by
adopting means which show disregard for the life, liberty, and human
rights of others.6 Given this ambiguity, it makes sense to qualify the
concept by adding the adjective violent, that is, violent extremism.

Typically, the kind of violence encountered in this study is terrorist in

nature. To avoid the longstanding (and seemingly never-ending)
dispute about the definition of terrorism,7 we decided to follow the
technical definition adopted in the EUs Framework Decision on
Combating Terrorism8 as well as the United Nations (UN) High-Level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes which, in late 2004,
proposed to define terrorism as any action.. that is intended to cause
death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the
purpose of such act, by its nature and context, is to intimidate a

Michael Taarnby: Recruitment of islamist terrorists in Europe: Trends and

Perspectives, Research Report funded by the Danish Ministry of Justice, 14 January
2005, p. 6.
5
Fernando Reinares, quoted in David J. Kilcullen, Subversion and Countersubversion
in the Campaign against Terrorism in Europe, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,
30(8) (2007), p. 652.
6
Roger Scruton, The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Political Thought, 3rd ed.
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
7
See Alex Schmid, Terrorism The Definitional Problem, Case Western Reserve
Journal of International Law, 36(2) (2004).
8
European Union, Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 13 June
2002, EU Document 2002/475/JHA.

12

population,

or

to

compel

Government

or

an

international

organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.9

The actors which this study investigates are described as Islamist

militants. Based on a thorough evaluation of the literature,10 we believe
that Islamist militancy combines a strict, literalist practice of Islam
(often referred to as Salafi or Wahhabi)11 with a revolutionary political
ideology (Islamism), proclaiming a global community of believers (the
ummah) to be liberated and/or united under Islamic rule, and the
belief that the most effective way of accomplishing this aim is through
violence or armed struggle (often referred to as jihad).12 Followers of
this movement typically believe themselves to be engaged in a war
against a coalition of Christians and Jews (the so-called Crusader and
Zionist Alliance) as well as apostate Muslim rulers in which it is the
individual duty of every Muslim to defend the ummah.

1.2

Social movement theory

The study of terrorism brings together scholars from many different

disciplines. This allows for cross-fertilisation, but it also means that
the multitude of prisms through which to look at the phenomenon can
sometimes be confusing. Many studies of terrorism as well as much
of the popular discourse is based on what some experts call strain

Report of the Secretary-Generals High Level Panel, United Nations Document

A/59/565 (2004).
10
See, for example, John Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002); Gilles Kepel, Jihad: Expansion et Dclin de
lIslamisme (Paris: ditions Gallimard, 2000); Guido Steinberg, Der nahe und der
ferne Feind (Munich: CH Beck, 2005); Quintan Wiktorowicz, A Genealogy of Radical
Islam, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 28(2) (2005). .
11
Not all Salafis are militant Islamists. For distinctions amongst followers of the Salafi
movement, see Quintan Wiktorowicz, Anatomy of the Salafi Movement, Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism, 29(3) (2006), pp. 207-39.
12
This definition follows the typology put forward by David Kilcullen in Kilcullen,
Subversion, p. 653. We are conscious that the concept of jihad has a variety of
meanings in Islamic theology, but Islamist militants use it almost exclusively in the
context of armed struggle. See Esposito, Unholy War, pp. 26-8.

13

theory, that is, the idea that terrorist mobilisation is a response to the
amount of strains and stresses encountered by a particular society: the
more people feel frustrated and alienated, the more likely they are to
join groups that resist the perceived sources of their frustration. As a
result, many authors have focused on the so-called roots and causes
of terrorism, hoping that it will be possible to formulate effective
counter-terrorism policies based on a correct appreciation of the
sources of peoples grievances. Arguments range from the role of
poverty, political leaning, perceptions of grievance and threat, to a
search for identity, personality factors and religion, without one single
factor providing a fully satisfactory answer to the question of why
terrorism occurs.13

One of the main criticisms of this approach is that, while grievances

are widespread, terrorism is not. On the contrary, some of the most
repressive as well as economically deprived societies have experienced
little political violence, whereas many prosperous and stable countries
have been the targets of many terrorist campaigns. Likewise, some of
the conditions which have been identified by strain theorists as the
principal causes of contemporary Islamist militancy in the Arab world
the rise of modernity, the aggressive imposition of Western culture,
the lack of democracy and access, as well as the gap between rich and
poor are uniform across the countries of the Middle East, yet some
have seen significantly higher levels of terrorism and political upheaval
than others.14 Even some of the strain theorists concede that while
alienation and frustration may be useful indicators for radicalisation
and revolutionary potential they are rarely sufficient in explaining
why political violence actually occurs.15

13

See Tore Bjorgo (ed.), Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities, and Ways
Forward (New York and London: Routledge, 2005). Also Louise Richardson, What
Terrorists Want: Understanding the Terrorist Threat (London: John Murray, 2006).
14
Roel Meijer, Taking the Islamist Movement Seriously: Social Movement Theory and
the Islamist Movement, IRSH, 50 (2005), p. 280.
15
See Louise Richardson, Introduction in Louise Richardson (ed.), The Roots of
Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 2.

14

The difference between revolutionary potential and actual revolution

lies in the extent to which social movements succeed in mobilising
peoples grievances and alienation and channel them into concrete
action. Though scholars in this particular field of sociology16 have,
until recently, paid little attention to terrorist groups,17 we believe that
social movement theory provides a uniquely relevant perspective
through which to understand the process of mobilisation of which
recruitment forms a vital part. In particular, there are three insights
and/or emphases drawn from social movement theory that have
provided useful lines of inquiry which have informed, guided and
structured our research.

First, social movement theory postulates that movements act (more or

less) rationally in mobilising their resources. Depending on what they
believe suits their purposes, they will attempt to take advantage of
formal structures as well as informal networks and use all the
communication channels open to them, yet they will also adapt and
respond to constraints and externally imposed limitations.18 We believe
that this way of looking at resource mobilisation offers a useful prism
through which to interpret changes in the Islamist militant recruitment
environment. In particular, it suggests that the choice of locations and
media through which to approach potential recruits is likely to be
determined by a cost/benefit analysis, weighing the benefits in terms
of mobilisation against the potential drawbacks, such as attention by
law enforcement and opposition from community leaders opposed to
violent extremism.

16

For an overview of the literature, see Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement, 2nd ed.
(Cambridge: CUP, 1998); Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics
of Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
17
A notable exception is Donatella della Porta. See Donatella della Porta, Social
Movements, Political Violence and the State: A Comparative Analyis of Italy and
Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
18
Meijer, Taking the Islamist Movement, p. 280.

15

Second, social movement theorists pay much attention to the process

through which messages (or frames) are conveyed to potential
supporters: while the content of such messages matters, it is equally
important, for example, to look at how frames are sequenced and
whether the frame articulator is credible.19 The aim of this process is
to achieve frame alignment, that is, the convergence between the
movements narrative and the views of their recruits. In our case, this
requires examination of what violent extremists are saying but also
how and when they are saying it. We will need to focus on what kinds
of messages are conveyed at which stage of the recruitment process
and what role is played by different types of frame articulator, such
as charismatic leaders and hate preachers.

Third, social movement theory argues that informal ties and social
networks play a vitally important part in the process of mobilisation.
For instance, Quintan Wiktorowicz maintains that frame alignment is
rarely sufficient in persuading people to engage in risky behaviour
(such as violence or crime), and that involvement in acts of violence
tends to be preceded by a process of socialisation which alters
perceptions of self-interest and increases the value of group loyalties
and personal ties.20 The value of these dynamics to the study of
terrorism was highlighted by Donatella della Porta in her research on
left-wing groups in Italy and Germany,21 and it heavily influenced the
work of Sageman, who applied della Portas findings to the Islamist
militant movement.22 Social networks are likely, therefore, to be
relevant to our study, and in addition to resource mobilisation and
the framing process they will constitute a third line of inquiry that
19

See Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social
Movements: An Overview and Assessment, Annual Review of Sociology, 2 (2000), pp.
611-39. Also Quintan Wiktorowicz, Joining the Cause: Al Muhajiroun and Radical
Islam, pp. 8-10; available at http://www.yaleuniversity.com/polisci/info/conferences/Islamic%20Radicalism/papers/wiktorowiczpaper.pdf
20
Ibid.
21
Della Porta, Social Movements, Chapter 6.
22
Sageman, Understanding Terrorist Networks, Chapter 5.

16

will be kept in mind when looking at the process through which violent
extremists maintain support and find new recruits.

1.3

Methodology

Having outlined key concepts as well as the theoretical foundations of

this study, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the methods
and approaches that were used in the course of the research. The
research which forms the basis of this report was carried out over a
period of ten months, from December 2006 to November 2007. Its
approach is qualitative, with evidence based on a combination of
secondary and primary sources.

We began our research by conducting an extensive review of the

existing literature related to recruitment, radicalisation, and violent
extremism. Reflecting the composition of the research team, our
approach was inter-disciplinary, drawing on monographs, edited
volumes and recent journal articles in the disciplines of sociology,
social psychology, history, anthropology, political science as well as
the much narrower field of terrorism studies.

Empirical evidence was gleaned from a systematic reading of

published policy reports by governments and independent researchers
as well as other publicly available materials, such as relevant articles
which have appeared in newspapers and magazines. In addition, we
have carried out extensive fieldwork, including nearly forty semistructured interviews with individuals residing in three EU counties
(France, Spain, and the United Kingdom). Interviewees were selected
from

three

categories.

We

interviewed

law

enforcement

and

intelligence officials dealing with recruitment and radicalisation;

community leaders, such as youth workers and imams, from areas in
which recruitment has taken place; and radicals as well as former

17

radicals who were members or close to groups or networks that

approved of and/or facilitated violent extremism.

This multi-tiered approach made it possible for us to gain first-hand

insights from a variety of different perspectives, depending on
interviewees relative proximity to the recruitment process. Needless
to say, the interviews do not constitute a representative sample, but
they have proved useful in complementing as well as substantiating
some of the findings that were gleaned from other sources. In
particular, they have allowed us to update the observations made in
the academic literature, which often tends to lag several years behind.
Furthermore, it needs to be stressed that all interviews were conducted
in accordance with the three participating institutions respective
codes on ethical conduct governing research involving human beings.

Though this report claims to provide an overview of the situation in

Europe, it is not a country by country account. Given available time
and resources, this would not have been feasible, nor would the
production of a European handbook on recruitment be particularly
insightful. Our desk-based research took into account relevant reports
and publications from all over Europe, yet most of the empirical
evidence including all the fieldwork relates to developments in
France, the United Kingdom and Spain. Though precise figures are
hard to come by (many EU member states do not hold records on
their residents religious affiliation), the three countries are estimated
to comprise about half of the Muslim population in the EU,23 and they
have all seen significant levels of Islamist militant activities in recent
years. Looking at a variety of different countries has made it possible
to determine similarities and differences in patterns, structures and
23

See, for example, Jocelyne Cesari, When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in
Europe and the United States (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), pp. 183-4. Also Ceri
Peach, Muslim Population of Europe: A Brief Overview of Demographic Trends and
Socioeconomic Integration in Center for Strategic and International Studies, Muslim
Integration: Challenging Conventional Wisdom in Europe and the United States
(Washington, DC: CSIS, 2007), p. 9.

18

processes. At the same time, limiting the fieldwork sample to just

three countries allowed us to concentrate on identifying the key
analytical variables that is, the dynamics and processes involved in
recruitment rather than getting bogged down in sterile fact-finding
exercises, producing information that is likely to be out of date by the
time this report will be publicly available. Needless to say, where
conditions are believed to differ significantly from the rest of Europe,
this will be pointed out.

19

The Islamist Militant Movement

Having

established that

social

movement

theory is

the

most

appropriate framework through which to look at the question of

recruitment (see 1.2), we need to better understand the nature of the
movement and the context in which this theory will be applied. This
chapter will identify the core structures of which the Islamist
movement is composed as well as the dynamics that are likely to
impact on the ways in which individuals join. First, we will try to make
sense of the multi-faceted nature of the Islamist movement. Based on
this evaluation, we will then develop a typology of Islamist militant cell
structures in Europe. This will be followed by a section that highlights
the differences between European countries and how they are likely to
impact recruitment. Based on our assessment and drawing on the
secondary literature in the field we will then distil a number of key
trends and dynamics, concluding that the process of joining Islamist
militancy in Europe has become more diffuse, with more flexible
recruitment

patterns

and

less

direction

from

the

movements

leadership.

2.1

Modelling Al Qaeda?

Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, numerous attempts

have been made to explain what the Islamist militant movement
often popularly (and sometimes misleadingly) referred to as Al Qaeda
constitutes. In the period immediately following the 9/11 attacks, Al
Qaeda was portrayed as a hierarchical organisation with a clear chain
of command and control. Al Qaeda, it was argued, resembled a spider
web, with Osama Bin Laden at the centre and sleeper cells around the

20

world, ready to strike at Western targets at any moment.24 Quickly, this

idea gave way to the notion of Al Qaeda as a franchise operation.
According to Olivier Roy and Peter Bergen, for example, rather than
planning particular operations, the leadership merely sponsored acts
of terrorism, subcontracting them to local groups who were given
permission to take action on behalf of the wider movement.25 Yet
others believed it was wrong to understand Al Qaeda as a coherent
organisation at all. Rather, it represented an ideology which could be
claimed by anyone who identified with certain beliefs. In this view, the
movement

operated

according to the

principles of leaderless

resistance in which the leadership provided incitement and (religious)

justification but left it to their supporters initiative to act on them.26 At
best, therefore, Al Qaeda represented an amorphous movement held
together by a loosely networked transnational constituency.27

The three images described above are often portrayed as competing

visions. In reality, they all represent accurate understandings of the
contemporary Islamist militant movement. In one of the best
appreciations of Al Qaeda, Jason Burke argued that the Islamist
militant movement operated at three levels: the hard core, consisting
of Bin Laden, his deputy Ayman Al Zawahiri and their lieutenants; the
network, made up of mujahideen who took part in jihad or spent
longer periods in training camps abroad, have returned to their home
countries and are now involved in local groups; and the wider
movement of all those who identify with Al Qaeda ideology and are

24

See Paul L. Williams, Al Qaeda: Brotherhood of Terror (New York: Alpha, 2002),
Chapters 7 and 8; also Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda (London: Hurst, 2002),
Chapter 2.
25
See Olivier Roy, Netzwerk des Terrors Markenzeichen al-Qaida, Le Monde
Diplomatique (German edition), 10 September 2004; Peter Bergen, Holy War Inc.:
Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden (London: Phoenix, 2001), Chapter 10.
26
See Jessica Stern, The Protean Enemy, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2003.
Ironically, the idea of leaderless resistance was formulated by American right-wing
extremists. See Louis Beam, Leaderless Resistance, The Seditionist, February 1992;
available at http://reactor-core.org/leaderless-resistance.html.
27
Bruce Hoffman, The changing face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism,
Studies in Conflict and Terorism, 27(3) (2004).

21

prepared to act out the hard cores ideas while having no direct
association with its members and only loose connections to the
network.28 Burke emphasises that, throughout the history of the
movement, the relationship between the three levels has never been
static. Indeed, he argues that it is the interplay between the different
levels that explains the changing dynamics of the movement.29

Burkes observations are reflected in the writings of some of the

movements most important strategists. Abu Musab al Suri, one of Al
Qaedas leading military thinkers, anticipated the diffusion of the
movement that took place in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan,
and argued that this development was highly desirable. In his view,
direct relationships between the hard core and operative units had to
be discouraged, with the only link between the core and its tentacles
being a common aim, a common doctrinal program and a selfeducational program.30 Moreover, he believed that the movements
global campaign had to assume a variety of different forms, ranging
from large-scale insurgencies (open fronts) to local or regional
campaigns (tanzims) and small cells engaging in sporadic acts of
terrorism (the jihad of individualised terrorism). Like Burke, Al Suri
argued that Al Qaeda was a system, not an organisation.31

2.2

Cell structures in Europe

There can be no doubt that compared to old terrorist groups such

as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) or Basque Homeland and Liberty
28

See Jason Burke, Al Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam (London: IB Tauris,
2003). A nearly identical typology is put forward in the French governments recent
White Paper on terrorism. See Premier minister de la Rpublique Franaise, La France
face au terrorisme: Livre blanc du Governement sur la scurit intrieure face au
terrorisme (Paris: La documentation Franaise, 2006), p. 26.
29
Ibid.
30
Brynjar Lia, The al-Qaida Strategist Abu Musab al-Suri: A Profile, OMS-Seminar
Presentation, Oslo, 15 March 2006, p. 17; available at
http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00076/_The_Al-Qaida_strate_76568a.pdf.
31
Ibid.

22

(ETA) the multi-faceted nature of Islamist militancy makes it difficult

to understand how the movement ticks. This is particularly true when
trying to make sense of the Islamist militant movement in Europe. On
the one hand, there are some who believe that Islamist militants in
Europe continue to be organised in structured cells, which receive
training and other resources from the Al Qaeda hard core and rely on
its leadership for strategic direction.32 Others, however, contend that
the Islamist militancy in Europe has mutated into an autonomous
phenomenon consisting of groups of alienated, home-grown Muslims
often described as self-starters33 who have adopted the language
of Al Qaeda but act on their own accord. In this view, contemporary
Islamist militancy in Europe is an extreme, violent form of popular
culture, which will never be eradicated as long as government continue
to focus on eliminating the leadership of the movement.34 In fact,
according to some observers, it is the absence of a clear leadership
which makes the Islamist militant movement in Europe distinctive.35

As with the debate about Al Qaeda, the different ideas about the
nature of the Islamist militant movement in Europe are not mutually
exclusive. On the contrary, the two models can be said to represent
ideal types which are located at opposite ends of a scale. On this
hypothetical scale, the degree to which cells rely on direction and
resources from the hard core (autonomy) and the way in which they
were recruited (selection) determine their location between the two
poles. Drawing on these distinctions, we believe that there are at least
three types of cell which can be found in Europe (see Figure 1):

32

See, for example, Robert S. Leiken, Europes Angry Muslims, Foreign Affairs,
July/August 2005.
33
The term was coined by Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon. See Dan Benjamin and
Steven Simon, The Next Attack (New York: Henry Holt, 2005), pp. 27-31.
34
Aidan Kirby, The London Bombers as Self-Starters: A Case Study in Indigenous
Radicalization and the Emergence of Autonomous Cliques, Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism, 30 (5) (2007), pp. 415-28.
35
The evolution of leadership in Europes Global Jihad Networks, Exclusive Analysis
Report, 21 September 2007.

23

The first is the chain of command cell. This type of cell is

recruited top down with the aim of carrying out operations on
behalf of the central leadership. The recruitment process is led
and/or directed by a member or senior associate of the hard
core who identifies and approaches individuals (or groups of
individuals) whose dedication, skills and general profile match
the requirements. The cell is fully resourced by the organisation,
with funding and equipment supplied by other parts of the
network. Where feasible, members of the cell are sent to training
camps abroad. The nature of their mission and the decision to
activate the cell is determined by the movements leadership
rather than by the recruits themselves.

The second type can be described as guided cell. Guided cells

are largely self-recruited, often emanating from what Sageman
described as cliques.36 Through members associations or
active seeking out, the cell manages to establish a link to the
jihad, that is, a relationship to a member and/or associate of
the Al Qaeda network, who facilitates its integration into the
movement. Though it remains largely self-sufficient, having
found a link to the jihad allows the unit to access some
resources, such as financial support, expertise, etc. Also, as a
conscious part of the movement, the cell will attempt to operate
within the strategic parameters set out by the hard core. In
other words, while the initiative for terrorist operations lies with
the group, members will try to seek guidance from the network
and, where possible, submit their plans for approval.

The third type are genuine self-starters. Frequently compared to

youth and street gangs,37 they are entirely self-recruited and

36

See Sageman, Understanding Terror, Chapter 4.

See, for example, Lorenzo Vidino, The Hofstad Group: The New Face of Terrorist
Networks in Europe, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 30 (7) (2007), pp. 579-92.
37

24

maintain no formal link to the Al Qaeda network. Some members

may have limited connections, but there is no access to the
resources of the wider movement, so that the group remains
entirely self-reliant in terms of funding, training and planning.
Members may be inspired by statements of Al Qaeda leaders
such as Bin Laden, but they define their agenda and the nature
and scope of their operations independently. The hard core will
have no knowledge about the timing and targets of operations,
nor indeed is it likely to know about the cells existence.

The so-called Hamburg cell, which led the 9/11 attacks in the United
States, clearly fits the description of the chain of command cell,38
whereas the recent attacks in London and Glasgow appear to have
been carried out by genuine self-starters with very limited links to the
wider network.39 Nevertheless, even with this more sophisticated
typology, it will sometimes be difficult to place a particular cell into
one category or another, largely because even in well-documented
cases the extent and significance of links to the jihad remains
unclear.40 Initially, cells often appear to be genuine self-starters or
amateurs. With further investigation, however, it frequently turns out
that members had links into the network. The nature of the cells
which carried out the 2004 attacks in Madrid, for example, continues
to be disputed.41 Likewise, while the so-called Hofstad Group in the

Also Yassin Musharbash, Die neue Al-Qaida (Cologne: Kiepenheuer und Witsch,
2006), pp. 245-51.
38
See Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United
States; available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.
39
See Shiraz Maher, Glasgow bombs: the doctor I new, New Statesman, 5 July 2007.
Recently, however, there was some speculation that some of the attackers were
linked to Al Qaeda in Iraq. See Raymond Bonner, Jane Perlez and Eric Schmitt, British
Inquiry of Failed Plots Points to Iraqs Qaeda Group, New York Times, 14 December
2007.
40
For examples, see Petter Nesser, Jihad in Europe: Recruitment for terrorist cells in
Europe, OMS-Seminar Presentation, Oslo, 15 March 2006, p. 17; available at
http://www.mil.no/felles/ffi/start/FFIprosjekter/Alfover/_TERRA/Publikasjoner/Speeches/.
41
See Javier Jordan, Mapping Jihadist Terrorism in Spain, Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism, 28 (2005), pp. 169-91; and Lorenzo Vidino, Al Qaeda in Europe (Amherst,
NY: Prometheus, 2006), Chapter 11.

25

Netherlands (one of whose members killed the filmmaker Theo van

Gogh) is described by some as a nihilistic street gang with no structure
and no formalised recruitment,42 whereas others are certain it was a
highly networked, ideologically conscious group with extensive
international links.43

Figure 1: Cell Typology

Chain of command
Guided
Self-starter

Autonomy
Directed
Takes initiative, but
seeks approval
Autonomous

Selection
Top-down
Self-recruited, but
link to jihad
Self-selected

Notwithstanding such debates, there is broad agreement amongst

experts that self-starter groups are less likely to pose a strategic threat
to the government or society against which their operations are
directed. Because they are lacking access to the resources and
strategic leadership of a network, their operations will have less
impact, if they do not fail altogether. According to Sageman, for
instance, it is inconceivable for a self-starter group to carry out a
highly complex operation like the September 11 attacks against the
United States.44 At the same time, most analysts agree that self-starter
groups are more difficult to detect and control than guided or chain
of command cells. Having no links to the wider network and no known
associations with terrorist suspects, the chances that they have come
to the attention of the authorities is low. Also, with no clear input from
the central leadership, their operations are less easy to predict and
protect against.45
42

See Vidino, The Hofstad Group.

Petter Nesser, Jihadism in Western Europe after the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing
Motivational Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe,
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 29(4) (2006), p. 336.
44
Sageman, Understanding Terror, p. 160.
45
Spanish official 1, interviewed September 2007.
43

26

2.3

National differences

While the typology presented in the previous section helps to

conceptualise the structures of Islamist militancy in Europe, it is not
meant to suggest that the structures and dynamics of Islamist
militancy are identical across the continent. On the contrary, though
the networks of Islamist militants often cross boundaries, there are
some important distinctions which result from the diverse nature of
European Muslim communities. Indeed, as we will show throughout
this report, these differences are highly significant when it comes to
the question of how individuals are recruited from local European
Muslim populations.

When dissecting the nature and the dynamics of European Muslim

communities, two significant variables emerge. The first is the region
from which the majority of the Muslim population in a country
emigrated. While most Turks settled in Germany, the majority of North
Africans went to southern European countries (initially France, more
recently also Spain and Italy). Most South Asians moved to Britain.46
The consequences of these different patterns of migration are
manifold. They mean, for example, that the Muslim population in
countries like France, Italy and Spain can access Arabic language
writings and media, whereas their co-religionists in Germany and
Britain cannot. They also imply that the spill-over from conflicts
outside of Europe Algeria, Kashmir, etc. has affected European
countries unevenly. In addition, and more generally, they have resulted
in local Muslim populations with vastly different attitudes on a whole

46

The Netherlands are unique in being the recipient of immigrants from all three
regions. Scandinavian countries have seen significant immigration from Arab
countries. For a full breakdown, see Peach, Muslim population of Europe, p. 12.

27

range of issues, such as the right to conversion, conflicts between

religious and secular law, etc.47

The second variable is the history of immigration. In many European

countries Germany, France and the UK, for example the largest
wave of Muslim immigration occurred during the post-war economic
boom, with the first generation settling in Europe in the 1950s and
1960s (and their families following them in the 1970s). In others
especially Spain and Italy a significant Muslim population only
emerged in the 1990s.48 As a result, the emotional and political centre
of gravity for many Muslims in countries like Spain and Italy still lies
across the Mediterranean. In contrast, many young second or third
generation European Muslims in, say, France and the UK are said to
experience a conflict of identity: born and raised in Europe, they no
longer identify with the country and/or culture in which their parents
or grandparents were brought up, yet they also feel excluded from
Western society, which still perceives them as foreigners. For them, the
idea of becoming citizens of the ummah a virtual Islamic nation
removed from territory and national culture may be more attractive
than for first generation immigrants.49

These differences between European Muslim populations are reflected

in the kinds of Islamist militant structures which have emerged in
European countries. In France, for example, the origins of the Islamist
militant movement can be traced back to the Algerian civil war in the
1990s, when the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) first used France for
logistical support and then declared the country a legitimate target.
The structures set up during this period served as the basis for the
47

Jytte Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 157, 192, 220.
48
See Jorgen Nielsen, Muslims in Western Europe, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 2004).
49
See Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2004), pp. 117-47. Also Jessica Stern, Culture in Club de
Madrid, Addressing the Root Causes of Terrorism (Madrid: Club de Madrid, 2005),
pp. 35-6.

28

extensive network established by the Salafist Group for Preaching and

Combat (GSPC), which split from the GIA and subsequently sought
closer links to Al Qaeda.50 The GSPCs recent identification with Al
Qaeda made it possible for existing GSPC structures to be used for
channelling recruits to Chechnya and Iraq. The groups adoption of a
global agenda has also attracted more young, second or third
generation French Muslims, who are complementing older veterans
(now in their late 30s or early 40s) in guided cells.51

Britain, for some time, served as a refuge for Islamist militants from
across the world, including associates of the GIA. Even so, earlier than
in France, much of the discourse was directed at mobilising second
and third generation Muslims. Furthermore, the mostly South Asian
background of the British Muslim community meant that the so-called
Pakistan connection the existence of militant training camps in
Pakistan and (pre-2001) Afghanistan has been instrumental in driving
the emergence of Islamist militant structures, and has on numerous
occasions provided self-starters with links to the jihad. In turn, the
linkage to Iraq is less significant than in the case of France. While there
can be no doubt that the issue radicalised many British Muslims, very
few managed to reach the country, because facilities and training
camps for non-Arabic speakers in Iraq are limited.52

The structures in Spain appear to be the most confusing. Originally

held together by a small group of Syrians with direct links to the Al
Qaeda leadership, the recent influx of Muslims from the Maghreb,
especially Morocco, meant that the Islamist militant movement in
50

In 2006, it merged with Al Qaeda and now calls itself Al Qaeda in the Maghreb. See
Kathryn Haahr, GSPC Joins al-Qaeda and France Becomes Top Enemy, Jamestown
Terrorism Focus, 26 September 2006. For the significance of the GSPC network, see
Largumentaire islamiste contre la France, Le Monde, 23 December 2005; also Lutte
antiterroriste: le projet de loi est-il adapt la menace?, Le Monde, 26 October
2005.
51
Annouar Boukhars, Islam, Jihadism and Depolitization in the French Banlieues,
Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, 21 September 2006.
52
Shiv Malik, interviewed July 2007.

29

Spain has come to be dominated by individuals associated with the

Algerian GSPC and, increasingly, the Moroccan Islamic Combatant
Group (GICM). While there is no second or even third generation of
Spanish Muslims to appeal to, the adoption of a global agenda by
Maghrebian groups led to the structures becoming more mixed. Most
Islamist militant cells in Spain tended to be ethnically homogenous
with a clear focus on and firm linkages to the struggle in
members country of origin, yet this is no longer the case. In recent
years, Spanish cells have played a significant role in facilitating the
supply of recruits to Iraq, and they are now closely integrated into the
continental networks which span much of continental Europe.53

2.4

Trends and dynamics

It has become a clich to describe the Islamist militant movement as

flexible, highly adaptive and constantly changing. Rarely, however,
are these statements corroborated with evidence that would make
sense of the extent, direction and drivers which underlie such
developments. Amongst all the authors cited in this chapter, the
notion that in the course of the past years there has been an
increase in self-starter groups whilst chain of command cells have
become the exception is widespread. Increasingly, therefore, Islamist
militancy in Europe is believed to consist of self-selected, multi-ethnic
local networks that have little or no connection to the Al Qaeda hard
core. Recruits are also said to be younger, with converts playing an
increasingly important role.54
53

Fernando Reinares, What Threat Does Jihadist Terrorism Currently Pose to Spain?,
Anlisis del Real Instituto, 2 April 2007; available at
http://www.realintitutoelcano.org/analisis/imprimir/1117imp.asp; also Javier Jordn
and Robert Wesley, After 3/11: The Evolution of Jihadist Networks in Spain,
Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, 12 January 2006.
54
See Petter Nesser, Local Networks and Recruitment for the Jihad, paper delivered
at the conference on Best Practices in European Counter Terrorism, Swedish
National Defence College Stockholm, 1 November 2006; available at
http://www.mil.no/felles/ffi/start/FFI-

30

If the analysts are correct, what would explain the trend away from
chain of command cells? Drawing on the literature as well as the
theoretical framework developed in the previous chapter, it becomes
possible to make two observations, which may turn out to be essential
in understanding the driving forces underlying the evolution of
Islamist militant mobilisation and recruitment in Europe.

First, since 2001, Al Qaeda has been confronted with a more hostile
environment in which the creation of chain of command cells has
become costly, if not entirely impossible. Internationally, the invasion
of Afghanistan has eliminated the safe haven from which the
organisation could direct the global movement. Whilst some of these
structures may now have resurfaced in the tribal areas of Pakistan,55
the hard core remains isolated and continues to find it hard to
provide strategic and operational leadership. At the domestic level,
more attention has been paid to Islamist militant activities by law
enforcement and intelligence agencies. As a result, efforts to conduct
top-down recruitment by known members of the pre-2001 Al Qaeda
network have been prevented, and overt places of congregation for
extremists have been closed down or cleaned up.

Second, over the same period, moves towards more self-reliance and
self-recruitment have been encouraged by necessity and opportunity.
On the one hand, the demand to engage in Islamist militancy has risen
significantly, with many European countries reporting a steep rise in
the number of individuals who are considered to be potentially violent

prosjekter/Alfover/_TERRA/Publikasjoner/Speeches/. Some analysts, however,

maintain that there were attempts to revive a more systematic and strategic
approach in the aftermath of the Iraq war. See Leiken, Europes Angry Mulims.
55
Senior member of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), private conversation in
October 2006. Also Mark Mazzetti and David Rhode, Signs of Qaeda resurgence,
New York Times, 19 February 2007.

31

extremists.56 If we assume the number of links to the jihad to have

remained constant, existing structures would have been overwhelmed
by the rise in demand, so that many aspiring militants had no choice
but to become self-starters. Furthermore, new technologies, such as
the Internet, have made it more convenient as well as less risky for
potential recruits to find like-minded individuals, pursue frame
alignment and maintain social networks within the Islamist militant
milieu.

In principle, therefore, there seem to be powerful reasons to assume

that the drivers behind Islamist militant mobilisation and recruitment
in Europe have changed significantly in the period since 2001. Based
on our evaluation, it is reasonable to suspect that the process of
joining the movement has become more diffuse, with less direction
from

abroad,

more

flexible

recruitment

practices

and

varying

organisational forms and patterns. Indeed, it is this process of

diffusion and its consequences which the following chapters aim to
substantiate.

56

See Peter R. Neumann, Europes Jihadist Dilemma, Survival, 48(2) (2006), pp. 7184. In Britain, for example, the number of potentially violent Islamist militants is said
to have trebled in the years between 2003 and 2006. See The International Terrorist
Threat to the UK, speech given by Dame Eliza Manningham Buller at Queen Marys
College, London, 9 November 2006; available at
https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page374.html. Similar developments are described
in the French governments recent White Paper on terrorism. See Premier Minister, La
Franche face au terrorisme.

32

Recruitment Grounds

The first question we hope to answer is whether there are any places
or locations in which recruitment is more likely to take place than in
others. Media reports often create the impression that there are
specific recruitment grounds in which spotters lurk for their victims,
and that such places simply need to be closed down or cleaned up in
order to eliminate the threat from violent extremism. This may, to
some extent, be true for recruitment magnets, such as radical
mosques, which attract seekers from a wider geographical areas.
Generally, though, the reality is more complex. Our research suggests
that there are two kinds of physical environment in which recruitment
into Islamist militancy takes place. The first are places where Muslims
meet and congregate, most prominently of course mosques which will
be explored in the first section of this chapter. The second are
locations in which individuals are likely to be vulnerable and may thus
be receptive to the appeal of violent extremists. The prime example of
this second type of place are prisons, which will be examined in the
second section. Other locations that have been found to play a role in
recruitment tend to fall into the first or the second category. Indeed,
as the third section will demonstrate, the nature of the place is often
secondary to the personal relationship that is being formed.

3.1

Mosques

Unlike most Christian churches, mosques play an integral part in the

day to day lives of Muslim communities. They are not just centres for
worship and spiritual enrichment, but they host educational activities,
perform welfare functions and serve as a gathering place for different
generations. Though supervised by a committee and managed by an

33

imam (who is usually the committees employee), many mosques are

open to different groups and associations who may use the facilities as
a venue for their own events and activities. Given the centrality of the
mosque in Muslim community life, it is logical that violent extremists
have tried to exploit mosques as a place in which to find support and
recruit followers. Simply put, there is no better and no more obvious
place in which to meet large numbers of devout Muslims, who could
be open to the religiously framed political message which Islamist
militants hope to convey.

Until recently, the objective of Islamist militants was to control certain

mosques and turn them into hubs of extremist activity. In its 2002
study, the Dutch domestic intelligence service asserted that extremists
were trying to take over mosques as safe havens from which to
arrange logistics and raise funds for active mujahideen, but also in
order to attract potential recruits, monitor [them] closely in the early
stages and offer facilities to support the process of integrating new
recruits into the structures of the Islamist militant movement.57 As is
well-known, some of these attempts were successful, and places like
Al Quds in Hamburg, the Islamic Cultural Centre in Milan, Finsbury
Park Mosque in London and others became bywords for the
propagation of violent extremism. These mosques turned into
magnets for radicalised individuals, who would actively seek out these
places in order to meet like-minded individuals or get involved in
violent extremism. In other words, the radical mosques facilitated a
process of self-recruitment whereby individuals who had already
decided to join up knew where to go.58

57

AIVD, Recruitment for the Jihad, p. 13.

During Abu Hamzas reign, for example, Finsbury Park mosque attracted an
audience of hundreds of Muslims from all over the United Kingdom, with many keen
to sign up to violent jihad as soon as they had found their way to the building. Sean
ONeill and Daniel McGrory, The Suicide Factory: Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park
Mosque (London: Harper, 2006), pp. 115-16.
58

34

Where taking over mosques proved difficult, violent extremists

undertook systematic attempts at infiltrating them. The tactics that
were used varied according to circumstances. At times, they would
present themselves as distinguished scholars of Islam and offer to lead
prayer. On other occasions, they set up study groups in which they
could propagate their message, hiding their motives and identities
until personal relationships amongst members had been cemented.59
Where none of this was possible, they would simply sit in the corner,
wait for the prayer to end, and then approach individuals, or engage
in conversation with groups of individuals who had attracted their
attention.60 Much of this activity was obvious to the rest of the
congregation. As one of our interviewees, a Muslim community worker
from East London, explained:

Occasionally, they would get into an argument with you, or you

could overhear them talking. We knew who they were. People
whod fallen for their message could be recognised. They were
moving away from the mainstream. They no longer attended
study circles. And when they did, they started asking questions
that were provocative. They became argumentative.61
Frequently, long-standing battles over the control of mosques ensued.
In some cases, the mosque committee took a robust stance, expelling
those who were considered radicals. Often, however, this merely
prompted the extremists to shift their activities from inside the
mosque to the outside, with radicals distributing leaflets after
prayers.62

In addition to systematic recruitment efforts, there have been many

instances where mosques simply provided the setting for the
formation of cliques, which would then (collectively) embark on a
path into violent extremism. As one of the radicals whom we
59
60
61
62

Wiktorowicz, Joining the Cause, p. 8.

British community leader 1, interviewed August 2007.
British community leader 2, interviewed July 2007.
Ibid; confirmed by British radical 6, interviewed November 2007.

35

interviewed reminded us, mosques are the natural place for Muslims to
meet in order to debate fundamental questions about religion and
society:

The community cannot be dissociated from the mosque as it is

the geometrical centre of our lives Within our mosque, we
dont talk about political affairs as such But the political and
the religious are inseparable in Islam. So, whilst we dont talk
about politics, the imam asks us in his sermons and appeals to
take a stand against the political aggressions and the calling
into question of Muslims in general and Islam in particular.63
A former French radical expressed similar views:

How can one be a good Muslim? Must one go to Iraq to defend

ones religious brothers? Must they be avenged there? Or
wouldnt it be better to spread the true Islam among our lost
brothers influenced by the media which broadcast a false image
of Islam? The mosque is the cohabitation of a series of
questions.64
For a former British radical, the mosque was the natural place at which
to seek clarification about the confusion caused by the events of 11
September 2001:

When 9/11 happened, I had already started going to the mosque

more regularly. I was rediscovering my faith. I remember
thinking: This changes everything. But I admit, I was confused
about it. I didnt know what Islam made of it. Nobody was
offering me direction. I had heard about Hizb-ut Tahrir, so I
talked to one of their guys at Leeds Grand Mosque. He was in
charge of the area, and he took me back to his house.65
It may be no accident, therefore, that mosques being the centres of
Muslim community life would provide the setting for recruitment
activities. This, however, is far from saying that mosques are breeding
grounds for terrorists.
63
64
65

Spanish radical 3, interviewed April 2007.

French radical 2, interviewed 2 March 2007.
British radical 6, interviewed November 2007.

36

A good case study of how mosques can have little more significance
than being the setting for the activities of violent extremists is an
Islamist militant network based in the 19th arrondissement of Paris,
which initially met at the Iqra mosque in the suburb of Levallois-Perret.
As it turned out, the group became one of the principal hubs through
which young French Muslims could join the insurgency in Iraq. When
several French citizens who were linked to the group were killed and
some detained by American forces in Iraq in early 2004,66 the French
authorities decided to move against the mosque, assuming that it was
similar to Finsbury Park in London or Al Quds in Hamburg. In reality,
though, the closure of the mosque in June 2004 made little difference
to the group, which simply moved on to another prayer hall.67 Instead
of Levallois-Perret, the network convened at the larger Addawa
mosque in the 19th arrondissement, where most of the members had
come from. A spiritual leader emerged who attracted further followers
and gained the group a reputation in radical circles beyond its
immediate vicinity. When the French authorities made further arrests
in early 2005, Addawa came under close public scrutiny. As it turned
out, the Islamist militant group had been below the mosque
committees radar screen. When interviewed by Le Monde, one of the
mosque officials stated: On Fridays, 3,000 people come here to pray.
The rector [of the mosque] is a moderate man by nature. But he cant
control everything.68

There are good reasons to believe that, in recent years, the role played
by mosques in extremists recruitment efforts has changed. First,
many of the so-called radical mosques, which were cited in the
literature as centres of gravity for the Islamist militant movement, no

66

See Irak: trios Franais prsums islamistes dtenus par les Etats-Unis, Le Monde,
4 February 2005.
67
Vidino, Al Qaeda, pp. 271-4.
68
A la mosque Addawa, Paris: On ne prche pas le djihad ici, Le Monde, 9
February 2005.

37

longer exist. They were either shut down or taken back by more
moderate leaders. Second, following the discovery of terrorist plots in
most European countries, many mosque committees have stopped
turning a blind eye to the activities of extremists, adopting zero
tolerance policies towards recruitment and the activities of Islamist
militants more generally. This together with the widespread
perception that most mosques are now being watched by the police
and the intelligence agencies appears to have deterred many violent
extremists from engaging in overt recruitment activities.

This does not mean that mosques no longer play any role in the
recruitment of violent extremists. Rather, it seems as if extremists
continue to take advantage of mosques for talent-spotting and as
points of first contact, but as soon as such contacts have been
established try to move away from the mosque and pursue the
radicalisation and recruitment of individuals in closed locations, such
as private flats and makeshift prayer halls. Members of Islamist
militant groups still mix with worshippers, but rather than stirring up
trouble with the rest of the congregation they will operate quietly,
making themselves available to associates and befriending people
whom they judge to be of interest. According to one of the community
leaders we interviewed:

They arent picking arguments anymore. They will withdraw

They will not be as vocal and vociferous as they used to be,
because they know that there is a lot of attention being paid to
extremism. By people at the mosque but also by the authorities.
This pattern is consistent across the countries in which we conducted
fieldwork. For instance, prior to the March 2004 train bombings, the
M30 mosque in Madrid had served not just as a recruitment ground
but effectively as operational headquarters for the cell which plotted
the attacks, with daily meetings taking place on the terrace of the

38

building.69 Since the bombings, however, violent extremists in Spain

have assumed a lower profile. As in Britain, mosques continue to be
used in order to identify and approach potential recruits, but recruiters
will do their utmost not to attract any attention. According to a senior
member of the Spanish intelligence service, the aim is to change the
setting as quickly as possible, typically by persuading recruits to
attend study sessions in private flats.70 In a similar vein, critics of the
extensive mosque monitoring programme in France have pointed out
that the authorities increasingly fail to capture the semi-hidden places
of worship which have sprung up and operate below the radar of the
state surveillance system.71 Regarding mosques, therefore, one may
conclude that a higher degree of vigilance by the authorities and the
mosques themselves has driven extremist recruitment underground.

3.2

Prisons

While the role of mosques in Islamist militant recruitment seems to

have decreased, the opposite is true for prisons. At first, the statement
sounds paradoxical: whereas mosques might well be the least
controllable public environment, prisons are by definition confined
spaces in which access and movement are tightly restricted. Yet, as the
growing body of literature on Islam in European prisons suggests,
prisons are also a highly some would say, uniquely conducive
environment for radicalisation and recruitment.72 We believe that this
situation is likely to continue, if not deteriorate.

69

Juzgado Central de Instruccin Nmero 6, Audiencia Nacional, Sumario No.

20/2004, 10 April 2006, p. 1219.
70
Spanish official 1, interviewed September 2007.
71
See Pascale Combelles Siegel, An Inside Look at Frances Mosque Surveillance
Program, Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, 16 August 2007.
72
See, for example, James A. Beckford, Daniele Joly and Farhad Khosrokhavar,
Muslims in Prison: Challenges and Change in Britain and France (Basingstoke:
Palgrave, 2005); Jean-Luc Marret (ed.), Les fabriques du jihad (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 2005).

39

Some of the basic points emerging from the literature on Islam and
European prisons are worth reiterating. First, prisons are unsettling
environments in which individuals are confronted with existential
questions in particularly intensive ways. This explains why the rate of
religious conversions in prison is higher than among the general
population: religion provides a sense of certainty and security, and it
also offers the chance for a break with the past. Second, conversions
towards Islam by non-practicing Muslims (becoming born-again
Muslims)73 or by individuals from other religious backgrounds far
outnumber conversions towards other faiths. This was illustrated by
one of our interviewees:

So, they are in prison, they are coming into prison some as
Muslims, some as Church of England, some with no religion,
some as Roman Catholic. And once they are in there, they are
changing into Islam. We are not getting anybody changing to
Church of England, we arent getting anybody going to
Christian, but everybody is becoming Islamic and there has be a
reason behind that. And I know that it is a growth religion, the
only growth religion that is going, but somebody is convincing
these people who have lived by no laws whatsoever, who have
not had any reasons to go to church in their lives, who couldnt
care less about anything, couldnt care less about religion.
Inside weeks, they are raving about Islam. So what has the
power of Islam got?74
Some of the experts believe that the popularity of Islam among
prisoners can be explained by its simplicity and the relative ease with
which one can declare oneself to be a Muslim.75 Others contend that
Islam has become a symbol of anti-systemic defiance, and that
converting to Islam constitutes an act of rebellion. In the words of
Farhad Khosrokhavar, Islam is becoming in Europe, especially France,

73

Olivier Roy, Terrorism and Deculturation in Richardson, Roots of Terrorism, p.

162.
74
British official 2, interviewed September 2007.
75
Beckford, cited in Islamic raidcalization in Europes jails?, MSNBC.com, 8 July
2006.

40

the religion of the repressed, what Marxism was in Europe at one

time.76

Against this background, many prisons across Europe have seen the
formation of radical Islamic groups, which adhere to the rhetoric and
strict behavioural codes of the Islamist militant movement. Arguably,
these groups are successful because they manage to exploit the
unsettling conditions imposed by the prison environment. Joining an
Islamic group satisfies individuals urgent need for a social network in
a situation in which at least initially they are completely on their
own: it allows them to avoid isolation, and it prevents them from being
picked on by other groups. Moreover, and more importantly perhaps,
the Islamic identity of these groups provides members with a unique
sense of strength and superiority. They can boast of being on a
mission, having abandoned their (often wretched) past in return for a
higher duty. However, far from being compliant, their newfound
identity appears to make them even more vociferous in their defiance
of the system. Indeed, it is their quiet aggression combined with the
use of jihadist rhetoric that makes them feared and respected by
prisoners and prison staff alike.77

The extent to which Muslim prison gangs should be regarded as

fully-fledged members of the Islamist militant movement is difficult to
determine. Some have no links to any specific group or network, which
means that individual members are left to seek out Islamist militant
groups after their release. Others, however, contain active links to the
jihad which ease their recruitment into existing networks and
structures.

76

Khosrokhavar, cited in Craig S. Smith, French Prisons Radicalizing large Muslim

populations, New York Times, 20 December 2004.
77
British official 1, interviewed August 2007; British official 2, interviewed September
2007.

41

It is our contention that the two principal methods in which such links
to the jihad can be established are likely to remain a cause of concern.
The first way of forming a link to the jihad inside prison, which is
frequently highlighted in media reporting,78 is through so-called
radical imams (see Chapter 4.2) who gain access to the prison
environment because they claim to provide religious instruction. In
practice, however, they pursue the radicalisation of prisoners and
facilitate their recruitment into extremist networks. The problem has
been recognised by most governments, yet remedies are difficult to
come by. Schemes under which only certified imams are granted
access to prisons take many years to implement, mainly because Islam
is a congregational faith which requires no formal qualifications for
spiritual leadership. In the words of a senior Spanish police adviser,
Many of these people are completely unknown, and we dont have the
resources or ability to find out who they are.79 Hence, imposing
certification without making sure that an adequate supply of certified
imams is available would amount to cutting off religious instruction
from the vast majority of the Muslim prison population.

In France, having appointed a national Muslim prison chaplain, a

certification scheme is now in place. Even so, French policymakers
have long struggled with the question of whether it was appropriate
for the state to get involved in the provision of religious services to
Muslim prisoners in the first place. Opponents cited the principle of
laicit, but conveniently ignored that this had not prevented the
appointment of nearly 800 clerics responsible for the welfare of
Christian prisoners. With more than fifty per cent of the French prison
population estimated to be Muslim and fewer than 100 imams

78

For example, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, a number of prison imams were
suspended for unprofessional behaviour in the UK after it emerged that they had
been spreading the message of the radical cleric Abu Hamza. This included the
prison imams at Feltham Young Offenders Institution, where Richard Reid the socalled shoe bomber had been radicalised. See Alan Travis and Audrey Gillan, Bomb
suspect became a militant in prison, The Guardian, 28 July 2005.
79
Spanish official 1, interviewed September 2007.

42

currently in place, it will take several years until the demand is met.80
On the other hand, where no certification schemes are in place, the
ability to monitor Islamic religious instruction in prisons remains
limited. As several of our interviewees pointed out, prison staff are not
always sufficiently trained to spot radicalisation or recruitment, and
will for good reasons be reluctant to interfere with religious
instruction, especially when it is provided in languages which they do
not understand.81

The second way in which to establish links to the jihad is through

Islamist militant inmates. Not only can they facilitate connections into
existing networks, being (alleged or convicted) terrorists, their
reputation and credibility is likely to surpass that of any radical
preacher. Referring to one of the members of the Hofstad Group, a
Dutch prison guard reported that other prisoners adore [him] like a
prophet, they literally kiss his feet.82 One of our interviewees, a Special
Branch officer from the North of England, confirmed this impression,
noting that Islamist militants enter prison with a certain amount of
notoriety. They come in there as heroes.83

With growing numbers, the problem is likely to get more acute. Other
than France, no European Union country had an Islamist militant
prisoner population of any significance prior to 11 September 2001.
Within just a few years, the numbers rose to triple-digit figures in
countries like Spain and Britain,84 and with no sudden change in the
overall situation they will increase further. As several of our
interviewees stressed, while much of the resources are currently
80

Dominique Gaulme, Islam en prison: missions durgence pour aumniers

musulmans, Le Figaro, 12 January 2007.
81
Spanish official 3, interviewed September 2007; British official 4, interviewed July
2007.
82
Cited in Vidino, The Hofstad Group, p. 588.
83
British official 2, interviewed September 2007.
84
For a snapshot of the situation in Spain, see 139 islamistas en las crceles, El
Pas, 28 October 2007. For a summary of an internal report of the Spanish Director
General of Prisons, see Prisiones estima que el 50% de los musulanes, El
Confidencial, 30 June 2005.

43

devoted to monitoring the most notorious inmates, the prison systems

have no capacity to control the activities of those convicted for lesser
offences, some of whom are certain to engage in radicalisation and
recruitment amongst the general prison population. Yet, in our view, it
is precisely this second category of prisoners those who will be
released within a relatively short period of time, that is, two or three
years that would merit the greatest attention. In the short term, the
solution may well be to concentrate Islamist militants in specific
prisons and isolate them from the rest of the prison population,
though even advocates of this approach (known as concentrate and
isolate) concede that, in the longer term, creating jihadist prisons
will be counter-productive and provide Islamist militants with a focus
for their efforts to portray European governments as anti-Muslim.85

3.3

Other locations

Recruitment into Islamist militant structures occurs not just in prisons

and mosques. As mentioned, recruitment can take place anywhere,
though in addition to so-called recruitment magnets which are
sought out by radicalised individuals who are actively looking for
opportunities to join up most of the places that have been found to
play a role in Islamist militant recruitment in Europe can be placed into
one of two broad categories (see Figure 2).

On the one hand, Islamist militants take advantage of places in which

individuals are likely to be vulnerable, lack orientation or experience
personal crises (places of vulnerability) all factors which are widely
believed to make people more receptive to the appeal of militant
Islam. This is true for prisons, but it may also apply to locations such

85

Fernando Reinares, Prisons and Radicalisation; paper delivered at Youth

Radicalisation workshop organised by the Global Institute for Counterterrorism,
Rome, 11 July 2007.

44

as asylum seekers reception centres and residences, which the Dutch

domestic intelligence service believed to be a prominent recruitment
ground,86 and Muslim welfare agencies, which were thought to have
played a role in the formation of the cell responsible for the recent
attempted attacks in London and Glasgow.87

A similar picture emerges when we look at educational institutions

and, especially, universities. Much has been made of the prominence
of students in recent Islamist militant plots and the alleged existence
of terrorist cells at universities across Europe.88 And indeed, there can
be no doubt that universities have always been hotbeds for radical
thought, and that like prisons and asylum reception centres they
are places in which individuals are prone to experience feelings of
isolation and vulnerability. In fact, the pattern is very similar to what
happens in mosques and prisons. According to Baber Siddiqi, who
represents the Luqmann Institute:

When young Muslims go to university, they often feel a sense of

insecurity and so the radical groups provide a social forum and
then develop personal relationships. They invite you to lectures
and sermons and follow these up with indoctrination in your
own homes and communities.89
Based on the literature cited above, it seems as if most of the groups
currently active on university campuses are gateway organisations
(see Chapter 4) rather than violent extremists per se. This may be no
less problematic in terms of radicalisation, but it suggests that with

86

AIVD, Recruitment, p. 14
Serge F. Kovaleski and Alan Cowell, British Identify Two Principal Suspects, New
York Times, 8 July 2007.
88
See, for example, Anthony Glees and Chris Pope, When Students Turn to Terror
(London: The Social Affairs Unit, 2005); Fidel Sendagorta, Jihad in Europe: The Wider
Context, Survival, 47(3) (2005), p. 67; Michael Whine, Islamist Recruitment and
Antisemitism on British Campuses, RUSI Workshop on Education and Extremism, 23
January 2006; paper available at
http://www.thecst.org.uk/docs/RUSI%20Homeland%20Security.doc.
89
Baber Siddiqi interviewed on BBC Radio 4; quoted in Glees, When Students, p. 25.
87

45

notable exceptions direct recruitment into violence has been quite

rare.

Figure 2: Typology of Recruitment Grounds

Places of
congregation
Significance/ No particular
significance
function
other than
Muslims
meeting
Examples
- Mosques
- Internet cafes
- Cafeterias
- Gyms
- Summer
camps
- Etc.

Places of
vulnerability
Taking
advantage of
individuals
crises or lack
of orientation
- Prisons
- Refugee
centres
- Welfare
agencies
- Universities?
- Etc.

Recruitment
magnets
Attracting
seekers from
a wider area

- Radical
mosques
- Radical
bookshops

Even so, like mosques, many other locations to which violent

extremists have turned in order to conduct recruitment have no
particular significance other than being places where Muslims meet
and congregate (places of congregation). This applies to Internet
cafes, cafeterias and fitness centres in Muslim areas of big European
cities as well as to summer camps organised by Muslim youth
organisations.

The

only

possible

exception

are

some

Islamic

bookshops, which can be argued to perform a similar role to that of

the radical mosques, albeit on a smaller scale. Like the radical
mosques, Islamic bookshops which have gained a reputation for
stocking extremist literature and periodicals, jihadist videos and
recordings from radical preachers may develop into magnets for
Islamist militants from a wider geographical area, who will visit the
bookshop not just in order to obtain a particular piece of literature but
also with the aim of meeting like-minded individuals. As in the case of

46

the radical mosques, such bookshops provide an opportunity for

radicalised individuals with no ties into extremist structures to seek
out a link to the jihad, thus facilitating their integration into violent
extremism.

Overall, one may conclude that the significance of particular locations

can easily be overrated. Needless to say, governments need to prevent
violent extremists from establishing fixed physical centres, such as
radical mosques or bookshops, which serve as magnets and attract
seekers with no prior links into extremist structures. Other than that,
recruitment into Islamist militancy can occur wherever Muslims
congregate, or where feelings of isolation and vulnerability can be
exploited in order to socialise individuals into violent extremism. What
seems to matter as much as if not more than particular locations
are the individuals involved in the process. So, who are the recruiters,
and what do they do?

47

The Recruiters

In the popular imagination, the recruiter is critical to the growth and

success of a terrorist organisation. He represents the link between the
underground and the rest of the world. He spots and selects amongs
a pool of applicants. Most importantly, he seduces and brainwashes
unsuspecting youth into wanting to become terrorists. Sageman
drawing on Della Portas earlier research put an end to such
misleading oversimplifications. He argued against ideas like top-down
recruitment and brainwashing, noting that joining the jihad is more
akin to the process of applying to a highly selective college, with
recruiters playing the role of gate-keepers rather than lurking in
mosques, ready to subvert nave and passive worshippers.90 As this
chapter will show, Sageman is right in exposing the myth of the
recruiter, yet his research may have overplayed the notion of selfrecruitment. Our research indicates that there are a number of
individuals and institutions which ease the process of integrating
people into the structures of Islamist militancy, in particular gateway
organisations, radical imams, and activists. Of these, we believe that
it is activists who will continue to drive the process of recruitment
into Islamist militancy in Europe. First, though, we believe it is
necessary to situate these actors and their functions within the wider
communities from which they operate.

4.1

The role of communities

The relationship between terrorist groups and the communities from

which they emerge is complex. Andrew Silke argues that, no matter
how successful a terrorist group appears to be, even the larger and
more popular groups represent a minority within their communities. At
90

Sageman, Understanding Terror, p. 122.

48

the same time, though the number of individuals actively involved in

violence may be low, in some communities, violent extremists are
positively tolerated.91 In Muslim communities in Europe, none of these
observations can be fully validated.

The key structural driver in countries with large second and third
generation European Muslim communities appears to be a widening
gulf between the younger generation and the generation which initially
settled in Europe. This can be seen most clearly in Britain. In addition
to facing exclusion from the majority community, much of the
infrastructure in these communities continues to be geared towards
the needs of the older generation. There is, in the words of one our
British interviewees, a lack of opportunities for young Muslims:

What you find is that a lot of mosques are culturally led. They
are more interested in keeping ties of kinship and traditional
values. This excludes the youth who follow in their footsteps.
Many young Muslims in this country have a dual identity. They
are Muslims, but they are also British, with the British identity
being more predominant. Their issues are not being addressed
by most of the mosques.92
The grounding of many mosques in the national cultures of the first
generations countries of origin, combined with the search for identity
among second and third generation European Muslims, can increase
the likelihood of membership in an extremist organisation. This
process of rejecting parental beliefs, which are viewed as culturally
grounded, and accepting a more universal (and sometimes extreme)
identity or belief system was illustrated in Jessica Jacobsons study
with young, second-generation British Muslims of Pakistani descent.93

91

Andrew Silke, The role of the organisation in suicide terrorism, International

Journal of Mental Health and Addiction, 4 (2006); available at http://www.ijmajournal.com/issues.php.
92
British community leader 3, interviewed August 2007.
93
See Jessica Jacobson, Religion and ethnicity: dual and alternative sources of
identity among young British Pakistanis, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 20(2) (1997), pp.
238-250.

49

The result is that the variety of social glues that used to provide
individuals with a sense of identity, purpose and meaning through the
provision and use of formal (institutional) and informal (family/friends)
social structures has come unstuck.94 This places individuals in a
position where they risk becoming more susceptible to extremist
messages or getting involved with extremist groups, who offer to fill
the identity void by providing the purpose and the role within their
group. Also, this has the potential to place an individual within an
environment where the social and ideological forces highlighted in
Chapter 5 are both introduced and reinforced.

As we pointed out in the context of prisons (see Chapter 3), holding

extremist views and being involved in extremist groups can generate
street credibility amongst peers, which serves to strengthen the
ability of Islamist militant groups to attract members:

If someone gets caught overseas because of their faith, they get

so much credibility and kudos its incredible. They really are
seen to have suffered for their faith It gives them so much
credibility.95
This is not true for the wider Muslim community, who would regard
such statements with suspicion. Indeed, among many mainstream
Muslim communities, there is a growing awareness of the problem of
radicalisation and recruitment. When asked how conscious members of
such communities were, one of our interviewees said:

Very! There is a lot of internal policing going on in the Muslim

community. An awful lot. And, of course, they are more aware of
the subtleties and nuances than we are. And there really is a
battle going on in the local communities here for how Islam is
defined and where it is going, and the role of political Islam and

94

Bill Durodie, Fear and terror in a post-political age, Government and Opposition,
42(3) (2007), pp. 4277-50.
95
British official 2, interviewed September 2007.

50

the whole question of identity. Are you British, are you Muslim,
and can you be both?96
However, these efforts do not always succeed in decreasing the
attraction of extremist groups:

You are dealing with very tight-knit communities, who obviously

wish to preserve the good name of the community. And this
causes some problems. This brings about internal policing
They might say, for example, Mr. X, we dont like what you are
saying and we want you to leave. This is good in some ways, but
it really only moves the problem on [to another place] On the
other hand, I can understand why they dont want to ring us
because they are scared of the foreign state. [This] comes up
all the time.97
The erosion of the social structures in many European Muslim
communities can also lead to a sense of helplessness, which means
that people no longer believe that the community can solve the
problem. Rather than confronting the threat, communities may then
become passive when faced with the rise of extremist groups. It seems
obvious, therefore, that counter-recruitment and counter-radicalisation
measures should be aimed at (re-)empowering these communities in
order to build social capital and (re-)establish a positive relationship
with the state and its agencies.

4.2

Gateway organisations

The expression gateway organisations is used by journalists and

scholars in order to denote entities which though not directly
involved in the pursuit of violence facilitate individuals path into
violent extremism. Gateway organisations so the argument goes
form part of a conveyor belt through which people are primed for

96
97

Ibid.
Ibid.

51

their later involvement in terrorism.98 The case against such entities

rests on three claims:

Indoctrination: Gateway organisations convey religious and

political ideas which are similar, if not identical, to those of
violent extremists. Though they do not themselves act on
them, they provide individuals with the ideological framework
the mindset which leads to involvement in violence.

Socialisation: Gateway organisations introduce individuals

into the radical milieu in which it becomes easy to establish
social networks with violent extremists and find links to the
jihad.

Subversion: Gateway organisations embrace values which are

incompatible with democracy and the full integration of
Muslims into European societies. As a consequence, they
perpetuate the conditions that breed violent extremism.

In the following, we will briefly examine three entities which have

come under public scrutiny as gateway organisations. As we will
demonstrate, the boundaries between mere subversion, incitement
and active recruitment into violence can be difficult to define.

Our first example is the Jamaat al-Tabligh (Tabligh), which emerged

in India in 1926 and has since spread across the world. In France, it
represented the principal fundamentalist movement in the 1970s and
1980s and generated a relatively broad following, especially through
its success in reforming drug addicts and criminals.99 In both South
Asia and Europe, a number of Islamist militants are known to have had
previous associations with the Tabligh, for example three of the
leading members of the network which carried out the Madrid
98

Zeyno Baran, Fighting the War of Ideas, Foreign Affairs, November/December

2005, pp. 68-78.
99
Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 261-2.

52

bombings in March 2004,100 and some of the individuals who are

alleged to be involved in the plot to blow up several transatlantic
flights in August 2006.101 The Tabligh is a religious group whose core
mission is to propagate the faith, in particular among non-practicing
Muslims. In doing so, it advocates a highly rigid interpretation of the
Quran in which followers are asked to separate their daily life from
the impious society that surround[s] them.102 While, theologically,
the Tabligh can be described as fundamentalist,103 its spokesmen
emphasise that the organisation has no political stance. Indeed, when
Omar Nasiri, a Belgian-Moroccan who ended up in Al Qaeda, turned to
the Tabligh in his search for violent jihad, he was immediately told,
This is the wrong way. The only true jihad is the [non-violent] jihad of
the Tabligh.104 Nevertheless, it seems clear that the Tabligh offers a
form of instruction that is fully compatible with the religious doctrine
of Islamist militancy, thus providing violent extremists with a religious
opening (see Chapter 5) to be exploited precisely because individuals
political views are left completely undefined. Arguably, then, although
there may be no direct link, the Tabligh presents the Islamist militant
movement with a potentially receptive audience amongst which to
recruit supporters.

The second example is Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), which portrays itself as a

global political party whose principal aim is to unite the Muslim world
under Islamic rule, that is, to create a new caliphate.105 HTs political
message and aspirations are similar, if not identical, to those of the
Islamist militant movement. Where it differs from Al Qaeda is over
means. HTs objective is to gain recruits among the political, military
100

Javier Jordn, The Madrid Attacks: Results of Investigations Two Years Later,
Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, 9 March 2006.
101
See Shane Drennan and Andrew Black, Jihad Online The Changing Role of the
Internet, Janes Intelligence Review, 19 July 2007.
102
Kepel, The War for Muslim, p. 261.
103
Klausen, The Islamic Challenge, p. 44.
104
Quoted in Omar Nasiri, Mein Leben bei al-Qaida (Munich: DVA, 2006), p. 162.
105
For an overview of HT ideology, see Jean-Francois Mayer, Hizb-ut Tahrir The
Next Al-Qaida, Really?, PSIO Occasional Paper, 4/2004. Also Ed Hussain, The
Islamist (London: Penguin, 2007), esp. Chapters 6 and 7.

53

and professional elites, who once a critical mass has been reached
are expected to overthrow their governments and establish Islamic
states.106 Violence may be necessary at some point, but not at this
stage. Although members of HT and Islamist militants disagree over
strategy, they are part of the same scene. As the journalist Shiv Malik
explains: These people hang out with each other, they meet each
other. They have arguments, no doubt, sometimes very strong and
vicious arguments, but they regard each other as brothers.107 Most
significantly, they try to recruit each others members. Several of our
interviewees told us that HT meetings are often attended by Islamist
militants,

who

will

attempt

to

take

advantage

of

members

exasperation with political discourse and capitalise on their desire for

action. Members will be approached by Islamist militants with the
question: Arent you tried of the talking?108 Hence, far from being
noisy but essentially harmless young people,109 HT fulfils all three of
the criteria mentioned above: it indoctrinates, it subverts, and it
socialises members into the milieu from which they are recruited into
the Islamist militant movement.

Our third example is Al Muhajiroun, which emerged as a splinter

group from HT in 1996, and was led by the self-styled cleric Omar
Bakri Mohammed. Initially, the ideology of Al Muhajiroun was based on
that of HT, yet the group quickly moved towards a more aggressive
approach, which publicly sanctioned attacks against Western soldiers
involved in Afghanistan and glorified the September 11 attacks
against the United States.110 An experienced and skilful organiser, Bakri
106

Mayer, Hizb-ut Tahrir, pp. 16-17.

Shiv Malik, interviewed July 2007. Also Shiv Malik, The new terror, New
Statesman, 5 July 2007.
108
British official 3, interviewed July 2007; British radical 5, interviewed November
2007.
109
Nielsen, Muslims in Western Europe, p. 168.
110
Michael Whine, Will the ban on the Al Muhajiroun successor groups work?, paper
published by the International Institute for Counter-terrorism, 8 August 2006;
available at
http://www.ict.org.il/index.php?sid=119&lang=en&act=page&id=6598&str=michael%
20whine.
107

54

managed to expand the organisations reach, setting up offices in

countries as diverse as Denmark111 and Pakistan. Rhetorically, it
refrained from involvement in violence. However, in contrast to HT, Al
Muhajiroun actively promoted and facilitated members desire to
engage in violent extremism. Bakri himself represented a link to the
jihad, who claimed he could provide individuals with references for
stays in terrorist training camps in Asia and the Middle East. Indeed,
Hassan Butt, who ran Al Muhajirouns office in Pakistan effectively
channelled British members towards the front line after the Western
invasion of Afghanistan.112 In this case, then, the question is no longer
if Al Muhajiroun qualifies as a gateway organisation, but whether it
should be regarded as a terrorist group in its own right.

For governments, dealing with gateway organisations represents one

of the greatest challenges in the fight against violent extremism. Some
countries argue that all such entities must be shunned, whereas others
view some of them (such as the non-political Tabligh and the soft
Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood) as natural allies.113 It would be a
mistake for the authors of this study to take sides in this wide-ranging
and ongoing debate. From a recruitment point of view, however, it is
difficult to see how groups like HT and Al Muhajiroun could ever play a
positive role in combating violent extremism.

4.3

Radical imams

The media coverage of the Islamist militant movement in Europe has

been dominated by stories about radical imams whose colourful
rhetoric has attracted tabloid journalists as much as young Muslims.

111

Taarnby, Jihad in Denmark, p. 55.

Whine, Will the ban.
113
See Zeyno Baran, Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism in Europe: Muslim
Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir Allies or Enemies?, Connections, 5(3) (2006), pp.
19-34; also Sendagorta, Jihad in Europe, p. 67-9.
112

55

Mainstream Muslim leaders often respond angrily to such coverage,

saying that the radical imams are misrepresenting the decent, lawabiding majority. They are right, of course, yet it is hard to deny that
figures such as Abu Hamza in London and Mohamed el Maghrebi in
Paris have played a pivotal role in the radicalisation and recruitment of
the minority of European Muslims who have become part of the
Islamist militant movement.

Based on our extensive review of their activities, radical imams can be

said to perform four main functions:

They serve as chief propagandists, who make the basic narrative

of Islamist militancy relevant to the life conditions of a second
and third generation European Muslim audience.

They are seen as religious authorities, who provide rulings

(fatwas) and justifications for violent jihad even when they lack
formal scholarly credentials.

They are recruitment magnets, who attract followers from a

diversity of backgrounds and integrate them into a coherent
network.

They generate networks of networks by forging national and

international links between different groups and networks, thus
providing the glue that holds the Islamist militant movement
together.

A recent study of leadership in Europes Islamist militant movement

underlines our findings about the crucial role of radical imams in the
recruitment and networking of violent extremists. It demonstrated that
radical preachers tend to appear as central nodal points in the
formation of terrorist networks, but do not feature as prominently
or as decisively [at the] training or tactical planning stage.114

114

Exclusive Analysis, Leadership in Europes, p. 13.

56

An excellent case study of the different functions performed by radical

imams is Abdul Jabbar van de Ven, a thirty year old Dutchman who
converted to Islam aged fourteen. Having spent a year in Saudi Arabia,
he returned to Holland instructing teenagers, mostly of Moroccan
origin, on what it meant to be a Muslim. His aim was to engage in
dawa, that is, to spread the word, and indeed he quickly managed to
build up a considerable following.115 After the terrorist attacks of 11
September 2001, Jabbar achieved national notoriety when he publicly
declared his solidarity with Bin Laden. This was followed by a series of
television interviews in which he welcomed the killing of the filmmaker
Theo van Gogh and expressed his desire to see a member of the Dutch
Parliament dead. Capitalising on his public profile, he frequently
toured the country, extending his own network as well as forging
connections with radical groups in other parts of the Netherlands.
Although he had no permanent physical base, Jabbars association
with the radical Al Furqaan mosque in Eindhoven enabled him to hook
up to several international networks, which were mostly led by North
African recruiters.116 Also, and despite his lack of formal religious
training, his views on what was haram (forbidden) and what halal
(permitted) proved highly influential. In fact, the computer of one of
the members of the Hofstad Group, Jason Walters, was found to
contain several chat conversations in which Walters boasted that
Jabbar had given him a fatwa sanctioning the decapitation of the
Dutch prime minister.117 Arguably, then, Jabbar not only served as a
propagandist and recruiter, but seems to have been directly involved
in the incitement of violent extremism.

115

Abdul-Jabbar van de Ven: Jongerenimam, De Telegraaf, 24 November 2004.

Se AIVD, Violent Jihad in the Netherlands: Current Trends in the Islamist Terrorist
Threat (AIVD: The Hague, 2006), p. 26.
117
The transcripts are available at http://dutchreport.blogspot.com/2005/01/chattinwith-terrorists.html.

116

57

One of the most interesting findings of our research is that, while

radical imams have come to play an influential role in Northern
European countries (especially Britain, Scandinavia, Benelux, and
Germany), they are less successful in the South. All of our Spanish
interviewees, for instance, told us that the phenomenon of radical
imams was either negligible or virtually unheard of in their
country.118 In our view, an explanation for this North/South divide lies
in the different patterns of Muslim immigration. Radical imams mainly
appeal to second and third generation European Muslims, who
despite their acute sense of alienation and exclusion are firmly
rooted in the West. They articulate their followers cultural anxieties
and provide them with an ideological template that allows them to
rebel against their parents and Western society at the same time.119 For
some time, they were also amongst the very few religious figures to be
able to preach to their second or third generation audience in the one
language in which they were fully fluent, that is, Dutch, French or
English rather than Arabic or Urdu.120 In countries like Spain or Italy,
where the vast majority of the Muslim population has arrived in the
last fifteen years, none of these factors are relevant. Most Muslims
here are fully fluent in Arabic, and they are unlikely to be impressed
with the scriptural knowledge of self-taught clerics like Abdul Jabbar.
Nor can radical imams tap into any widespread conflict of identity,
which may take another generation (or two) to materialise. This does
not mean that radical imams are completely without appeal in the
South, but it has prevented them from becoming a mass phenomenon.

Is the age of the radical imam coming to a close? Some have been
jailed or deported; mosques are less willing to provide them with a
platform (see Chapter 3); there are fewer radical bookshops that sell

118

Spanish official 2, interviewed September 2007; Spanish official 3, interviewed

September 2007; Spanish community leader 1, interviewed August 2007.
119
Roy, Terrorism and Deculturation, p. 160.
120
British community leader 1, interviewed August 2007; French community leader 3,
interviewed May 2007.

58

their tapes; and new laws against the glorification of terrorism are
believed to have made radical imams think twice before inciting their
followers to engage in jihad.121 France in particular has executed an
aggressive policy to deal with radical clerics. Since 2001, dozens have
been deported to North Africa. In doing so, the threshold for what
constitutes unacceptable behaviour in the eyes of the authorities
seems to be relatively low. Whereas in Britain, only the incitement to
violence would attract the attention of the authorities, in France it is
sufficient to be considered as an ideological point of reference for
Islamist militants. Critics have pointed out that this has included
fundamentalist Salafis whose views on social matters are often
incompatible with European norms but whose involvement in, and
propagation of, Islamist militancy is less clear.122 Indeed, some of the
so-called scientific Salafists whose obligations include loyalty to the
Prince now feel increasingly squeezed between the jihadist Salafists,
who condemn their quietist stance, and the state authorities, who
suspects them of being radical. As one French community leader
pointed out: The armed Salafist group [in Algeria] has nothing to do
with [our] movement. Its completely different. I read books by
theologians from Saudi Arabia like El Albani. These people understand
religion better, this is scientific Salafism.123

Even in France, however, the government concedes that some

genuinely radical imams, who propagate and incite to violence,
continue to be active.124 Also, some of those who have left Europe stay
in touch with their followers in Europe via web sites and online chat
communities (such as PalTalk) on which they post sermons and
respond to requests for fatwas (see Chapter 6). Overall, therefore, one
121

British official 3, interviewed July 2007; also Shiv Malik, interviewed July 2007.
Red Ameuroud a t expulse vers lAlgrie, Associated Press, 30 July 2005; for
the controversial case of Abdelkader Bouziane, see Craig S. Smith, France Struggles
to Curb Extremist Muslim Clerics, New York Times, 30 April 2004; also Keppel, The
War for Muslim, pp. 258-60.
123
French community leader 3, interviewed May 2007.
124
French official 1, interviewed September 2007. Also Jon Henley, Muslims are not
cockroaches, The Guardian, 11 August 2005.

122

59

may conclude that the space for radical imams has been significantly
reduced, but that it is too early to conclude that they have gone away
completely.

4.4

Activists

The third type of actor involved in recruitment is often described as

activist or entrepreneur. According to Petter Nesser, the activist is
the member of a terrorist cell that makes things happen:

He is typically senior to the other operatives, and central to the

recruitment, radicalization and training of the other cell
members. The entrepreneur has an activist mindset, being
driven by ideas rather than personal grievances. He is interested
in and committed to social issues and politics. He demands
respect from his surroundings and he has a strong sense of
justice He has an entrepreneurial spirit and wants to build
something for himself and those he considers his people In
the end he takes on a project for the holy warriors. He has high
aspirations, and sometimes he has a record of failed
ambitions.125
This description applies to individuals like Mohammed Bouyeri of the
Hofstad Group, Mohammed Siddique Khan, the leader of the 7/7 cell
in Britain, or Sarhane Faket, who was involved in the network
responsible for the Madrid bombings.126 In Nessers view, activists such
as the ones mentioned here are self-motivated, intelligent (often
possessing formal qualifications) and articulate, and they use their
skills and invest time and energy in order to persuade others to join
the cause. The people they recruit, on the other hand, are often less

125

Petter Nesser, Structures of Jihadist Terrorist Cells in the UK and Europe, paper
given at the joint FFI/Kings College London conference on The Changing Faces of
Jihadism, London, 28 April 2006. Available at http://www.mil.no/felles/ffi/start/FFIprosjekter/Alfover/_TERRA/Publikasjoner/Speeches/.
126
For profiles of the three individuals mentioned here, see Vidino, The Hofstad
Group; Shiv Malik, My brother the bomber, Prospect Magazine, June 2007; Juzgado
Central de Instruccin Nmero 6, Audiencia Nacional, Sumario No. 20/2004, 10 April
2006, pp. 1212-13.

60

capable and driven, and may in some cases have a record of

criminal activity prior to becoming involved with Islamist militancy.127
Indeed, in his sociology of Islamist militant cell members, Nesser
differentiates

between the leaders, the

entrepreneur and

his

(younger) protg, and the followers, the drifters and misfits which
they have recruited into the cell.128

Nessers analysis, in combination with other reports such as Exclusive

Analysis recent study of jihadist leadership in Europe129 as well as the
observations gleaned from our own research, makes it possible to
derive three main functions performed by the activist, which
underline his significance in recruiting terrorist cells and maintaining
its members support:

Internally, the activist provides leadership and cohesion. He is

(typically) the one with whom the cell has originated, and he is
the person responsible for holding it together more often
through personality, charisma and commitment to the cause
than through religious authority (which he lacks).

The activist leads the process of cell expansion. Not only is he

the most persuasive and most ideologically driven member of
the group, he is also the one who is most likely to have a
network of (local) friends and associates through whom to spot
and select new recruits.

The activist manages the groups external relations.130 He will

lead the effort of seeking a link to the jihad and if successful
negotiate and supervise the cells integration into the networks

127

Exclusive Analysis, Leadership in Europes, p. 8.

Nesser, Structures of Jihadist.
129
The evolution of leadership in Europes Global Jihad Networks, Exclusive Analysis
Report, 21 September 2007.
130
Ibid.
128

61

of Islamist militancy, which may transform a purely home-grown

cell of self-starters into a guided cell with access to the
strategic leadership and resources of the wider movement (see
Chapter 2).

It is activists, then, who are most likely to fit the popular idea of the
recruiter. In fact, based on our observations of how individuals join
the Islamist militant movement in Europe, we would argue that
Sagemans work overplays the notion of a bunch of guys who find
each other more or less randomly and turn into a terrorist cell only
when having encountered a link to the jihad. The idea that the
relationships between members are based on ties of kinship and
friendship, and that these precede peoples attraction to violent
extremism, may well be true, but in contrast to Sageman we have
found little evidence to support the contention that it takes a link to
the jihad for such groups to tip over into embracing Islamist militant
ideology.

On the contrary, in most of the examples cited above, links to the

jihad were sought out by the activist when the radicalisation had
already taken place, and it was the activist who then led conscious
efforts to recruit new members into the cell, such as by spotting and
befriending people at mosques (see Chapter 3) or by attending the
meetings of gateway organisations at which potential recruits could be
found. Sageman is right in pointing out that recruitment is less
strategic and less professional than commonly imagined, but several
of our interviewees especially the community leaders could cite
instances in which low-level spotting by activists was unfolding
before their eyes (see also 3.1).131

131
British community leader 2, interviewed July 2007; French community leader 3,
interviewed May 2007.

62

In this context, an excellent case study, which brings together the role
of the activist and other themes highlighted in this report, is that of a
self-starter group in Ceuta, which was disrupted by the Spanish police
in December 2006. The group had eleven members and was led by
Karin Abdelselam Mohamed, who had become radicalised in prison
whilst serving a sentence for involvement in petty crime. Upon his
release, Karin befriended a group of youths in the neighbourhood of
Principe Alfonso, a poor area of Ceuta with a large Muslim population.
The groups meetings took place in a mosque, though they were held
outside praying hours and there exists little evidence that the mosque
leadership knew or sanctioned, the activities of the group. During
these meetings, Karin utilised Islamist militant videos and songs to
further the process of radicalisation. After some time, the group
collectively embarked on a series of actions, which included the
spreading of rumours about an impending attack as well as the
spraying of jihadist graffiti. The first act of low-level violence was the
destruction of a tomb, which was widely condemned by the community
and prompted the police to take action against the group. As it later
turned out, the group had already discussed ideas for a high-casualty
attack at a later stage of their campaign. Possible targets included a
shopping mall, a fuel depot and a fairground. For this purpose, Karin
had sought to re-establish contact with a link to the jihad which he
had met in prison and who had been convicted for his role in
facilitating the recruitment of insurgents in Iraq. Had Karin succeeded
in making the link, a group of hapless self-starters could have been
transformed into a guided cell with significant potential to carry out a
substantial attack.132

However, the dynamics, which prompt activists to increase recruitment

and/or seek out links to the jihad, appear to be influenced by
broader developments as much as they are shaped by local factors.
132
See Javier Jordn, The Threat of Grassroots Jihadi Networks, Jamestown
Terrorism Monitor, 15 February 2007.

63

There can be no doubt, for example, that in all the countries

surveyed the invasion of Iraq triggered efforts to reconstruct more
coherent structures for the Islamist militant movement in Europe, and
that this was matched by activist pressure from below.133 In Spain and
France, several our interviewees told us that developments in countries
like Algeria and Morocco are likely to influence activists propensity to
network and increase efforts at propagation (which, in turn, may lead
to recruitment).134 By contrast, in Britain, many of the structures which
the current generation of activists resort to seem to be holdovers
from the period following the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, when
many attempted to go to Pakistan to join the jihad against the
Western Coalition.135

Figure 3: Functions of recruitment agents

Gateway
organisations
- Indoctrination
- Socialisation
- Subversion

Radical imams

Activists

- Propaganda
- Religious
justification
- Recruitment
magnets
- Networking

- Leadership and
cohesion
- Cell expansion
- External relations

Regardless of such dynamics, it seems clear that activists have been

the engine of Islamist militant recruitment in Europe for some time,
and that their significance will increase, not least because other actors
(such as radical imams) have somewhat declined in importance (for a
summary of their function, see Figure 3). It is activists, therefore,
against whom the main thrust of governments counter-recruitment
133

Leiken, Europes Angry; also Neumann, Europes Jihadist, pp. 74-8.

Spanish official 1, interviewed September 2007; French official 2, interviewed May
2007.
135
See Jamie Doward and Andrew Wander, The Network, The Observer, 6 May 2007.
134

64

efforts should be directed. In doing so, however, it will be important

not only to know who they are but also to understand through what
kinds of messages they manage to attract support for Islamist
militancy.

65

The Message

Much has been written about the ideology of the Islamist militant
movement. It would be foolish to attempt to replicate some of the
work done by other scholars,136 nor would it be appropriate given the
focus of this study. This study deals with the process of disseminating
the Islamist militant message as much as it is concerned its content. In
fact, if anything, it is the interplay between the former and the latter
that is of particular interest to us. Based on the existing literature (as
well as common sense), it seems obvious that there are four elements
which are critical to the process of persuasion during the recruitment
period: identity, social forces (group dynamics), politics and religion.
In the following, we will explore how these different components are
deployed at critical stages of this process. Our argument is that the
justification of violence is the culmination of a gradual transformation
of attitudes which begins with the exploitation of a crisis (or tipping
point), continues with the formation of a tightly-knit group, and is
accompanied by a period of learning during which frame alignment is
achieved.

5.1

Cognitive openings

Most scholars agree that peoples decision to engage in violent

extremism is nearly always preceded by a so-called tipping point
event or crisis which prompts a reassessment of their status in
society, political and religious attitudes, and even their sense of self.
For example, Andrew Silke points out that catalyst events are critical
in facilitating the transition from being a member of a disaffected

136

Wiktorowicz, A Genealogy of. For various excellent reports on Islamist militant

ideology issued by the Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point, see
http://ctc.usma.edu/publications/publications.asp.

66

group to being a violent extremist.137 Likewise, Harvey Kushner found

that potential suicide bombers have always had at least one friend or
relative killed, maimed or abused by the perceived enemy, and that it
was this event which in most cases triggered the realisation that
something needed to be done.138 Drawing on these insights, Quintan
Wiktorowicz postulates more broadly that personal crises can
produce cognitive openings which shake certainty in previously
accepted beliefs and render an individual more receptive to the
possibility of alternative views and perspectives.139 Such crises,
Wiktorowicz believes, need not always be political, but they can be
cultural, economic, or indeed purely personal.140

In our research, we have found numerous examples of how Islamist

militants have skilfully exploited crises in order to produce cognitive
openings. One of the most powerful triggers in the European context
are experiences of exclusion and discrimination in Western society.
European Muslims, especially the second and third generation, often
feel that despite governments inclusive rhetoric Western societies
have not offered them the full respect and equality they believe they
deserve. As one of the French radical interviewed in the course of our
research told us:

I am a French Muslim a republican who doesnt see any

contradiction with the principles of my religion [Yet still] I am
regarded with suspicion On a day to day level, this is what it
often comes down to... The fact that, in their eyes, you are a
foreigner...141
Clearly, this sense of exclusion often perceived as outright hatred
breeds a type of reverse loathing. As another French radical explained:

137

Silke, The role of.

Harvey W. Kushner, Suicide bombers: business as usual, Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism, 19 (2006), pp. 329-37.
139
Wiktorowicz, Joining the Cause, p. 7.
140
Ibid, p. 8.
141
French radical 4, interviewed March 2007.
138

67

The type of person who despises you [hogra] is inferior to me

regarding his level, be it moral, academic and even material.
Hes a dead loss, less than nothing. If this person who despised
me were better than me, I would understand. Then, I would say
that there was good reason. But, in reality, some of these people
have feelings of unmotivated hatred that seem to be part of their
very essence.
Do you have to deal with this kind of annoyance at work?
I deal with it in the street, in public transport, when dealing with
local government, everywhere.142
Violent extremists have long realised that this sense of alienation and
social frustration can be capitalised upon in order to attract recruits.
According to Omar Bakri, the leader of Al Muhajiroun:

If there is no racism in the West, there is no conflict of identity.

People, when they suffer in the West, it makes them think. If
there is no discrimination or racism, I think it would be very
difficult for us.143
It could be argued, then, that extremist movements succeed in
offering potential recruits identities of empowerment, which allow
them to reconstruct their sense of self and gain new confidence.144 And
indeed, Bakri would tell recruits: Come on Abu Jafar. Your are not
Bobby. You belong to a very great nation [Islam]. You belong to the
history of civilisation, 1300 years of a ruling [Islamic] system.145

As pointed out in the previous chapter, young Muslims alienation

from Western society is often mirrored by an equally strong conflict
with their parents culture, especially in countries with a second
and/or third generation of European Muslims. When significant
numbers of Muslims settled in many Western European countries

142
143
144
145

French radical 3, interviewed May 2007.

Bakri, interviewed in June 2002; quoted in Wiktorowicz, p. 16.
Ibid.
Bakri, quoted ibid.

68

during the post-war economic boom, they imported the customs from
their countries of origins, which were assumed to be Islamic, though
often they were based on rural-based oral traditions.146 In the Western
context, many of these tribal traditions became difficult to maintain
partly because they no longer made any sense, but also because the
younger generation (having received their education in Western
Europe) pro-actively challenged them. This clearly happened in the
case of the London bombers. According to the journalist Shiv Malik,
who spent several months in the hometown of Mohammed Siddique
Khan:

[Khan] felt that drugs use should be acknowledged by the

community, that women should have access to university
education, and that forced marriages were wrong. He also made
a stance against corruption and the anti-meritocratic attitude
within his community Later on, people would say that he had
been thrown out of the mosque because he was a radical, but
really it was because he was challenging the status quo.147
Khan, like many others, responded to this conflict by embracing the
purist (and seemingly far more rational) interpretations of Islam
offered by the Wahhabi and Salafi traditions, which enabled him to
expose traditional institutions like forced marriage as un-Islamic. In
fact, against this background, it is easy to understand why the idea of
a global community of believers the ummah appears to be so
attractive: it articulates opposition to Western culture, yet it also allows
followers to escape from the narrowness of their parents cultural
Islam. According to Malik, gateway organisations such as Hizb utTahrir and other extremist groups are well-aware of conflicts such as
the ones experienced by Khan, and much of their literature and
propagation is geared at providing the religious arguments with which
to resolve them in their favour.148

146
147
148

Nielsen, Muslims in Western Europe, p. 118.

Shiv Malik, interviewed July 2007.
Ibid.

69

Frequently, of course, rather than capitalising on existing conflicts or

crises, extremist groups are hoping to induce them. This is the
principal purpose of the gruesome jihad videos from places like
Chechnya, Bosnia, Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq, which are freely
available on the internet but continue to be shown also at events in
mosques, community centres, universities and for invited guests at
private homes.149 These films perform three important functions. First,
they are certain to provoke moral outrage and produce a sense of what
Farhad Khosrokhavar described as humiliation by proxy.150 Second,
they convey the need for urgent action in standing up for other
Muslims, who seem to be faced with suffering and systematic
injustices, if not extermination. Third, they appear to substantiate the
grand narrative according to which the West has embarked on a war
against Islam and by extension a war against all Muslims.

In fact, it is worth pointing out that some of the jihad videos have
recently begun to appeal directly to second and third generation
Muslims in Europe by combining the narrative of the Muslim world
under attack with specifically European issues and experiences.151 One
can see how for young Western Muslims this kind of video may
become a powerful sense-making device: it suggests that their own
sense of alienation and personal crisis can be attributed to the same
forces that are causing the suffering of Muslims everywhere else, and
that indeed they are all part of one and the same struggle.

5.2

Group dynamics

Based on our research, it seems clear that, in the vast majority of

cases, the transition to violence takes place within the confines of
149

For an example of the latter, see Juzgado Central de Instruccin Nmero 6,

Audiencia Nacional, Sumario No. 20/2004, 10 April 2006, pp. 1216-17.
150
Khosrokhavar, Les Nouveaux, p. 152.
151
French official 3, interviewed July 2007; British official1, interviewed August 2007.

70

tightly-knit groups, and that the social forces which unfold here have a
strong influence on their judgement and behaviour.

Henry Tajfel and John Turners Social Identity Theory (SIT) explains
how individuals create a positive identity by defining themselves in
terms of their group membership.152 This, in turn, enables the
individual to assign value and emotional significance to his group
membership and group goals. It also brings with it a tendency to see
ones own group as better than others, and to rally to its defence in
response to perceived threats.153 The latter may be an important way in
which social identity links to violent extremism: when a valued social
identity is perceived to be under threat from another group (for
example, when Islam is perceived to be under threat from the West),
then those who identify strongly will tend to derogate and hold
negative views towards the group posing the threat. Because the social
identity becomes a part of the self-concept, then a threat to the group
is a threat to self.154

How do such groups form? Research suggests that membership in a

terrorist group fulfils the material and immaterial longings of an
individual, while providing the necessary training and outlet for the
emotions caused by concrete grievances.155 For example, the group
might address an individuals welfare needs, as noted by a Spanish
respondent:

152

See Henry Tajfel and John C. Turner, An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict
in William Austin and Stephen Worchel (eds.), the Social Psychology of Intergroup
Relations (Monterey, CA: Brooks Cole, 1979).
153
Nyla R. Branscombe et al, The context and content of social identity threat in
Naomi Ellemers et al (eds.), Social Identity: Context, Commitment, Content (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1999), pp. 35-58. See also Lawrence Kuznar and James Lutz, Risk
Sensitivity and Terrorism, Political Studies, 55(2) (2007), pp. 341-61.
154
Brooke M. Rogers et al, The Role of Religious Fundamentalism in Terrorist
Violence: A Social Psychological Analysis, The International Review of Psychiatry,
19(3) (2007), p. 257.
155
Jerrold M. Post, Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behaviour as a product of
psychological forces in Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies,
Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1998), pp. 25-40.

71

There is a small part of the Muslim population in Spain who is

very marginalised, and they are targeted by radical elements.
They approach them and try to attract them to their movements
not just by sending religious messages, but also by providing
welfare and more generally making them feel part of the
community. It is in small, closed environments that they are
invited to form part of jihadist groups156.
Likewise, group membership may provide an individual with selfesteem, as noted by a French Muslim community leader who described
the way in which a new recruit could find like-minded individuals. He
said:

He has a group of people that listen to him. So it makes him feel

very important and very opinionated at the same time, and
therefore he has some kind of influence amongst a group of
people.157
In fact, belonging to such a group might be the first time that a recruit
feels accepted or important.

Furthermore, in the context of group formation, the significance of

pre-existing friendships and kinship relations cannot be ignored. This
is supported by Della Portas conclusion that the decision to join an
underground organisation was rarely an individual one. For most of
the militants, it involved cliques of friends.158 Her findings formed the
basis for Sagemans research, and it was also reflected in Edwin
Bakkers recent study of 242 Islamist militants in Europe in which
Bakker found that friendship and kinship were highly significant in
driving the process of group formation:

If we look at the circumstances in which these individuals

became involved in jihadi terrorist activities, a picture emerges
of networks including friends or relatives that radicalise with
156
157
158

Spanish official 2, interviewed September 2007.

French community leader 3, interviewed May 2007.
Della Porta, Social Movements, p. 167.

72

little outside interference; and that do so in the country in which

they live, often together with family members or friends.159

A well-researched case study of this phenomenon are the Madrid

bombings in March 2004 that were carried out by a relatively large,
mixed network with members belonging to different nationalities. Still,
kinship seemed to be a significant factor, as exemplified by the
involvement of several groups of brothers, such as Rachid and
Mohammed Oulad, both killed in the collective suicide in Legans
several weeks after the attacks. Further siblings included Moutaz
Almallah Dabbas and Mohannad Almallah, as well as Abdelgani
Chedadi and Said Chedadi. The latter were arrested before the attacks,
whereas the former were captured in their aftermath. In fact, the
Chedadi brothers ran a shop just a few meters away from several of
the regular meeting places of the networks, the Restaurante Alhambra
and a public phone booth. A further group of siblings were
Abdelkhalak Chergi and his brother Abdelhak, who were arrested and
interrogated under the suspicion of being involved in the preparation
and financing of the attacks. In addition, the kinship connections in
the Madrid network also extended to cousins, such as Hamid Ahmidan
charged with membership of a terrorist organisation in April 2006
and Jamal Ahmidan, one of the seven terrorists killed in Legans in
April 2004.160

As previously pointed out, numerous authors have highlighted the

similarities between recruitment into violent extremism and religious
cults.161 As in the case of cults, the radical group comes to serve a

159

Edwin Bakker, Jihadi terrorists in Europe, Clingendael Security Paper No. 2,

Netherlands Institute of International Relations, December 2006, p. 56.
160
Rogelio Alonso, Radicalisation in Spain, unpublished paper, September 2007.
161
See, for example, Della Porta, Social Movements, p. 167; Farhad Khosrokhavar, Les
Nouveaux Martyrs dAllah (Paris: Flammarion, 2002), pp. 156, 167; Sageman,
Understanding Terror, pp. 126-30; Wiktorowicz, Joining, p. 8.

73

socialising function akin to that of the family.162 In the words of one of

our interviewees:

People underestimate or rather, people havent come to

appreciate what it means to find a family again. Many of the
jihadists broke with their parents, and they were cut off from
everything. They dont want to leave the group because they
dont want to be pariahs again. So the fatherly element is very
important... They hang out with each other, and they all become
brothers.163
In this context, then, the purpose of so-called training camps,
whitewater rafting trips and even paint-balling exercises, which were
found to play an important role in the process of Islamist militant
group formation across Europe, is precisely to strengthen group
identity and inter-personal bonds rather than to convey any skills
which may (or may not) be important in fighting the jihad.164

Within isolated groups, the perception of external danger serves to

magnify group cohesion, which may in turn reduce internal
disagreements as the group tries to create a united front against an
external threat. Occasionally, this perceived threat can be the only
social glue holding the group together.165 Additionally, perceived
urgency, danger and mistrust of outsiders can together lead to
groupthink166

whereby decision-making

becomes

irrational

and

members of the group fearful of appearing not to hold the majority

view. Membership in any group, then, comes with benefits and
pressure, which impact on the attitudes and behaviours of the
individuals who make up the group. In violent extremist groups, these
forces are often found to put pressure on an individual to conform.

162

Della Porta, Social Movements, p. 170.

Shiv Malik, interviewed July 2007.
164
British official 3, interviewed July 2007. Also French official 3, interviewed
September 2007.
165
Post, Terrorist psycho-logic, pp. 28-30.
166
Irving Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos, 2nd
ed. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1982); also Rogers, The role of, p. 258.
163

74

5.3

Frame alignment

The process of group formation is accompanied by a period of

learning in which the recruits mindset is reconstructed in accordance
with a new set of beliefs. These new ideas are framed in religious
terms, and this we believe has important implications for the
process and the methods through which they are being conveyed.
First, they are portrayed as absolute and all-embracing, and they
require the recruits total submission to a new system of rules. Some
of the radicals we interviewed emphasised not only that Islam knows
no distinction between religion and the state (see 3.1), but also that
there is no boundary between the public and the private. As a Spanish
radical put it: There is no Muslim who doesnt have any relation or at
least a certain personal vision that would emerge from his/her own [...]
personality independent of the religion in a general sense in the
Koran.167 Becoming a good Muslim, in the radical understanding,
calls for an absolute commitment, and it allows for no questioning
once the religious validity of an idea or a practice has been
established.

Second, the nature of the religious ideology and practices that are
being embraced forces recruits to cut their ties with friends and family
as well as to isolate themselves from the society in which they live.
With practically everyone else regarded as kuffar (infidel), close
interaction with society at large not only makes no sense, it is negative
and potentially dangerous. Arguably, then, the intense in-group
dynamics which Sageman describes as the precursor to religious
commitment could equally be seen as their consequence.

What distinguishes Islamist militants from other fundamentalist

groups is their emphasis on armed struggle to liberate and/or unite
167

Spanish radical 1, interviewed October 2007.

75

Muslim lands under Islamic rule. It is this urgent need for jihad which
runs like a thread through the period of learning and indoctrination to
which recruits are subjected. Jihad, despite its varied and more
peaceful connotations in mainstream scholarship,168 is presented in
almost exclusively military terms, and recruits are left in no doubt that
it constitutes a religious duty which every able-bodied male should
pursue. One of the key points emphasised is that as long as the
Muslim world is under attack most forms of violent jihad qualify as
defensive action. Indeed, most of the taped sermons and videos that
are shown during the learning period are designed to illustrate and
sustain this argument. Amongst the possessions of members of the
Madrid cell, for example, the police found numerous tapes of radical
preachers, such as the Jordanian born cleric Abu Qatada, who fiercely
extolled the virtues of jihad and criticised those who failed to
respond to the call. In such materials, jihad was consistently
portrayed not just as a defensive action and religious duty to be
discharged by every good Muslim, but as something that will bring
great rewards. In Qatadas words: Those who fall in the name of God
and their nation do not die, because they remain alive with God.169

Ultimately, however, the success in achieving frame alignment

depends on the reputation and credibility of the frame articulator.170
In this regard, many radical imams lack of scholarly qualifications
matters less than one would expect. Islamist militants are distrustful
of official scholarship, which they regard as corrupt and little more
than a tool in the hands of the authoritarian rulers of the Middle
East.171 There has been a long tradition, therefore, of self-taught
and/or renegade clerics within the Islamist militant movement.
Furthermore, converts, second and third generation Muslims of South

168

See, for example, Esposito, Unholy War, pp. 64-70.

Qatada, quoted in Juzgado Central de Instruccin Nmero 6, Audiencia Nacional,
Sumario No. 20/2004, 10 April 2006, p. 1217.
170
Wiktorowicz, Joining the Cause, p. 5.
171
Steinberg, Der nahe und, Chapter 2.
169

76

Asian descent or those from North African ancestry whose Arabic has
lapsed, often tend to equate even the most rudimentary knowledge of
the Arabic language with great scholarship. As the Chairman of Brixton
Mosque in London told us:

[The radical imams] could speak English, they knew the lingo,
the slang But they could also delve into the Quran and read
the Arabic. Reading the Quran in Arabic is like music to Muslims
ears, especially to British converts who are unable to understand
the context and who are likely to be impressed by people who
pretend to be Islamic scholars and who speak Arabic.172
The Dutch radical imam, Abdul Jabbar van de Ven (see 4.2), who
described himself as a student of Islam but frequently issued fatwas
and was clearly regarded as a religious authority by his followers,
made no secret of his relative lack of scriptural knowledge. He told a
journalist: In the land of the blind, the one-eyed is king.173

5.4

Justifying violence

The justification of terrorism is the logical end product of the frames

acquired in the period of learning. It is underpinned by recruits full
identification as citizens of the ummah which will have superseded
their loyalties or attachments to any other frame of identity. As a
French radical told us, the idea of the ummah transcends the
individual [it] exists all over the world and its troubles are felt the
same way everywhere.174 As a result, recruits believe to have a stake in
the conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims regardless of their
geographical location, and there is no question with whom to side. As
the same French radical explained:

172

British community leader 1, interviewed August 2007.

Jabbar, quoted in Abdul-Jabbar van de Ven: Jongerenimam, De Telegraaf, 24
November 2004.
174
French radical 6, interviewed April 2007.

173

77

Every Muslim is angry when the ummah is being undermined. I

am going to give you the example of the demonstrations against
the Vatican in Arab countries where French and Danish flags
were burned. Western politicians became upset about this
[But,] how can you ask me not to get angry when the ummah is
being tarnished? How can they be proud of their nations and not
understand that we are proud of ours?175
Indeed, one may argue that in the minds of Islamist militants the
concept of the ummah not only trumps all other forms of identity, its
religious subtext means that the enemies of the ummah are, in effect,
enemies of God.

Moreover, Islamist militants will have been taught that they have an
obligation to respond to the troubles of the ummah, and that the
religiously correct response to physical assaults against the ummah is
jihad. When Muslim lands are occupied or attacked, Islamist militant
doctrine dictates that the resistance against such attacks qualifies as a
form of defensive jihad in which every individual Muslim (rather than
the collective) has an individual duty to participate regardless of what
traditional scholars say.176 In the words of another French radical:

The defensive jihad doesnt need the fatwa as it is a personal

duty for every individual. It is a method of protecting against
injustices If an ordinary mortal commits an aggression against
you without reason, in that case you are in self-defence Why
did the French resist German occupation? Resistance is a
legitimate right. Every people agrees with this logic. Religion,
the laws, international law, they all guarantee this. It is an
acquired right which doesnt need a legal frame.177
Hence, based on Islamist militants frame of reasoning, there is a
strong and strictly logical case for responding to attacks against their

175

Ibid.
Needless to say, what we are referring to are jihadist doctrines, which in most
conventional scholars view completely contradict the Qurans stipulations about
the laws of war and peace. See, for example, Shaheen Sardar Ali and Javaid Rehman,
The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International Law, Journal of Conflict and Security
Law, 1 (2005), pp. 1-23.
177
French radical 2, interviewed March 2007.
176

78

nation by force, and it is equally clear that, in cases of self-defence,

no formal and/or external authorisation is required.

Despite agreement on the legitimacy of defensive jihad in principle,

Islamist militants differ over when exactly it applies and what means
are permitted in pursuing the ummahs defence. For some, the idea of
defensive jihad implies that certain laws of war need to be
respected. One of the British radicals we interviewed, for example,
explained to us that there is a clear distinction between jihad and
terrorism:

I understand the acts of resistance in Afghanistan. They are

freedom fighters. They didnt go to the United States to carry
out acts of terrorism. I sympathise with the people who fight in
Afghanistan, in Iraq, in Palestine, in Sudan. I dont agree with the
ones who commit acts in an underground, a train, a plane. The
true Mujahideen are those who fight against American terrorism
and the Zionists What some are doing in Muslim countries and
what others are doing in Europe, its not the same thing. The
Taliban retaliate against an external enemy In Islam, it is all
very clear: one does not kill the elderly, women, and boys.178
Others, however, choose to disregard such prohibitions in favour
holding to account all those who are believed to be responsible for the
plight of the ummah. The idea of Jihad thus becomes a way of
punishing the enemies of Islam, which pursued to its natural
conclusion may include the civilian populations of democratic
nations whose governments are thought to be part of the Crusader
and Zionist Coalition. In the words of one of the French radicals whom
we interviewed:

Every individual has his share of responsibility in what is

currently going on in the world. Who elected the president of the
United States? The American people. Why did they vote for Bush?
They elected him for a political programme, and they were aware
of his policy. You cant tell me the American people are
innocent! If the American state invaded Iraq, then the people
178

British radical 1, interviewed September 2007.

79

bear the entire

programme.179

responsibility

because

they

chose

this

This argument, which uses democracy as an excuse for killing civilians

in Western European countries, is a constant theme among Western
Islamist militant. In his suicide video, Khans protg, Shehzad
Tanweer, applied the same logic, when he stated that you [the British
people] are those who have voted in your government who in turn
have and still to this day continues to oppress our mothers and
children.180 Khan put it more bluntly even: Until you stop the
bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people [sic] we will
not stop this fight Now you too will taste the reality of this
situation.181

Figure 4: The process of message dissemination

Cognitive
openings
Based on
- Alienation
from Western
society
- Alienation
from cultural
Islam
-Humiliation
by proxy

Group
dynamics
Based on
- Material and
immaterial
needs
- Friendships
and bonding
- Group
pressure and
conformity

Frame
alignment
Based on
- Religious
commitment
- Separation
from society
- Imperative of
jihad

Justification
of violence
Based on
- Ummah as
the new
identity
- Legitimacy of
violent jihad
- Liberal
interpretation
of jihad

When dealing with less thoughtful members of the movement,

however, it quickly becomes obvious how concepts like kuffar and the
militant Islamist idea of jihad serve as tools through which young
Muslims can legitimise and sanctify their frustrations and their hatred
179

French radical 1, interviewed May 2007.

Video of 7 July bomber released, BBC News, 6 July 2006; available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/5154714.stm.
181
London bomber: text in full, BBC News, 1 September 2005; available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4206800.stm.
180

80

of the societies in which they live. In fact, not only do these ideas
provide an intellectual platform, they also prescribe a course of action,
which may result in acts of terrorism. This clearly seems to have been
the case with the Hofstad Group in the Netherlands, which tended to
come up with gruesome ideas for how to kill various public figures and
only then looked for ways in which this could be justified in
ideological and/or religious terms.182 The same was true for a group of
young British Muslims, who were found guilty in April 2007 as part of
the so-called Operation Crevice. During their trial, the prosecution
played secretly taped conversations between the members of the cell.
One of the defendants told his comrades that attacks against civilians
were justified because when we kill the kuffar, this is because we
know Allah hates the kuffar.183 Discussing the idea of blowing up
Londons biggest nightclub, another member said: No one can put
their hands up and say they are innocent those slags dancing
around.184

This chapter tried to explain how violent extremists capitalise on

cognitive openings. It also showed how recruits identity and outlook
are transformed through their integration into tightly-knit groups, and
how this process is accompanied by the transmission of a set of
religious frames which if credibly conveyed can lead not only to
their isolation from society but be used as intellectual tools with which
to justify, and incite them to engage in, acts of violence (the process is
summed up in Figure 4). We emphasised the use of jihadist video
tapes, but it seems obvious that the relevance of new media and
information technologies in extremist radicalisation and recruitment
goes far beyond the distribution of jihadist videos. Indeed, we believe
the role of the Internet merits a short chapter in its own right.

182

See Vidino, The Hofstad Group.

Quoted in Rosie Cowan, British suspects considered blowing up London club,
court told, The Guardian, 23 March 2006.
184
Ibid.

183

81

The Internet

The information revolution, which resulted in the unprecedented rise

of the Internet since the mid-1990s, has been of enormous benefit in
bringing people together, revitalising grassroots democracy, and
facilitating new forms of business. Arguably, though, the very same
features that have made global exchange and engagement possible
have also allowed violent extremists to exploit the new technology for
their own less benign reasons. After all, the Internet is the worlds
most extensive network of communication; it is low cost; it is global; it
is difficult to regulate; and it allows users to remain (more or less)
anonymous.

Terrorists can use the Internet for a wide range of purposes, which
include attack planning, reconnaissance, fundraising, and even
psychological warfare.185 What we hope to explore in the context of
this study are not such operational uses of the Internet but mostly its
communicative functions, that is, as a tool with which to spread
information, facilitate communication and ultimately mobilise
potential supporters.186 We believe that it is in these areas that the
Internet is of particular relevance to Islamist militant recruitment.
Indeed, leading Al Qaeda strategists have long identified the
importance of the Internet as the principal method through which to
create a jihadist community and break the monopoly of the
establishment media. As Bin Ladens deputy, Ayman Al Zawahiri,
wrote in 2001: We must get our message across to the masses

185

Timothy L. Thomas, Al Qaida and the Internet: The Danger of Cyberplanning,

Parameters, 33(2) (2003), pp. 112-23. Also Gabriel Weimann, Terror on the Internet:
The New Arena, the New Challenges (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2006). A
review of jihadism on the Internet was recently published by the Dutch National
Coordinator Counterterrorism. See National Coordinator for Counterterrorism,
Jihadis and the Internet (NCTb: The Hague, 2007); available at
http://english.nctb.nl/Images/Jihadis%20and%20the%20Internet_tcm127139397.pdf.
186
Ibid.

82

and break the media siege imposed on the jihad movement This can
be achieved through the use of the Internet.187

Before exploring what, based on our research, we believe to be the

core functions of the Internet in Islamist militant recruitment in Europe
Internet-supported recruitment and virtual self-recruitment it is
necessary to explain briefly how jihadism online works.

All the actors involved in Islamist militancy are also represented in the
Internet. This includes the hard core of Al Qaeda, Islamist militant
clerics, the strategic thinkers, and of course the grassroots
jihadist movement. Their roles are varied and constantly changing,
and it would therefore be mistaken to view the first three categories as
the (active) providers of information and the latter as the (passive)
consumers. In fact, one of the main difficulties in combating jihadism
online is that the grassroots movement plays an important role in
producing and distributing information, and that it is key to
maintaining the decentralised structure of jihadism online more
generally.188

Despite the impression of anarchy, the architecture of the Islamist

militant Internet presence is relatively straightforward.189 First, there
are the official web sites, representing clerics, strategists, or Islamist
militant organisations. They are very unstable, but they are often well
run and may contain downloadable videos, communiqus, discussion
papers and religious rulings, and frequently also provide opportunities
for interaction with leading personalities.190 Second, there are the web
forums which are mostly administered and populated by grassroots

187

See Ayman Al Zawahiri, Knights Under the Prophets Banner: Contemplations on

the Jihad Movement (London Al Sharq Al Awsat, 2001).
188
Hanna Rogan, Jihadism Online: A study of al-Qaida and radical Islamist groups
use the Internet for terrorist purposes, FFI Report, 2006/0915, p. 15.
189
Ibid; Brynjar Lia, Al-Qaeda online: understanding jihadist internet infrastructure,
Janes Intelligence Review, 1 January 2006.
190
Rogan, Jihadism Online, pp. 17-20.

83

supporters. The web forums are the soap boxes of the Islamist militant
movement, where key debates about the latest news take place,
networks are formed, and a real sense of community emerges. Often
password-protected, they are also used to exchange videos, training
material, and links to other web sites.191 The third element of the
Islamist militant Internet architecture are so-called distributor sites,
which include jihadist web directories, tribute sites, and the web
pages

of

so-called

media

groups.

These

sites

sustain

the

infrastructure of the Islamist militant web presence, as they distribute

jihadist material and provide updated links on where to locate official
sites and web forums. Web forums can also perform the function of
distributor site.192

6.1

Internet-supported recruitment

None of the radicals or former radicals we have interviewed were

radicalised or recruited solely on the Internet. Nor did any of the
community leaders or law enforcement or intelligence officials we have
spoken to believe that the Internet is likely ever to fully replace person
interaction. A university imam summed it up as follows: Human
contact is important because [recruitment] is all about who knows
who. One guy knows a friend who knows a friend, and so on.193 Realworld social relationships continue to be pivotal in recruitment,
therefore, but that does not exclude some role for the Internet
altogether. On the contrary, whilst pointing out that the Internet is not
the one dominant factor, nearly all our interviewees emphasised that it
was important in supporting the process of recruitment.

191
192
193

Ibid., pp. 20-4.

Lia, Al Qaeda online.
British community leader 3, interviewed August 2007.

84

There are three main functions of Internet-supported recruitment

which we have identified in our research. First, the Internet is used to
illustrate and reinforce the ideological message which recruits are
likely to receive in private study sessions. In the words of a senior
British police officer, In the process of recruitment, the recruiter will
be able to point out Internet sites that illustrate the narrative, and
which explain what he was talking about in the abstract.194 A senior
Spanish intelligence made a similar observation:

After the first meeting, when they are gradually introduced to a

more private and select environment, the Internet and other
media are being used to hammer home religious and political
messages to increase commitment and dedication. The internet
gives them religious and practical instructions [and] ideological
guidance, but also friends and support.195

Arguably, the very act of participating in jihadist web forums makes

individuals experience being part of a global movement. In itself,
therefore, the Internet represents and powerfully communicates the
sense of ummah which is the underlying principle of much Islamist
militant ideology.196 In the case of the Dutch Hofstad group, for
example, most experts agree that the group would not have moved
along the path of Islamist militancy as quickly and as decisively as it
had without the Internet from which members gained most of their
inspiration and ideological support.197

Second, the Internet allows recruits to network amongst like-minded

individuals. It enables them to reach beyond their core group of
friends and/or conspirators, and helps them facilitate links with other
cells. Indeed, it makes it possible for self-starter cells to find links to

194

British official 1, interviewed August 2007.

Spanish official 1, interviewed September 2007. Similar findings were made as
early as 2002 by the Dutch domestic intelligence service; see AIVD, Recruitment, p.
15.
196
See Sageman, Understanding Terror, p. 161.
197
Vidino, The Hofstad Group, p. 585.
195

85

the jihad and gain access to the resources of the wider movement.
The so-called Glostrup network from Denmark, for instance, had failed
to hook up with a link to the jihad in their home country for several
months, but quickly managed to find more experienced militants in
other European countries via the Internet.198 More generally, then, the
Internet needs to be understood as a recruitment magnet, which
allows seekers with no prior involvement to find access to the
movement. In our view, it performs the same function as radical
mosques or radical bookshops, except of course that it constitutes
a virtual rather than an actual place.

Finally, the Internet can form an environment in which individuals

commitment to the cause and their concept of what means are
justified in defending the ummah are exaggerated. As the senior
Spanish intelligence officer told us: People egg each other on. They
compare themselves to other activists. They realise that a lot more
people are doing this than what it first seemed. Sometimes, there
seems to be a competition for who can be the most radical.199 Though
much of this is theatre with the majority of participants in web
forums being armchair jihadists at best200 the effect for some can be
one of hyper-radicalisation in which not unlike the phenomenon of
group think201 the most extreme ideas and solutions receive the
most encouragement and support.

Based on our analysis, we believe that the phenomenon of Internetsupported recruitment will grow in significance. Though it started to
play an increasingly important role in Europe in the late 1990s, the
breakthrough for jihadism online occurred at the time of the Iraq

198
199
200
201

Taarnby, Jihad in Denmark, pp. 44-7.

Spanish official 1, interviewed September 2007.
Rogan, Jihadism Online, p. 20.
See Janis, Groupthink.

86

war,202 when massive grassroots mobilisation coincided with the

closing down of real-world recruitment magnets (radical mosques,
radical bookshops, etc.) and the near-universal availability of highspeed internet connections. From an Islamist militant perspective, the
logical response to this new set of opportunities and constraints was
to go virtual, and indeed, there has been a steep rise in the number
of web forums and web sites available in modern European
languages,203 reaching out to converts as well as second and third
generations European Muslims.

6.2

Virtual self-recruitment

As noted above, the consensus amongst experts is that recruitment is

a group thing, and that real-word social relationships continue to be
decisive (see Chapter 5). The Internet so the argument goes can
support radicalisation and recruitment, but it will never be able to
completely replace direct human contact and the ties of friendship and
kinship through which loyalties form. This chimes with Wiktorowiczs
observation that risky behaviours, such as violence, necessitate social
networks in order for the perceived cost/benefit calculation to tip in
favour of taking risk (see Chapter 1). And it corresponds with the
thrust of Sagemans argument, who contends that, [f]or the type of
allegiance that the jihad demands, there is no evidence that the
Internet is persuasive enough by itself.204 Indeed, straightforward
recruitment on the Internet continues to be the exception, with only
sporadic evidence of systematic recruitment drives.205 Even so, we
would argue that the idea of the Internet as nothing more than a

202

See Hanna Rogan, Abu Reuter and the E-Jihad, Georgetown Journal of
International Affairs, Summer 2007, pp. 89-96.
203
Lia, Al Qaeda Online.
204
Sageman, Understanding Terror, p. 163.
205
Weimann cites the SITE Institute, which believes that Al Qaeda conducted a hightech recruitment drive in 2003 to attract fighters to fight the U.S.-led Coalition in
Iraq. See Weimann, Terror on the, pp. 119-20.

87

support mechanism for small-group recruitment is no longer fully valid

either. In recent years, new and virtual forms of Islamist militant
activism have evolved, which challenge, and impact upon, traditional
patterns of recruitment.

Two case studies may serve to illustrate our point. The first is that of
Younis Tsouli, better known as irhabi007 (terrorist007), who
emerged as the undisputed superstar of jihadism online in early
2004. Having joined a number of popular web forums, Tsouli managed
to create a (virtual) relationship with Abu Musab Al Zarqawis
spokesman through which he gained credibility with other online
jihadists. Tsouli also had considerable expertise in hacking
computer systems, which made him a trusted source of information
for how to circumvent internet security. (He even published Seminars
on Hacking Websites in some of the forums).206 Within a matter of
months, Tsouli thus became one of the most important hubs for the
jihadist online community. He was in touch with several Islamist
militant groups across Europe, North America and the Middle East, and
is said to have brokered links to the jihad for several leaderless
militant groups.207 Moreover, as a result of his involvement and
prominence within the online movement, he seems to have concluded
at some point in early 2005 that he wanted to participate in a suicide
attack. According to the British authorities, who arrested the 22-year
old in a flat in West London, he had made plans to blow himself up in
London during the Christmas period in 2005.208 In little more than a
year, then, he had gone from a nobody to become a potential suicide
bomber as well as one of the Islamist militant movements most
prominent figures. Even more remarkably, his radicalisation and
recruitment had taken place entirely virtually, with Tsouli acting as his
206

Site Institute, Irhabi 007 Unveiled: A Portrait of a Cyber-Terrorist, Site Report,

2006; available at http://www.siteinstitute.org.
207
Yassin Musharbash, 37.000 Kreditkarten fr Terrorist 007, Spiegel Online, 26
July 2007; available at
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,495468,00.html.
208
Yassin Musharbash, Die neue Al-Qaida, p. 155.

88

own recruiter. According to the journalist Yassin Musharbash: The

case of irhabi007 proves that the boundaries between virtual and
actual terrorism between Internet jihad and real attacks have
become porous.209

Our second example is that of Irfan Raja, a 19 year old student from
Ilford in England, who was convicted of downloading and sharing
extremist materials in September 2007 along with four other British
Muslims of Pakistani descent. Raja had not been part of the Islamist
militant scene in Ilford, nor was he known by his friends or parents to
have radical tendencies. His entire radicalisation occurred online, with
hours spent online downloading extremist videos, posting messages
and chatting to other radicals. When Raja declared his intention to
participate in jihad, an extremist based in the United States put him
in touch with the four others, who were based in Bradford, around 350
kilometres away from Rajas home town. Never having met each other,
the five decided to go to Pakistan in order to attend a training camp
and fight in Afghanistan. On one of the various web forums of which
they had been members, they managed to find a more experienced
jihadist, who was able to provide precise instructions on how to make
their way to Pakistans North West Frontier Province. The plan was
thwarted, however, because Rajas parents discovered a note, which he
had written before setting off for Bradford and Pakistan. It said: If not
in this [world], we will meet in the [highest reaches of heaven].210
Rajas parents immediately called the police, who arrested all five
members of the cell.

The examples of Tsouli and Raja prove that the Internet can be the
dominant, if not the sole, factor that facilitates radicalisation and
recruitment. Some may therefore be tempted to argue that a

209

Ibid.
Dominic Casciani, Students who descended into extremism, BBC News, 3
September 2007; available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6916554.stm.

210

89

completely new era of recruitment has arisen in which neither human

contact nor physical proximity are necessary for individuals to join the
jihad. In our view, such a conclusion would be misleading. It is
important to emphasise that cases like Tsouli and Raja continue to
represent a small minority compared to the many occasions on which
the Internet is used in order to support real-world recruitment.
Conversely, though, virtual self-recruitment can no longer be ignored
simply because it does not fit with experts long-held assumptions
about the salience of direct human contact and group dynamics. As we
demonstrated, there clearly seem to be instances in which the sense of
virtual community fostered by the Internet has been persuasive
enough by itself to engage in risky behaviour (see above), and this
development

needs

to

be

taken

seriously

by

analysts

and

policymakers. In general, the Internet is likely to become one of the

key battlegrounds for European policymakers in countering the
growth of Islamist militant recruitment. As the next chapter shows, it
is also one of the most difficult to tackle.

90

Summary and Recommendations

In this report, we have presented a comprehensive overview of the

methods through which Islamist militants in Europe mobilise their
supporters and find new recruits. We have examined and analysed the
structures and dynamics of the movement as it currently operates. In
doing so, we have come to the following conclusions:

Islamist militant recruitment efforts have largely been driven

underground, with little overt propagation and recruitment now
occurring at mosques. Prisons and other places of vulnerability
in which individuals are likely to feel lost or experience tensions
continue to be a great cause of concern, which urgently needs to
be addressed.

A variety of actors continue to be involved in propagation and

recruitment, though radical imams have lost some influence.
Activists are the engines of Islamist militant recruitment. They
often draw on recruits from so-called gateway organisations
which prepare individuals ideologically and socialise them into
the extremist milieu.

Islamist militants skilfully exploit young Muslims conflicts of

identity, especially when feeling torn between Western society
and the cultural Islam of their parents. Based on such cognitive
openings, they facilitate the formation of in-groups in which
frame alignment is achieved.

The Internet has come to play an increasingly important role. The

main

function

reinforcing

is to support

religious

and

real-world

political

themes;

recruitment
by

(by

facilitating

networking; and by creating a climate of exaggeration). In recent

91

years, however, new forms of Islamist militant online activism

have emerged, which rely less on human contact and can be
described as virtual self-recruitment.

Even so, these developments are not uniform. We found there to be

clear differences between countries in Southern Europe, where Muslim
immigration is recent, and those in which the second and third
generation of European Muslims is reaching adolescence. In countries
where no second or third generation of European Muslims has yet
emerged, language is less of an issue, nor is the conflict of identity
between Western society and traditional culture as pivotal as in
countries like Britain and France. As a consequence, Islamist militants
in countries like Spain are less likely to attract converts, and extremist
cells of mixed ethnic backgrounds are rare (though there are some
indications that this might be changing).211 In our view, this also
explains why the phenomenon of the radical imam, which tends to
appeal more to converts and second or third generation European
Muslims, has been less pronounced in Southern countries.

Across Europe, the environment in which Islamist militants operate has

changed. Especially after the attacks in Madrid and London in 2004
and 2005 respectively, open recruitment has become more difficult.
The authorities and many Muslim communities have become more
vigilant and willing to confront extremism, yet there are no indications
at all that the pressure of radicalisation has ebbed away. Based on
these observations, we believe that the trend towards seekers and
home-grown self-starter groups will continue, especially in countries
with a large second and third generation European Muslim population.
We also predict that, given the constraints now faced by Islamist
militants in the open environment, the significance of the Internet as
a virtual recruitment place will grow, with some of the new forms of
Islamist militant activism described above becoming more frequent.
211

Spanish official 3, interviewed September 2007.

92

What can be done? In outlining our policy recommendations, it is

useful to differentiate between short term measures aimed at curbing
recruitment, and long term measures directed at addressing the
strains which may provide the breeding ground of grievances in
which mobilisation can become effective.

Short term measures, therefore, are policies that have a disruptive

effect on recruitment efforts but are unlikely to affect the underlying
dynamics and structures that drive recruitment. Among these, we
consider the following to be the most important:

Of vital importance is to prevent the emergence of recruitment

magnets which allow seekers and self-starter cells to find
links to the jihad and deepen their involvement in the Islamist
militant movement. Recruitment magnets can be fixed physical
locations, such as radical mosques or radical bookshops, but
the term also refers to radical imams who travel around the
country. Where recruitment magnets cannot be dealt with
without incurring the risk of turning the radicals into martyrs,
access should be made difficult. In extreme cases, such as
Finsbury Park Mosque prior to 2004, the short-term drawbacks
of decisive action may well be cancelled out by long-term
benefits. Indeed, a zero tolerance policy will not only curb
recruitment, but also send a strong and consistent message that
racism and incitement to violence will not be tolerated in
European democracies. When accompanied by a communication
strategy that clearly distinguishes between extremists and the
vast majority of moderates, it may even be welcomed by
mainstream Muslim communities.

Governments need to pay urgent attention to the situation in

European prisons, which are likely to become major hubs for the

93

radicalisation and recruitment efforts into Islamist militancy.

Some of the difficulties in addressing the challenge have been
outlined in Chapter 3. A system of certified imams is difficult to
implement, but a viable solution may well be identified in
collaboration with mainstream Muslim faith leaders.212 More
fundamentally even, there needs to be heavy investment in
training and staff, so that radicalisation and recruitment can be
recognised.

Intelligence and law enforcement strategies need to be geared

towards identifying the activist leaders of cells rather than their
followers. Activists are the ones who makes things happen, and
it is they who pursue the expansion of cells, be it through their
charisma and leadership or as a result of systematic low-level
recruitment. Activists, however, are also vulnerable, because
they are likely to be the most vocal members of their cells, who
take part in the life of the wider community and are known by
outsiders. In that sense, they represent the weakest link of
grassroots jihadism against which counter-recruitment efforts
are most likely to pay off.

Governments need to tackle the challenge posed by gateway

organisations, and they need to be clear and consistent in doing
so. Organisations which approve of, incite or justify violence
whether at home or abroad should never be seen as allies in
counter-recruitment. Purely religious organisations, such as the
Tabligh or some non-violent Salafi groups, may be helpful in
facilitating grassroots counter-radicalisation programmes and
providing the religious arguments through which to counter the
extremists interpretations of jihad. Even so, governments

212

In this respect, positive lessons may be learned from Middle Eastern countries in
which programmes aimed at reforming radical inmates seem to have been
successful.

94

should resist the temptation of turning them into official

spokespeople for the Muslim community. In no European
countries do they represent mainstream Muslims, nor should
European governments be seen to promote rigid faith practices
which may prevent Muslims from becoming full and active
citizens of Western democracies.

More attention needs to be paid to extremist activities on the

Internet. Governments need to become as Internet savvy as the
extremists they are meant to counter, which requires investment
in staff and technical capacity. Initiatives aimed at monitoring
extremist activities on the net are important and welcome, but
governments should not shy away from taking disruptive action
where necessary. It has become a clich to say that no extremist
site can be taken down for long,213 but de-stabilising the
extremist Internet architecture in particular distributor sites
and large web forums may produce valuable short-term gains.
Also, the Internet may be difficult to regulate, but the successes
in curbing the distribution of other undesirable materials, such
as child pornography, may hold valuable lessons for the fight
against jihadism online.

The long-term measures proposed in the following are meant to

address the dynamics that underlie the recruitment and mobilisation
processes which we have observed. They are aimed at tackling some of
the strains which produce grievances that are exploited by Islamist
militants in their efforts at mobilisation. As a result, they will take
more time to effect, but they are crucial in undermining the successful
activation of support for the Islamist militant movement:

213

See, for example, Johnny Ryan, Countering Militant Islamist Radicalisation on the
Internet: A User Driven Strategy to Recover the Web (Dublin: Institute of European
Affairs, 2007), Chapter 2.

95

Mainstream Muslim communities, especially in places where there

is a second or third generation of European Muslims need to be
re-vitalised and empowered. Islamist militants exploit the
generational

conflicts

in

Muslims

communities,

and they

capitalise on their apparent lack of social capital. Mainstream

community leaders need to be supported politically and
through economic incentives in building social capital, for
instance by providing more effective mechanisms for local
democracy and accountability, as well as leisure activities and
educational opportunities for young people.

Law enforcement agencies need to build and/or re-establish trust

with Muslim communities. All to often, the police and other
agents of the state are viewed as repressive instruments even by
mainstream Muslim communities, who worry that all Muslims
are being targeted as potential terrorists. Government agencies
need to make it clear that they are on the side of the decent,
law-abiding

majority.

This

requires

concerted

efforts

to

communicate and explain seemingly repressive actions to

moderate community leaders. It also calls for the creation of
long-term,

local

engagement

strategies

through

which

relationships based on personal trust can be cultivated. Most

importantly, it means that law enforcement agencies should
always consider community impact in the planning and
implementation of operations.

Schools need to play a more prominent role in countering the

violent extremists efforts to gain support and find recruits. With
the average age of recruits falling, it is vital for schools to take a
leading role in educating their students about the narratives
used by violent extremists as well as the ways in which they are
likely to be drawn into their circles. In doing so, schools should

96

provide platforms in which issues likely to be raised by violent

extremists are discussed openly, questions and contradictions
are highlighted, and alternative courses of action are pointed
out.

A similar effort is required on the Internet. Johnny Ryans idea of

building cultural intelligence that can be used to confront
extremist narratives on Islamist militant web sites may not be
feasible even in the medium to long term,214 but there is no
question that taking down extremist sites represents no viable
solution in the long run either. Young European Muslims need to
be able to engage with appealing European language web
content that addresses their issues and conflicts, provides a
prism though which to examine extremist narratives critically,
and more generally gives them a clear sense of collective
direction without being patronising. None of this can be
imposed through government initiatives alone, but governments
can offer incentives and encouragement for such initiatives.

Naturally, there are potential tensions between the short and long
term measures presented here. Short term measures can be important
in preventing immediate danger, but only long term measures will
address the structural factors that underlie the problem. Furthermore,
in the case of Islamist militancy, even longer term measures aimed at
resolving the drivers of recruitment will not bear fruit unless the
causes of radicalisation are successfully addressed.

214

Ibid., Chapter 3.

97

Interviewees
In line with the guidelines issued by the Kings College London
Research Ethics Committee,215 all interviewees received assurances that
their identity would not be revealed. However, we were given
permission to include the following information in this report.

It needs to be pointed out that when dealing with radicals and/or

former radicals we had no means of verifying the information given.
In some cases, interviewees refused to reveal information about their
occupational status.
Radicals and/or former radicals
Format: age; stated residence; occupation (at time of interview); period
of activity
France
1) 24; Paris (suburbs); student; ongoing
2) 27; Paris (suburbs); student; ongoing
3) 26; Paris (suburbs); administrator; ongoing
4) 32; Paris; not known; ongoing
5) 24; Paris (suburbs); student; ongoing
6) 30; Paris; unemployed; ongoing
Spain
1) 30;
2) 32;
3) 37;
4) 22;
5) 24;
6) 23;

Madrid
Madrid
Madrid
Madrid
Madrid
Madrid

(suburbs);
(suburbs);
(suburbs);
(suburbs);
(suburbs);
(suburbs);

shopkeeper; ongoing
labourer; ongoing
unemployed; early 2000s
student; ongoing
not known; 2002-2004
not known; early 2000s

United Kingdom
1) 28; Outer London; not known; 2000-2005
2) 33; Outer London; community worker; 1998-2002
3) 19; Outer London; apprentice; 2005-2007
4) 20; Outer London; unemployed; 2005- 2007
5) 31; Bradford; journalist; early 2000s
6) 32; Leeds; journalist; 2001-2005
215
See Kings College London, College Research Ethics Committee:
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/research/ethics/crec/.

98

Community leaders
France
1) Official, La Grand Mosque de Paris
2) Regional leader (Ile de France), Union des Organisations Islamique
de France
3) Community worker, Seine-Saint-Denis
Spain
1) Committee member, Centro Cultural Islamico, Madrid
2) Prayer leader, Centro Cultural Islamico, Madrid
United Kingdom
1) Chairman of Brixton Mosque, London
2) Community worker, Ilford
3) University imam, London Metropolitan University

Officials
France
1) Special advisor to the Ministry of Interior
2) Former Director, Directoire de la Surveillance du Territoire
3) Counter-terrorism official, Directoire de la Surveillance du Territoire
Spain
1) Former deputy Director of the Spanish foreign intelligence service
2) Special advisor to the Guardia Civil
3) Special advisor to the Spanish Ministry of the Interior
United Kingdom
1) Head of the Muslim Contact Unit, London Metropolitan Police
2) Counter-terrorism officer, West Yorkshire Police
3) Senior official, Office for Security and Counter-terrorism, Home
Office
4) Senior official, Intelligence, London Metropolitan Police

99

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103

*USAREC Manual
No. 3-01

Headquarters
United States Army Recruiting Command
1307 3rd Avenue
Fort Knox, Kentucky 40121-2725
22 November 2011

Recruiter Handbook
Contents
Page
FIGURES .................................................................................................................. ii
TABLES .................................................................................................................... ii
VIGNETTES .............................................................................................................. ii
PREFACE ................................................................................................................. iii
PART ONE

RECRUITING UNIT DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Chapter 1

Recruiting Support Team Duties and Responsibilities ...................................... 1-1

Chapter 2

Engagement Team Duties Responsibilities ........................................................ 2-1

Chapter 3

Future Soldier Leader Duties and Responsibilities ........................................... 3-1

PART TWO

RECRUITING ENVIRONMENT

Chapter 4

The Operating Environment ................................................................................ 4-1

Chapter 5

Network Centric Recruiting ................................................................................. 5-1

Chapter 6

School Recruiting Program ................................................................................. 6-1

Chapter 7

Recruiting Operations ......................................................................................... 7-1

Chapter 8

Planning ................................................................................................................ 8-1

PART THREE

RECRUITING FUNCTIONS

Chapter 9

Intelligence ............................................................................................................ 9-1

Chapter 10

Prospecting ........................................................................................................ 10-1

Chapter 11

The Army Interview ............................................................................................ 11-1

Chapter 12

Processing .......................................................................................................... 12-1

Chapter 13

Lead a Future Soldier ........................................................................................ 13-1

Chapter 14

Training, Sustainment, and Mission Command ................................................ 14-1

Chapter 15

Follow-up ............................................................................................................ 15-1

Appendix A

THE ENLISTMENT PROCESS (SCENARIO) ...................................................... A-1

*This manual supersedes USAREC Manual 3-01, dated 23 December 2008.

USAREC Manual 3-01

Appendix B

TOOL BOX ............................................................................................................B-1

GLOSSARY ............................................................................................... Glossary-1

Figures

1-1. Recruiting support team duties .................................................................. 1-1

1-2. RST workflow model .................................................................................... 1-2
2-1. Engagement team duties ............................................................................. 2-1
2-2. ET workflow model ...................................................................................... 2-2
3-1. FSL duties .................................................................................................... 3-1
3-2. FSL workflow model .................................................................................... 3-2
5-1. Recruiting Center Network ......................................................................... 5-4
7-1. Recruiting functions .................................................................................... 7-2
8-1. Sample of a recruiting center synchronization matrix .............................. 8-3
A-1. Appointment made on RSTs calendar ...................................................... A-2
A-2. Interview appointment made on ETs calendar ........................................ A-3
A-3. Test and processing on RSTs calendar ................................................... A-4
A-4. Packet review on ACCs calendar.............................................................. A-5
A-5. Hot-seat on center commanders calendar .............................................A-6
A-6. Future Soldier orientation on FSLs calendar...........................................A-7
A-7. Future Soldier orientation on center commanders calendar .................A-7
A-8. Recruiting center workflow model ............................................................A-8

Tables

11-1. Correlation between the Army interview and developmental counseling11-2

12-1. ASVAB sub-tests ....................................................................................... 12-2
12-2. Army ASVAB line scores .......................................................................... 12-3

Vignettes

Small unit leadership:School recruiting program .............................................. 6-3

Examples of prospecting phone calls ................................................................ B-2
The phone call: Questions and responses ........................................................ B-3
Handling obstacles in the interview .................................................................. B-10

ii

Preface
USAREC Manual 3-01 is a how to think manual for recruiting center team members. The manuals
primary goal is to describe the duties and responsibilities of each team member and how they
work together to achieve the mission.

PURPOSE
USAREC Manual 3-01 is the recruiters guide for planning and executing recruiting operations.
This handbook uses practical examples to explain each operation and thoroughly describes the
recruiting environment. It also provides an in-depth discussion of each recruiting function, and
communication and counseling techniques that work. This handbook describe each team
members individual duties and responsibilities and how team members interface within the
center.

SCOPE
This handbook also discusses recruiting fundamentals and concepts as well as providing the
most successful recruiting tactics and practices. This handbook discusses the eight recruiting
functions; decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations; as well as recruiting tools and techniques.

INTRODUCTION
The contents of this manual are not regulatory. They are a compilation of strategies and field
proven techniques that thoroughly explain the what, why, and how of recruiting functions at the
team member level. The methods detailed are not the remedy for every situation, but they do
provide recruiting team members a doctrinal starting point from which to formulate and execute
their operation plans.

APPLICABILITY
This manual applies to all recruiting center team members.

ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION
The proponent for this manual is Headquarters, United States Army Recruiting Command (HQ
USAREC), Assistant Chief of Staff, Recruiting and Retention SchoolForward. Send comments and
recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms)
directly to HQ USAREC, ATTN: RCRRS-D, 1307 3rd Avenue, Fort Knox, KY 40121-2725; or by email to doctrine@usarec.army.mil.

iii

PART ONE

Recruiting Unit Duties and Responsibilities

Part One defines the duties and responsibilities of the recruiting support team, engagement
team, and Future Soldier leader. Each team members duties are graphically depicted on a flow
chart showing how team members interface and where in the process hand-offs take place.
Chapter 1 Defines the recruiting support team members duties and responsibilities.
Chapter 2 Defines the engagement team members duties and responsibilities.
Chapter 3 Defines the Future Soldier leaders duties and responsibilities.
The recruiting center is the basic recruiting unit. Part One discusses how the ET, the RST, and
the FSL work together under the center commanders leadership to achieve the mission. (USAREC
Manual 3-06 discusses how the center commander and the assistant center commander lead
and manage the teams.) The teams carry out specific recruiting functions. Mission success
demands that the teams and all members work together. Each member depends on the other
to accomplish the mission.
Figures throughout Part One clearly show the array of teams in the recruiting center structure.

Chapter 1

Recruiting Support Team Duties and Responsibilities

1-1. The recruiting support team (RST) is the operational backbone of the recuiting
unit. This team of professional recuiters must handle a wide range of operational
and administrative tasks. The fast-paced work environment demands quick
thinking, strong organizational skills, and a keen ability to make sound decisions
and solve problems. RSTs interact daily with Soldiers, Future Soldiers, prospects,
applicants, and centers of influence (COIs). RSTs handle highly-sensitive personal
information and use high-dollar-value equipment. These Soldiers conduct most
prospecting operations, all applicant processing, and office administration.
1-2. The list of duties found in figure 1-1 is not meant to be all-inclusive. The
figure simply provides the RSTs primary and associated responsibilities. RSTs,
as all members of the center, regardless of their primary duties and responsibilities, can be temporarily redirected by the recruiting unit commander.

Figure 1-1. Recruiting support team duties

PROSPECTING AND LEADS MANAGEMENT

1-3. The RST conducts prospecting activities using the telephone, texting, and
virtual methods. The RST manages and refines leads, gathers blueprint information, conducts prospecting activities, follow-up and all related activities.
1-4. When a lead agrees to an appointment, he or she becomes a prospect. The
RST checks the calendars of the engagement team (ET) members to see who is
available to conduct the interview. The next step is to hand the new prospect off
to the ET. The hand-off must be smooth and reassuring to the individual. The
1-1

Recruiting Support Team Duties and Responsibilities

RST must provide the prospect with the ETs name and background and give them
a positive endorsement. This practice will lessen the individuals natural fear of
meeting an ET for the first time.

PROCESSING
1-5. The RST handles all processing. A prospect becomes an applicant the
moment they agree to process for enlistment. The ET then hands the applicant
back to the RST with a positive endorsement of that particular RST who will
complete their processing. Now the ET starts the enlistment packet and collects the applicants source documents. Processing includes collecting and validating source documents, performing a biometric scan, scanning documents
into electronic records management (ERM), scheduling testing and military entrance processing station (MEPS) processing, transporting applicants to and
from mobile examining team (MET) sites, MEPS, shipping locations (airport,
train station, bus terminal), and so on.

Figure 1-2. RST workflow model

1-6. The RST is responsible for all processing activitiesto include MEPS processingand any additional administrative work that may arise during the Future Soldiers time in the DEP/DTP (medical and conduct waivers, for example).
The applicant becomes a Future Soldier when they take the oath of enlistment
into the delayed enlisted program (DEP) or the delayed training program (DTP).
Now the RST hands off the new Future Soldier to the Future Soldier leader (FSL).
The hand-off should follow the same procedures discussed earlier. The RST introduces the new Soldier to the FSL. Figure 1-2 shows an example of a workflow
model for the RST.

ADMINISTRATION
1-7. The RST is responsible for managing the Government-owned vehicles (GOV),
voter registration and the key control program. The RST is also responsible for
1-2

USAREC Manual 3-01

maintaining applicant drug and alcohol test logs and postage stamp logs, and for
ordering recruiting publicity items (RPI) and personal presentation items (PPI).
1-8. RSTs are also responsible for providing intelligence to the recruiting unit
commander, as are all other team members. It should be noted that this is not
how-to information, but simply the best business practices as we know them
today. Many responsibilities are combined and shared where possible and when
necessary. It is imperative the RST, ET, and FSL work together for the good of the
recruiting unit. See appendix A for a working example of the entire enlistment
process and workflow model.

1-3

Chapter 2
Engagement Team Duties Responsbilities
2-1. ET members assume the roles of leader, communicator, planner, public relations representative, marketing analyst and counselor. The ET must be of strong
moral character and embody the Army values. The ET is an ambassador of the
Armyself-disciplined and professional. The ET is the face and voice of the Army
and recruiting unit.
2-2. The list of duties shown in figure 2-1 is not meant to be all-inclusive. The
figure simply shows the ETs primary duties. The recruiting unit commander
can temporarily redirect ETs and any other member of the unit, regardless of
their primary duties and responsibilities, to support mission objectives.

Figure 21. Engagement team duties

PROSPECTING
2-3. The ET conducts face-to-face prospecting in accordance with the recruiting units recruiting operation plan (ROP). Face-to-face prospecting ideally should
be carried out in the recruiting units target areas to coincide with telephone
prospecting activities. Face-to-face prospecting should not be confused with area
canvassing. Face-to-face prospecting is trying to contact a lead in person. The
expanded areas of many recruiting units require leaders to focus prospecting
efforts in specific areas to maximize resources.
2-1

Engagement Team Duties Responsibilities

AREA CANVASSING
2-4. Area canvassing includes such activities as visiting popular hangouts, executing the school recruiting program (SRP) through school visits, posting businesses, and developing COIs and VIPs. Leaders should focus area canvassing
activities in prospecting areas designated by the centers ROP. By focusing these
activities in the designated prospecting areas, the ETs position themselves to
conduct interviews made via telephone prospecting. Recruiting unit commanders should direct their teams to make the most of the ETs mobility. ETs can
and should assist with processing by running police checks and collecting school
letters and other document during area canvassing activities.

INTERVIEWING
2-5. When the RST schedules an appointment, the ET must immediately contact the prospect to establish rapport and confirm the appointment. This technique continues the hand-off process and reassures the prospect they are dealing with a professional team and organization. This hand-off is critical to the
rest of the recruiting process. The team concept must be embraced by the ET
to ensure a smooth hand-off back to the RST, FSL and unit leaders. Figure 2-2
is an example of a workflow model for the ET.

Figure 2-2. ET Workflow Model

2-6. The ET, in addition to their primary duties, must also provide intelligence
to the center. ETs share this responsibility with all other team members. This is
not how-to information, but simply the best business practices as we know
them today. Many responsibilities are combined and shared where possible
and when necessary. The ET, RST, and FSL must work together for the good of
the center. Appendix A includes an example of the enlistment process and
workflow model.

2-2

Chapter 3

Future Soldier Leader Duties and Responsibilities

3-1. The FSL provides the leadership, mentoring, training, and guidance to recruiting centers Future Soldiers. The FSL must be a proven leader who thoroughly understands the recruiting process. The FSL must be of strong moral
character and embody the Army values. Since the FSL in most cases will have
the most interaction with the units Future Soldiers, they should be among the
most experienced members of the team.
3-2. The FSL will execute their duties as discussed in USAREC Regulation
601-95 and the units ROP. Figure 3-1 shows the FSLs primary responsibilitiesthe list is not all-inclusive. The recruiting unit commander may temporarily redirect the FSL, regardless of their primary duties and responsibilities to
support mission objectives.

Figure 3 1. FSL duties

3-3. The FSL missions Future Soldiers for referrals. The FSL also supports
SRP events, sporting events, and community events. Future Soldiers are valuable COIs and part of the center team. The FSL should work closely with the
ETs and RSTs supporting prospecting, events, and lead generation activities
whenever possible. The Future Soldier is also a good intelligence and blueprint
information provider for prospecting activities. Future Soldiers can be an asset
or a liability. The impact Future Soldiers have on the unit will reflect the leadership and guidance they get from the FSL and other Soldiers in the unit.
3-4. The FSL is responsible for all Future Soldier activities, to include gathering documents and completing paperwork required for shipping. Documents may
include such items as diplomas, transcripts, marriage certificates, and promo3-1

Engagement Team Duties Responsibilities

tion orders. The FSL should work closely with RSTs to complete any additional
paperwork that may arise during the Future Soldiers time in the DEP/DTP, such
as waivers, marriage certificates, and dependent birth certificates. Figure 3-2 is
an example of a workflow model for the FSL.

Figure 3 2. FSL workflow model

3-5. The FSL, in addition to their primary responsibilities, are also responsible
for providing intelligence to the recruiting unit. It should be noted that this is
not how-to information, but simply the best business practices as we know
them today. Many responsibilities are combined and shared where possible
and when necessary. The ET, RST and FSL must work together for the good of
the unit. Appendix A includes an example of the enlistment process and workflow
model.

3-2

PART TWO

Recruiting Environment
Part Two discusses the team member and recruiting units operating environment, networkcentric recruiting, SRP, recruiting operations, and the recruiting operation plan.
Chapter 4 Discusses the recruiting units operating environment.
Chapter 5 Discusses the recruiting units network-centric recruiting environment.
Chapter 6 Discusses the SRP.
Chapter 7 Discusses recruiting operations.
Chapter 8 Discusses the recruiting operation plan.

Chapter 4

The Operating Environment

INTRODUCTION
4-1. The recruiting units operating environment is unlike any you may have
experienced during your career. Soldiers assigned to recruiting duty operate in
small towns and metropolitan areas, far from military installations, and the Soldier and Family support services they offer.
4-2. USAREC is responsible for initiating the transition of volunteers from civilian to Soldier and acts as the Armys liaison with the American people. USAREC
provides command, control, and staff support for the recruiting force.

RECRUITING MISSION
4-3. The recruiting mission is based on the Armys projected loss rate. The Department of the Army assigns a yearly accession mission to meet its end strength
goals and to cover normal attrition. The accession mission is broken down into
very specific categories. Major categories include the following:
Regular Army (RA) and Army Reserve (AR) enlistments.
Army Medical Department commissions.
Officer Candidate School.
Technical warrant officer.
Warrant Officer Flight Training.
Chaplain commissions.
Band.
Special Forces officer and enlisted.
160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.
4-4. The Department of the Army accession mission is converted to an adjusted
contract mission at HQ USAREC. The adjusted contract mission equals the accession mission plus a percentage (about 10 percent) to cover potential losses
from Future Soldier pool. In a perfect world, every enlistment contract would result in a new Soldier reporting for duty. In the real world, however, Future Soldier
losses do occur. Losses occur for many reasonsmedical or conduct disqualifications and failure to graduate, for example. For this reason, the USAREC G2 adjusts the mission to offset losses. The adjusted mission is then distributed to the
brigades for further distribution down to recruiting unit level.
4-5. The mission assignment process is both art and science and combines years
of experience with actual performance data. Analysts and marketing experts dissect and examine historical data, demographic models, target-market surveys,
and many other intelligence sources to provide equitable and achievable mission assignments.
4-1

The Operating Environemnt

ROLES IN THE COMMUNITY

4-6. Members of a recruiting unit must demonstrate Army values, live the Warrior Ethos, and do so in full view of the community in which they serve. These
team members are responsible for initiating the transition of volunteers from
civilian to Soldier and act as the Armys liaison with the American people.
4-7. Each team member is expected to assume various roles. These roles range
from developing trust and credibility within the community to determining best
marketing techniques to producing leads and ultimately the enlisting of Future
Soldiers. Team members assume the roles of leader, communicator, planner,
public relations expert, marketing expert, and counselor.
4-8. Leader. As a leader or team member, you will be called upon to demonstrate your leadership skills. Your ability to lead, inspire, and involve yourself
in your community, could be the difference between recruiting success and
failure. Your actions on and off-duty are closely watched by members of your
community. You must lead by example.
4-9. Communicator. As a leader or team member, you must understand that
communication is your center of gravity. Communication is the key for successful execution of all recruiting operations. All team members must communicate the Army story to all members of the community in which they live and
work.
4-10. Planner. As a leader or team member, executing recruiting operations
(decisive, shaping, and sustaining) will lead to mission success, but only if you
have a sound plan. It is important to spend your time where it will do the most
good. Planning is one of the most important things you will do as a leader or
team member. The mission depends on it.
4-11. Public relations specialist. As a leader or team member you must establish and promote a favorable relationship between you and the community.
Team members must participate in public events such as high school sports
functions or Army-sponsored events. You should volunteer to give presentations about Army programs to civic organizations such as the Veterans of Foreign Wars or local parent-teacher organizations. This type of involvement will
demonstrate your willingness to be a viable part of the community.
4-12. Marketing specialist. As a leader or team member you should know the
general makeup and distribution of your communitys population. Understanding
these marketing principles will help you tailor your recruiting plan so you can
be in the right place, at the right time, with the right message.
4-13. Counselor. This is the role you will automatically assume when recruiting, processing or leading Future Soldiers. The techniques you used to counsel
your Soldiers are the same ones you will use to guide and lead prospective and
Future Soldiers. Your wise counsel based on experience and Army values will
positively affect the lives of all those you talk to, whether they join the Army or
not.

4-2

Chapter 5

Network-Centric Recruiting
5-1. The network-centric environment consists of both an internal and external information network. The internal network is your connection to USARECs
integrated information systems, staff elements, other recruiting leaders, recruiting units, Future Soldiers, and team members. The external network includes
the community, businesses, schools, clubs, and other outside organizations.
5-2. A recruiting unit is essential to both the internal and external information
networks. The internal network exists so you can conduct operations with as
little distraction and wasted effort as possible. The external network, while an
integral part of your recruiting network, exists and flourishes as a result of your
recruiting efforts.
5-3. Combined, these two information networks make available the leadership, support, and information the team needs to advance recruiting efforts.
These networks can supply market intelligence (internal) or an invitation to
address the local chamber of commerce to discuss Army opportunities (external). These networks give the leader a tactical advantage for mission success.

RECRUITING MISSION
5-4. The internal network connects a recruiting unit to staff elements within
the organization that provide time-critical intelligence, analysis, and a wide range
of other vital support functions. Market analysis, leads distribution, advice,
interpretation of policy, or mentoring can all be found on the internal network.
The primary purpose of the internal network is to provide all the tools and
information necessary to accomplish the mission.
5-5. The internal network provides information in a variety of ways to accomplish three basic objectives: Reach and engage people effectively, boost recruiting efficiency and focus, and develop a common operating picture. The
internal network ensures all levels of command are synchronized, headed in
the same direction, and sharing the same intelligence information. A recruiting
unit is the major provider of real-time market and operational data that feeds
the system. This data must be timely and accurate.
5-6. The internal network ties directly to a recruiters ability to conduct operations. The knowledge of available resources determines the quality of service
you can provide to the community and Future Soldiers. You are the recruiting
subject matter expert in the community and require firsthand and timely information. The internal network is your source for all changes, updates, options,
and information.
5-7. The science of recruiting requires a great deal of data gathering, interpretation, and analysis. Without accurate and timely operational data, recruiters
would just be shooting in the dark. Recruiters who know how to access and
use their market intelligence can effectively focus their prospecting efforts.
5-1

Network-Centric Recruiting
5-8. Recruiting is a team effort. Mission accomplishment and the success of the
command depend heavily on the collective effort of all its members. One of the
most underrated assets at your disposal is the experience and knowledge of fellow recruiters. Leaders are encouraged to facilitate and support peer networking.
Company and battalion functions nearly always include social events that allow
team members to sharpen their networking techniques and share their insight
and experience.
5-9. One of the best places to actively engage with other team members is the
Recruiting ProNet forum. Recruiting ProNet is USARECs collaboration site that
connects all recruiting personnel, recruiting leaders, and command staff. The
forum allows recruiting personnel to openly voice their opinions, give advice,
ask questions, and share knowledge. To join Recruiting ProNet, visit the forums
Web address: https://forums.army.mil/secure/communitybrowser..aspx?id=51486.

UNDERSTAND
5-10. External networking activities occur at all levels of the command and
focus on synchronizing recruiting efforts with events and the rhythm of the surrounding civilian community. While networking with high school counselors
and local business owners, the company commander may be supporting recruiting units efforts by establishing relationships with school boards and community leaders. External networking occurs at all levels. USAREC networks
with state and federal lawmakers, industry leaders, and so on. While USAREC
establishes and nurtures these relationships nationally, battalions and companies network regionally, and recruiting units and recruiters locally.
5-11. Social networks such as Facebook, MySpace, Twitter, and YouTube are
now an accepted means of communication for Soldiers and Army civilians. These
sites can be useful for presenting Army and recruiting information and interacting with the target market and with influencers, COIs, VIPs, and the local
populace.
5-12. Local businesses, civic organizations, as well as religious and educational institutions are linked through shared interests and like needs. These
local networks are the heart and soul of every community. Networking within
these organizations and institutions can open doors that may otherwise be closed
to recruiting efforts.
5-13. Many influencers such as COIs and VIPs are military veterans themselves. Many influencers have served during war and are fully aware of freedoms
price. Others may never have served, but strongly support the military nonetheless. Veterans and nonveterans alike can be great allies. They want to help.
5-14. Working with COIs involves a great deal of detailed planning and lots of
follow-up. Community influencers will be more inclined to cooperate with you
once you have established a good working relationship with them. You must go
the extra mile to build their trust.
5-15. Businesses are an important part of the community network. With this in
mind, the smallest efforts to support local businesses can go a long way. The next
5-2

USAREC Manual 3-01

time you stop for gas in your area of operation (AO); go inside for a cup of coffee or
soft drink. Patronizing local businesses will help you become the face of the Army
in your community.
Note: Recruiters must not officially endorse or give preferential treatment to businesses.
5-16. Good relationships with businesses in the community make it easier for
recruiters to help high school students, recent graduates, and Future Soldiers
pending accession find temporary jobs. Future Soldiers provide employers with
talented, bright, and drug-free employees. Thus, networking efforts can help
students, Future Soldiers, and the community. These working relationships
help the business community to see you as a trusted ally to whom they will
provide referrals.
5-17. No other segment of the community network has as much impact on
recruiting as schools. The SRP is based on the trust and credibility established
with educators, students, and parents. Even a well planned SRP will fall on its
face without the support of these key influencers.
5-18. Think of the SRP as a long-term investment. You will find that establishing trust and credibility with studentseven seventh- and eighth-graderscan
positively impact high school and postsecondary school recruiting efforts. Students who already know you as a respected and trusted member of the community will also see you as someone they can emulate and fearlessly approach
to discuss their career options. A successful SRP requires great patience, persistence, and tactical savvy. You must be seen, be trusted, and above all be
available for students at every level of education.
5-19. You probably wont have much success in your schools if you ignore the
major influencers. Teachers, principals, counselors, school secretaries, and even
parent-teacher organization members fall into this category. If you have established yourself as a friend to the educational community who can provide a
valuable service, you will find great levels of access and support.
5-20. Another point of entry into the community is parents, veterans, and community leaders who are members of local Army Reserve or National Guard
units. These contacts can be valuable allies who can help you gain access to
schools and community organizations. They can also help establish good working relationships within the reserve community which can assist your recruiting efforts.
5-21. A recruiting unit needs the willing support and cooperation of community and school influencers. Without such support, recruiting units cannot hope
to succeed. Tapping into the community network requires recruiters to give
something of value. You must actively and visibly commit time and energy to
the community in which you recruit. You can choose to be a tolerated outsider
or a welcomed participant.
5-22. Recruiting unit leaders and team members should get to know local community officials and influencers, such as
5-3

Network-Centric Recruiting

Mayors.
Chiefs of police and sheriffs.
School superintendents and principals.
Members of the city council and county board of supervisors.
College presidents and deans.

5-23. People who hold those positions can positively or negatively influence
recruiting efforts. Recruiters and leaders must get to know these people before
the they ask them for something. You must avoid being labeled as takers
someone who comes around only when they need something. You must be
proactive. You must introduce yourself and fellow team members and use the
opportunity to make people aware of Army opportunities. If you will follow this
simple advice, you and your teammates will gain respect and be viewed, not as
transient outsiders, but as valuable members of the community.

RECRUITING UNIT NETWORK

5-24. Figure 5-1 illustrates the recruiting units network and how information
and support intersect with the units sphere of influence.

Figure 5-1. Recruiting center network

5-4

Chapter 6

School Recruiting Program

6-1. The SRP is the cornerstone of Army recruiting. It was designed to create
awareness and interest in available Army programs among students, parents,
educators, and school officials. Without a strong secondary school program,
there cannot be a strong grad recruiting program.

HIGH SCHOOL RELATIONS

6-2. The SRP is outlined in USAREC Pamphlet 350-13 and USAREC Regulation 601-104. The digital School Zone (SZ)part of Recruiter Zoneis a Webbased tool that allows leaders and recruiters to build and maintain effective
school programs. Inside SZ, real-time data populates to secondary and
postsecondary school folders. School folders combine operational (FSTP) goals
with a comprehensive outline and calendar of events that help the recruiting
unit execute effective school programs. The intent of the SRP is to promote
enlistments in the secondary and postsecondary school markets.
6-3. The best school plans and goals rest on your ability to establish good
working relationships with key school influencers. You are the key ingredient
to successful school programs. School officials (especially guidance counselors) typically are wary of military recruiters. Many view the military as a choice
only for the student who is not college or trade school bound. Some may not
favor the military in general. It is your job to educate these educators and
explain how the Army can help students achieve their goals. Dealing with educators is like dealing with prospects: they may hold uninformed opinions of the
Army and simply need information. You must assume the roles of counselor,
mentor, and coach to educate the educators and positively affect their opinions.
6-4. At the start of a new school year (SY), faculty and staff are generally very
busy and may resent an early invasion by recruiters. Before the SY starts, you
should find out when the staff will be available. Speak with the administrator
responsible for school rules and regulations as early as possible. You must be
careful to keep relationships with students on a professional level. Students
tend not to respect recruiters who try to become their buddies. Careless remarkscommenting on other students ASVAB scores, negative remarks about
other services, or (even worse) expressing negative opinions about school officialswill quickly sour relationships.
6-5. Schools are autonomous, and every schools organizational climate and
structure is different. You must keep this in mind and be flexible when dealing
with staff and faculty. Also be sensitive to administration changesa new principal or school board member, for example. You should ask a school administrator or staff member to introduce you to the new official. This will make them
aware of the Armys presence in the school and let you know where they stand
in regard to the military.

6-1

School Recruiting Program

6-6. You should be proactive and not wait around to see if a new official will
negatively affect the SRP. It is far easier to influence someone before they make
the rules than it is to change them after theyre made. Knowing and following
the schools ground rules for general access and school visits can make or
break your SRP. Successful recruiters fully understand the rules and stay
abreast of changes that occur during the SY.
6-7. Always keep school staff (especially counselors) informed when processing one of their students for enlistment. If another recruiter absolutely must
schedule an appointment with a senior during school time, have the responsible recruiter clear it with school officials as far in advance as possible. Never
react negatively to a schools refusal to do something you have asked. Always
maintain composure and present a positive image to school officials. Try to find
alternative ways to obtain the information you need. If there is a problem with
your school that you or your unit leader cant resolve, ask the chain of command
for assistance.
6-8. Never lose sight of the fact that you represent the Army in the school and
community. So be the Army in every way by demonstrating absolute professionalism and integrity. Be indispensable to school administration, counselors,
faculty, and students. Attend as many school activities as possible. Offer Army
training and experience, and personal knowledge of sports or hobbies as a
resource to the school. Always attend events in uniform; of course, if you are
coaching a sport or working in a shop, you should dress accordingly. Be helpful
and so entrenched in the school scene that the Army is in constant demand.
When you are successful in these things, you will generally be the first person
they call when students have questions about military service.

THINGS TO AVOID
6-9. Never rely on guidance counselors alone as a schools COI. Cultivate
coaches, librarians, administrative staff (especially school secretaries), and teachers whose subjects correlate with Army programs or your MOS. By directing
your efforts toward other faculty members, additional ways may be found to obtain
information and effectively communicate with students.
6-10. Dont discuss civilian life or jobs negatively with school officials or students. Above all, dont make salary comparisons between Soldiers and school
personnel. Even if your income exceeds that of the counselors and faculty, its not
necessary to tell everyone. Remember these are the people you are trying to win
over. Your professionalism and program knowledge will demonstrate that the Army
has a lot to offer.
6-11. Always introduce new recruiters to school officials. Explain how the recruiting unit supports and assists their school and provide them with information about the Army. This is an important step when getting the school to become comfortable with you as a recruiter. As a rule, school officials prefer to
have only one representative from each service on campus. If its necessary to
have another recruiter visit the school, be sure to call them in advance to request permission and let them know who the new recruiter will be. The following vignette is an example of proper school protocol.
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Small unit leadership: School recruiting program

The Armadillo center commander has just finished his weekly planning
meeting. During the meeting, SGT Jones (an ET) reminded everyone
that he would begin his leave on Thursday. The center commander, SFC
Brown, thanked SGT Jones for the reminder and then informed all team
members that SGT Jones will be on leave for 14 days. He then had
everyone refer to their planning schedule.
SFC Brown has always done a great job of introducing new team
members to the centers schools during in-processing. He also
understands the importance of having an alternate ET to fill in during a
primary ETs absence.
SFC Brown asks the assistant center commander how SGT Joness
leave will affect the RSTs planning for the week. The assistant center
commanders prospecting plan has the RSTs calling two of SGT Joness
assigned high schools. The schools are priority schools, and one is
scheduled to administer the ASVAB next week. Additionally, the
prospecting plan would require someone to conduct interviews for
graduates and seniors from this Wednesday to next Monday.
SFC Brown checks the remaining ETs schedules for their availability
to handle interviews and the ASVAB scheduled for next week. SFC
Brown directs the RSTs to continue with their prospecting plan. He
also directs SGT Jones to inform the high school POC that SGT Graham,
an RST, will assist during the schools ASVAB and represent the Army
during SGT Joness absence.

6-12. Never end a school visit without asking school officials what the Army
can do for them and their students. You do not want to be perceived by faculty
and staff as someone who only visits when they need something. Always give
back to the schools whether its teaching a class, providing a color guard for
special events, or just working as an usher at a basketball game. If you want
more cooperation from a school, volunteering your services and time could
very likely open that door.

SCHOOL PROFILE
6-13. Each school has its own profile or distinctive claim to fame. One school
may place a premium on its music program, one on its athletic program, and
yet another on its academic scholarship program. This information will enable
you to tailor a program that will fit each school. Study school folders from previous years. Plan activities and set objectives for each school. Dont reinvent the
wheel. Look for things which were used or tried in the past that worked. Seek
out important details about a school such as school colors, mascot, and whether
or not they give the ASVAB during school hours and for which grades. Often,
you can use Total Army Involvement in Recruiting (TAIR) activities or COI events
in conjunction with activities going on in your particular schools. This will give
you and the Army the positive exposure you need.
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School Recruiting Program

INFLUENCERS
6-14. Like parents and faculty members, student influencers can play an important role in the SRP. Students who stand out as leaders among their peers
are typically student influencers. Know who the student influencers are. Students such as class officers, newspaper and yearbook editors, and athletes can
help build interest in the Army among the student body. Keep them informed.
Tell them about the excellent educational benefits and the opportunities available in Americas Army. Some influential students such as the student body
president or the captain of the football team may not enlist; however, they can
and will refer other students who will.
6-15. Never pass up the opportunity to address a parent-teacher association
meeting. Many educators, parents, and business leaders are unaware of the
multifaceted opportunities the Army can offer young people. Provide them with
information on the benefits of an Army enlistment. Informed members of the
community can provide guidance to young people and serve as positive Army
influencers.
DECISION POINTS
6-16. A seniors plans can, and will, change throughout their senior year. Plans
to go directly into the workplace or attend college will change as the student
confronts reality. Work-bound students may find they lack the training and
experience to land a good paying job. College-bound students who planned on
continuing their education will discover the realities of tuition and book fees.
Recruiting unit leaders must develop a prospecting plan that will identify and
capitalize on these decision points as they occur.
6-17. Contacting students in the summer between their junior and senior year
will plant the seed of Army opportunities. Contact them again during the first
quarter and encourage them to take the ASVAB, if its offered, to help them
prepare for postsecondary school or the job market. Ask them what their plans
and goals are after graduation. Contact them again in the early spring. At this
point students will know if they are going to graduate and should know about
college acceptance and financial aid arrangements. For some students it is
clear that college is not an option, at least for now. Let them know how the Army
can help them fulfill their college aspirations. This is a key decision point and
one that must be pursued without fail. Typically, the first to contact will be the
first to contract.

STUDENT ASVAB
6-18. At the beginning of each SY, each MEPS provides a list of Army-assigned
schools for the ASVAB. You must contact your schools and market the test.
Schools that traditionally test have already been scheduled prior to the SY. You
should concentrate on both scheduling those schools that do not have a test
date and encouraging all schools to test class-wide. This information must be
given to your recruiting unit leader so they can notify the chain of command
about your schools ASVAB status.
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USAREC Manual 3-01

6-19. When you market the ASVAB, you must know who the key decision makers are and the schools policies regarding military testing. The school guidance
counselor is usually responsible for student testing and career development,
but the principal is the key decision maker. However, in some schools the
policy on testing may be established by the superintendent or the school board.
Once you know who makes the decision, arrange a meeting with them to discuss the benefits of the ASVAB. If you would like professional assistance contact your chain of command or the education services specialist.
6-20. The ASVAB can help establish, maintain, or improve school relations.
The ASVAB is a nationally recognized career exploration program. A benefit to
the school is that there is no cost. The ASVAB is designed to help guidance
counselors direct students toward career fields they are qualified for. In addition to helping the school, the ASVAB provides your recruiting unit with academically prequalified leads.
6-21. The MEPS compiles and distributes ASVAB results. The results provide
information not available from any other source. It provides the students AFQT
scores, military aptitude composites, and career goals. The list also identifies
the best potential prospects to contact and provides the most current contact
information for each student. The information is important when initially discussing careers and educational incentives with potential applicants.
6-22. An Army recruiter should be present during testing sessions, even if
another service is responsible for the test. Volunteer as a test proctor whenever
possible. ASVAB testing is a great opportunity to interact not only with the
students, but with school officials as well. You must always abide by schoolimposed restrictions on the use of ASVAB lists to contact students. Offer to
help schools interpret ASVAB results. Unless the school has imposed restrictions, call each student on the list and offer to interpret their test scores. This is
an excellent way to get one-on-one with the market.

POSTSECONDARY SCHOOLS
6-23. The postsecondary market is an excellent source of potential Army enlistments due to the high percentage of students who drop out of college, particularly during the first two years. Routinely reassure college officials the Army
is interested only in recruiting former students who have dropped out and students who are about to graduate. Avoid giving the impression the Army is on
campus to cause students to drop out of school.
6-24. Coordinate with school officials the best time (monthly) and place (student center) to set up an information table. You may not get to speak with many
students initially, but as the semester progresses more students will talk to
you about their future and what the Army has to offer. Establish a schedule
and location on campus where you can to interview interested students. Your
first choice should be the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) department.
If there is no ROTC program in the school, any agreed upon location by you and
the school will be fine.
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School Recruiting Program

6-25. Develop a working relationship with as many school officials as possible.
Suggested officials would include: Director of student affairs, career placement
officer, college registrar, financial aid officer, dean of students, director of student housing, veterans affairs officer, professor of military science, Concurrent
Admissions Program (ConAP) officer, department chairpersons, and professors
who may be helpful in making presentations or communicating Army opportunities.
6-26. Stop-Out Cycle (Decision Points). There are certain times during every
semester, students will likely drop out. The first is usually about 6 weeks into
the semester when a student can withdraw with no academic penalty and still
receive a refund. The second is about 11 weeks into the semester when a
student can still withdraw with no academic penalty but does not receive a
refund. The third is after the semester ends, grades are received, and tuition
must be paid for the next semester. Generally, attrition during the first year of
college is higher than in subsequent years. Students drop out during this time
because they are homesick, have to work, are out of money, or are in academic
difficulty. The freshman class should be your primary focus because they will
have the highest dropout rate. They often lack both the direction and funds to
fully pursue their education.

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Chapter 7

Recruiting Operations
7-1. Recruiting success is a matter of engaging the current market while preparing for future operations. Recruiting operations are central to the tactical
plan and fall into three categories: decisive, shaping, and sustaining.
DECISIVE
7-2. Decisive operations refer to direct actions that accomplish the mission, such
as prospecting, processing, and the leading Future Soldiers.
SHAPING
7-3. Shaping operations create conditions that make it possible to conduct effective decisive operations. Recruiting operations are shaped through school programs, the gathering and managing of leads, market analysis and community
involvement, school visits and COI development, TAIR events, and the student
ASVAB.
SUSTAINING
7-4. Sustaining operations provide support for all decisive and shaping operations ensuring freedom of action, extended operational reach, and prolonged endurance of decisive and shaping operations. Examples of sustaining operations
are training, vehicle maintenance, tending to personal and Family issues, and
physical fitness.

ROP
7-5. Recruiting operations typically have three phases: Planning, preparing, and
executing. In a recruiting unit, the first phase is planning how and when to
contact the most productive markets while considering the near- and long-term
benefits. The second phasepreparingwould be preparing an appropriate message for the targeted market. Finally, execute the plan and document the results.
7-6. Shaping operations can become decisive operations and vice versa. If, for
example, you are out posting your area (shaping operation) and happen to encounter a prospect who wants to hear the Army story (decisive operation), the
shaping operation changes into a decisive operation.
7-7. Recruiting operations are similar to combat operations in that a recruiting
unit must act decisively, shape the environment, and manage their ability to
sustain the fight. Planning, preparation, and execution are all about timing and
economy of force. This thought process will enable team members to execute
their units short-term operations while positively affecting long-term objectives.

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Recruiting Operations

FIVE AREAS OF EMPHASIS

7-8. Successful recruiting rests on a foundation called the five areas of emphasis. All daily recruiting activities fall within one or more of these areas: prospecting, interviewing, processing, the Future Soldier Training Program (FSTP), and
follow-up. The teams success or failure relates directly to the mastery of all five.
Training assistance is provided by the unit commander, ACC, first sergeant, and
battalion master trainers; however, recruiters are required to seek individual
training via distributed learning on the Learning Management System and commercially available publications.

RECRUITING FUNCTIONS
7-9. The recruiting functionsintelligence, prospecting, interviewing, processing, FSTP, training, sustainment, and mission commandrepresent the execution, support, and control of recruiting operations. Figure 7-1 shows the operational picture of recruiting. The following paragraphs briefly define the eight recruiting functions.

Figure 7-1. Recruiting functions

7-10. Intelligence gathering provides market data for the planning of recruiting
operations. It gives team members a historical and current demographic view of
the market as well as political, education and business information.
7-11. Prospecting identifies interested people who agree to hear your Army story.
Your mission success is relative to your prospecting success.
7-12. The Army interview is the art of recruiting. During the interview, the
recruiter must determine the persons goals and passions, devise a career plan,
and ask them to join the Army.
7-13. Processing ensures only qualified applicants become Soldiers. Processing
matches an applicants qualifications and desires with the needs of the Army.
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7-14. The FSTP reinforces the Future Soldiers commitment, prepares them for
basic training (BT), and reduces the personal and family anxiety often associated
with joining the Army. The FSTP also supports your recruiting efforts by providing quality referrals and market intelligence.
7-15. Training is the leaders domain and is necessary to sustain ones recruiting proficiency. However, it is each Soldiers responsibility to master the
art and science of recruiting.
7-16. Sustainment is the military, civilian, and contracted support that provides the physical means for team members to work and accomplish the mission.
7-17. Mission command enables leaders to make informed decisions, assign
responsibilities, and synchronize functions. It helps leaders adjust plans for
future operations while maintaining focus on the current operation.

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Chapter 8

Planning
INTRODUCTION
8-1. In recruiting, sustained mission accomplishment requires a tactical
mindset that for many is a new way of thinking. Time management is a critical
and essential element in the successful completion of all assigned tasks in
recruiting. Planning is the key to success in mission accomplishment of the
recruiting unit. Team members adjust their plan to meet daily events required
to support the ROP and in the normal conduct of recruiting operations. This is
the most important part of all the administrative recruiting tasks, as all planning within the unit are nested with each other. That is, they support each
other and reflect the interaction of the team throughout daily recruiting operations. An overview of planning will show how various team member activities
support the ROP and the mission.

PLANNING OVERVIEW
8-2. All team members must be familiar with what a ROP is before they begin
planning individual recruiting operation activities. Recruiting success is a matter of design. The ROP is the recruiting units big picture strategyit defines
the time, place, and actions required to dominate the market. A well thoughtout and highly detailed plan will set in motion the actions necessary to accomplish the recruiting mission. The ROP is the units near-term tactical plan. Simply stated, the ROP is what executes the mission strategy. Team member plans
represent the short, mid and long-term activities in the planning and execution
phases, which support the ROP.
8-3. The recruiting units ROP is a plan to maximize efforts and achieve success. The unit commander adjusts the ROP for each phase line and uses the
recruiting functions to formulate its tactical road map. The ROP is market driven,
but is also nested in the companys plan and adjusted to accommodate any
market changes or command directives. The ROP is the units daily plan that
covers the current phase line. Likewise, team member plans must reflect critical mission tasks and all known future events which support the units ROP.
Team members place recruiting operation activities in the Recruiter Zone (RZ)
calendar, which then becomes their individual plan. See examples in appendix
A of linked team members plans.
8-4. The units ROP identifies recruiting high payoff targets and locations, such
as highly productive schools, gathering places, or economic trends within the
community. The ROP identifies school and seasonal community events, which
have positive effects on prospecting. This information will direct prospecting
efforts to high payoff zones and events taking place during the phase line. These
directed prospecting efforts maximize the use of time and increase effectiveness. Proper time management by team members results in sufficient time to
execute mission related tasks.
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Planning
8-5. Prospecting is the key to mission success and the unit commander gives it
considerable thought during the planning phase. The unit commander carefully
considers the intelligence, prospecting analysis, and conversion data. The ROP
then includes time for prospecting activities. Commanders intent and simultaneous market penetration are part of the considerations when developing the
ROP. Team members annotate these detailed prospecting activities in their daily
section of the RZ calendar. Together, all of the team members plans roll up to
form the prospecting plan of the ROP. There will be other tasks, which will consume a portion of your time not directly related to lead generation or prospecting.
However, intelligent prospecting will maximize efforts and the use of time.
8-6. Applicant processing, although not initially scheduled, is anticipated and
is the result a good Army interview. The units ROP as well as team members
plans must be flexible enough to accommodate this important activity. Unit
commanders and ACCs review team member plans throughout the day and
direct or redirect applicant processing as required. This is execution of mission
command and the efficient use of available resources.
8-7. The ROP also includes Future Soldier training. The unit commander plans
funded and unfunded Future Soldier training events. Team member support
activitiessuch as helping during FS training events should be annotated in
the RZ calendar. The FSL coordinates with the unit commander and ACC for
team member support. All planned events must take place. Future Soldiers
are also valuable COIs who refer prospects, provide valuable intelligence, and
promote Army awareness in the community. Proper planning and execution of
these types of events increase referrals and prospecting results. This is an
example of efficiency in time management during the execution phase.
8-8. Sustainment and shaping operations should be annotated in the units
ROP. These events must be coordinated in advance and nested in team members plans. Sustainment such as logistical, military, and facility support should
be considered when scheduling shaping operations such as TAIR events, adventure van, rock climbing wall, or the guest speaker program. The unit commander annotates these events on the synchronization (or synch) matrix to
ensure higher command support. All planned events must state the date, time,
and location. (See the example in Figure 8-1).

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USAREC Manual 3-01

Figure 8-1. Sample of a recruiting center synchronization matrix

8-3

PART THREE

Part Three discusses in detail the eight recruiting functions that comprise the recruiting process.
Unit commanders use the functions as a template to assess, plan, prepare, and execute recruiting operations.
Chapter 9 Describes team member intelligence gathering at the recruiting center.
Chapter 10 Describes in detail the methods of prospecting and lead generation.
Chapter 11 Discusses the Army interview in detail.
Chapter 12 Discusses processing activities.
Chapter 13 Discusses the FSTP.
Chapter 14 Briefly discusses training, sustainment and mission command.
Chapter 15 Discusses follow-up (an area of emphasis) which is used throughout the recruiting
process.

Chapter 9

Intelligence
INTRODUCTION
9-1. Intelligence is a key ingredient in the planning and execution of successful recruiting operations. World, national and local events, employment opportunities, and economic trends, can directly or indirectly affect the local population, and more importantly, the target markets view of the military. This important information must be considered before planning and executing recruiting
operations. It is every team members responsibility to collect and provide timely
information to the unit commander.
9-2. The Army defines intelligence as the collection, processing, integration,
evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information. This information affects elements or areas of actual or potential operations. Higher echelons
provide some intelligence, such as market capabilities, local economy, demographics, past production, and military competition. However, intelligence gathered at unit and team member level provides commanders with the best picture of their current operating environment.

ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE
9-3. Commanders at all levels must consider the recruiting environment via
awareness and assessment assets, before executing operations. This information helps commanders understand and visualize their AO, organize their forces,
and control operations to achieve their objectives. Awareness and assessment
assets support the mission by alerting commanders to potential obstacles and
threats that may affect mission success. For example, the company commander
needs to know that a local college changed their access policy for recruiting
personnel. This example of awareness directly affects any college recruiting
operation and is a key consideration during mission planning.
9-4. Intelligence preparation of the environment (IPE) is the systematic, continuous process of analyzing a recruiting units market and recruiting environment. The process gauges the units performance and spots markets of opportunity. It provides the basis for current and future operations, drives the military decision-making process, and supports targeting. Staffs conduct IPE, and
team members provide awareness and assessment information that further
defines the environment. Some key environmental indicators include schools,
traffic flow, shopping malls, competition, colleges, industry, DOD locations, income levels, education levels, economy, and types of employment. Awareness
and assessment information assists recruiting unit commanders to correctly
identifying high payoff targets.

SENSORS AND THE INTELLIGENCE RECRUITING FUNCTION

9-5. The Army learned many lessons during our war on terrorism. One especially important lesson is that we need to share information from the individual
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Intelligence
on the ground to higher echelons. Every day during combat operations, Soldiers exit the wire on patrols or convoys and engage the local populace. In
doing so, Soldiers collect more vital information than any piece of technology in
the Armys inventory. Recognizing this, the Army has coined the phrase every
Soldier is a sensor. The same is true for recruiting operations. Whenever team
members are in their AO making contact with people, they are performing as
information awareness and assessment assets. Every team member is a sensor.
9-6. Sensors must be able to understand and describe the local recruiting
environment. They must understand their markets lifestyle trends, cultural
and social values, and how they view military service. Sensors must constantly
be aware of their surroundings especially during recruiting activities. Market
awareness is especially important when team members engage in
Prospecting by phone or face-to-face.
Area canvassing.
Leading Future Soldiers.
Visiting schools.
Army interviews.
9-7. Intelligence in recruiting is derived from activities and systems that provide information and understanding of the recruiting environment. This recruiting
function relies on awareness and assessment assets that continually report
information to the unit commander. Intelligence is more than just data collectionit is a continuous process of gathering and analyzing information from all
sources. Team members constantly gather information while traveling within
the local recruiting area, and during route planning for individual or unit events.
Intelligence at unit level requires team members to support situational understanding, targeting, and the collection of information.
9-8. Gathering and reporting intelligence facilitates the unit commanders understanding and visualization of the centers AO. This provides the unit commander with predictive intelligence and the ability to anticipate market shifts,
key events, or obstacles that can affect the units ROP. Most of the time, recruiting tasks and intelligence gathering are interactive and often occur simultaneously. For example, while conducting a Future Soldier follow-up, you may
learn that another recruiting service has scheduled presentations with all of
the history classes at a high school. This is an important detail to know when
the unit commander and team members plan school visits and classroom presentations.

OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE
9-9. Recruiters collect information through observation, research, academic
study, and open-source intelligence. Open-source intelligence is publicly available information collected and disseminated in a timely manner. It is relevant
information that generates from the collection, processing, and analysis of public information. Team members (sensors) and higher recruiting echelons perform these activities. Open-source and publicly available information can be
further defined as follows:
Open source is any person or group that provides information without
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USAREC Manual 3-01

the expectation of privacy. Public disclosure does not protect the information, the individuals, or both.
Publicly available information is data, facts, instructions, or other material published or broadcast for general public consumption; available on request to a member of the general public; lawfully seen or
heard by any casual observer; or made available at a meeting open to
the public.

PROCESS OF INTELLIGENCE GATHERING

9-10. Each echelon of command uses the same four-step process to gather information
Define the local recruiting environment.
Describe the recruiting environment.
Evaluate the market.
Synchronize efforts to high payoff areas and organizations.
9-11. Commanders need situational understanding for the planning and execution of recruiting operations. They depend on staff and team members to provide
them with information that will deepen their understanding. Upon receipt of the
mission and during mission analysis, commanders focus on the mission variables: mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time
available and civil considerations (METT-TC). Commander use METT-TC to visualize, describe their intent, and then provide direction toward the mission. During this time, information provided by team members becomes critical.
9-12. The transfer of intelligence information is continuous. Team members
report their information throughout the day and during their interface with the
unit commander or ACC. The unit commander communicates this intelligence
to higher echelons for consideration. The team shares and discusses this information during daily IPR and weekly or event driven AARs. This sharing leads to
situational awareness for the team, adjusted application of recruiting tasks, or
a change in directives.
9-13. Team members (sensors) aid the unit commander in understanding civil
considerations. Civil considerations encompass manmade infrastructure, institutions, attitudes and activities of the community leaders, population, and
organizations. Team members use the memory tool ASCOPEarea, structures,
capabilities, organizations, people, and eventsto gather and transfer awareness and assessment information through the center commander to higher echelons. The local commander analyzes this data to understand civil considerations that may affect operations. No standard product results from this analysis. Civil considerations include
Geographical area.
Social, political, or religious culture.
Streets, highways, and railroads.
Commercial zones.
County and city boundaries.
Structures.
Government centers and schools.
Television and radio stations.
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Intelligence

Military facilities.
Trade centers.
Capabilities.
Health centers.
Technology.
Transportation.
Communication.
Organizations.
Churches.
Fraternal organizations.
Patriotic or service organizations.
Labor unions.
People.
Perceptions.
Religious beliefs.
Events.
County fairs.
Elections.
School activities.
Job fairs.
Community events; air shows and festivals.

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Chapter 10

Prospecting
INTRODUCTION
10-1. Prospecting is the foundation of recruiting. Purposeful, focused, and vigorous prospecting leads to success. Prospecting is any action a team member
takes to contact a lead. A lead is simply a name with contact information
physical address, phone number, or e-mail addressfor someone who may
agree to an Army interview. Prospecting can be executed by telephone, face-toface contact, and through virtual methods (e-mail, Facebook and Twitter, for
example). Prospecting operations should consume most of the units time and
become a way of life. Individual prospecting efforts are an important part of the
unit and companys prospecting picture. Leaders must be fully aware of all
recruiting efforts. Unit commanders must provide guidance and detailed information regarding team members prospecting plans.
10-2. Leads enable prospecting. Even though USAREC supplies leads through
the recruiter workstation (RWS), it is still good practice and a requirement to
ask school officials for a student directory. Most schools will release a student
directory or list to comply with the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, but if they
dont, team members may have to use a little creativity. Consider, for example,
contacting the companies that produce the senior photos or class rings. Team
members should task Future Soldiers to review school yearbooks and get phone
numbers and e-mail addresses for their classmates. Use the phone book. This
kind of information gathering can establish contact with an otherwise hard to
find lead. Future Soldiers and COIs can be very helpful filling the gaps in your
lead lists.

ROP
10-3. Soldiers dont go into combat without a plan or the right equipment. Similarly, prospecting should not be attempted without a solid plan. A well thoughtout plan based on the units ROP will optimize prospecting time and effort.
Prospecting without a plan is nothing more than a waste of time.
10-4. The units ROP should include a great deal of insight and keen situational awareness. No single prospecting method is best. All prospecting methods should be exploited to take advantage of every prospecting opportunity.
Close analysis of the market will help direct prospecting efforts where they will
most likely be effective.
10-5. A number of resources can help determine when, where, and how to
prospect most effectively. One such resource is conversion data. Conversion
data can be found in Reports in RZ. It shows conversion ratios for each step of
the recruiting process from appointment made to contract. If ten people agree
to an interview and two enlist, the conversion data is 5 to 1 (10 divided by 2).
That is, if five prospects are interviewed, one should enlist. This information
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Prospecting
shows how much prospecting should be conducted to achieve mission.
10-6. Prospecting analysis, found in Leader Zone, will help determine the units
best prospecting method. It will reveal which method is the most effective. The
unit may have a conversion rate of 5 to 1 in face-to-face prospecting and a
conversion rate of 25 to 1 in telephone prospecting. Which prospecting technique is going to be the most productive for the unit, and which prospecting
method needs a little fine-tuning? The unit commander should also look at the
time required for travel to conduct face-to face prospecting. Prospecting analysis coupled with conversion data provides solid intelligence to build a successful prospecting plan.
10-7. Once conversion data is understood, along with the most effective lead
source and prospecting method, the unit commander is ready to develop the
centers ROP.

PROSPECTING
10-8. Pre-prospecting plan. Define the prospecting target. Determine the mission category the unit is attempting to enlist. For example, if trying to enlist a
high school senior, test score category I-IIIA, then contact seniors from a high
school that historically produces I-IIIA caliber students. Filter the list by where
the contacts reside in a specific ZIP Code or community area. The list can be
further refined by eliminating leads that were previously attempted but werent
at home during the planned prospecting time. Use opportunities such as holidays, snow days, and school and local events to leverage prospecting efforts.
10-9. Blueprinting. Blueprint all leads prior to any prospecting operations.
Blueprinting is nothing more than obtaining specific or personal information
about the people to be contacted. Blueprint information can usually be obtained from COIs, VIPs, parents, school officials, and Future Soldiers. Information may not always be available, but the more one knows about a person, the
more receptive they will be to the Army message.
10-10. Tracking. The RZ calendar automatically tracks prospecting attempts,
contacts, and appointments. As team members make attempts, contacts, and
appointments, they can clearly see the results of their work. It could look something like this: Attempts: 25, contacts: 5, appointments: 1. Contacts are only
counted if a recruiter speaks with the intended person. Prospecting data is
used by leaders to identify and address training shortfalls.
10-11. Callback plan. What happens during the contact attempt will determine the callback plan. If there was no answer, schedule the follow-up for a
different time. If the individual was not home find out the best time to call them.
By recording detailed notes of attempts such as time called and information
received from family members, adjustments can be made regarding time and
message. Care should be taken to ensure follow-ups are evenly distributed to
avoid overbooking the daily plan.
10-12. The telephone, amidst all of todays technology, still remains the unit
commanders tool of choice for prospecting. A text message to a cell phone is
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considered a telephone attempt. Some prospects have a text-only digital plan or
limited voice capability, but no home number listed. Voice mail and caller identification have somewhat reduced the effectiveness of the telephone. Even so,
the phone remains the most efficient way to rapidly contact a large number of
leads.
10-13. Prospecting steps. Once a solid prospecting plan has been established,
its time to put it into action. The art of recruiting begins with that first contact
the first phone call, the first handshake, the first virtual response. Regardless
of the prospecting method, team members are the ones responsible for taking
the first step. Dont allow distractions to interfere with established prospecting
goals. Even though the steps of telephone prospecting are linear, team members must remain flexible to accommodate any questions the prospect may
have.
10-14. The teams objective during any prospecting operation is getting the
person to agree to an appointment. The following paragraphs represent the
steps of the phone call.
Identify yourself and the Army. This cannot be overstated. Be excited!
Be proud of our profession and the service it provides to both the individual and the Nation. Initiate communication by using a scripted opening statement. (See appendix B for introductory scripts.) For example,
Hello, Im Sergeant Jones with the Army recruiting office here in town.
Is John home?
Establish trust and credibility. First impressions are everything. Remember, when calling prospects at home it will more than likely be an
interruption to them. The person was not expecting a call, especially
from an Army representative, and may be in the middle of a meal, doing
homework, or getting ready to leave the house. A telephone call can
make it difficult to convey a sincere interest in the person. Therefore, it
is essential the team member communicates their role as a counselor.
This can be done by briefly describing Army training or educational programs and how the Army can assist them realize their career goals. Remember, establishing trust and credibility on the telephone may take a
little time. Be patient and show a genuine interest in the individuals
aspirations, dreams, and goals. Ask questions and most of all listen.
State the reason for the call. The intention of the call is to explain how
the Army can help them identify their goals and develop strategies to
achieve them. It is important team members communicate to the prospect their ability to provide such a service. Using a scripted and well
rehearsed introduction, one might say something like, John, this is SGT
Jones, your local Army representative. The reason Im calling is to talk
with you about the Army, and how the Army can help you realize your
career goals. Would you mind spending a few minutes with me? Present
a simple Army story whenever the opportunity presents itself and relate
that story to your role as a counselor. Sometimes, simply being an adult
who is willing to listen has a tremendous impact.
Identify the need for a plan to achieve their goals. Use counseling
techniques to uncover not only the persons goals, but also their true
passions. A person may tell you their goal is to attend college, earn a
business degree, and own their own business. Their passion may be
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having something they can be proud of, something they have dreamed of
for years. Never confuse the two. Perhaps the person knows what they
want, but arent really sure how to get it. Perhaps they know how to get
what they want, but dont have the means. Either situation presents an
outstanding opportunity for you to reiterate your ability to assist them.
Establish your value to the contact. It is not unusual to meet people
who have no goals at all. These people often try to hide the fact that they
havent thought about life goals or dont see how they could achieve any
goals even if they had them. They might be embarrassed to talk about
their situation, especially with a stranger. Others have a laundry list of
goals with no set plans to achieve them. In either case, skilled counseling techniques (see appendix B) will make them see the value of speaking with a recruiter.
Respect their goals. The recruiter must ask open-ended, fact finding
questions and avoid questions that ask for a yes or no answer. The
questions should avoid giving the impression of an interrogation. For
example, John, what plans have you made to continue your education
following high school? This sort of question can only be answered with
a good bit of thought. The questions should help the prospect understand that the recruiter wants to help. The interview should open their
eyes. The recruiter must be patient and flexible while trying to uncover
needs that will require the recruiters help.
Identify facts and eliminate assumptions. During phone conversations, misunderstandings may occur. The recruiter should never assume the intent of the prospect. When necessary, the recruiter should
ask follow-on questions and restate what the prospect has said. The
recruiter must seek to clearly understand the prospects goals and passions. By listening closely to the prospects answers, the recruiter will
convey sincerity and an ability to counsel professionally.
Engender a commitment. Once the recruiter has identified goals and
passions, its time to ask for the appointment. The recruiter must explain that a personal meeting is necessary to show how the Army can
help them achieve their goals. People often think if they agree to an
appointment, they have to join the Army. In order to calm their fears,
the recruiter must make clear that they have the prospects interests at
heart.
Note: Field Manual (FM) 6-22, Army Leadership, outlines three approaches to the problemsolving process that can be used to overcome most obstacles. The recruiter must remain
empathetic. They should let the person know they understand their hesitation and work through
obstacles as they arise. Not every prospecting call will result in an appointment. Even if the
prospect says no, the recruiter should end the conversation on a high note. A sincere, low
pressure approach will leave the door open and make it easy for the person to approach the
recruiter later. (See appendix B.)

Ask for a referral. The recruiter should always ask for a referral. A referral has the highest probability of becoming an enlistment. When a person offers a referral, very likely the referred person is someone they
know is interested in military service. The recruiter should use a light
and comfortable approach for example, John, whom do you know
who could use some help in planning for their future? or John, is there
anyone you can think of whod benefit from what we talked about today?
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FACE-TO-FACE PROSPECTING
10-15. Face-to-face is the most direct form of prospecting. It gives you an opportunity to physically meet with people rather than talk with them on the phone.
When you cannot contact a lead by phone, the next best thing is to stop by their
house.
10-16. Face-to-face prospecting should be a part of the units ROP just as the
telephone and virtual methods. Plan your face-to-face prospecting activities by
selecting leads living in the same general area. Select a time based on their
status, such as, seniors in the late afternoon and grads in the morning. Always
be prepared to interview someone, and make sure you have a good supply of
recruiting publicity items (RPIs) and business cards. Always leave an RPI and a
business card whether youve talked to someone or not.
10-17. Keep in mind face-to-face prospecting is a hit and miss type of activity.
Your goal is to talk to the person, but if theyre not at home, you can usually get
valuable blueprint information from parents, family members, and even neighbors. They will usually let you know a good time to stop back. They may also
supply you with additional contact information such as a cell phone number, email address, or other location where the person can be reached.
10-18. If you are fortunate enough to talk with a parent, you can usually learn
their childs career plans. This will give you an opportunity to share with parents how the Army can help their son or daughter, achieve their plans. Your
personal visit could also find a brother, sister, or even parent who may be
interested in hearing the Army story. Uncovering new leads is a common byproduct of face-to-face prospecting, but one youll never experience until you
do it.
10-19. Even though face-to-face isnt the most efficient means of prospecting,
it is the most effective if excessive travel is not required. With the lowest contact
to contract ratio, face-to-face prospecting should be your method of choice when
you need a quick contract. Simply make a list of people you havent been able
to contact, grab some RPIs, and knock on some doors.

VIRTUAL PROSPECTING
10-20. One of the newest tools in the recruiting arsenal is the Internet. The
Internet helps team members communicate via e-mail and can be seen as a
very efficient and cost effective tool for contacting large numbers of prospects.
Team members must keep in mind that virtual contact can never be as personal or captivating as a telephone or face-to-face conversation. It is impossible to personally meet every person in your market. E-mail and social media
sites can be used to initiate contact, pique interest, and get the message out.
Unit commanders must appoint one or more team members to maintain the
units social media sites. All team members should leverage social media sites
to gather blueprint information and generate leads.
10-21. While virtual prospecting can be a great tool for contacting large numbers of leads, recruiters must not appear as mere mass-marketers. Send a single
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Prospecting
prospecting e-mail message to no more than 20 people. If the To line contains
more than twenty addresses, many e-mail systems will flag the mail as spam.
Many Internet service providers filter such e-mail traffic as a service to their
clients.
10-22. USAREC provides guidance on social media communication and site
set-up. Recruiting systems provide a number of templates for e-mail prospecting. In fact, use of the templates is required for all e-mail prospecting. E-mail
templates are designed to synchronize with other messages going out through
other media. Messages sent from RZ will be personal, professional, and on
track with current command initiatives. USAREC e-mail templates are updated
regularly and include the following mandatory items:
The senders full name, address, telephone number, and a removal
clause.
Links to www.goarmy.com A link to the virtual recruiting chat room,
http://www.goarmy.com/talk-with-us/chat.html, can be added if desired.
The removal clause: If you do not wish to receive e-mail about new
Army offers and information, please respond to this e-mail with the word
Remove in the subject line and I will remove your name from my mailing list.
10-23. The Internet can be a highly productive recruiting tool. Recruiters must
use caution, however, when contacting schools and students. Recruiters must
never jeopardize the Armys positive relationship with the school or its students. The Armys entire Internet domain can be denied or blocked if team
members violate this guidance. The following are examples of templates provided by USAREC. These templates can be found in RZ.
College Market.
General Market Opt-In.
Influencer.
Student Loan Repayment.
Grad Workforce.
Local Event.
High School Market.
Special Bonus Upgrade.
10-24. The following are examples of social networking guidance and procedures located on the G7/9 social networking page in the command intranet:
Posting events.
Adding favorites.
Creating a discussion tab.
USAREC Social Media SOP.

LEAD-GENERATION ACTIVITIES
10-25. Referrals. Getting referrals demonstrates the power of the centers external network. Every person in your community is a potential lead source.
When your neighbors, COIs, school officials, and Future Soldiers accept you as
a respected member of the community, they will refer their friends and family
members. Remember, when a person refers someone, they are in effect telling
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that individual they trust you. More importantly, the referrers honor and integrity transfer to you. Therefore, referred leads are more comfortable and open to
what you have to say. Thats why you should always ask for a referral.
10-26. Dont sit around and wait for referrals to come to you, though some will.
Get out in the community and ask for them. Give your Future Soldiers a monthly
referral mission and explain how referrals can help them get promoted. Remember, referrals convert to enlistments much more frequently than leads from
any other source.
10-27. Area canvassing. Area canvassing is not only the fastest and easiest
way to gain exposure to your market it is also an excellent source of leads.
Canvassing activities allow you to develop and nurture a solid community network. Time spent in the community allows you to develop COIs and VIPs. It
enables you to identify high traffic areas and hotspots (places where people
hang out). You can also use canvassing activities to target strategic locations for
free advertising, such as posters and RPIs.
10-28. Area canvassing can be very time consuming, so you must have a solid
and predictable plan. Unit leaders should synchronize efforts between team
members while creating their supporting plan. Team members should create
their plans so people will know where they will be at given time during the
week. The more time spent in the community, the more the recruiter will understand where to be and when to be there. These high payoff locations should
be discussed during the IPR. Knowing the habits of people in the market will
greatly assist the team in their efforts.
10-29. All team members should attend high school athletic events; they should
visit strip malls, shopping centers, hangouts, and restaurants. One of the most
important locations for recruiters is their high schools. The purpose of the visit
should be to obtain leads without being a hindrance to students or school
officials. Recruiters should take advantage of every opportunity to visit their
schools. Table days, lunch time visits, and classroom presentations should be
standard parts of any SRP.
10-30. In general, recruiters are more likely to find an enlistment by meeting
people face-to-face than by talking on the phone. While out in the community,
recruiters should talk to everyone they meet. They should develop comfortable
and friendly techniques to break the ice with people. Team members should
give business cards to everyone they meet. Store owners and employees can
provide referrals. Reserve centers and National Guard armories are always a
good source of leads. When team members stop for gas, get a haircut, or check
out at the grocery store, they should ask for a referral. The key is to make as
many friends as possible.

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Chapter 11

The Army Interview

INTRODUCTION
11-1. The Army story is as old as the Army itself. Its about a bridge in Concord, Massachusetts, an amphibious landing on Omaha Beach, and crossing
the Euphrates into Baghdad. The Army story began during our Nations birth,
and for more than two centuries the Army has supported and defended Americas
way of life.
11-2. Your chapter of the Army story continues today as you share your personal experiences with young men and women who are considering their own
Army story. It all starts with the Army interviewa more or less formal conversation between you and a prospective Future Soldier. The Army interview uses
the developmental counseling approach to determine the individuals needs,
wants, and desires.
11-3. Your Army story is critical to your success. Your story should include the
reason you joined, the benefits you received, your experiences as a Soldier
and leader, the places youve been, and Army life in general. You must be
flexible and able to adapt your Army story to any situation. You should tailor
your story to the audience, whether it is potential Soldiers, parents, teachers,
or community influencers. Even people who are not eligible know someone
who is, and they will refer them to you if you ask. Use every opportunity to tell
your Army story.
11-4. Your Army story, combined with your counseling experience and leadership ability is what motivates a person to enlist. The interview itself is nothing
more than a form of developmental counseling, something you should already
be familiar with. Youve probably counseled Soldiers and most assuredly have
been counseled yourself sometime during your career. Those same counseling
skills, along with your Army story, will now be used to show potential Soldiers
how they can realize their life goals through an Army enlistment.

ADAPTIVE APPROACHES TO COUNSELING

11-5. To be an effective recruiter, you must learn to treat each prospect as an
individual. Different people and different situations require different counseling approaches. FM 6-22 discusses three approaches to counseling: nondirective, directive, and combined. The nondirective approach encourages maturity,
open communication, and personal responsibility. The directive approach is good
for prospects that need clear, concise direction. The directive approach allows
the counselor to use their own experiences to guide the prospect. The combined
approach encourages maturity, open communication, and allows the counselor
to use their own experiences.
11-6. The Army interview is not a platform for Soldiers to share war stories.
The Army interview is a developmental counseling session where the recruiter
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leads the prospect to a decision to become a Soldier. Most Soldiers on recruiting
duty have counseled other Soldiers. At the very least, they have received counseling from a military or civilian supervisor. It should be easy to transfer that
experience with counseling and adapt those skills to the Army interview. Table
11-1 shows the close relationship between developmental counseling and the
Army interview.
Table 11-1.
Correlation between the Army interview and developmental counseling

11-7. Leading someone through the decision making process relies heavily on
your ability to use all three counseling approaches. You must be sensitive to
the responses you receive during the interview so you can make on-the-fly
adjustments. Some prospects start out timid and slowly gain confidence as you
build their self-esteem. You could very well use all three approaches in the
same interview.
11-8. In addition to the counseling approaches, you must also be able to inspire and intellectually stimulate your prospect. Inspirational motivation provides your prospect with challenges and reasons to achieve their goals by tak11-2

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ing action. One way to inspire your prospect is to help them reflect on their past
goals and what it took to achieve them. Intellectual stimulation helps your prospect question assumptions theyve made about their future. This will help them
generate realistic and achievable goals. Individualized consideration is the most
important part of the interview. It allows you to coach and mentor each prospect one-on-one. A successful interview should inspire the prospect to emulate you.

HOW TO COUNSEL EFFECTIVELY

11-9. There are no easy answers or guides that can prepare you for the many
different leadership and counseling challenges you will encounter. You must
rely on the leadership competencies and behaviors youve learned throughout
your Army career. The Armys leadership competencies and behaviors are outlined in FM 6-22.
11-10. You must be a leader with strong moral character and embody the Army
values. You serve a public that sees you as an ambassador of the Army: selfdisciplined, professional, and socially upstanding. You cannot allow a negative
stereotype of your profession to be confirmed. If you live the Soldiers creed,
you will create mutual trust with the community and enhance your mission
success.
11-11. You will earn trust and gain credibility with your community and prospective Future Soldiers by being honest and consistent in your statements
and actions. This can be as simple as showing up on time for an appointment
or by just keeping your word. Trust and credibility form the foundation of your
relationship with the community and ultimately your target market. By successfully establishing trust and credibility, you will increase the likelihood of
prospects who will seek your career guidance.
11-12. Since our country is one of the most culturally diverse in the world,
understanding the beliefs, values, and norms of the ethnic groups in your community is a must. Do research, contact the local chamber of commerce, visit
veteran and civic organizations, and actively listen when talking with prospects.
This information gathering will help you appreciate what is important to the
people you are counseling and make you more effective.
11-13. Self-awareness means knowing your personal strengths and vulnerabilities. Remember, every person is unique and may interpret your words and
actions in ways you never intended. You must be aware that ideas, plans, or
goals communicated to you by your prospects are very personal, regardless of
how you perceive them, and they must be respected. During the interview you
must develop alternatives designed to help the person achieve their goals. If
you encounter someone who has no set goals, empathize with them. Help them
establish some goals and then proceed with the interview. Never minimize a
persons needs, wants, and desires. Trivializing their goals and replacing them
with your own will negatively impact your relationship. The interview will become one-sided and your role as counselor will degrade to that of a salesperson.
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The Army Interview

11-14. Empathy is an important skill you must acquire if you expect to be a good
counselor. You must be understanding and sensitive to the experiences, feelings, and thoughts of your prospect to the degree that you can almost experience
or feel them yourself. Putting yourself in your prospects shoes will help you understand their needs, wants, and desires. It is a way to validate the other persons
reality, perspective, and point of view. This insight plays an important part in
your influence now and later to reinforce their commitment as a Future Soldier.

COUNSELING SKILLS
11-15. You should continuously develop your counseling skills and techniques.
You can accomplish this through active listening, studying human behavior,
sharpening your communication techniques, becoming self-aware, and developing valuable interpersonal skills. Each interview will vary depending on the individual, but the skills you use will remain constant. The basic skill you must
master is active listening.
11-16. Active listening is an intent to listen for meaning, in which the listener
checks with the speaker to see that a statement has been correctly heard and
understood. The goal of active listening is to improve mutual understanding and
encourage people to communicate more openly and freely. Active listening has
many components, including body language (nodding, eye contact, open posture,
body and facial expressions) and verbal techniques (reflective listening, paraphrasing, asking clarifying questions, and understanding the message behind
the message).
11-17. Body language interpretation is very useful, but can be difficult if you are
unfamiliar with your audience. The following examples will apply in most cases.
Arms crossed on the chest can denote defensiveness or closed mindedness. Stroking the chin could be a sign the person is trying to make a decision. Placing the
hand on the cheek could mean the prospect is evaluating and thinking about
what has been said. Touching or slightly rubbing the nose can mean there is
doubt, rejection, or distrust about what has been said. Leaning forward could
mean the person you are speaking with is very interested in what is being said.
You should be aware of subtle changes in your prospects body position, eye contact, and hand gestures. For the same reason, you should recognize the signals
you are sending through your own body language. The practice and study of nonverbal communication is necessary to effectively communicate with your audience.
11-18. Reflective listening is crucial. It is simply repeating back to the prospect
exactly what you heard them say, using their words. This technique will increase
your understanding of the persons intent. It can help the person clarify their
thoughts. It can also reassure them you understand their point of view and that
you sincerely want to help.
11-19. Paraphrasing is repeating to the person what you heard them say by summarizing it and putting it into your own words. When the person senses you truly
understand what they are saying, your credibility will be enhanced.
11-20. Clarifying questions are asked in an effort to gain a deeper and more
accurate understanding of what the person is trying to say. Clarifying questions
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lessen the possibility of any misunderstanding on your part. When you are able to
uncover the hidden message that lies beneath what is actually said, your effectiveness in providing meaningful counsel is greatly enhanced.

COUNSELING PITFALLS
11-21. Here are some counseling pitfalls to avoid:
Personal biasAn unfair preference or opinion based on your background,
culture, or previous experience.
Rash judgmentsJumping to conclusions with incomplete information.
StereotypingCategorizing individuals or groups according to a preconceived image or idea.
Loss of emotional controlGetting angry and allowing personal distractions to influence the outcome of the interview.
InflexibilityAn uncompromising, one size fits all counseling method.
Failure to follow upFailing to re-contact the prospect within a reasonable amount of time.
Premature interview terminationFailing to tell the Army story to prospects who are permanently or temporarily disqualified (see note 1 and 2
below). Always ask for a referral, even if the person cannot join the Army.

Note 1: If the prospect is permanently disqualified, continue with an abbreviated

interview so they are generally knowledgeable of Army programs and options.
Keep them in your network. They will help you spread the Army word within your
community and bring you referrals.
Note 2: If the applicant is temporarily disqualified, do not spend excessive time
discussing their disqualification. Continue with the interview and try to get their
commitment to join. Once they have agreed to join, then you can fully explain
what they must do to become qualified.
COUNSELING PROCESS
11-22. You will encounter people from all walks of life. You must be able to
adapt the interview to any situation. While this chapter addresses interview
techniques as it applies to a prospect, you must also be able to adapt them to
all aspects of recruiting, such as COI and VIP development.
11-23. The Army interview is a universal model that applies to all mission
categories, to include medical and chaplain recruiting. During the interview,
you must get to know the person, counsel them regarding their career plans,
and attempt to lead them to an enlistment or commission decision. The principles and concepts that comprise the interview can be applied to any mission
category or life situation. Your mission success can be directly attributed to
your understanding and practice of the concepts in this model.
11-24. Since you spend most of your time looking for people who will agree to
an appointment, it only makes good sense to give them your very best during
the interview. Practice, rehearse, and listen to other team members. Develop
your own personal style, but stay flexible so you can adjust to the individuals
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The Army Interview

needs, wants, and desires. For more information on developmental counseling
see FM 6-22, appendix B.

PREPARE FOR COUNSELING

11-25. Preparation is the key to successful counseling. You can never predict
the outcome of an interview, but you can take steps to increase the prospects
likelihood of joining the Army.
11-26. Blueprint. Review blueprint information gathered prior to prospecting and
during contact with the individual as well as information received from third
parties (friends, parents, school officials, Future Soldiers). It is important to review this information before the interview. You will need this information to help
establish and maintain trust and credibility, determine needs and interests, and
identify goals. This information will help you lead the person through the process
and determine their best COA.
11-27. Create a good appearance. Your appearance (including your office, equipment, and professional conduct) represents the Army as a whole. You are probably the first Soldier your prospect, their family, and friends have ever met. The
people the Army serves have high expectations of Soldiers, you must exceed their
expectations. Your office and GOV must be neat, clean, and present a professional appearance. First impressions are lasting impressions. Remember, the
people in the communities where you work and live observe everything you do.
11-28. Choose a suitable location. You can interview a prospect anywhere. However, you should choose a location that minimizes interruptions and is free from
distracting sights and sounds. Consider the comfort zone of your prospect. Let
them decide if the office, their own home, or another location will be best. When
your prospect is comfortable, they will be more apt to open up and talk freely and
honestly. The ideal location is the prospects living room or around the dining
room table with their family present.
11-29. Select a suitable time. When scheduling an appointment, you should allow time for a complete Army interview. A complete interview has the potential
to take more than two hours, even without distractions. Allow enough time to
give your prospects the attention they deserve. Never overbook your schedule.
The prospects time is just as valuable as yours. Arrive on or just before the
agreed upon time, and then use the time wisely.
11-30. Invite influencers. You enter a win-win situation by discovering who will
influence your prospects decision-making process. Include these influencers in
the interview (see blueprinting). If your prospect is married, involved in a relationship, relies heavily on the advice of friends, or is seventeen years of age and
needs parental consent, schedule the appointment so these influential people
can be present. This approach will eliminate obstacles early on, allowing you to
gain a commitment without the prospect changing their mind later. Dont forget,
influencers can also refer even more leads.
11-31. Get organized. Review any blueprint information youve gathered to assist you during the interview. Identify topics to explore. You should ask yourself,
Did I make the appointments based on ASVAB score? Is this person interested in
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USAREC Manual 3-01

airborne training? What are my prospects goals? Identify potential obtacles: A
parent who served in the Armed Forces and had a bad experience; a significant
other who may not want to endure a separation; obstacles that surfaced during
the initial contact. Develop a plan to counter these potential problems so they do
not become obstacles.
11-32. Write it all down. Outline the counseling session components. By using
the information obtained from the prospect and outside sources, you can create a
foundation to work from during the interview. You can then formulate COAs before encountering them face-to-face. You must be ready for anything and everything. Remain flexible, but focus on the desired outcome.
11-33. Plan your counseling strategy. While there are many approaches to counseling, FM 6-22, appendix B addresses three avenues of approach that can be
effective: Directive, nondirective, and combined. You must be adept at reading
the situation and your prospects personality. You may start the interview in the
nondirective approachsoliciting input to uncover their goals and aspirations
then move into the combined approach to solidify plans of action and engender
the commitment to enlist. You might take the directive approach as you schedule enlistment processing.
11-34. Establish the right atmosphere. Make the prospect feel as comfortable
and relaxed as possible. If the interview will take place in the recruiting center,
make sure there is something to drink (bottled water, coffee, and soda), and that
theres enough seating for everyone. Attention to detail goes a long way.

CONDUCT COUNSELINGTHE ARMY INTERVIEW

11-35. The Army interview is a nonlinear process. However, there is a logical
sequence of steps that will be discussed later in the chapter (see Steps of the
Army Interview). You will rely upon your training, experience, intuition, and the
fundamentals of effective counseling to move through the interview. Regardless
of what you encounter, you must adapt, adjust, and stay on course. You may
retrace earlier discussions or jump ahead depending on the situation and the
prospect. You should not be confined by a lock-step process. By paying close attention to what is occurring during the interview, you can help the prospect identify their goals and formulate a plan to achieve them.

TEMPERATURE CHECK
11-36. Knowing when to ask someone to join is just as important as asking them
to join. Timing is everything. A technique you can use to determine whether or
not your prospect is ready to make a commitment is called a temperature check.
A temperature check helps you know when the time is right to ask for a commitment. It is nothing more than asking the prospect for an opinion or a feeling
about the Army or a specific program and then analyzing their reaction. It makes
good recruiting sense to do temperature checks throughout the interview.
11-37. Asking a person to join does not have to occur during the last step of the
interview. You can ask the question at any time. For example, after telling your
Army story and your experiences as a tanker, you perceive youve touched the
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The Army Interview

applicants hot button. Follow up with a question such as, So, John, does that
sound like something youd like to do? This simple temperature check will get
you a yes or no response. If the answer is no or Im not sure, dont be alarmed.
The prospect is simply telling you they need more information. You might respond by saying something like, Thats okay, Johnnot everyone wants to drive
a tank, and continue with the interview.
11-38. However, if the prospect responds by saying yes, start treating them as
though theyve already committed to join the Army. The interview will go a lot
smoother because the big question has already been answered. Now you can
show them how the Army can fulfill their goals and passions. Continue to reinforce their commitment by taking more temperature checks during the course
of the interview. As such questions as, John, doesnt it feel good to know you
have your future all mapped out? Use your imagination and treat the prospect
like a Soldier. After all, they told you the Army is something they want to be a part
of.
11-39. Dont let agreement opportunities slip by. Early agreement diminishes
anxiety and promotes open dialog. Periodic temperature checks throughout the
course of the interview will also help establish a pattern of agreement from the
prospect such as, John, wouldnt you agree that the Army can help you achieve
your educational goals? After agreeing to your questions throughout the interview it will be a lot easier for the individual to say yes when you ask them to
enlist. (See examples in appendix B.)

STEPS OF THE ARMY INTERVIEW

TRUST AND CREDIBILITY
11-40. Opening and introduction. In most cases, youve already talked with your
prospect either by telephone or face-to-face. You must be mindful of the initial
trust and credibility that was established and build upon it during the opening of
the interview. Even when you are interviewing a walk-in you must build trust
and credibility. Just because someone walks through the door of your office does
not mean that they are going to enlist. Most prospects feel uneasy during their
first interview. They will experience fear, doubt, intimidation, distrust, and anxiety as they face the unknown. You should assume these feelings exist and take
deliberate action to put your prospects at ease and make them feel comfortable.
11-41. The best approach you can use to break the ice is to be honest and direct.
Its all right for you to say something like, John, I know you may feel a little
apprehensive about talking to me today. The first time I spoke with my Army
representative, I didnt know what to expect either. Just remember, Im here to
help you. If you have any questions about what we talk about today, feel free to
ask them at any time, okay? You might even say, John, in case you were wondering, you cannot join the Army today, but if you should decide to enlist, I will do
my best to make that happen, is that okay? Your prospects agreement with your
ice breaking statement will set the tone for further agreement during the interview. Inform the prospect up front that you understand their fears and concerns.
There is always initial anxiety when encountering the unknown. You must help
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them overcome their anxiety and remove any psychological barriers that may
obstruct the two-way communication channel.
11-42. State the reason for the interview. The Army interview begins as you
state the purpose of the meeting and establish the role of the prospect during the
interview. For example, you might say, John, the reason were here is to develop
a plan that will help you accomplish your goals. If you havent established any
goals or are undecided, we will work together to determine whats best for you. I
will help you discover a variety of ways you can achieve your goals. Let the prospect know youre working for them.
11-43. Tell an Army story. While each story is personal, it is universal in its
impact on the audience when told with honesty and conviction. This is your
opportunity to present details of your own experiences. Avoid bragging about your
experiences. By telling your Army story up front, the task of establishing credibility and trust becomes easier. You will build self-confidence early in the counseling process. Confidence leads to enthusiasm and enthusiasm is contagious.
11-44. Your Army story may include your initial enlistment experience and subsequent assignments By discussing promotions, awards, campaigns, and assignment locations you will begin the process of educating your prospect so they can
picture themselves in the Army. Your personalized Army story should be well
rehearsed and supported by some form of testimony or personal scrapbook. You
can customize your scrapbook by using the PowerPoint presentation template
located on USARECs Recruiting Multimedia DVD.
11-45. Tell the Army story. Recall that at the start of the interview, you told your
personal Army story. You told the prospect why you joined the Army, and you
mentioned your accomplishments and adventures. At this point, you want to shift
the focus to the Army. By telling the Army story, you open the world of the Army to
the prospective Future Soldier. This will help your prospects see the Army through
your eyes, showing them with word pictures some of the things they will do when
they become a Soldier. The multimedia presentations on the RWS can help bring
your Army story to life.
11-46. Ask your prospect what they know about the Army. This can serve as a
starting point to build your Army story. By understanding the prospects point of
view, you also gain insight about the person. You will talk about the history of the
Army, the Army values you live by, and the Soldiers creed.
PREQUALIFICATION
11-47. Recruiting is a human resources function. Always qualify the prospect.
You should approach the Army interview as if you are the Armys human resources representative. You must ask general questions to establish control of
the interview as you work to qualify the prospect. There are no standard questions. You may ask such things as, Do you believe you are qualified to be a Soldier? What can you offer the Army? What do you expect from the Army? What do
you know about the Army?
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The Army Interview

11-48. Treat the Army interview just as you would any job interview. You are
responsible to determine if the prospect is medically qualified and meets the
administrative and conduct qualifications outlined in AR 601-210. You will learn
to gather most of the required prequalification information during the body of the
interview. As a general guideline, you should determine the prospects qualifications before you develop a plan of action. This ensures you present the prospect
with the right options and information.
11-49. Determining eligibility. Once you have uncovered the prospects passions and goals you must explain that Army programs are contingent on their
eligibility to join. This important step is classified as prequalification. The best
way to determine the prospects qualifications is to use the acronym APPLEMDT
as a guide: A = age, P = physical, P = prior service, L = law violations, E = education, M = marital status, D = dependents, and T = testing. The guide will help you
uncover most disqualifications. This step should not be taken lightly. Failure to
uncover information that could make the prospect unqualified for an option or
enlistment could result in losing the prospect and tarnishing your trust and credibility within the community.
11-50. When determining eligibility, its important to ask the right questions.
The following examples are designed to uncover the information you need to
prequalify the prospect
Age. What is your date of birth? Where were you born? What is your
SSN? Are you registered to vote? Do you know your selective service
number?
Physical. Are you now or have you ever been under the care of a doctor to
include any childhood illnesses or injuries?
Note: This question could be asked as follows: Please tell me about all the illnesses
youve had. What is the first one, when did you have it, and what medications did you
use? When was the last time you used marijuana or any other drugs? How tall are
you and how much do you weigh? Do you have any tattoos or piercings?
Prior service. Are you now or have you ever been a member of or processed for any branch of the Armed Forces, to include the National Guard
or Reserve? Have you ever been a member of any youth organization
such as ROTC, JROTC, Naval Sea Cadets, Air Force Civil Air Patrol, National Defense Cadets Corp, or the Boy Scouts (or Girl Scouts)? If so what
awards did you receive?
Law violations. Please list all your law violations to include tickets. This
list must include all violations from any law enforcement agency to include military police. I will need anything that happened when you were
a juvenile as well. I will also need the disposition of these cases.
Education. Did you graduate from high school or college? What grade
are you in? What school did you attend? How many college credits did
you earn?
Marital status. Have you ever been married? Are you planning to get
married or divorced in the near future? Is your spouse in the military
now?
Dependents. Is anyone morally, legally, or financially dependent upon
you for support?
Testing. Have you ever taken the ASVAB? What was your score and
when did you take it?
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Note 1: If the prospect doesnt know about the ASVAB, explain that it measures their
trainability and can help determine a career path that would best set them up for
success.
Note 2: If the prospect has never taken the ASVAB, took it more than two years
ago, or if you cannot validate their scores, have them take the Enlistment Screening Test (EST). Use the time theyre taking the test to do a little more research so you
can develop RA and AR plans for them.
IDENTIFY AND ESTABLISH GOALS
11-51. Present facts using the memory aid SOLDIER. You must be conscious of
the methods you use to uncover your prospects goals. Do not bombard your prospect with questions and never give the impression you are interrogating them.
Take your time and make sure you uncover all their goals and motives. This will
effectively remove most potential obstacles down the road. You must cover the
following areas when discussing Army opportunities:
Service to country. Tradition, history, and Army values.
Occupational and career enhancement. Practical work experience and
marketable job skill, college education, and emerging technology.
Leadership. Management development.
Diversity. Cultural (travel) and organizational.
Income. Financial stability and security.
Excitement. Challenge, adventure, and recreation.
Respect. Pride of service, public opinion, and sense of self-worth.
11-52. Solicit prospects plan. After youve uncovered your prospects goals
and aspirations, ask the prospect how they intend to accomplish them. In most
cases youll find they really havent given it much thought, so your plan will be
their best option. Now present all the features and benefits the Army can provide. While presenting these features and benefits, you should continue questioning the prospect about their qualifications for enlisting. These questions
should be transparent to your prospect but provide you with valuable insight
about their qualifications for special programs and options. You must be the
subject matter expert on all programs, options, and benefits for both RA and
AR enlistments. You must be able to explain the options and benefits in detail
and tailor them to meet the prospects specific goals.
11-53. Eliminate assumptions. A fact is a piece of information about circumstances that exist or events that have occurred. An assumption is a statement
that is assumed to be true and from which a conclusion can be drawn. It is vital
to your mission to base your counsel and career guidance on facts, not assumptions. Uncovering facts during the interview is tedious and time-consuming, but necessary to become an effective counselor. Dont take shortcuts.
11-54. Identify short- and long-range goals. The next step in establishing the
prospects plan is to identify the desired outcome. Your goal is to gain a commitment from your prospect to join the Army. But, you cannot afford to lose sight of
the fact that you are there for the prospect; to outline how the Army can help
them achieve their personal goals and aspirations. During the initial part of the
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interview you will take on the roles of counselor, mentor, and coach as you lead
the prospect through the mental process of identifying their needs, wants, and
desires.
11-55. To identify your prospects goals and motives, you must actively listen and
understand what they are telling you. Some prospects may not have put a lot of
thought into the goal-setting process prior to meeting with you. In other cases,
your prospect may have a laundry list of goals they are trying to fulfill. Regardless
of the situation, using skillful questioning and active listening techniques, you
must draw from your prospect as much information as possible to correctly identify their goals.
11-56. Questions to help generate goal-orientated thoughts might include, Where
do you see yourself in five years? Now that you are a senior in high school, what
kind of plans have you made? What kind of career move are you looking for?
How do you see the Army benefiting you in the future?
11-57. A prospect who responds by telling you they were thinking of attending
the local community college because their friends are or its what their parents
want, has only given you a glimpse of their world. Well thought-out, follow-on
questions are necessary to help you uncover and get a complete understanding of
their desires such as, What do you want to do, John? Whats important to you?
Whats your passion in life?
11-58. Active listening and open, two-way communication are the foundations of
the interview. It is important for your personal biases to take a backseat. You
must remain objective during the counseling session. You need to look beyond
the face value of any statement and try to understand what your prospect is really
saying and feeling. You must listen to what they say and observe how they say it.
You should work with the facts presented to you, but continue to ask and expand
the prospects responses by asking follow-on questions.
11-59. Misunderstanding your prospects motivation could lead you to a COA that
will not help them achieve their true goals. Even when you think you understand
their goals, ask follow-on questions to make sure. The only way you can effectively lead and guide the prospect is to identify their true passion. For instance, if
your prospect tells you they want to attend the local technical college, you may
start to outline a plan that involves the Post-9/11 GI Bill. By asking additional
questions, though, you may learn your prospect wants to open their own business. Armed with all the information about your prospects goals, aspirations,
and true passion, you can effectively generate a plan consisting of options and
alternatives specifically tailored for them. The plan you develop for the prospect
must identify the Army as the primary means to realize their passions and reach
their goals.

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GENERATE AND COMPARE ALTERNATIVES
11-60. Create alternatives. Every person has different goals. As a leader, you
must assist in generating specific COAs tailored to the goals of the person you
are counseling. You must tap into their true passion and communicate the
proposed alternatives as a life plan, not just a career plan.
11-61. Engage the individuals emotional side; get them enthusiastic, motivated, and involved. Present several comprehensive alternatives. Have an indepth understanding of all potential alternatives and present them as a viable
and relevant COA. Do not mention specific incentives such as the Army College
Fund or a specific military occupational specialty (MOS) until you determine
the persons qualifications. This will help maintain the prospects self-esteem
and save you the embarrassment of explaining why theyre not qualified for the
COA you presented.
11-62. The intangible benefits (leadership skills, self-discipline, self-awareness) must be included when developing alternatives. While a person can receive a cash bonus or hands-on training to take care of their short-term goals,
you must effectively convey the merits of loyalty, duty, respect, service, honor,
integrity, and personal courage. You must convey how they will affect your
prospects future endeavors. An Army enlistment may not be the prospects
only alternative. You must be prepared to address all alternatives that may fall
outside of your lane such as college enrollment or referring to local job placement centers. The point is you must aggressively address the persons goals.
11-63. Analyze alternatives. Your prospect might feel overwhelmed when presented with all their career goal alternatives. The Army Recruiting Compensation Advantage (ARCA) system will help them weigh their choices. ARCA uses
current school and occupational data for their area of interest and helps them
see the very best path. It is crucial that you use the ARCA system when dissecting and comparing alternatives. Providing alternatives using real-time data
will greatly enhance their decision-making. Considering their needs, ask the
individual what they think would be their best plan of action and have them
explain how they arrived at their conclusion. Once the alternatives are addressed and your prospect has an understanding of how the Army will help
them achieve their goals, the next step is asking them to join.

THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

11-64. Lead the prospect through the decision-making process. You should
now be able to point out alternatives the individual can choose to reach their
career goals. The experienced leader will allow the final decision to reside with
the person who will be affected the most, the prospect. You will suggest, recommend, and advise about each COA available. Then you must act decisively, by
asking for a decision. The wording of the question should be direct enough to
ensure there is no question in the prospects mind that you are expecting a
decision to be made. John, which of these alternatives do you feel will best
support your goals? At this point you are asking the prospect to decide on the
best COA, which will always be the Army. Once the prospect selects the best COA,
the next step is to engender their commitment to join the Army.
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The Army Interview

WORKING THROUGH OBSTACLES
11-65. Find the hidden obstacle. You can encounter obstacles at any time during
the interview, but they most often appear when you ask for a decision. When an
obstacle appears, deal with it right away. Lets face facts: You are asking your
prospect to make a significant decision. Let them know you understand how
difficult it can be to make a big decision and that you only have their best interests in mind. Remember your prospect does not have your leadership experience
or training. Therefore, you must lead them.
11-66. Even if youve just given the best interview of your life and successfully
mapped out your prospects future, there may still be some obstacles to address before they will agree to enlist (see examples in appendix B). Treat all
obstacles for what they really are: requests for more information. View obstacles
as an opportunity to get more detailed in those areas that may concern your
prospect. More information will dispel any misgivings that hindered the persons
ability to make a positive enlistment decision.
11-67. Overcoming obstacles is the same as solving any problem. FM 5-0, The
Operations Process, outlines seven steps to solving a problem. However, at this
point you and your prospect have already discussed most of the information you
will need to overcome the obstacle. This fact allows us to reduce the seven steps
to just three: Identify the problem, gather facts and assumptions, and generate
alternatives or solutions. (See appendix B.)
11-68. The first step is to identify the real obstacle. You need to know what is
causing your prospect to balk at making a decision. Tactfully bring the root
cause of the obstacle to the surface and resolve it. Ask thoughtful questions,
such as, Jane, what is it thats causing you to hesitate about making a decision? or John, it appears youre really not sure which direction to go. What is it
thats causing you concern? It is important to identify the true obstacle and not
be distracted by smokescreens. A smokescreen merely hides what is truly causing their hesitation. Your prospect may not state their true concerns for many
reasons, including biases, personal values, even embarrassment.
11-69. This second step is to identify the facts and assumptions. Follow-on
questions will uncover the prospects real concerns. Be sure when you move
into the next step you are providing information that will calm their concerns.
Jane, isnt it true the Post-9/11 GI Bill and Loan Repayment Program will
enable you to obtain your bachelors degree as a full-time student? or John,
isnt it true the Army will provide you with a secure job and benefits, so you can
support your family? (See appendix B.)
11-70. The third step is to generate, analyze, and compare alternatives. You must
be adept at active listening and skilled questioning in order to successfully address obstacles and provide practical solutions. As in the examples cited above,
Jane may understand she would be able to achieve her goals by enlisting in the
AR. She is reluctant to join because she perceives BT would be too rigorous an
ordeal (the true obstacle). John reveals that while he is enthusiastic about having a steady source of income, he is also concerned about being separated from
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USAREC Manual 3-01

his family for long periods of time. With this knowledge, you can now help the
person work through the obstacle.
11-71. By offering insight through experience and providing your prospect choices
to solve their own problem, you continue to build trust and credibility. Whether
addressing emotional needs or material facts, you must help your prospect weigh
the pros and cons and compare the alternatives.
ENGENDER THE COMMITMENT AND EXECUTE THE DECISION
11-72. After working through all obstacles, you must ask for the commitment.
You must ask the prospect to join the Army. There are many closing questions
that you can use (see appendix B). Choose one that best fits the interview you
are conducting. For example, Jane, dont you agree that enduring the rigors of
basic training and getting in shape is a small price to pay to realize your dreams?
When would you like to take your physical and join the Army Reserve Tuesday
or Thursday? If the prospect picks a day, then its time to find them a job using
the Future Soldier Remote Reservation System (FSR2S). At this time you should
also discuss the ASVAB, the application, the physical exam, and the enlistment
process. You might also touch on the FSTP. Above all, ask for a referral.
11-73. If youve overcome every obstacle and the prospect still decides not to join,
or if theyre unqualified, be supportive and respectful. Regardless of the outcome,
you must get them to agree that even though the Army wasnt their choice, it
was their best alternative. Make sure you provide them with a copy of the ARCA
alternative comparison sheet so they can look at it again and share it with their
family and friends. Now is a good time to ask for a referralsomeone the prospect
knows who could benefit by joining the Army. Even though they didnt join, they
are now very knowledgeable of Army programs and can become a valuable COI.

FOLLOW-UP

11-74. Leave the communication door open and ask if you can call them periodically to see how theyre doing. Once the pressure is off, they will be receptive to
your follow-up plan. Keeping in touch will reinforce the prospects trust in you and
keep the Army alternative at the forefront, should their plans change. Not every
interview results in an immediate enlistment, but timely follow-up and proper
reinforcement make it more likely the prospect will enlist later.

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Chapter 12

Processing
12-1. Processing starts when a prospect agrees to enlist. This agreement normally happens during the Army interview, but can occur during a follow-up or
even after testing. In any event, once the prospect says yes, processing begins.
12-2. The first task is to verify the applicants basic eligibility. This is done by
reviewing official documents that verify the applicants age, citizenship, education, marital status, dependents, and any other required documentation. The
recruiter must also thoroughly screen the applicant to uncover any medical
condition or law violation that could disqualify them or require additional documentation.
12-3. Applicant processing can test a recruiters character and integrity. A recruiter must never compromise their integrity to gain an enlistment. Recruiters
should never hesitate to ask tough, honest questions regarding the applicants
eligibility. Under no circumstances will anyone ever conceal or conspire to conceal any information that might disqualify the applicant. The goal is to enlist
Future Soldiers whom the recruiter would proudly welcome as a member of
their own squad or platoon. If ever faced with a choice between mission accomplishment and integrity, the recruiter must always choose integrity.
12-4. The completed application receives a quality assurance (QA) check by
the ACC before the recruiter projects the applicant for further processing. The
recruiter must ensure applicants understand they will undergo an in-depth QA
interview with the center commander before they are allowed to process for
enlistment at the MEPS. The applicant must also understand the MEPS experience will include a thorough medical examination to determine their physical
qualifications. Once the applicant is mentally, morally, and physically qualified,
the guidance counselor will verify the job reserved through FSR2S or match their
abilities and desires with the needs of the Army. Next the applicant will meet
with a security interviewer. The last step is to take the oath of enlistment.
12-5. A day at the MEPS is a long and trying experience. The applicant will
have to answer question after question and endure long periods of waiting. The
physical examination will present its own special challenges. Your applicant
will be prepared if you tell them exactly what to expect. Assure your applicant
that the Amy guidance counselors have their best interests at heart and will
take good care of them.
12-6. The recruiters ability to create a projection is essential to the processing
cycle. Projecting an applicant can mean the difference between a smooth transition at the MEPS or having to sit and wait while the guidance counselor manually inputs the applicants data. Projecting also ensures the recruiting center
receives the applicants test, physical, and enlistment data. Projecting an
applicants record is like sending a brief rsum on that person. Other information submitted includes the type of test, physical, and processing the recruiting center is requesting.
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Processing
12-7. Recruiting personnel often underestimate the value of solid organizational
skills. Unit leaders provide direction and approve the recruiters plans and schedule for processing of applicants. Recruiters schedule applicant processing and
movements through the unit leaders to capitalize on team coordinating efforts,
resulting in increased team efficiency. This means that one team member could
run applicants to the MET site while another team member picks them up at the
tests conclusion. Recruiters planning a trip to the local county courthouse to
conduct records checks should find out whether another team member needs
records checks from the same location.
12-8. Prospects who agree to process for enlistment must pass the ASVAB.
Applicants whose scores are no longer valid must retest. Testing can take place
prior to or in conjunction with their physical processing at the MEPS. The ASVAB
comprises eight subtests (see table 12-1). Test results make up the overall
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score. The AFQT is a percentile score
used to determine minimum military mental qualifications and specific enlistment options.
Table 12-1.
ASVAB sub-tests

12-9. Jobs offered to an applicant are based upon groupings of scores referred
to as line scores (see Table 12-2). These 10 scores will be indicated on the
applicants test record. The AFQT determines an applicants eligibility to enlist,
while line scores match the applicants abilities to specific job offerings. For
example, an applicant may have a 56 AFQT. This applicant is qualified for
enlistment. However, this applicant may desire to enlist in one of several medical MOSs that require a high score in the ST (Skilled Technical) category.
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USAREC Manual 3-01

Table 12-2.
ASVAB line scores

12-10. Recruiters initially determine prequalification and then further qualify

applicants both medically and morally before scheduling them for the ASVAB.
Testing an applicant who is not eligible to enlist is a waste of the team and
applicants valuable time and effort. Medical prequalification means having a
frank and open discussion with the applicant about their medical history. These
discussions often touch on very personal, sensitive matters. All team members
should be professional and discreet, but thorough. At minimum, recruiters must
ask the applicant to complete the required medical prescreening form (DD Form
2807-2, Medical Prescreen of Medical History Report).
12-11. The prescreening may uncover a condition that requires copies of the
applicants medical records. Unit leaders may direct recruiters to call the MEPS
Dial-a-Medic line for advice. Recruiters may need to send medical records to
the chief medical officer for evaluation before scheduling the physical. It may
also be a good idea to discuss the applicants medical history with their parents.
12-12. Moral prequalification entails another honest discussion. The applicant must declare any involvement with the legal system, to include juvenile
offenses. When the recruiter is satisfied that the applicant is ready, they can
schedule the applicant for testing. The recruiter sends basic information (name,
Social Security number, and date of birth) to the Army guidance counselor
through an RWS. The recruiter may also need to schedule lodging and special
tests, such as the Officer Candidate Test or a language aptitude test. The data
initiates the applicants MEPS record and is used for all further processing.

MEDICAL PROCESSING
12-13. The processing cycle is a challenge for applicant and recruiting center
team members alike. The medical qualification process can prove the most
taxing of all. Close coordination between the team members, unit leaders, applicant, and the MEPS can help make this phase of the enlistment process
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Processing
professional and relatively painless. The unit commanders final QA check prior
to the applicant going to the MEPS is the check and balance in the process. The
check ensures the applicant is qualified and committed to enlist.
12-14. Discharges based on preexisting medical conditions cost the Army approximately $15,000 per applicant. The Army loses approximately 6,000 applicants a year, which equates to a yearly loss of nearly 90 million dollars. The
team member who was the primary point of contact during processing and
knows the most about the applicant-- it is their responsibility to conduct a thorough medical screening.
12-15. Some applicants may not receive a qualifying AFQT or may be disqualified during the physical examination. These can be sensitive issues for your
applicant. Explain the disqualification carefully and be sensitive to potential
embarrassment. Consider the next step carefully. Should the applicant retest?
Did the chief medical officer recommend a medical waiver? Consult with the
center commander. If an applicant is clearly not eligible to enlist, further processing should professionally and tactfully end. However, failing the ASVAB or
the medical examination does not necessarily mean ending the relationship.
Even a disqualified person can be a rich source of referrals.

RECRUITING TEAMS OBLIGATION

12-16. The leadership and counseling process does not end when the prospect agrees to join the Armyits just getting started. The teams inherent obligation to take care of Soldiers provides the Army with a more dedicated and
determined Soldier. Future Soldiers will remember their relationship with the
recruiting team members, whether positive or negative. Let that memory be a
positive one.

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Chapter 13

Lead a Future Soldier

13-1. Future Soldiers are the result of recruiting efforts. Recruiters have been
entrusted with the crucial mission of providing quality manpower for our Army.
The hard fought efforts continue to produce high quality, motivated Soldiers
who are among the best in the world. Coaching, mentoring, and leadership
make these young men and women what they are. That is why Future Soldiers
deserve our very best.
13-2. Future Soldiers require a great deal of mentoring, guidance, and care,
just like Soldiers in the operational Army. While Future Soldiers deserve care
and attention, it would be just as true to say that, in the recruiters role as a
noncommissioned officer, Future Soldiers have a right to demand excellent
leadership.

FUTURE SOLDIER FOLLOW-UP

13-3. Every Future Soldiers commitment to enlist required a great deal of faith
in the recruiter and the organization. Even so, it must be expected that immediately following their enlistment, the Future Soldier will suffer varying levels of
something known as buyers remorse. They may ask themselves questions such
as, What have I done? or Did I make a mistake? These doubts sometimes
created by friends and familycan creep into a Future Soldiers thoughts even
months after enlisting. This is where solid leadership is most vital.
13-4. All Future Soldiers must receive their orientation briefing within 3-10
days following their enlistment. Future Soldiers who join the AR require the
recruiter to notify their unit of assignment within 3 days of enlistment and escort the Future Soldier to the unit within 10 days. The purpose of the notification is to coordinate the Future Soldiers appointment for sponsorship and inprocessing by unit personnel. The recruiter must ensure the Future Soldier
has all necessary documents to guarantee a smooth in-processing experience.
13-5. Recruiter follow-up assures Future Soldiers that the Army is interested
in them and always accessible. Enroll all interested Future Soldiers in the CONAP
during their orientation. Regulations require specific contact, of course, but give
thought to the quality of the follow-up. Make the most of Future Soldier follow-up
and let them know how much the Army genuinely cares about them.
13-6. Recruiters will use follow-up to address Future Soldiers eligibility status. Offer to sit with their key influencerssuch as parents, spouses, or even
close friendsto discuss their decision to enlist. This will calm any fears or
apprehensions on their part and help reinforce the Future Soldiers decision.
13-7. Follow-up is an excellent opportunity to involve Future Soldiers in the
recruiting centers network. Future Soldiers are excellent sources of market
intelligence, blueprint information, andmore importantlyreferrals. By involving Future Soldiers in recruiting activities, recruiters give them an opportunity
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Lead a Future Soldier

to serve their country even before shipping to initial entry training. A key result
of great follow-up is a motivated Future Soldier.

FUTURE SOLDIER LOSS MANAGEMENT

13-8. Future Soldier losses are a fact of life. It is the rare recruiter who has
never lost a recruit. Future Soldiers who enlisted as high school seniors may fail
to graduate. Others get in trouble with the law or fall victim to illness or injury.
Recruiters cannot control every aspect of a Future Soldiers thoughts and behavior. However, members of the recruiting team can do much to prevent losses.
13-9. Recruiters should apply their skills: counseling, mentoring, coaching, andabove all-leadership. Recruiters prevent losses by staying fully engaged with their
Future Soldiers and by keeping their Future Soldiers actively involved in the
FSTP. The alert leader can see a loss well before it happens and take immediate
action to prevent it.
13-10. Staying engaged with the Future Soldier means much more than simply
making the required weekly or bi-weekly follow-up phone call. Recruiters must
remain constantly alert to any sign of trouble. Falling grades and repeated absences can point to trouble in school (result: failure to graduate). The recruit who
misses formations, fails to return calls, or wont look their leader in the eye may
be losing their commitment to the Army.
13-11. Future Soldiers who stay active in the FSTP typically are too busy to get
distracted. Steady, rigorous engagement in training helps the Future Soldier
stay focused and connected. When the recruiter picks up any hint of trouble, they
should start simply by counseling the Future Soldier. Counseling can uncover
the source of the problem. Perhaps the Future Soldier has found what they feel is
a great job opportunity. Perhaps they have enrolled in a college or vocational
training program.
13-12. Recruiters need to know the people who influence the Future Soldiers
thinking and actions. Girlfriends, boyfriends, spouses, parents, teachers, and
clergy often hold powerful sway over a young man or woman. The recruiter who
fails to connect with these influencers lacks real influence over the Future Soldier. If the recruiter has never met Pvt. Smiths girlfriend, and if that girlfriend
has talked Smith out of shipping, the recruiter has little chance of reversing that
decision. Such losses result from poor follow-up and an ineffective FSTP.
13-13. Almost all Future Soldier losses for apathy can be avoided with a strong
FSTP. The FSTP comprises, in itself, required training, physical fitness training,
and Future Soldier administrative actions and assessments (see USAREC Reg
601-95). A vital ingredient of the FSTP is the time-proven ability of the recruiter
to anticipate and address Soldier concerns and issues. Future Soldiers, just like
every other Soldier in the Army, require leaders who are insightful and mature.

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USAREC Manual 3-01

13-14. Future Soldier sustainment should not fall solely on the recruiters shoulders. Every member of the team who has helped lead a recruit to enlist shares
responsibility for training and sustaining the Future Soldier. Small-unit recruiting
requires teamworkit is not a mere assembly line. From time to time, team
members may confront a Future Soldier challenge that appears unsolvable.
The recruiter who first interviewed the young person and met with the parents
in the home may have the rapport needed to restore the Future Soldiers commitment.
13-15. A Future Soldierlike any other Soldierwill respond to good leadership. Future Soldiers will fulfill their commitment when they trust and respect
the members of the recruiting team.

HOMETOWN SHIPPING
13-16. Hometown shipping allows the recruiting center to complete the enlistment process and provide Future Soldiers with transportation to their initial
entry training location. Hometown shipping minimizes windshield time for team
members and Future Soldiers alike. During hometown shipping, the recruiter
and the unit commander ensure all requirements normally conducted at the
MEPS are completed. (See USAREC Reg 601-96.)

POST-ACCESSION DUTIES
13-17. Team members have put forth a great deal of effort in supporting and
validating the Future Soldiers commitment to serve. Prior to a Future Soldiers
departure to an initial entry training location, the recruiter and unit commander
must sit with them and conduct a thorough out-brief. This is the last opportunity to answer their questions and explain what to expect at the MEPS, recruiting center (hometown shippers), and at the training base. Red-carpet treatment
is essential to a successful FSTP.
13-18. The recruiters involvement in a new Soldiers life doesnt end when the
plane leaves. Many other people played a vital role in the Future Soldiers
decision. The recruiter must not forget them. They must continue to contact
family members and loved ones over the course of their Soldiers initial entry
training.
13-19. Parents may be concerned about contacting their Soldier. A spouse may
have questions regarding the Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System
(DEERS), housing allowances, or what to expect should their Soldier be assigned overseas. School administrators may want to know that their Soldier
was an honor graduate, finished jump school, is on their way to Europe, or has
enrolled in a college program.

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Chapter 14

Training, Sustainment, and Mission Command

TRAINING
14-1. Training is the recruiting function that develops self-aware and adaptive
Soldiers capable of responding to the ever-changing recruiting environment. The
Recruiter Development Program (RDP) and Advanced Training Program (ATP) (outlined in USAREC Regulation 350-1 Training and Leader Development) provide
the advanced and sustainment training necessary for skill proficiency and are
administered by the center commander. Refer to the Soldier Training Publication (STP) (Soldiers and Trainers Guide Recruiter MOS 79R Skill Level 3/4/5)
for specific tasks, conditions, and standards.
14-2. Learning development is continuous and progressive throughout a Soldiers
career. Recruiting leaders develop and hone their team members skills and
knowledge through the three training domains: institutional (schools), operational (unit training), and self-development. The Army develops competent and
confident leaders through a combination of all of the domains. Self development
training, however, is the responsibility of each individual Soldier, regardless of
their rank or position. Effective training begins with the study of doctrine and the
current recruiting policies and practices.
14-3. The goals of training are to increase knowledge, improve technical skills
and proficiency and enable career development. Training should focus on tasks
directly related to the units METL, coupled with an understanding of future requirements based on the cyclic nature of recruiting.
14-4. The training systems consist of things that make sure every unit is at
the highest readiness level. It is crucial that Soldiers learn and improve their
skills with each completed task and action, using proper metrics and after-action reviews (AAR).

SUSTAINMENT
14-5. Sustainment focuses resources to support the commanders intent and
the concept of operations and maximizes freedom of action. Without proper employment of sustainment operations, decisive and shaping operations cannot go
forward successfully.
14-6. Sustainment uses military, civilian, and contracted resources to provide
the physical means for recruiting teams to work. The sustainment recruiting
function includes human resources, intelligence gathering, operational support,
facilities and logistics, marketing, educational support, Family support, and much
more. USAREC Manual 3-0 discusses sustainment in more detail.

MISSION COMMAND
14-7. Mission command is fundamental to both the art and science of recruiting. Each recruiting function relies on it for the integration and synchronization
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Training, Sustainment, and Mission command

of recruiting operations. Commanders combine the art of command and the science of control to accomplish their mission. It includes those tasks associated
with acquiring information, managing relevant information, and directing and
leading subordinates. Team members support mission command by preparing
themselves to function as effective team members and execute command policies and procedures. The FSL executes mission command by ensuring Future
Soldiers follow policies and procedures and prepare for basic training. USAREC
Manual 3-0 and USAREC Manual 3-06 discuss mission command in detail.

14-2

Chapter 15

Follow-up

15-1. Recruiting veterans say persistence accounts for more recruiting success than any other single factor. More enlistments are lost for lack of follow-up
than for any other single reason. Ask any successful team member their secret
to success, and theyll tell you its the result of persistent and well-planned
follow-up.

FOLLOW-UP
15-2. Follow-up is defined as something done to reinforce an initial action.
Typical follow-up can include: Contacting a COI to obtain a lead, contacting a
prospect met at a school event to arrange an interview, or contacting a prospect
already interviewed who wanted some time to think before making a decision.
Persistent, well planned, and faithfully executed follow-up will result in more
leads, prospects, interviews, and enlistments. Simply stated, timely, creative,
and purposeful follow-up will result in recruiting success.

CREATIVE, PURPOSEFUL FOLLOW-UP

15-3. The first step in creative, purposeful follow-up is to do it. Good intentions dont produce appointments or enlistments. During initial contact with a
prospect or family member, ask them what would be a good day and time to call
back. Annotate the information in the RZ calendar and make sure to follow
through. Dont be afraid of negative responsesthere will be a lot of no and
not now responses before a yes. To be successful, one must be willing to
persevere through the follow-up process. Remember: Each contact with a prospect or lead strengthens the relationship. It may not always appear that way,
but they will be aware of who their recruiting representative is and what they
represent. Here are a few helpful thoughts on follow-up
Know the prospect or leads emotional hot buttons and consider these
when constructing a follow-up plan.
Present new information relevant to the prospect or lead every time they
are contacted.
Be creative in style and manner.
Be direct. Beating around the bush will only frustrate the prospect or
lead.
Be honest. People dont trust anyone they dont respect.
When in doubt, stick to the contacts motivations.
Dont be afraid to ask for a commitment or decision.
Use humor. People love to laugh. Making the prospect laugh is a great
way to establish common ground and rapport.
Be sincere about being of value to the prospect. Think of the prospects
needs first, last, and always.
Be persistent, but dont be a pest.
15-4. Some team members feel they are pestering a prospect when they do
their follow-up. It could be the result of one or more of the following reasons:
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Follow-up

Team members havent established enough rapport and the prospect

isnt opening up to them.

Follow-up is perceived as selling and the prospect doesnt see the team

member as sincere about helping them with their future.

The team member lacks a strong conviction about the value of Army
service.

15-5. Follow-up is not perceived as pestering if the team member has something new, creative, or entertaining to say. Keep calls short and to the point.
Droning on and on about things already discussed or boasting of ones importance are counterproductive. If the team member is creative, sincere, and helpful, the prospect will not perceive them as a typical pushy salesman.

CONDUCT FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITIES (FREQUENCY)

15-6. The goal of follow-up is to sustain relationships with the recruiting centers
network and to facilitate further processing with prospects. Regular follow-up
should be maintained with prospects, applicants, Future Soldiers, school or
college faculty members, and other COIs and VIPs. The frequency of follow-up
will vary based on the type of follow-up and its importance to the mission.
LEADS
15-7. Follow-up with all the leads team members have been unable to contacthigh school students and graduates. Recruiters should use every available means of communication, to include social media, e-mail, text messaging,
and conventional phone calls. When calling, vary the times and days of the
week for the call. Leave messages on answering machines and gather contact
information from family members who answer the phone. If a lead cannot be
contacted electronically, follow up with a visit to the home if you have a physical address.
PROSPECTS
15-8. Follow up with prospects as necessary, especially those who seem to be
losing interest. For new prospects scheduled for an interview outside a 72hour window, ensure there is a follow-up to confirm the appointment.
15-9. Follow up with all individuals who were no-shows or rescheduled their
appointments. Assume the prospect has a valid reason for not being able to
meet with the team member to discuss Army service.
15-10. Follow up with high school seniors and college freshmen during key
decision points. High school seniors should be contacted at the beginning of
their first semester, during their second semester, after graduation, and at the
end of summer. College freshmen should be contacted at the end of the first
semester and the end of their freshmen year.
Note: Follow-up for prospects can include an invitation to sit and discuss alternate
(other than Army) COAs.
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USAREC Manual 3-01

APPLICANTS
15-11. Follow up with applicants as agreed to during the interview. Call when
the team member said they would call. If there was not a time agreed upon for
follow-up, plan and conduct a follow-up with the applicant. Follow up within 72
hours of the first interview to schedule processing, discuss test or physical
results, and answer questions the applicant is likely to have raised since the
interview.

FUTURE SOLDIERS
15-12. Future Soldiers put a great deal of trust in your role as mentor and
counselor. After the required Future Soldier orientation, be sure to follow up
regularly with Future Soldiers to keep them abreast of Army news. Inform them
of any changes that may affect their enlistment. Speak (and listen) to all Future
Soldiers to ensure awareness of any changes in their lives that may affect their
enlistment. Offer assistance and counsel regarding life, school, job, and so on.
Show an interest in their lives. Seek opportunities to discuss the Future Soldiers
decision to enlist with key influencers, such as parents or other loved ones. Of
course, follow up with all Future Soldiers is a requirement, but its really more
than that. These recruits are the future of the Army. Take good care of them.
They deserve it.

COIS AND VIPS

15-13. Follow-up with COIs and VIPs is the key to the city. Contact influencers
and important persons every day to establish a solid relationship and to gather
intelligence. Social media sites are a good way to establish new contacts and
maintain existing relationships. In very short order, team members will know
more about their recruiting AO than they known about their own hometown. Be
involved. Offer community service. Demonstrate personal interest. Discuss Army
activities, coming events, COI functions, and educator tours. Call all COIs and
VIPs to discuss or update the status of leads they provided. The COI or VIP
who provided a lead has a vested interest in the individual and should be
informed of their progress. Diligent follow-up communicates a respect for the
influencer. Never be afraid to ask COIs and VIPs for leads.

CONDUCT FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITIES (EXECUTE)

15-14. All team members now know how often follow-up should occur. The
follow-up is a persistent desire to stay in touch, to show interest, and to offer
the recruiting units participation. You must understand that other service recruiters are in the recruiting units AO. First to contact and best at follow-up
usually get the commitment for enlistment. Be the first, own the AO, and follow
up.
15-15. Plan all follow-up activities. Document the name(s) and place(s) for all
face-to-face follow-up. Document phone call or text message follow-up and
determine the best time to call. Plan and document virtual follow-up for social
media sites.
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Follow-up
15-16. When making follow-up attempts, use blueprint information to establish or reestablish trust and credibility. Cover all planned points of discussion.
In the discussion, remember one of the goals is to form and maintain professional relationships. This is a good opportunity to demonstrate the role of counselor by educating leads and prospects about Army opportunities, and as public affairs specialist by offering assistance with community and civic events.
15-17. There are few hard-set requirements as to the end goal of follow-up.
This is the opportunity to put a finger on the pulse of the community and to
weave recruiting team members into the fabric of the community and target
market. This is also the opportunity to facilitate a prospects understanding of
the obvious. If the prospect is truly interested in military service and has learned
to trust and respect counsel, they will be inclined to follow the advice. They
know and trust the recruiting team member. The team member has spoken to
them on a number of occasions. The prospect wont join the Army for just anybody. This is the true value of follow-up.
15-18. Finally, never end a conversation with a prospect, applicant, or Future
Soldier without establishing a time and date for the next follow-up. Let the
contact know when to expect the next call or visit. Not only does this communicate respect for the contacts time, it also affirms a sense of professionalism in
the team members business conduct.

15-4

Appendix A

The Enlistment Process (Scenario)

A-1. The scenario illustrates the enlistment process from planning through shipping. It demonstrates how each team members duties and responsibilities are
applied and synchronized during the enlistment process. This scenario was
designed to provide unit commanders with an example of what right looks like
and represents current best business practices.
SCENARIO
A-2. The following scenario depicts a fully staffed recruiting center and a prospect who is fully qualified and committed to enlist. The screenshots in this
scenario (figures A-1 through A-7) have been altered to show the detailed linkage of team members activities during the enlistment process. The altered
screenshots also illustrate the nesting of team members plans into the centers
ROP. For instructional purposes only, all gray boxes reflect applicant or activity
information pertaining to the applicant Bishop. User guides contain detailed
instruction for adding activities and events in the RZ calendar.
PLANNING
A-3. Its Monday morning. The weekly planning meeting has ended, and all
team members have their operation plan. Prospecting plans are in place, and
all team members have current individual calendars and schedules. The center commander has directed a mass of forces in a specific area of the centers
AO this week.

PROSPECTING
A-4. RSTs check the schedules of all ETs and note the days and times they are
available to conduct interviews. The center commanders focus this week is on
high school diploma graduates. The RSTs prepare their pre-call plan to contact
graduates in the same areas the ETs will be in conducting school visits, door
knocks, and area-canvassing activities.
A-5. During telephone prospecting, an RST makes contact with a diploma graduate who agrees to an appointment (see fig A-1). The RST checks the calendars
to see which ET is available to conduct the interview. The RST prequalifies the
prospect and sets the appointment. The RST tells the prospect a little about
the Soldier who will conduct the interview.

FIRST HAND-OFF
A-6. The RST must spend enough time introducing the ET to eliminate any
fears the prospect may have at this point. A good practice is for RSTs to have
biographies of the ETs on their workstation. The RST then documents the
prospects goals and motives and any other available blueprinting information
on the prospects record. The ET will refer to this information before making the
first contact.
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USAREC Manual 3-01

Figure A-1. Appointment made on RSTs calendar (highlighting added for illustration purposes).

ARMY INTERVIEW
A-7. The RST and the prospect discuss the time and location for the appointment. The prospect agrees to an interview at their home today at 1215. The
RST opens the ETs schedule and documents the prospects name, address,
and the appointment time. The RST confirms the location and gets directions
for the ET. Finally, the RST thanks the prospect, asks for a referral, and ends
the call. The RST immediately updates the ALRL and informs the ACC that an
appointment was made. The ACC checks the details and verifies the appointment as valid. The RST contacts the ET, who is already out in the area, and
informs them of the appointment. The ET acknowledges the appointment and
annotates their calendar. (See figure A-2.)

A-2

Appendix A

Figure A-2. Interview appointment made on ETs calendar (highlighting added for illustration).

A-8. The ET contacts the prospect to confirm the appointment. When the prospect answers the phone, the ET introduces himself and mentions the RST who
made the appointment. This practice will continue a smooth transition from the
RST to ET. The ET then confirms the time and location and identifies any
influencers who may be present during the interview. The ET reviews the
prospects goals and motives, uncovered by the RST, asks for a referral and
ends the call.
A-9. The ET arrives at 1210 and conducts the interview. The prospect agrees
to process for enlistment (the prospect now becomes an applicant). The ET
administers the screening test and asks detailed prequalifying questions.
A-10. The applicant receives a qualifying score on the screening test. The ET
congratulates the prospect on their decision to enlist, then explains the details
of processing: testing, application, physical, enlistment, and the FSTP.
A-11. The ET checks the RSTs calendar and schedules the applicant for the
ASVAB and completion of their enlistment application. The ET explains how to
fill out an application on-line using the Army Career Explorer (ACE), completes
any required documentation, and introduces the applicant to the recruiting
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USAREC Manual 3-01

centers Facebook page. The applicant agrees to the appointment and will drive
himself to the recruiting center.

SECOND HAND-OFF
A-12. The ET gives the applicant some background information about the RST
who will be completing their processing. (ETs should have the RSTs biographies and pictures on their communications device for this purpose). The ET
must ensure the applicants record has their current goals, motives, and blueprint information. The RST will refer to this information prior to making the
follow-on contact.
A-13. The ET explains the application process within the recruiting center.
The ET verifies what documentation the applicant has and provides him with a
list of what documents are still required. The ET asks for a referral and departs.
The ET immediately contacts the RST or ACC to confirm the applicants appointment to process and executes the hand off. The RST confirms the appointment and informs the ACC. The RST then projects the applicant for testing.
(See fig A-3.)

Figure A-3. Test and processing on RSTs calendar (highlighting added for illustration purposes).

PROCESSING
A-14. The RST reviews his next days schedule with the ACC and blocks off
time for transporting the applicant to the test site. The test is at 0900 tomorrowthe RST calls the applicant to confirm the time and what documents they
A-4

Appendix A
are to bring with them. The ACC verifies the projection and updates the center
commander at the end of day AAR.
A-15. Following morning the applicant arrives at the recruiting center with their
documents. If necessary, the RST performs a biometric scan on the applicant. If
the results are favorable, the RST drives the applicant to the test site.
A-16. While the applicant is taking the ASVAB, the RST scans their source
documents into the system and determines they are valid for enlistment. The
RST picks up the applicant from the test site and notes that they received a
passing score for enlistment.
Note: The RST is responsible for completing required administrative actions and
forms. The RST can coordinate with other center personnel to get documents from
out-lying areas.
A-17. The RST congratulates the applicant for his qualifying test scores, and
together they complete the application. The RST helps the prospect select a
date for the physical exam and enlistment at the MEPS. Now, the RST introduces the applicant to the ACC. The ACC reviews the application with the applicant and confirms the information. He determines the applicant is eligible to
continue processing. Next, the applicant meets the center commander, who
performs a quality assurance check (also known as a hot seat). The center
commander was aware of the processing that day and was available to meet the
applicant. The center commander does not find any information that would
prevent further processing. The center commander authorizes the RST to project
the applicant for enlistment processing. (See fig A-4 and A-5.)

Figure A-4. Packet review on ACCs calendar (highlighting added for illustration purposes).

A-18. The applicant selects Monday the following week, and the RST projects
the rest of the processing. The RST discusses transportation to the MEPS and
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USAREC Manual 3-01

adds it to his schedule. The RST returns the source documents to the applicant
and instructs the applicant to bring the documents with them on the day they
process. The RST again congratulates the applicant on his decision to enlist.

Figure A-5. Hot-seat on center commanders calendar (highlighting added for illustration).

A-19. The RST transports the applicant to the MEPS, and the applicant enlists.
The RST transports the applicant back from the MEPS.
Note: If any issues arise on the floor, the RST and ACC are responsible for troubleshooting.
THIRD HAND-OFF
A-20. The RST introduces the applicant to the FSL (either in person or through
their bio). If the FSL is not present, the RST will check the FSLs calendar, and
let the Future Soldier select a date and time for the orientation. The FSL will
refer to the Future Soldiers record to learn why they enlisted and to review the
details of the enlistment contract. The ACC will identify any additional testing
or processing the Future Soldier may be required to do and schedule them for
it. The FSL and the ACC annotate their recruiting systems with the enlistment
information.
FUTURE SOLDIER TRAINING PROGRAM
A-21. The FSL follows up with the Future Soldier prior to the scheduled orientation and discusses transportation to the center.
Note: The FSL is responsible for transportation and may coordinate with the RST or
ET to pick up the Future Soldier if they are already in their area.
A-6

Appendix A
A-22. The FSL should encourage the Future Soldier and his family or significant other to participate in the initial orientation. By involving influencers from
the beginning, the FSL can head off problems that may lead to losses. (See fig
A-6, A-7.)

Figure A-6. Future Soldier orientation on FSLs calendar (highlighting added for illustration).

Figure A-7. Future Soldier orientation on center commanders calendar (highlighting added).

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USAREC Manual 3-01

A-23. The FSL is directly responsible for Future Soldiers as long as they remain in the FSTP. The FSL conducts all follow-up; the ACC conducts it in his
absence. The ACC manages all scheduled Future Soldier processing and coordinates with the FSL for transportation. The center commander gives direction
to the FSL, as required.

FOURTH HAND-OFF
A-24. The FSL verifies the Future Soldier has satisfied all FSTP requirements,
and discusses transportation for shipping with the Future Soldier. The FSL
then hands off the Future Soldier to the ACC who conducts final QC and preshipping review of the Future Soldiers record. The FSL and ACC confirm the
Future Soldier is ready for shipping prior to the actual ship day. The ACC then
informs the center commander, who bears ultimate responsibility for clearing
the Future Soldier to ship.

SHIPPING
A-25. The center commander reviews the Future Soldiers records and schedules the final DEP-out interview. If the Future Soldier is a hometown shipper,
the FSL ensures that all requirements are satisfied. He then informs the ACC,
who verifies the enlistment packet and confirms arrangements for meals and
travel. The center commander conducts the final DEP-out interview and authorizes transportation. The ACC manages the final process and informs the center commander when complete. If the Future Soldier is a hometown shipper,
the center commander confirms with the chain of command when the Future
Soldier has shipped. Figure 16-8 is an example of a workflow model for a recruiting center. The figure shows the synchronization of effort during the enlistment process and provides the outline for this scenario.

Figure A-8. Recruiting center workflow model.

A-8

Appendix B

Tool Box
B-1. The toolbox is a collection of proven tactics, techniques, and procedures
that can help you establish and refine critical areas such as telephone introductions, establishing rapport, how to use fact-finding and open-ended questions, overcoming obstacles, and trial closes. The examples may be similar to
what you use now, but this appendix will also explain the psychology behind
why we use them. Memorizing scripts is good, but its equally important to understand how they affect your audience.
B-2. You dont need a degree in psychology to understand human nature. All
you need to understand is what makes people feel good. Generally speaking,
people react favorably when you show them respect by addressing them by
name, complimenting them on their achievements, or showing them special
favor or treatment. Basically, if you treat people the way you want to be treated
you will always be received favorably. Remember, a first impression is a lasting
impression, whether it be face-to-face or on the telephone. The examples used
in this appendix are time tested and should be customized to fit your personality and market.

INTRODUCTORY SCRIPTS
B-3. Your introduction should be pleasant, upbeat, and delivered with a telephone
smile. How you say something is just as important as what you say. You want
every prospect to feel like theyre the only person youve called today. Keep in
mind that your phone call was not anticipated and is an interruption. Its just
common courtesy to let the person know up front who you are and what you represent. A good standard opening line is, Good afternoon. Im SGT Ring, and I
represent the US Army. May I speak with John, please?
B-4. Once you get your lead on the phone, its important to establish rapport.
Establishing rapport on the telephone is a little more difficult than in person,
but can be done by asking the proper questions. Remember, rapport is nothing
more than trying to create an atmosphere of mutual understanding, trust, and
agreement between you and the prospect. To do that you must first break the
ice by initiating the conversation with a simple statement such as, John, Im
glad I caught you at home. I understand you recently graduated from West
Undershirt High School, is that right? Once you receive their response, follow
up with a statement such as, Well, on behalf of myself and the US Army, congratulations on a job well done. This simple introduction established the fact
that you know something about the person and you are proud of their achievement. It puts them at ease and makes it easier to ask fact-finding questions
such as, So John, what have you been doing since graduation?
B-5. Now that you see how this works, study the examples on the following
pages.

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USAREC Manual 3-01

Examples of prospecting phone calls

Good afternoon. Im SGT Ring and I represent the U.S. Army. May I speak
with John, please? Hi John, how are you today? I understand youre a senior
at West Undershirt High School.
Good morning. Im SGT Ring and I represent the U.S. Army. May I speak with
John, please? Hi, John. This is SGT Ring with the U.S. Army. I understand you
recently graduated from West Undershirt High School.
Good evening. Im SGT Ring, and I represent the U.S. Army. May I speak with
John, please? Hi John. This is SGT Ring with the U.S. Armyhow are you
today? John, the reason Im calling is I just received the results of the ASVAB
test you took in school and noticed youre planning to serve in the military.
Thats great! Let me be the first to congratulate you on your decision.
Good afternoon. Im SGT Ring, and I represent the U.S. Army. May I speak
with John, please? Hi, John. This is SGT Ring with the U.S. Armyhow are
you today? John, I understand youre a freshman at State University.
Good evening. Im SGT Ring, and I represent the U.S. Army. May I speak with
John, please? Hi, John. This is SGT Ring with the U.S. Armyhow are you
today? I was recently talking with Mrs. Black, your guidance counselor, and
she said you might be interested in some of the programs offered by the Army.
Good afternoon. Im SGT Ring, and I represent the U.S. Army. May I speak
with John, please? Hi, Johnthis is SGT Ring with the U.S. Army. How are
you today? John, I just received the results of the ASVAB test you recently took
at your school, and would like to congratulate you on your score. I understand you are planning to attend college. Is that still true?
Good afternoon. Im SGT Ring, and I represent the U.S. Army. May I speak
with John, please? Hi, Johnthis is SGT Ring with the U.S. Army. How are
you today? John, I just received the results of the ASVAB test you took at
school. I was wondering if anyone from your high school has offered to discuss your scores?

B-6. Once youve introduced yourself and established rapport, its time to ask
some open-ended, fact-finding questions. For example: So, John, what are
your plans after graduation?

B-2

Appendix B

The phone call: Questions and responses

Lead response: Im interested in joining the military.
John, I applaud you for the decision you made to serve our country. Im
sure you have a military branch in mind, but Id suggest you check out
other services before making your final decision. Id like to show you what
the Army can offer. Can we get together on _______ or would _______ be
better for you.
Thats great, John! Exactly what is it you want to do in the military? Did
you know the Army has over 180 different jobs to choose from? Some of the
jobs come with a substantial cash bonus and money for college. I would like
to discuss these opportunities with you in more detail. Can we get together
on _______ or would _______ be better for you.

Lead response: Im looking for skill training.

John, the Army has some dynamic programs that offer guaranteed skill
training and educational assistance for college. I would like to meet with
you to discuss how these programs can help you reach your goals. How about
meeting with me at _______ or ________? Which would be better for you?
John, the Army is one of the most trusted and respected organizations in
this country. Our skill training, education, and incentives are the best of
any service, and have helped many achieve their education and career
goals. Id like an opportunity to show how the Army can help you achieve
yours. Would _______ or _______ be better for you?

Lead response: I need money for my education.

John, the U.S. Army has a program called the GI Bill which can offer you up
to $_____________ for college. This program, combined with other educational programs the Army offers, will allow you to pursue your educational
goals. I would like to discuss these programs in detail with you and show
how you can obtain your degree at little or no cost. May I see you at __________
or would _________ be better?
John, the Army offers the GI Bill which will guarantee you up to $__________,
plus numerous other education programs that will allow you to attend college with little or no cost to you. I would like to meet with you to discuss
these programs in greater detail. Can we meet on_____________ or would
___________ be better?

Lead response: I want to be a leader.

John, I understand you contacted the Armys Web site, and are interested
in becoming a leader. The Army has many challenging leadership opportunities along with the training you need to become a problem-solver, teacher,
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USAREC Manual 3-01

Questions and responses (continued)

and leader of the team. I would like to discuss this with you in more detail.
Can we get together on _______ or _______? Which would be better for you?

Lead response: I need income and security.

John, the Army offers employment in over 180 different and exciting jobs
that will provide you with the security and financial stability youre looking for. In addition, the Army provides excellent health care benefits for
you and your family. Id like to sit down with you and show how the Army
can benefit you and your family. Would _______ or _______ be better for
you?
John, the Army is definitely an option you should consider. It has a competitive starting salary, full benefit package, educational and cash incentives, and unmatched skill training. I would like to show you how the
Army can help you achieve your career goals. Would _______ or _______
be better for you?

Lead response: I want to do something exciting and different.

John, the Army is an adventure in itself and offers a wide range of exciting jobs plus the opportunity for worldwide travel. Id like to visit with you
and discuss the many adventurous opportunities available. Would _______
or _______ be better for an appointment?
John, did you know the Army is a diverse organization that offers worldwide traveling opportunities? The Army has bases in many countries and
gives you the opportunity to experience their cultures and languages first
hand. I would like to discuss these opportunities with you in more detail
and show you how they may be your passport to the world. Would _______
or _______ be better for you?

B-7. Now that youve contacted the lead, established rapport, and discovered their
area of interest, its time to ask for the appointment. Remember, this person was
not expecting your call and may hesitate to agree to an appointment, so its good
to use the two-choice close. Offer a choice of date, time, and location to give them
some say in the decision. John, Id like to show how the Army can help you
achieve your career goals. Could we get together Tuesday at 4:30, or would Wednesday at 3:30 be better for you? When the person chooses a date, let them also
determine the location by asking, John, would you like to meet at your house, or
would the recruiting center be better?
B-8. Obstacles can appear at any time during a telephone conversation, but are
most likely to come up when you ask for the appointment. People are normally
reluctant to agree on anything during a short telephone conversation. They may
B-4

Appendix B
create obstacles to simply slow down the process or get more information. In either case once you understand their real objection, make sure you answer it
clearly and as briefly as possible. Check to see if the obstacle is a smokescreen
use the techniques discussed in chapter 11, Army Interview. Never argue with
or attack anyone youve called or their family members, regardless of the topic.
Anger and sarcasm, even if justified, can give you and the Army a bad name.
Even if you win the argument, you will lose the appointment and any referrals
you might have obtained.
B-9. Use the telephone to contact leads, create interest, and get an appointment. You cannot enlist anyone on the telephone, so keep the conversation
brief. Dont try to convince someone who has made it quite clear they are not
interested. Politely thank them for their time, ask for a referral, and try to establish a follow-up date. Make sure you end all your calls on a positive note. If the
prospect should change their mind as they often do they will feel more
comfortable speaking with you. The following are examples of obstacles and
how to overcome them.
Obstacle: Call me later.
John, I understand youre busy right now and can appreciate your
full schedule. Rather than me calling you back, lets schedule a
time to meet. Would ______ or _______ be better?
John, I would be glad to call you back at a later time. Should I call
back at _______ or would ________ be better?
Obstacle: Mail me the information.
John, I would be happy to send you information. However, the Army
offers such a variety of opportunities, it would be impossible for me
to personalize the information. Besides, John, you will certainly
have questions that I could answer much better in person. Can we
get together on _____ or would _____ be more convenient for you?
Obstacle: Family or friends had a bad military experience.
John, I think you will agree that all people will experience some
difficulties in life. Difficulties come whether youre in the Army or
a member of the civilian workforce. What some people perceive
as a bad experience, others perceive as a challenge or an opportunity. There are a lot of successful people in business today who
got their start in the Army. Its okay to listen to your family and
friends, but were talking about your future John, not theirs. Dont
make a decision based on someone elses good or bad experiences. Make your own informed decision. When can we sit down
and discuss what the Army can do for you. Would _______ be good
or would ______ be better?
Obstacle: Youre wasting your time.
John, what makes you think talking with you about your future
would be a waste of my time? (Response) I realize the Army is
not for everyone, but you should be aware of Army opportunities
before you discount the Army as an option. Besides, helping someone plan for their future is never a waste of my time. Can we meet
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USAREC Manual 3-01

on _____ or would ______ be better?
Obstacle: I already have a good job.
John, it sounds like you have a great job; but have you given any
thought to long-term opportunities? Do you have job security,
with unlimited advancement and educational assistance? You
know, todays job market is extremely competitive and volatile.
Without specialized training or education the chances of finding
and keeping a good paying job are not in your favor. I would like
to discuss with you how the Army can provide the training, experience, and educational assistance that will help you compete in
todays work environment. Can we get together on _________ or
would ______ be better?
Obstacle: Im not interested.
John, you must have a good reason for saying youre not interested; would you mind telling me what it is? (Response) John,
thats exactly why Im calling you today. Most people are unaware
of Army opportunities and feel the Army has nothing to offer them.
Ill bet you cant think of another organization that will provide
you with state of the art skill training and unmatched education
assistance. If after meeting with me, youre still not interested, at
least youll be making an informed decision. We can meet on
______ or would ____ be better for you?

Obstacle: Im going to college.

John, thats great. What are you going to major in? (Response)
Have you decided on a college or university yet? (Response)
Im sure youre aware of the rising cost of a college education,
even in state schools. Have you thought about how youre going
to pay for your education? John, Im glad I called. The Army has
educational assistance programs that can virtually pay for your
college education. That means no student loans to pay back after you graduate. That may not seem important now, but it will
when you start paying it back. In fact I will show you how you can
attend college while youre in the Army and receive college credits for your military training and experience. When can we get
together to further discuss these and other programs? Would
_____________ or ____________ be better for you?

Obstacle: Anti-military.
John, I can understand your feelings toward the Army and military service. What is it exactly that makes you feel the way you
do? (Response) Well, John, I understand how you feel. Ive talked
with other people whove felt the very same way, but after explaining to them how the Army has changed, particularly in the
area of educational assistance and guaranteed training, they came
away with a different point of view. John, I would like to meet
with you and explain how these programs can help you achieve
your career goals. I can meet with you on _______ or would _______
be better?
B-6

Appendix B

Obstacle: Interested in another service.

John, Im happy to hear youre interested in military service. The
branch youre considering is a good one, but you should look
into all the branches before making your final decision. As you
know all services are not alike, and that includes what they can
offer you in the form of training, incentives, and education programs. It would be to your advantage to choose the service that
can benefit you the most. The Army, for instance, offers guaranteed skill training, shorter enlistment periods, and an unmatched
education assistance program. I believe the Army can help you
reach your career and education goals. I would like to meet with
you to discuss these programs in greater detail. Would _______
be good or would _______ be better?

Obstacle: Too much discipline.

John, what is it about discipline that concerns you the most?
(Response) Its true the Army maintains a high degree of discipline, but the nature of its mission makes it necessary to maintain order and control. Really, the Army isnt any different than an
employer who has rules their employees must follow. The experience you get working in a disciplined environment such as the
Army, will make you more marketable when seeking employment.
But John, theres more to the Army than discipline. The Army also
offers guaranteed skill training, shorter enlistment periods, and
unmatched education assistance programs. I would like to meet
with you to discuss how these programs can help you achieve your
career goals. Can we meet on _________ or would __________ be
better for you?

Obstacle: Im too busy.

John, I understand your time is valuable, but I believe planning
for your future will be time well spent. I know youre very busy
this time of year, but now is the time to look at all your options
and decide on a career plan. I would like to visit with you to discuss your plans and show how the Army can help you achieve
your goals. I have some time available on ______ or would _____
be better?

Obstacle: I dont believe in war.

John, I can understand how you feel. I dont think anyone in this
Nation believes in war. However, the events of September 11,
2001, made it necessary for our leaders to wage war against terrorism and the countries that support it. Soldiers dont want to go
to war, but its our job to protect the United States and guard the
freedoms we all enjoy. John, Im not calling to change the way
you feel about war, Im only calling to make you aware of the
many opportunities offered by the Army and how they can help
you achieve your career goals. I would like to show you what the
Army has to offer. I can see you on _________ or would _________ be
better?
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USAREC Manual 3-01

Obstacle: Prospect is not home, and a parent answers the phone.

Maam, Im SGT Ring, Johns Army representative. The reason
Im calling is to discuss the many opportunities available to John
in todays Army. Maam, do you happen to know what Johns planning to do after graduation? (Response) Maam, thats exactly
why Im calling. The Army offers guaranteed state-of-the-art skill
training that will help him get a good job and education programs
that can pay for his college education. I think it would be worth
Johns time to hear what the Army has to offer, wouldnt you agree?
Maam when would be a good time to catch John at home?

Obstacle: No answerthe call goes to voice-mail or an answering

machine.
Hi, my name is SGT Ring, your local Army representative. Im
calling for John to discuss the many opportunities, such as skill
training and education assistance, the Army can offer him. I can
be reached on my cell phone at [phone number]. Im looking forward to meeting with you.

PREQUALIFYING PROSPECTS
B-10. Once a lead has agreed to an appointment, you must determine if they
are mentally, medically, and morally qualified. Use care when asking qualifying
questions. If you ask them too soon, it could destroy the rapport youve established. Asking personal questions of someone you dont know can be somewhat intimidating. On the other hand, making an appointment with a person
who cant qualify to enlist can waste valuable time and even embarrass the
prospect. You must decide how far to go with prequalification when scheduling
appointments. For instance, if youre driving a long distance to conduct the
appointment, it may be necessary to do a more thorough prequalification than
you would if the applicant lived close by.
B-11. Usually a good time to introduce the question is when the prospect has
agreed to an appointment. So, John, when would you like to meetTuesday
at 3:30 or Wednesday at 5:00? (Response) Great, John Wednesday at 5:00 it
is. Would you like to meet at your house or at the recruiting center? (Response) Okay Wednesday, 5 oclock at the recruiting centergot it. John,
before we hang up, could I ask you just one more question? (Response) John,
to the best of your knowledge, do you have any medical condition or law violation that you think might disqualify you for military service? If you ask the
question without hesitation right after you verify the appointment, it will be
more natural and less intimidating for both you and the prospect.
B-12. As you gain more experience, youll find ways to ask questions that are
less intimidating. For example, you can ask, John is there anything you can
think of that would prevent you from joining the Army? This is obviously better
than, John, what law violations do you have? or Do you have any serious
medical conditions? Remember, your question could reveal an embarrassing
police record or medical condition. If the record or condition is a disqualification,
you must tactfully tell the prospect they are not eligible to enlist. End the converB-8

Appendix B
sation by asking for a referral. John, Im sorry to disappoint you, but the fact that
you have epilepsy disqualifies you for military service. Do you know anyone who
might be interested in Army opportunities? Always keep in mind that people
know people, and referrals are your best lead source.
INTERVIEW TECHNIQUES
B-13. All prospecting and lead generation efforts are directed toward the Army
interview. Telling the Army story and mapping out career plans through the use
of developmental counseling is what recruiting is all about. There is an art and
a science to the Army interview. The science is devising a plan that will help a
person achieve their goals and passions. The art is telling a convincing Army
story, knowing when and how to use the trial close, overcoming obstacles, and
knowing when and how to ask for the commitment.
TRIAL CLOSE
B-14. A trial close is not a close that didnt work. Its nothing more than a
temperature check; asking for an opinion or feeling about the Army or a specific program, then analyzing the reaction. In the trial close, John, are you
ready to be Army strong? The ET is simply checking to see how the person will
answer. If they answer yes, theyre ready to join the Army. If they answer no, it
means they have not committed yet and need more information. A trial close is
about asking questions that will help you determine the right time to ask the
person to join the Army.
B-15. Trial closes perform some very important functions. They prepare the
prospect to make a decision and the positive feedback builds your confidence
to ask them to join the Army. Take full advantage of every opportunity to ask
questions that assuredly will get a positive response. It makes good recruiting
sense to do trial closes throughout the interview to determine the prospects
interest level. Asking the prospect for any kind of agreement is a type of trial
close (temperature check). Here are some examples
John, do you think the Army can help you meet your financial obligations?
John, can you see yourself wearing an Army uniform?
John, do you feel that being paid to learn a skill is a benefit to you?
John, do you think the Armys education programs can help you get
your degree?

OVERCOME OBSTACLES (INTERVIEW)

B-16. Obstacles are a good thing. When a prospect raises an objection, you
know he or she has been listening and cares about what youre saying. Its also
a sign youre getting close to the reason the prospect agreed to the appointment in the first place. Obstacles can be the result of what a prospect might
have heard from friends, family, influencers, and the media. They can also stem
from the prospects personal, religious, or political beliefs.
B-17. Most prospects want what the Army has to offer, but may be wary of the
commitment, the Army lifestyle, or both. If you treat all obstacles as requests
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USAREC Manual 3-01

for information, you will be able to act more as a coach and mentor through the
interview process. After all, who can better answer their questions than you?
Welcome the objectionsthey are a sure sign that your prospect is seriously
considering the Army. Your skill in overcoming obstacles will determine your
success as an ET.
B-18. In those rare cases where you dont encounter any obstacles, either the
prospect has already decided to join or isnt seriously considering it at all. If the
prospect doesnt present any obstacles, dont try to create them. John, dont you
have any questions about the physical and emotional demands of basic training? Such a question only brings up something that may not have been the
prospects concern. Now it could become the reason they decide not to join. Avoid
creating obstacles at all costs.
B-19. The following example shows step-by-step how to identify and overcome
obstacles. The scenario is an interview with a married man who has just learned
hell have to be separated from his wife for a few months while hes at training.

Handling obstacles in the interview

Step one. Obviously you.
Prospect: It all sounds good, but I cant be gone that long.
ET: Obviously, John, you have a good reason for saying that. Do you mind
if I ask what it is?
Step two. Repeat the obstacle as a question.
Prospect: I dont want to be separated from my wife during training.
ET: You dont want to be separated from your wife during training?
Note: By restating the obstacle you are gaining time to think of an appropriate response.
Step three. Check for smokescreen.
ET: Well, John, if you didnt have to be separated from your wife while
youre at training, would you join the Army? If the prospect answers yes,
proceed to step four. If the answer is no, go back to step one to find the real
objection.
Step four. Show emotion.
ET: I understand how you feel, John. Many people in your situation have
felt the same way. What we have found is the time away from your family is
a small price to pay for the investment you are about to make for your future
and theirs.
Step five. Use logic.
ET: John, suppose you were offered a civilian job that guaranteed skill
training in the field of your choice, a cash bonus, education assistance, including free medical, dental, and life insurance, but separated you from
your wife for a few months. Wouldnt you take it? (Response) Sure you
would, but John, the only organization I know that can make you that kind
of offer is the Army.

B-10

Appendix B

CLOSING TECHNIQUES
B-20. No matter how good your interview, the prospect will not agree to join the
Army until you ask. Closing is critical to the Army interview because its where
the commitment is asked for and hopefully obtained. The effective use of trial
closes and reading of body language are keys to successful closing. You may
have a favorite, but there is no one best closing technique. Whichever technique you use to obtain a commitment is the best one at that particular time.
B-21. The close formalizes the decision the prospect has been considering
throughout the interview. The close simply summarizes the prospects career
goals and passions, and shows how an Army enlistment can fulfill them. Dont
try to disguise the close using vague statements such as, Well, John, the next
thing to do is see what jobs are available at the MEPS. or When do you want to
take a trip to the MEPS for your physical? Dont evade the issue. You must
actually say the words that leave no doubt in the prospects mind. So, John,
taking into consideration all that weve discussed, when do you want to process
for enlistment? Would Wednesday or Friday be better for you?

CLOSES
B-22. The following are some closes you can use.
Single-question close.
John, are you ready to join the Army? It could be the best decision
youve ever made.
Use caution with single-question closes. You are forcing the prospect to make a decision, and the answer may be no. Use this
close only if you are absolutely sure the prospect will say yes.

Two-choice close.
John, which day would you prefer, Wednesday or Thursday, to
take your physical and enlist?
This close gives the prospect a sense of control, because you are
allowing them to choose the day. If the first two days are rejected,
try two more. If the applicant still wont commit, determine what
the objection is and try again.

Minor point close.

John, would you rather go to basic training in September or October?
The minor point close is used when you dont want the prospect
to feel they are being forced to make a decision. This type of close
gets the prospect to agree on a minor point that presumes they
have already made the decision to join the Army. When they pick
a month, they in fact have decided to join the Army.
Contingent close.
John, I realize this is an important decision in your life and you
would like to discuss it with your parents. I would like to be there
with you to answer any questions they might have. Suppose they
agree that this is a good idea. Will you be ready to take your physiB-11

USAREC Manual 3-01

cal amd enlist this week?
This makes their decision to enlist contingent on something else
happening. In this case, the contingency is getting their parents
approval.

Conditional close (facts, evidence, benefit, agreement).

As you can see, John, the Army can provide you with the skill training and education assistance that you want. The benefit to you is
that you will have the training to get a good paying job and finish
your degree in computer science. That is what you wanted, isnt it?
John, if I can guarantee you all of the things weve just talked about
here today, will you join the Army?
This close simply says, I can do what you want. Will you do what I
want?

Third-person close.
This close requires the assistance of another team member, but
is very effective. With a prearranged signal, hand-off the interview
to another team member. Briefly explain the prospects career
plans and the programs you have outlined, asking your partner
for their views. Your partner goes right on with the interview, often repeating the same points you made. Because the other is a
disinterested third party, this lends support to what you said, verifying the information in the prospects mind.

Challenge close.
John, I really dont know if youre ready for the kind of challenge basic
training will give you. This close challenges the prospects ego by
telling them they probably couldnt make it through BT or jump
school anyway. The danger here is they may agree with you. This
close should not be used with someone who has voiced a concern
about BT.

Service to country close.

This close works on a prospects sense of obligation or pride.
John, there are other reasons for joining the Army besides the training and education. By serving in the Army you will be protecting
Americas freedoms at home and abroad, securing our homeland,
and defending democracy worldwide. Your decision to join the Army
will put you in the elite company of those brave men and women
whove served to protect the freedoms that you, your family, and
friends enjoy. John, are you ready to be Army strong?

Already enlisted close.

This is a frog-in-the-pot kind of close. At some point during the
interview, based on positive responses to your trial closes, start
using phrases that presume the prospect has already decided to
enlist.
John, when you get to the MEPS, the first thing youll do is check in
with the Army guidance counselor or John, if you like to play sports,
youre gonna love basic training!
B-12

Appendix B

Ben Franklin close.

This is an excellent technique for a follow-up interview when the
prospect needs time to make a decision. Give the prospect a piece
of paper. Have them draw a vertical line down the center and write,
Reasons to join today on the right side and Ideas opposed on
the left. Have the prospect list all the Ideas opposed first. Most
prospects can only come up with two or three. These are their
objections, remember them. Have the prospect list all the Reasons to join today they can think of. Add to that all the remaining
benefits of an enlistment you can think of. The reasons to join will
always outnumber the reasons opposed. Tell them to take the
sheet, along with the ARCA worksheet, home to consider and share
the information with their parents or spouse. Set a time to get
back with them to discuss their conclusions. Maintain a high level
of rapport with them throughout the process. When they leave,
immediately write down their objections and develop a plan to
overcome them.

Scarcity principal close.

This close adds value to your product and moves prospects
through the processing cycle.
John, this is absolutely the best time of year for a senior to select a
job. Why dont we schedule you for your physical so you can select
your job before all the other seniors in the Nation do? or John, the career
field youre looking for isnt always open. I think there are a few slots
left. Why dont we schedule you for your physical on Thursday or Friday?

Contrast principle close.

Discuss a 4-year enlistment first, then move on to the 2-year enlistment. Use this close to help make the prospects decision to
enlist easier. This contrast adds value to the 2-year enlistment
and the cost in time is more reasonable to the prospect.

Complete the application close.

After you have completed the interview (without asking the person to join), begin filling out the application.
John, there are a few forms that we need to fill out before I can
schedule you to take your physical and enlist in the Army.
This can be effective if you were receiving positive responses during the interview.

Doorknob close.
If youve tried everything you can think of to get a commitment
and are about to leave, try the doorknob close. Just before you
leave, when the pressure is off, say, John, before I go could you just
answer one question? Whats the real reason you decided against
joining the Army today? This close gives you one more shot at the
prospect and may surface an unspoken obstacle you can overcome.
B-13

Glossary
Section I.
Abbreviations
ACC

assistant center commander

ACE

Army Career Explorer

ACS

assistant chief of staff

AD
ADOS-RC
AFQT
AGR

active duty
active duty for operational support-reserve component
Armed Forces Qualification Test
Active Guard Reserve

AO

area of operations

AR

Army Reserve or Army Regulation

ARC

Army Recruiter Course

ARCA

Army Recruiting Compensation Advantage

ARISS

Army Recruiting Information Support System

ARNG

Army National Guard

ASB
ASVAB

Accessions Support Brigade

Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery

ATP

Advanced Training Program

BCT

basic combat training

CAST
CG

Computerized Adaptive Screening Test

commanding general

COA

course of action

COE

US Army Corps of Engineers

COI
ConAP
DEP

center of influence
Concurrent Admissions Program
Delayed Entry Program
Glossary-1

USAREC Manual 3-01

DIME
DTP
ERM
EST
ET
FAZR

demographic, income, military service, education (report)

Delayed Training Program
electronic records management
Enlistment Screening Test
engagement team
Force Aligment ZIP Code Registration

FEC

forward engagement center

FSL

Future Soldier leader

FSR2S
FSTP
GAMAT
G2
HQ USAREC
HRAP
IADT

Future Soldier Remote Reservation System

Future Soldier Training Program
Graphical Accessions Mapping Analysis Tool
Assistant Chief of Staff, G2--Market Intelligence and Mission Analysis
Headquarters, U.S. Army Recruiting Command
Hometown Recruiter Assistanc Program
initial active duty for training

IET

initial entry training

IMT

initial military training

IPR

inprocess review

LZ
MEPS

Leader Zone
military entrance processing station

MET

mobile examining team

RMZ

Report Management Zone

ROP

recruiting operation plan

RPI

recruiting publicity item

RRS

Recruiting and Retention School

RST

recruiting support team

SRP

school recruiting program

Glossary-2

Glossary

SWOT

strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats

SY

school year

SZ

School Zone

TAIR
USAREC
VIP

Total Army Involvement in Recruiting

U.S. Army Recruiting Command
very important person

Section II.
Terms
Advanced Training Program
Part of the Recruiter Development Program. The ATP begins upon completion of phase III;
evaluates the new recruiters skills and provides refresher training where necessary.
applicant
A prospect who has agreed to process for enlistment or commissioning.
area canvassing
An activity in a public area within the recruiting area of operations which involves posting of
the area and seeking new leads, COIs, and VIPs.
Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
A battery of subtests designed under Department of Defense sponsorship, to measure
potential for training in general occupational and aptitudinal qualification for enlistment.
The battery is structured in production and student (school) forms. The production forms
are administered by military entrance processing stations and mobile examining team sites
for selection and classification purposes. The student form is provided at no cost to high
schools and postsecondary institutions by the Department of Defense. It may be used as an
enlistment qualifying battery and also provide leads on potential applicants for recruiters. It
may be used as a career exploration tool by students and their counselors.
Army interview
A formal meeting between an Army recruiter and a prospect for the purpose of telling the
Army story and counseling the prospect on the benefits of an Army enlistment or
commission.
assistant center commander
The operations noncommissioned officer for a recruiting center. The assistant center
commander directly supervises operation planning, daily work activities, and training;
supervises and directs the recruiting support team; commands the center during the
absence of the center commander.
battle rhythm
A deliberate daily cycle of command, staff, and unit activities intended to synchronize
current and future operations.
Glossary-3

USAREC Manual 3-01

blueprinting
Any action to obtain specific information about leads, COIs, VIPs, or other persons.
center commander
A noncommissioned officer, typically a sergeant first class, who leads a recruiting center. The
center commander is responsible for recruiting operations, training, and the welfare of the
Soldiers and civilian employees assigned to the center; directly supervises the assistant
center commander, the Future Soldier leader, and the engagement team.
Computerized Adaptive Screening Test
A computerized test that predicts an applicants performance on the Armed Forces
Qualification Test.
Delayed Entry Program
An RA enlistment program which allows an applicant to delay their entry onto AD for a period
of time. This program is subject to controls, as determined by the Commanding General,
USAREC.
Delayed Training Program
The time from AR enlistment to departure for IADT to an MOS-producing school.
DEP-out
The final processing conducted to access a Future Soldier to IADT.
electronic records management
Efficient and systematic control of the creation, receipt, maintenance, use and disposition of
records, including the processes for capturing and maintaining evidence of and information
about business activities and transactions in the form of records.
engagement team
A team of two or more Soldiers who engage with the public. Members of the ET conduct Army
interviews and execute the SRP.
face-to-face prospecting
A prospecting activity where the recruiter goes to the known location of a lead with the intent
to communicate in person and schedule an Army interview.
follow-up
Any action taken to reinforce an initial action. Typical follow-up can include: Contacting a
COI to obtain a lead, contacting a prospect met at a school event to arrange an interview, or
contacting a prospect already interviewed who wanted some time to think before making a
decision.
forward engagement center
The physical location and facility that supports the operations of the forward engagement
team. Intended for administrative support only, not for direct engagement with the public.
Where possible, FECs are placed in existing Government facilities, to include reserve centers
and/or National Guard armories.
forward engagement team
A subset of a recruiting centers engagement team; comprises two or more ETs. FET members
are assigned to a recruiting center with duty at another location to conduct forward
operations. Members act as liaison between applicants and the RST.
Glossary-4

Glossary
Future Soldier
A person who has enlisted into the DEP, DTP, or delayed status and has not shipped to the
training base.
Future Soldier leader
A noncommissioned officer and cadre recruiter who supervises, trains, and mentors the
Future Soldier pool in a recruiting center.
Future Soldier Remote Reservation System
The application that recruiters use to start the processing of an applicant outside the MEPS.
The recruiter, using the RWS, can work with an applicant in the applicants home with the
parents or spouse present. The recruiter temporarily reserves a training seat for the MOS of
the applicants choosing. The applicant must then travel to the MEPS to fully qualify for
enlistment, take the oath of enlistment, and thus make the reservation permanent.
Future Soldier Training Program
The program of training that prepares new recruits for Army life and sustains their
commitment to the Army until they depart for the training base. Training begins with
enlistment into the DEP or DTP.
Future Soldier Training System
An online system for the delivery of training for Future Soldiers. The training cycle and
training tasks appear on USAREC Form 1137, section III.
Graphical Accessions Mapping Analysis Tool
A Web-based data-mapping tool that visually displays data on specially designed maps
based on recruiting unit boundaries. The data displayed includes (but is not limited to)
leads, enlistments, schools, and market share data.
hot seat
The final screening interview conducted by a designated leader prior to sending the
applicant to complete the processing for enlistment or commissioning.
lead
A name with an address, telephone number, or e-mail address and for whom no
appointment has been made for an Army interview; a name with contact information that a
recruiter can use in prospecting operations.
Leader Zone
A single login access through the USAREC Enterprise Portal, where recruiting leaders
manage leads and monitor applicant processing.
market share
Unit accomplishments in ZIP Codes measured against the total percentage or proportion of
the available recruiting area, or market by categories.
MET site
A location outside the MEPS used for the administration of the ASVAB. It may be staffed by
either military or Federal civilian employees.
military entrance processing station
The joint service facility which conducts final physical examinations and final aptitude tests
of all selective service registrants and service applicants, effects induction or enlistment
processing, and ships such accessions to appropriate reception battalions or duty stations.
Glossary-5

USAREC Manual 3-01

mobile examining team
One or more persons who administer the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery at
locations away from the parent military entrance processing station.
phase line
The end of a phase or process used to control and coordinate operations.
Pinnacle
Recruiting model based on the division of labor, specialization of skills, and teamwork that
optimizes recruiter time for engaging the public and less time on administrative support
functions.
processing
An activity that assesses an applicants qualifications and matches a qualified applicant
with the needs of the Army. Processing begins when the prospect agrees to process for
enlistment or commissioning.
prospect
A person who has agreed to meet with an Army recruiter, or a person who has been
interviewed but who has not committed to process for enlistment.
prospecting
An activity to contact leads and engage them in conversation with the intent to schedule an
Army interview.
quality assurance
Any activity that seeks to ensure that an applicant or Future Soldier is ready to proceed to
the next stage of processing for enlistment or commissioning.
quality control
Any activity that ensures an applicant or Future Soldiers record is complete and accurate.
Recruiter Zone
A single login access through the USAAC Enterprise Portal where recruiting personnel view,
contact and manage all applicant records.
RZ calendar
The recruiters digital planning tool built into the RZ; also referred to as the electronic
planning guide or e-planner.
recruiting center
A recruiting facility comprised of Soldier teams trained and equipped to handle specific
recruiting tasks.
recruiting operation plan
A leaders plan for conducting recruiting operations.
recruiting station
A permanent location, within a facility, authorized by the tables of distribution and
allowances which is manned on a full-time basis by no more than three recruiters for the
purpose of conducting recruiting operations in outlying areas. It may be either leased or
rent-free space.
recruiting support team
The planning, prospecting, and processing arm of a recruiting center. As many as six
Soldiers comprise the team.
Glossary-6

Glossary
referral
A lead furnished to a recruiter by a prospect, applicant, Future Soldier, COI, VIP or other
person with the intent that a recruiter will contact the lead to schedule an initial interview or
follow-up for processing.
Report Management Zone
A single login access through the USAAC Enterprise Portal that enables the user to access
multiple data sources within the ARISS architecture through the Hyperion query, analysis
and reporting tool.
school recruiting program
A program designed to assist recruiters in evaluating school markets and directing their
recruiting efforts toward specific tasks and goals in order to obtain the maximum number of
quality enlistments possible.
School Zone
A single login access through the USAAC Enterprise Portal where recruiting personnel view
and manage all activities relating to the SRP.
sensor
USAREC Soldiers who by observing their area of operations collect information and provide
it to the commander as part of recruiting intelligence gathering. This activity conforms with
the intent of the Armys Every Soldier a Sensor (ES2) program.
social media
Web-based applications that promote the creation and exchange of user-generated content.
Prominent examples include Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Flickr, and MySpace.
student ASVAB
The ASVAB when administered in a school. The results may be used for enlistment.
SWOT
A strategic planning analysis method used to evaluate the strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities, and threats involved in a project or operations.
virtual prospecting
An activity where the recruiter contacts leads and engages them through email, internet and
social media sites, with the intent to schedule an Army interview.

Glossary-7

USAREC Manual 3-01

References
Section I
Required Publications
These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.
USAREC Reg 601-107
Operational Management Systems. 27 November 2006.
USAREC Manual 3-0
Recruiting Operations. 24 September 2009.
Section II
Related Publication
These sources contain relevant supplemental information.

AR 601-210
Army and Army Reserve Enlistment Program. 8 February 2011.
FM 2-0
Intelligence. 23 March 2010.
FM 2-01.3
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace (incl C1 and C2). 15 October 2009.
FM 3-0
Operations. 27 February 2008.
FM 5-0
The Operations Process. 26 March 2010.
FM 6-0
Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. 11 August 2003.
FM 6-22
Army Leadership. 12 October 2006.
USAREC Reg 350-1
Training and Leader Development. 6 January 2011.

Glossary-8

USAREC Manual 3-01

For the Commander:

HEATHER L. GARRETT
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff
Official:

JOSEPH P. BONANO
Assistant Chief of Staff, G6

DISTRIBUTION: This manual is available in electronic media only and is intended for command distribution
level A.

Research Corner: Strategies for Recruiting and Retaining Volunteers

Dr. Jean Rhodes, University of Massachusetts Boston, April 2006

From Intention To Action: Strategies For Recruiting And Retaining Today's

Volunteers
"No one has a right to consume happiness without producing it." - Helen Keller
Although most people view mentoring as a worthwhile pursuit, far fewer actually step forward
and volunteer. Consequently, despite strenuous efforts, many programs struggle to recruit
enough volunteers for all of the children who need them. It is not uncommon for a child to spend
a year or more on a waiting list to get a mentor.
A major barrier is the fact that, unlike other forms of volunteering, mentoring requires a
sustained and relatively intensive commitment. In community-based mentoring programs, for
example, volunteers are often required to meet with their mentees several hours a week for a
year. Newer forms of mentoring (i.e., school-based) have reduced such requirements. In
addition, many agencies have taken steps to further minimize demands on volunteer time. Such
steps include requiring minimal training, providing e-mail options and allowing mentoring pairs to
meet every other week rather than weekly. Of course, such steps must be balanced against the
need to maintain sufficient levels of quality, intensity and duration in relationships.
In this Research Corner, I will discuss promising strategies for recruiting adults into programs
and keeping them engaged. The themes are the subject of a newly edited volume, Mobilizing
Adults for Positive Youth Development: Strategies for Closing the Gap between Beliefs and
Behaviors (Clary & Rhodes, Editors). I draw on several chapters, with particular focus on the
very interesting work of Arthur Stukas, Maree Daly and Gil Clary.

Background
According to the 2002 National Poll on Mentoring conducted by MENTOR and AOL Time
Warner, far more Americans are willing to mentor both formally and informally than actually
do. The survey found that 42 percent of adults were not mentoring (either formally or informally)
but said that they would be interested in doing so. This represents 57 million potential
volunteers a huge untapped resource that could be mobilized to redress the long waiting lists
in many mentoring programs. Although the survey findings are encouraging, they also highlight
the vital need to translate good intentions into action on behalf of youth. In the following
sections, I will review what is known about recruiting and retaining volunteer mentors.

Strategies for Recruiting and Retaining Volunteers

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Recruitment
Different mentoring programs use different strategies to recruit mentors. Some emphasize the
enjoyment that the volunteer will have; others highlight the unmet needs of youth.
Gil Clary and colleagues would argue that programs should take a functional approach to
volunteer recruitment. Different people may have very different, underlying motivations for
deciding to volunteer. Therefore, recruitment messages that address these motivations should
be more persuasive than more generic messages.
With this in mind, the researchers began to identify the major functions that volunteerism can
serve. They developed a questionnaire, the Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI), which asks
potential volunteers to rate the importance of 30 different reasons for volunteering. They found
that the VFI tapped into six major reasons why people volunteer:
Values to put their values into action (e.g., I am genuinely concerted about the
particular group I am serving);
Career to explore career options, increase the likelihood of pursuing particular career
paths (e.g., Mentoring allows me to visibly demonstrate my interest in youth, to explore
different career options);
Understanding to gain a greater understanding of the world, the people in it (including
their own children) and themselves (e.g., Mentoring allows me to gain a new perspective
on things);
Enhancement to feel important, to form new friendships, and to boost their own selfesteem (e.g., Mentoring a child makes me feel needed);
Protective to distract themselves from work or personal problems (e.g., Mentoring
relieves me of some of the guilt over being more fortunate than others); and
Social to satisfy expectation of friends, spouse or others who are close to them. (e.g.,
Others with whom I am close place a high value on mentoring).
Omoto and Snyder developed a similar questionnaire, which includes an additional reason:
Community Concern (e.g., I volunteer because of my sense of obligation to the
community).

Matching Message to Motivation

A 1992 national US Gallup poll that included a subset of VFI items found interesting differences
between what motivated most volunteers and what motivated those working on youthdevelopment issues. In that study, adult volunteers who work on youth-development issues
tended to be more motivated by understanding.
Similarly, in a survey of 1,388 volunteers, Clary found that those who were involved in youthdevelopment organizations, tended to rank understanding as the most important reason. The
next most important reasons were enhancement, social, protective and career.
Clary and colleagues have also conducted a series of studies in which they first assessed
participants motivations and then showed them a series of messages in recruitment videos and

Strategies for Recruiting and Retaining Volunteers

Page 2

brochures. Study participants rated messages that matched their motivations as significantly
more persuasive.
Other studies shed light onto how organizations can tailor messages for specific volunteer
audiences. For example, Okun & Schultz (2003) found that older people have lower career and
understanding motives and higher social motives than younger volunteers. With this in mind:
Recruitment events that are targeted to retired adults might enlist current volunteers to
persuade their loved ones and friends to volunteer.
Efforts to recruit college students might highlight the secondary benefits of mentoring,
including increased perspective on youth and career benefits.

Consider the Context

Ajzen (1991) has suggested that behavior is affected not only by ones attitudes or intentions,
but also by ones perceptions of social norms (e.g., People that I am close to want me to
mentor) and on the physical context (I can successfully enact the behavior).
This was exemplified in a recent e-mail (identifiers removed) in which a new mentor was
seeking to encourage her boyfriend to become a mentor by making it easier for him to
volunteer. She wrote:
I just wanted to say that I think you did a great job matching Julia and me. She is such a sweet
girl and I'm so excited about being her mentor, so thank you! I actually also have a question for
you do you happen to know whether there are any schools that participate in the mentoring
program by Government Plaza. My boyfriend, Tim, works right across from it and he loves kids
I'm trying to convince him to join. Thanks again for a great match.

Social Norms
Research by Piliavin and Callero (1991) has shown that the perceived expectations of
significant others can influence both self-concept (e.g., I am the type of person who could be a
mentor) and sustained commitment.
Given that finding, Tim (from the example above) would probably be less likely to terminate his
mentoring relationship, so long as his girlfriend was still mentoring and expected him to do the
same.
Building on this notion is Search Institute researcher, Peter Scales. In his book, Other People's
Kids: Social Expectations and American Adults' Involvement with Children and Adolescents,
Scales argues that adults are more likely to get deeply involved if they believe that society puts
a high value on such involvement, and if they perceive society expects them to get involved.

Behavioral control

Strategies for Recruiting and Retaining Volunteers

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Ajzen suggests that when people perceive that they can actually do what is needed (i.e, get to
and from the mentoring site or their mentees home, find time in their schedule, negotiate the
logistics of enrolling) their perception may significantly influence their intentions (Ajzen, 1991).
Okun (2002) found that perceived behavioral control was the strongest predictor in intentions to
enroll in a college volunteer program. Attitudes and subjective norms were also significant
predictors.
Referring back to the earlier example, Tim may feel emboldened to take the next step and sign
up to be a mentor if he finds that: the mentoring program only requires him to volunteer one
hour a week, a school is within walking distance of his office, and that the mentoring program
can facilitate the relationship. The additional information that his girlfriend provided about how
mentoring works and where to volunteer may give him the needed sense of self-efficacy. If he
believes that he can accomplish the task, he may be motivated enough to take action.
Indeed, self-efficacy has been found to be a key predictor of mentor and youth contact and
closeness and even youth outcomes (DuBois et al.).

Retention of volunteers
Programs put considerable effort into recruiting volunteers, matching them with young people
and monitoring their mentoring relationships. Despite those efforts, as many as half of volunteer
mentoring relationships terminate within the first few months.
Volunteers have many reasons for dropping out of mentoring programs. For instance,
volunteers may:
Fear that they are being ineffective and do not want to risk failure;
Perceive that their mentees show a lack of effort or appreciation;
Find that the personal investment required to work with troubled adolescents exceeds
their expectations;
Feel burdened by their youths issues and not be aware of the many resources that are
available to help them through services in the community-at-large (e.g., Mentoring.org)
or through the mentoring program that matched them;
Feel overwhelmed by the difficult circumstances or neediness of their mentees, which
ignite the mentors own painful or unwelcome memories.
No matter why early terminations occur, mentoring programs should take the terminations
seriously and handle them with care.3 Indeed, when relationships dont thrive, both the mentees
and the programs can suffer negative effects.

Effects on youth

Strategies for Recruiting and Retaining Volunteers

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Jean Grossman and I analyzed data from the national Big Brothers Big Sisters study, examining
whether the effects of mentoring relationships varied as a function of their duration. First, we
categorized the mentored youth into two groups, depending on how long their matches lasted.
On group consisted of youth who were in matches that terminated within the first six
months. The youth in this group suffered larger drops in feelings of self-worth and
perceived scholastic competence than youth who had never been matched with a
mentor (controls).
The other group consisted of youth who were in matches that lasted more than 12
months. The young people in this group reported significantly higher levels of self-worth,
social acceptance and scholastic competence. They also reported that their relationships
with their parents had improved, school had become more rewarding and their drug and
alcohol use had declined!
Along similar lines, Ellen Slicker and Douglas Palmer found that students who were "effectively
mentored" (as measured by the quality and length of their relationships) had better academic
outcomes than controls. By contrast, young people whose relationships terminated prematurely
experienced a significant decline in self-concept when compared with students who were not
mentored at all.5
David DuBois and colleagues research also supports this pattern. They used a meta-analysis to
review 55 evaluations of youth mentoring programs. Stronger effects emerged among those
youth who had closer, more enduring mentoring relationships: they derived more benefits.
These and related findings have underscored the potentially disruptive effects of early
terminations.

Effect on organization
Termination is not only disruptive to mentees, it can take a toll on mentoring programs.
Recruiting and training new volunteers is expensive and can drain an organizations limited
budget.

A functional approach to retention

As discussed earlier, people often are attracted to volunteerism as a means of addressing their
own needs, goals and motives. Volunteers will be more satisfied and more apt to continue
volunteering so long as their needs are met. Thus, mentoring programs should take steps to
ensure that mentors experiences align with their expectations.
Clary found that elderly and college student volunteers who received benefits that matched their
initial motivations (as measured on the VFI) were more satisfied. These volunteers also
indicated greater intentions to continue in both the short- and long-term future. This suggests
that programs should not misrepresent the mentoring experience in their marketing (e.g.,
oversell the fun and minimize the challenges of mentoring). Ultimately, if the actual experience
fails to align with their motivation, volunteers will be at-risk for dropping out.

Strategies for Recruiting and Retaining Volunteers

Page 5

Altruism vs. Egoistic motivations

As suggested above, motivations to volunteer tend to fall on a continuum from the more
altruistic (selfless concern for others) to the more egoistic (self-interested). Volunteering to
express ones values or to give back to ones community is more altruistic in nature, whereas
volunteering to learn about oneself or children, or to advance ones career is more egoistic.
Karcher, Nakkula and Harris have found that mentors are more likely to perceive their
mentoring relationships as positive if they are motivated by altruistic motivations as
opposed to egoistic motivations.
Similarly, Rubin & Thorelli (1984) found that the number of egoistic motives indicated by
volunteers was inversely related to their longevity of participation.
Davis et al. (2003) looked at motives and their fulfillment in actual volunteer activities as
predictors of satisfaction in a sample of community volunteers recruited from a range of
volunteer agencies. Altruistic vs. egoistic motives were measured at the beginning of the
volunteer service. Satisfaction and motive fulfillment were measured every three months
for a year. Results were interesting associations between motive fulfillment and
satisfaction were found, but only at the first two time points. As time went on, fulfillment
of original motives became less relevant. The authors speculated that perhaps, as time
went on, the more egoistic goals that led volunteers to initially participate were fulfilled,
and the motivations to continue became more altruistic.

Role identity
Other researchers have looked at the importance of a role identity and the extent to which
adults volunteer roles become important to their sense of who they are.
Organizations that encourage volunteers to attend mentor support groups, hold events for
volunteers or send out newsletters and group e-mails to all volunteers may help those
individuals to internalize their identities as volunteers. This, in turn, may go a long way toward
retaining volunteers and facilitating longer-lasting mentoring relationships (McClanahan, 1998).

Carrot and Stick

Some programs have sought to increase mentor retention by providing rewards for mentors
sustained efforts (i.e., by offering course credits, repaying debts, even offering hourly wages)
and by withholding such rewards if mentors terminate relationships.
Although such tactics may seem promising, some fear that it might reduce individuals interest in
an activity and undermine its intrinsic value. This appears to be the case in studies where
children are paid for good grades or when adults are paid to shed pounds or give blood. The
external motivation appears to undermine the belief that individuals should do something
because they will enjoy it. Often, when the reward goes, these individuals consider their work
less worthwhile. Psychologists call this the "over-justification effect." (Sharpe, 200)

Strategies for Recruiting and Retaining Volunteers

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Such an undermining effect has been demonstrated as a result of required community service,
which have become a common feature of many high schools and colleges (Stukas, Snyder, &
Clary). As the researchers argue, ''limiting an individual's freedom to act may lead to desires to
reestablish that freedom, which can be accomplished by derogating the forced activity and by
refusing to perform it once the mandate has been lifted.''
Moreover, as discussed above, volunteers who are more motivated by internal factors (i.e.,
wanting to give back) are more likely to complete their volunteer assignments than those
motivated by external factors (i.e., building their rsums).
Nonetheless, extrinsic rewards can be effective, particularly when coupled with intrinsic
motivations. Friends of the Children (http://www.friendsofthechildren.com/) successfully employs
paid professional mentors to work with vulnerable youth from kindergarten through high school.
Additionally, externally motivated volunteers who went through intensive training were just as
likely to complete their assignments as were internally motivated volunteers. This suggests that
careful attention to the quality of training can override individual differences that otherwise might
have led to early terminations. Indeed, researchers have underscored the importance of training
in youth mentoring .5

The Bottom Line

To summarize the research, adults are more likely to be mobilized into sustained mentoring
relationships when they:
Perceive that the experience is addressing their underlying expectations and needs;
Are made more aware of the potential benefits mentoring offers to themselves
(particularly enhanced understanding), their mentees and to the community;
Feel a connection with other volunteers or the with the community in which the
mentoring will occur;
Feel confident that they can master logistics of the mentoring experience and can both
find the time and energy to volunteer;
Are provided with opportunities to internalize their role as volunteers; and
Feel greater social norms and pressure to authentically engage in the lives of todays
youth.
Taken together, these findings suggest that mentoring programs can enhance their mentor
recruitment and retention efforts by understanding what motivates their volunteer pool and tailor
their recruitment messages and experiences accordingly.

References
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior & Human Decision
Processes, 50(2), 179-211.
Davis, M.H., Hall, J.A., & Meyer, M. (2003). The first year: Influences on the satisfaction,
involvement, and persistence of new community volunteers. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 29(2), 248-260.

Strategies for Recruiting and Retaining Volunteers

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DuBois, D.L., Holloway, B.E., Valentine, J.C., & Cooper, H. (2002). Effectiveness of mentoring
programs for youth: A meta-analytic review. American Journal of Community Psychology, 30,
157-197.
Grossman, J.B., & Rhodes, J.E. (2002). The test of time: Predictors and effects of duration in
youth mentoring relationships. American Journal of Community Psychology, 30, 199-219.
Karcher, M.L., Nakkula, M.J., & Harris, J. (2005). Developmental mentoring match
characteristics: Correspondence between mentors and mentees assessments of relationship
quality. Journal of Primary Prevention, 26, 92-110.
McClanahan, W.S. (1998). Relationships in a career mentoring program: Lessons learned from
the Hospital Youth Mentoring Program. Philadelphia: Public/Private Ventures.
Okun, M. (2002). Application of planned behavior theory to predicting volunteer enrollment by
college students in a campus-based program. Social Behavior and Personality, 30(30), 243250.
Okun, M.A., & Schultz, A. (2003). Age and motives for volunteering: Testing hypotheses derived
from socioemotional selectivity theory. Psychology and Aging, 18, 231-239.
Pillavin, J.A., & Callero, P.L. (1991). Giving blood: The development of an altruistic identity.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Rubin, A., & Thorelli, I.M. (1984). Egoistic motives and longevity of participation by social
service volunteers. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 20, 223-235.
Stukas, A.A., Snyder, M., & Clary, E.G. (1999). The effects of mandatory volunteerism on
intentions to volunteer. Psychological Science, 10(1), 59-64.
Scales, P.C. (2003) Other peoples kids: Social expectations and American adults involvement
with children and adolescents. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum.

Strategies for Recruiting and Retaining Volunteers

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TARGETING YOUTH:
WHAT EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT
MILITARY RECRUITING IN PUBLIC
HIGH SCHOOLS

A Report Prepared by The

Constitutional Litigation Clinic
Rutgers School of Law-Newark
November 2008

Under the supervision of Clinical Professor Penny Venetis, the following students and interns contributed to writing
this report: Heidi Alexander, Avi Appel, Erica Askin, Amy Brown, Eric Bueide, Matthew Coleman, Randle
DeFalco, Jason Fertakos, Lisa Hansen, Safia Hussain, Michael Isaac, Syrion Jack, Daniel Louis, Devi Shah, Nadia
Rollins, and Robert Ulon.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The decision to join the military is a very serious one that should not be made lightly.
Enlisting in the Armed Forces is an irreversible commitment to at least two years of wartime
service. Teenagers considering enlisting should do so based on an honest and straightforward
appraisal of the facts, rather than glossy advertising campaigns that glamorize military service
without acknowledging its dangers.
This report presents facts about military recruitment and military service to help parents
and students determine whether joining the military is appropriate or necessary. This Executive
Summary of the report summarizes the detailed information contained in the rest of the report.
PARENTS AND CHILDREN CONSIDERING ENLISTMENT
SHOULD BE AWARE THAT:
The Military Uses Aggressive Recruiting Tactics And Spends Billions Of Dollars On
Advertising Firms To Convince Teenagers To Enlist.
Funding for military recruitment is on the rise. The 2009 military advertising budget
totals $20.5 Billion. This money is used for slick ads and video games designed by the
same marketing firms that create commercials for major corporations, such as Coca-Cola,
McDonalds and Nintendo. These ads and video games do not accurately portray the
lives of soldiers and do not mention the dangers of war.
Under the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), schools are required to give recruiters
access to students and student information. The NCLB and the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) require that parents be told that they have the right to
keep recruiters away from their children. High schools throughout the State do not notify
parents of this right adequately, or at all.
Under the NCLB, schools receiving federal funds must give military recruiters the same
access to students as they give employers and college recruiters. But, schools throughout
the State give recruiters much greater access to students than is required by law. There
are no uniform rules in New Jersey for schools to control military recruiter behavior on
campus. School officials do not supervise military recruiters. Lack of oversight allows
recruiters to present students with unrealistic and false portrayals of military service.

Recruiters Do Not Present Families with Important Facts. With virtually unfettered access to
high school students and limited oversight, military recruiters play up themes of adventure and
patriotism while failing to present the realities of military service.
Casualties. Military recruiters fail to adequately present the cost of military action. As
of October, 2008 4,734 American troops have been killed and 33,012 have been wounded
in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Realities of War.
o Students are not told that they will likely be sent to Iraq or Afghanistan, and that
soldiers may be recalled for up to four separate tours of duty.
o Students are not told that between 12-20% of Iraq veterans suffer from serious
psychological problems related to their military service.
o Recruiters give female students the impression that they will be out of harms
way. While women do not serve in front line combat positions, they work some
of the most dangerous jobs at the front lines.
o Female students are not informed about the dangers of sexual assault and
harassment. Of women receiving care from the Veterans Administration, 23%
reported sexual assault and 55% reported harassment during their service.
Furthermore, women report higher rates of psychological disorders than men.
Wounded Veterans do not Receive Adequate Health Care. Given the prevalence of
injuries in the line of duty, recruiters should inform students about the lack of health care
for wounded veterans.
o The U.S. Congress has found that numerous Veterans Administration centers and
hospitals offer sub-standard health services.
o Many injured soldiers are turned away from Veterans Administration centers on
the basis that their illness was caused by a pre-existing condition not related to
combat duty.
o If you are injured in combat, the only other way to get full benefits is to suffer a
service-related disability. The VA has been routinely classifying serious
injuries as non-service-related. As a result, veterans do not receive health care
coverage for injuries sustained during the war.

o On average, veterans wait six months for the Veterans Administration to process
medical claims. The appeals process for rejected claims averages 3.5 years.
Soldiers are not permitted to seek legal representation to expedite their claims.
Military Reserve Soldiers Are Real Soldiers.
o Military Reserve soldiers are real soldiers and can be called to active duty at any
time.
o There is less support to Reservists who return from active duty.
o Reserve soldiers suffer from higher rates of suicide.
Education.
If a students sole goal in joining the military is to pursue a college education, the student
should explore the many scholarship opportunities available in New Jersey and consider
participating in college ROTC programs.
o The new GI Bill, which will start delivering education benefits in August 2009,
makes it easier for soldiers to gain access to education funding. But, the Bill still
requires 36 months of active duty service and an honorable discharge (or its
equivalent) before a veteran can receive benefits that would pay for a typical
undergraduate degree.
o There are numerous scholarships that are available in New Jersey that do not
require military service.
o If a student has good grades, the student should consider applying to the ROTC
program as an entering freshman or during college. In a college ROTC program,
the military offers many scholarships that pay for students college education in
full. Additionally, ROTC graduates receive higher pay, more responsibility, and
better benefits than enlistees who do not have a degree.

Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................ 1
II. THE MILITARY PURPOSEFULLY USES ADVERTISING TECHNIQUES
TO LURE ADOLESCENTS INTO ENLISTING.................................................... 3
A. Tax Dollars Fund Aggressive Marketing Tactics........................................... 3
B. The Armed Forces Hire Top Advertising Firms to Sell Messages of
Adventure and Patriotism That Do Not Portray the Harsh Realities of War....... 4
C. The Military Uses Behavioral Psychology to Create Coercive Marketing
Campaigns Targeting Adolescents...................................................................... 5
D. The Militarys School Recruitment Program Handbook is a Sales Plan That
Refers to High Schools as Markets.................................................................. 10
III. MILITARY RECRUITERS EXERT INFLUENCE OVER TEENAGERS
WITHOUT PARENTAL CONSENT.........................................................................18
A. The Military Has Extensive Information About Students.............................. 19
B. The No Child Left Behind Act Requires Schools to Notify Parents of Their
Right to Keep Recruiters From Contacting Their Children................................. 19
C. Schools that Fail to Notify Parents of Their Opt-Out Rights are in
Violation of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act..............................28
D. Recommendations to Protect Parents Rights................................................. 29
IV. THE JUNIOR RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING PROGRAM RECRUITS
CHILDREN WHO ARE YOUNGER THAN 17.................................................... 30
A. The Recruiting Debate and JROTC................................................................ 31
B. Donna High School Marine Corps JROTC Program...................................... 33
V. IMPACT OF THE ONGOING WARS ON MEMBERS OF THE ARMED
FORCES....................................................................................................................... 42
A. Members of the Armed Forces Serve Up to Four Tours of Duty.................. 42

B. Soldiers Returning from Iraq and Afghanistan Suffer from Brain Damage
and Other Psychological Disorders...................................................................... 43
C. Suicide is a Growing Epidemic in the Military............................................... 45
D. Women in the Military are Not Out of Harms Way...................................... 46
E. How We Fail Wounded Veterans The Heath Care Crisis............................ 49
VI. STUDENTS INTERESTED IN ENLISTING TO RECEIVE EDUCATIONAL
BENEFITS HAVE OTHER OPTIONS.....................................................................53
A. New Jersey State Scholarship Programs......................................................... 55
B. Military Educational Benefits Available to High School Enlistees................ 58
C. Military-Based Education Assistance for College Students and Graduates... 63
D. Enlistment Benefits for College Students and Graduates Not Enrolled in
ROTC Programs...................................................................................................65
VII. CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 67
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS.............................................................................................. 68

Appendices

A. School Recruiting Program Handbook

B. Sample Emergency Form Opt-Out Language
C. Sample Opt-Out Letter For Parents
D. Veteran Health Care Fact Sheet

I.

INTRODUCTION

Military enlistment is a major life decision and should not be taken lightly, particularly
during times of war. The United States has been at war in Afghanistan since 2001 and Iraq since
2003. These campaigns have come at a steep cost to America and its citizens. As of October
2008, 4,734 American troops have been killed and 33,012 have been wounded. The military has
extended soldiers tours in both length and number, and the length of their leave between tours
has been shortened. The impact of the increased strain on American soldiers has been profound.
Aside from deaths and numerous life-altering injuries suffered by soldiers, rates of suicide, posttraumatic stress syndrome, and instances of sexual assault and other criminal misconduct within
the military have risen significantly.
Beginning in 2004, the military routinely fell short of its recruiting goals. In response,
the military began a multi-Billion dollar Madison Avenue-driven marketing campaign to sell
military service to Americas youth. Facilitating this effort is the No Child Left Behind Act
(NCLB), a federal statute aimed at equalizing the quality of education throughout the nation.
A little-known provision of that law aids military recruitment. The NCLB requires public high
schools that receive federal funding to give recruiters access to students and student information,
including contact information of all juniors and seniors who fail to affirmatively opt-out of the
information release. But, many schools throughout the state fail to notify parents of their right to
opt-out and to keep recruiters from their children. As a result, children are exposed to
aggressive recruitment tactics without parental knowledge or approval.
This report aims to provide as much information as possible so students and their families
can make informed decisions about whether to join the military. The report discusses: (1) the
1

militarys aggressive recruiting efforts; (2) how these tactics are imported to the high schools
under NCLB; (3) the actual educational benefits available to new recruits; (4) how these benefits
compare to non-military sources of educational financial aid; and (5) the impact of the war on
current soldiers and veterans. The report concludes with a series of recommendations to ensure
that students who decide to enlist will do so based on an unbiased and full understanding of what
it means to joint the military during wartime.

II.

A.

THE MILITARY PURPOSEFULLY USES MISLEADING

ADVERTISING TECHNIQUES TO LURE
ADOLESCENTS INTO ENLISTING

TAX DOLLARS FUND AGGRESSIVE MARKETING TACTICS

To meet its human capital needs, the Department of Defense (DOD) must convince

about 200,000 people each yearthe majority of them recent high school graduatesto join the
military. 1 Convincing young people to join the armed forces means competing with other postsecondary educational and career opportunities that are available to them, 2 and asking high
school students to defer or forego college and/or employment. This has proved an increasingly
difficult challenge as casualties mount and tours of duty lengthen. 3 The harder it is to recruit
teenagers to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan, the more tax dollars are spent on military recruitment
advertising. The budget for recruiting advertising campaigns nearly tripled from fiscal years
1990 to 2003. 4 The National Priorities Project reports that prior to 2006, more than $4 Billion
per year was spent on recruiting related expenditures. 5 According to the Department of Defense,
the 2009 budget for military recruitment is up to $20.5 Billion. 6
Indeed, under 10 U.S.C.A. 503, the Secretary of Defense is required by law to
enhance the effectiveness of DODs recruitment programs through an aggressive program of
advertising and market research targeted at prospective recruits and those who may influence
them. 7

B.

THE ARMED FORCES HIRE TOP ADVERTISING FIRMS TO SELL MESSAGES OF

ADVENTURE AND PATRIOTISM THAT DO NOT PORTRAY THE HARSH REALITIES
WAR

OF

Each branch of the armed forces has gotten more aggressive in its advertising efforts in
recent years. 8 As casualties mount, the U.S. military spends Billions of tax dollars to recruit our
youth, using the same tactics as advertising agencies that create ads to sell cars, sugary drinks,
and fast food.

In 2005, the Army entered into a five-year contract with global advertising firm McCann
Erickson for $1.35 Billion of advertising, promotional, and publicity programs to
support all recruiting and retention programs. 9 McCann Ericksons client list includes
multi-Billion dollar, multi-national corporations such as: Microsoft, Johnson & Johnson,
Coca-Cola, ExxonMobil, General Motors, American Airlines, Goodyear, Intel, and
Pfizer. 10 From 2000 to 2005, the Army had contracted with the Leo Burnett agency,
which handles many of the world's most valuable brands and successful marketers,
including McDonald's, Disney, Procter & Gamble, Marlboro, Altoids, Heinz, Kellogg,
and Nintendo. 11

The Navy spends over $90 Million taxpayer dollars annually on advertising and has a
renewable $91.9 Million contract with the Campbell Edwald agency. 12 This makes the
contract worth $468.8 Million if the renewal options are exercised over four years.
Campbell Ewalds clients include Chevrolet, General Motors, Michelin, and OnStar. 13

The Marines employ J. Walter Thompson Co. (JWT) of Atlanta, Georgia. 14 JWT is the
largest advertising agency in the United States and the fourth-largest in the world. 15 The
Marines multi-year contract with JWT is worth approximately $213 Million. 16 JWT also
represents Bayer, Johnson & Johnson, HSBC, and Rolex. 17

The Air Force has contracted with Gurasich, Spence, Darilek and McClure (GSD&M)
of Austin, Texas, whose clients include AT&T, Southwest Airlines, American Red Cross,
BMW, John Deere, AARP, and MasterCard. 18 The Air Forces renewable contract is
worth $57 Million annually. 19
These contracts, paid for with tax dollars, are very lucrative for advertising agencies. The

Billions of dollars spent on advertising could be used for scholarships and other youth programs.

C.

THE MILITARY USES BEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY TO CREATE COERCIVE

MARKETING CAMPAIGNS TARGETING ADOLESCENTS
The military has conducted extensive research into the psychological and behavioral

factors that influence teenagers to enlist in the military. 20 In 1999, the Department of Defense
(DOD) charged the National Academies of Sciences National Research Council to do a fouryear study on youth attitudes toward the military and the effectiveness of advertising campaigns
using the Youth Attitudes Tracking Survey (YATS). 21 The Defense Manpower Data Center
(DMDC) administers the YATS to students annually so that changes in youth demographic
trends, cultural characteristics, attitudes, and educational attainments can be tracked by the
DOD to formulate recruiting strategies. 22 The DOD uses information derived from its
behavioral research to guide its recruiting strategy and to influence teenagers to join the
military. 23
The militarys marketing campaigns emphasize patriotic themes and tales of adventure
that appeal to teenage sensitivities, while downplaying the actual risks of war. For example, the
Armys television commercials show soldiers in grassy settings performing athletic feats such as
jogging in formation, scaling an obstacle course, and leaping from a helicopter. These ads,
however, omit all but the most fleeting images related to the all-volunteer Armys biggest
endeavor ever: the war in Iraq. 24 Ads fail to point out that signing up these days almost
inevitably means deployment to combat zones in Afghanistan or Iraq, where the majority of the
more than 2,850 killed and 21,000 wounded have been soldiers. 25
Similarly, promotional materials left in schools by military recruiters fail to mention the
negative consequences of war or the possibility of being deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan. 26 This

lack of disclosure prevents a teenager from making an informed choice about a very serious life
decision. While adult consumers may be fair game for manipulation by sophisticated marketers,
impressionable teenagers should not be seduced into joining the military through psychological
tactics that exploit adolescent vulnerabilities.

1. Adolescents Lack the Neurological Capacity to Make Fully Informed Decisions

The military is exploiting the fact that adolescents lack a fully-developed capacity to
make informed decisions. Teenagers are less likely to consider the long-term consequences of
their decisions than adults who are only a few years older. 27 In particular, adolescents generally
do not perceive or assess risk in the same way as adults, and they tend to make riskier
decisions. 28 Neurological studies reveal structural differences between the adult and adolescent
brains. 29 Scientific research conducted by the National Institute of Mental Health shows that:
the greatest changes to the parts of the brain that are responsible for functions
such as self-control, judgment, emotions, and organization occur between puberty
and adulthood. This may help to explain certain teenage behavior . . . such as
poor decision-making, recklessness, and emotional outbursts . . . compared to
adults the teens frontal lobes (the seat of goal-oriented rational thinking) are less
active . . . . The results suggest that in teens, the judgment, insight and reasoning
power of the frontal cortex is not being brought to bear on the task as it is in
adults. 30
The United States Supreme Court has also recognized the psychological vulnerability of
children and teenagers in several landmark decisions. 31 In 2005, in discussing why the execution
of juveniles is unconstitutional, 32 the Supreme Court cited [s]cientific and sociological studies
documenting the tendency of adolescents to make impetuous and ill-considered decisions;
their susceptibility to negative influences and outside pressures; and the transitory nature of
their character traits. 33
6

As a result of drunken teens dying in auto crashes, Congress raised the minimum age for
the purchase and possession of alcoholic beverages to 21. 34 Increasing the national drinking age
to 21 has saved an estimated 20,000 lives in the past 20 years. 35 Recognizing the
psychological vulnerability of children, Congress passed laws prohibiting slick marketing
campaigns that glamorize risky behaviors such as smoking 36 and drinking. 37 For similar
reasons, as the obesity rate among young people has soared, school officials and legislators have
targeted the sale of unhealthy foods on school campuses. 38 Adolescents neurological
immaturity has also been noted by auto safety experts, who advocate raising the minimum
driving age, because 16-year-olds, the youngest drivers licensed in most states, are too
immature to handle today's cars and roadway risks. 39
While a broad consensus exists that teenagers lack the decision-making capacity of
adults, the military deliberately exploits this immaturity by equating the military with video
games and other entertainment. This trivializes what should be a mature, serious, and sober
decision to be made by teens and their families.

2. Interactive Military Games Target Teenagers

Military recruiters ability to affect young people is greatly enhanced by captivating
images shown in the various promotional materials that they bring to schools, including
brochures, DVDs, videos, and electronic games. Often the military prominently displays its
promotional materials inside or nearby the school cafeteria, where the entire student population
can be exposed to the recruiters messages.

The Army employs a range of techniques to entice potential recruits. It developed its
own video game, Americas Army, which is available for free download at the Armys
recruiting website. 40 The game has 6.5 million registered users according to the Armys
website. 41 Americas Army, which has become the gold standard for recruitment video
games, cost $5.5 Million. 42 The Army also plans to use cell phone text messages, helicopter
simulators in the back of eighteen wheelers, and visits to NASCAR and rodeo races. 43
[R]ecruiters will visit schools and malls a few days before an event, offering free tickets and the
chance to meet famous drivers or bull riders. 44
At one location, the Army displays customized vehicles and a black Hummer with an
Army logo and a high-end audiovisual system. 45 Two flat-screen monitors show Army
footage from Iraq to the accompaniment of the Toby Keith song American Soldier, while a
third monitor displays images from an Xbox video game. 46 A road show attraction includes an
aviation van with a new Special Forces vehicle, which includes a simulated parachute drop. 47
The Air Force maintains a website that allows a visitor to chat with an Air Force advisor
in real time. 48 The Air Force features USAF: Air Dominance, a simple flight simulator played
on kiosks in Air Force mobile recruiting centers. 49 The Air Force also maintains a fleet of
customized SUVs and trailers called RAPTORS (Reaching Americas Public to Optimize
Recruiting), which come equipped with interactive games and a scale model of the latest fighter
jet. 50 The Air Force deploys the RAPTORS at high schools, colleges, job fairs, sporting events,
and in convention halls. 51
The Navy has also joined the interactive game club with Strike and Retrieve. 52 This
online game is based on shooting skills, and is geared for teens and young adults. 53 Strike
8

and Retrieve involves a spy plane downed over the Atlantic. 54 Players must operate remotecontrolled submarines that navigate a fantastic world of undersea caves, dangerous fish and
enemy subs. 55
The game landed a T rating, for Teenager, from the Entertainment Software Rating
Board for its flashy graphics. 56 A T rating means the material may be suitable for ages 13
and older and may contain violence, suggestive themes, crude humor, minimal blood and/or
infrequent use of strong language. While the Navys director of the advertising plans division
was initially displeased about the T rating, he soon realized that it was better for recruitment.
As he stated, our target market is teenagers. If it were rated E for Everyone, then a teenager
might be less likely to play it because its not cool. 57

3. The Military Exploits Adolescent Insecurities

The military combines traditional mass media marketing with psychological tactics to
influence students to enlist. The Armys computer program, the Blueprint, trains military
recruiters to:
[a]nalyze students and make a pitch according to what will strike a
motivational chord job training, college scholarships, adventure. Signing
bonuses, or service to country. 58
Military recruiters create a customized pitch for each individual student based in part on
personal information gathered from the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery test
(ASVAB). 59 The military:
pitches the test to schools as a free career exploration program, but its manual
notes that [the ASVAB] is also specifically designed to provide the recruiter
with concrete and personal information about the student. 60

Military recruiters are instructed to read yearbooks to mysteriously know something

about a prospect to spark the students curiosity. 61 While it is only natural for people to
resist, military recruiters learn sales techniques for closing the deal. 62 One such sales
technique, the challenge close method, plays on adolescent male insecurities. This technique
works best with younger men. Be on friendly terms with your prospect, or this
may backfire. It works like this: When you find difficulty in closing, particularly
when your prospects interest seems to be waning, challenge his ego by
suggesting that basic training may be too difficult for him and he might not be
able to pass it. Then if he accepts your challenge, you will be a giant step closer to
getting him to enlist. 63
Recruiters view each teenager as a potential sale, rather than an individual who is trying
to navigate the difficult years of adolescence. Indeed, the Secretary of Defenses Director of
Recruiting Policy stated that the military concentrates on schools most likely to maximize
returns on the recruiting dollar [because] the advertising and marketing research people tell us to
go where the low-hanging fruit is. In other words, we fish where the fish are. 64

D.

THE MILITARYS SCHOOL RECRUITMENT PROGRAM HANDBOOK

THAT REFERS TO HIGH SCHOOLS AS MARKETS

IS A

SALES PLAN

Recruiters must follow the militarys School Recruitment Program Handbook (SRP
Handbook), which instructs them to penetrate the school market and achieve school
ownership. 65 To achieve school ownership, recruiters employ traditional corporate
marketing strategies developed by multi-Million dollar advertising firms. The SRP Handbook is
a ten page document that gives detailed instructions to military recruiters, telling them how to
convince students to enlist (It is attached to this report as Appendix A.) The SRP Handbook

10

reveals that military recruiting is an exercise in pure salesmanship. High schools are referred to
as markets where recruiters make sales presentations to students. 66
The SRP Handbook ignores completely that public schools are places for students to
learn. The SRP Handbook candidly states that following its instructions closely is the
cornerstone of mission accomplishment, which is to ensure an army presence in all secondary
schools. 67 A military recruiter has successfully sold a student when he or she enlists in the
military. As popular support for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan wane and casualties
accumulate, to achieve mission accomplishment, recruiters are becoming fixtures in the public
school system.

1. Penetrating the School Market: Winning the Trust of School Administrators

Recruiters are instructed by the SRP Handbook to employ a two-step strategy. First, win
the trust of school administrators to gain maximum access to the student body and second,
aggressively solicit students to enlist:
[r]ecruiters must first establish rapport in the schools. This is a basic step in the
sales process and a prerequisite to an effective school program. . . . Once
educators are convinced recruiters have their students best interests in mind the
SRP can be effectively implemented. 68
The SRP Handbook provides recruiters with tactics to help win the confidence of school
administrators, who can assist them in the recruitment effort. Recruiters are told to give out free
mugs, calendars and office supplies with the Army logo on them to school employees because
[s]omething as simple as an Army personal promotional item can help produce positive
results. 69 Military recruiters are also instructed to be courteous and helpful to the schools
administration and faculty. 70

11

While this directive appears admirable at first glance, its explicit purpose is to win the
trust of school employees and thereby facilitate penetration of the school market. The SRP
Handbook refers to educators as tools to further implement the militarys goals. The SRP
Handbook directs recruiters to employ aggressive solicitation techniques: [i]f you can make an
appointment for a sales presentation on the first contact, then do so. 71 The SRP Handbook is
clear that unhindered and unchecked access to students is the crucial first-step in the recruiting
sales process.

2. Achieving School Ownership

After winning the trust of school administrators, a recruiters next required objective is to
achieve school ownership. To facilitate this ownership, recruiters are instructed to approach
youths as early and as often as possible and to seek help from school administrators and popular
students, or centers of influence, (COIs) in the recruiting process. Perhaps the most
disturbing aspect of this strategy is the deliberate targeting of children who are too young to
enlist.
The SRP Handbook clearly instructs recruiters to target youths as early as possible. The
SRP Handbook tells recruiters that high school seniors are by no means the only intended
audience for their message:
[r]emember, first to contact, first to contract . . . that doesnt just mean seniors or
grads; it means having the Army perceived as a positive career choice as soon as
young people begin to think about the future. If you wait until theyre seniors, its
probably too late. 72
The official policy of the military is to gain back door access to students who are not
legally eligible to enlist in the military. Indeed, the SRP Handbook encourages military
recruiters to [g]et involved with local Boy Scout troops, because [s]coutmasters are typically
12

happy to get any assistance you can offer. 73 [M]any scouts are HS students and potential
enlistees or student influencers. 74 What the Handbook fails to mention is that the actual age
range for the Boy Scouts is ten to eighteen years old. This means that military recruiters not
only target younger high school students, but have access to boys as young as ten years of age,
without any parental knowledge or permission.
The SRP Handbook exploits adolescent boys insecurities. It specifically discusses that
although most student COIs are not likely to enlist in the military, they should still be used as
tools to recruit less popular students who look up to them:
Some influential students such as the student president or the captain of the
football team may not enlist; however, they can and will provide you with
referrals who will enlist. 75
The SRP Handbook further requires recruiters to:
Know [their] student influencers. Students such as class officers, newspaper and
yearbook editors, and athletes can help build interest in the Army among the
student body. Keep them informed. 76
A successful recruiter with many COIs working with him can insert the militarys sales
pitch into every aspect of the lives of high school students. A pervasive and aggressive
marketing campaign is the essence of the school ownership that is the goal of the military.
The SRP Handbook urges recruiters to establish rapport with COIs, so that they will then exert
additional influence on potential recruits, instructing that to effectively work the school market,
recruiters must maintain rapport throughout the SY [school year] and develop a good working
relationship with key influencers. 77 The SRP Handbook also provides helpful hints and
guidelines for working the school market and using COIs in order to achieve school
ownership:
Be indispensable to school administrators, counselors, faculty, and students. Be
so helpful and so much a part of the school scene that you are in constant demand
13

. . . Never rely on guidance counselors as the sole COI in the school. Cultivate
coaches, librarians, administrative staff, and teachers . . . By directing your efforts
toward other faculty members you may be able to obtain the information
necessary to effectively communicate with students. 78

3. Implementing the SRP Handbooks Twelve-Month Plan

Unlike college and vocational recruiters who typically visit schools once a year at a
college or employment fair, the military seeks to have a constant, visible presence in public high
schools. Military recruiters are instructed to eat lunch in the school cafeteria several times each
month in order to obtain more visibility and to identify potential candidates for
enlistment. 79 The Armys Calendar of School Activities 80 urges military recruiters to "wear
[their] dress blues" to school events commemorating Martin Luther King, Jr.'s birthday and to
participate in activities during Black History Month and Hispanic Heritage Month. 81 There is
no mention, however, of similar events such as Columbus Day and Saint Patricks Day, which
are days of ethnic pride for Irish and Italian-Americans. 82
This apparent targeting of African-American and Hispanic students is confirmed by a
United States General Accounting Office report, which found that all of the [military] services
have specialized campaigns to target diverse segments of the young adult population. 83 For
instance, the Navy created a Web site, called El Navy, which is designed to better communicate
with the Hispanic market, and the Army has specifically tailored radio advertisements to reach
the African-American market. 84
The SRP Handbook lays out a detailed twelve-month plan to achieve its high school
enlistment goals. 85 Recruiters selected monthly activities include:
July
Obtain a copy of the HS fall sports and activity calendars [and] arrange to have the schedules
copied with the RS [Recruiting Station] address prominently displayed. Post them
14

throughout the RS area, including restaurants, arcades, and anywhere else students
congregate. . . .
August
Contact the schools student government . . . to discuss what the Army and you can do to
assist them in the upcoming SY [school year] (chaperon, give a speech, tour a reserve center,
etc.) . . . The football team usually starts practicing in August. Contact the coach and
volunteer to assist in leading calisthenics or calling cadence during team runs. . . .
September
Distribute desk calendars to your assigned schools . . . Attend athletic events at the HS . . .
Get involved with the parent-teacher association . . . Obtain a tactical vehicle from a local
USAR [US Army Recruiting] troop program unit and drive it in the parade with your
future Soldiers riding along. . . . Deliver donuts and coffee for the faculty once a month. . . .
Hispanic Heritage Month. Participate in events as available. . . .
October
Homecoming normally happens in October. Coordinate with the homecoming committee to
get involved with the parade. Use a tactical vehicle . . . Offer to be a chaperone or escort for
homecoming activities and coronations. . . . Order personal presentation items (pens, bags,
mouse pads, mugs) as needed monthly for special events. .
November
Basketball season begins. Distribute new schedules for the basketball season. Assemble and
offer a color guard for the opening home game. . . Prior to Thanksgiving, many student
organizations gather food baskets for needy citizens. Offer your assistance and get involved.
. . . Attend as many school holiday functions or assemblies as possible. . . .
December
Set up school career day presentations. . . .Contact college students who are home during the
holidays (remember that many first year students do not return to school after the first
semester). . . . Offer to be a timekeeper at football games. . . .Participate in HS holiday
events. . . .
January
Turn up the tempo on contacting your juniors. Get a jump on the competition. . . . Martin
Luther King Jr.s birthday is in January. Wear your dress blues and participate in school
events commemorating this holiday. . . .
February
Contact the HS athletic director and arrange for an exhibition basketball game between the
faculty and Army recruiters. This is an excellent way to build rapport in the HS. . . . Black
History Month. Participate in events as available . . .

15

March
Prepare certificates for those faculty and staff members who have aided you in your HS
recruiting efforts. . . . present these certificates at a COI [Center of Influence] event. . . .
Continue to advertise in school newspapers and conduct class presentations. . . .
April
Track and field meets begin. Offer to be a timekeeper or coachs assistant. . . . Basketball
season starts. Offer assistance to the coach. . . .
May
Since Memorial Day occurs in May, there are normally many patriotic events . . . . Contact
the HS to find out what events they are involved with and offer any assistance possible. . . .
June
Coordinate with your CLT to . . . send thank you notes to those staff and faculty members
who have been helpful . . . . Secure and present USAR Scholar/Athlete Awards at HS
graduation or award ceremonies . . . . Assist in arranging a color guard for the graduation
ceremony. . . . Coordinate with school officials to determine if they can use your assistance
during summer school. 86
4. Military Recruiters Reach Children By Targeting Their Teachers

All four branches of the armed forces host all-expense paid workshops for educators. 87
The SRP Handbook blatantly states that [if] recruiters successfully target the teachers first,
then they will have another foot in the door. 88 Curtis Gilroy, the head of recruitment for the
Department of Defense notes:
Teachers are a significant influencer, theres no question about it. . . . We just
want the cadre of teachers, regardless of political persuasion or background, to
speak about the military objectively. 89
Allen Kanner, a clinical psychologist and researcher on military recruiting, calls the use of
teachers a very clever marketing technique, and explains: Teachers are role models, and if
they approve of something, then the students believe the whole school system approves of it. 90

16

5. Service Members and Veterans Have Financial Incentives to Hide the Realities of
War and to Perpetuate the Recruiters Sales Tactics.
In 2008, to increase enlistment, the military increased its bonus allowance from $1,000 91
to $2,000 92 to members of the Army, National Guard, Army Reserve, retired service-members,
and civilian Army employees who refer potential enlistees to recruiters. 93 Authorized by the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, active service members or veterans
who convince someone to enlist receives $1,000 when the referred enlistee commences basic
training, and another $2,000 when the referred enlistee completes basic training and individual
advanced training. 94
Under this program, essentially every service-member acts as a recruiter. The program
encourages deceptive recruiting practices. Service members have a financial incentive to glorify
the war and to minimize negative experiences.

17

III.

MILITARY RECRUITERS EXERT INFLUENCE OVER

TEENAGERS WITHOUT PARENTAL CONSENT

Recruiters insinuate themselves in teenagers lives without their parents knowledge.

The interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children-is perhaps the oldest of
the fundamental liberty interests recognized in our countrys laws. 95 These fundamental rights
include a constitutionally protected zone in which parents can direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control, without hindrance from the government. 96 This
primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate
as an enduring American tradition. 97
Yet, parents are often unable to control the militarys influence over their children while
they are at school, despite having a legal right to do so under the opt-out provisions of the No
Child Left Behind Act (NCLB). 98 The school setting is a powerful reinforcement for the
militarys message, which is directed at impressionable high school students who are exposed to
it year after year. 99
Parental control over a childs upbringing is widely understood to include the right to
limit exposure to objectionable or harmful activities and substances. Nobody questions a
parents right to monitor a childs driving privileges, or when necessary to take away the car
keys; to impose a curfew hour; or to prevent a childs alcohol and cigarette consumption.
Parents may stop their children from viewing inappropriate material through various media
controls. They can ensure that the television shows their children watch are appropriate, by
installing a v-chip, a parental blocking PIN or password, or requesting a lockbox from their cable
provider. Similarly, computer software such as internet filters and browser plug-ins prevent their
childrens exposure to questionable websites and images. 100 But, by the pervasive presence of
18

recruiters in schools, underage children are exposed on a regular basis to military recruitment.
This is the case even when their parents opposed the militarys recruitment of their children.

A.

THE MILITARY HAS EXTENSIVE INFORMATION ABOUT STUDENTS

In order to recruit students, the military has to gain access to students and information

about them. The Department of Defense maintains a database of information on students eligible
for recruitment (seventeen years of age and older, or juniors in high school). The database
contains students' names, contact information, birth dates, Social Security numbers, ethnicity,
religious affiliation, and grade-point averages. This database currently contains approximately
30 million entries compiled from a variety of sources. High schools are required through the
NCLB to give military recruiters students' directory information, such as names, addresses, and
contact information. Once this basic information is entered into the database, military recruiters
obtain additional information about students from commercial firms (including some that process
college scholarship and loan applications), the Selective Service System, and state motor
vehicles departments. 101

B.

THE NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT REQUIRES SCHOOLS TO NOTIFY PARENTS

THEIR RIGHT TO KEEP RECRUITERS FROM CONTACTING THEIR CHILDREN

OF

The NCLB is a federal law that aims to improve quality of education and standardize test
results for public schools throughout the country. 102 NCLB attempts to improve student success
in reading and mathematics, and improve in teacher quality. Amid these worthy goals, NCLB
contains a provision totally unrelated to its educational goals. That provision of the NLCB
requires schools to open their doors to military recruiters and provide them with contact
information of all students who are at least seventeen years old or members of the junior or
senior high school classes. The NCLB also contains a provision requiring schools to give
19

students' names, addresses, and telephone numbers to military recruiters who request them. 103
High schools risk losing federal funding if they do not comply with these provisions.
Rutgers School of Law-Newark students and interns attempted to determine how these
provisions were implemented in New Jersey high schools. Students interviewed principals,
guidance counselors, and administrators in forty-eight high schools in thirteen counties
throughout New Jersey. These interviews were done on an informal basis to provide a snapshot
of military recruiting in New Jersey. The interviews revealed that there is no consistency
between how schools throughout the State handle military recruiters. The interviews also
revealed that military recruiters are largely unsupervised in their dealings with students. School
officials do not verify whether recruiters use deceptive practices and often give recruiters freereign of the cafeteria and other areas of the school. Why does this matter? Because, as discussed
earlier in this report, military recruiters are trained sales people who use carefully developed
strategies, including tactics developed by the largest advertising firms to sell the military to
students. In doing so, they manipulate adolescent insecurities.
The information we gathered breaks down into the following categories: the lack of
authority over military recruiters in high schools, the disparity in the amount of access to
students given to military recruiters and the access given to colleges and business recruiters,
recruiter misconduct, and steps parents and students can take to restrict the militarys access to
students and student information.

1. There are No State or Local Policies for Monitoring Military Presence in Schools
There is no uniform State-wide policy as to who is the main contact person at the school
for military recruiters. School boards and principals do not issue guidelines for dealing with
recruiters. As a result, it is often left up to the discretion of guidance counselors to supervise
20

recruiters. Guidance counselors are the primary contact person for military recruiters in thirtythree schools (69%), whereas principals are the main contact for recruiters in only eleven schools
(23%). In the remaining 8% of schools surveyed, secretaries and faculty members make
decisions regarding recruiter access.
This difference demonstrates that principals have largely delegated the authority to allow
or deny access to military recruiters to guidance counselors. At Dunnellen High School, a
guidance counselor expressed frustration due to the lack of oversight. She sought assistance
from the principal when a recruiter violated the counselors procedures requiring recruiters to
schedule appointments and obtain permission to roam hallways. The principal refused to deal
with the situation, explaining that it was the guidance counselors responsibility. At South
Plainfield High School, a guidance counselor was unsure how often recruiters visit classrooms
because faculty members within individual departments at the school have the authority to
determine if and when recruiters can visit their classrooms.

2. New Jersey High Schools Give Military Recruiters More Access to Students Than is
Legally Required
The NCLB includes a provision requiring schools to give military recruiters the same
access to students that they give college and business recruiters. 104 Our study found that in
trying to comply with the NCLB, high schools throughout New Jersey give the military
recruiters significantly more access to students than is required under the law. Under the NCLB,
if a school allows on-campus recruiting, it must allow the same access to the military. But, if a
school does not have any on-campus recruiting by employers or colleges, it is not required to
have the military recruit on campus either.

21

Recruiter presence and visibility in the high schools polled is generally strong. In eleven
out of forty-eight (23%) reporting high schools, recruiters from at least one branch of the military
are present at least once a week. Recruiters visit thirty-six of forty-eight high schools surveyed
(75%) at least once a month. In contrast, recruiters from higher educational institutions and postsecondary employment opportunities visit most high schools solely during their annual career
fair. In most cases, the military is also present at those career fairs. Several administrators
interviewed characterized recruiters as informal school employees, referring to them as quasi
staff and part of the school community. 105 These statements demonstrate that the twin goals
of penetrating high school communities and gaining the trust of school administrators have been
successful in New Jersey.
Recruiters are most often visible in high school cafeterias, but their access in most
schools is not limited to that area. Seventy-one percent (71%) of schools allow military
recruiters in the cafeteria where they can talk freely with all students. One-third of the schools
allow military recruiters to give presentations in the classroom. But, less than one-forth of those
presentations are related to classroom curriculum. Some high school administrators, including
the principal at Watchung Hills Regional High School, allowed the military access to
classrooms, but are unsure of what information they impart to students. At North Plainfield, an
English teacher allowed military recruiters to makes presentations to the class about military
service. Other schools reported allowing recruiters to conduct physical competitions in gym
class.
In addition to recruitment in the schools, recruiters maintain a presence at sporting events
and other extra-curricular activities. At North Warren Regional High School in Blairstown, the

22

lacrosse team participates in an adopt a marine program and listens to soldiers speak about
their experience in Iraq.
In more than half of the schools surveyed, recruiters give out gifts to the students, such as
key chains, t-shirts, calendars, school supplies, and computer accessories. Summit High School
reported that the recruiters bought lunch for the guidance counselors.

3. The Military Abuses Unrestricted Access to Students to Employ Inappropriate

Recruiting Tactics
Nine schools reported that recruitment behavior was so inappropriate that school
administrators needed to intervene on the students behalf. For instance, at Kearny High School,
recruiters removed students from class without permission to encourage them to sign up for
service. At North Hunterdon High School, a guidance counselor discovered recruiters
impermissibly smoking with students and removing students from classes. Some of these
incidents were remedied only when an administrator witnessed the inappropriate behavior
him/herself, and then acted to correct it. Most school officials however, stated they do not
monitor the interactions between military recruiters and students. For example, one principal
stated he was unsure whether recruiters roamed the cafeteria, but assumed that recruiters were
following the rules. 106 It is possible that many more incidents of recruiter misconduct occur,
but that school administrators are unaware of them because they do not monitor the militarys
interaction with students.
Several schools reported incidents of recruiters approaching students in areas where they
were not allowed access, and incidents of recruiters pulling students from class without the
administrations authority. For instance, at High Tech High School in North Bergen, the
principal asked two Navy recruiters to stop approaching students in the food court, an area to
23

which they had previously been denied access. At Maple Shade High School, the principal had
to contact a recruiters commanding officer when the recruiter continued aggressively pursuing
students who had initially expressed interest in the military and later decided not to enlist. A
guidance counselor at North Hunterdon Regional High School had to intervene when she saw a
recruiter violating school policy by smoking with students in the parking lot. Despite the need
for intervention, officials at seven of the schools (78%) where intervention was required
characterized school-recruiter relations as positive.
School administrators lack oversight of the information recruiters give to students. They
are therefore unaware if the information students receive is accurate. An unsupervised
presentation of the obligations and benefits of military service by recruiters can be misleading.
At Central High School in Newark, a recruiter told a female student that women do not see frontline combat. This statement is at best grossly misleading. Even though women technically do
not have combat positions, they perform some of the most dangerous jobs on the front lines,
such as flying jets and helicopter gunships, driving and fixing trucks in dangerous territory, and
searching suspected terrorists in the field. Each of these tasks can lead to fighting the enemy.
At Snyder High School in Jersey City, a recruiter promised student that citizenship would
be expedited for her non-U.S. citizen family members if she joined the Armed Forces. In this
instance, the Vice Principal stepped in to reprimand the recruiter for giving misinformation.
These examples illustrate a need for administrators and counselors to assist with student
decision-making. Of the schools surveyed, not one provides information or counseling to make
informed decisions about military service.

24

4. Students Who Do Not Support the Military Presence in Their Schools Are
Ostracized by Teachers and Students
Students who object to military presence in their high schools can be ostracized. For
example, at one high school in Southern New Jersey, a student was reprimanded and ostracized
for refusing to participate in a recruiter-led gym class that simulated military training. During
the gym class, students were told to respond yes sergeant to the recruiters orders. The penalty
for failing to respond was 20 push-ups. One student who refused to participate was removed
from gym class for the day and initially given a 0 grade.
The student was later harassed by students and members of the schools staff. Students
called him un-American and a Communist. One student openly confronted him about the
incident, sparking a public argument. A teacher chastised the student for refusing to participate
in the military exercise. While doing so, the teacher referenced his grandparents who were
holocaust survivors.
This example demonstrates that students who do not support military presence in their
schools can be made to suffer when they express their views that the military has no place in the
classroom. It also shows that the military agenda has become such a part of the fabric of high
schools that anyone who does not agree with it does not fit in.

5. Parents Are Not Meaningfully Informed of Their Rights to Opt-Out Their Child
from Being Recruited
Under the No Child Left Behind Act, high schools can lose federal funds if they do not
disclose student information requested by the military. But, the NCLB gives parents and
students the right to prevent their school from sharing student information with military
recruiters by signing an "opt-out" form. 107 Schools must tell parents of their right to opt-out. 108
Many schools in New Jersey are not properly complying with this NCLB Act requirement.
25

The Rutgers School of Law study found that in New Jersey there is no uniform policy to
ensure that the opt-out requirements are being enforced. Parental notification of the right to opt
their child out of military recruitment varies from school to school or does not exist at all. As
stated elsewhere in this report, officials in only four of the forty-eight schools visited (10%) were
aware of their opt-out obligations. Some school officials did not even know what an opt-out
was. Schools that fail to meet their obligations under the NCLB give an unfair advantage to
military recruiters and deprive parents of important rights regarding controlling strong influences
on their children.
Some schools in New Jersey put an affirmative obligation of opting-out solely onto
parents. Kearny High School provides a letter from the superintendent instructing the parents to
draft a letter requesting to opt-out. This task can be daunting, particularly to parents who do not
have a good command of English, or who are too overwhelmed by work and parental obligations
to take time to draft an opt-out letter. Proof of this is that the guidance counselor at Kearny High
School did not know of any families who have taken these affirmative steps to opt-out.
Metuchen High School does not mail forms to families at all. Instead, information on opting out
is mentioned at the bottom of the last page of a newsletter from the superintendents office. By
placing the burden on parents to contact the school, school districts violate the NCLB Act.
Many school officials know of their opt-out obligations do not send out any opt-out
information to parents. These schools bury the opt-out information at the back of lengthy student
handbooks. This information is not prominent, and no direct notification or discussion about the
opt-out requirement exists. Without open and obvious notification to students and parents of
their rights to opt-out, the notification requirement is not met.

26

Other New Jersey schools approach their out-out obligations very differently.
Bloomfield and Plainfield mail opt-out forms to families, but do not follow up or require that
the forms be returned. As a result, only 46% of parents at Bloomfield High School return the
opt-out form and 13% of parents at Plainfield High School return the forms.
In Montclair, there was no formal notification to parents that their childrens information
was automatically given to military recruiters and no formalized process in which to opt-out. An
anti-military student group on campus, Open Your Ears, Open Your Eyes (Oye Oye),
researched the NLCB act and discovered the opt-out provision. The group created a simple
opt-out form and received school board approval to send it to parents. Prior to the start of the
school year, the school sent these opt-out forms to the families of every high school student
with their emergency contact forms. Students were required to return the forms, either
consenting or not consenting to having their information released to military recruiters, in order
to receive their schedules and begin the school year. The first year the policy was in place,
Montclair High School reported responses from 98% of students, with 92% deciding to optout. Highland Park has adopted a similar policy to Montclair, achieving a response rate of
approximately 85%.

6. Schools are Under the Misimpression that if Parents Exercise Their Opt-Out
Right that the School is Obligated to Withhold Student Information from Colleges
and Employers
Our research shows that New Jersey schools misinterpret their obligations under the
NCLB Act. Officials in some schools erroneously believe that keeping student contact
information away from recruiters means that the same contact information cannot be shared with
colleges and employers. This so-called "all or nothing" belief has no basis in the law.
According to the federal Family Policy Compliance Office of the U.S. Department of Education,
27

the law does not require an "all or nothing" policy. Thus, families have the right to opt-out of
making their child's name available to military recruiters, while still making the same
information available to other recruiters, such as colleges and employers.

C.

SCHOOLS THAT FAIL TO NOTIFY PARENTS OF THEIR OPT-OUT RIGHTS

VIOLATION OF THE FAMILY EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS AND PRIVACY ACT

ARE IN

Schools that release information under the NLCB to military recruiters without informing
parents of their right to opt-out not only run afoul of the NCLB, but also the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). 109 FERPA affirmatively states that educational institutions
must inform students and parents before releasing their personal information.
FERPA is a federal law that protects the privacy of student education records. The law
applies to all schools that receive federal funds. 110 FERPA gives parents certain rights with
respect to their children's education records. These rights transfer to the student when he or she
reaches eighteen or attends a school beyond the high school level. 111 Schools may disclose,
without consent, "directory" information such as a student's name, address, telephone number,
date and place of birth, honors and awards, and dates of attendance. However, schools must tell
parents and eligible students that directory information will be disclosed without prior written
consent. According to FERPA, schools must give parents and eligible students a reasonable
amount of time to request that the school not disclose directory information about them. 112
Failure to comply with the requirements of FERPA will result in the loss of funds. 113
FERPA requires schools to notify parents of their rights. 114 However, the system of
notification is left to the discretion of local schools. Federal regulations interpreting FERPA
describe this obligation of notification as an annual requirement. 115 There is no requirement as

28

to the manner of notification. In order to ensure that schools do not use insufficient means to
address their notification requirements, there should be a statewide opt-out policy.
NCLB does not alter in any way high schools notification obligations under FERPA.
High schools that fail to notify parents about the opt-out option under NCLB violate both
NCLB and FERPA, and risk the danger of losing federal funding. This funding provision,
however, was included to ensure military access to high schools and student information. Even
though both NCLB and FERPA require that schools that fail to notify parents should lose
funding, it is unlikely that the federal government will take funding away for providing the
military with student access and contact information. Thus, the parental protections that NCLB
and FERPA put in place are rendered moot unless parents and schools assert their rights.

D.

RECOMMENDATIONS

TO

PROTECT PARENTS RIGHTS

We recommend that all schools adopt the notification process employed at Montclair and
Highland Park and send a basic opt-out form along with paperwork that it is mandatory for
students to return. (These opt-out forms are attached to this Report as Exhibit B.) Schools
should take this action immediately to comply with the notice requirement of NCLB.
Furthermore, notice of the right to opt-out should be mandated by the State and be uniform
throughout New Jersey. As part of this mandate, counties should be required to report annually
to the State that all schools within each county have followed the uniform opt-out policy.

29

IV. THE JUNIOR RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING

PROGRAM RECRUITS CHILDREN WHO ARE YOUNGER THAN 17
As discussed above, the military aims to recruit young teens through the Boy Scouts
and other programs, as well as by being omnipresent at high schools and sporting events. There
are other programs, such as the Junior Reserve Officers Training Corps (JROTC), which help in
the effort to recruit young teens at public high schools. Technically, recruiters are not permitted
to approach students until they are at least juniors in high school or 17 years old. Programs such
as the JROTC, however, provide the military a way to reach students at a much earlier age when
they are even less mature and more impressionable. Some JROTC programs mislead young
teens into believing that life in the military consists of fun activities such as marching, rifle
competitions and summer camp trips. No efforts are made to inform JROTC participants of the
demanding and difficult realities of military life.
The JROTC is authorized by the National Defense Act and directs [t]he Secretary of
each military [branch to] establish and maintain a Junior Reserve Officers Training Corps . . . at
public . . . secondary educational institutions. 116 To qualify for a JROTC program, a school
must be able to maintain a unit of 100 students or at least 10% the schools total enrolment. 117
To be eligible, students must be physically fit, in at least the ninth grade and citizens or legal
residents of the United States. 118 A school must also agree to limit membership in the unit to
students who maintain acceptable standards of academic achievement and conduct, as prescribed
by the Secretary of the military department concerned. 119
The JROTCs official purpose [is to] instill in students . . . values of citizenship, service
to the United States, personal responsibility and a sense of accomplishment. 120 The JROTC
pursues these goals by providing a course of military instruction of not less than three academic
30

years duration. 121 There are currently 3,500 high schools with JROTC programs, 58 of which
are in New Jersey. 122 Of these programs, 21 are affiliated with the Army, 18 with the Air Force,
14 with the Navy and 5 with the Marine Corps. 123
The JROTC is partially funded by the United States Department of the Military. The
Secretary of the Department, shall . . . provide necessary text materials, equipment, and
uniforms and . . . such additional resources (including transportation and billeting) as may be
available to support activities of the program. 124 JROTC instructors are retired military officers
and the cost of instructor salaries is shared by school boards and the military. 125 Despite this
cost-sharing plan, the JROTC program comes at a considerable expense to the military. 126 In
fact, the Department of Defense spent $258,769,000 on the JROTC program in 2006 alone. 127

A.

THE JROTC RECRUITS YOUNG TEENS

Even though the United States military insists that the JROTC is not a recruiting tool,

strong evidence indicates otherwise. 128 First, the military itself boasts that 42% of all graduating
JROTC cadets expect to establish some connection with the military services and that JROTC
cadets are five times more likely to enlist than their non-JROTC contemporaries. 129 Second, a
1999 policy memorandum signed by Major General Stewart Wallace, commanding officer of the
United States Army Cadet Command at the time, admits that the JROTC is at least in part, a
recruiting tool. The policy memorandum states:
[w]hile not designed to be a specific recruiting tool, there is nothing in existing
law, DOD directive or Army regulation that precludes either ROTC program from
facilitating the recruitment of young men and women into the U.S. Army. 130
The memorandum also commands JROTC personnel to [a]ctively assist cadets [who are high
school students as young as 14] who want to enlist in the military [and] [e]mphasize service in
the U.S. Army. 131 The memo also tells JROTC instructors to facilitate recruiter access to
31

cadets in JROTC and the entire student body and [w]ork closely with . . . guidance counselors
to sell the Army story. 132 The memorandum, which was subsequently cited with approval in a
2001 military article, 133 concludes by stating that [t]he intent of these partnership initiatives is
to [inter alia] promote synergistic effort of all Army assets [and] maximize recruiting efforts. 134
Thus, the stated goal of the JROTC program has been to boost enlistment rates. The
JROTC program follows the militarys recruiting policy of first to contact, first to contract,
which is laid out in detail in the Armys SRP Handbook, discussed earlier, which states that if
military recruiters wait until [high school students] are seniors, its probably too late to recruit
them. 135
The activities associated with the JROTC program emphasize military training and
discipline to high school students as young as fourteen. JROTC students are referred to as
cadets, have military drill uniforms and are instructed to march and form ranks like real
soldiers. 136 Furthermore, cadets may join air rifle marksmanship teams and participate in local
and national competitions. 137 Cadets also are given military ranks within the program and learn
military history from a textbook provided by the United States military. 138
In addition to a military-based curriculum, extra-curricular activities and trips are also
part of the JROTC. These activities, such as Donna High Schools JROTC summer orientation
trip, discussed below, demonstrate quite clearly how the JROTC is a recruiting tool for the
military. Like other aspects of military recruitment discussed in this report, the JROTC program
uses manipulative tactics to recruit children.

32

B. DONNA HIGH SCHOOL MARINE CORPS JROTC PROGRAM:

A CASE STUDY IN MANIPULATING UNDERAGE UNDER-PRIVILEGED CHILDREN
The JROTC program at Donna High School (DHS) is an example of how the slick
recruitment advertising discussed above is successfully employed to convince under-age and
under-privileged children to pursue a military path. DHS is a public school in Donna, Texas,
situated along Texas southernmost border with Mexico. Donna is located in Hidalgo County,
which has a median household income of $26,375 with 30.5% of the population living below the
poverty line. 139 Of the high schools 1900 students, 99% are Hispanic. 71% of DHS students
are eligible for free lunches under the Federal School Lunch Program. 140 Free lunches are
awarded under the Federal School Lunch Program based on the financial need of the student. 141
Generally, a student is eligible for a free or subsidized lunch if he or she is member of a
household whose net income falls below the Federal Poverty Guidelines. 142 By all measures,
DHS is a high school largely comprised of low-income, Latino students. 143
DHS is home to one of the nations 260 national Marine Corps JROTC programs. 144 The
Department of Defense spent an average of over $65,000 per Marine Corps JROTC unit in
2006. 145 As part of the JROTC program at DHS, students take part in numerous extra-curricular
activities including marksmanship competitions and field exercises at a local United States
Marine Corps Military Academy. 146
The JROTC program at DHS is not limited local military-style field trips, however. The
students at DHS enrolled in the JROTC program also participate in a summer orientation trip
to Camp Pendleton in San Diego, that is supposed to give them a taste of life in the military. 147
The DHS JROTC orientation trip to Camp Pendleton is advertised on the Marine Corps JROTC
website and appears to be indicative of the basic format of JROTC orientation trips. 148

33

(Student and instructor: DHS Air Rifle Marksmanship Team 2006) 149

1. Camp Pendleton
The JROTC students from DHS spent a week at Camp Pendleton, California in the
summer of 2006. Camp Pendleton is one of the largest and most impressive military installations
in the United States. Camp Pendleton is a self-contained community, housing approximately
25,000 active-duty Marines at any given time. 150 The Camps daytime population is estimated
at 60,000. 151 Camp Pendleton both trains and houses Marines and their families and covers over
125,000 acres in a pristine natural area along the Pacific coast outside of San Diego. 152 Its total
economic impact is estimated at $2.3 Billion. 153 By any measure, Camp Pendleton is an
exceptional military base with seemingly unlimited resources. The camp is a far cry from the
numerous, smaller, isolated and under-funded bases that make up the bulk of the United States
military.
Taking impoverished kids from the Texas-Mexico border to Camp Pendleton is an
effective and highly manipulative way to sell them the militarys message.

34

2. DHS JROTC Trip to Camp Pendleton

The JROTC students of DHS, ranging in age from 14 to 17, traveled to Camp Pendleton
in the summer of 2006 with their JROTC unit. The Marine Corps JROTC published a studentwritten account of the orientation trip in the JROTC News portion of its promotional
website. 154 The student describes the trip as an experience the cadets of Donna High School
will remember for the rest of their lives. 155 For the students, the trip was more than a vacation,
but rather provided a broader outlook at military . . . life including training, living conditions
and their dining facilities. 156
But, the DHS JROTC trip was more of a teenagers dream vacation than a simulation of
life as a Marine. Mock military training and motivational speeches delivered by military
personnel were interspersed with expensive and exciting activities. DHS JROTC students
watched the San Diego Chargers football team scrimmage, met the players and cheerleaders,
attended a San Diego Padres baseball game, traveled to Universal Studios and visited Camp
Pendletons on-site bowling alley and arcade. 157

(DHS JROTC students in the Marine Barracks) 158

35

(Bowling and Martial Arts Instruction) 159

The trip to Camp Pendleton included many activities beyond the financial reach of most
DHS students. By interspersing what the students considered the dream activities of a lifetime
with military exercises, the Marine Corps misled the students into believing that enlisting in the
Marines would provide an avenue to achieve this wealthy lifestyle. In the words of the student
author, [t]he cadets and the chaperons (sic) cherished the beautiful treat of a first class baseball
stadium, and their eagerness was . . . overwhelming to visit Universal Studios. 160
Most of the activities to which the students were treated however, are not only out of the
financial reach of the DHS students and their families, but also out of the reach of typical
Marines. For example, the tickets for the baseball game would cost approximately $50.00 each
and general admission to Universal Studios is $64.00 per person. 161 Enlisted Marine cannot
afford those tickets. Basic pay for a military enlistee currently starts at only $14,950 per year,
which amounts to $287.50 per week. 162

36

(Universal Studios, Hollywood) 163

The trip also encouraged the adulation and hero-worship of military personnel.
Interspersed with the fun activities were speeches by military personnel and mock training
exercises with military instructors. For example, after watching the San Diego Chargers
scrimmage, a Marine Corps General was introduced to the DHS students on the football field
alongside Chargers players and cheerleaders. 164 The MCJROTC website also contains a link to
photos of the event, showing scantily-clad cheerleaders posing for photographs with the DHS
students.
The Marine Corps is channeling the message that by joining the military the students will
gain the favor of highly attractive members of the opposite sex. The boys can be like their
football playing heroes and be cheered on by beautiful, half-naked women, and the girls can
become the beautiful cheerleaders. Packaging strength, beauty, sex and public adulation with a
military message is even more powerful when delivered to a group of poor, minority children
who have very few opportunities to gain prosperity.

37

(Pro football players with the General and DHS students) 165

(Chargers Cheerleaders with DHS students) 166

The JROTC introduced the DHS students only to the most elite and highly selected units
in the Marine Corps, such as the Marine Corps SWAT and Crash Crew Fire and Rescue teams.
SWAT team members explained their mission, the qualifications, and the gratification of their
job. 167 Cadets were also able to handle the equipment utilized by the SWAT team after their
presentation. 168 The cadets had a similar experience when they met the Marine Crash Crew
38

Fire and Rescue Team and participated in using the water hoses and equipment the Craw Crew
uses to get the job done. 169
But, students were not told that admission into the Marine SWAT team or Crash Crew
requires high standardized test scores as a prerequisite for consideration. 170 For example, the
Crash Crew requires a high score on the mechanical, scientific and mathematical portions of the
Armed Service Vocational Aptitude Battery standardized test as well as extensive, specialized
training. 171 Nor were JROTC students told that these units are generally open only to career
Marines, as they require extended, specialized training. 172
After meeting the SWAT Team, the cadets were transported to a facility that had
computerized simulation weapons, which the author described as being like playing X-Box in
a theater size screen with real scenarios. 173 The weapons simulator placed the students behind a
realistic machine gun, which fired beams of light rather than bullets. In the simulator, the
students took turns firing on computerized enemies in a totally safe environment. To call the
computerized machine gun game the students played a weapons simulator is a grave misnomer
which equates firing a machine gun in combat with a video game. The combat Marines
encounter in Iraq and Afghanistan is vastly different from the sanitized simulation sold to the
DHS students. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the enemy is real and blends into the rest of the
population and the bullets are real and deadly.

39

(Like playing X-Box Marine Weapons Simulator) 174

The DHS JROTC summer camp is a successful Marine Corps advertising campaign. The
effectiveness of that campaign comes across in the DHS students report posted on the Marine
Corps JROTC website. The student author clearly idolizes Marines, emulating military speak
and emphasizing the rank of the various military personnel who interacted with the students. 175
He says that the DHS JROTC students will remember [Camp Pendleton] for the rest of their
lives. 176
Regardless of the stated goal of the program, its impact is clear. The JROTC sell[s] the
Army story, just as its officers were ordered to do by the Army in its 1999 Policy
Memorandum. 177 Military service is presented as a path to fun and adventure to a captive and
impressionable adolescent audience. The militarys message is conveyed to JROTC children as

40

young as 14 through video games, mock training and the endorsement of professional football
players and cheerleaders.
This packaging of the military lifestyle grossly overstates the benefits of enlistment and
ignores its serious drawbacks and dangers. The irony is that DHS students and real Marines
actually do share much in common. Both groups are largely poor. Enlisting in the Marines
would not provide the average DHS student a way to escape their unpromising life. It will only
change the scenery from Southern Texas to Iraq or Afghanistan, and add the risks of snipers,
roadside bombs and firefights. As a student wrote when leaving Camp Pendleton, [i]t was time
to say good-bye to the Marine Corps for now. 178 For a program whose goal is not military
recruitment, the JROTC certainly is good at it.

41

V. THE IMPACT OF THE ONGOING WARS ON MEMBERS OF THE ARMED

FORCES: WHAT RECRUITERS DO NOT TELL STUDENTS AND PARENTS
A.

MEMBERS

OF THE

ARMED FORCES SERVE UP

TO FOUR

TOURS

OF

DUTY 179

Tours of duty do not have definite time limits. The length of a soldiers stay in any
region depends on troop requirements, and may change during a soldiers tour of duty. As of
August 1, 2008, President Bush ordered that troops that were newly deployed to Iraq would
serve 12 month tours of duty. 180 But, 16 months earlier, in relation to his new surge policy,
President Bush had increased Iraq and Afghanistan tours of duty from 12 months to 15
months. 181 President Bushs surge policy did not add new troops to Iraq; rather, it expedited
deployment of soldiers already set to go to Iraq and increased the length of tours of duty. 182
Like tours of duty, time at home between deployments, or dwell time, is not of a
definite duration. Currently, soldiers spend 12 months at home between tours. 183 With a few
exceptions, Marines have standard 7 month tours, with an average of 7 months between tours. 184
But, those schedules cannot be counted on or enforced. 185
As such, high school students considering enlisting in the military should know that they
can be deployed at any time, and as many times as the U.S. government believes is necessary to
accomplish its military objectives.

42

*Source- Alvarez, Lizette, Long Tours Can Make Home a Trying Front, The New York
Times, February 23, 2007.

B.

SOLDIERS RETURNING FROM IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN SUFFER FROM BRAIN

DAMAGE AND OTHER PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDERS
Since the military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan began in 2002, over 1.5 million troops

have seen combat. 186 Of these soldiers, 29,320 187 were wounded, and some sources estimate
that 10 - 20% suffer from traumatic brain injuries. 188 Approximately 7% to 15% of veterans
from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan suffer depression after their service. 189 Between 6% and
11% of veterans of the Afghanistan war, and between 12% and 20% of veterans of the Iraq war
suffer Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). 190 This is quite high compared to instances of
43

PTSD in the general population, which averages at 5%. 191 PTSD is an anxiety disorder triggered
by a serious traumatic event. 192 Symptoms include flashbacks, nightmares, feelings of
detachment, irritability, trouble concentrating and sleeplessness. 193 A June 2004 study published
in the New England Journal of Medicine found that troops who fought in the Iraq war saw more
combat than those who served in Afghanistan, which may account for the disparity in instances
of PTSD between veteran of the Iraq war and veterans of the Afghanistan war.
The second national survey assessing mental health of Iraq veterans found that many
reported significantly more mental health problems six months after their return from
deployment than they did immediately after returning home. The study found that while 12% of
active duty Iraq veterans reported PTSD immediately after returning home, 17% reported PTSD
upon reassessment six months later. The increase in PTSD instances was much higher among
veteran members of the National Guard and Army Reserve. Upon immediate return from duty,
13% of these veterans reported having PTSD. However, at their six month reassessment, 25% of
National Guard and Army Reserve veterans reported suffering with PTSD.
The rate of depression symptoms among combat veterans also increased dramatically in
the six month period between screenings. Active duty soldiers rate of depression symptoms
rose from 5% to 10%, while rates for reservists rose from 17% to 36%. Problems with
interpersonal conflict 194 also greatly increased during this period. 195 In their first screening upon
return from Iraq, 3.5% of active duty soldiers reported problems with interpersonal conflict.
This number increased to 14% upon the second screening six months later. Among reservists,
problems with conflict rose from 4% at the first screening to 21% at the second screening. 196

44

Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in Soldiers Returning From Iraq

Post deployment Health
Post deployment Health
Assessment
Reassessment (Six months
later)
Active Duty
12%
17%
National Guard and Army
13%
25%
Reserve
*Source- Moon, Mary Ann, Returning Vets Mental Health Worsens Over Time, Clinical
Psychiatry News, December 1, 2007.

Depression in Soldiers Returning from Iraq

Post deployment Health
Assessment

Post deployment Health

Reassessment (Six months
later)
10%
36%

Active Duty
5%
National Guard and Army
17%
Reserve
*Source- Moon, Mary Ann, Returning Vets Mental Health Worsens Over Time, Clinical
Psychiatry News, December 1, 2007.

Problems with Interpersonal Conflict in Soldiers Returning from Iraq

Post deployment Health
Post deployment Health
Assessment
Reassessment (Six months
later)
Active Duty
3.5%
14%
National Guard and Army
4%
21%
Reserve
*Source- Moon, Mary Ann, Returning Vets Mental Health Worsens Over Time, Clinical
Psychiatry News, December 1, 2007.

C.

SUICIDE

IS A

GROWING EPIDEMIC

IN THE

MILITARY

In addition to suffering from a staggeringly high number of mental health problems,

many veterans struggle with suicidal thoughts. In 2005, more than 6,250 soldiers committed
suicide. 197 National Guard and Army Reserve veterans account for more than half of all suicides
among Iraq and Afghanistan veterans. 198 This figure is quite high, given that the National Guard
and Reserves account for only 28% of all U.S. military forces deployed in Iraq and
45

Afghanistan. 199 According to Master Sgt. Marshall Bradshaw, the Army National Guard suicide
prevention manager, the National Guard does not have the same level of suicide prevention
resources and facilities as the active duty army. 200 Upon completing a tour of duty, members of
the National Guard and Reserves do not return to a military base, where active duty soldiers
benefit from the support of fellow veterans. 201

202

D.

WOMEN

IN THE

MILITARY ARE NOT OUT OF HARMS WAY

1. Women Perform Dangerous Jobs

Over 160,000 women have been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, compared to 7,500
who served in Vietnam and 41,000 who served in the Gulf War. 203 Women are officially limited
to combat support roles in war. The truth however, is that women are often thrust into combat
due to the nature of the Iraq war. Womens roles in combat are defined by a 1994 policy
memorandum issued by former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. The memorandum states that
women must be excluded from units whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on
the ground. 204 A 2007 report commissioned by the DOD and authored by the RAND
Corporation found that the militarys assignment policies regarding women and their exposure to
46

combat are not clearly understandable. 205 The RAND report concluded that the vague
assignment policies result in situations where the letter of the policies may be satisfied, even
when women are assigned to units whose exposure to combat the framers of the policy sought
to rule out. 206
The RAND report makes clear that women are in no way insulated from danger in Iraq or
Afghanistan. For example, women presently hold military jobs such as truck drivers, gunners,
medics, military police and helicopter pilots, which are all dangerous occupations. 207 The
danger of such occupations cannot be discounted, especially in non-traditional warfare situations
such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. As Matthew Friedmand, executive director for the
National Center for PTSD, has stated: one of the most dangerous things you can do in Iraq is
drive a truck, and thats considered a combat support role. 208 In fact, as of March 17, 2008, 106
women had died in Afghanistan and Iraq, representing approximately 2.5% of all U.S. military
casualties. 209 Statistics of injuries by gender are not released. But, if the percentage of women
injured are similar to fatality rates, then approximately 782 women have been injured in Iraq and
Afghanistan. 210 Female high school students should know that the exigencies of fighting in the
global war on terror put every enlistee in danger, regardless of the technical characterization of
their job title or unit assignment.

2. Sexual Assault
Combat exposure is just one cause of PTSD and other mental health problems among
veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Women soldiers may suffer additional psychiatric
harm if they are sexually assaulted and/or harassed while on active duty. Sexual assault and
harassment is referred to as Military Sexual Trauma (MST). While there are no statistics
available about the instances of MST in Iraq and Afghanistan, 23% of all women veterans using
47

health care from the Department for Veterans Affairs (VA) report sexual assault while in the
military. Additionally, an astonishingly high 55% of women and 38% of men using VA health
care report being sexually harassed while in the military. 211 Of women veterans reporting being
raped by fellow soldiers, 37% report being raped multiple times and 14% report being gangraped. 212
MST statistics are shocking given the fact that rape is, in general, an under-reported
crime. 213 While current rates of rape under-reporting in the military could not be found, a
Department of Defense policy change highlights that rape is pervasive. In 2005, the DOD rewrote its rules so that victims of sexual assault can report abuse confidentially. Such confidential
reports open the door to counseling and treatment without setting off an official
investigation. 214 Since this change in policy, reports of military sexual assault have increased
by 40%. 215
In light of the prevalence of MST, it is not surprising that women veterans report higher
rates of mental anguish and PTSD. 216 A VA study following the Gulf War demonstrates a trend
suggesting that rates of sexual trauma rise during wartime and women were more likely to
develop PTSD from sexual assault than from exposure to combat. 217 Women soldiers have to
suffer with both the stressors associated with combat and those rising out of sexual trauma. This
is especially significant today, when one in ten soldiers are women. 218
The command structure of military service also contributes to the psychological
difficulties women face in dealing with sexual trauma. A soldier commits a punishable crime by
not obeying orders. 219 Soldiers are trained to be completely subordinate to their superiors in the
chain of command. Indeed, it is a criminally punishable offense to disobey the orders of a
superior officer. One particularly traumatic experience many women soldiers report is combat
48

rape, where they are raped by men higher up in the military command chain. Army specialist
Suzanne Swift recalls her squad leader in Iraq knocking on her door late at night demanding sex.
When she protested his demands, her sergeant ordered her to do solitary forced marches from
one side of the camp to another at night in full battle gear.220 One female soldier reported that
she was wrongfully accused of intoxication and was disciplined after she reported sexual
harassment. 221
Women soldiers who survive sexual assault find little solace in the military discipline
process. Of 3,038 investigations of sexual assault in 2004 and 2005, only 329 resulted in a courtmartial, while 617 of perpetrators received less serious punishments such as demotions, transfers
and letters of admonition. 222

E.

HOW THE U.S. FAILS WOUNDED VETERANS THE HEALTH CARE CRISIS
In 2007, the media began reporting the abysmal conditions at the Walter Reed Army

Medical Center. News reports were full of descriptions of moldy, vermin-infested rooms with
cheap mattresses and stained rugs. 223 Once the beacon of the VAs vast system of treatment
facilities for injured soldiers, the Walter Reed Medical Center deteriorated after five years of
sustained combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. 224 The problems at Walter Reed are endemic of the
VA healthcare system. Veterans report similarly horrific experiences in many other VA
facilities. A veterans mother reported that The Naval Medical Center in San Diego had a room
swarming with fruit flies, trash overflowing and a syringe on the table. 225 Other reports of
substandard care have come from Fort Knox in Kentucky, Fort Campbell in Kentucky, Fort
Bragg in North Carolina, Fort Dix in New Jersey, and Fort Irwin in California. 226
Perhaps even more troubling than the standard of care at many VA facilities is the
difficulty many veterans face in receiving health care. One particularly shocking story is that of
49

Jonathan Schulze, a Marine who received two purple hearts for his service in Iraq. Having
returned from the war with severe depression, Schulze drove 75 miles to his nearest VA medical
center in St. Cloud, MN. When he arrived, he was told that the clinician he came to see was
unavailable. When he finally spoke to the clinician the next day, he learned that he was 26th in
line for a bed in the centers PTSD ward. Four days later, he hung himself with a telephone
cord. 227
While Schulzes story is dramatic, it illustrates the flaws of the VA system. Soldiers are
not receiving adequate health care. A Government Accountability Office study found that 80%
of soldiers returning from Iraq who showed signs of potential PTSD were not referred to mental
health follow up visits. 228 This is troubling given the fact that, according to the Associated
Press, Veterans Affairs has a backlog of about 400,000 pending medical claims and
complaints, especially in mental health care. 229
One particularly troubling trend is that approximately 22,500 troops have been released
from service from the Iraq war because they allegedly have a pre-existing personality disorder
that surfaced in the heat of battle. 230 A discharge because of personality disorder prevents
veterans from collecting medical benefits and disability insurance. 231 Soldiers dismissed in this
manner have to return the portion of their re-enlistment bonus for time they have not served
under their contract. 232
By discharging 22,500 soldiers because of personality disorders, the military will save
approximately $4.5 Billion in medical care over the lifetimes of injured soldiers. 233 Since the
start of the Iraq war, cases of personality disorder discharge have increased dramatically. 234

50

1200
1100
1000
900
800
700
600
2001

CasesofPersonality
DisorderDiagnosisin
theArmy

2003

2006
235

Several critics, including military attorneys and veterans groups, have stated publicly
that the pre-existing personality disorder diagnosis is a manufactured one, and is just an excuse
for the U.S. to save money by denying benefits to veterans. 236 As Russel Terry of the Iraq War
Veterans Organization points out, every soldier must pass a thorough psychological screening
upon entering the military and cannot serve if he or she has psychological problems. 237 Any
psychological problem, including personality disorder, should be detected during this
examination.
It is thus disingenuous for the military to claim, after the fact, that a soldier has a preexisting psychological disorder and to deny him benefits. Steve Robinson, director of veterans
affairs at Veterans for America, attributes the rise in personality disorder diagnoses to the
overflow of wounded soldiers coming from Iraq. He believes that doctors are quick to make this
diagnosis in order to free up space for the three or four [soldiers] who are waiting. 238 A third
observer, a lawyer with Trial Defense Services in the Army, believes that doctors are ordered to
make these diagnoses by commanders who want to get rid of un-deployable soldiers. 239
Whatever the reasons for the high rates of personality disorder diagnoses, challenging
these diagnoses is quite difficult. Claims can only be reviewed once through the Board for
Correction of Military Records. Even approved reversals of personality disorder diagnoses can
take up to 18 months to take effect. 240 Lawyers advising soldiers in challenging these diagnoses
51

often advise them to petition their Congressional representatives. This remedy is hardly the
quickest or least cumbersome alternative for veterans seeking medical benefits. 241
For information on how veterans can increase chances of receiving appropriate
healthcare, see Appendix D.

52

VI.

STUDENTS INTERESTED IN ENLISTING TO RECEIVE

EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS HAVE OTHER OPTIONS

Almost all teenagers have a hard time deciding what to do after graduating from high
school. College-bound teens face the additional challenge of planning how to finance their
education; a challenge that will only become more difficult with the ongoing economic problems
in the United States. For many students, enlisting in the armed services immediately following
graduation appears to be the simplest and best way to obtain a free college education. There are
however, other options available to students who may not be able to afford college. In addition
to traditional tuition assistance, such as federal educational loan programs, private loan
programs, university grants, university scholarships, and independent scholarship programs, the
State of New Jersey and even the Armed Forces offer educational assistance programs that do
not require a student to go to war before attending college.
For students whose primary motivation for joining the military is educational benefits,
the alternative sources of financial assistance (listed below) may provide an immediate, viable,
non-military route to attaining a college education. For students who are motivated by
patriotism, but who still want to earn a degree, enlisting immediately upon graduating from high
school still may not be the best option. These students should consider enlisting after or during
college via the militarys Reserve Officers Training Program (ROTC). Enlisting via the
ROTC program provides a student with two advantages. First, the student does not have to wait
to get an education. The ROTC program provides the student with significant immediate
financial assistance. Second, a college degree helps soldiers move up the ranks in the military,
and often provides enlistees with a higher base salary.

53

Students who are unsure what to do after graduation should keep all options on the table
by applying broadly to colleges, and for scholarships, grants and/or other opportunities. By
taking these steps, a student and his or her parent(s) will be able to accurately weigh the risks and
benefits of military enlistment and make a truly informed decision regarding whether to enlist.
It took law students nearly 25 hours to find and read the various websites necessary to
compile the information below. Gathering scholarship information can be a daunting task for
any parent or student, and is especially challenging to those who may not have access to the
internet or other information sources. It is therefore critical for guidance counselors and other
school officials to provide this information to students, especially if the student makes clear that
he or she is interested in the military because of the educational benefits of service.
The following is a comprehensive listing of both State and military programs providing
tuition assistance and other educational benefits to qualifying students. Also provided in this
report are the eligibility requirements and conditions of the programs. This listing should assists
parents, students and educators in determining whether military enlistment immediately
following high school is the best option. 242 The State programs, listed below, are in addition to
other sources of funding such as federal educational assistance and private loans and
scholarships, which also should be explored by students wishing to develop a full picture of posthigh school options.

54

A.

NEW JERSEY STATE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAMS

1. NJ STARS Program 243
The NJ STARS program helps recent high school graduates attend community college by
providing full-tuition scholarships to those that meek the eligibility requirements.
a. Eligibility
To apply for the NJ Stars Program, a student must graduate in the top 20
percent of his or her high school class and apply for all other federal and state
financial aid available to them.
b. Benefits
NJ STARS covers up to 5 semesters of the tuition and approved fees at New
Jerseys community colleges.
c. Requirements for Recipients
Once accepted in the NJ STARS program, a student must follow the following
requirements:
1. Enroll at a community college within 2 years of graduating from high
school;
2. Take a minimum of 12 college-level credits each semester, but no
more than 15 credits;
3. Enroll in an associate degree program;
4. Maintain full-time enrollment;
5. Achieve a minimum of a 3.0 GPA after the first year of enrollment in
order to have NJ STARS funding renewed for a second year.
2. NJ STARS II 244
The NJ STARS II program provides successful NJ STARS participants with additional
tuition coverage at any public four-year college or university in New Jersey. Thus, if the
requirements of NJ STARS and NJ STARS II are complied with, a student can earn an
undergraduate degree with their tuition completely paid by the State.
a. Eligibility
NJ STARS II is a program limited to NJ STARS graduates who have earned
an associates degree, graduating from community college with a GPA of 3.0
55

or better. Students also have to reapply for all available state and federal
financial aid to be eligible for NJ STARS II.
b. Benefits
NJ STARS II provides a full tuition and approved fees scholarship at any
public, 4-year college or university in New Jersey. The NJ STARS II
program also ensures that all credits achieved at community college under NJ
STARS are fully transferrable.
c. Limitations
NJ STARS II does not cover room, books and board and is limited to public
colleges and universities.
For more information on the NJ STARS and NJ STARS II programs, please visit
http://www.njstars.net/.
3. Educational Opportunity Fund 245
New Jerseys Educational Opportunity Fund (EOF) provides participating colleges and
universities with the means to assist students from difficult or underprivileged
backgrounds achieve college educations through mentoring, tutoring and financial
assistance.
a. Benefits
The EOF provides grants for both undergraduate and graduate studies, 246 and
provides individual grants that range from $200 to $2,500 (up to $4,350 for
graduate coursework). The EOF also provides support services for enrolled
students, such as counseling, tutoring and developmental coursework.
b. Eligibility
To be eligible for EOF assistance, a student must meet the following
requirements:
1. Attend an institution of higher education in New Jersey;
2. Be a New Jersey resident;
3. File a Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA);
4. Grants are typically available only to students who grew up in poverty
or faced other difficulties as a child and/or adolescent.
c. Limitations and Conditions
EOF assistance is limited to participating colleges and universities
participating in the program (currently this represents 42 institutions in New
56

Jersey). Furthermore, each institution is responsible for implementing the

program and set is own criteria for the EOF admissions process and has
limited spaces available each year.
For more information, visit:
http://www.nj.gov/highereducation/EOF/EOF_Eligibility.htm.
For a list of participating institutions visit:
http://www.nj.gov/highereducation/EOF/EOF_programs.htm.
4. New Jersey Higher Education Student Assistance Authority 247
The following scholarships are smaller-scale individual awards, often administered by
specific branches of the State government. Although these programs are not as
comprehensive as the NJ STARS or Educational Opportunity Fund, they are still
important sources of assistance that high school graduates should apply for if eligible.
a. Edward J. Bloustein Distinguished Scholars
Provides $1,000 to exceptional NJ students who rank in the top 10% of their
classes and have a combined SAT score of 1260 (regardless of their financial
need).
b. Urban Scholars
Provides $1,000 to exceptional NJ students attending NJ colleges in urban and
economically distressed areas. Students must rank in the top 10% of their
classes and have a minimum grade point average (GPA) of 3.0 (regardless of
financial need).
c. Outstanding Scholar Recruitment Program
Up to $7,500 per year to outstanding NJ students at participating New Jersey
educational institutions. Grants are dispersed based on class rank and SAT
score. The minimum class rank is the top 15%, and the minimum SAT is
1250. 248
d. Survivor Tuition Benefits Program
Provides free tuition at New Jersey educational institutions for the spouses
and dependants of law enforcement officers, fire fighters, or other emergency
services personnel who were killed in the line of duty.
e. Dana Christmas Scholarship for Heroism
Provides up to $10,000 to recognize young New Jerseyans for exceptional acts
of heroism in honor of Dana Christmas, the late Seton Hall student who is
credited with saving the many lives of her fellow students during a fire on
January 19, 2001.

57

f. New Jersey World Trade Center Scholarship Fund

Provides up to $6,500 per year for college studies to the surviving spouses and
children of New Jersey residents who died as a result of the terrorist attacks
against the U.S. on September 11, 2001.
g. Law Enforcement Officer Memorial Scholarship Programs
Provides scholarships to the dependent children of New Jersey law
enforcement officers who have died in the line of duty, for full-time
undergraduate studies at accredited NJ educational institutions.

B.

MILITARY EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS AVAILABLE

TO

HIGH SCHOOL ENLISTEES

On June 30th, 2008 President Bush signed House of Representatives Supplemental

Appropriations Act 2462 into law. Title V of HR 2462, the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational
Assistance Act of 2008, (Post-9/11 VEAA) replaces the existing Montgomery GI bill, which
did not offer clear or adequate educational benefits. 249

1. The Basics of the Post-9/11 VEAA

The Post-9/11 VEAA provides educational benefits for veterans who have or will
complete a minimum amount of active-duty service since September 11, 2001. 250 The act will
begin delivering educational benefits to veterans on August 1, 2009. 251 The Post-9/11 VEAA
amends the Montgomery GI Bill, 252 which was widely criticized as having sub-standard
educational benefits.

2. Entitlement Eligibility
To be eligible for educational assistance under the Post-9/11 VEAA, a person must have
completed:
a. a minimum of 90 days of aggregate service in the Armed Forces or 30 days of
continuous service in the Armed Forces and be released due to a serviceconnected disability 253
58

OR
b. minimum of 90 days of aggregate service and a qualifying discharge:
(1) an honorable discharge;
(2) a release characterized as honorable by the relevant
Secretary, and placement on the retired list or transfer to a
reserve Marine Corps or Fleet unit, or placement on the
temporary disabled list;
(3) a release for further service in the Armed Forces in a reserve
component after service characterized as honorable by the
relevant Secretary;
OR
(4) a discharge or release due to: (a) a preexisting medical
condition; (b) hardship; or (c) a physical or mental disability
that was not the result of the individuals own willful
misconduct, but interfered with active duty. 254
Once a soldier is eligible for educational assistance under the Post-9/11 VEAA, the
amount of time s/he served in active duty dictates the amount of his or her educational benefits.

3. Amount of Educational Assistance

There are two main routes to becoming eligible for educational assistance under the Post9/11 VEAA. The first is based on length of service in active duty, and is predicated on the
nature of ones discharge from the military. 255 The second is based on suffering a serviceconnected disability, (injury in the line of duty). 256 Maximum benefits are available for up to
36 months (9 months per year for a typical 4 year undergraduate degree program). For those
who do not qualify for the maximum entitlement (36 months active duty, or service-connected
disability) the length of entitlement does not change, but the amount received is reduced to a
percentage of the maximum, which is as follows:

59

a.

Tuition Assistance: up to the cost of the most-expensive approved

institute of higher learning (IHL) in the same State as the school
attended by the eligible veteran. These payments are made directly
to the school, which simplifies the process for veterans. 257

b.

Housing Assistance: matching the amount that an active-duty

member of the armed forces in the E-5 pay grade with dependants
would receive in the same ZIP code where the school is located.
This amount can be found under section 403 of title 37 of the US
Code. 258

c.

Books and Supplies Assistance: up to $1000 per year. This

amount is divided by the number of semesters or quarters and paid
to the veteran. 259

d.

Rural Relocation Assistance: of $500. Veterans moving from

locations classified as highly rural may apply to receive a one-time
payment of $500 if they are traveling far enough to attend
school. 260

e.

Tutorial Assistance: available if a veterans professor or

instructor deems it necessary in the course and such course is a
necessary element to the veterans curriculum. If approved the
maximum tuition assistance is $1200 per year, paid out as $100 per
month. 261

f.

Licensure and Certification Test Assistance: full payment for

approved tests up to $2000 regardless of a veterans entitlement
percentage of the maximum, discussed below. This amount is
considered separate and does not affect other entitlements. 262

g.

Yellow Ribbon Assistance at More Expensive Institutions:

schools that charge higher tuition than that of the most expensive
in-state public institution may participate in a cost-sharing program
with the military. The school and the DOD will split the cost of
attendance. The formula will be determined on a case-by-case
basis. 263

60

4. Amount of Educational Benefits

a. Maximum Entitlement: 36 Months of Service or a Service-Connected
Disability
Veterans who are eligible for assistance due to a service-connected disability are entitled
to the maximum benefits automatically under the Post-9/11 VEAA. 264 Otherwise, the amount of
entitlement of any veteran under the Post-9/11 VEAA is tied to the length of his or her service.
To be eligible for the maximum entitled mentioned above, a veteran must have completed 36
aggregate months of active service and receive a qualifying discharge. 265 Otherwise, a veteran is
entitled to assistance that still continues for 36 months but is paid as a percentage of the
maximum as follows:
(1) 30 Months of Service 90% of maximum entitlement
(2) 24 Months of Service 80% of maximum entitlement
(3) 18 Months of Service 70% of maximum entitlement
(4) 12 Months of Service 60% of maximum entitlement
(5) 6 Months of Service 50% of maximum entitlement
(6) 90 Days of Service 40% of maximum entitlement 266

A typical active-duty service obligation for new enlistees is 2 - 6 years, with the majority
of enlistment contracts specifying a 2 or 3 year commitment. Thus, a solder who completes a
minimum 2 year commitment of active duty and who receives a qualifying discharge would be
eligible for 80% of the maximum benefits according to his state and ZIP code of residence.

61

5. Transferability of Benefits
Section 3319 of the Post-9/11 VEAA generally authorizes the transfer of educational
benefits from veterans to their spouses and/or children. 267 The act itself allows the Secretary of
Defense to authorize the Secretary of each branch of the military to promulgate specific
regulations outlining the specifics of transferability under the Post-9/11 VEAA. 268 According to
the Department of Veterans Affairs, regulations regarding transferability will be forthcoming
before August 1, 2009 when the act begins to deliver benefits. 269

6. Expiration of Benefits
The benefits a veteran is entitled to under the Post-9/11 VEAA must be used within 15
years. This period begins at the time of the soldiers last discharge from active duty. 270

7. Conclusion
The Post-9/11 VEAA provides veterans with meaningful educational assistance.
Veterans however, cannot begin receiving benefits until August 1, 2009. Veterans must serve 3
years of active duty service, or be injured in the line of duty in a manner considered to be
service-connected in order to receive full educational benefits. The act covers only 9 months
per academic year for a typical 4 year undergraduate degree. This means that the veteran must
cover non-academic year costs personally and must graduate on schedule, without summer or
winter session schooling. Anyone considering joining the military should compare these benefits
with scholarships, State and federal financial aid, and ROTC programs. The educational benefits
provided under the Post-9/11 VEAA should also been considered in the context of the risks of
military service during wartime. Anyone considering enlisting should be mindful that the term
service-connected disabilities may be interpreted very narrowly. 271 Disabilities that the
62

average person would consider service-connected are often excluded by the Veterans
Administration, as discussed earlier in this report.

C.

MILITARY-BASED EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE

GRADUATES

FOR

COLLEGE STUDENTS

AND

The Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps all maintain ROTC programs which offer
generous scholarship opportunities to graduating high school seniors and college students who
have not completed their degrees. The ROTC is used by the military branches to recruit and
train highly skilled officers. As such, scholarships are awarded based on a student's merit and
grades, not financial need. 272 The ROTC allows graduates to start active-duty military service as
officers.
Each branch of the military administers its own ROTC program. But, the eligibility
requirements are roughly the same for all ROTC programs. As such, for the sake of brevity, the
Army ROTC program will be used as an example where necessary.

1. ROTC College Students Can Be Called Into Active Duty after One Year of
College
While ROTC programs offer students an opportunity to go to college before military
service, the military reserves the right to call students to active duty after one year of college
classes. For more information, visit: http://www.army.com/enlist/rotc-faqs.html.
2. Benefits 273
The Army offers two, three, and four-year ROTC scholarships, depending on when a
student applies to the program. Once accepted, a student receives a tuition scholarship as well as
additional allowances to pay for books and fees. Most graduates of the program begin their

63

active-duty commitment as officers, with more specialized training and higher pay than soldiers
who enlist immediately after high school.
Living Expenses are also covered under ROTC scholarships. Students can earn certain
amounts depending on their progress in the Army ROTC curriculum. The monthly living
expenses stipend for a ROTC student is as follows:
Monthly Living Stipends for College ROTC Students
Army 274

Navy 275

Air Force 276

Marines 277

1st year:

$300

$250

$300

$250

2nd year:

$350

$300

$350

$300

3rd year:

$450

$350

$400

$350

4th year:

$500

$400

$450

$400

3. Eligibility Requirements 278

U.S. citizenship

Between 17 and 26 years old

Able to meet physical standards

Agree to accept a commission and service on Active Duty or in a Reserve

Component (U.S. Army Reserve or Army National Guard). This requires a total
of an 8-year military commitment (4 years in college and 4 years active duty after
graduation).

4. Academic Requirements
Army:
High school GPA of at least 2.50, high school diploma or equivalent and a
minimum of 920 on SAT or 19 on ACT (excluding required writing test
scores). 279

64

Navy:
High school diploma or equivalent, score a minimum of 530 in Critical Reading
and 520 in math on the SAT or score 22 on English and 21 on Math on the ACT.
The test score requirements are reduced for students graduating in the top 10% of
their high school class. 280
Air Force:
College enrollment, good academic standing, pass the Air Force Officer
Qualifying Test, be selected by a board of Air Force officers. 281
Marines:
High school diploma or equivalent, minimum of 1000 composite SAT score or 22
composite ACT. The test score requirements are reduced for students graduating
in the top 10% of their high school class. 282

For more information and to apply to ROTC college programs, visit:

D.

Navy and Marine Corps: https://www.nrotc.navy.mil/aboutnrotc.cfm

Army: http://www.goarmy.com/rotc/

Air Force: http://www.afrotc.com/

ENLISTMENT BENEFITS
ROTC PROGRAMS

FOR

COLLEGE STUDENTS

AND GRADUATES NOT ENROLLED IN

There are many other advantages to enlisting in the military during and after college. A
selection of these benefits is listed below and should be explored by college-bound students
interested in serving in the military.

1. Advantages to Enlisting During College

Higher Sign-On Bonuses 283
Those with Associates Degrees and college credits also qualify for higher sign-on
bonuses.
Better Pay 284
Those with Associates Degrees and college credits qualify for higher pay than
enlistees who are only high school graduates.
More Elite Jobs
65

Those with Associates Degrees and college credits are also much more likely to
qualify for elite jobs and training programs.
Navy Baccalaureate Degree Completion Program 285
Available to students enrolled in college degree programs who wish to attend the
Navys officer candidate school upon graduation. Provides financial assistance to
students to facilitate completion of an undergraduate degree. Unlike ROTC, this
program does not offer officer training during college.
Air Force In-College Scholarship Program 286
Offers scholarships to college freshmen and sophomores in any degree program.
Like the Navy Baccalaureate Degree Completion Program, this program does not
offer officer training during college.
Health Services Program
The Army offers full-tuition plus stipend scholarships to students pursuing any
accredited medical, dental, veterinary, psychology or optometry program in the U.S.
or Puerto Rico. The student must serve one year in the Army for every year that he or
she receives a scholarship.

2. Benefits of Enlisting as a College Graduate

In addition to receiving the benefits listed directly above, college graduates who enlist
may reap additional benefits. The military has student loan repayment programs which can help
enlistees repay existing student loans. Additionally, college graduates may be eligible to enlist
directly into the officer candidate schools of the various military branches. This puts them on a
fast-track to interesting careers with better pay and benefits.

66

VII.

CONCLUSION

There are many alternative routes to receiving a college education that do not involve
military service. Enlisting in the armed forces is a serious and irrevocable commitment. It
should be considered once a student has a complete understanding of the various post-high
school opportunities available to him or her. For some students, enlisting upon graduation from
high school will be the right choice. Some students may reconsider the decision to enlist once
they are made aware of other educational opportunities to which they may be entitled. This
Report highlights numerous options available to high school students. It is an effort to provide
meaningful information so that families can make informed decisions concerning military
enlistment.
This report also discusses how many high schools are failing their students by giving
military recruiters unlimited access to students. Recruiters are ordered to sell the military to all
high school students, even the ones who are too young to enlist. The militarys 2009 recruitment
budget is $20.5 Billion. The military uses our tax dollars to pay the same advertising firms that
help sell sugary soft drinks and junk food to come up with slick video games and advertisements
to convince teenagers to enlist. These advertisements do not give students an accurate picture of
military life and strategically exploit adolescent insecurities for recruitment purposes.
High schools fail families by neglecting their obligations under federal law to notify
parents that they have the right that we hope keep recruiters from their children. This report
contains recommendations that we hope the State legislature, school boards, high school
administrators, parents and students will adopt to ensure that parents and high school students are
informed of their rights to keep recruiters away from children.

67

VIII.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To protect the rights of students and parents, and to ensure that schools throughout the
state comply with both NCLB and FERPA, we urge that the following recommendations be
implemented immediately.

LEGISLATURE

Pass a State-wide opt-out policy that includes the following provisions:

o Require schools to include an opt-out check box on a mandatory emergency form
(see mandatory emergency information form) OR print as a stand alone form and
require its return along with other mandatory forms
o Require schools to distribute opt-out forms within the first few weeks of each
school year
o Honor opt-outs for the entire time a student spends in a particular high school, and
eliminate the need for annual opt-out forms
o Translate the opt-out form into different languages in multilingual districts
o Require guidance offices to keep visible copies of opt-out forms
o Require school boards to certify compliance with the above policy to the New
Jersey State Board of Education by the first week of classes of each academic
year.

SCHOOL BOARDS

Pass a resolution that includes the following provisions:

o Limit military recruitment to number of visits by colleges and other postsecondary options (i.e. college fairs)
o Limit military recruitment to the same single location where college and employer
recruiters meet students (usually the guidance office)
o End recruiter abilities to roam halls and approach students
o End recruiter classroom presentations
68

o End recruiter access to teachers lounges

o Ensure that information given by recruiters is accurate
o Require military recruiters to sign in/sign out
o Require schools to collect and make publicly available recruiter data such as:

Recruiter frequency on campus

Dates of requests for student contact information

Submissions of student information by military branch, class level and age

of students, and number of students opting out

o Require a formal grievance procedure for incidences of military

misconduct/misrepresentation

Make grievances known to recruiters superiors

Deny access to recruiters engaging in misrepresentation/misconduct

o Provide equal access to students to groups that provide information about nonmilitary public service and anti-war groups

HIGH SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS & GUIDANCE COUNSELORS

Incorporate recommendations for School Boards and Legislature listed above

Publicize parents opt-out rights regarding their children and military recruitment
o Make opt-out forms and information available in the guidance office
o Post opt-out forms and information on schools website
o Discuss opt-out information at meetings with parents

Understand that No Child Left Behind requires equal access to students for military
recruiters, but it does not entitle the military to unlimited access

Ensure that information given by recruiters is accurate

o Identify one staff person to talk with students interested in enlisting about pros
and cons of service, and the reality of benefits
69

o Notify parents and students of the identity of this person

o Develop a benefits fact sheet to disseminate to students containing accurate
information about military benefits

Limit students information released to name, phone number, and address only
o Do not include additional information about ethnicity, participation in student
organizations, etc.

Provide equal access to students to groups that provide information about non-military
public service and anti-war groups

Notify students that they do not have to take the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude
Battery test

PARENTS

Know that you have a right to opt your child out of military recruitment lists

If no opt-out policy exists at your childs school

o Demand it
o Write an affirmative letter opting out (see sample letter)

Get involved
o Understand your rights
o Voice your concerns
o Run for local school board
o Attend school board meeting and submit a request for a resolution
o Raise awareness of opt-out policies and rights to other parents and with school
officials

Inform your child that he or she does not have to take the Armed Services Vocational
Aptitude Battery test

70

STUDENTS

You do not have to speak to recruiters

You can opt-out yourself (see NCLB 9528)

You do not have to take the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test

71

APPENDIX A

*USAREC Pamphlet 350-13

Headquarters
United States Army Recruiting Command
1307 3rd Avenue
Fort Knox, Kentucky 40121-2726
1 September 2004
Training

School Recruiting Program Handbook

source document for the School Recruiting Program.

For the Commander:

JAMES M. PALERMO
Colonel, General Staff
Chief of Staff

Applicability. This pamphlet is applicable to all

elements of the United States Army Recruiting
Command.

Official:
BRUCE W. MORRIS
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-6
History. This UPDATE printing publishes a revised pamphlet.
Summary. This pamphlet provides a singleContents (Listed by paragraph number)
Chapter 1
Introduction
Purpose 1-1
References 1-2
Explanation of abbreviations
SRP 1-4
General 1-5

1-3

Chapter 2
School Relations
Purpose 2-1
Establishing and maintaining rapport 2-2
School profile 2-3
Student influencers 2-4
Educator, parent, and business influencers 25
Trimester system of senior contacts 2-6
Preparation for the upcoming SY 2-7
Chapter 3
School Guidelines
Purpose 3-1
Annual planning meeting 3-2
Recruiter expectations of school officials 3-3
School officials expectations of recruiters 3-4
Chapter 4
School Folders and Army Recruiting Information Support System Information
Screens
Purpose 4-1
Information 4-2
Filing and disposition 4-3
Information screens 4-4
Chapter 5
Calendar of School Activities (Month-byMonth) Overview

Proponent and exception authority. The

proponent of this pamphlet is the Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-5. The proponent has the authority
to approve exceptions to this pamphlet that are
consistent with controlling law and regulation. Proponent may delegate the approval authority, in writing, to a division chief within the
proponent agency in the grade of lieutenant colo-

nel or the civilian equivalent.

Suggested improvements. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended
Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to HQ USAREC, ATTN: RCMPO-E, 1307
3rd Avenue, Fort Knox, KY 40121-2726.
Distribution. Distribution of this pamphlet has
been made in accordance with USAREC Pam
25-30, distribution Y. This pamphlet is published
in the Recruiter Management UPDATE. This
pamphlet is also available electronically and can
be found on the Command Enterprise Portal.

July 5-1
August 5-2
September 5-3
October 5-4
November 5-5
December 5-6
January 5-7
February 5-8
March 5-9
April 5-10
May 5-11
June 5-12

Recruiter responsibilities

Chapter 6
ASVAB
Program description 6-1
Purpose 6-2
Recruiter responsibilities 6-3
Marketing the ASVAB 6-4
Benefits 6-5
March 2 Success 6-6

Chapter 11
Release of Student Recruiting Information
Solomon Amendment 11-1
Hutchinson Amendment 11-2
Reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 2001 11-3

Chapter 7
Education Incentives
General 7-1
Purpose 7-2
Recruiter responsibilities

Glossary

Chapter 10
Postsecondary Schools Recruiting Program
Colleges and universities 10-1
Other degree-granting institutions 10-2
Nondegree-granting institutions 10-3
School visits 10-4
Recruiter activities 10-5
Stop-out cycle 10-6
Lessons 10-7

Chapter 8
ConAP
General 8-1
Purpose 8-2
ConAP benefits 8-3
Recruiter responsibilities
Chapter 9
E/COI Tours
General 9-1
Purpose 9-2
E/COI tour nominations

9-4

Appendix A. References

Chapter 1
Introduction

7-3

8-4

9-3

1-1. Purpose
The purpose of this handbook is:
a. To provide a single-source guidance document, combining regulatory requirements and
successful techniques and ideas to assist staff
and recruiters in building and maintaining an
effective School Recruiting Program (SRP).
b. To provide a school calendar of events
and significant activities and ensure an Army
presence in all secondary schools. School ownership is the goal.
c. To assist in the training of new recruiters
and serve as a reference guide. The tech-

*This pamphlet supersedes USAREC Pamphlet 350-13, 29 April 2002.

UPDATE USAREC Pam 350-13

niques and programs contained in this handbook have been proven to be successful
throughout this command. They are time-tested
techniques and if properly implemented, can
assist the recruiting force in developing, implementing, and maintaining the SRP.
1-2. References
Required and related publications and referenced
forms are listed in appendix A.
1-3. Explanation of abbreviations
Abbreviations used in this pamphlet are explained in the glossary.
1-4. SRP
a. The SRP is a well planned, prioritized, and
coordinated effort designed to create positive
awareness and interest in available Army programs among students, parents, educators, and
centers of influence (COIs) within the community. It is designed to assist recruiters in penetrating their school market and channeling their
efforts through specific tasks and goals to obtain the maximum number of quality enlistments.
The SRP is also an important part of an integrated recruiting prospecting-lead generation
program that ensures total market penetration.
Teamwork at all levels is essential to the execution of the SRP.
b. The SRP has four distinct phases: Summer, Fall, Winter, and Spring and its success is
dependent upon the development and implementation of a sound school plan. School plans
for the upcoming school year (SY) are developed at recruiting battalion (Rctg Bn) and recruiting company (Rctg Co) level during the 4th
quarter of the current SY. The plans will include
procedures for establishing school priorities,
Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
(ASVAB) testing goals, directory information acquisition objectives, and a college expansion
plan. Also included in the school plan is a matrix which lists mandated activities which should
be completed on a monthly basis by each member of the Rctg Bn, Rctg Co, and recruiting station (RS) recruiting team. Commanders and
the field force at all levels should continually
assess their school programs and recruiting
activities to see what type of impact they have
on production.
c. The objective of the SRP is to assist recruiters with programs and services so they
can effectively penetrate the school market.
The goal is school ownership that can only lead
to a greater number of Army enlistments. Recruiters must first establish rapport in the
schools. This is a basic step in the sales process and a prerequisite to an effective school
program. Maintaining this rapport and establishing a good working relationship is next. Once
educators are convinced recruiters have their
students best interests in mind the SRP can be
effectively implemented.
d. The SRP is the cornerstone of mission
accomplishment, without a strong high school
(HS) program you cannot have a strong grad

recruiting program. The RS that has a solid,

results-orientated SRP will be successful in the
schools. Establishing, executing, and maintaining the program is ultimately the responsibility of
the RS commander and individual recruiter. The
process is ongoing. Like the farmer who fails to
guard the hen house, we can easily lose our
schools and relinquish ownership to the other
services if we fail to maintain a strong SRP.
1-5. General
This is not a policy document. This is a guidebook and a resource and reference manual.
Chapter 2
School Relations
2-1. Purpose
The relationship between Army recruiters and
educators in a school district is a potential source
of comfort and conflict for both parties. Before
you can expect any type of assistance from
school officials or be accepted by students you
must first establish rapport and credibility. You
must convince them that you have their students best interests in mind. They need to know
that your interest in their students goes beyond
enlisting them and extends to a genuine concern for their future. The purpose of this chapter is to outline some of the ways to establish
and maintain rapport, identify key influencers,
and review basic preparations for the upcoming
SY.
2-2. Establishing and maintaining rapport
Establishing rapport with school officials is a
key step in maintaining access to schools. To
effectively work the school market, recruiters
must maintain rapport throughout the SY and
develop a good working relationship with key
influencers. Here are some helpful hints and
guidelines that you should know about and follow when working the school market.
a. Schools are autonomous and every schools
organizational climate and structure is different.
Recruiters should be aware of this and be flexible in tailoring approaches. Changes often occur in the schools administration (new principal, new school board, etc.). Because of this,
recruiters must work constantly to maintain and
improve school relations.
b. Never forget to ask school officials if there
is anything you can do for them and their
students. Dont be looked upon as someone
always asking for something. Give something
back to the schools.
c. The recruiter is the Army in the school.
Be the Army in every way. Absolute professionalism and integrity is demanded. Be indispensable to school administration, counselors,
faculty, and students. Be so helpful and so
much a part of the school scene that you are in
constant demand, so if anyone has any questions about the military service, they call you
first! Remember, always be professional when
dealing with school officials.
d. Recruiters need to make sure school offi-

UPDATE USAREC Pam 350-13

cials understand why school recruiting is

necessary. Many dont, so its difficult for them
to be supportive of recruiting needs. Using the
Educator/Centers of Influence (E/COI) Presentation or Speaker Kit which are available through
the Rctg Bn education services specialist (ESS)
and the Rctg Bn advertising and public affairs
staff will help.
e. Always schedule a courtesy visit with the
principal and assistant (vice) principal(s) before school starts if possible, but at least early in
the SY. The Rctg Co or RS commander should
go with new recruiters on the first visit to each
school. Make early appointments with the counseling staff as well. The Rctg Co commander
visits the school superintendent.
f. Never rely on guidance counselors as the
sole COI in the school. Cultivate coaches, librarians, administrative staff, and teachers, especially those whose subjects correlate with
Army programs. By directing your efforts toward other faculty members you may be able to
obtain the information necessary to effectively
communicate with students.
g. Knowing and following the schools ground
rules on access and school visits can make or
break a recruiters SRP. Find out as early as
possible what the rules are, and remember, they
can change.
h. Never react negatively to a schools refusal to do something youve asked. Look for
another way to achieve your mission. Always
maintain your composure and present a positive image to school officials. If you have a
problem, ask your chain of command and the
Rctg Bn ESS for assistance.
i. Always keep school staff (especially counselors) informed when you have a student who
may be processing for enlistment. If you absolutely must schedule a senior during school time,
clear it with the school officials as far in advance
as possible.
j. Dont discuss civilian life or jobs negatively
with school officials or students. Also, dont make
comparisons between your income and those
of school personnel. The Army isnt for everyone and the pride and professionalism you show
will make the point that Army life has a lot to
offer.
k. Attend as many school activities as possible. Offer your Army training and experience,
your sports and hobby knowledge, etc., as a
resource to the school. In general, attend events
in uniform; of course, if you are coaching a sport
or working in a shop, you should dress appropriately.
l. If at all possible, never send another Soldier who happens to be assigned to the Rctg Co
or RS to your school without you. As a rule,
school officials prefer to have only the assigned
recruiter on campus. If its necessary to have
another Soldier visit the school, be sure to call
them in advance to explain the situation and
request permission.
m. When school opens each year, be sensitive to the fact that school officials will be very
busy and may resent an early invasion by

recruiters. Preparation for making initial contacts with your HSs should be as follows:
(1) Find out at end of the current SY (or in
the summer) when the staff will be ready to
meet with you next SY.
(2) Make sure you speak with the administrator responsible for school rules and regulations as early as possible.
(3) Always keep relationships with students
on a professional level. Students tend not to
respect recruiters who try to become buddies.
Remember, damage can be done to school relationships by careless remarks made to students. They may be reported to school officials. Examples include talking about other students ASVAB scores; negative comments about
other services; or even worse, expressing negative opinions about school officials.
n. School recruiting is critical to both shortterm and long-term recruiting success. Remember, first to contact, first to contract...that
doesnt just mean seniors or grads; it means
having the Army perceived as a positive career
choice as soon as young people begin to think
about the future. If you wait until theyre seniors, its probably too late.
2-3. School profile
If you think of each school as an individual with
needs and interests, it will be easier to understand what the school profile is all about. For
example, one school may place a premium on
its music program; another may give prominence to its athletic program. One school may
place more emphasis on its academic scholarship program. Each school has a distinct chain
of command structure. An effective sales approach would be to tailor a program to fit the
needs and interests of the individual school.
Study the school folders from previous years.
Plan your activities and set forth your objectives for each school. Look for helpful people
you didnt even know about. Look for things
which were used or tried in the past that worked.
It will be surprising the number of problems that
can be solved by doing what some other recruiter has already done. Seek out important
details about assigned schools (i.e., school colors, mascots, whether they voluntarily or mandatory test ASVAB and at what grade). You
should have a strip map to the school from the
RS, showing both distance and time to travel.
Get involved in activities at the school which
support its priorities. Contact the Rctg Bn ESS
and the advertising and public affairs staff for
historical information and Army unique programs
and services which may be used in assigned
schools (e.g., Concurrent Admissions Program
(ConAP), College First, and March 2 Success).
Many times you can use Total Army Involvement in Recruiting activities or COI events in
conjunction with activities going on at your
schools. This will help give you and the Army
the positive exposure you need within the
schools.
2-4. Student influencers
Not every student will enlist in the Army. Like
parents and faculty members, student influencers play an important role in your SRP. Students

who stand out as leaders among their peers are

typically student influencers. Know your student influencers. Students such as class
officers, newspaper and yearbook editors, and
athletes can help build interest in the Army among
the student body. Keep them informed. Tell
them about the excellent educational benefits
and the opportunities available in Americas
Army. Some influential students such as the
student president or the captain of the football
team may not enlist; however, they can and will
provide you with referrals who will enlist. More
importantly is the fact that an informed student
leader will respect the choice of enlistment, in
turn, future Soldiers feel good about their decision to join. Future Soldiers can also be tremendous influencers. Something as simple as
an Army personal promotional item can help
produce positive results.
2-5. Educator, parent, and business influencers
Many educators, parents, and business leaders are not aware of the multifaceted opportunities that Americas Army offers young people.
Ensure the total community is cognizant of what
programs and services are available not only
for students but for school systems, parents
groups, and the business community as well.
Never pass up the opportunity to address the
parent-teacher association. Keep them informed. Provide them with information on the
benefits of an Army enlistment. Members of the
community can provide guidance and serve as
positive influencers.
2-6. Trimester system of senior contacts
a. A seniors plans for the future can, and
will, change throughout the last year of HS.
Plans to go directly into the workplace or attend
college will change as the student confronts
reality. For example, work-bound students may
realize that they lack the necessary training and
experience to land a good paying job or for some
college-bound students who planned on continuing their education the expected scholarship money didnt materialize. You need to develop a prospecting plan that will help you identify and capitalize on these changes when they
occur. You should use a positive approach and
contact the high school seniors as follows:
(1) First contact. Contact the students during the summer between their junior and senior
year; this plants awareness of the Army in their
minds. Remember, first to contact, first to contract.
(2) Second contact. Contact the students
sometime during the first quarter, after school
begins. Give them time to allow the hustle and
bustle of the new SY to settle down. At this
point, seniors should begin realizing that they
will graduate in 9 months or less. Encourage
them to take the ASVAB when it is offered in
school. They will start considering, possibly for
the first time ever, their future plans and goals.
(3) Third contact. Contact the seniors in the
early spring. At this point of the SY, the stu-

UPDATE USAREC Pam 350-13

dents should be certain about graduation. They

should know about college application, acceptance, and financial aid arrangements. The end
of their lives as HS students is approaching
fast. This is the time reality sets in. For some it
is clear that college is not an option, at least for
now. Let them know that the Army can fulfill
their college aspirations later on.
b. Dont get the impression that you have to
contact seniors three times before you ask them
to join the Army. If you can make an appointment for a sales presentation on the first contact, then do so. Remember, that you will probably need to tailor your sales message to meet
the stage of the SY.
c. In summary, this chapter provided you
with an overview of some of the key elements
that affect your SRP. The calendar of events in
chapter 5 gives you an overview of what USAREC Reg 350-6, table 3-5, requires you to do
and some ideas you might want to initiate on a
quarterly basis.
2-7. Preparation for the upcoming SY
a. There are some basic preparations that
should be completed prior to the beginning of
the SY. Have you:
(1) Reviewed the school plan for the upcoming year?
(2) Initiated school folders for assigned HSs
and colleges?
(3) Contacted your summer grads?
(4) Obtained faculty lists from your assigned
schools?
(5) Talked to the Rctg Bn staff about expected support?
(6) Identified and met with the counseling staff
at your schools?
(7) Identified and met your local college
ConAP point of contact?
(8) Scheduled a faculty COI breakfast or luncheon?
(9) Attended some of the summer school activities?
(10) Received training on ASVAB promotion
and interpretation?
(11) Scheduled Army-assigned schools for
ASVAB?
(12) Restocked your recruiting publicity item
(RPI) racks at HSs and colleges?
(13) Scheduled a Junior Achievement presentation?
(14) Met the professor of military science
(PMS) for Junior Reserve Officers Training
Corps or Reserve Officers Training Corps
(ROTC)?
(15) Made your schools aware of the Scholar/
Athlete Awards Program?
(16) Completed the HS and college priority
evaluation sheets?
(17) Located the school Web site for school
term schedule?
(18) Scheduled Back to School activities?
b. As an Army recruiter, theres not a single
thing on the above list that is not a part of your
having a successful program. These are the
basics, the obvious, the originals, the stuff you

do without thinking. Stop for a minute and see if

maybe you could do them a little better, a little
more completely, or even a little more creatively.
You never know, even the basics can be improved with a fresh, innovative look.
c. These basic preparations are expounded
upon in chapter 5 using a calendar of school
activities format.
Chapter 3
School Guidelines
3-1. Purpose
The purpose of this chapter is to set forth guidelines and expectations for both school officials
and Army recruiters throughout the SY. These
guidelines assume that representatives of all
the armed services are accorded a reception in
the schools equal to the reception given to the
representatives of other career and educational
institutions.
3-2. Annual planning meeting
It is desirable that an annual meeting of school
officials and armed services recruiting representatives be conducted prior to the beginning
of the SY. A key objective of the meeting should
be to develop a clear understanding of the school
district policy and procedures in the coming year.
a. Ideally, faculty representatives should include the principal, the head of the guidance
department, and the school counselor with primary responsibility for military career information.
b. Each Services recruiting representatives
with supervisory or liaison authority and the designated recruiter for that school would attend.
Recruiting representatives would be expected
to provide the name, address, and telephone
number of their respective commanding officer
to facilitate quick resolution of misunderstandings.
c. Issues to be discussed at the annual planning meeting should include:
(1) Recruiter access to students.
(2) School district policy relating to the release of student directory information.
(3) Student absences for recruiting activities.
(4) ASVAB testing program.
(5) Armed services stay-in-school policy.
(6) Current information on armed services
education and career opportunities.
(7) An informational meeting early in the SY
for all interested faculty members with armed
services representatives.
(8) Mutual expectations for the SY.
d. The school representatives are encouraged to discuss and make available the materials normally provided students. For example:
(1) Student Handbook.
(2) Course catalog and schedule of classes.
(3) School activities; major events in the
school calendar.
(4) School organization chart.
(5) A school map or floor plan.
3-3. Recruiter expectations of school officials
It is reasonable for the armed services recruit-

ers to expect school officials to:

a. Allocate opportunity for presentations and
individual student contact on armed services
careers and educational opportunities on par
with other career and educational institutions.
b. Display information on armed services careers and educational opportunities along with
information on all other career and educational
opportunities.
c. Assist with the interpretation of ASVAB test
scores as requested by students and parents.
d. Assist in developing awareness of career
and educational opportunities offered by the
armed services.
e. Release student directory information in
accordance with legislative and school district
policies.
f. Invite recruiters to participate in career fairs,
college nights, and other activities where nonschool personnel present career and educational options.
3-4. School officials expectations of recruiters
It is reasonable for school officials to expect
armed services recruiters to:
a. Encourage all students to stay in school
to graduate. (Dont assume school officials know
this as a fact. Reinforce this often.)
b. Reinforce student participation in academic, technological, and vocational courses
appropriate to their career plans.
c. Encourage acceptance of the ASVAB program and aid in interpretation of the results.
d. Contact students within the guidelines established by school officials.
e. Present clear, accurate, and complete information to students, giving honest answers
on both positive and negative aspects of military life, so that students may make informed
choices.
f. Visit the school in accordance with guidelines established at the annual planning meeting.
g. Make appointments in advance for visits
to school officials.
h. Have written permission from a student or
parent, if the student is a minor, before requesting school records.
Chapter 4
School Folders and Army Recruiting Information Support System School Information Screens
4-1. Purpose
USAREC Form 446 (High School Folder) and
USAREC Form 1256 (Postsecondary School
Folder) are designed to assist recruiters in developing an effective and consistent SRP. The
folders are used by recruiters to document essential information on each assigned school.
School folders will be prepared on all assigned
schools to include postsecondary institutions. All
school visits will be documented. Each recruiter
will maintain a written account in the school folder
of all activities in the school that impact recruit-

UPDATE USAREC Pam 350-13

ing. School folders are also used to identify key

educators and evaluate specific programs and
provide each recruiter with a historical reference of past and current performance and productivity.
4-2. Information
The data recorded in the following sections of
the school folder reflect a profile for each school.
a. Front cover. Annotate priority and document information on type of school and enrollment. Record ASVAB information and production accomplishments and always keep information current.
b. Inside front cover. School profile to include
faculty, student, ROTC information, and a
monthly list of school events.
c. Inserts. Inserts include a list of school
activities, school priority evaluations, college
matrix, and college assessment form. All school
visits will be documented.
d. Inside back cover. A continuation of the
school profile to include information on school
advertising, access, and directory information.
Also, list the career days and the date and educator tours scheduled. Also, space is provided
to store necessary school information that is
not addressed on the folder itself (e.g., newspaper ads, directory lists, and other pertinent information). Keep all current ASVAB lists in the
appropriate school folder.
e. Outside back cover. Space is provided
to track future Soldiers.
4-3. Filing and disposition
School folders are initiated on 1 July or the next
available workday.
a. The RS commander will hold current year
school folders; however, it is the recruiters responsibility to keep the data current.
b. School folders are maintained for a minimum of 2 years in the RS inactive files.
4-4. Information screens
The Army Recruiting Information Support System (ARISS) school information screens are
designed to make it easier for the recruiter to
access information about his or her school. This
function will allow the recruiter to have updated
historical data on the schools performance and
productivity. This tool used in conjunction with
the paper-based school folder (USAREC Form
446) will enhance a recruiters ability to design a
productive SRP. The ARISS school information function is divided into three screens. They
are:
a. The School Information screen. This section is for school profile data. The basic school
information (i.e., names, address, telephone
number, etc.,) is an automatic input from the
ARISS Top of the System. The recruiter will
input faculty and academic information.
b. The School Activities screen. Recruiters
will use this screen to document all accomplishments at the schools (who, what, when, where,
why). This screen will display what has been
accomplished and the next scheduled activity

at the school.
c. The Student Information screen. Recruiters will use this screen to maintain a list of key
students and people at the school. Recruiters
will enter the title (coach, newspaper editor, president), name, e-mail address, and telephone
number of these key personnel.
Chapter 5
Calendar of School Activities (Month-byMonth) Overview
5-1. July
a. July is the month that your school program officially begins. Initiate your school folders (USAREC Form 446 and USAREC Form
1256) on 1 July or the next available duty day.
b. Contact school officials for appointment to
discuss new or changed Army programs, confirm this years school policies, and schedule or
confirm ASVAB dates.
c. Schedule career day, job fair, presentations, etc.
d. Request directory information from registrar, dean, principal, or helpful school administrator (preferably electronically).
e. Restock RPI rack, request activities calendar, sporting event schedules, etc.
f. Training, ideas, and resources.
(1) Attend Rctg Co training or update training on ASVAB, ConAP, Junior Achievement Program, and Federal school access laws.
(2) Each RS should receive a supply of desktop calendars for delivery to schools and key
education staff. Contact the advertising and
public affairs staff for specific dates of delivery.
(3) Try to obtain a schedule of HS faculty or
college staff meetings. Coordinate through your
company leadership team (CLT) for a COI event
for the faculty. A luncheon presentation of what
the Army offers young people will enhance your
relationship with the entire school faculty. Start
with our shared goals for students of staying in
school, off drugs, and out of trouble.
(4) Many faculty members are prior service
or are current members of the United States
Army Reserve (USAR). Try to identify these
individuals and develop them as COIs. Your
goal is to develop as many COIs as possible in
the schools. Dont forget the administrative staff
since many of them act as representatives for
the school policymakers. Establish and maintain rapport and always treat them with respect.
Also, have something to give them (pen, calendar, cup, donuts, etc.,) and always remember
secretarys week with a card or flowers.
(5) Obtain a copy of the HS fall sports and
activity calendars. Contact the CLT to arrange
to have the schedules copied with the RS address prominently displayed. Post them
throughout the RS area, including restaurants,
arcades, and anywhere else students congregate.
(6) Join the local chamber of commerce. This
is a great source of potential COIs and very
important persons. The chamber of commerce
is also an excellent source of obtaining demog-

raphic data and market trends. The chamber

schedules speakers...schedule the commander.
(7) Make an appointment to discuss the upcoming SY with the PMS or Director of Junior
Reserve Officers Training Corps.
(8) Visit ConAP points of contact at your assigned colleges.
5-2. August
a. Determine ASVAB scheduling of assigned
schools.
b. Training, ideas, and resources.
(1) Contact the schools student government
and set up a meeting to discuss what the Army
and you can do to assist them in the upcoming
SY (chaperon, give a speech, tour a reserve
center, etc.).
(2) The football team usually starts practicing in August. Contact the coach and volunteer
to assist in leading calisthenics or calling cadence during team runs.
(3) Use your split-training USAR future Soldiers at every opportunity. Ask them to assist
you with school activities that correspond with
Army activities. Ensure that using the Soldiers
does not interfere with their school obligations.
(4) Remember that, although the faculty is
working at full strength in August, things around
the HS tend to be hectic during this time of year.
Make an appointment prior to going to the HS.
5-3. September
a. Continue to establish rapport with the HS
faculty. Begin your ASVAB program and schedule the exam as early as possible.
b. Arrange for ASVAB pretest promotion activities.
c. Arrange for ASVAB interpretation activities.
d. Develop a plan to visit all schools and post
in your planning guide.
e. Get dates of college career days and
nights.
f. Training, ideas, and resources.
(1) Distribute desk calendars to your assigned schools.
(2) Discuss the benefits of the ASVAB with
school officials. Talk with students and faculty
about the ASVAB being a no-cost service that
students can use to help determine their future
career paths. Explain benefits of junior testing
to the counseling staff.
(3) Attend athletic events at the HS. Make
sure you wear your uniform and have RPIs on
the Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB), Army College
Fund (ACF), and ConAP and have plenty of
business cards.
(4) Get involved with the parent-teacher association. At this stage, many parents will be
pondering how they will finance their childs education. The Army is a viable option for them and
the student.
(5) Many communities have Labor Day activities, parades, etc. Get involved through the
local chamber of commerce. If your school has
a color guard, offer to train them in drill and

UPDATE USAREC Pam 350-13

ceremonies. Obtain a tactical vehicle from a

local USAR troop program unit and drive it in the
parade with your future Soldiers riding along.
(6) The HS registration may be hectic. Go
to the HS, offer your assistance in registration
and any other administrative help you can give.
Remember: You need all the blueprint information on your HS you can get. The good HS
program is a proactive one; the early bird gets
the worm. This means, first to contact, first to
contract.
(7) Coordinate with school officials to eat
lunch in the school cafeteria several times each
month. This will give you more visibility, and will
help you identify potential candidates for any
opportunities and enhance your contact milestones.
(8) Deliver donuts and coffee for the faculty
once a month. This will help in scheduling classroom presentations and advise teachers of the
many Army opportunities.
(9) Hispanic Heritage Month. Participate in
events as available.
5-4. October
a. Determine ASVAB scheduling of assigned
schools.
b. Training, ideas, and resources.
(1) Homecoming normally happens in October. Coordinate with the homecoming committee to get involved with the parade. Use a tactical vehicle as described in paragraph 5-3. Offer to be a chaperon or escort for homecoming
activities and coronations.
(2) Contact Army-assigned unscheduled
schools for ASVAB.
(3) Many schools publish their first issue of
their newspaper in October. Coordinate with
the Rctg Bn advertising and public affairs staff
to place an advertisement. Ensure that we meet
all financial obligations in a timely manner.
(4) As the month before elections, October
is a great time to give presentations to school
history and government classes about the electoral process and how the Army serves a vital
role in the security of our nation.
(5) Get involved with local Boy Scout troops.
Scoutmasters are typically happy to get any
assistance you can offer. Many scouts are HS
students and potential enlistees or student influencers.
(6) Order personal presentation items (pens,
bags, mousepads, mugs) as needed monthly
for special events.
5-5. November
Training, ideas, and resources.
a. Basketball season begins. Distribute new
schedules for the basketball season. Assemble
and offer a color guard for the opening home
game.
b. Prior to Thanksgiving, many student organizations gather food baskets for needy citizens. Offer your assistance and get involved.
Offer your RS as a collection point and volunteer to distribute the food baskets.
c. Attend as many school holiday functions

or assemblies as possible. Wear your class A

or dress blue uniform when appropriate.
d. Observe Veterans Day by planning a luncheon to honor school faculty members who
are veterans and invite all faculty members (excellent COI function).
e. During November, Education Week occurs throughout the United States. Coordinate
a COI event for key officials. Contact the Rctg
Bn ESS and advertising and public affairs staff
for ideas and implementation guidance.
5-6. December
Training, ideas, and resources.
a. Set up school career day presentations.
b. Contact college students who are home
during the holidays (remember that many firstyear college students do not return to school
after the first semester).
c. Offer to be a timekeeper at football games.
d. Participate in HS holiday events.
e. Get with other service recruiters and compare the size of your future Soldiers pool to
theirs. Are you behind the power curve? Which
service is doing well and what should you do to
alter your sales presentations?
f. Establish a point of contact at the school to
obtain HS letters and/or transcripts during the
holidays.
g. By December our future Soldier population is substantial in several schools. Inform the
principal, in writing, about the educational benefits earned by his or her students.
5-7. January
Training, ideas, and resources.
a. Obtain a list of mid-term graduates and
contact them as soon as possible.
b. Turn up the tempo on contacting your juniors. Get a jump on the competition.
c. Dr. Martin Luther King Jrs birthday is in
January. Wear your dress blues and participate in school events commemorating this holiday.
d. Contact your first-year college students
to see if they returned to school. How is their
second semester financial situation?
5-8. February
Training, ideas, and resources.
a. Coordinate and execute Total Army Involvement in Recruiting events.
b. February is an excellent time to take advantage of active duty for special work and hometown recruiter assistance Soldiers. Contact last
years graduates who are in the USAR and involve them in activities at their alma mater HS.
c. Conduct an educator luncheon (COI) and
invite the Rctg Bn commander to be the guest
speaker.
d. Contact the HS athletic director and arrange for an exhibition basketball game between
the faculty and Army recruiters. This is an excellent way to build rapport in the HS. Ensure
that the school does not conduct the game during any event where they charge admission.
e. Black History Month. Participate in events

as available.
5-9. March
Training, ideas, and resources.
a. Have the Rctg Bn advertising and public
affairs prepare certificates for those faculty and
staff members who have aided you in your HS
recruiting efforts. Have the Rctg Bn or Rctg Co
commander present these certificates at a COI
event.
b. Continue to advertise in school newspapers and conduct class presentations.
c. Award certificates of appreciation to key
influencers.
5-10. April
Training, ideas, and resources.
a. Continue involvement with the chamber of
commerce.
b. Arrange now for next SYs ASVAB testing
dates with the school administrator.
c. Track and field meets begin. Offer to be a
timekeeper or a coachs assistant.
d. Baseball season starts. Offer assistance
to the coach.
e. Followup with school administrators to ensure USAR scholar/athlete nominations have
been submitted to the Rctg Bn advertising and
public affairs section.
5-11. May
Training, ideas, and resources.
a. Armed Forces Week activities.
b. Since Memorial Day occurs in May, there
are normally many patriotic events in the community and in the schools during this month.
Contact the HS to find out what events they are
involved with and offer any assistance possible.
5-12. June
Training, ideas, and resources.
a. Coordinate with your CLT to have the Rctg
Bn commander send thank you notes to those
staff and faculty members who have been helpful to you during the SY.
b. Secure and present USAR Scholar/Athlete Awards at HS graduation or award ceremonies.
c. Coordinate with school officials so you can
present certificates to those future Soldiers who
have enlisted during the SY.
d. Assist in arranging a color guard for the
graduation ceremony.
e. Coordinate with school officials to determine if they can use your assistance during
summer school. The faculty is normally shorthanded during the summer and they will probably welcome your help.
f. Maintain close contact with your future
Soldiers. Secure their HS diplomas and ensure
you get copies of them to the Military Entrance
Processing Station prior to their ship date.
Chapter 6
ASVAB
6-1. Program description
ASVAB, developed at the direction of the Department of Defense (DOD), is offered through
the student testing program to HSs and other

UPDATE USAREC Pam 350-13

educational institutions. The program serves

as a means of sharing extensive knowledge
and experience in aptitude testing, career planning, and occupational information with students
and their counselors, and as a means of stimulating interest in military jobs and training opportunities in the armed services.
6-2. Purpose
Within the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC), ASVAB is designed to:
a. Provide the field recruiter with a source of
leads of high school seniors and juniors qualified through the ASVAB for enlistment into the
Active Army and Army Reserve.
b. Provide HS students and their counselors
with a tool for vocational career exploration
through evaluation of students current aptitudes
as measured by the ASVAB and the occupational data provided from Army classification
experience.
6-3. Recruiter responsibilities
a. Coordination of ASVAB scheduling in Armyassigned schools. The form used is USMEPCOM
Form 601-4-3-R-E (Student ASVAB Test
Record).
b. ASVAB test promotion in HSs, vo-tech
schools, and postsecondary institutions in assigned area.
c. Be present during testing sessions in assigned schools to ensure proper coordination.
d. Serve as test proctors, as required.
e. Use ASVAB service printouts to your advantage in contracting and enlisting qualified personnel.
f. Observe and abide by school mandated
restrictions on the use of ASVAB printouts to
contact students.
g. Assist schools in the process of interpreting the ASVAB test results to students.
h. Request additional training, as needed, on
marketing the ASVAB and test interpretation
from the ESS.
6-4. Marketing the ASVAB
a. As a recruiter, one of your most important
responsibilities will be arranging the ASVAB in
your schools. This process is called Marketing the ASVAB. Each SY you receive a list of
Army-assigned schools from the Military Entrance Processing Station in which you are responsible for scheduling the ASVAB. Some
schools that traditionally test have already been
scheduled prior to the SY and others only allow
testing on a voluntary basis. You need to concentrate on both scheduling those schools that
do not have a test date and encouraging all
schools to test classwide. The Rctg Bn ESS
should be able to provide you with guidance and
assistance in those schools that elect not to
administer the ASVAB.
b. Marketing the ASVAB requires that recruiters know the rules of the school and the key
decision makers. The school guidance counselor is usually responsible for student testing
and career development. The principal runs

the school, sets the policies, and for the most

part is the key decision maker. However, in
some cases the schools policy on testing is
established by the superintendent and/or school
board. Once you know who makes the decision, you need to followup with a meeting or
presentation on the benefits of ASVAB testing.
6-5. Benefits
a. First, from the recruiters perspective, the
ASVAB is not only a valuable tool used to maintain and improve school relations but it is also
specifically designed to provide recruiters with
a source of prequalified leads. The ASVAB prequalifies potential applicants academically before more expensive and time-consuming medical and moral qualifications are done. The
ASVAB recruiter printout provides information
you cant get from any other list. It gives the
recruiter the students Armed Forces Qualification Test scores, military aptitude composites,
and career goals. It identifies the best potential
prospects for recruitment that allows recruiters
to work smarter. The printout provides the recruiter with concrete and personal information
about the student. The information is important
when initially discussing careers and educational incentives with potential applicants. The
ASVAB recruiter service printout is a working
document that provides recruiters with a list of
students qualified for military service with test
scores that are valid for enlistment for 2 years.
b. The ASVAB is also a comprehensive career exploration program that benefits all students and schools that participate. The ASVAB
testing program provides students with a structured approach to career and vocational planning, identifies student academic strengths and
weaknesses, and provides information on student interests to assist in career and educational decisionmaking. Schools benefit from the
program because ASVAB and all the related
services and materials are provided at no cost.
Schools receive a cost effective career exploration program that meets or exceeds most
state-mandated career planning policies. For
college-bound students the ASVAB is a very
reliable academic ability predictor and is a good
practice test for the Scholastic Aptitude Test
and American College Testing.
6-6. March 2 Success
a. March 2 Success is a highly interactive
online program to provide HS and college students easy access to test preparation. The
program, sponsored by the Army, allows young
men and women to participate in up to 30 hours
of instruction in more than 50 self-paced online
lessons covering Math, English, and test-taking
skills.
b. The goals of the Armys March 2 Success
Program are:
(1) To build the image with students, parents, and educators that the Army is high tech
and career oriented.
(2) To build rapport and strengthen the working relationship between recruiters and school

officials.
(3) To enhance test scores, including the
ASVAB.
c. Recruiters are encouraged to offer this
online test preparation program to schools at no
cost to them. This will provide all students the
opportunity to improve their test-taking skills and
improve their standardized test scores. By developing and offering this program the Army is
extending its commitment to success to young
adults still in school by becoming partners in
education. For more information, brochures,
and posters contact the Rctg Bn ESS.
d. Recruiters are authorized to recommend
this program to applicants in order to prepare
for the ASVAB.
Chapter 7
Education Incentives
7-1. General
Over the years individuals have stated that
money for college was one of the dominant reasons for their enlisting in the Army. In response
to the needs of individuals wishing to further
their education at a college or vocational-technical school, the Army offers six programs that
provide financial assistance to attend college
during and after service. They are the MGIB,
ACF, Selected Reserve GI Bill, Loan Repayment Program (LRP), eArmyU, and tuition assistance (TA). Additionally, some states offer
special veterans educational benefits. These
programs will fit many needs:
a. For students who want to attend college
after completing Army service.
b. For students who want to join the Army
after completing college.
c. For students who want to join the Army
with some college credits and continue both as
a college student and serve in the Army.
d. For students who want to attend college
while in service.
7-2. Purpose
a. To encourage college-capable individuals
to defer their college until they have served in
the Army.
b. To fill the various Army skills with capable
individuals.
c. To demonstrate to the education community that the Army is concerned with assisting
Soldiers by providing financial assistance for
postsecondary education.
7-3. Recruiter responsibilities
a. Be familiar with all aspects of these programs.
b. Offer each of these programs according
to the needs of the individual.
c. Inform HS counselors of the MGIB, Selective Reserve GI Bill, ACF, and TA programs.
d. Ensure that teachers, counselors, and
parents receive information and RPIs on these
programs.
e. Discuss the LRP with college financial aid
officers, college graduates, and college students.

UPDATE USAREC Pam 350-13

f. Be familiar with state-sponsored veterans

education programs.
Chapter 8
ConAP
8-1. General
ConAP assists recruiters in enlisting collegebound, Army-eligible prospects into the Army
while at the same time arranging for them to
make a plan to enroll in a Servicemembers Opportunity College. ConAP is an initiative of USAREC, with cooperation of 1,700 participating
colleges, to increase the number of Army veterans and reservists who enroll in college and
use their MGIB education benefits. The program helps prospects realize that an Army enlistment prepares the way to college since enlistees establish a home college that accepts
transfer credits and recognizes Army training
and job experience for possible college credit.
8-2. Purpose
The purpose of ConAP is to develop leads, cut
losses of future Soldiers, and enroll more veterans and reservists in college.
8-3. ConAP benefits
a. For recruiters, ConAP develops leads
among young men and women interested in
college and who need money for college. It also
creates mutually beneficial contact with college
admission officers.
b. For new Soldiers who formally state their
intent to enroll, the process is completed when
they are eligible for MGIB education benefits;
and they have created an all important plan to
attend college after leaving the Army.
c. It benefits the HS by enabling more graduates to go to college with access to MGIB education benefits.
d. Colleges benefit with higher enrollments
of mature, motivated students with job experience and financial resources, and since the application process is complete, the Soldier has
bonded with a home college.
8-4. Recruiter responsibilities
a. Pass out ConAP literature to leads, parents, HS officials, college officials, and civic leaders.
b. Meet the ConAP points of contact at your
local colleges and create a good working relationship. Remember that these individuals are
also your doors to the rest of the college.
c. Inform every enlistee of the benefits of
ConAP. Assist them in filling out the necessary
forms.
d. Maintain your enlistees interests in ConAP
and you will have few losses of future Soldiers.
Call it good future Soldier management. Studies
have shown that enlistees participating in ConAP
are three times more likely to ship than those
not participating in ConAP.
Chapter 9
E/COI Tours
9-1. General
E/COI tours are designed to be professionally

enriching experiences for key influencers. They

are not junkets or rewards for cooperation with
recruiters. Tours are resources that must focus on those areas (access, ASVAB testing,
and release of directory information) that need
special attention. Tours provide E/COIs the
opportunity to view Soldiers in a training environment. Many participants become informed
supporters who publicize and promote Army
opportunities with students, graduates, and other
key influencers.
9-2. Purpose
The purpose of E/COI tours is:
a. To support the recruiting force by improving recruiter access to the school market.
b. To pass on the following messages to tour
participants:
(1) Education and training opportunities in
Americas Army are excellent.
(2) Army interest in Soldier welfare and development matches the concern educators have
for their students.
(3) Training and educational opportunities
make the Army a competitive choice worthy of
consideration by every graduating HS student.
c. To request support from educators and
key influencers for improving access to
schools, arranging availability of directory information, and administering the ASVAB.
9-3. E/COI tour nominations
Rctg Bns are authorized and funded to conduct
at a minimum, one E/COI tour per fiscal year.
Each Rctg Co is limited in the number of nominees depending on the size of the tour. It is
usually the recruiters who submit the nominations. Dont just nominate friends of the Army.
Mix in some pro-Army selections with openminded neutrals and undecided influencers.
Choose people who can help. Key influencers
among HS students are guidance counselors
and teachers who can testify as to the quality of
Army educational benefits and technical training. Key policymakers are principals, superintendents, and school board members who can
establish a more favorable policy toward school
access, ASVAB testing, and release of directory information. College administrators, financial aid counselors, admissions officers, and
registrars can support recruiters and influence
students at the postsecondary level.
9-4. Recruiter responsibilities
a. Assess your school market to determine
problem areas. Identify those key influencers
and policymakers who can help remove the barriers to recruiting.
b. Submit your nominations through appropriate channels to the E/COI tour program manager. Provide accurate address information for
written invitations.
c. Followup with the nominee to ensure that
the tour invitation is received. Coordinate with
tour program manager if your tour selection has
agreed to participate.
d. Escort and transport tour participants to

and from the departure point.

e. Immediately following the tour, followup with
your E/COIs. Accept volunteered support and
request additional assistance (testing, access,
etc.).
Chapter 10
Postsecondary Schools Recruiting Program
10-1. Colleges and universities
The college recruiting market consists of regionally accredited 2-year (community and junior colleges) and 4-year (colleges and universities) degree-granting postsecondary institutions.
This market is an excellent source of potential
Army enlistments due to the high percentage of
students who drop out of college, particularly
during the first 2 years. Colleges are shared
markets within RSs. The Rctg Co commander
is responsible for initiating the actions required
to establish an ongoing college recruiting program. RS commanders are responsible for ensuring that recruiters work their assigned colleges in a planned, systemic manner and the
assigned recruiter will serve as the colleges
point of contact for all recruiting activities. In all
contacts with college officials, recruiting personnel should emphasize that the Army is only
interested in recruiting former students who have
dropped out and those students who are about
to graduate, and in helping current students stay
in school through enlistment in the USAR.
10-2. Other degree-granting institutions
Operating institutions of higher education legally
authorized to grant degrees are not limited to
colleges and universities. Vocational-trade
schools are nationally accredited 2- and 4-year
degree-granting private for profit (proprietary)
postsecondary institutions. These institutions
are recognized by the American Council on Education and listed in the degree-granting section
of the Accredited Institutions of Postsecondary
Education book published for the Council of
Higher Education Accreditation. These business schools and technical institutes are widespread and represent a hidden market that is
often times ignored by the recruiting field force.
The Rctg Bn ESS, Rctg Co commanders, and
RS commanders need to identify the degreegranting vocational-trade schools in their area
of operation and approach and treat this market
in a manner similar to 2-year colleges. When
discussing Army recruiting with school officials
from these institutions emphasize placement in
a skilled specialty, educational incentives, and
accelerated promotions.
10-3. Nondegree-granting institutions
Another segment of the postsecondary recruiting market that is often overlooked is fully accredited postsecondary certificate and diploma
programs. These schools are recognized by
the American Council on Education and listed in
the nondegree-granting section of the Accredited Institutions of Postsecondary Education

UPDATE USAREC Pam 350-13

book. This category includes postsecondary

vocational-technical schools, career centers,
academies, learning centers, training centers,
and technical institutes. These institutions train
for specific occupations and careers. Examples
of occupations include: Practical nursing, computer operator, medical assistant, automotive
repair, welding, hairstyling, truck driving, and
cosmetology. When discussing Army recruiting with students and graduates from these institutions, stress skill training and related Army
occupational specialties.
10-4. School visits
a. The Rctg Co commander should take the
lead on initial visits to colleges. Initial visits should
accomplish the following:
(1) Conduct a meeting with the ConAP point
of contact at each participating college.
(2) Identify and collect demographic information about the college, faculty, and students.
(3) Introduce the assigned recruiter to key
COIs within the administration.
(4) Use the Solomon Amendment to request
college student recruiting information.
(5) Establish a schedule and location for
Regular Army and USAR recruiters to interview
interested students. Locations should be mutually agreed to by the school and the recruiter.
(6) Identify and request displays, RPIs, public service announcements, and advertising outlets throughout the college.
(7) Orient the recruiter to the layout of the
campus.
b. Effective recruiting on the college campus
requires recruiters to understand differences
which exist between colleges and HSs.
(1) Students are older and more mature on
college campuses.
(2) Students and/or parents are paying tuition to attend college. Personal debts can accrue and student loan repayment plans can be
very appealing to these students.
(3) College personnel may feel threatened
by the presence of Army recruiters on campus.
Every effort must be made to avoid giving the
impression that the Army is on campus to cause
students to drop out of school.
(4) College students are more focused on
opportunities in the workplace following graduation. Use of the USAR Job Vacancy Report
will provide students with information on parttime Reserve positions in the area. (The USAR
Job Vacancy Report, which is produced monthly
by the Rctg Bn operations section and found on
the goarmy.com Web site, can serve as a want
ad, but more importantly it will generate leads.)
(5) The following are also effective tools to
assist in the recruiting process on the college
campus.
(a) MGIB and ACF. (Money to continue postsecondary education.)
(b) LRP. (Money to pay off federally-insured
student loans.)
(c) ConAP. (Program to enroll in college concurrent with Army enlistment.)
(d) DOD Student Testing Program. (Pro-

gram to further enhance student career exploration.)

(e) Accelerated promotion for education. (Increased rank and financial incentive for
postsecondary education.)
(f) Army Civilian Acquired Skills Program. (Increased rank and financial incentive for postsecondary training and experience.)
(g) Specialized Training for Army Reserve
Readiness. (A USAR program which pays for
training in health care specialties.)
(h) Warrant Officer Flight Training. (Flight
training.)
(i) Army Continuing Education System and
TA. (Inservice education programs and up to
100 percent TA.)
(j) ROTC and Officer Candidate School programs. (Commissioning programs.)
10-5. Recruiter activities
a. Develop a working relationship with as
many of the following as possible: Director of
student affairs, career placement officer, college registrar, financial aid officer, dean of students, director of student housing, veterans affairs officer, PMS, ConAP officer, department
chairpersons, and any professor in a specific
field that might be helpful in making presentations or communicating Army opportunities.
b. Obtain a copy of the college catalog which
contains information about the academic calendar for the SY. It also contains the programs of
study.
c. Plan a future Soldier event and invite the
ConAP representative at the college to make a
presentation and assist in completing college
applications.
d. Invite key staff to participate in upcoming
educator tours.
e. Work with the placement office to help students who are looking for jobs. In a number of
cases this office is helping graduates find fulltime work after graduation, but some will be interested in part-time situations, such as the
USAR. (Use the USAR Job Vacancy Report.)
f. Work with the financial aid officer to make
presentations on the LRP.
g. Request through the chain of command to
take a morning class using Army TA.
h. Target vocational markets. The nonreturn
rate in vocational programs is extremely high
because students get enough training to become employable. Vocational instructors realize this. Recruiters should target one department (e.g., Allied Health) per month by offering
class presentations on available jobs, by conducting job interviews at scheduled times, and
by offering USAR opportunities to allow students
to continue their college education.
10-6. Stop-out cycle
a. There are certain times during every semester when, if students are going to drop out,
they will do so. For those schools on the quarter system, the same principles apply, but the
number of weeks will differ.
(1) The first is usually 6 weeks into the se-

mester when a student can withdraw with no

academic penalty and still receive a refund.
(2) The second is usually 11 weeks, plus or
minus, into the semester when a student can
still withdraw with no academic penalty but does
not receive a refund.
(3) The third is after the semester ends and
grades are received, and tuition must be paid
for the next semester.
b. Generally, attrition during the first year of
college is higher than in subsequent years, and
occurs especially at the mid-term grading period, at the end of the first semester, and again
at the end of the second semester. Students
drop out during this time because they are homesick, have to work, are out of money, or are in
academic difficulty.
10-7. Lessons
To summarize this section there are five lessons that apply to postsecondary recruiting.
a. Visit the campus and pick up the college
catalog that contains information about the academic calendar for the SY, profile of the school,
and major programs of study.
b. Visit and introduce yourself to four key
administrators: Registrar, financial aid officer,
job placement officer or career counselor, and
veterans affair officer. USAR recruiters should
also leave a copy of the USAR Job Vacancy
Report at the job placement office.
c. Focus on the freshman class because
they will have the highest dropout rate. They
often lack both the direction and funds to fully
pursue their education.
d. Review the catalog and focus on the times
when students are most likely to consider leaving school. (Review para 10-6, stop-out cycle.)
e. Coordinate with school officials on a time
(monthly) and place (student center) to set up
an information table. You may not talk to many
students initially, so dont get discouraged, but
as the semester progresses more students will
talk with you about their future and what the
Army has to offer.
Chapter 11
Release of Student Recruiting Information
11-1. Solomon Amendment
Establishes a policy whereby the military services are provided the same opportunities to
inform postsecondary students of military career options as are available to other
employers. The policy also identifies the actions that can be taken against any institution
that has a policy of denying or effectively prevents for the purposes of military recruiting entry to campuses, access to students on campus, or access to student recruiting information
(lists).
a. Postsecondary institutions can be denied
access to certain Federal funds for preventing
military recruiting on campus.
b. DOD will determine if the postsecondary
institution has a policy or practice that either
prohibits or in effect prevents:

UPDATE USAREC Pam 350-13

(1) Entry to campus or access to students

(who are 17 years of age or older) on campuses for the purpose of military recruiting; or
(2) Access to student recruiting information
(lists) pertaining to students (who are 17 years
of age or older). Student recruiting information
is defined as: Name, address (local or permanent), telephone number, age (or year of birth),
level of education (e.g., freshman, sophomore),
or degree awarded for recent graduate, academic major, and degrees received. Postsecondary institutions need not provide other
information. Though the colleges are not required to sort this information, most have the
capability to do so and are willing to sort this
information upon request. They can also charge
a reasonable fee for providing this information.
c. There is a sample letter (see USAREC
Reg 601-104, fig E-1) commanders and recruiters can use when requesting student recruiting
information. Requests for this information should
be made once every semester or term.
d. Provided are the procedures if a
postsecondary institution fails to comply with
the Amendment.
(1) Recruiters will report any noncompliance
and provide any documentation to the Rctg Bn
ESS.
(2) Rctg Bns will identify the problem and attempt to devise an acceptable solution.
(3) A memorandum with appropriate documentation will be submitted through channels to
the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, Education Division, for further followup and action.
11-2. Hutchinson Amendment
Establishes recruiter access to secondary
schools. Each local educational agency shall
provide to DOD, upon a request made for military purposes, the same access to secondary
school students and to directory information
concerning such students, as is provided generally to postsecondary education institutions
or to prospective employers of those students.
a. DOD in cooperation with the Secretary of
the military department concerned, will designate an officer (O-6) to visit a school that denies
a request for recruiting access. The designated
officer will seek to have the meeting within 120
days of the date of the denial of the request for
recruiting access.
b. If after the initial meeting and at the end of
120 days recruiting access is still denied the
Secretary of Defense will notify and request
assistance from the chief executive of the
State. The Secretary of Defense will also provide the Secretary of Education a copy of the
notification.
c. If after 1 year of the notification, access is
still denied the Secretary of Defense will report
the schools denial of recruiting access to:
(1) The specified congressional committee.
(2) Senators of the State in which the school
is located.
(3) The member of the House of Representatives who represents the school district.
d. The requirements of the Amendment do

not apply to private schools which maintain a

religious objection to service in the Armed
Forces.
NOTE: This amendment went into effect July
2002.
11-3. Reauthorization of the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 2001
a. Also known as the No Child Left Behind
Act of 2001.
b. Section 9528, Armed Forces Recruiter
Access to Student Directory Information, requires:
(1) Secondary schools to provide access to
students names, addresses, and telephone listings.
(2) Recruiters be provided the same access
to secondary school students as is provided to
postsecondary institutions and employers of
prospective students.
c. Only exceptions to this law are private
schools that can provide a verifiable historical
religious objection to military service.
d. Parents have the right to opt out by requesting that their students name, address, and
telephone listing not be released to the military
services.
(1) At the beginning of each SY, schools must
provide parents with the opportunity to opt out
having student directory information released
to the military.
(2) The military can be singled out, so parents can allow information to be released to postsecondary institutions and not to the military.
(3) Due to the right to opt out recruiters will
receive lists with less than 85 percent of the
names from some schools.

10

UPDATE USAREC Pam 350-13

Appendix A
References

Section IV
Referenced Forms

Section I
Required Publications

USAREC Form 446

High School Folder.

USAREC Reg 350-6

Recruiter Production Management System.
(Cited in para 2-6c.)

USAREC Form 1256

Postsecondary School Folder.

USAREC Reg 601-104

Postsecondary Schools Recruiting Program.
(Cited in para 11-1c.)

USMEPCOM Form 601-4-3-R-E

Student ASVAB Test Record.

Section II
Related Publications
AR 601-210
Regular Army and Army Reserve Enlistment
Program.
AR 601-222
Armed Services Military Personnel Accession
Testing Programs.
AR 621-5
Army Continuing Education System (ACES).
USAREC Reg 1-18
Management of Centers of Influence Events.
USAREC Reg 350-7
Recruiting Station Production Management System.
USAREC Reg 350-9
Recruiting Company Production Management
System.
USAREC Reg 350-10
Recruiting Battalion Production Management
System.
USAREC Reg 601-59
Department of Defense Student Testing Program.
USAREC Reg 601-81
Educator/Centers of Influence Tour Program.
USAREC Reg 601-95
Delayed Entry and Delayed Training Program.
USAREC Reg 601-101
Education Enlistment Credentials.
USAREC Reg 621-1
Montgomery GI Bill, Army College Fund, and
Loan Repayment Program.
USAREC Reg 621-2
Concurrent Admissions Program.
Section III
Prescribed Forms
This section contains no entries.

UPDATE USAREC Pam 350-13

11

Glossary

USAREC
United States Army Recruiting Command

ACF
Army College Fund
ARISS
Army Recruiting Information Support System
ASVAB
Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
CLT
company leadership team
COI
centers of influence
ConAP
Concurrent Admissions Program
DOD
Department of Defense
E/COI
educator/centers of influence
ESS
education services specialist
HS
high school
LRP
Loan Repayment Program
MGIB
Montgomery GI Bill
PMS
professor of military science
Rctg Bn
recruiting battalion
Rctg Co
recruiting company
ROTC
Reserve Officers Training Corps
RPI
recruiting publicity item
RS
recruiting station
SRP
School Recruiting Program
SY
school year
TA
tuition assistance
USAR
United States Army Reserve

12

UPDATE USAREC Pam 350-13

APPENDIX B

SAMPLE EMERGENCY FORM OPT-OUT LANGUAGE

Schools should include the following language in the mandatory emergency information form:

Release of Information to Military Recruiters:

Your childs name, phone number, and address WILL be released to the
armed forces, military recruiters, and military schools UNLESS you
specify below that you want to withhold this information.
Withholding information from the military DOES NOT affect
transmission of information to colleges or employers.
__ DO NOT release my childs contact information to military recruiters
without my prior written consent.
Name of Child

______________________________

Name of Parent

______________________________

Parents Signature:

______________________________

APPENDIX C

SAMPLE OPT-OUT LETTER FOR PARENTS

[DATE]
Dear administrator of [NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL]:
We are exercising our right under the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, and hereby request that
the name, address, and telephone listing of:
[PRINT NAME OF STUDENTS]
who is a current student at your school, NOT BE RELEASED to military recruiters.
Please note: withholding information from the military DOES NOT affect transmission of
information to colleges.

[PRINT NAME OF PARENT OR LEGAL GUARDIAN]

________________________
Print Name

[SIGNATURE OF PARENT OR GUARDIAN]

________________________
Signature

[SIGNATURE OF STUDENT]

________________________
Signature

APPENDIX D

VETERAN HEALTHCARE
FACT SHEET FOR STUDENTS AND SOLDIERS

1) Do not wait to be injured before you know your entitlement to benefits.

Military service is dangerous, and the process for receiving off-duty aid is long and full
of pit-falls. Knowing the militarys policy for healthcare coverage is necessary before you start
your service.

2) Keep meticulous medical records.

A Purple Heart is not adequate evidence of a military injury. In order to receive any
disability benefits, soldiers must prove that their injury was a result of military service. VA
doctors are warned not to believe soldiers accounts of their injuries, so come prepared. 287 The
last thing an injured soldier wants to do is have to worry about whether he or she will be covered.
Unfortunately, if a service-member does not keep a good account and records of the incident that
led to their injury, as well as their medical history from before military service, the VA may deny
his or her claim.

3) Submit claims immediately, and be prepared to wait.

Visit http://www.va.gov and download a 21-526 claim form. Know that you will have to
wait to receive assistance, and be ready for a possible denial. According to the VA, the average
amount of time it takes to process a claim is six months. 288 Critics argue that the six month
statistic is not accurate as it includes the processing of pension claims and classifies documenting
death as resolved claims. 289 If a claim is denied, the appeals process takes an average of 3.5
years. 290

4) Take advantage of a Benefits Delivery at Discharge (BDD) program.

Some military installations allow wounded soldiers to submit disability claims to the VA
before discharge. While this may not reduce your total wait time, filing a disability claim before
discharge means that you may need to wait less time after discharge to know if you are covered.

ENDNOTES
1

United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Senate and House Committees on Armed Services,
Military Recruiting: DOD Needs to Establish Objectives and Measures to Better Evaluate Advertisings
Effectiveness, GAO-03-1005, at 1 (Sept. 2003) [hereinafter GAO-03-1005 Military Recruiting].
2
GAO-03-1005 Military Recruiting, at 17 (Many factors impact recruiting . . . such as employment and educational
opportunities . . . . Enlisting in a military service is a profound life decision. Typically, an enlistment is at least a 4year commitment and can be the start of a long military career.)
3
DOD found that the publics perceptions about military enlistment has changed and that youth and their parents
believe that deployment to a hostile environment is very likely for some types of servicemembers. Officials also said
that fear of death and serious injury is an increasingly important factor affecting potential recruits decisions about
whether they will join. U.S. General Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, Military
Personnel: Reporting Additional Service member Demographics Could Enhance Congressional Oversight, GAO-05952, at 67 (Sept. 2005) [hereinafter GAO-05-952 Military Personnel]. See also GAO-03-1005 Military Recruiting,
at 8 (Some reserve officers expressed concerns about the negative impact of the recent high deployment rates on
future recruiting.)
4
GAO-03-1005 Military Recruiting, at 11 (noting the total advertising investment per enlisted recruit rose from
approximately $640 to $1,900 between fiscal year 1990 and fiscal year 2003.)
5
National Priorities Project, Military Recruiting 2007: Army Misses Benchmarks by Greater Margin,
http://www.nationalpriorities.org/militaryrecruiting2007.
6
Department of Defense, Budget FY 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2009/defense.html; Allen
McDuffee, Dollar-Driven Recruiting, The Nation, May 16, 2008,
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080602/mcduffee/print.
7
GAO-03-1005 Military Recruiting, at 15.
8
The GAO estimates that the Army spent $196.9 Million in 2003, a 73% increase from 1998 ($113.7 Million), the
Navy increased its spending by 41% from 1998 ($75.7 Million) to 2003 ($107 Million), the Air Force increased its
spending by 396% from 1998 ($18.3 Million) to 2003 ($90.5), and the Marine Corp increased its spending by 56%
from 1998 ($29.8 Million) to 2003 ($46.5 Million). GAO-03-1005 Military Recruiting, at 14.
9
Stuart Elliot, McCann Wins Armys Ad Account, Replacing Burnett, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/07/business/media/07cnd-army.html; Gary Sheftick, Army Selects New
Advertising Agency, Army News Service, Dec. 13, 2005, http://www4.army.mil/racing/read.php?story=8330.
10
http://www.mccann.com.
11
Stuart Elliot, McCann Wins Armys Ad Account, Replacing Burnett, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/07/business/media/07cnd-army.html; Press Release, June 22, 2005,
http://www.leoburnett.com/manstudy/PressRelease.htm.
12
Campbell Ewald Keeps Navy Recruiting Contract, N.Y. Times, at C11, Oct. 31, 2005.
13
National 2005 Agency Report Cards, Adweek, 24 (Apr. 3, 2006),
http://www.adweek.com/aw/images/pdfs/reportcards_2005.pdf.
14
Department of Defense Press Release, No. 089-06, February 2, 2006,
http://www.defenselink.mil/contracts/contract.aspx?contractid=3186.
15
Philip Dougherty, Company News; Britons New Bid Wins JWT, N.Y. Times, at Sec. 1, June 27, 1987.
16
Id.
17
Http://www.jwt.com.
18
Department of Defense Press Release, No. 1326-04, Dec. 29, 2004,
http://www.defenselink.mil/contracts/contract.aspx?contractid=2916; http://www.gsdm.com.
19
Id.
20
John Eighmey, Why Do Youth Enlist?: Identification of Underlying Themes, 32 Armed Forces & Society 307,
2006.
21
Id. The National Research Council found that the single factor that consistently predicted teenagers decisions to
join the military was their propensity to enlist, measured by how strongly they desired to join the military in their
senior year of high school. The National Research Councils Committee on the Youth Population and Military
Recruitment (Committee) makes recommendations to the DOD based upon the annual results of the YATS
studies.

22

National Academics Press, Letter Report on the Youth Attitude Tracking Study (YATS) 1, 2000,
http://fermat.nap.edu/books/NI000226/html.
23
The DOD carefully calibrates its message strategies based upon the propensity to enlist findings in its military
recruitment campaigns. John Eighmey, Why Do Youth Enlist?: Identification of Underlying Themes, 32 Armed
Forces & Society 309, 2006.
24
Amy Scott Tyson, Army Debuts New Slogan In Recruiting Commercials, Washington Post at A19, Nov. 22, 2006,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/21/AR2006112101295_pf.html.
25
Id. Indeed, the American death toll from the Iraq War surpassed the 3,000 milestone mark in January 2007.
Lizette Alvarez and Andrew Lehman, 3,000 Deaths in Iraq, Countless Tears at Home, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/01/us/01deaths.html.
26
For an overview of recruiter misrepresentations, see supra pp. 3-17.
27
Laura Cohen and Randi Mandelbaum, Kids Will Be Kids: Creating a Framework for Interviewing and
Counseling Adolescent Clients, 79 Temp. L. Rev. 357 at 364 (2006).
28
Id.
29
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Nina W. Chernoff and Marsha L. Levick, Beyond the Death Penalty:
Implications of Adolescent Development Research for the Prosecution, Defense, and Sanctioning of Youthful
Offenders, Clearinghouse Rev. J. Poverty L. & Pol., 209, 210, Jul.-Aug. 2005 (citing research about the
psychological developmental of the adolescent brain).
30
Act for Youth Upstate Center of Excellence, a collaboration of Cornell University, University of Rochester, and
the NYS Center for School Safety, Research Facts and Findings, Adolescent Brain Development, 1-3, May, 2002,
http://www.actforyouth.net/documents/may02factsheetadolbraindev.pdf.
31
Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In 1954, the Supreme Court recognized the severe psychological
consequences of negative racial stereotyping upon African American children in its landmark decision in Brown v.
Board of Ed., which overruled segregation in the public schools. Of particular interest to the Court were various
psychological studies, including the now famous doll studies of Kenneth Clark, which used black and white dolls to
demonstrate how African American children internalized racist messages society directed at them. Id. at 494, n. 11
(citing K. B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development (Midcentury White House
Conference on Children and Youth, 1950); Ludy T. Benjamin, Jr. and Ellen M. Crouse, The American
Psychological Associations Response to Brown v. Board of Education: The Case of Kenneth B. Clark, 57 (1) Am.
Psychologist, 38, 40, 2002.
32
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Nina W. Chernoff and Marsha L. Levick, Beyond the Death Penalty:
Implications of Adolescent Development Research for the Prosecution, Defense, and Sanctioning of Youthful
Offenders, Clearinghouse Rev. J. Poverty L. & Pol., 209, 209 at n.1 (Jul.-Aug. 2005)(discussing the Courts
reasoning in Roper leading to its conclusion that juveniles possessed diminished culpability and the growing
number of state laws restricting the rights of minors from participating in a wide and growing
array of adult activities.)
33
Nina W. Chernoff and Marsha L. Levick, Beyond the Death Penalty: Implications of Adolescent Development
Research for the Prosecution, Defense, and Sanctioning of Youthful Offenders, Clearinghouse Rev. J. Poverty L. &
Pol., 209, 209 (Jul.-Aug. 2005)(discussing the Courts reasoning in Roper leading to its conclusion that juveniles
possessed diminished culpability).
34
The 1984 National Minimum Drinking Age Act requires that States prohibit the purchase or public possession in
such State of any alcoholic beverage by a person who is less than twenty-one years of age. 23 U.S.C. 158.
35
Robert Davis, Is 16 too young to drive a car? USA Today, Mar. 3, 2005.

36

A study of factors related to adolescent smoking concluded that tobacco marketing may be a stronger current
influence in encouraging adolescents to initiate the smoking uptake process than exposure to peer or family smokers
or socio-demographic variables including perceived school performance. [J Nat'l Cancer Inst 1995; 87: 153845]
Robert J. Wellman, PhD, et al; The Extent to Which Tobacco Marketing and Tobacco Use in Films Contribute to
Children's Use of Tobacco: A Meta-analysis, 160 (12) Pediatric Adolesc. Med., 1285-1296 (2006) (Pro-tobacco
marketing and media stimulate tobacco use among youth. A ban on all tobacco promotions is warranted to protect
children.); Linda Titus-Ernstoff, PhD, MA, et al; Longitudinal Study of Viewing Smoking in Movies and Initiation
of Smoking by Children, 121 (1) Pediatrics, 15-21 (2008) (Our study, which is the first to enroll children in
elementary school and to update movie smoking exposure longitudinally, indicates that early exposure has as much
influence on smoking risk as does exposure nearer the outcome. Overall, movie smoking may be responsible for at
least one third of smoking initiation for children in this age group.)
37
Leslie B. Snyder, PhD et al; Effects of Alcohol Advertising Exposure on Drinking Among Youth, 160 Arch Pediatr.
Adolesc. Med. 18-24(2006); Alcohol and the Super Bowl, http://alcoholism.about.com/library/blsuper.htm. Alcohol
Advertising and Youth, The Marin Institute, http://www.marininstitute.org/Youth/alcohol_ads.htm (Alcohol
advertising appeared during all 15 of the top teen television shows in 2002. . . . A 1996 survey of children ages nine
to 11 found that children were more familiar with Budweisers television frogs than with Kelloggs Tony the Tiger,
the Mighty Morphin Power Rangers, or Smokey Bear.).
38
David Nakimura, Schools Hooked on Junk Foods, Washington Post, Feb 27, 2001, at A1.
39
Robert Davis, Is 16 too young to drive a car? USA Today, Mar. 3, 2005.
40
http://americasarmy.com.
41
http://americasarmy.com.
42
Michael Peck, Navy Video Game Targets Future Sailors, National Defense Magazine, Dec., 2005,
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2005/December/Pages/Navy_Video3058.aspx.
43
Damien Cave, For a General, A Tough Mission, Building the Army, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 2006.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
http://www.airforce.com.
49
Michael Peck, Navy Video Game Targets Future Sailors, National Defense Magazine, Dec., 2005,
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2005/December/Pages/Navy_Video3058.aspx.
50
Air Force Special Events, Air Force on the Road, Go One-on-One with a Raptor,
http://events.airforce.com/content.htm?nav1=community&nav1_community_hl=_f2&nav2=raptor&nav2_raptor_hl
=_f2&nav3=main&nav3_main_hl=_f2.
51
Air Force Special Events, Air Force on the Road, Air Force In Your Town,
http://events.airforce.com/content.htm?nav1=community&nav1_community_hl=_f2&nav2=raptor&nav2_raptor_hl
=_f2&nav3=main&nav3_main_hl=_f2.
52
Michael Peck, Navy Video Game Targets Future Sailors, National Defense Magazine, Dec., 2005,
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2005/December/Pages/Navy_Video3058.aspx.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
58
Charlie Savage, Military recruiters target schools strategically, The Boston Globe, November 29, 2004,
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2004/11/29/military_recruiters_pursue_target_schools_carefully/.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.

64

Charlie Savage, Military recruiters target schools strategically, The Boston Globe, November 29, 2004,
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2004/11/29/military_recruiters_pursue_target_schools_carefully/.
65
United States Army Recruiting Command, School Recruiting Program Handbook, USAREC Pamphlet 350-12,
Sept., 2004 [hereinafter SRP Handbook].
66
Id. at 2, 3.
67
Id. at 1.
68
Id. (emphasis added).
69
Id. at 3.
70
Id. at 2.
71
Id. at 1, 3.
72
Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
73
Id. at 5.
74
http://usscouts.org/advance/boyscout/bsrank1.asp.
75
Id. at 3.
76
Id. at 3.
77
United States Army Recruiting Command, School Recruiting Program Handbook, USAREC Pamphlet 350-12,
Sept., 2004, at 2
78
Id. at 2
79
United States Army Recruiting Command, School Recruiting Program Handbook, USAREC Pamphlet 350-12,
Sept., 2004, at 5.
80
Calendar of School Activities (Month-by-Month) Overview, Id. at 5-6.
81
Id. at 5.
82
All of these events take place during the academic school year and are not mentioned in the Calendar of School
Activities in the SRP.
83
United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Senate and House Committees on Armed Forces 7, 2003,
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031005.pdf .
84
Id.
85
United States Army Recruiting Command, School Recruiting Program Handbook, USAREC Pamphlet 350-12,
Sept. 2004, at 5.
86
Id. at 5-6.
87
Cynthia Kopkowski, Military Recruiting, Uncle Sam WantsYou? As military recruiters continue targeting
students, theyre increasingly trying to win the hearts and minds of educators, NEA Today, National Education
Association, April, 2007, http://www.nea.org/neatoday/0704/unclesam.html.
88
Id. (quoting military spokesman Lt. Scott Miller) (internal quotations omitted).
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, PUB. L. NO. 109 - 163, 199 Stat. 3136.
92
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, PUB. L. NO. 110 - 181, 122 Stat. 3252.
93
Id.
94
Id. 3252(e).
95
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000) (citing a long line of cases stretching back more than seventy-five
years that reaffirmed the constitutionally protected right of parents to control their childrens upbringing). The Court
noted that the Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause, and its Fifth Amendment counterpart, provide[]
heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests. These
fundamental rights include a constitutionally protected zone in which parents can direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control, without hindrance from the government. Id. at 65.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 66 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
98
See supra 25-29.
99
Often college and vocational recruiters offer presentations that are specifically shown to seniors, as opposed to the
scatter shot approach of the military recruiters, whose open and prominent displays are visible to all students. Chart
of High School Visitations.

100

For a recent example of control being extended to parents in the escalating battle for access to children in the
high-tech world of cyberspace, Brad Stone, MySpace to Let Parents Block Their Children From Joining, N.Y.
Times, (Jan. 14, 2008)(Representatives from MySpace and the attorneys general of 49 states are announcing a new
partnership to fight sexual predators and clean up social networks. Among the dozens of measures MySpace has
agreed to take, the social network will let parents submit the e-mail addresses of their children, so the company can
prevent anyone from using that address to set up a profile. It will also set the profiles of all 16 and 17-year-olds to
private, so only their established online friends can visit their pages - essentially creating a closed section for
users under age 18. ), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/14/myspace-to-let-parents-block-their-kids-fromjoining.
101
Johnathan Krim, Pentagon Creating Student Database, The Washington Post, , June 23, 2005 at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/06/22/AR2005062202305.html.
102
20 U.S.C. 7908 (2006).
103
[E]ach local educational agency receiving assistance under this Act shall provide, on request made by military
recruiters or an institution of higher education, access to secondary school students names, addresses, and telephone
listings. 20 U.S.C. 7908(a)(1) (2006).
104
20 U.S.C. 7908(a)(3) (2006). Same access to students. Each local educational agency receiving assistance
under this Act shall provide military recruiters the same access to secondary school students as is provided generally
to post secondary educational institutions or to prospective employers of those students. Id.
105
Bloomfield High School and North Plainfield.
106
Bloomfield High School.
107
20 U.S.C. 7908(a)(2) (2006). This provisions states:
A secondary school student or the parent of the student may request that the student's name, address, and
telephone listing described in paragraph (1) not be released without prior written parental consent, and the
local educational agency or private school shall notify parents of the option to make a request and shall
comply with any request.
108
20 U.S.C. 7908(a)(2) (2006).
109
20 U.S.C. 1232g (2006).
110
20 U.S.C. 1232g(b)(1) (2006). No funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any
educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of educational records . . .
.
111
20 U.S.C. 1232g(d) (2006). [W]henever a student has attained eighteen years of age, or is attending an
institution of postsecondary education, the permission or consent required of and the rights accorded to the parents
of the student shall thereafter only be required of and accorded to the student.
112
20 U.S.C. 1232g(a)(5)(B) (2006). This provision states:
Any educational agency or institution making public directory information shall give public notice of the
categories of information which it has designated as such information with respect to each student attending
the institution or agency and shall allow a reasonable period of time after such notice has been given for a
parent to inform the institution or agency that any or all of the information designated should not be
released without the parent's prior consent.
113
20 U.S.C. 1232g(b)(1) (2006).
114
20 USCS 1232g(e) (2006). No funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational
agency or institution unless such agency or institution effectively informs the parents of students, or the students, if
they are eighteen years of age or older, or are attending an institution of postsecondary education, of the rights
accorded them by this section.
115
34 CFR 99.7(a)(1). What must an educational agency or institution include in its annual notification?
116
Junior Reserve Officers Training Corps, 10 U.S.C. 2031-2033 (2006).
117
Id. at 2031(b)(1).
118
Id.
119
Id. at (b)(4).
120
Id. at (a)(2).
121
Id. at (b)(3).
122
Army JROTC Website, https://www.usarmyjrotc.com/; Air Force JROTC website,
http://www.afoats.af.mil/AFJROTC/AFJROTCunits.asp; Navy JROTC website,

https://www.njrotc.navy.mil/hostschools.cfm; Marine Corps JROTC website,

http://www.mcjrotc.org/units/MCJROTC%20Units.aspx.
123
Id.
124
10 U.S.C. 2031(c)(1)-(2).
125
Id. at (d)(1).
126
The military reimburses school boards the amount of each instructors pre-employment military pension, plus one
half of the difference between the instructors pension and the minimum pay the instructor would be entitled to if in
active military duty, based on rank and experience. Furthermore, the military may further subsidize the pay of
individual JROTC instructors if the secretary of the affiliated military branch determines that the institution is in an
educationally and economically deprived area and the Secretary determines that such action is in the national
interest. 10 U.S.C. 2031(c).
127
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year 2006 (Feb.
2005); MCJORTC Website, History of Marine Corps JROTC Program, http://www.mcjrotc.org/about/history.aspx.
128
e.g. Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers Global Report 2004 United States of America,
http://www.child-soldiers.org/regions/country?id=226 ([e]ffectively, the [JROTC] serves to boost recruitment to
the armed forces).
129
Col John W Corbett & Col Arthur T Coumbe (res), JROTC: Recent Trends and Developments, Military Review,
Vol. 81 Issue 1, (January-February 2001), 41.
130
Department of the Army, Headquarters, United States Army Cadet Command, Policy Memorandum 50-US Army
Recruiting Command (USAREC) Partnership Initiatives, March 30, 1999,
http://www.projectyano.org/pdf/JROTC_military_recruiting_memo.pdf. According to information received by the
author via email from Paul Kotakis, the Chief of the Public Affairs Division at the U.S. Army Cadet Command
Headquarters, the Cadet Command has discontinued the use of policy memorandums. Presently, Army Regulation
145-2 and Cadet Command Regulation 145-2 now provide guidance to our units on all aspects of Army Junior
ROTC operations. Upon investigation by the author, however, these regulations do not explicitly state the
purposes, other than the official statutory purposes of the JROTC in them and make no statement contradicting
policy memorandum 50. Otherwise the author could find no positive statement by the military overruling or
disavowing the memorandum.
131
Id.
132
Id. (emphasis added).
133
JROTC: Recent Trends and Developments, (citing Policy Memorandum 50 as authority).
134
Policy Memorandum 50.
135
United States Army Recruiting Command, School Recruiting Program Handbook, USAREC Pamphlet 350-13, at
8 (Sept. 2004).
136
http://www.mcjrotc.org/group.aspx.
137
Id.
138
Id. In fact, military after-school programs are now entering middle schools in some States. Currently, Illinois
(Chicago), Florida and Texas offer military-run after-school programs to sixth, seventh and eighth graders and in
Chicago the citys youngsters drill with wooden rifles and chant time-honored marching cadences (I used to date a
high school queen/Now I lug an M-16, etc.) Karen Houppert, Whos Next? The Nation, Sept. 12, 2005.
139
U.S. Census Bureau, State and County Quick Facts, Hidalgo County, Texas, 2008,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/48215.html.
140
http://www.schooldigger.com/go/TX/schools/1739001497/school.aspx.
141
School Lunch Programs, 10 U.S.C. 1751 (1989).
142
Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service, Child Nutrition ProgramsIncome Eligibility
Guidelines, Fed. Reg. Vol. 71, No. 50, 1336 (15 March, 2006).
143
According to the National Priorities Project, 90 of the 100 high schools which provided the military with the
most African-American and Hispanic recruits has a JROTC program. DHS JROTC program thus appears to be
indicative of a typical JROTC unit and host school. National Priorities Project, Military Recruitment Race and
Ethnicity, http://www.nationalpriorities.org/Publications/Military-Recruitment-Race-and-Ethnicity-2.html (statistics
compiled during 2004).
144
DHS JROTC website, http://www.esconett.org/dhs/mcjrotc/.

145

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET, at 8; Marine Corps JROTC website,

http://www.mcjrotc.org/units/MCJROTC%20Units.aspx (figure estimated by dividing total expenditure by total
number of Marine Corps JROTC units).
146
http://www.mcjrotc.org/about/donna.aspx.
147
MCJROTC website, http://www.mcjrotc.org/news/DonnaHSOrientation06.aspx.
148
The author spoke with representatives of Camp Pendleton in March and April of 2008. Personnel at the Camp
Pendleton Community Relations Office stated that numerous groups, including the Boy Scouts and JROTC units
from all military branches stay on the Camp for extended visits. The Office representative further stated that during
the school year visits are sparse but that during the summer break there is a group visiting Camp Pendleton almost
every week. The author also spoke with Ralph Ingles, the Deputy Director of the Marine Corps JROTC program
who stated that each JROTC unit is entitled to one orientation trip either annually or bi-annually. The specifics of
the trip, including payment and itinerary are largely up to the discretion of the JROTC instructor at each high school.
Instructors are given a budget of annual operational dollars by their respective military branch that can be used at
their discretion for expenses including: materials, equipment, transport, billeting, competitions, orientations and
other approved activities. The Deputy Director further stated that typically, trips are funded by a mix of operational
dollars and individual school fundraising like many other high school extra-curricular activities. The orientation
trips are made to military bases located in the same region as the visiting high school JROTC units and the itinerary
for each visit can consist of any approved activity, depending on local attractions and the amount of funding
available.
149
http://www.esconett.org/dhs/mcjrotc/markmanship06/index.htm
150
Official Website for Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, http://www.pendleton.usmc.mil/impact/population.asp.
151
Id.
152
http://www.pendleton.usmc.mil/impact/introduction.asp.
153
http://www.pendleton.usmc.mil/impact/summary.asp.
154
Marine Corps official JROTC Website, JROTC News, A Cadets Memories from a Trip to Camp Pendleton, CA,
http://www.mcjrotc.org/news/DonnaHSOrientation06.aspx (This report will refer to the youth as students rather
than cadets as it is important to bear in mind that these are children as young as 14).
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
http://www.mcjrotc.org/news/DonnaHSOrientation06.aspx.
158
Source given by Marine Corps official JROTC Website for its JROTC News story A Cadets Memories from a
Trip to Camp Pendleton, CA, http://www.esconett.org/dhs/mcjrotc/story/story.htm.
159
http://www.esconett.org/dhs/mcjrotc/story/story.htm.
160
http://www.mcjrotc.org/news/DonnaHSOrientation06.aspx.
161
San Diego Padres Official Website, Single Game Tickets,
http://sandiego.padres.mlb.com/ticketing/singlegame.jsp?c_id=sd (ticket price estimated using April 4th game, which
is Military Opening Night at Petco field); Universal Studios Hollywood Official Website, FAQ,
http://www.universalstudioshollywood.com/vi_faq.html#6.
162
Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Basic Pay Effective January 1, 2008,
http://www.dfas.mil/militarypay/militarypaytables/2008MilitaryPayCharts35.pdf.
163
http://www.esconett.org/dhs/mcjrotc/story/story.htm.
164
http://www.mcjrotc.org/news/DonnaHSOrientation06.aspx.
165
http://www.esconett.org/dhs/mcjrotc/story/story.htm.
166
http://www.esconett.org/dhs/mcjrotc/story/story.htm.
167
http://www.mcjrotc.org/news/DonnaHSOrientation06.aspx.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Dept. of the Navy Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Order P1200.16: Military
Occupational Specialties Manual, 18 Apr. 2005,
http://www.utexas.edu/rotc/navymarine/content/midshipmen_access/PDF/leathernecks/MOS_manual.pdf.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
http://www.esconett.org/dhs/mcjrotc/story/story.htm.

175

http://www.mcjrotc.org/news/DonnaHSOrientation06.aspx (Cadets were flattered and so were MGySgt Castro

and MSgt Rodriguez when the Sgt Major complemented the cadets as the best that he had seen.)
176
Id.
177
Policy Memorandum 50.
178
http://www.mcjrotc.org/news/DonnaHSOrientation06.aspx (emphasis added).
179
Foderaro, Lisa, Report Faults Mental Care for Iraq Veterans at Upstate Base, N.Y. Times, February 13, 2008.
180
Iraq War Still Unpopular Even As U.S. Deaths Plummet, CNN, July 31, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/07/31/bush.iraq/index.html.
181
Robert Burns, Army Extends Iraq Tours to 15 Months, San Francisco Chronicle, April 12, 2007,
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2007/04/11/national/w144905D46.DTL&type=politics.
182
Fred Kaplan, The Armys Math Problem, Slate, May 5, 2008, http://www.slate.com/id/2190661/.
183
Robert Burns, Army Extends Iraq Tours to 15 Months, San Francisco Chronicle, April 12, 2007,
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2007/04/11/national/w144905D46.DTL&type=politics.
184
Robert Burns, Army Extends Iraq Tours to 15 Months, San Francisco Chronicle, April 12, 2007,
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2007/04/11/national/w144905D46.DTL&type=politics.
185
Christian Lowe, Dwell Time Could be Cut for Surge, Military.com, March 29, 2007,
http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,130497,00.html.
186
Center for American Progress, Veterans Health Care by the Numbers, November 9, 2007.
187
Associated Press, True Cost of War Staggering Number of Wounded Vets, March 08, 2008.
188
Denverpost.com, Hidden Wounds Plague GIs, http://www.denverpost.com/ci_5675337, April 16, 2007.
189
US Department of Veterans Affairs National Center for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Fact Sheet- An
Overview of the Mental Health Effects of Serving in Afghanistan and Iraq,
http://www.ncptsd.va.gov/ncmain/ncdocs/fact_shts/overview_mental_health_effects.html?opm=1&rr=rr1773&srt=d
&echorr=true.
190
US Department of Veterans Affairs - National Center for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Fact Sheet: How
Common is PTSD?, http://www.ncptsd.va.gov/ncmain/ncdocs/fact_shts/fs_how_common_is_ptsd.html, September
8, 2008.
191
The Associate Press, 1 in 8 Returning Soldiers suffers from PTSD But Less Than Half with Problems Seek
Help, Report Finds, June 30, 2004.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
In the initial post-deployment assessment, Interpersonal conflict [was] measured with 1 question ... that asks if
the soldier is having thoughts or concerns that you may have serious conflicts with your spouse, family members, or
close friends. In post-deployment reassessment, the wording of this question is, Since return from deployment
have you had serious conflicts with your spouse, family members, close friends, or at work that continue to cause
you worry or concern?" Milliken, Charles S., Auchterlonie, Jennifer L., Hoge, Charles W., Longitudinal Assessment
of Mental Health Problems Among Active and Reserve Component Soldiers Returning From the Iraq War, The
Journal of the American Medical Association, November 14, 2007, Vol. 298, No. 18:2141-2148.
195
Related to the rise in problems with interpersonal conflict among soldiers is the divorce rate among veterans of
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the Army, divorce rates rose from 2.9% in 2003, when the Iraq War began, to
3.9% in 2004. In 2007, the rate was 3.5%. Female soldiers have a much higher divorce rate of 9%. Kaufman, Leslie,
After War, Love Can Be a Battlefield, N.Y. Times, April 6, 2008.
196
Moon, Mary Ann, Returning Vets Mental Health Worsens Over Time, Clinical Psychiatry News, December 1,
2007.
197
Kors, Joshua, How the VA Abandons Our Vets, The Nation, August 27, 2008,
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080915/kors.
198
Susan Walsh, Most Vet Suicides Among Guard, Reserve Troops, MSNBC, Feb. 12, 2008,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23132421.
199
Id.
200
Sgt. 1st Class Erick Studenicka, Suicide Seen as major Threat to National Guard Soldiers, National Guard
Bureau, http://www.ngb.army.mil/news/archives/2007/08/082007-Suicide_NG.aspx.
201
Shaprio, Joseph, Guard Suicide Highlights Risks for Returning Troops, National Public Radio,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4668346.

202

Susan Walsh, Most Vet Suicides Among Guard, Reserve Troops, MSNBC, Feb. 12, 2008,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23132421.
203
Id.
204
Memorandum from Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin on Direct Combat Assignment and Definition Rule to the
Secretaries of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Personnel and Readiness) and Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), Jan. 13, 1994,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG590-1.sum.pdf (Direct ground combat is defined as
engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew serviced weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire
and to a high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile forces personnel and takes place well forward
on the battlefield while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, maneuver or shock effect.).
205
The RAND Corporation, Assessing the Assignment Policy for Army Women, prepared for the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (RAND Corp.) (2007) (Report finding that although how women are currently assigned to
units in the military meets the letter of the militarys vague assignment policies, the assignments may involve
activities or interactions that framers of the policy sought to rule out i.e. exposure to active combat.)
206
Id.
207
All Things Considered: Women in Combat: Roles for Women in U.S. Army Expand (NPR radio broadcast, Oct. 1,
2007) http://www.npr.org.
208
Sara Corbett, The Womens War, N.Y. Times, March 18, 2007, available online:
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/18/magazine/18cover.html?partner=permalink&exprod=permalink
209
CRS Report for Congress, United States Military Casualty Statistics: Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation
Enduring Freedom (March 18, 2008). For an updated account of total casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan, see
Department of Defense, casualty updates, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/casualty.pdf.
210
Id. figure represents 2.5% of the 31,289 total injuries reported as of March 17, 2008; For a report on women
injured in Iraq, Dave Moniz, Female amputees make clear that all troops are on front lines, USA Today, Apr. 28,
2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-04-28-female-amputees-combat_x.htm.
211
US Department of Veterans Affairs National Center for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Fact Sheet- An
Overview of the Mental Health Effects of Serving in Afghanistan and Iraq,
http://www.ncptsd.va.gov/ncmain/ncdocs/fact_shts/overview_mental_health_effects.html?opm=1&rr=rr1773&srt=d
&echorr=true.
212
Sara Corbett, The Womens War, N.Y. Times, March 18, 2007.
213
World Health Organization, World Report on Violence and Health, 150-151, World Health Organization, Geneva
(2002).
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Sara Corbett, The Womens War, N.Y. Times, March 18, 2007.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
10 U.S.C. 892 (2008).
220
Sara Corbett, The Womens War, N.Y. Times, March 18, 2007.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Dana Priest and Anne Hull, Soldiers Face Neglect, Frustration at Armys Top Medical Facility, The Washington
Post, February 18, 2007.
224
Id.
225
Id.
226
Id.
227
Charles Sennott, Told to Wait, A Marine Dies VA Care in Spotlight After Iraq War Veterans Suicide, The
Boston Globe, February 11, 2007.
228
Daniel Zwerdling, Soldiers Say Army Ignores, Punishes Mental Anguish, National Public Radio,
http://www.npr.org, Last accessed January 16, 2008.
229
Associated Press, True Cost of War Staggering Number of Wounded Vets, March 08, 2008.
230
Kimberly Dozier, Reporters Notebook: The War Over PTSD, CBS News, December 20, 2007,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories, January 16, 2008.
231
Id.

232

Joshua Kors, How Specialist Town Lost His Benefits, The Nation, April 9, 2007.
Id.
234
Id.
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
Id.
241
Id.
242
Since our report is directed to high school students, teachers and parents, we chose to focus our analysis on nonenlistment educational finance options for high school and college students. Enlistment incentives available to
college graduates, such as student loan repayment programs, and education financing available to military personnel
are not listed. Although we have made an effort to find all of the New Jersey-sponsored and military-sponsored
educational finance options available for high school and college students, we do not claim that this list is
exhaustive.
243
For more information see the NJ Stars website at http://www.njstars.net/.
244
Id.
245
For more information see the equal opportunity fund website at http://www.state.nj.us/highereducation/EOF/.
246
The EOF Program also administers the Martin Luther King Physician-Dentist Scholarship for students pursuing
degrees in medicine or dentistry at the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey and the C. Clyde
Ferguson Law Scholarship for students pursuing graduate studies in law at Rutgers, the State University or Seton
Hall University
247
For more information, see the New Jersey Higher Education Student Assistance Authority website at
http://www.hesaa.org/index.php?page=nj-grants-scholarships.
248
The Outstanding Scholar Recruitment Program, Oct., 2004,
http://www.state.nj.us/highereducation/outstandingscholarsfinal.pdf.
249
Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act, H.R. 2462, Chapter V, 3301(bb)(d).
250
Id. 3311(b).
251
Id. 3301(bb)(d).
252
Id. Increase in Basic Educational Assistance Under the Montgomery GI Bill, (a). This increase immediately
makes the maximum benefits under the Montgomery GI Bill $1,321 and the amendment to the wording of the Bill
contains a provision that increases funding at the beginning of every fiscal year by the average increase in national
undergraduate tuition.
253
Id. 3311(b)(1).
254
Id. 3311(c).
255
Id. 3311(b)(1)(A).
256
Id. 3311(b)(1)(B).
257
Id. 3313(c)(1)(A). According to the website maintained by the department of veterans affairs, [a]pproved
training under the Post-9/11 GI Bill includes graduate and undergraduate degrees, and vocational/technical training.
All training programs must be offered by an IHL and approved for GI Bill benefits. United States Department of
Veterans Affairs website, Questions & Answers,
https://www.gibill2.va.gov/vba/vba.cfg/php.exe/enduser/std_adp.php?p_faqid=939&p_sid=Zzxt_cej&p_lva=927&p
_accessibility=0&p_redirect=&p_sp=cF9zcmNoPSZwX3NvcnRfYnk9JnBfZ3JpZHNvcnQ9JnBfcm93X2NudD0xN
zMsMTczJnBfcHJvZHM9JnBfY2F0cz0mcF9wdj0mcF9jdj0mcF9zZWFyY2hfdHlwZT1hbnN3ZXJzLnNlYXJjaF9
ubCZwX3BhZ2U9MQ**&p_li=.
258
Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act, H.R. 2462, Chapter V, 3313(c)(1)(B)(i).
259
Id. 3313(c)(1)(B)(ii).
260
Id. 3318.
261
Id. 3314.
262
Id. 3315.
263
The United States Department of Veterans Affairs website, Questions & Answers,
https://www.gibill2.va.gov/vba/vba.cfg/php.exe/enduser/std_adp.php?p_faqid=932&p_sid=Zzxt_cej&p_lva=927&p
_accessibility=0&p_redirect=&p_sp=cF9zcmNoPSZwX3NvcnRfYnk9JnBfZ3JpZHNvcnQ9JnBfcm93X2NudD0xN
233

zMsMTczJnBfcHJvZHM9JnBfY2F0cz0mcF9wdj0mcF9jdj0mcF9zZWFyY2hfdHlwZT1hbnN3ZXJzLnNlYXJjaF9
ubCZwX3BhZ2U9MQ**&p_li= (accessed September 18, 2008). This program does not apply to active-duty
personnel.
264
Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act, H.R. 2462, Chapter V, 3311(b)(1)(B).
265
Id. 3311(b)(1)(A).
266
Id. 3311(b)(2)-(8).
267
Id. 3319.
268
Id. 3319(a).
269
Department of Veterans Affairs, The Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008, S22 Fact Sheet,
July 3, 2008, http://www.gibill.va.gov/S22/S22%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf.
270
Id. 3321(a).
271
The Post-9/11 VEAA does address this issue somewhat, however, stating that discharges due to disabilities not
classified as service-connected do not affect general entitlement under the act. However, a veteran who is
discharged due to a differently classified disability (other than one willfully self inflicted) is only entitled to the
amount of educational assistance predicated on length of service and not the maximum entitlement automatically
afforded to any veteran who suffers a service-related disability. Id. 3311(c)(4).
272
U.S. Army official website, Army ROTC: Scholarships, http://www.goarmy.com/rotc/scholarships.jsp.
273
Id.
274
Id.;
275
U.S. Navy, NROTC, NROTC Scholarship Opportunities and Application,
https://www.nrotc.navy.mil/scholarships_application.cfm.
276
U.S. Air Force ROTC, Scholarship Types, http://www.afrotc.com/scholarships/hsschol/types.php.
277
U.S. Navy, NROTC, NROTC Scholarship Opportunities and Application,
https://www.nrotc.navy.mil/scholarships_application.cfm.
278
U.S. Army official website, Army ROTC: High School Students
http://www.goarmy.com/rotc/high_school_students.jsp; U.S. Navy, NROTC, General Eligibility Requirements,
https://www.nrotc.navy.mil/eligibility.cfm#eligibility; U.S. Air Force ROTC, General Requirements,
http://www.afrotc.com/admissions/genReq.php.
279
U.S. Army official website, Army ROTC: High School Students
http://www.goarmy.com/rotc/high_school_students.jsp.
280
U.S. Navy, NROTC, General Eligibility Requirements, https://www.nrotc.navy.mil/eligibility.cfm#eligibility.
281
U.S. Air Force ROTC, General Requirements, http://www.afrotc.com/admissions/genReq.php.
282
U.S. Navy, NROTC, General Eligibility Requirements, https://www.nrotc.navy.mil/eligibility.cfm#eligibility.
283
Telephone interviews with anonymous military recruiters from the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines and Coast
Guard, April 12, 2008.
284
Id.
285
U.S. Navy official website, Earn Money for College, http://www.navy.com/benefits/education/earnmoney/.
286
U.S. Air Force official website, http://www.afrotc.com/scholarships/incolschol/incolProgram.php.
287
Joshua Kors, How the VA Abandons Our Vets, The Nation, September 15, 2008, 18.
288
Frequently Asked Questions: How long will it take to receive a decision on my compensation claim?, United
States Department of Veterans Affairs, May 5, 2006,
https://iris.va.gov/scripts/iris.cfg/php.exe/enduser/std_adp.php?p_sid=hPiB*Hdj&p_lva=&p_faqid=931&p_created=
1147125625&p_sp=cF9zcmNoPSZwX2dyaWRzb3J0PSZwX3Jvd19jbnQ9MzM1JnBfcGFnZT0x&p_li=; Joshua
Kors, How the VA Abandons Our Vets, The Nation, September 15, 2008, 18.
289
Joshua Kors, How the VA Abandons Our Vets, The Nation, September 15, 2008, 18.
290
Id.

RECRUITMENT , SELECTION
AND RETENTION STRATEGIES

Finding the Right Person, for the

Right Job, at the Right Time and
keeping them!
Ms. Jenifer David

Our organizations are all uniquely

different but the overall mission to
have the best and the brightest
within is a common goal

The recruitment, selection and

retention process must be driven by
clear policies, accountability, shared
responsibility but most importantly
by professionals who have the
capacity to deliver..

STRATEGIES
RECRUITMENT, SELECTION &
RETENTION

An assessment of where we are right now,

where we want to go and the gap between the
two. Using HR innovation to come up with
strategies to alleviate challenges and reduce
the likelihood of potential challenges. Finding
quick fixes do not work.

CHALLENGES & SOLUTIONS IN THE BVI

Scarcity/shortage of
applicants for specialized
vacancies (court reporting,
environmental health
specialists, engineers)

Create partnerships and

linkages with the private
sector and institutions of
higher learning.

Surplus/abundance of
applicants with the same
specialties

Partnerships we have
established and continue
to expand upon with the
private sector ad statutory
bodies.

CHALLENGES & SOLUTIONS IN THE BVI

Image of the Public Sector

not comparable to the
Private Sector

Aggressive marketing
strategy to rebrand the
Public Service as the
Employer of Choice.

Inability to pay
competitive salaries due to
budgetary constraints.

We offer competitive
benefits, career
development & training,
health & life insurance,
pension benefits.

CHALLENGES & SOLUTIONS IN THE BVI

Lack of technological
processes to maintain
demand for recruitment
and selection.

Acquisition of an HRIS
database system that
manages employment,
training, succession
planning, leave and other
integral hr functions

Lack of definitive policies

Creation of employee
handbook and an HR
Policies and Procedural
Manual.

SUCCESSFUL TECHNIQUES
9 Targeted Recruitment

utilizing associations,
universities, professional
bodies
9 Utilization of
Assessment Centers
psychometric testing
9 Utilization of
Technologywebsites to
target larger audience

SUCCESSFUL TECHNIQUES
9 Direct head hunting

targeting specific
professionals to fill a
specific need
9 Head hunting at High
Schools and College to
attract potential candidates
9 Utilization of
Testing/Examinations
9 Offering incentives
bonuses, special packages

SUCCESSFUL TECHNIQUES
9 Ranking according to

job related
requirements
9 Developing and
utilizing competencies
to select candidates
9 Utilization of Internet
and other technology

INTERNET AND OTHER

TECHNOLOGY!
While most organizations are utilizing some form
of technology to enhance their recruitment and
selection process, amongst the many successes, is
the caution of knowing which strategy is best for
each organization.

RECRUITMENT & RETENTION

A National survey/study of the changing
workplace (SHRM) asked employees
what they considered to be very
important in their decision to take an
employment offer.

Balance
2) Meaningful Work
3) Open Communication
1)

BALANCE
y Balance may well become the most sought

after employer benefit for the twentyfirst

century. According to a Coopers & Lybrand
survey, Generation Xers arent as impressed
with money as with a balanced lifestyle
the top priority it has identified in young
job seekers. (Quality of Life)

y Gen Xers/Baby Bust

= 1967 1979
y Baby Boom Echo = 1980 1995 (large group)

MEANINGFUL WORK Making A

Difference, Not Just a Living
y Were all desperate to belong to something

larger than ourselves. So soulful work is

where you feel you belong, states David
Whyte, author of The Heart Aroused: Poetry
and the Preservation of the Soul in
Corporate America. Having work with
meaningto make a difference in the work
that we dois of paramount importance to
employees today.

OPEN COMMUNICATION
y Scott Adams, author of The Dilbert Principle, offers

this reminder of how management chooses not to

listen to its employees, and the impact it has on
employee morale: heres one that happened at a
company I worked forPresident of the company
ignores suggestions by employees on how to improve
their same suggestions are presented to the
President by a Consultant, who says they are good
ideas and implements them. Quite irritating

y Practice management by wandering around (MBWA).

Managers need to follow the excellence principle of

getting out amongst employees to discuss important
daytoday issues. Consider asking such questions as,
what can we do to create a better experience for
you?

RECRUITMENT, SELECTION &

RETENTION PROCESS. HOW IS IT
DONE?
While different organizations use varying
approaches, the process must be transparent,
effective, ensure accountability, well
documented, and promote shared
responsibility

RECRUITMENT STRATEGIES
Recruitment & Retention Task Force
y Obtain current employees ideas of what attracted

them to the organization & what makes them stay

y What do they think would attract their colleagues
to come to the organization
y Package & Market the organization (branding)
y Strategize & weight the positive aspects of the
organization
y Include employees (end users) on task force
y Make an institutional plan (prepared document)
y Develop a solid Recruitment Policy/Guide

STRATEGIC ADVERTISING
y Career Fairs
y Monster Board
y Contacts by people of
y
y

y
y

influence
Local & National papers,
Professional Journals
Academic Papers
(Chronicle of Higher
Ed.)
Networks
Cluster Hiring

TRAIN SELECTION COMMITTEE

MEMBERS
y Entrance Interviews
y What attracted you?

y Exit Interviews
y Why are you leaving

the organization? (the

answers can assist a
recruitment task force
& the organization in
developing strategies
for retention and
recruitment.)

RESPONSIBLERESPONSIVE H.R.
POLICES & PROGRAMS
y We need policies that enable rather than

restrict individuals
y Flexibility is key
y Total compensation, working conditions, work
life balance, flexible work arrangements,
personal and career development opportunities
(including grow your own or promote from
within.)
y Flex benefits (one size does not fit all)
y Different pension options

RESPONSIBLERESPONSIVE H.R.
POLICES & PROGRAMS

Building partnerships with businesses

Opportunities for external compensation
Consulting
Cross-appointments
Mentoring
Demonstration of appreciation for service

LABOUR SHORTAGES & SURPLUSES

What is the answer?
y Labor Shortage

1. Utilization of
recruitment strategies
to attract
2. Developing
specialized training
programs to fill gap

LABOR SHORTAGES AND SURPLUSES

What is the answer?
y Labor Surplus

1. Redistribution of skills
2. Reskilling
3. Reduction in hiring
practices
4. Revision of
Employment/Succession
policies.

CONCLUSION/OVERARCHING ISSUES
Recruitment, Selection & Retention!

y Human Resources Management is a discipline

and must be practiced according to standards

and best practices
y Every Manager is an HRManagerwhether

formally trained or not, the responsibility

should be innate and be viewed equally or even
more than other disciplines within the
organization.

CONCLUSION/OVERARCHING ISSUES
Recruitment, Selection & Retention!
y Recruitment, Selection and Retention is critical

to effective HR Managementbut it must be

practiced within the context of other HR subjects
Training and Development, Succession
Planning, Workforce Planning and Strategic HR
Planning.

CONCLUSION/OVERARCHING ISSUES
Recruitment, Selection & Retention!

y Our organizations are all uniquely different but

the overall mission to have the best and the

brightest within is a common goalthe Right
Person, for the Right Job, at the Right Time and
KEEPING Them!

RECRUITMENT STRATEGIES
MANAGING/EFFECTING THE RECRUITMENT PROCESS
By Margaret A. Richardson

ABSTRACT
Recruitment, as a human resource management function, is one of the activities that
impact most critically on the performance of an organisation. While it is understood and
accepted that poor recruitment decisions continue to affect organisational performance
and limit goal achievement, it is taking a long time for public service agencies in many
jurisdictions to identify and implement new, effective hiring strategies. In some areas,
existing laws inhibit change; in others, the inhibiting factor is managerial inertia.

This paper discusses some of the strategies that organisations can and do employ to
ensure the existence of the best possible pool of qualified applicants from which they can
fill vacancies as and when required. It will identify the advantages of each of the
strategies, highlight the drawbacks of its use and offer suggestions for ensuring its utility.

2
INTRODUCTION
Acquiring and retaining high-quality talent is critical to an organisations success. As the
job market becomes increasingly competitive and the available skills grow more diverse,
recruiters need to be more selective in their choices, since poor recruiting decisions can
produce long-term negative effects, among them high training and development costs to
minimise the incidence of poor performance and high turnover which, in turn, impact
staff morale, the production of high quality goods and services and the retention of
organisational memory. At worst, the organisation can fail to achieve its objectives
thereby losing its competitive edge and its share of the market.

Traditionally, Public Service organisations have had little need to worry about market
share and increasing competition since they operate in a monopolistic environment. But
in recent time, the emphasis on New Public Management/ Public Sector Management
approaches has forced public organisations to pay closer attention to their service
delivery as consumers have begun to expect and demand more for their tax dollars. No
longer are citizens content to grumble about poorly-produced goods and services and the
under-qualified, untrained employees who provide them. As societies become more
critical and litigious, public service organisations must seek all possible avenues for
improving their output and providing the satisfaction their clients require and deserve.
The provision of high-quality goods and services begins with the recruitment process.

Recruitment is described as the set of activities and processes used to legally obtain a
sufficient number of qualified people at the right place and time so that the people and the

3
organisation can select each other in their own best short and long term interests.1 In
other words, the recruitment process provides the organisation with a pool of potentially
qualified job candidates from which judicious selection can be made to fill vacancies.
Successful recruitment begins with proper employment planning and forecasting. In this
phase of the staffing process, an organisation formulates plans to fill or eliminate future
job openings based on an analysis of future needs, the talent available within and outside
of the organisation, and the current and anticipated resources that can be expended to
attract and retain such talent.

Also related to the success of a recruitment process are the strategies an organisation is
prepared to employ in order to identify and select the best candidates for its developing
pool of human resources. Organisations seeking recruits for base-level entry positions
often require minimum qualifications and experience. These applicants are usually recent
high school or university/ technical college graduates many of whom have not yet made
clear decisions about future careers or are contemplating engaging in advanced academic
activity. At the middle levels, senior administrative, technical and junior executive
positions are often filled internally.

The push for scarce, high-quality talent, often

recruited from external sources, has usually been at the senior executive levels. Most
organisations utilise both mechanisms to effect recruitment to all levels.
THE RECRUITMENT PROCESS
Successful recruitment involves the several processes of:
1. development of a policy on recruitment and retention and the systems that give
life to the policy;
1

Schuler, Randall S.: Personnel and Human Resource Management, Third Edition. 1987.

2. needs assessment to determine the current and future human resource

requirements of the organisation. If the activity is to be effective, the human
resource requirements for each job category and functional division/unit of the
organisation must be assessed and a priority assigned;

3. identification, within and outside the organisation, of the potential human

resource pool and the likely competition for the knowledge and skills resident
within it;

4. job analysis and job evaluation to identify the individual aspects of each job and
calculate its relative worth;

5. assessment of qualifications profiles, drawn from job descriptions that identify

responsibilities and required skills, abilities, knowledge and experience;

6. determination of the organisations ability to pay salaries and benefits within a

defined period;
7. identification and documentation of the actual process of recruitment and
selection to ensure equity and adherence to equal opportunity and other laws.

Documenting the organisations policy on recruitment, the criteria to be utilised, and all
the steps in the recruiting process is as necessary in the seemingly informal setting of in-

5
house selection as it is when selection is made from external sources. Documentation
satisfies the requirement of procedural transparency and leaves a trail that can easily be
followed for audit and other purposes. Of special importance is documentation that is in
conformity with Freedom of Information legislation (where such legislation exists), such
as:

criteria and procedures for the initial screening of applicants;

criteria for generating long and short lists;

criteria and procedures for the selection of interview panels;

interview questions;

interview scores and panellists comments;

results of tests (where administered);

results of reference checks.

Recruitment strategies and processes

Recruitment may be conducted internally through the promotion and transfer of existing
personnel or through referrals, by current staff members, of friends and family members.
Where internal recruitment is the chosen method of filling vacancies, job openings can be
advertised by job posting, that is, a strategy of placing notices on manual and electronic
bulletin boards, in company newsletters and through office memoranda. Referrals are
usually word-of-mouth advertisements that are a low-cost-per-hire way of recruiting.

Internal recruitment does not always produce the number or quality of personnel needed;
in such an instance, the organisation needs to recruit from external sources, either by

6
encouraging walk-in applicants; advertising vacancies in newspapers, magazines and
journals, and the visual and/or audio media; using employment agencies to head hunt;
advertising on-line via the Internet; or through job fairs and the use of college
recruitment.

Public service agencies enjoy greater exposure to scrutiny than most private sector
organisations; therefore, openness and transparency in recruitment and selection practices
are crucial. The discussion that follows will identify some of the options available for
attracting applicants to the public service job market and discuss strategies for managing
the process.

POSTING VACANCIES
As indicated earlier, job posting refers to the practice of publicising an open job to
employees (often by literally posting it on bulletin boards) and listing its attributes, such
as criteria of knowledge, qualification, skill and experience.2 The purpose of posting
vacancies is to bring to the attention of all interested persons (inside or out of the
organisation) the jobs that are to be filled.

Before posting a vacancy, management needs to decide whether:

it intends to retain the job in its present form and with its present title,
remuneration and status;

selected attributes of the job, for example, skill or experience, will change;

Dessler, Gary: Human Resource Management, Eighth Edition. New Jersey, USA, 2000.

there are sufficient qualified, potential applicants serving in other positions within
the organisation who may be potential candidates for that job;

the existing organisational policy on recruitment is still applicable (for example,

whether referrals, by staff members, of friends and family are still an acceptable
way of filling vacancies);

the organisations stands to benefit more, in the long-term, from recruiting

applicants from external sources.

Also necessary is the availability of a functional human resource information system that
supports recruitment. An effective, [ideally] computerised system3 would:

flag imminent vacancies throughout the organisation to ensure that the

recruitment process is timely;

ensure that no candidates are lost but, instead, move through the process and are
kept informed of their status;

ensure that good candidates whose applications are pending are kept in touch to
maintain their interest in the organisation;

assist in analysing hiring, transfer and exit trends and provide other data that are
helpful in planning, evaluating and auditing the recruitment process;

identify any adverse impacts of the recruitment process on vulnerable groups (for
example minorities, especially where Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action
legislation exists);4

In a small organisation, a manual information system would provide most of the benefits that the
organisation needs for an effective recruitment process. However, in a medium-sized or large
organisation, where speed is critical for decision-making, the speedy processing that determines
the effectiveness of the HR Department can only be found in a computerised system.

for internal recruiting, control the internal job posting process, generate the
notices, and then match internal applicant qualifications with job specifications;

where jobs are not being posted, generate a list of qualified internal candidates.

An organisation needs to analyse the benefits and disadvantages of recruiting its

personnel through internal or external sources and, where the latter is selected, whether
formal or informal systems should be used.

Recruiting from internal sources

There are sound reasons for recruiting from sources within the organisation:

The ability of the recruit is known so it is easy to assess potential for the next
level. By contrast, assessments of external recruits are based on less reliable
sources, such as references, and relatively brief encounters, such as interviews.

Insiders know the organisation, its strengths and weaknesses, its culture and,
most of all, its people.

Promotions from within build motivation and a sense of commitment to the

organisation.

Skilled and ambitious employees are more likely to become

involved in developmental activities if they believe that these activities will lead
to promotion.

Fisher, Cynthia D.; Schoenfeldt, Lyle F.; Shaw, James B.: Human Resource Management,
Second Edition. Boston, MA, USA, 1993.

Internal recruitment is cheaper and quicker than advertising in various media and
interviewing outsiders. Time spent in training and socialisation is also reduced.

At the same time, several disadvantages exist:

Sometimes it is difficult to find the right candidate within and the organisation
may settle for an employee who possesses a less than ideal mix of competencies.

If the vacancies are being caused by rapid expansion of the organisation there
may be an insufficient supply of qualified individuals above the entry level. This
may result in people being promoted before they are ready, or not being allowed
to stay in a position long enough to learn how to do the job well.

Infighting, inbreeding, and a shortage of varied perspectives and interests may

reduce organisational flexibility and growth, and resistance to change by those
who have an interest in maintaining the status quo may present long term
problems.

In times of rapid growth and during transitions, the organisation may promote
from within into managerial positions, regardless of the qualifications of
incumbents. Transition activities and rapid organisational growth often mask
managerial deficiencies; it is not until the growth rate slows that the deficiencies
become apparent and, then, the organisation finds it difficult, if not impossible, to
undo the damage. The resulting cost of remedial training can prove prohibitive.

10

Recruiting from external sources

External recruiting methods can be grouped into two classes: informal and formal.
Informal recruiting methods tap a smaller market than formal methods. These methods
may include rehiring former employees and choosing from among those walk-in
applicants whose unsolicited rsums had been retained on file. The use of referrals also
constitutes an informal hiring method. Because they are relatively inexpensive to use and
can be implemented quickly, informal recruiting methods are commonly used for hiring
clerical and other base-level recruits who are more likely than other groups to have
submitted unsolicited applications.

Former students who participated in internship

programmes may also be easily and cheaply accessed.

Formal methods of external recruiting entail searching the labour market more widely for
candidates with no previous connection to the organisation.

These methods have

traditionally included newspaper/magazine/journal advertising, the use of employment

agencies and executive search firms, and college recruitment.

More often, now,

job/career fairs and e-Recruiting are reaching the job seeker market.

Posting vacancies externally through the various arms of the media5 or via employment
agencies reaches a wider audience and may turn up a greater number of potential
candidates from which the organisation can choose. At the same time, this method is
relatively expensive and time-consuming as the organisation works through initial
5

Running advertisements in newspapers, periodicals and journals will continue to be an

important way to reach potential candidates. Less popular is the use of the audio and visual
media.

11
advertisements, short-listing, interviewing and the other processes that precede selection.
Even then, there is no guarantee that the results will be satisfactory to the organisation,
since the cost of advertising often limits the frequency and duration of the job posting, as
well as the amount of information made available, thus making it difficult for a job seeker
to accurately judge the worth of the position being offered. In addition, the organisation
may hire a candidate who fails to live up to the high potential displayed during the
selection process.

Recruiting firms/employment agencies are gaining in popularity, especially in the search

for management level/executive talent. Recruiting via this medium is expensive, whether
the organisation uses a contingency firm or has one on retainer. Executive search firms
tend to match candidates to jobs faster that most organisations can, on their own,
primarily because the recruiting firms/employment agencies possess larger databases of,
and wider access to, persons (whom they may themselves have placed) and have a greater
awareness of the location of competencies needed by the client agencies.

Of course, it is possible to for an organisation to reduce the risks and high costs of
recruitment by maintaining a small cadre of full-time, permanent employees and meeting
an unexpected and temporary need for staff through the use of ad hoc and short-term
contract workers who come to the position already trained.

It is frequently said that the best jobs are not advertised; their availability is
communicated by word of mouth.

Networking, therefore, continues to be a viable

12
mechanism for recruiting, especially at the senior management level in certain industries.
In many instances, networking is a strategy used by the recruitment firms/employment
agencies.

ON-LINE APPLICATIONS/RECRUITING ON THE INTERNET

Using the Internet is faster and cheaper than many traditional methods of recruiting. Jobs
can be posted on Internet sites for a modest amount (less than in the print media), remain
there for periods of thirty or sixty days or more - at no additional cost - and are available
twenty-four hours a day. Candidates can view detailed information about the job and the
organisation and then respond electronically.

Most homes and workplaces are now using computerised equipment for communication;
the Internet is rapidly becoming the method of choice for accessing and sharing
information. First-time job seekers are now more likely to search websites for job
postings than to peruse newspapers, magazines and journals.

The prevalence of e-

advertising has made it easier. The Internet speeds up the hiring process in three basis
stages:

Faster posting of jobs

o The wait for a suitable date and a prominent place in the print media is
eliminated.

The time lag that exists between the submission of

information to the media house and its appearance in print disappears. On

the internet, the advertisement appears immediately and can be kept alive
for as long as the recruiter requires it.

13

Faster applicant response

o Jobs posted on the Internet and requiring responses via the same medium
receive responses on the same day.

Faster processing of rsums

o An applicant sending a rsum electronically can immediately have the
application processed, receive an acknowledgement, be screened
electronically, and have details of the application and rsum despatched
to several managers at the same time.6

On-line recruiting also provides access to passive job seekers, that is, individuals who
already have a job but would apply for what appears a better one that is advertised on the
Internet. These job seekers may be of a better quality since they are not desperate for a
job change as are the active job seekers who may be frustrated, disgruntled workers
looking for a new position.

Companies that are likely to advertise on-line usually have a website that allows potential
candidates to learn about the company before deciding whether to apply, thus lowering
the incidence time-wasting through the submission of unsuitable applications.

The

website can be used as a tool to encourage potential job seekers to build an interest in
joining the organisation.
6

Internet Recruiting Power: Opportunities and Effectiveness. CareerJournal.com. Taken from

website: http://www.edu/research. This study was the result of a survey conducted in Europe by
IRCO-IESE Business School on E-Recruitment.

14

Job websites offer unlimited space which can be used, by management, to sell the
organisation. The site can then be used, not only to post vacancies, but also to publicise
the organisation. That will allow candidates to become more familiar with the company,
know what skills the company is looking for and get to know about its culture. Most
importantly, the system will provide a proper path to securing quick responses to job
openings. On-line recruiting facilitates the decentralisation of the hiring function by
making it possible for other groups in the organisation to take responsibility for part of
the function.

Internet recruiting is not all positive, though; there are drawbacks for unwary users:

Some applicants still place great value on face-to-face interactions in the hiring
process. Such applicants are likely to ignore jobs posted, impersonally, on-line.

Companies are overwhelmed by the volume of rsums posted on the Internet.

This can, in fact, lengthen the short-listing process. If the screening process is not
well done, the quantity of applications/rsums logged-on may be more of a
hindrance to the process that an aid to selection.

Job seekers who demand confidentiality in the recruitment process may be

reluctant to use the Internet as a job search mechanism.7

For effectiveness in the use of the strategy of e-Recruiting, companies are advised to:

Ibid.

use specialised Job Sites that cater to specific industries;

15

thoroughly assess the service level provided by Job Sites to ensure that they
maintain the level they claim to provide;

enhance the Corporate Web Site as a tool to encourage potential job seekers to
become interested in joining the company;

take advantage of the fact that Internet job advertisements have no space
limitations so recruiters can use longer job descriptions to fully describe the
company, job requirements and working conditions offered;

use valid Search Engines that will sort candidates effectively, but will not
discriminate against any persons or groups;

create attention-grabbing newspaper advertisements that prompt people to visit

the companys website. They will then see all vacancies that are advertised;

encourage employees to e-mail job advertisements to friends;

design and implement a successful e-Recruitment strategy.8

COLLEGE RECRUITMENT
College recruiting sending an employers representatives to college campuses to prescreen applicants and create an applicant pool from that colleges graduating class is an
important source of management trainees, promotable [entry-level] candidates, and
professional and technical employees.9 To get the best out of this hiring strategy, the
organisation and its career opportunities must be made to stand out. Human resource
professionals are aware that few college students and potential graduates know where
their careers will take them over the next fifteen to twenty years. Therefore many of the

8
9

Ibid.
Fisher, Schoenfeldt and Shaw. Op.cit.

16
criteria used by students to select the first job may be quite arbitrary. The organisation
that will succeed, then, is one can show how the work it offers meets students needs for
skill enhancement, rewarding opportunities, personal satisfaction, flexibility and
compensation.10

College recruitment offers an opportunity for recruiters to select the potential employees
with the personal, technical and professional competencies they require in their
organisation. The personal competencies identified may include, inter alia, a positive
work ethic, strong interpersonal skills, leadership capacity and an ability to function well
in a work team. The opportunity to discuss a students current strengths and potential
future value to an organisation cannot be replicated in any other setting.

Two major advantages of this strategy are the cost (which is higher than word-of-mouth
recruiting but lower than advertising in the media or using an employment agency), and
the convenience (since many candidates can be interviewed in a short time in the same
location with space and administrative support provided by the college itself).

Unfortunately, suitable candidates become available only at certain times of the year,
which may not always suit the needs of the hiring organisation.

Another major

disadvantage of college recruiting is the lack of experience and the inflated expectations

10

Burleigh, Susan L. and Wilson, Kevin C. Developing a Recruiting Strategy: A Critical Human
Resource Initiative. Taken from http://www.utoledo.edu/~ddwyer/mgmt3220/recruitstrat.htm

17
of new graduates and the cost of hiring graduates for entry-level positions that may not
require a college degree.11

To make college recruiting effective, the recruiting organisation must first determine how
many and which schools should be targeted. It may prove cost-effective to do intensive
recruiting in a few, carefully-selected institutions, establishing a presence and building
the organisations reputation among students and faculty.

Timely and frequent

dissemination of literature, the offer of internships and the award of prizes for academic
and/or social prowess help to advertise the organisation as a preferred place of
employment.

Subsequent invitations to the organisations offices, made to students

identified as potential employees, may serve to solidify the firms image.12

Public Service organisations are usually unable to compete financially with their Private
Sector counterparts and are therefore less likely to pay competitive salaries. However,
most public service agencies provide their employees with a wealth and range of
experiences that are available nowhere else. It is for that reason that many college
graduates use the Public Service as an employer of first resort to gain the experiences that
will make them marketable in the short term.

The strategies discussed above may not work as smoothly for public service recruiters,
since the laws that govern their organisations recruitment practices may be more
stringent than those that apply in private sector companies. There may also be questions

11
12

Fisher, Schoenfeldt and Shaw. Op.cit.

Ibid.

18
about the legality of the on-line application form.13 If this strategy were to be employed,
public service recruiters must first decide on the criteria that should guide the process.
The Public Service is seldom immediately seen as an attractive employer, mainly because
salaries are uncompetitive. Except for those students who have a commitment to public
service, the top ten percent of college graduates will select the Private Sector as the
employer of choice, partly because of the prestige value but primarily because of the
remuneration package and because the recruiters may have been more successful in
marketing their company. Therefore, it is understood that many of the graduates who
enter the Public Service will stay for a short time and either return to school or proceed to
another sector once they have acquired the requisite skills and experience that make them
marketable.

Recruitment and retention strategies in the Public Service must, therefore, reflect this
reality and efforts made to get the most out of college graduates before they move on;
conversely, the organisation may need to plan to recruit those students whose academic
records suggest that they will remain in an organisation that pays less.

Retention

strategies will focus on ensuring opportunities for intense training and development for
skill enhancement and personal satisfaction.

College recruitment also offers opportunities for internships. These programmes may
provide the organisations with quality employees at low cost per hire. Some interns are
hired at low cost (perhaps minimum wage) and are offered work experience. Interns are
13

Wallace, J. Craig; Tye, Mary G.; Vodanovich, Stephen J. Applying for Jobs Online: Examining
the Legality of Internet-Based Application Forms. In Personnel Management, Vol. 29 No. 4
Winter 2000.

19
able to hone business skills, check out potential employers, and learn more about
employers likes and dislikes before making final career choices.14 Some of the better
interns are recruited after graduation.

College recruitment is relatively expensive15 and time consuming for the recruiting
company. The process involves screening the candidate, that is, determining whether
he/she is worthy of further consideration and marketing the company as a preferred place
of employment.

An alternate strategy for college recruitment is the career planning workshop. These
activities are usually (but not exclusively) associated with adolescent school leavers.
They do not immediately produce ready candidates for the job market but provide the
opportunity for an organisation to present itself as an employer worthy of consideration.

Co-ordinators of career planning workshops co-opt professionals and organisations to

present career options to potential school leavers in a controlled setting so as to lay out
the range of possibilities to young job seekers. Career planning workshops are used
mainly as information-giving tools which the school leaver can use to make informed
career choices. Some organisations use the workshops as a base for internships.

14

Dessler. Op.cit.
Recruiters may not be employees of the company, but paid professionals who have been
trained to perform the function.

15

20
Job fairs
The concept of a job fair is to bring those interested in finding a job into those companies
who are searching for applicants.16 Job fairs are open fora at which employers can
exhibit the best their companies have to offer so that job seekers can make informed
choices. They are considered one of the most effective ways for job seekers to land jobs.
At the job fair, employers have a large pool of candidates on which to draw, while job
seekers have the opportunity to shop around for dozens sometimes hundreds of
employers, all in one place.17

Notwithstanding the fact that the atmosphere at the fair is more relaxed than at an
interview, employers are still on the look out for qualified, potential employees who have
interest, dedication and initiative.

Maintaining fairness/equity in the recruitment process

It is often difficult to ensure and maintain fairness/equity in the recruitment process
although, in every jurisdiction, there are laws that protect individuals and vulnerable
groups from the negative impact of discriminatory practices. Where necessary, systems,
detailed procedures and processes exist or must be established to minimise
discrimination.

16

The usual format of job fairs is to have several companies set up information stations at an
expo, with at least one representative of the company present to provide information. The fairs
usually have a common theme or are specific to a certain field or area of interest. Interested
individuals browse through the information provided by each company and then decide which
company, if any, they would like to apply to. They have the opportunity to talk with a current
employee of specific companies to learn more about the employment experience. Buzzle.com on
Job Fairs and Career Expos. Taken from website: http://buzzle.com/chapters/business-andfinance_occupation-and-employment-issue. 30/08/2003
17
Job Fair Strategies: http://jobsearchtech.about.com/library/weekly/aa120197-2.htm

21

Each country designates/identifies a group or groups for special notice; women, visible
minorities and the disabled are usual targets. The Government of Canada, in articulating
its Employment Equity Act and Regulations, identified four designated groups as
employment equity targets: women, Aboriginal people, members of visible minority
groups, persons with disabilities.

In the legislation, managers responsibilities for

employment equity are stated as:

Ensuring effective overall performance and continuous progress of the

employment equity goals within the operation;

Achieving, fostering and maintaining a representative workforce;

Showing leadership in employment equity and demonstrating commitment to it by

ensuring that discrimination and stereotyping are not tolerated; and

Informing and educating employees in the organisation about employment equity

and diversity.18

The Australian Public Service Commission, in ensuring that there were no infringements
against individuals rights, issued general guidelines on workplace diversity, some of
which related to recruitment:

Integrate workplace diversity with the agencys goals and business.

Reflect agency workplace diversity objectives in workplace agreements and

certified agreements.

18

Adapted from the Public Service Commission of Canada Managers Handbook: Chapter Five:
Employment Equity. In http://www.psc-cfp.gcca/staf_dot/mgr-gestion/guide/chap5_e.htm

22

Integrate workplace diversity principles into human resources policies and

practices.

Include implementation of workplace diversity objectives in the corporate plan,

business plan and client service charters.

Ensure information about employment opportunities is available in accessible

formats.

Review recruitment and selection processes to ensure that current and potential
employees are not discriminated against.

Gather information on demographics.19

It is the goal of every jurisdiction to minimise or eliminate any instance of obvious

discrimination against individuals or groups.

In discussing policies on employment

equity, Carleton University explains:

Employment equity policies and programs are about fairness in the
workplace, not about reverse discrimination. Fairness is achieved when
no one is denied employment opportunity and no one benefits for reasons
unrelated to ability. Employment equity programs attempt to change the
composition of the work force so that employees better reflect the
community. The facts (both historical and current) show that members of
the four designated groups [mentioned above] face discrimination, enjoy
less access to educational programs and training, and are often denied
employment and promotions even when they have the necessary skills and
experience.20

19

Australian Government/Australian Public Service Commission: Guidelines on workplace

diversity. In http://www.apsc.gov.au/publications01/diversityguidelines8.htm
20
Taken from the website of Carleton University: Frequently asked questions about employment
equity. In http://temagami.carelton.ca/equity/emp-equity-FAQ.html

23
The Universitys policies give special attention, inter alia, to the existence of systemic
barriers21 and instances of intentional discrimination22 in the process of recruitment.

Service Commissions were enshrined in the Independence Constitutions of the territories

of the Commonwealth Caribbean and given inter alia, the power to recruit/appoint
persons into the Public Service and, in so doing, reduce the influence of politicians on the
staffing process.23 In order to discharge their authority for making appointments, the
Commissions have influenced the development of legislation and regulations that
circumscribe the practice of recruitment, primarily to ensure that no discrimination
attends the exercise. To this end, entry into the Public Service follows the procedures of:

application on prescribed forms;

selection on the basis of seniority of application;24

application of age limits for entry into certain defined grades/classes;25

the use of written examinations and/or competitive interviews as the basis for
permanent appointment to certain grades/classes.

21

Ibid. Systemic barriers are practices and policies that appear neutral but actually have a
negative impact on certain groups and are not reasonable or bona fide. Arbitrary screening,
requests for training or work experience unrelated to actual job performance are examples of
systemic barriers in the hiring process.
22
Ibid. Intentional discrimination is the granting or denying of opportunities to certain groups of
individuals. An example of this is denying someone employment on the basis of his/her sex.
23
Bissessar, Ann Marie: Colonial Administration, Structural Adjustment and New Public
Management: The Agony of Reform (Chapter 4: The Critical Role of the Public Service
Commission). Trinidad, the University of the West Indies, School of Continuing Studies, 2000.
24
Once an applicant satisfies the entry qualifications, his/her name is added to a list which is
accessed when a vacancy occurs. All things being equal, the candidate whose name appears at
the top of the list is offered the position.
25
Within the Public Service of Trinidad and Tobago, the maximum age for entry at the level of
Clerk I is 23 years. For most other permanent and pensionable positions, the maximum age for
entry is 50 years.

24
The rules established by the Commissions enforce compliance in an attempt to minimise
or eliminate the possibility of bias in staffing on the basis of race/ethnicity, creed, age,
social status or physical disability.

CONCLUSION
In all Public Service jurisdictions, new approaches to recruitment are being used. In
many territories, the strategies are manual but, as automated methods become more
pervasive, those mechanisms that support its use will assume greater popularity.
Whatever the strategies selected for use, the objective is to recruit the most qualified,
committed individuals into the organisations and ensure that the provision of government
services to the public is timely and effective, that the goods are of consistent high quality
and that the organisations achieve the objectives for which they have been established.

________________________________________________________________________

Author
Margaret A. Richardson
Director of Corporate Services
Personnel Department
Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
Tel: (868) 623-6166
Email: margaretangela@hotmail.com
As the Director of Corporate Services, Government of Trinidad and Tobago, Margaret
Richardson is responsible for managing the Human Resource Management Unit of the
Department, ensuring that a) the provision of staff to the Divisions is adequate and timely
and b) staff members receive the services to which they are entitled. The Director also
manages the portfolios of Communications and Public Relations, Information
Technology, Accounting, and Office Management. The Corporate Services Division
provides support to all the technical Division of the Personnel Department.

Strategiesforrecruitingandretaining
participantsinpreventionprograms

WHATWORKS,WISCONSINRESEARCHTOPRACTICESERIES

ISSUE#2,FEBRUARY2007

BYSIOBHANM.COONEY,STEPHENA.SMALL,ANDCAILINOCONNOR

UniversityofWisconsinMadisonandUniversityofWisconsinExtension

Recruiting and retainingyouth andfamilies in prevention programs can some

times be difficult. Poor recruitment and retention can undermine the success of
even the strongest program; programs cannot have a favorable impact if people
dont participate. The scientific literature on youth and family programs suggests
multiple reasons for these challenges, as well as strategies for more successful
recruitment and retention. Some of these obstacles and strategies have greater
relevance for audiences from particular cultural backgrounds, social classes, or geo
graphic locations, but the majority of them are appropriate across populations and
communities.

Obstaclestoprogramparticipation
Thereareanumberofreasonswhyitcanbedifficulttogetyouthandfamiliestocommitto
programs and to stay involved over time. First, it is important to consider that youth and
familiesoftenhavecompetingdemandsontheirtimeandenergy.Forexample,parentsmay
work jobs with inflexible hours, and youth may work afterschool jobs and/or be involved in
extracurricularactivities.Attendinggroupsessionsasafamilyorindividuallyonceaweekfor
severalmonthsmayseemlikeanimpossiblecommitmenttosome.Anotherreasonoftencitedis
differencesinculturalbackgroundsbetweenprogramparticipantsandprogramstaff.Asoneex
ample, given this nations history of racial discrimination, some ethnic minority groups may
distrustprogramstaffandtheWhite,mainstreamestablishmentstheyrepresent.Similarly,practi
tionersworkingwithimmigrantfamiliesmayfindthatrecruitmentisdifficultwhenindividualsare
fearfulofeitherhavingtheirresidencystatusrevokedorputtingthemselvesinsituationsthatmight
revealundocumentedimmigration.

Other obstacles to program attendance can result

from accessibility. In both rural and urban areas,
reliabletransportationisoftenanecessityforpar
ticipants to make it to the program site. Rural
areas are unlikely to have good public transpor
tation, while some urban areas are unsafe for
walkingorusingpublictransportationafterdark.
Others report that keeping participants in pro
gramsovertimecanproveverydifficultiffamilies
changeresidencesoften,asituationmorecommon
in families that have lower incomes or have
recentlyimmigrated.

Strategiesforrecruitmentand
retention
The scientific literature provides suggestions for
successfully recruiting and retaining youth and
families in prevention programs. As with the ob
stacles listed above, some of these strategies will
bemoreappropriatethanothersforyoursituation
and your target audience. It is important to note
thatmanyofthesestrategieshavenotbeenevalu
ated to the degree that evidencebased programs
have,butaresimplybasedonthebestknowledge
currentlyavailable.Theserecommendationsdraw
from a number of published studies and reviews,
whichareincludedinthesourceslistedattheend
ofthispublication.

Involvemembersofthetargetedpopula

tionandthelocalcommunityinprogram
planning, including selection, recruit
ment, and implementation. Programs are
more appealing when potential participants
and community members serve on the
programplanningandadvisoryboards.Their
local knowledge can assist in important
decisions; without the aid of such local
knowledge, programs are unlikely to recruit
and retain many participants. This strategy
alsoworkstoestablishandmaintaintrustbe
cause it demonstrates that program staff are

Strategiesforrecruitingandretainingparticipants
WhatWorks,WisconsinResearchtoPracticeSeries,#2

committed to the community. Furthermore,

when community members recruit youth and
families and assist in program implemen
tation,participationratesaregenerallyhigher.
This strategy is particularly likely to work if
respected community elders or other leaders
work to recruit and retain parents and
families.

Link the program to a trusted and re

spectedinstitutionorindividualalready
known to potential participants. This
practice can boost recruitment rates and can
alsoaidretentioniftheinstitutionorindivid
ual continues to promote the program. For
example,programsmayaskaschoolprincipal
or church leader to send a letter inviting
families to participate. The individual or org
anizationshouldbeonethatiswellrespected
andtrustedbytheaudienceofinterest.

Strategically choose the site where the

programwillbeheld.Ideally,programsare
implemented in locations where potential
participants already visit frequently and feel
comfortablesuchasdaycarecenters,schools,
worksites,andrecreationalcenters.Whenever
possible the site should be both familiar and
close to participants homes. In addition,
urban program sites should be centrally
located in an area where families feel safe
walkingiftheyhavenoothertransportation.

Involve additional family members and

othersupportnetworks.Familiesandother
support networks that encourage program
participationareessentialwhenengagingand
retaining people in programs. Without this
support, youth and their families may be un
able or unwilling to participate in program
activities. For example, program practitioners
mayfindvalueingainingtheapproval,ifnot
participation, of fathers and/or grandparents
in programs traditionally aimed at mothers
andchildren.

 Hire and train culturally sensitive

individuals to recruit participants and

implement programs. Regardless of their
ethnic or cultural background, staff members
need to be able to establish rapport with
participants, gain trust, relate well to others,
andremainnonjudgmental.Researchsuggests
that theseinterpersonalskillsare moreessen
tialthanmatchingstaffandparticipantsbased
on race or ethnicity. However, matching
participantsandprogramstaffonculturaland
ethnicsimilaritiescanfacilitaterecruitmentof
youthandtheirfamilies.Inaddition,thistype
ofmatchingmayfacilitatethedevelopmentof
trusting relationships between participants
and program staff, which can ease program
delivery and help keep participants in the
program.

Provide for basic needs and give

participation incentives. Refreshments,
transportation, and quality child care make it
easierforparticipantstoattendaprogram.In
addition, providing even small tokens of
appreciation can assist retention efforts.
Program implementers should consult with
potential participants and local experts to
determine appropriate incentives for the
audience of interest. If practitioners collect
evaluationdata,theyshouldprovideaddition
al compensation, especially when evaluation
proceduresmightbeperceivedasunpleasant,
intrusive,ortimeconsuming.

Be flexible in scheduling. Families may

prefer home visits or meetings on weekday
evenings or weekends. If families and ind
ividualsaretocontinuecomingtoaprogram,
allowances must be made for scheduling
outside of traditional working hours.
Offering makeup sessions for groupbased
programscanincreasethenumberofsessions
participantsattend.Inaddition,programstaff

Strategiesforrecruitingandretainingparticipants
WhatWorks,WisconsinResearchtoPracticeSeries,#2

should respect participants commitments to

their families, schools, and communities, and
avoid scheduling program activities that will
force participants to choose between commit
ments.

Make frequent contact. Between faceto

face meetings, retention can be increased by
stayingintouchbymail,email,orphone.For
example,iftheprogramrunsforasignificant
length of time, sending birthday or holiday
cards can help participants stay connected to
theprogram.Callingthedaybeforeameeting
can remind them of the session and increase
participation. Also, placing phone calls after
missed sessions lets participants know that
their presence is valued and missed by other
group members. If participants are likely to
move during the course of the program, it is
essential to keep contact information for
multiplepeopleclosetoeachparticipant.Staff
should confirm this contact information on a
regular basis, as long as the process does not
intimidateparticipants.

Make every effort to maintain staff

members
throughout
program
implementation. Retention rates are higher
whenparticipantsinteractwiththesamestaff
members throughout the course of the
program. High staff turnover means there is
little continuity in the relationships between
staff members and program participants.
Good relationships are critical not only for
participant retention, but also the overall
successoftheprogram.Staffhiredtofacilitate
a program or otherwise work directly with
participantsshouldbeaskedtocommittothe
lengthoftheprogram.Ifaprogramfacilitator
orotherstaffmemberdoesleavehisorherjob
in the midst of a program, efforts should be
made to smooth the transition. For example,
the original facilitator could announce his or
her departure and introduce the new
facilitatortoprogramparticipants.

 Keep promises. Program staff should al

ways keep appointments, follow procedures
astheywereexplained,andfollowthroughon
promises, especially related to compensation
or incentives for participants. This strategy is
essential for maintaining trust within
communities and retaining participants in
programs.

Help potential participants to see the

program as worthwhile. When youth and
their families believe that a program is
worthwhile,theyaremorelikelytoparticipate
andstayintheprogramtotheend.Marketing
theprogramwiththeassistanceofcommunity
memberscanhelptoreducethestigmasome
timesassociatedwithpreventionprograms.In
addition, many communities have found it
beneficial to frame program participation as
health promotion or positive youth dev

elopment rather than focusing on reducing

the risk for negative outcomes. Furthermore,
ensuring that a program really is worth
participants time and effort is probably the
greatest incentive a program can offer. This
strategymayrequireadaptingtheprogramto
fit specific needs in the local community. For
example, program implementers can add rel
evant discussions to the curriculum on topics
such as coping with discrimination, dealing
withjobloss,orovercomingsocialisolation.

In sum, while it can be difficult to recruit and

retain participants in prevention programs, an
emerging literature is beginning to provide some
practical suggestions for addressing this issue.
Practitionerswhowishtoincreasetheirchancesof
success can benefit by incorporating these
strategiesintocurrentprotocol.

WHATWORKS,WISCONSIN:RESEARCHTO PRACTICESERIES

ThisisoneofaseriesofResearchtoPracticebriefspreparedbytheWhatWorks,Wisconsin
teamattheUniversityofWisconsinMadison,SchoolofHumanEcology,andCooperative
Extension,UniversityofWisconsinExtension.Allofthebriefscanbedownloadedfrom
http://whatworks.uwex.edu.

ThisseriesexpandsuponideasthatarediscussedinWhatWorks,Wisconsin:WhatScience
TellsUsaboutCostEffectiveProgramsforJuvenileDelinquencyPrevention,whichisalso
availablefordownloadattheaddressgivenabove.

Thispublicationmaybecitedwithoutpermissionprovidedthesourceisidentifiedas:
Cooney,S.M.,Small,S.A.,&OConnor,C.(2007).Strategiesforrecruitingandretaining
participantsinpreventionprograms.WhatWorks,WisconsinResearchtoPracticeSeries,2.
Madison,WI:UniversityofWisconsinMadison/Extension.

ThisprojectwassupportedbyGrantAwardNo.JF04PO0025awardedbytheWisconsin
OfficeofJusticeAssistancethroughtheWisconsinGovernorsJuvenileJusticeCommission
withfundsfromtheOfficeofJuvenileJusticeandDelinquencyPrevention.

Strategiesforrecruitingandretainingparticipants
WhatWorks,WisconsinResearchtoPracticeSeries,#2

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Lindenberg,C.S.,Solorzano,R.M.,Vilaro,F.M.,&
Westbrook,L.O.(2001).Challengesandstrategies
forconductinginterventionresearchwithculturally
diversepopulations.JournalofTranscultural
Nursing,12,132139.
MaldonadoMolina,M.M.,Reyes,N.A.,&Espinosa
Hernandez,G.(2006).Preventionresearchand
Latinofamilies:Resourcesforresearchersand
practitioners.FamilyRelations,55,403414.
McGuigan,W.M.,Katzev,A.R.&Pratt,C.C.(2003).
Multileveldeterminantsofretentioninahome
visitingchildabusepreventionprogram.Child
AbuseandNeglect,27,363380.

Gallagher,K.M.,Stanley,A.,Shearer,D.,&Mosca,C.
(2005).Implementationofyouthdevelopment
programs:Promiseandchallenges.Journalof
AdolescentHealth,37,S61S68.

Prinz,R.J.,Smith,E.P.,Dumas,J.E.,Laughlin,J.E.,
White,D.W.,&Barron,R.(2001).Recruitmentand
retentionofparticipantsinpreventiontrials
involvingfamilybasedinterventions.American
JournalofPreventiveMedicine,20,3137.

GormanSmith,D.,Tolan,P.H.,Henry,D.B.,Leventhal,
A.,Schoeny,M.,Lutovsky,K.,etal.(2002).
Predictorsofparticipationinafamilyfocused
preventiveinterventionforsubstanceuse.
PsychologyofAddictiveBehaviors,16,S55S64.

Resinow,K.,Braithwaite,R.,Dilorio,C.,Vaughan,R.,
Cohen,M.I.,&Uhl,G.A.(2001).Preventing
substanceuseinhighriskyouth:Evaluation
challengesandsolutions.TheJournalofPrimary
Prevention,21,399415.

Gross,D.,Julion,W.,&Fogg,L.(2001).Whatmotivates
participationanddropoutamonglowincome
familiesofcolorinapreventionintervention?
FamilyRelations,50,246254.

Spoth,R.&Redmond,C.(1994).Effectiverecruitmentof
parentsintofamilyfocusedpreventionresearch:A
comparisonoftwostrategies.PsychologyandHealth,
9,353370.

Harachi,T.W.,Catalano,R.F.,&Hawkins,J.D.(1997).
Effectiverecruitmentforparentingprograms
withinethnicminoritycommunities.Childand
AdolescentSocialWorkJournal,14,2339.

Zand,D.,Thomson,N.R.,Dugan,M.,Braun,J.A.,
HoltermanHommes,P.,&Hunter,P.L.(2006).
Predictorsofretentioninanalcohol,tobacco,and
otherdrugpreventionstudy.EvaluationReview,30,
209222.

Heinrichs,N.,Bertram,H.,Kuschel,A.,&Hahlweg,K.
(2005).Parentrecruitmentandretentionina
universalpreventionprogramforchildbehaviorand
emotionalproblems:Barrierstoresearchand
programparticipation.PreventionScience,6,275286.

Strategiesforrecruitingandretainingparticipants
WhatWorks,WisconsinResearchtoPracticeSeries,#2

HOMELAND SECU
URITY INSTITUTE
The Homeland Security Institute (HS
SI) is a federally funded research and
development center (FFRDC) establiished by the Secretary of Homeland
Security under Section 312 of the Hom
meland Security Act of 2002. Analytic
Services Inc. operates HSI under contraact number W81XWH-04-D-0011.
HSIs mission
HSI
i i is
i to assist
i the
h Secreta
S
ary off Homeland
H
l d Security,
S
i the
h Under
U d
Secretary for Science and Technologgy, and the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) operating elements in addressing
a
national policy and security
issues where scientific, technical, andd analytical expertise is required. HSI
also consults with other goverrnment agencies, nongovernmental
organizations, institutions of higher eduucation, and nonprofit organizations.
HSI delivers independent and objectivee analyses and advice to support policy
development,
p
, decision making,
g, alternnative approaches,
pp
, and new ideas on
significant issues.
HSIs research is undertaken by mutuaal consent with DHS and is organized
by Tasks in the annual HSI Research Plan.
P
This report presents the results of
research and analysis conducted under
Task 08-37,
0
Implications for U.S. Educators on the Prevalence and Tactics Used to
Recruit Youth for Violent or Terrorist
T
Activities Worldwide
of HSIs Fiscal Year 2008 Research Plaan. The purpose of the task is to look at
the phenomenon of school-aged individduals being recruited by individuals or
groups that promote violence or terrorissm.
The results presented in this report doo not necessarily reflect official DHS
opinion or policy.

Homeland
Security
Institute

Catherine Bott
Task lead, Threats Analysis
Division
W. James Castan
Robertson Dickens
Thomas Rowley
Erik Smith
Rosemary Lark
Fellow & Division
Manager, Threats Analysis
Division
George Thompson,
Deputy Director, HSI

RECRUITMENT AND
RADICALIZATION OF
SCHOOL-AGED YOUTH
BY INTERNATIONAL
TERRORIST GROUPS
Final Report
23 April 2009

Prepared for
U.S. Department of Education,
Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Homeland Security Institute (HSI) is grateful to many agencies and
individuals for their contributions to this study. This project would not
have been possible without the support and guidance received from key
personnel at the U.S. Department of Education, including the task
sponsor, Bill Modzeleski, Associate Assistant Deputy Secretary for the
Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools, and Yvonne Bartoli, Senior
Policy Advisor, Homeland Security Center for School Preparedness,
Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools.
HSI benefited from the contributions of Matthew M. Aid, an intelligence
historian, who assisted in conducting research and interviews with
subject matter experts in the Netherlands.
The authors also wish to thank Dr. Peter W. Singer, Dr. Gabriel
Weimann, Dr. Anne Speckhard, and Dr. Phelan Wyrick for their
contributions to the Youth Recruitment and Radicalization Roundtable.

For information about this publication or other HSI research, contact

HOMELAND SECURITY INSTITUTE

Analytic Services Incorporated
2900 S. Quincy Street
Arlington, VA 22206
Tel (703) 416-3550 Fax (703) 416-3530
www.homelandsecurity.org
HSI Publication Number: RP08-37-01

ii

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

TABLE OF C ONTENTS
Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................1
Approach ....................................................................................................................................1
Key Themes and Trends.............................................................................................................2
Implications ................................................................................................................................2
Introduction .....................................................................................................................................3
Purpose .......................................................................................................................................6
Methodology ..............................................................................................................................7
Definitions ...........................................................................................................................7
Case Study Selection ...........................................................................................................8
Research Questions .............................................................................................................9
Data Sources ..............................................................................................................................9
Youth Recruitment & Radicalization Roundtable .............................................................10
Parameters and Limitations ......................................................................................................10
Report Structure .......................................................................................................................11
Section I. Themes & Trends .........................................................................................................12
Are school-aged youth being recruited or radicalized by terrorist groups? ..............................12
Who is recruited? .....................................................................................................................12
Who recruits school-aged youth? .............................................................................................12
From where are youth being recruited? ....................................................................................13
How are youth recruited? .........................................................................................................14
What are youth recruited to do? ...............................................................................................15
What are the benefits of recruitment? ......................................................................................15
What programs or initiatives have been developed to try to counter the recruitment of youth?16
Section II. Case Studies on Recruitment, Radicalization, and Utilization of Youth by
Terrorist Groups ...........................................................................................................................17
Hamas and Hizballah ...............................................................................................................18
Background .......................................................................................................................18
Appeal ...............................................................................................................................19
Why Youth? .......................................................................................................................19
Approach ...........................................................................................................................20
Counter Initiatives.............................................................................................................23
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) ..............................................................................................................24
Background .......................................................................................................................24
Appeal ...............................................................................................................................25
Why Youth .........................................................................................................................25
Approach ...........................................................................................................................25
Counter-Initiatives ............................................................................................................28
Al-Qaeda and Affiliated Groups ..............................................................................................30
Background .......................................................................................................................31
Appeal United Kingdom .................................................................................................31
Why Youth United Kingdom ...........................................................................................32
Approach United Kingdom ............................................................................................32
Counter-Initiatives United Kingdom ..............................................................................33
Appeal Conflict Zones ....................................................................................................35
Why Youth Conflict Zones ..............................................................................................36
Approach Conflict Zones................................................................................................36
Counter-Initiatives Conflict Zones .................................................................................37

iii

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) ..............................................................................38

Background .......................................................................................................................39
Appeal ...............................................................................................................................39
Why Youth? .......................................................................................................................39
Approach ...........................................................................................................................40
Counter Initiatives.............................................................................................................42
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) .................................................................................................43
Background .......................................................................................................................43
Appeal ...............................................................................................................................44
Why Youth? .......................................................................................................................45
Approach ...........................................................................................................................46
Counter-initiatives ............................................................................................................47
Youth Radicalization in the Netherlands..................................................................................49
Background .......................................................................................................................49
Appeal to Youth .................................................................................................................49
Approach ...........................................................................................................................50
Counter Initiatives.............................................................................................................52
The Internet as a Terrorist Tool to Recruit and Radicalize Youth ...........................................54
Narrowcasting to Youth Audiences ...................................................................................55
Implications.......................................................................................................................57
Countering Terrorists Online............................................................................................60
Section III. Summary & Implications..........................................................................................62
Implications ..............................................................................................................................63
Appendix A. Youth Recruitment & Radicalization Roundtable 19 March 2009 .................65
Children at War: Understanding the Global Trend of Children Being Pulled into Conflict and
Violence Dr. Peter Singer......................................................................................................65
The Internet as a Terrorist Tool to Recruit and Radicalize Youth Dr. Gabriel Weimann .....66
Understanding Radicalization: Trajectories, Vulnerabilities, Prevention, Detection & Counter
InitiativesDr. Anne Speckhard .............................................................................................68
Gang Recruitment and Utilization of YouthDr. Phelan Wyrick...........................................69
List of Youth Recruitment & Radicalization Roundtable Attendees .......................................71
Appendix B. Cooperative Civic Education and economic education exchange program grant:
International Program Activities in Civic Education.................................................................72
Civitas: An International Civic Education Exchange Program ........................................73
Civic Mosaic .....................................................................................................................73
Deliberating in a Democracy ............................................................................................73
Economics International ...................................................................................................73
Glossary of Terms .........................................................................................................................74
Groups ..............................................................................................................................74
Terms ................................................................................................................................74
Bibliography ..................................................................................................................................77

iv

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

E XECUTIVE S UMMARY
Terrorists are adaptive adversaries who use a variety of tools and tactics to reach potential recruits and
supporters. Unfortunately, there is increasing evidence that terrorist organizations are drawing schoolaged youth into their ranks all around the world.
The United States Department of Education, Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools (OSDFS) sponsored
this study to gain insight into how school-aged youth are recruited, radicalized, and utilized by various
international terrorist groups. The study is intended to analyze the role, if any, played by schools,
educators, or others within the school setting (either directly or indirectly) to induce students toward
violence or participation in terrorist groups through actions that promote, advocate, or support such
groups.
Additionally, OSDFS wanted to know what initiatives have been implemented internationally to address
the emerging threat of youth recruitment and radicalization. Consequently, the study also sought to
determine what role, if any, is currently being played by schools, educators, or others within the school
setting to advance measures or take actions that denounce violence or terrorist groups and/or propose
other alternatives.
An examination of the context(s) in which recruitment occurs, the range of tactics used by terrorist groups
worldwide, the inducements offered, and the ways in which these issues are being addressed
internationally will lead to a more comprehensive understanding of the issues as well as help the
Department of Education identify practical implications. It will also allow the Department to review
whether modifications to current policies and practices being used by U.S. schools are indicated.

Approach
Preliminary research found evidence that at least 23 of the 42 currently active groups designated by the
U.S. Department of State as Foreign Terrorist Organizations utilize school-aged youth in some capacity.
These groups, with differing goals and motivations, are located in a variety of countries and regions
throughout the world to include Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Nepal, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Thailand, Palestine,
Lebanon, Colombia, Somalia, Philippines, Japan, Sri Lanka, Peru, Bosnia, North Africa, and Western
Europe.
A sample of terrorist organizations was selected for further study and a series of case studies were
developed. The groups selected for additional research were chosen because they were diverse in terms of
geographic location, ideology, and tactics, as well as in how they recruited, radicalized, or utilized young
persons. These groups include:

Hamas

Hizballah

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)

Al-Qaeda and affiliated groups (primarily includes those active in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq,
and the United Kingdom)

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

In addition to these groups, research was also conducted on radicalization of youth in the Netherlands and
on how the Internet is being used by terrorist organizations to reach out to youth audiences.

Key Themes and Trends

Notable themes and trends emerged from across all of the terrorist groups that were examined in depth.
The groups systematically prey upon the vulnerabilities of young persons in various contexts offering a
range of incentives from financial assistance, to familial-like bonds, to the promise of something
exciting to do that are intended to make membership in the group attractive. In some cases, youth have
been forcibly recruited or tricked into participating in terrorist activities, including suicide bombings.
Terrorist organizations have used schools as a recruitment venue in many locations throughout the world,
utilizing the education system to transmit group ideologies as well as provide mental and physical training
and indoctrination. Youth recruitment and radicalization extends far beyond conflict areas. Of the diverse
groups studied, all have reached out to youth populations both locally as well as globally. The Internet has
become a resource for disseminating terrorist propaganda and instructions to young persons who might
not otherwise have direct contact with group recruiters or supporters.

Implications
While this study has led to a better understanding of how some terrorist groups are recruiting,
radicalizing, and utilizing school-aged youth, there is still a great deal of research that needs to be done to
further inform our understanding of this dynamic issue. It is necessary to get a more comprehensive
understanding of youth radicalization and to share this knowledge with community members who come
in contact with young persons on a regular basis, including educators, parents, and religious leaders.
Educating these individuals will enable them to better address the needs of young persons and to identify
and prevent potential problems.
Given the apparent increase of youth involvement in terrorist organizations, and the changing
demographics of those involved or implicated, it is necessary to promote greater awareness that young
persons are susceptible to terrorist recruitment and radicalization. Any young person with access to an
Internet connection can view websites that promote terrorist groups or provide graphic depictions of acts
of terrorism that are commonly portrayed as acts of heroism.
Counter-recruitment and counter-radicalization initiatives should be tailored locally, and should engage
members from across the community who are in a position to address specific underlying factors or
identify potential radicalization indicators. Counter-recruitment and radicalization initiatives must also
evolve with the young audiences they are intended to reach, adapt along with the adversaries, incorporate
new developments in technologies, and address changes within environments where young persons are
susceptible.
Finally, it is imperative that we as a society make it unacceptable for terrorist organizations to consider
utilizing young persons to further their violent goals.

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

I NTRODUCTION
Throughout history, school-aged youth have participated in a variety of organizations that promote or
carry out acts of violence. Youth have helped to fill the ranks of militaries, militias, gangs, and terrorist
groups. Young persons' roles within these organizations have varied, from providing logistical support,
serving as lookouts or mules, raising funds, taking part in battles, or carrying out attacks. The process
by which youth become involved in these groups also varies, with some being born into radical
environments that promote violence, some being spotted and directly recruited by groups, some selfselecting into the group, and others being forced into membership.
While much of the attention and research on this topic to-date has focused on the issue of children as
soldiers in various rebel armies, there is increasing evidence that youth are being drawn into the ranks of
terrorist organizations operating around the world.

In November 2007, the United Kingdoms MI5 Chief, Mr. Jonathan Evans, stated that Terrorists
were methodically and intentionally targeting young people and children in the United
Kingdom, and that MI5 has seen individuals as young as 15 implicated in activities related to
terrorism.1 In March 2009, the Association of Chief Police Officers indicated that two-hundred
schoolchildren in Britain (some as young as thirteen) had been identified and reported by
community members including parents, imams, and teachers as being at risk of extremism or
of being groomed by radicalisers.2

A special youth facility was developed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba called Camp Iguana in order
to house the young persons that were captured fighting alongside al-Qaeda and the Taliban.3 At
least six boys between the ages of 13 and 16 were captured by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan in the
initial fighting there. Likewise, in Iraq, U.S. forces detained more than 100 juveniles in the first
year following the invasion, and more than 600 to date.4

Al-Shabaab, the youth, is an al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist group based in Somalia that has
conducted a range of operations against a number of targets within the country. The group has
recently made headlines for its alleged attempts to recruit young persons within Somali diaspora
communities. According to March 2009 testimony from Deputy Director of Intelligence for the
National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), in the last few years a number of Somali-American
young men have traveled to Somalia, possibly to train and fight with al-Shabaab.5 At least one of

Philip Johnston, MI5: Al-Qaeda Recruiting U.K. Children for Terror, Telegraph.co.uk, 7 November 2007.

Mark Hughes, Police Identify 200 Children as Potential Terrorists, The Independent, 28 March 2009,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/police-identify-200-children-as-potential-terrorists-1656027.html.

P.W. Singer, Too Young to Kill, Human Rights, (Newshouse News Service, Brookings Institution, 9 January
2005).

Rear Adm. Gregory Smith; and Major General Mohammed al-Askari, Press Conference, 5 February 2008,
www.mnf-iraq.com.

National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Hearing before the Senate Homeland Security Committee, Violent
Extremism: Al-Shabaab Recruitment in America, 11 March 2009.

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

these young men was killed during a suicide bombing attack in northern Somalia in October
2008, which is the first known instance of a U.S. citizen participating in a suicide attack.6
Evidence would suggest that youths roles within terrorist organizations has changed over time as well,
with a growing number of instances of young persons carrying out (or attempting to carry out) terrorist
attacks, to include suicide bombings.

Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers have a long history of using children as suicide bombers. They have
manufactured specialized denim jackets tailored in small sizes to enable children to conceal
explosives.7

In January 2002, two young Dutch men aged 20 and 21 years were killed in an attempt to attack a
heavily armed Indian Army patrol at a border checkpoint in Kashmir.8

Al-Qaeda in Iraq has developed videos to boost youth recruitment. The videos show al-Qaeda
members boasting about turning children into suicide bombers and show young boys making
statements promoting slaughter and declaring their allegiance to al-Qaeda. These tapes are
believed to be training films used to encourage other youth to join the terrorist network. Captured
along with these videos was a movie script outlining scenes where children would interrogate and
execute victims, plant improvised explosive devises, and conduct sniper attacks against security
forces.9

The demographics of the young persons becoming involved in terrorist groups also appear to be changing.
In many cases the persons implicated are younger than reported in the past; there appear to be more
female youth joining the ranks of terrorist organizations; and more young supporters are coming from
Western countries that are further removed from actual conflict areas.

The Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas have recruited children as young as thirteen to be
suicide bombers and children as young as eleven to smuggle explosives and weapons.10

During 2003, thirteen-year-old twin sisters who had been recruited by al-Qaeda linked groups
were caught attempting to commit a suicide bombing against Western businesses and local
government buildings in Morocco.11

Videos have been found in which young persons in the United Kingdom filmed themselves
reenacting beheadings. The youth were copying videos of beheadings that had been posted online
by terrorist groups or their supporters.12

Philip Mudd, Associate Executive Assistant Director, National Security Branch of the Federal Bureau of
Investigations (FBI) statement before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 11
March 2009.

P.W. Singer, The New Children of Terror, The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes,
vol. 1, ed. James J.F. Frost, (Praeger, November 2005), 105-119.

8 General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), Recruitment for the Jihad in The Netherlands: From Incident
to Trend, Den Haag: AIVD, December 2002, 34.
9

Rear Adm. Gregory Smith; and Major General Mohammed al-Askari, Press Conference, 5 February 2008,
www.mnf-iraq.com.

10

Singer, The New Children of Terror."

11

Ibid.

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

Finally, the Internet is used by terrorist groups to spread propaganda and garner support for their
activities. The Internet is accessible, cheap, and anonymous. It offers terrorists a variety of mediums to
disseminate messages and provides connections to recruiters and recruits that might not otherwise be
possible. Some groups have established websites designed specifically for youth audiences, disseminating
propaganda through colorful cartoons and games. These sites many of which are available in English
help to get the groups message out to a worldwide audience, including any young person that has access
to an Internet connection. In recent years, there have been reports of a growing trend of young persons
self-radicalizing through use of the Internet.

In 1998 there were a total of 12 active terrorist-related websites existed. By 2003, approximately
2630 such sites existed, and by January 2009 a total of 6940 active terrorist-related websites
existed.13

A website sponsored by Hamas, al-Fateh (meaning The Conqueror) is updated every week and
is designed for children, with a cartoon-style design and colorful childrens stories.14

Irfan Raja was a 19-year old British student whose entire radicalisation occurred online, with
hours spent online downloading extremist videos, posting messages, and chatting with other
radicals.15 In 2007, Raja made contact with an extremist recruiter online and, along with four
other young British persons he had never met, prepared to travel to a training camp overseas.

In response to inquiries about missing Somali-American youth, intelligence officials at the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) indicated recent statements by some al-Qaeda leaders and affiliates
have revealed an emphasis on communicating to international and, notably, English-speaking audiences
online.16
These and other examples provide evidence that youth have been utilized by terrorist organizations.
However, the circumstances by which youth became involved with terrorist groups, to include the process
by which they are recruited and radicalized, does not appear to be the subject of a significant body of
research, at least within the unclassified arena. For example, in 2006, a subgroup of the NATO Advanced
Research Working Group on the Social and Psychological Factors in the Genesis of Terrorism met to
discuss approaches for preventing or reducing the recruitment and retention of young people into terrorist
groups. The group comprised of social scientists, terrorism researchers, and educators, among others
acknowledged:
A great gap exists between what we know and what we need to know in order to reduce
the likelihood that young people will turn to terrorismCollaborative interdisciplinary
12

Jessica Stern, Jihad a global fad, The Boston Globe, August 1, 2006, from:
www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2006/08/01/jihad_a_global_fad.

13

Dr. Gabriel Weimann, "The Internet as a Terrorist Tool to Recruit Youth" (presentation given at the Youth
Recruitment & Radicalization Roundtable, Arlington, Virginia, March 19, 2009).

14

Dr. Gabriel Weimann, Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges (Washington, DC: USIP,
2006), 91.

15

Kings College London. "The Internet." in Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Militant Movement in
Europe. (University of London, December 2007), 89.

16

Andrew Liepman, Deputy Director of Intelligence for the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC),
Directorate of Intelligence, Hearing before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee,
11 March 2009.

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

research is urgently needed to develop policies and practices that are most likely to
prevent impressionable young people, especially those that perceive themselves to be part
of simmering or active conflicts, from becoming and remaining committed terrorists.17
The term radicalization has become more prevalent after the 2005 terrorist bombings in London that
targeted a bus and the subway system. The attacks were carried out by young men who had grown up in
the United Kingdom and did not fit the profile of past terrorist perpetrators: One of the four bombers
of 7 July was, on the face of it, a model student. He had never been in trouble with the police, was the son
of a well-established family and was employed and integrated into society. Since this attack, a
significant body of research has been aimed at getting a better understanding of why some people are
vulnerable to radicalization and the processes through which radicalization occurs.
More recently, the concern that youth are increasingly being radicalized and manipulated by terrorist
organizations was expressed in the U.S. Department of States 2007 Country Report on Terrorism
(released April 2008):
Radicalization of immigrant populations, youth and alienated minorities in Europe, the
Middle East, and Africa continued. But it became increasingly clear that radicalization to
violent extremism does not occur by accident, or because such populations are innately
prone to extremism. Rather, we saw increasing evidence of terrorists and extremists
manipulating the grievances of alienated youth or immigrant populations, and then
cynically exploiting those grievances to subvert legitimate authority and create unrest.
We also note a self-radicalization process of youth reaching out to extremists in order
to become involved in the broader AQ fight.
Such efforts to manipulate grievances represent a conveyor belt through which
terrorists seek to convert alienated or aggrieved populations, by stages, to increasingly
radicalized and extremist viewpoints, turning them into sympathizers, supporters, and
ultimately, in some cases, members of terrorist networks.18
The Department of State indicates radicalization to violent extremism does not occur by accident and
there is increasing evidence of terrorists and extremists manipulating the grievances of alienated youth.
Additionally, they point to the trend of a self-radicalization process of youth reaching out to extremists,
whereby young persons use the Internet to acquaint themselves to the terrorist groups ideologies. In
addition to understanding how terrorist groups recruit and utilize youth, a better understanding of how
youth are radicalized is needed.

Purpose
The United States Department of Education, Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools (OSDFS) has
sponsored this study to gain insight into how school-aged youth are recruited, radicalized, and utilized by
various international terrorist groups, to include: gaining a better understanding of the context(s) in which
recruitment and radicalization occur; the factors that may make youth more vulnerable to recruitment; the
17

Jeff Victoroff, et al., "Working Group 2: Preventing Substate Terrorist Groups from Recruiting and Retaining
Young Members, In Tangled Roots: Social and Psychological Factors in the Genesis of Terrorism (Amsterdam:
IOS Press, 2006).

18

U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, "Chapter 1, Strategic Assessment,"
Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, (Washington, DC, April 2008).

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

venues and circumstances where youth are targeted for recruitment; the kinds of persons or tools (e.g., the
Internet) involved in the recruitment process; and, the incentives offered.
The study is intended to analyze the role, if any, played by schools, educators, or others within the school
setting, either directly or indirectly, in inducing students toward violence or participation in terrorist
groups, through actions that promote, advocate, or support such groups.
Additionally, OSDFS wanted to discover what initiatives have been implemented internationally to
address the emerging threat of youth recruitment and radicalization. As such, the study also sought to
determine what, if any, role is currently being played by schools, educators, or others within the school
setting, either directly or indirectly, in advancing measures or taking actions that denounce violence or
terrorist groups and/or propose other alternatives.
An examination of the context(s) in which recruitment occurs, the range of tactics used by terrorist groups
worldwide, the inducements offered, and the ways in which these issues are being addressed
internationally will lead to a more comprehensive understanding of the issues as well as help the
Department of Education to identify if there are practical implications. Knowledge of the behaviors
associated with the recruitment and radicalization of youth will significantly advance our understanding
of whether schools, and by extension teachers, faculty, or others within the school setting are in any way
either directly or indirectly encouraging or motivating students toward violence or groups that support
violence. In addition, knowledge of whether schools, teachers, faculty or others within the school setting
either directly or indirectly take actions to denounce violence or violent groups and propose other
alternatives, will allow the Department of Education to determine whether modifications to current
policies and practices being used by U.S. schools are indicated.

Methodology
This study examines the recruitment, radicalization, and utilization of school-aged youth by international
terrorist groups and the initiatives that have been implemented internationally to counter the recruitment
and radicalization of young persons. To that end, case studies were developed to examine a set of
geographically and ideologically diverse international terrorist groups that utilize school-aged youth in
some capacity.

Definitions
For the purpose of this study, the following definitions apply:

Radicalization is the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to
use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change.19

Recruitment is the act of getting recruits or enlisting people for an army or a cause.20

School-aged youth include students ranging from kindergarten through college, which generally
include young persons between the ages of five and twenty-two.

19

As defined by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security

20

Dictionary.com., Princeton University. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/recruitment

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

International terrorist groups include those designated by the Secretary of State as Foreign
Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).21

Terrorism is the unlawful use of force against persons or property to intimidate a government, the
civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives.22

Case Study Selection

To narrow data collection, preliminary research was conducted on the 42 terrorist groups designated as
FTOs to determine if evidence existed that the group utilized school-aged youth. From the initial review,
a list of 23 currently active terrorist organizations was identified as utilizing youth. These groups, with
differing goals and motivations, are located in a variety of countries and regions throughout the world to
include: Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Nepal, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Thailand, Palestine, Lebanon, Colombia,
Somalia, Philippines, Japan, Sri Lanka, Peru, Bosnia, North Africa, & Western Europe. From this list, a
sample of terrorist organizations was selected for further study.
The groups selected for additional research were chosen because they were diverse in terms of geographic
location, ideology, and tactics, as well as how they recruited, radicalized, or utilized young persons. These
groups include:

Hamas

Hizballah

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)

Al-Qaeda and affiliated groups (primarily includes those active in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq,
and the United Kingdom)

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)

In addition to these groups, research was also conducted on radicalization of youth in the Netherlands and
on how the Internet is being used by terrorist organizations to reach out to youth audiences
A previous radicalization study conducted by HSI in 2008 looked at what actions were being taken by the
government of the Netherlands to prevent and counter radicalization. Through the course of this research,
it became apparent the Netherlands has been dealing with a growing problem of radicalization, especially
among segments of its youth population. Based on those findings, it was decided to take a second look at
the problem in the Netherlands with a specific focus on the radicalization of school-aged youth.

21

22

U.S. Department of State website, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm. Factsheet on Foreign Terrorist

Organizations (FTOs). Legal Criteria for Designation under Section 219 of the INA as amended: 1) It must be a
foreign organization; 2) The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined in section 212 (a)(3)(B) of
the INA (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)), or terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f(d)(2)), or retain the capability and intent to
engage in terrorist activity or terrorism; and 3) The organizations terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the
security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of
the United States.
U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85)

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

It was evident early into the process of researching the terrorist organizations listed above that many of
the groups were utilizing the Internet to reach out to a broad audience of potential recruits or supporters.
Similarly, it became apparent that some young persons especially those living outside of areas where
terrorist groups were prevalent had self-recruited or self-radicalized based on materials and connections
they were able to find online. As a result, the topic of Internet utilization by terrorist organizations and by
young persons as a means of recruitment and radicalization was included for further study.

Research Questions
Case study research was guided by eight framing questions that were developed at the outset of the study.
The questions, which were developed to address the areas of recruitment that were of interest or relevance
to the Department of Education, include:

Are school-aged youth recruited by the group? (If so, what age ranges?)

How are youth recruited? (What is the process? How does the process vary across the target
population of youth?)

Who recruits youth? (Are they being recruited by teachers, family members, religious leaders, or
other community members?)

What are youth recruited to do? (Are there differences in terms of what younger versus older
youth are recruited to do? Are youth utilized for violent or non-violent roles, or both?)

Who is recruited? (Is there a profile of the kinds of young persons who are recruited? Does the
group have a vetting process? Are there any specialized skill sets or educational level that groups
look for in young recruits? How does this vary depending on the situation?)

From where are youth being recruited? (Is it happening in schools, religious institutions, through
youth groups or sporting clubs?)

What are the benefits of recruitment? (For the youth, what incentives are they offered? For the
group, how does having young members help them?)

Have any programs or initiatives been developed to try to counter the recruitment of youth by this
group? (To what extent has the education system been involved in initiatives to counter
recruitment or radicalization?)

Data Sources
This study is derived entirely from unclassified materials. A wide range of sources was utilized to include
governmental reports on terrorism and counterterrorism initiatives, academic and private sector research,
media reporting, videos, and books.
Information was also derived through interviews with subject matter experts. Discussions were held, both
in person and via teleconference, with representatives from various governments, academic and private
sector researchers, and intelligence analysts located within the U.S. and abroad. All persons interviewed
were asked to recommend additional resources for the study.

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

Youth Recruitment & Radicalization Roundtable

OSDFS and HSI co-hosted a one-day Youth Recruitment and Radicalization Roundtable on 19 March
2009. The purpose of this session was to bring together a select group of persons to discuss what can be
learned from what is occurring elsewhere in the world with respect to youth recruitment and
radicalization; to discuss potential implications for the U.S.; and to determine what, if any, role the
education system can play in countering youth recruitment and radicalization or in promoting resilience
among youth.
This session provided a forum for OSDFS and HSI to vet their preliminary research observations with a
diverse audience of experts and stakeholders. Attendees included representatives from across the U.S.
government (including the Department of Justice, the National Counter Terrorism Center, the
Departments of Homeland Security and Education; school chiefs of police and Safe School Center
Directors from across the U.S.; and subject matter experts from academia and the private sector. More
detailed information on this roundtable and key points from the presentations provided therein are
included as Appendix A.

Parameters and Limitations

This study focused on gaining a better understanding of how international terrorist groups are recruiting,
radicalizing, and utilizing school-aged youth. The phenomenon of child soldiers (e.g., those serving in
militias in regions such as Africa and South America) was not within the scope of this study because a
significant body of research has already been devoted to the topic. However, the cases where young
persons were found to be serving as soldiers in the ranks of terrorist organizations (e.g., those that are
currently battling against Coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq) were included.
As noted above, this study utilized only open-source materials. It is possible that additional information
exists within the classified domain that could have advanced the understanding of how youth are being
recruited and utilized by terrorist groups. Additionally, it is likely that further details are available in
languages other than English. Some Dutch and Spanish source materials were translated by researchers
supporting this study. However, materials in other languages were not utilized. Finally, access to subject
matter experts varied depending on the groups being studied. In some cases (e.g., the Netherlands), far
more interviews were conducted with in-country experts. It was more difficult to identify in-country
experts to interview about the activities of other terrorist organizations.
It appears that minimal research has been conducted to-date that specifically addresses the role youth play
in terrorist organizations, as well as how youth become members in these groups. As such, for many of
the groups studied, it was difficult to find information available to answer all of the questions that guided
this study. In some cases, the information that was available was anecdotal and did not cover all aspects
of recruitment in detail.
The situation in some of the regions studied appears to be in a state of flux, to include those in active
conflict zones. Some of the groups studied appear to be in the process of changing their tactics, to include
the utilization of young persons. As a result, the extent to which the information collected is up-to-date
was difficult to measure. However, for all groups studied, efforts were made to get a better understanding
of their current practices as well as any applicable group trends.
Lastly, one of the goals of this study was to get a better understanding of the initiatives and programs that
have been put in place in various locations by community groups, governments, and schools to counter
10

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

terrorist recruitment and radicalization of youth. In some cases, it was difficult to identify specific
programs implemented to address young persons directly. There are likely a wide range of counterterrorism and counter-radicalization initiatives as well as developmental aid programs implemented
abroad by various governmental and non-governmental actors that may indirectly serve to counter
terrorist recruitment and radicalization of youth. However, unless these programs were explicitly linked to
countering youth recruitment, radicalization, or utilization by terrorist organizations, they were not
included as examples.

Report Structure
The report is organized into three sections, followed by Appendices.

Section I provides an overview of the themes and trends derived from across all of the terrorist
groups that were examined in depth. These key insights are organized around the eight research
questions that guided this study.

Section II contains research summaries for each of the terrorist groups that were studied, as well
as overviews on youth radicalization in the Netherlands and on how the Internet is being used by
terrorist groups as a recruitment and radicalization tool. The case studies are intended to address
the following key points for each of the terrorist groups studied:

Group background

Group appeal

Reasons for recruiting/radicalizing youth

Group approach

Initiatives implemented to counter their attempts to enlist young recruits

Section III summarizes the key findings and their implications for countering youth recruitment
and radicalization. It also identifies areas where additional research is needed.

Appendix A provides an overview of the Youth Recruitment & Radicalization Roundtable cohosted by the Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools and the Homeland Security Institute on 19
March 2009.

Appendix B provides an overview of the Cooperative Civic Education and Economic Education
Exchange Program administered by the United States Department of Education, Office of Safe
and Drug-Free Schools.

The report concludes with a glossary of terms, and a bibliography containing the references utilized
for this study.

11

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

S ECTION I. T HEMES & T RENDS

This section provides an overview of the themes and trends derived from across all of the terrorist groups
that were examined in depth. Key insights are organized into each of the eight research questions that
guided the study.

Are school-aged youth being recruited or radicalized by terrorist

groups?
The terrorist groups selected for this study were all found to be actively recruiting and utilizing youth.
While the ages of the young persons varied depending on the group, across all groups there were
examples of school-aged young persons (e.g., kindergarten through college, or approximately between the
ages of five and twenty-two) that were involved in a range of support and operational activities.

Who is recruited?
There is not a single profile to describe young persons who have been recruited by the terrorist groups
studied. There appear to be variations both within the groups, as well as between the different groups
overseas. The young persons who have been recruited or radicalized span a range of ages and
developmental stages, include both males and females, have varying skill sets and education levels, and
appear to have grown up in a variety of environments.
It appears that some of the groups utilize a vetting process to help identify new recruits. In some cases,
the group might be looking for more educated, skilled, or committed young persons to fill a particular role
in the organization (e.g., future leaders or operational planners), while in other cases the groups appear to
be interested in simply filling the ranks. Vetting has occurred through the use of gateway organizations,
which have included groups similar to the Boy Scouts or through other youth organizations, such as those
affiliated with universities or religious institutions. In some cases these gateway organizations are
sponsored by the terrorist groups to grow future members, while in other circumstances the groups may
use the organization(s) as a venue for spotting potential recruits. The Internet has also been used to vet
potential members by testing language capabilities, specific ideological knowledge, and fervor.
As mentioned above, there appear to be variations within the groups over time with respect to who is
recruited. As the groups goals and situational context change, or as they are affected by retention issues
and losses of members due to incarceration or death, the types of recruits they are willing to bring on may
change. In some situations where groups have enjoyed broad support from the community, they have
been able to be more selective about recruits. However, when support bases have lessened and/or the need
for personnel has increased, it appears to have an effect on the types of persons that are recruited (i.e., the
group might decide to reach out to even younger persons or persons who have less knowledge of or
dedication to the groups underlying ideology.)

Who recruits school-aged youth?

Looking across all of the case studies, the types of individuals that appear to play a key role in recruiting
youth begin to emerge. These persons include (but are not limited to) religious figures and teachers, as
well as family members and peers. In most cases, these individuals are members or supporters of the
terrorist group and have access to the youth, such as in schools, religious institutions, or social situations.

12

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

In regions where the terrorist organization has broad community endorsement, family members (who may
also belong to the group) have been known to influence or encourage their son/daughter, sibling,
niece/nephew, or grandchild to support the group. Likewise, friends and close social networks that are
important and influential in the lives of young persons, have also been a part of the radicalization or
recruitment process.
Teachers at the elementary, secondary, and university levels have recruited or attempted to recruit
students to join or support various terrorist organizations. It is unclear whether these individuals go into
the profession for the purpose of being in a position to radicalize youth, or if they take advantage of their
role as a mentor to encourage recruitment or radicalization.
Young persons are not always recruited by others. In some instances, youth appear to become acquainted
with the group or radicalized of their own volition. The Internet has been used by some youths to
familiarize themselves with radical ideology, or to identify other likeminded persons (e.g., to include
recruiters) that can provide additional information and access.

From where are youth being recruited?

Recruitment was found to take place across a wide range of venues. While not inclusive of all locations
where recruitment is initiated, common settings used by the groups studied include: schools and afterschool activities, religious institutions or events, refugee camps, and the Internet.
For most of the groups studied, the education system (e.g., schools) was used in some form or another to
recruit or radicalize young students. In at least one instance, the terrorist organization actually runs the
education system, to include infiltration in teacher and student unions, and exerts total control over
curricula. In other locations, groups had either established or taken over individual schools in essence,
creating a parallel education system to teach radical ideology and provide training. In some rural areas,
these groups provided the only educational institution available to young persons. In all cases, the ability
of the terrorist group to gain access to schools appeared to be due to weak governmental control over the
education system.
Some organizations were also found to sponsor after-school activities, youth groups, and summer camps
aimed at providing additional opportunities for indoctrination and training. These activities provide an
outlet for youth to socialize with their peers, and participate in recreational activities while affording the
group more opportunities to identify and train qualified recruits.
Religious institutions, specifically mosques, were also highlighted across many of the groups as a location
where recruitment occurs. There were examples of both radical mosques (e.g., preaching Salafist
ideologies) as well as radical persons within the mosques, that attempted to use the venue to spot potential
recruits. In many cases, it appears the recruiters would pull the more promising young persons away from
the mosque into a smaller setting where more in-depth recruitment could occur with less fear of being
noticed by other, more moderate members of the congregation.
Refugee camps in conflict areas (e.g., Afghanistan) were also identified as locations where youth have
been recruited. Some groups in the Afghan region have played upon the vulnerability of the large number
of young displaced persons by recruiting and using them in battles against Coalition forces and local
government.

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Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

The Internet offers thousands of sites, which provide radical propaganda distributed by terrorist groups, to
reach potential supporters or recruits. All of the groups studied had an Internet presence, although the
extent to which they are online varies greatly.
A trend that was noted across many of the groups was that they did not limit recruitment to local venues,
but also recruited globally through some of the locations described above. There was evidence of
coordinated outreach to young persons in the groups diaspora communities. This occurred through the
Internet as well as in person, with group members utilizing mosques and social activities in other
locations to find sympathetic youth that could enable expansion of the groups reach.

How are youth recruited?

Four broad categories were identified to describe the way in which young persons were recruited or
became members of the groups studied. These approaches born into a radical environment, forced
into it, recruited or persuaded, and self-radicalization are not inclusive of all the ways in which young
persons are recruited, and are likely to occur in various combinations.
To clarify, saying that some young persons are born into a radical environment is not to say they are
born a terrorist. For some of the groups and regions studied, there is a culture of violence that is
reinforced by the community, and many within the community are members or supporters of the group. In
situations where the group serves as the pseudo- (or actual) government, providing social services and
other support mechanisms, it appears the local community views membership or martyrdom on behalf of
the group to be an honor, even if it means young lives are lost. There are also some regions that have been
faced with instability for years and, as a result, the only life young persons have ever known is one
defined by violence and conflict. In these situations, it appears youth could be more inclined or have no
choice to support the violent tactics used by the group.
In some cases, young persons have been forced into joining or supporting terrorist groups. Young persons
have been kidnapped from locations such as schools and refugee camps. Additionally, some youth have
been forced to participate against their will or unknowingly.
As described throughout this study, there are persons within all of the groups studied who have made
concerted efforts to recruit or persuade youth to join or support the groups cause. Recruitment occurs in a
variety of locations and utilizes a range of approaches and tactics. In some cases, recruiters will place
themselves within large groups of young persons (e.g., at mosques or schools), where they will attempt to
spot potential recruits to pull into smaller settings for additional indoctrination of training. Groups have
also established or used gateway organizations (e.g., scouting groups) that provide access to young
persons who support (or can be grown to support) the groups cause.
The Internet has also enabled some youth to become self-radicalized. This forum provides access to a
wealth of materials and propaganda put out by terrorist groups or their supporters. These websites also
enable young persons to communicate anonymously with likeminded individuals and can facilitate
introductions to persons with whom the youth otherwise would not have likely come in contact.
For all of the groups studied, another important factor in how they recruit is the communication of
tailored messages and targeting of specific grievances aimed at encouraging youth to support the cause.
All of the groups took actions as a recruitment tool to manipulate young persons personal and political
grievances and/or to exploit feelings of social or cultural repression.

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Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

What are youth recruited to do?

While it is difficult to say exactly what youth are recruited to do, there are examples from each of the
groups studied that show how young persons have been utilized. The roles include both operational and
support activities, in addition to helping to keep the organization alive.
Specifically, school-aged youth have been used to carry out terrorist attacks or serve on the front line in
battles against the opposing forces. It appears that the groups use youth to support operations because
they are more likely to evade detection by security forces. In some instances, it also seems that young
persons are perpetrating attacks for the groups because there are not enough willing adults.
Young persons were also found to fulfill a range of logistical support needs for the groups. These
activities include: conducting surveillance, assisting in fundraising, or helping to move materials or
weapons.
Ultimately, it would appear that youth are recruited by terrorist groups in an attempt to keep the
organization alive. To that end, young persons are utilized to keep the groups message going. This occurs
online (which may also be self-initiated) and through youth participation in videos and other forms of
propaganda. In the course of this research, several videos were identified that portray young persons
training for terrorist activities, espousing radical ideology, and advocating youth involvement and support
for the groups studied, all of which could be used as tools designed to encourage participation of other
youngsters.

What are the benefits of recruitment?

The benefits and consequences of recruitment can be broken into two categories: those that benefit the
terrorist group, and, those that benefit the young person. For the groups studied, the primary benefit of
recruiting youth is that it enables them to fill their ranks, which is crucial to their continued existence.
Also, the use of young persons (as mentioned above) is likely to help some groups evade detection by
security forces, something that would enable them to carry out terrorist attacks. It does not appear that
there are significant negative consequences to groups that have utilized young persons to further their
goals.
For the young person, the group offers to meet needs personal, welfare, and social that might not
already be met by their social or familial networks. In many of the regions studied, parts of the youth
population are living in poverty, lack shelter and food, and have limited access to education. The terrorist
groups have used these situations to their advantage by offering young persons what they are lacking (or
by offering a way out through martyrdom). Not all youth who have been susceptible to recruitment and
radicalization necessarily come from poverty-stricken areas or conflict zones or are uneducated.
Membership in terrorist groups can also help to provide a sense of community, family, or friendships that
some young persons, rich or poor, might lack. Membership in groups also appeared to provide youth with
a sense of identity, prestige or pride, acceptance, responsibility, outlets for frustration, and excitement
all factors that could just as easily lead youth to other types of violent or non-violent groups or networks.

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Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

What programs or initiatives have been developed to try to counter the

recruitment of youth?
Initiatives to counter violent radical groups have been developed in many of the locations studied. The
approach taken in each of these regions varies, with some focusing primarily on law enforcement and
government actions or initiatives aimed at preventing acts of terrorism and shutting down terrorist
networks. Some of the regions studied have implemented counter-radicalization initiatives aimed more at
understanding why people are susceptible to radicalization and then using that knowledge to minimize its
occurrence. However, very few of the counter-radicalization initiatives appear to be aimed specifically at
addressing or preventing radicalization and recruitment of school-aged individuals.
There are a few initiatives or programs identified in some of the regions that directly address youth, or are
aimed at stemming recruitment attempts in venues frequented by youths. For example, school-based
programs have been implemented in some regions that seek to educate both students and teachers about
radicalization and potential signs of extremism. Curricula have been updated in some countries to
promote integration and multiculturalism, as well as to teach skills that would be useful to young persons
seeking employment. In at least one of the locations studied, new schools are being opened in areas where
existing schools were either established or infiltrated by terrorist groups in order to provide educational
alternatives.
Other youth-based programs that were identified include: ensuring that job opportunities are available for
young persons; tackling discrimination that could lead persons to become radicalized; and, developing
rehabilitation programs for young persons who have been implicated in terrorist or extremist activity.
With respect to countering Internet-based recruitment or radicalization, it appears that existing initiatives
are not focused on youth as a distinct group.

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Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

S ECTION II. C ASE S TUDIES ON R ECRUITMENT,

R ADICALIZATION , AND U TILIZATION OF Y OUTH BY
T ERRORIST G ROUPS
The processes by which school-aged youth become involved in terrorist groups worldwide are not well
understood. Research to date that specifically addresses the recruitment, radicalization, and utilization of
young persons appears to be limited. This is not to say that the problem is limited. There is growing
evidence that the number of young persons from diverse locations across the world who are becoming
members or supporters of various terrorist organizations is growing.
The purpose of the case studies below is to provide a better understanding of the context(s) in which
young persons are recruited and radicalized by some terrorist groups. The cases address the reasons why
these groups appear to have chosen to target young persons as well as the approaches and tactics used.
The various ways that groups appeal to their young audiences also is discussed, as are some of the
initiatives that have been implemented to counter youth recruitment and radicalization. Information that
addresses the role, if any, played by schools, educators, or others within the school setting, either directly
or indirectly, in inducing students toward violence or participation in terrorist groups, through actions that
promote, advocate, or support such groups also is presented. Conversely, information that addresses the
role, if any, that is currently being played by schools, educators, or others within the school setting, either
directly or indirectly, in advancing measures or taking actions that denounce violence or terrorist groups
and/or propose other alternatives also is provided.
Case studies are provided for the following terrorist organizations, which were selected because they
appear to be diverse in terms of geographic location, ideology, and tactics:

Hamas and Hizballah

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

Al-Qaeda and Affiliated Groups

Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).

Additional case studies are provided to present research findings on the growing problem of youth
radicalization in the Netherlands, and to present research on how the Internet is being used by terrorist
groups to reach out to youth audiences, including how some young persons are self-radicalizing online.
The information provided herein represents a high-level overview of the research that was conducted for
this study, and specifically addresses the approaches being used by the groups to gain support from young
persons. Any evidence found that addresses the ways education systems have been utilized by terrorist
groups to reach students has been included. It is important to note that the case studies are not intended to
provide an evaluation of the effectiveness of any of the tactics being used by the various groups. Based on
the limited amount of data that addresses this topic, it is also likely that the recruitment and radicalization
approaches described herein are not inclusive of all methods currently being used by these groups. Figure
I. highlights the countries and regions discussed in the case studies.

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Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

Figure I. Map of the countries and regions discussed in the case studies

Hamas and Hizballah

Hamas and Hizballah attempt to recruit and radicalize school-aged youth by actively reaching out through
schools, youth camps, and the mass media. The groups utilization of various media platforms including
the Internet, TV, and radio is extensive. Both Hamas and Hizballah have used young persons to carry
out violent attacks, including suicide bombings. Initiatives to counter recruitment of youths appear to be
severely hindered due to the groups political legitimacy and their control of the social welfare system.
The culture of violence existing within the locations where Hamas and Hizballah operate further
complicates the effectiveness of counter initiatives.

Background
Hamas, the Arabic acronym for Islamic Resistance Movement, and Hizballah, which means Party of
God, are similar in that both groups have active roles in governance and terrorism. Both began as
resistance groups before evolving into separate controlling authorities. Hizballah, which was established
in the early 1980s, is the current de facto authority in parts of Lebanon, currently holds 14 seats in the
Lebanese Parliament, and controls 11 of 30 cabinet positions.23 Hizballah has also maintained its widely

23

Council on Foreign Relations, "Hezbollah," http://www.cfr.org/publication/9155/

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Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

feared militant arm during its political ascent. While Hamas became active in the late 1980s, with the
start of the first Intifada in the Palestinian Territories, it escalated
from an armed resistance group to the democratically-elected
majority party in the Palestinian Parliament. 24 Like Hizballah,
Hamas still operates a militant arm, the Al-Qassam Brigades,
which are internationally recognized for committing suicide
operations and firing Qassam rockets against Israel.
Hamas and Hizballah are both mature organizations containing
legitimate social welfare programs and political parties with
varying levels of governing authority. Each group is the dominant
influence in their respective region that gives them a distinct
advantage in maintaining a radicalized and supportive population
that, in turn, helps them recruit local youth.

Appeal
Hamas and Hizballah appeal to their bases by acting as the representative opposition on behalf of the
Palestinians. While having differences in mission and religious persuasion, both share a combination of
factors, including opposition to Israel and other geopolitical grievances, which are used as catalysts for
radicalizing the population. Israel serves as the common other, or the projected evil enemy that
pervades rhetoric and lifestyle for both Hamas and Hizballah. By having this common enemy, each
organization strategically manipulates the geo-political grievances linked with Israeli occupation or
alleged repression in order to keep the respective populations radicalized and potentially ripe for future
recruitment.
Hamas is adept at using perceived or real grievances to keep its constituents hostile. There are a number
of grievances or social preconditions that can be linked to each respective cause, such as low quality of
life, lack of jobs, poor living conditions in the refugee camps, and lack of adequate institutions. According
to one expert, Hamas is able to execute a strategically planned radicalization campaign that translates
existing social preconditions Israeli occupation, military checkpoints, lack of Palestinian leadership,
lawlessness into an active, violent, and radical response.25 Regardless of the specific grievance or
condition, both Hamas and Hizballah use existing circumstances and external factors to appeal to their
base.

Why Youth?
Youth are utilized to fill the ranks of both terrorist organizations. While one source observed a peak in the
use of young people in suicide terrorist operations in 2002, the Israel Security Agency (ISA) compared
the number of minors involved in terrorist incidents and found a 64% increase since 2003. 26

24

There have been conflicting reports about whether Hamas helped start the first intifada, or merely took advantage
of it after it started. Hamas won the majority of seats in the Palestinian Authority in the 2006 elections.

25

Matthew Levitt, Hamas: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad, The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, (Yale University Press, 2006).

26

Ibid.

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Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

In 2001, the Islamic University in Gaza conducted a poll of 1000 local youth ranging in age from 9-16
years old. The survey findings indicated that 45 per cent of the respondents had taken an active role in the
violence and, in addition, 73 per cent of the youngsters stated that they wanted to become martyrs.27 It
would appear some youth who grow up in these societies where violence is widespread may be more
willing to participate in violent activities or to support terrorist goals.
Not only are youth a source of human capital, they are also a tactical asset as well. Hamas knows that
Israeli soldiers are instructed not to shoot at children so the group uses young people as human shields or
bait.28 Senior Hamas operative Salim Haja admitted during questioning that he placed a bomb
laboratory close to a school, and that the operatives in the laboratory were disguised as pupils carrying
schoolbags and books, in an apparent attempt to prevent the factory from being destroyed.29 There are
indications that children act as bait, burning tires and shooting slingshots to attract the television cameras
and distract the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), in tandem with well-armed Palestinian gunmen in ambush
positions.30
Lastly, young people are the future of any organization, society or culture. By winning over the young
generation of children, both Hizballah and Hamas are establishing societal support for future operations
and causes.

Approach
Both Hamas and Hizballah use a holistic, authority-approved approach to recruiting and radicalizing
youth. The approaches are holistic in that both groups reach out to young persons from an early age (e.g.,
kindergarten, utilizing a wide range of tools, tactics, and venues aimed at garnering support and preparing
recruits for future membership. Attempts to recruit and radicalize the population can be considered
authority-approved because both Hamas and Hizballah hold leadership positions in the cabinet and seats
in parliament. Both Hizballah and Hamas operate powerful and charitable social welfare systems in their
respective regions. The groups fund and operate hospitals and schools, and take care of infrastructure and
other basic needs.
While many members of both communities are supportive of the groups activities, for those that are not,
it appears resistance is futile and, at times, met with retribution.31 There have been reports that the armed
groups have pressured families of those who have been killed while carrying out attacks, including
children, not to condemn but to welcome and endorse their relatives actions.32 Therefore it is likely
many people do not speak out against the groups methods for recruiting and utilizing youth for fear of
retribution.

27

Likud of Holland, Exploitation of children for terrorist purposes, Communicated by Israeli security sources,
(January 14, 2003), http://www.likud.nl/extr257.html.

28

Tashbih Sayyad, Disposable Children, (March 31, 2004), www.paktoday.com/children.htm

29

Ibid.

30

Ibid.

31

Ibid.

32

Ibid.

20

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

The Education System

The educational system has played a central role in radicalization and recruitment for Hamas and
Hizballah. Hamas leader Sheikh Hasan Usef and Hizballah General Secretary Hassan Nasrallah have
indicated that the groups like to grow them (members) from kindergarten through college. Many young
persons in both regions attend schools that are controlled by those respective groups. These schools
provide educational instruction that in concert with the groups ideologies and beliefs, and often times
provide physical training (e.g, drills with guns) aimed at preparing young persons for participation in the
groups militant wings.
Hamas controls the Palestinian education system, from the Ministry of Education to the school district to
the classroom. According to one report, Hamas controls eight of the fourteen West Bank school districts,
and has implemented requirements that have resulted in the hiring of nearly 300 graduates of Islamic
teachers colleges that are located within Hamas strongholds. 33 Hamas established a teachers union and
claims to have enlisted 58,000 teachers, including those in both private and public schools throughout
Gaza and the West Bank.34 At the university level, group members have infiltrated student councils and
have established a Hamas-affiliated student association called Kutla Islamiya, or Islamic bloc.35
Hizballah sponsors schools within Lebanon. These schools (which are subject to approval by the
Lebanese government, of which Hizballah is a part) are privately funded and operated, and exist
alongside the state education system and other private schools. Hizballahs primary and secondary
schools teach the national curriculum approved by the Lebanese Ministry of Education, but supplement
this with a significant focus on Shia Islamic studies.36 These schools have the potential to indoctrinate
students and teachers alike, and provide the group with a ready and willing support base. As one
Hizballah schoolteacher indicated, Ive been teaching at Al-Mahdi School for years, and when your
employer asks you to be part of an organized movement that relies on the presence of their supporters,
you cant say no.37 While in some instances Hizballah-run schools may be preferred to other state or
private institutions, in other cases they may serve as the only school available to Lebanese youth, due to
the lack of other schools in the area.38
Summer Camps
In addition to the indoctrination and training provided within the school system, both groups sponsor
summer camps and other extra-curricular activities for young persons. Hizballah operates the Imam alMahdi Scouts group for young boys and girls. The Scouts are comparable to boy-scout/girl-scout groups,
except that in addition to tying knots, going camping and playing sports, they also teach young persons
33

Karin Laub, Hamas pushing ideology as it takes control of education system, Desert News (Salt Lake City, June
19, 2007).

34

Ibid.

35

Levitt, Hamas: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad.

36

See: Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism, (IB Taurus. 2005), 84; and Lt. Cl. Rodger
Shanahan, Radical Islamist Groups in the Modern Age: A Case Study of Hizbullah, Working Paper No. 376,
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, (Canberra, Australia, June, 2003), 12.

37

Hanin Ghaddar, Tent City or Ghost City? NOW Lebanon, (19 July 2007).
http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=7204.

38

Shanahan, Radical Islamist Groups in the Modern Age: A Case Study of Hizbullah, 12.

21

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

how to take hostages and carry out assassinations. The Scouts provide an additional outlet for
indoctrination into the groups ideology, placing emphasis on the hatred of Israel. There are reportedly
42,000 young members, with some as young as 8-years-old. 39 According to Bilal Naim, Hizballahs
former director for the Mahdi Scouts, it appears that many young male Scouts leave the group to join the
resistance or the military around the age of sixteen.40
Hamas controls the Ministry of Sport and Youth, which sponsors summer camps for young persons living
in the Palestinian Territories. Hamas camps also provide activities for young persons, such as playing
sports and participating in other outdoor activities. With many young persons living in refugee camps in
the area, Hamas summer camps appear to be influential in the lives of impoverished young boys and girls
by giving them something to do.
Mass Media
Hamas and Hizballah are on the cutting edge of mass communications and media related terrorist
propaganda. From childhood, kids watch puppet shows of, for example, former President Bush getting
stabbed on television. They read online magazines that advocate violence against Israel, and play online
video games that promote violence against the West.
Hamas runs a television station, Al Aqsa TV, and an online magazine, Al-Fateh, that promote violence
against Israel. The magazine, which is designed for children, uses cartoon characters, games and other
content to demonize Jews and Israelis and glorify terrorism.41 It provides games and coloring sections,
as well as pictures of children with guns and of Hamas leaders. On Al Aqsa TV, there is a childrens
program called Tomorrows Pioneer that once had a popular character, named Farfur, who closely
resembled Mickey Mouse. 42 In one episode, Farfur the mouse was beaten to death by an alleged Israeli
soldier. According to the narrator, the mouse was martyred while defending his land. Farfur was replaced
by Nahool the Bee, who was also killed by the enemy.43
Hizballah operates a similar television station, called Al Manar that also has programming reinforcing
group goals and ideology. Hizballah also has an Internet division that has released a series of video games
for young persons. Special Force (released in 2003) and Special Force 2 (released in 2007) are designed
to simulate military missions against Israeli soldiers.44

39

40
41

42

The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Hezbollahs Shiite Youth Movement, 'The Imam al-Mahdi
Scouts,' Has Tens of Thousands of Members, (Gelilot, Israel: Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration
Center, 11 September 2006).
Ibid.
Hamas Online Magazine for Children Promotes Terror and Hatred, Anti-Defamation League, (11 May 2007),
http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/hamas_alfateh_may.htm.
Ibid.

43

Mickey Mouse Knockoff On Hamas TV Used To Indoctrinate Children Into Culture Of Hate, Anti-Defamation
League, (9 May 2007), http://www.adl.org/PresRele/ASaw_14/5046_14.htm.

44

Richard Engel, Hezbollah Game Celebrates War Vs. Israel, (August 16, 2007), MSNBC
http://worldblog.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2007/08/16/320076.aspx?p=1.

22

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

Counter Initiatives
Because Hamas and Hizballah are part of the government authority in their respective regions, it isnt
surprising that initiatives in place to counter the groups attempts to recruit or radicalize young persons
are minimal. Initiatives that do exist are primarily sponsored by international governments or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and are aimed at educational development as opposed to countering
recruitment or radicalization. A single locally sponsored initiative was identified, which is aimed at
empowering young persons and helping them address issues they have faced as a result of growing up in
violent environments.
The U.S. Government is active in aiding Palestinians and individuals in Lebanon. For example, the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) has allocated over $10 million toward education
development programs in the West Bank and Gaza. The Academy for Education Development (AED) has
provided technical assistance to Palestinian education reform, including training future Palestinian
teachers, who many contend are crucial to any lasting changes in Palestinian education.45 USAID
Lebanon is engaged with a variety of programs, including upgrading over 200 schools that house nearly
75,000 students, and providing scholarships for young people in need of financial assistance. 46 There
have been attempts to revitalize the Palestinian education system through the United Nations Work and
Relief Agency (UNWRA). The UNWRA coordinated a group of organizations to conduct an analysis on
the state of education in the Territories, to include curriculum that is being taught.
The Freedom Theatre is another key initiative in the region. It is run out of the Jenin Refugee Camp in the
northern part of the Occupied Palestinian West Bank, which is home to nearly 16,000 Palestinian
refugees, almost half of whom are estimated to be under the age of eighteen. Nearly all of these young
persons are said to have witnessed actual or threatened death, experienced serious physical injury, or had
threats made to their physical and/or psychological integrity.47 The primary aim of the Freedom Theatre
program is to provide children and youth with a safe space in which they are free to express themselves
and in which they can develop the skills, self-knowledge, and confidence that would empower them to
challenge present realities and to reach out beyond the limits of their own community.48 Through
theatrical performances and other artistic endeavors, young persons are encouraged to imagine and accept
alternatives. The program not only provides a place for young persons to go to get off the street, but also
provides an opportunity for young males and females to act, play, and learn together, something that is
rare within the Palestinian community, which is often segregated by gender.49
The Freedom Theatre, which was initially established by an Israeli woman, has a strong advocate in the
head of the Jenin Branch of the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Zakaria Zubeidi, who indicated that childrens

45

Aaron D. Pina, Palestinian Education and the Debate Over Textbooks, CRS Report for Congress, (March 7,
2006), 19.

46

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Programs: Investing in Youth, Updated 3 January 2008.
http://www.usaid.gov/lb/programs/youth.html.

47

The Freedom Theatre Website, Children & Youth in Palestine, http://www.thefreedomtheatre.org/aboutusbackground.php.

48

The Freedom Theatre Website, Empowering Children & Youth, http://www.thefreedomtheatre.org/aboutusnew.php.

49

Al Jazeera, Jenins Theatrical Oasis, Al Jazeera.net, (5 September 2008).

23

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

theatre is as important a method for achieving Palestinian statehood as armed conflict.50 Due to his links
to terrorism, the theatre director indicates that Zubeidi does not provide funding for the program but does
provide support from the top of the mountain, protecting us, giving us legitimacy to be here.51

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) radicalizes and recruits school-aged youth into the organization through Islamic
boarding schools and universities, as well as by utilizing communal bonds. Some JI members are known
to have been former students and/or instructors at radical schools and universities. Strong familial
relations within the terrorist organization means young persons often follow in their relatives footsteps
into the group, helping to maintain a strong and unified support community. Counter initiatives vary by
country, but several have targeted school settings either through the provision of alternative schools, or
curriculum that emphasizes multiculturalism and inclusion.

Background
Jemaah Islamiyah, meaning
Islamic Congregation, is an
Islamist terrorist network that has
claimed responsibility for several
high profile terrorist attacks across
Southeast Asia, resulting in the
deaths of hundreds of civilians. In
addition to terrorist attacks, JI
operates as a communal social
network that conducts economic and
social outreach activities in several
Southeast Asian countries, including
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,
Thailand, and the Philippines.
Jemaah Islamiyah was created in the early 1990s as an offshoot to Darul Islam, a militant radical
movement that opposed Dutch colonialism in Indonesia. In contrast to the Indonesian-centric approach of
Darul Islam, group members and Muslim clerics Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir, formed JI
with the intention of waging global jihad. The goal of JI is to establish strict interpretation of Muslim law
(shariah) in Indonesia, and then spread shariah law to other neighboring Southeast Asian nations.
Jemaah Islamiyah is currently consolidating its base and focusing on recruiting and training new members
to ensure group resilience and strength for years to come. Although counter-terrorism operations have
dealt a significant blow to senior JI leadership, with several key members recently being incarcerated or
killed, the group continues to pose a threat as key operational leaders remain at large.
The group is known to use schools to radicalize, recruit, and indoctrinate youth. JI is believed to have a
systematic indoctrination program that starts as early as the pre-kindergarten years.52 The group runs a

50

Ibid.

51

Ibid.

24

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

network of pesantrens (religious boarding schools that typically serve youth under the age of 18) that are
used to reinforce the extremist ideology of the group. Several JI leaders have been graduates of these
schools, and in a few instances have also been instructors.

Appeal
Jemaah Islamiyahs appeal to its supporters partially lies in its ability to supply a sense of religiosity. JI
leaders, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir, are Muslim clerics that have developed the groups
ideology of waging a global jihad. Sungkar and Baasyir have sought to create a jemaah (religious
community) in Indonesia that would abide by shariah law. As the terrorist network expanded to
surrounding nations, including Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, the networks ideological goal
began to encompass these nations as well. After generations of suffering under colonialism and
authoritarian rule, a government guided by Muslim principles was appealing to many JI members.
A strength of the JI network is the groups strong communal bonds. Strong social networks ensure the
group ideology is continually reinforced, especially from a young age, through family members, friends,
and classmates. The strong communal ties shared by group members make disengagement and deradicalization initiatives difficult. Members who leave physically or emotionally feel they are
betraying family and friends. Jemaah Islamiyah also reinforces commitment to the Muslim community.
The continuing sectarian conflict between Muslims and Christians in parts of Indonesia is used by Jemaah
Islamiyah as a recruiting tool, a radicalizing message, and a mechanism for members to demonstrate their
commitment to their fellow Muslims.

Why Youth
Jemaah Islamiyah appears to be focusing radicalization and indoctrination efforts on young persons in
order to maintain its community of supporters and sympathizers. Sons, brothers, and nephews are
encouraged to follow in the footsteps of their male relatives by joining the terrorist organization, while
daughters and wives are expected to be sympathizers and supporters. Referred to as Inherited Jihadism,
these family ties ensure that the children of JI members will grow up in the network, allowing the
ideology to strengthen the group socially and economically to enable it to survive police and intelligence
crackdowns.53
There is a lack of conclusive evidence that suggests JI uses school-aged youth to carry out attacks,
reinforcing the analysis that these youth are targeted in order to build a support base. However, the
targeted recruitment of university students who display certain technical skills suggests JI seeks
individuals possessing characteristics that can be used for planning and preparing terrorist attacks.

Approach
Jemaah Islamiyah radicalizes and recruits school aged youth at pesantrens, through universities located
throughout Southeast Asia, and through communal ties. The approach taken by the group in each of these
settings does not appear to be uniform.

52

Sidney Jones, Inherited Jihadism: Like Father Like Son, Australian Financial Review, (4 July 2007).

53

Sidney Jones, Inherited Jihadism: Like Father Like Son, 2007.

25

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

Pesantrens
Pesantrens are Islamic religious boarding schools that are located throughout Southeast Asian nations.
These schools often exhibit a diverse curriculum including general education such as language, math, and
science, as well as vocational skills and religious studies. 54 There are approximately 25,000 35,000
Islamic boarding schools in Southeast Asia, including 14,000 pesantrens in Indonesia registered with the
Ministry of Religion.55 Pesantrens serve between 20-25 percent of Indonesian school children as a whole,
with certain areas, such as East Java as high as 40 percent.56 The popularity of these schools is likely due
to the inability of the central governments to provide adequate, state-run educational institutions.
Pesantrens run by Jemaah Islamiyah comprise a very small portion of the 25,000-35,000 schools in
Southeast Asia. Most experts agree that JI controls between approximately 20 and 150 pesantrens. 57 The
curriculum in these JI-run schools appears to be significantly different than traditional pesantrens.
Education is based solely on Arabic training and Quranic study according to Sungkar and Baasyirs
teachings, utilizing rote memorization and recitation as teaching methods.5859 Jemaah Islamiyah uses their
pesantrens to create a culture of extremism that radicalizes and indoctrinates students according to the JI
ideology. Several journalistic accounts of the culture inside JI-affiliated pesantrens located in Indonesia
show common themes. School decorations often consist of posters and calligraphies, displaying themes
such as, live as a noble man or die as a martyr.60 Students are instructed that they have no obligation to
follow Indonesian laws, since these laws are created by a secular government. The Indonesian flag is not
flown, and there appears to be an institutional approach to educating students against Western culture.
Blue jeans, sunglasses, cigarettes, and Western music are prohibited. T-shirts with images of Osama bin
Laden, Saddam Hussein, and Chechen rebel leader Shamil Basayev are commonly worn by students. JI
also has an extensive publishing industry that provides radical texts for their schools. These accounts, and
others, emphasize that JI use these schools to radicalize students into believing that their faith is under
attack from non-Muslims, including the secular governments of Southeast Asia.61

54

Zachary Abuza, Education and Radicalization: Jemaah Islamiyah Recruitment in Southeast Asia, The Making of
a Terrorist, Vol 1, ed. James J.F. Frost, (Praeger, November 2005).

55

Several sources cite these figures. Zachary Abuza, Education and Radicalization: Jemaah Islamiyah Recruitment
in Southeast Asia, 69; Scott Atran, et al., Radical Madrasas in Southeast Asia, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 1 Issue 3,
(2008), 13; International Crisis Group, Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous,
Asia Report No. 63, (26 August 2003), 26.

56
57

Abuza, Education and Radicalization: Jemaah Islamiyah Recruitment in Southeast Asia, 2006, 69.
The International Crisis Group estimates that there are approximately 20 JI sympathetic pesantrens located on the
island of Java: International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyahs Current Status, Asia Briefing No. 63,
(3 May 2007); Zachary Abuza cites JIs claim of 141 pesantrens and Indonesian security forces claims of 60-100
JI sympathetic pesantrens: Abuza, Education and Radicalization: Jemaah Islamiyah Recruitment in Southeast
Asia, 70.

58

Abuza, Education and Radicalization: Jemaah Islamiyah Recruitment in Southeast Asia, 71.

59

Ibid.

60

Noor Huda Ismail, Schooled For a House of Islam, YaleGlobal, (August 25, 2005),
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=6177.

61

Noor Huda Ismail, Schooled for Jihad, The Washington Post, (June 26, 2005); Ismail, Schooled For a House of
Islam,; Inside a JI School, The New Paper, (January 5, 2004); International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Jemaah
Islamiyahs Publishing Industry, Asia Report No. 147, (28 February 2008), 3-5.

26

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

It is important to note that not every student who attends JI-affiliated pesantrens becomes a member of the
terrorist group. There appears to be a specific recruitment and vetting process. According to some
terrorism experts, JI recruiters search for specific students who are deemed to be 'pious' Muslims.62 This
reinforces the importance of the strong religious convictions. Potential recruits are then invited to
informal study groups, called halaqah. In these study groups, recruiters further advocate the ideology of
JI leaders Sungkar and Baasyir. They also show video tapes that depict the brutality and inhumanity of
Christians in the sectarian conflicts in Indonesia and other conflict areas. After several months of further
radicalization through these study groups, potential recruits are invited to further their education by
joining the group to engage in military training and further religious education.63
Universities
Radicalization and recruitment among university students in Southeast Asia appears less systematic.
Jemaah Islamiyah relies on Islamic student organizations, study groups, and teacher-student relations. On
university campuses, Muslim student organizations are common. Although many have no connection to
JI, some experts believe a few individual organizations may act as talent scouts for the terrorist network.64
The radicalization and recruitment of university students into JI from student organizations and study
groups appear similar to the process described in pesantrens, where students deemed religiously devout
are approached, indoctrinated into the JI ideology over a period of several months, and then invited to
participate in military training. According to an expert on JI, much of the leadership in the group consists
of technical faculty members, including architects, engineers, and chemists.65 These university faculty
members have also been known to recruit their students into the terrorist network. The recruitment of
youth from university settings ensures JI a cadre of educated and technically capable operational leaders
for terrorist attacks. An example of university recruitment involved JIs former leading bomb-maker, Dr.
Azahari bin Husin, who was a professor at Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM). Dr. Azahari recruited a
student of his by the name of Noordin Top. Top is currently thought to be the operational leader of JI, and
responsible for several high profile terrorist attacks.66
Communal Bonds
Jemaah Islamiyah has survived partly because it is held together by an intricate pattern of kinship.67
The reliance upon communal bonds, such as those between family and friends, help radicalize and recruit
young persons into the terrorist organization.
Children of group members will often attend the same pesantren their parents did, helping to reinforce the
ideology in another generation. Several JI-run pesantrens, referred to as the JI Ivy League, enroll
62
63

Abuza, Education and Radicalization: Jemaah Islamiyah Recruitment in Southeast Asia.

International Crisis Group, How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates, Asia Report No. 43, (11
December 2002), 22.

64

Abuza, Education and Radicalization: Jemaah Islamiyah Recruitment in Southeast Asia.

65

Ibid., 78-79.

66

67

Zachary Abuza, JIs Moneyman and Top Recruiter: A Profile of Noordin Mohammad Top, Unmasking terror:
A global review of terrorist activities, ed. Jonathan D. Hutzley, (Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation,
2007).
Noor Huda Ismail, The Role of Kinship in Indonesias Jemaah Islamiyah, Terrorism Monitor, (2006).

27

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

students whose parents are members of the terrorist group.68 Jemaah Islamiyah members have also sent
their children to radical schools abroad, to include schools in Pakistan. For example, nineteen individuals
suspected to be members of JI were arrested in Pakistan while attending a radical madrassa run by the
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorist organization. These individuals included the son of JI founding member
Baasyir and the brother of Hambali, a prominent JI member currently detained by the United States.69
Siblings are also prominent among Jemaah Islamiyah members. Several attacks attributed to JI have been
planned or carried out by brothers, including the Bali bombing attacks in 2002. The Bali attack featured
two sets of siblings who were implicated for planning the attack and procuring bomb making materials.70
Marriage alliances are also common within JI. In some cases, it appears that formal membership into the
group is partially determined by the trustworthiness of the wife of a potential member.71 Marriages help
ensure group security as well as improve the likelihood that children will be sympathetic to the group
ideology.

Counter-Initiatives
In Indonesia, counter-initiatives have focused heavily on intelligence and law enforcement crackdowns,
aimed at arresting several high-level JI members. In addition, the Indonesian government has also
undertaken some education-based initiatives focused at the regional level to include providing alternative
schools and developing curricula.
An expert on JI and Indonesia stressed the importance of non-radical Islamic education in Indonesia,
which about 20 percent of kids rely on for basic education: The fear has always been that Islamic
education writ large would be stigmatized if the government moved against schools simply because of the
content of their teaching.72 This sentiment has been echoed by the Director of Islamic religious schools
at Indonesias Ministry of Religious Affairs, who indicated: We wont let a wayward few destroy tens of
thousands of pesantrens that have brought peace to this country for ages. Thus, the government has taken
steps to provide localities with quality educational alternatives.
For example, in Poso, Indonesia (a region with connections to the JI and to sectarian violence), the
government has created a new mega-pesantren with the goal of creating an educated, open-minded,
nationalist student body less vulnerable to recruitment than the young men persuaded to join the radical JI
pesantren located in the same area.73 Officially opened in 2008, with a complex consisting of twentytwo buildings and costing $2.7 million (USD), this school is meant to be a strong statement from the
government of Indonesia to the local population that they are serious about providing a quality education
for their children as an alternative to the JI-run pesantrens.74
68
69

International Crisis Group, Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous, 28.
Noor Huda Ismail, The Role of Kinship in Indonesias Jemaah Islamiyah, and: Abuza, Education and
Radicalization: Jemaah Islamiyah Recruitment in Southeast Asia.

70

Ismail, The Role of Kinship in Indonesias Jemaah Islamiyah, 7.

71

International Crisis Group, Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous, 28.

72

Personal correspondence with Sydney Jones of the International Crisis Group, Jakarta Branch.

73
74

International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Tackling Radicalism in Poso, Asia Briefing No. 75, (22 January 2008) 8.
Ibid., 8-9.

28

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

Another educational initiative was the Development and Cooperation of the Pesantrens in Countering
Religious Radicalism summit and conference held in 2004. The agenda of the conference focused on
radicalism and extremism, acknowledging the significant and strategic role pesantrens could play in
countering radical misinterpretations of Islam. The conference recommended the following measures to
limit the spread of extremism: pesantrens should fulfill their obligation to produce well-educated
graduates displaying qualities such as being open-minded and inclusive; pesantrens should implement an
open management process; they should promote the theology of affection and peace; and they should
attempt building inter-faith dialogues in order to create mutual understanding and avoid religious
polarization.75
In Singapore, counter-radicalization initiatives focus largely on emphasizing multiculturalism. The
National Education Program (NEP) is directed at students and is designed to transmit national
Singaporean values across racial categories. In the classroom, this means that students are taught not only
in their mother-tongue, but they are also taught English so that they are empowered with a common
language and can relate to others more effectively. To achieve the goal of greater racial understanding and
to build a sense of a singular Singaporean community, the NEP is built around six key messages:

Singapore is our homeland. This is where we belong. We want to keep our heritage and way of
life.

We must preserve racial and religious harmony. Though drawn from many races, religions,
languages, and cultures, we pursue one destiny.

We must uphold meritocracy and prevent corruption. This provides opportunity for all according
to their ability and effort.

No one owes Singapore a living. As a nation, we must find our own way to survive and prosper.

We must defend Singapore. No one else is responsible for our security and wellbeing.

We must have confidence in the future. United, determined, and well prepared, we shall build a
bright future for ourselves.76

These multicultural initiatives demonstrate recognition by the Singapore government that religious
extremism is a threat to their national values and that a long-term commitment to developing and
instilling these values in their society, and specifically in their school children, requires a significant
investment.
The local Singapore Muslim community is also playing a role in countering radicalization among school
aged youth. The Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) focuses mainly on providing counseling for
detained Jemaah Islamiyah members and their families. The RRG also has published counter-ideological
materials and conducts public education campaigns for the Muslim community. Included in these public

75

Ahmad Haris, The Role of Muslims in the Struggle Against Violent Extremist Ideology in Indonesia, The
Quarterly Journal, (Winter Supplement 2006), 163-164.

76

Norman Vasu and Kumar Ramakrishna, Countering Terrorism: Multiculturalism in Singapore, The Quarterly
Journal, (Winter Supplement 2006), 151-152.

29

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

education campaigns are conventions for community youth, students from government schools, and
students from local Islamic schools.77
Search for Common Ground (SFCG), an international NGO, has also developed pesantren-based
initiatives to counter violent extremism. In 2002, SFCG established a peace education program in
Madura, Indonesia. The number of serious violent conflicts in the region drove the creation of the
program. Community leaders began to wonder whether the education system was partially responsible for
the violence, and if it could play a positive role in addressing community leadership, ethical guidance, and
education. The target audiences for the program are teachers, students, and pesantren alumni. As a first
step, SFCG conducted an assessment to gauge the existence and characteristics of pesantrens in Madura,
the level of interest from the community, and the types of targets and indicators the program should
consider implementing. To date, the SFCG has established curricula in two pesantrens that teach
educators and the broader Muslim community about the need for peace education.78
To reach Indonesian youth audiences with messages about tolerance and positive views on inter-ethnic
relations, the SFCG also uses comics. For example, they sponsored development of a comic series,
GEBORA. In GEBORA, five teenagers of various ethnicities meet as part of a village soccer competition
and discover that despite their differences, it is possible to have exciting adventures and find strength in
their diversity. A second comic, entitled Perjalanan Mencari Sahabat, focuses specifically on the
sectarian conflict in Poso, Indonesia between Muslims and Christians, where Jemaah Islamiyah uses the
conflict to radicalize and recruit members. Using a similar theme, this 6-part series focuses on youth from
different ethnic groups who are able to overcome their differences and get through the challenges they
face by working together as a group.79 Both series of comics try to create a positive image of all
ethnicities, and seek to change the perceptions and attitudes that can lead youth to radicalization and
violence.

Al-Qaeda and Affiliated Groups80

As a diverse network, al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups employ a wide range of tactics and messages to
encourage recruitment and radicalization of young persons. These approaches vary depending on the
location and target audience. Below, approaches utilized by al-Qaeda and affiliated groups in the United
Kingdom and in the conflict zones of Afghanistan/Pakistan and Iraq are discussed.

77

Muhammad Haniff Hassan, Singapores Muslim Community-Based Initiatives against JI, Perspectives on
Terrorism, Vol. 1, Issue 5, (2007).

78

Search for Common Ground, Pesantren-Based Peace Education: Madura,

www.sfcg.org/programmes/children/indonesia_community.html

79

Search for Common Ground, Comics for Conflict Transformation,

www.sfcg.org/programmes/indonesia/indonesia_comics.html

80

For simplicity, this case study will use the term Al-Qaeda or Al-Qaeda affiliates to refer to this developing nexus
of Islamist terrorist groups. This by no means seeks to belittle the significant differences between these groups in
terms of stated ideologies, goals, tactics, and trainings. Groups such as the Taliban, Al-Qaeda in Yemen, Al-Qaeda
in Saudi Arabia, Al-Qaeda Central, Laskar-e-Toiba, al-Shabaab, and Al-Qaeda in Iraq are some examples of the
groups comprising this nexus. The naming generalization is for simplicity only, and further group distinctions fall
outside the purview of this case study.

30

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

Background
Al-Qaeda (meaning The Base) is a
terrorist network widely recognized as
having conducted and inspired terrorist
attacks around the world. There are
numerous examples of the al-Qaeda
network using school-aged youth to
conduct terrorist operations, although
the extent seems to be dependent on
situational factors. The al-Qaeda
terrorist network does not appear to be
a cohesive organization with command
and control functions being the sole responsibility of a central leadership hierarchy. Instead, it has
devolved into a diverse nexus of franchises and affiliate groups. According to some experts, there are
more than 40 such franchises spread around the globe that have claimed allegiance to al-Qaeda and
Osama bin Laden.81
United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, al-Qaeda and affiliates take advantage of personal conflict and political
grievances especially among the young immigrant populations to encourage young persons to support
their actions. Jonathan Evans, the Director General of MI5, has released several statements stating that alQaeda poses the primary security threat to the United Kingdom, and is methodically and intentionally
targeting young people and children in this [U.K.] country. They are radicalizing, indoctrinating, and
grooming young, vulnerable people to carry out acts of terrorism. 82 Within the U.K., individuals as
young as fifteen have been implicated for terrorist-related activity and hundreds of other young persons
have been identified as vulnerable to radicalization. Due to concerns about the prevalence of young
extremists, local communities, along with the education system, within the U.K. have taken steps to
identify and address students (at the elementary, secondary, and university levels) at risk of radicalizing.

Appeal United Kingdom

Al-Qaedas leader, Osama bin Laden, espouses an ideology that seeks to unite the global Muslim
community and wage a terrorism campaign against Western countries and Middle Eastern regimes they
view as apostate and sympathetic to Western interests. This narrative is consistently used to drive
radicalization and recruitment and its appeal has been attributed to three key factors:

Al-Qaeda propagates a simple popular message encompassing deeply held grievances in the
Muslim world against the West

81

Michael Jacobson, Matthew Levitt, Franchises of Al-Qaida Pose a Great Threat, Camden Courier-Post, (7
September 2008); Also see: Hassan Mneimneh, Seven Years Later: The Jihadist International, Middle Eastern
Outlook, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, No.6 (September 2008).

82

Jonathan Evans, Intelligence, counter-terrorism and trust, Address to the Society of Editors by the Director
General of the Security Service, (5 November 2007), www.mi5.gov.uk/output/intelligence-counter-terrorism-andtrust.html.

31

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

Al-Qaeda has created a powerful and captivating image of itself as the worlds most feared
terrorist organization

Al-Qaedas global character means membership is open to all people, irrespective of ethnicity and
nationality as long as one is willing to accept its extremist ideology.83

Even school-aged youth understand al-Qaedas narrative and feel empowered by it. Terrorism experts
have found that some European youth see waging jihad as cool, and as a way to express dissatisfaction
with the power elites. These radical youth are expressing their dissatisfaction through violent means, and
see an appeal in the narrative that allows them to avenge wrongs visited on the weak by the strong.84

Why Youth United Kingdom

Al-Qaeda and affiliated groups see Western youth as valuable assets. According to several sources,
including former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Michael Hayden, al-Qaeda is seeking
recruits among Western youth because of their familiarity with language, culture, and appearance.
Recruits who may not elicit any notice whatsoever from you if they were standing next to you in the
airport line could be attractive to al-Qaeda for potential operations against the West.85

Approach United Kingdom

A growing body of literature on radicalization in the United Kingdom and Western Europe focuses on a
connection between domestic social discontent and negative views of foreign policies conducted by
Western governments. Recruitment into the al-Qaeda terrorist franchise appears to be a self-selection
process where individuals are often radicalized independent of the formal organization. While numerous
experts have characterized radicalized youths as being angry, disaffected, disillusioned, disengaged,
suffering from identity crises, and alienated, it is impossible to provide a common profile that describes
all young persons that have been susceptible to radicalization.86 In general, many young persons are
looking to establish an identity for themselves and a cause to associate with. These radicalized youth have
most commonly been second and third generation immigrants, Muslims who do not feel comfortable
associating with their traditional religion, nor with the Western culture of their place of birth. Through the
al-Qaeda franchise, some U.K. youth are able to focus on a single message, the narrative, which provides
a sense of meaning and purpose.
Authorities in the United Kingdom consider university settings to be a particular concern. A researcher
analyzing the issue of extremism and radicalization on campus identified extremist and/or terrorist

83

84

Brynjar Lia, Al-Qaidas Appeal: Understanding its Unique Selling Points, Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. II,
Issue 8, (May 2008).
Stern, Jihad a global fad.

85

Michael Hayden, Director Central Intelligence Agency, Transcript of Remarks, (Presented at the Atlantic
Council, New York City, 13 November 2008), available from: www.cia.gov/news-information/speechestestimony/directors-remarks-at-the-atlantic-council.html.

86

Brian Michael Jenkins, Building an Army of Believers: Jihadist Radicalization and Recruitment, RAND
Corporation Report (April 2007); See also: Brendan ODuffy, Radical Atmosphere: Explaining Jihadist
Radicalization in the U.K.," (Queen Mary: University of London, January 2008), www.apsanet.org; Patrick Sawer,
Young Muslims are turning to extremism, Telegraph.co.uk (22 June 2008),
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/2171300/Young-Muslims-.

32

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

groups on nearly 30 universities in the United Kingdom.87 The study found that two prominent Islamist
groups that are supportive of terrorism, Hizb ut-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroun, often conceal their identities on
campuses, calling themselves an international politics society or some variation.88 However, these
reports have been criticized by academics and student groups who claim British campuses are not
prevalent radicalization centers. Other researchers assert that Muslim university students are secure with
their British identity and that, the portrayal of a disproportionate threat from the Islamic community does
not reflect informed opinion about how most young British Muslims and university students in
particular live their lives.89 While the debate about the extent of Muslim radicalization on British
campuses continues, the U.K. government is clearly seeing extremism as a significant threat. Higher
Education Minister Bill Rammell has said There is evidence of serious, but not widespread, Islamist
extremist activity in higher education institutions.90
Radicalization and recruitment can also occur through social networks, as was the case with the
perpetrators of the London bombings in July 2005. These groups can form out of social settings where
radicalized individuals feel empathy and a shared bond with each other. It appears these alienated and
displaced individuals come together in social networks based around criminal networks, schools,
universities, social clubs, and/or worship at local mosques.91

Counter-Initiatives United Kingdom

Several government agencies in the United Kingdom work together on counter-radicalization initiatives.
These include, but are not limited to: the Home Office, Department for Communities and Local
Government, the Department for Children, Schools and Family, and the Department of University,
Innovation and Skills.92
Focusing specifically on preventing or countering radicalization within the elementary and secondary
school settings, the British government in 2008 published a toolkit on preventing violent extremism as
guidance for school leaders. Specifically tailored to the education system, this tool kit seeks to:

87

Raise awareness amongst school personnel to the threat posed by violent extremism

Provide information about the causes of violent extremism

Help schools understand the positive role they can play in making youths more resilient to violent
extremism

Provide advice on managing the risks that might have an impact on the school community

Jamie Doward, Radical Islam gains ground in campuses, The Observer (27 July 2008),
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/27/islam.highereducation/print.

88

Anthony Glees, Beacons of truth or crucibles of terror?" Times Higher Education (23 September 2005).

89

June Edmonds, Look elsewhere for the enemy within, www.guardian.co.uk (3 December 2008).

90

Doward, Radical Islam gains ground in campuses.

91

ODuffy, Radical Atmosphere: Explaining Jihadist Radicalization in the U.K.

92

The Homeland Security Institute, Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism (CIST) Action Plan,
(Arlington, VA: Analytic Services, Inc. 23 May 2008).

33

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

The toolkit emphasizes the importance of the schools efforts to understand and stay current with specific
local issues affecting their community. Along with encouraging cooperation with the local community,
the toolkit informs schools about national and local government programs aimed at countering violent
extremism. The toolkit also provides general information on factors that may cause youth to be
susceptible to exploitation by terrorists. These have been discussed previously and include identity crisis,
personal crises, personal circumstances, un- or under-employment, and criminality. Information on how
to prevent violent extremism is provided. There also is guidance on how to develop curriculum that is
adaptable to local needs, how to challenge extremist narratives, how to use external programs or groups
for support, and teaching and learning strategies for educators to explore controversial issues in a way that
promotes critical analysis. The toolkit also includes sections on pupil support and risk management.93
The British government has also issued guidance aimed at educators at the university level. The
Department of University, Innovation, and Skills prepared a report for providers of higher education that
addresses what violent extremism is and how to recognize its presence among students. Higher education
providers also are given several scenarios of possible radicalization on campus, and recommendations on
how to handle these scenarios. Importantly, this report emphasizes that higher education providers need to
have a clearly stated, highly transparent, and fair system in place in which concerns about possible
radicalization on campus, communicated by students or University staff, can be addressed.94
Community initiatives to counter school aged youth radicalization are also prevalent in the United
Kingdom. Several Muslim community groups are playing important roles to counter the violent ideology
espoused by al-Qaeda. The Muslim Council of Britain has released statements urging Muslim
organizations and institutions to exercise their Islamic duty to correct and dispel misinterpretations of
the faith and give the fullest support and cooperation to the police in helping to prevent acts of terror.95
The Department of Communities and Local Government has helped fund community engagement
programs. One such program is the Scholars Roadshow, where British Muslim organizations facilitate
discussions between British youth and moderate Muslim scholars about the un-Islamic nature of
extremism and terrorism.96 The Quilliam Foundation, a Muslim organization founded by former Islamist
radicals, also tries to provide moderate Islamic voices to the British Muslim community. The Foundation
has interfaith understanding training programs for school officials and community members, and has
produced several reports condemning extremism and highlighting interfaith community initiatives.97
A series of community-based intervention programs have been implemented in locations throughout the
United Kingdom that have been identified as potential breeding grounds for violent extremism. The
Channel Project, initiated in 2008 by the Association of Chief Police Officers, asks teachers, parents, and

93

Department for Children, Schools, and Families, Learning together to be safe: A toolkit to help schools
contribute to the prevention of violent extremism, (London, U.K.: 2008), www.dcsf.gov.uk/publications.

94

Department for Innovations, Education, and Skills, Promoting Good Campus Relations: Working with Staff and
Students to Build Community Cohesion and Tackle Violent Extremism in the Name of Islam at Universities and
Colleges," (London, U.K.: 2006).

95

David Smock and Qamar-ul Huda, Islamic Peacemaking Since 9/11, United States Institute of Peace, Special
Report 218 (January 2009).

96

Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdoms Strategy, Presented to Parliament by the Prime
Minister and the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, (2006).

97

The Quilliam Foundation, www.quilliamfoundation.org.

34

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

community figures to be vigilant for signs that "may indicate an attraction to extreme views or
susceptibility of being 'groomed' by radicalisers."98 Community members are encouraged to identify and
intervene in instances where young persons have shown an interest in extremist materials, to include those
found online. Interventions are tailored to the young person and generally involve discussions with the
youth and his/her family, outreach workers, or a local religious leader: "With the help of these
communities we can identify the kids who are vulnerable to the message and influenced by the message.
The challenge is to intervene and offer guidance, not necessarily prosecute them, but to address their
grievance, their growing sense of hate and potential to do something violent in the name of some
misinterpretation of a faith."99 Since the program was initiated there have been at least 200 interventions
conducted with schoolchildren as young as thirteen. Actual interventions by the police are much less
frequent.
Conflict Zones Afghanistan/Pakistan & Iraq
In current conflict zones such as Afghanistan/Pakistan and Iraq, al-Qaeda and affiliates also exploit
situational factors such as personal grievances and poverty. They utilize forced recruitment and
kidnapping to gain recruits. In some cases, young persons have been forced or tricked into carrying out
suicide bombings

Appeal Conflict Zones

In conflict zones such as Afghanistan/Pakistan, the al-Qaeda narrative may not be as important of a factor
in the recruitment of school-aged youth as in the U.K. and Europe. In conflict areas, al-Qaedas appeal is
driven by situational factors, including financial incentives and personal grievances. Reports suggest that
youth are recruited from refugee camps and join al-Qaeda and affiliate groups to earn money for their
family or to exact revenge, and do not always agree with the radical philosophies espoused. For example,
many youth join to avenge the death of relatives who have been killed as a result of ongoing military
operations by Western and Pakistani military forces.100
The use of school-aged youth by al-Qaeda in Iraq can also be attributed to situational factors, which could
lead young persons to view membership in the group as advantageous. Similar to Afghanistan/Pakistan,
these situational factors arise from the current conflict in the country and the general weakness of the state
to provide basic services: Ongoing violence has destroyed the social fabric that once provided a safety
net, and created a generation of undereducated, unemployed, traumatized, and vengeful boys and girls
receptive to appeals of militias and insurgent or terrorist groups.101 Lack of access to effective
educational institutions, a population living in relative poverty, feelings of revenge, and marginalization
have resulted in young persons being vulnerable to radicalization, recruitment, and indoctrination into alQaeda and other terrorist groups. A representative to the U.N. envoy to Iraq has said that children in Iraq,
who are being exploited for their poverty and who no longer go to school, lack access to the most basic
98

Mark Hughes, "Police Identify 200 Children as Potential Terrorists."

99

Ibid.

100

Aamir Latif, Taliban Find Fertile Recruiting Ground in Pakistans Tribal Refugee Camps, (February 9, 2009),
www.usnews.com/articles/news/world/2009/02/09/taliban-finds-fertile-recruiting-gound.

101

Kathleen Meilahn, The Strategic Landscape: Avoiding Future Generations of Violent Extremists, Strategic
Insights, Center for Contemporary Conflict, (July 2008). Also see, Christian Caryl, The Next Jihadists: Iraqs
Lost Children, Newsweek, (22 January 2007).

35

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

services and manifest a wide range of psychological symptoms from the violence in their everyday
lives.102

Why Youth Conflict Zones

Al-Qaeda and affiliated groups have referred to children as the new generation of Mujahidin.103
Numerous press reports, militant media videos, and official government statements depict young persons
participating in terrorist activities on behalf of the groups. Al-Qaeda uses these school-aged youth to
conduct suicide attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan/Pakistan because of their ability to circumvent security
forces. Some experts believe that the security forces, including police and military personnel, will not
immediately suspect a young child of being a suicide bomber threat. Young suicide bombers might be
able to enhance the lethality of the violence because of their ability to circumvent security measures.104

Approach Conflict Zones

According to the United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF) monitoring Afghanistan/Pakistan, there is a
disturbing use of children as combatants, specifically as suicide bombers. These children are being
recruited from a variety of locations and for several reasons. A United Nations report released in 2008
notes that al-Qaeda and affiliated groups are recruiting youth from areas with high concentrations of
internally displaced persons (IDP's).105 Recruiting youths from IDP and refugee camps in Helmand and
Kandahar provinces, among others, has picked up recently as a result of military engagements in the
region. One example is that of a six-year old boy from a village in Ghazni Province who was tricked by
the Taliban into thinking the suicide vest he was wearing would "spray out flowers if he pressed a
button." 106
Along with tricking and coercing youths into becoming suicide bombers, al-Qaeda-linked groups have
been accused of kidnapping, forcing, and paying young persons for carrying out attacks. According to
Multi-National Force - Iraq, publicly released captured video tapes show al-Qaeda in Iraq training and
indoctrinating a group of young boys, approximately aged 8-14 years old. The tapes also show al-Qaeda
members boasting about turning children into suicide bombers along with statements from young boys
promoting slaughter and declaring their allegiance to al-Qaeda.107 Videos showing youth training and

102

BBC News, Militias recruit child bombers, BBC News (25 April 2008) http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr//2/hi/middle_east/7367920.stm

103

Rear Adm. Gregory Smith and Major General Mohammed al-Askari, Press Conference, (5 February 2008).

104

Merle Kellerhals, Using Children as Suicide Attackers Increases Sense of Barbarity, America.gov (23 October
2007).

105

United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in
Afghanistan, (10 November 2008).

106

UNICEF, Afghanistan: Martin Bell Reports on Children Caught in War, UNICEF, No.5 (October 2007).

This example is also cited in an America.gov article: Merle Kellerhals, Using Children as Suicide Attackers
Increases Sense of Barbarity.
107

Rear Adm. Gregory Smith and Major General Mohammed al-Askari, Press Conference, (5 February 2008).

36

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

conducting terrorist operations are thought to be effective propaganda tools, possibly encouraging other
youth to wage jihad.108
Some madrassas in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region are also used by al-Qaeda and affiliated groups to
radicalize and recruit young persons. According to the International Crisis Group, more than one-and-a
half million children (generally between the ages of 5 and 18) attend madrassas in Pakistan. A Pakistan
government report issued in 1995 found the existence of 746 extremist madrassas in Punjab province
alone; it is currently unclear how many madrassas in the region would be considered radical.109 There
appears to be significant anecdotal evidence to suggest that the presence of a radical madrassa constitutes
a security risk to the region in which it is located. UNICEF notes that the Taliban currently uses
madrassas outside of Afghanistan as training schools for volunteers.110 For example, in 2009, at least two
young persons (aged 12 and 14) have been detained while attempting to carry out suicide attacks on
behalf of the Taliban.111 The fourteen-year old indicated he had been sent to a madrassa by his parents,
who were unaware it was being run by radicals. Upon completion of his religious studies (e.g., reciting
the Quaran), he was told to go to Afghanistan to conduct a suicide attack.112 A Taliban leader in Pakistan
indicated he recruits youth as young as five to carry out attacks, stating: Children are tools to achieve
Gods will. And whatever comes your way, you sacrifice it.113
However, it is important to note that not all madrassas promote radical teachings or are supportive of
terrorism or terrorist groups, and that not all students who attend madrassas become terrorists.

Counter-Initiatives Conflict Zones

Counter-radicalization and recruitment initiatives are difficult to institute and measure in the conflict
zones of Afghanistan/Pakistan and Iraq. In some instances, initiatives are being undertaken by military
forces as part of counter-insurgency operations. Some governments, non-governmental organizations, and
international aid agencies have also instituted programs.
The Afghanistan government, aware of the use of madrassas as radicalization and recruitment centers
within the country, has sought to counter this process by creating 34 new madrassas in the country under
its direct supervision. According to UNICEF, 40 percent of the curriculum will be dedicated to religious
studies, 40 percent to general education studies, and the remaining 20 percent to English language and
computer skills.114 This initiative seeks to give students a quality alternative to the radical madrassas, as

108

Ibid.

109

International Crisis Group, Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military, Asia Report No. 36, (29 July
2002).

110

UNICEF, Afghanistan: Martin Bell Reports on Children Caught in War.

111

Jim Lehrer News Hours, "U.S. Military Works to Bring Stability to Remote Afghan Areas," (Aired 16 March
2009), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june09/afghanistan_03-16.html.

112

Atia Abawi, Teen Trained to be Suicide Bomber Feels Tricked, (2 January 2009),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/01/02/afghan.suicide.recruit/index.html.

113

Frontine, "Children of the Taliban," PBS Broadcasting (14 April 2009).

http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/pakistan802/video/video_index.html

114

UNICEF, "Afghanistan: Martin Bell Reports on Children Caught in War."

37

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

well as provide students with the necessary education skills to contribute to the rebuilding of Afghan
society.
The United States Institute for Peace (USIP) also has a program targeting madrassas in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. USIPs Religion and Peacemaking Program is working with school administrators and teachers
to provide alternative teaching materials focusing on interfaith tolerance, pluralism, and
peacemaking.115 USIP has also partnered with Pakistani scholars to create a peace education textbook
based upon Islamic traditions for use in religious schools. In Afghanistan, USIP has training programs for
teachers that seek to develop peace education and critical-thinking skills that can be passed on to
students.116
Also in Afghanistan, senior United Nations officials have called for greater efforts to improve the
situation of young persons and to stop the use and recruitment of youth by armed groups.117 The UN
issued a report in late 2008 that highlights the trends and patterns of violence against children in
Afghanistan that occurred between July 2007 and August 2008. As discussed within this study, the report
points to the alarming increase of young persons being recruited as suicide bombers. Among the
recommendations in the report is the suggestion that the Afghan government introduce legislation to
criminalize the recruitment of children.118 It remains to be seen if any such legislation is developed or
enforced.
In Iraq, the Young Ambassadors Program is a joint venture between U.S.-based War Kids Relief and
Iraqi-based Darstan Group, two non-governmental organizations. The Young Ambassadors Program
seeks to create cross-cultural understanding between Iraqi and U.S. middle school children through
cultural exchanges, promoting tolerance, the principles of human rights, and educational initiatives that
allow U.S. students to understand how they can help their Iraqi peers.119

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

In 2007, the Salafist Group for Prayer and Combat (GSPC) appears to have affiliated itself with al-Qaeda
thereby creating Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in an attempt to maintain relevance and
halt dwindling membership. As such, AQIM has established a broad approach to recruitment and
radicalization, with evidence suggesting the group not only reaches out for supporters within the Maghreb
region, but also in Europe among its diaspora communities. The situational factors affecting young
persons in parts of the Maghreb (including few job prospects and poor education systems) are important
to understanding how some have been vulnerable to being radicalized or recruited. AQIM has also
exploited political grievances, convincing numerous fighters to go to Iraq to fight against Coalition forces.
Schools do not appear to play a significant role in radicalization and recruitment of youth. Instead, the
group appears to focus its recruitment efforts in mosques and on the Internet.

115

Smock and Huda, Islamic Peacemaking Since 9/11.

116

Ibid.

117

United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in
Afghanistan.

118

United Nations, Senior UN Officials Urge Greater Protection for Afghan Childrens Rights, UN News Service,
(15 December 2008).

119

War Kids Relief, http://www.childrenscultureconnection.com/WarKidsRelief.html

38

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

Background
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is
an Islamist extremist group that is based
predominantly in the Maghreb Region of
North Africa, which consists of Algeria,
Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia.120 GSPC
is likely to have affiliated itself with alQaeda (forming AQIM) because they were
losing relevance and momentum as an
organization. According to a researcher that
has studied the groups transition, the GSPC
courted al-Qaeda because of the need to
maintain relevancy and to have a certain
number of visible successes to shore up
declining recruitment.121 The extent to
which the group benefited, or will benefit, from its new affiliation has yet to be determined. However, in
the two years since its reorganization, it is evident that young persons have been recruited by AQIM for a
variety of purposes, including carrying out suicide attacks. 122

Appeal
AQIM tries to reach youth both locally (in the Maghreb), as well as globally (to include parts of Europe).
Within these areas, AQIM appeals to youth by capitalizing on past or current personal and political
grievances. Young recruits that have been drawn to AQIM include those who are disgruntled with their
governments, as well as those who appear to feel disenfranchised, marginalized, or excluded. In some
cases, it appears that young members were looking for a cause or want to do something that matters.123
According to the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, radical elements find support in young persons
in the Maghreb region because they are among the most disenfranchised and frustrated members of this
population.124

Why Youth?
A combination of demand and regional demographics appear to have led AQIM to focus some of its
recruitment efforts on youth. After years of civil war, much of the adult population is weary of conflict

120

Libya is included in this list on occasion.

121

Lianne Kennedy-Boudali, The GSPC: Newest Franchise in Al Qaidas Global Jihad, The United States
Military Academys Counter Terrorism Center, The North Africa Project, (April 2007), 6, http://ctc.usma.edu.

122

U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Terrorist Organizations," http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/08/103392.htm.

123

Amel Boubekeur, Salafism and Radical Politics in Postconflict Algeria, Carnegie Papers, no. 11,
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2008).

124

Noureddine Jebnoun, "Is the Maghreb the 'Next Afghanistan'?: Mapping the Radicalization of the Algerian Salafi
Jihadist Movement," Center for Contemporary Arab Studies. Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service.
Georgetown University, (16 November 2007).

39

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

and many are reluctant to engage in or support violent activities. 125 While there is an apparent shortage
of unwilling adults, at the same time there are a large number of young persons within the North African
region. Combined, these factors likely contribute to AQIMs attempts to reach out to the next generation.
Beyond the wide availability of youth in the region, AQIM also appears to have found young persons to
be more impressionable and willing to follow its mission, something that likely makes their recruitment
more appealing. According to a researcher at the Institute for Security Studies in Africa, the group is
believed to be targeting youth aged 16 to 20 because they are more idealistic and can be easily
manipulated.126

Approach
While it is evident that AQIM utilizes school-aged young persons, the process(es) by which youth are
recruited and/or radicalized are not clear. Recruitment approaches appear to vary by region and
community. AQIM targets young persons within the local Maghreb region as well as through diaspora
communities. The group uses direct recruiting techniques (e.g., members reaching out to young persons in
a variety of venues) in addition to utilizing the Internet and other forms of propaganda aimed at
encouraging self-radicalization. The groups propaganda often perpetuates an Us vs. Them mentality
and plays upon grievances, geopolitics or conflicts (e.g., Iraq).
Direct Recruiting
AQIM has reportedly made use of cyber cafes, mosques and bookstores to make contact with young
unemployed men and students.127 Mosques have been a prime area for recruitment of youth because they
not only act as a place of worship, but also as place for large numbers of people to gather. The use of
mosques extends beyond the Maghreb as well. For example, the Dutch Internal Security Agency found
that AQIM had recruited young Muslim immigrants at mosques in the Netherlands and has been
encouraging young Muslims to join the jihadi movement in conflict zones such as Afghanistan and
Kashmir.128 Family connections are also used for recruiting purposes, using the influence these
connections have to pressure young people into joining, glorifying the lifestyle of the prospective group,
or at least providing acceptance for radical activities.129

125

From 1992-1999, Algeria was engaged in a civil war between the Islamists and those associated with the
Algerian government. Over 100,000 people died in the conflict; Kennedy-Boudali, The GSPC: Newest Franchise
in Al Qaidas Global Jihad, 9.

126

Anneli Botha, Terrorism in the Maghreb: The transnationalisation of domestic terror, Institute for Security
Studies Monograph 144, (June 2008) 58.

127

Ibid., 166.

128

Blake Mobley and Eric Rosenbach, GSPC Dossier, Center for Policing Terrorism, (1 June 2005).

129

Ibid.

40

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

Propaganda
AQIM places a good deal of emphasis on propagating its messages globally, which is likely intended to
help sensitize potential recruits to the groups Salafist ideology.130 An important aspect of a groups
propaganda includes rhetoric by its leadership. Statements from leadership are significant because they
are often specifically designed to rally the base and excite potential fighters. This is likely intended to
serve as a catalyst for self-radicalization.131 For example, one of the groups former leaders, Abdelmalik
Dourkdal, referenced the Iraq War in a communiqu to Al-Faath magazine in 2004, specifically
mentioning the critical role of young Muslim men: the defeat that America is suffering now along
with other Western nationshas played a critical role in awakening young Muslim men around the
world, including Algeria.132
Videos are also used to incite the groups diaspora community. Recruitment videos have been shown at
mosques, in a community center-style setting, timed specifically for students and school children to be in
attendance.133 The group has reportedly also used an especially gruesome video titled Algeria that was
shown to young persons at the Finsbury Park Mosque in London.134
Manipulating of Circumstances/Grievances
AQIM manipulates circumstances and grievances with the intention of encouraging supporters to take
action. The group has taken advantage of opposition to the conflict in Iraq to recruit young people and to
encourage them to join the fight. For example, in a move to draw more recruits from Algeria, AQIM
embarked upon what has been referred to as an "Iraq-ization of Algeria, using the conflict in Iraq as a
new magnet to draw Maghrebi youths into an insurgency pipeline135
The group has also played upon quality of life factors (e.g., lack of resources and opportunities) to attract
young recruits. Young persons in the Maghreb face problems of unemployment. According to one source,
Algerias young men leave school because there is no longer any connection between education and
employmentThe schools raise them to be religious but do not teach them the skills needed to get a
job.136 At one of AQIMs training camps, young recruits were paid 2000-3000 Algerian dinars

130

Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, "ITAC Presents, 'Militant Jihadism: Radicalization,
Conversion, Recruitment,' Trends in Terrorism Series, vol. 2006-4, ITAC & Canadian Centre for Intelligence and
Security Studies, (2006), 15.

131

Emily Hunt, Islamist Terrorism in Northwestern Africa: A Thorn in the Neck of the United States? The
Washington Institute of Near East Policy, Policy Focus #65, (February 2007), 3.

132

Evan Kohlmann, Two Decades of Jihad in Algeria: the GIA, the GSPC, and Al-Qaida," The NEFA Foundation,
(September 2008), 16.

133

Blake and Rosenbach.

134

Jason Burke, You have to kill in the name of Allah until you are killed, The Observer, (27 January 2002),
www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2002/jan/27/september11.terrorism/print.

135

Noureddine Jebnoun, What is Behind the December 11th Bomb Attacks in Algiers? Center for Contemporary
Arab Studies, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, (12 December 2007).

136

Michael Slackman, In Algeria, A Tug of War for Young Minds, The New York Times, (23 June 2008).

41

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

(approximately 28-42 U.S. dollars) per week.137 High poverty and a lack of job opportunities make such
recruitment tactics effective.

Counter Initiatives
The governments in the Maghreb region recognize that action is required to counter recruitment and
radicalization by AQIM and have implemented measures to address the problem. However, the
approaches taken by the governments vary. While most of the governments in the Maghreb use law
enforcement and intelligence tactics to address terrorism and radicalization, some also partner with nonprofit groups and NGOs, to sponsor initiatives aimed at preventing violence.
Search for Common Ground (SFCG) works with local partners in many countries to find culturally
appropriate means of strengthening the capacity of societies to deal with conflicts constructively.138 The
organization sponsors programs that address conflict through the use of media (radio, TV, film and print),
mediation and facilitation, training, community organizing, sports, drama and music. In Morocco, SFCG
has initiated several projects aimed at addressing the socio-economic conditions that may lead to
radicalization or violence and are trying to address what it terms the growing identity crisis affecting
some youth in the country.139
SFCG has partnered with various youth NGOs, governmental institutions, and foreign embassies to
develop youth community mediation centers. These programs provide training necessary for young
leaders to be able to resolve conflicts within their communities, to facilitate dialogue, and to foster
stability. The youth leaders use these skills to work in schools, among other locations, where they offer
coaching and training to marginalized youth. As part of this program, four youth community mediation
centers have been established.
Utilizing the popularity of television, SFCG has also developed a prime-time television series called The
Team that is a fictionalized story of a Moroccan football team and its players.140 The show addresses
themes such as moderation, mutual understanding, and non-violent communication and tolerance. While
the program will initially be shown in Morocco, the group hopes to expand into other parts of the
Maghreb region, chiefly Algeria and Tunisia.
The SFCG, U.K. Foreign Commonwealth Office/British Embassy in Rabat, and the Moroccan National
Prison Administration are also working together on a de-radicalization program aimed at at-risk youth and
prisoners in Maghreb prisons. The initiative was established to address concerns that prisons in the region
were becoming a breeding ground for radicalization. The program is designed to reduce prisoners
potential for becoming radicalized while incarcerated by providing training that promotes constructive

137

Botha, 144.

138

Search for Common Ground, "Children Programs,"

http://www.sfcg.org/programmes/children/programmes_children.html

139

Steve Utterwulghe and Abou El Mahassine Fassi-Fihri, Empower Moroccan Youth, Common Ground News
Service, (28 May 2007), http://www.commongroundnews.org.

140

Search for Common Ground, "Morocco: Program Overview,"

http://www.sfcg.org/programmes/children/programmes_children.html

42

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

dialogue, capacity-building, and conflict management skills. 141 The program also encourages positive
civic participation upon re-entry to society.

Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)

Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) has evolved as a terrorist organization. Once relatively selective about
membership when it was primarily a Basque Separatist movement, the group appears to be shifting to
violent tactics and taking on new members from a broader, younger demographic. ETAs emphasis on
encouraging street violence is a huge draw for disaffected youth and the opportunity to engage in violence
is proving to be a successful recruiting tool. The education system in Spain does not appear to play a role
in the radicalization and recruitment process. However, it does appear that supporters of ETA can be
found in school settings. Current members appear to be less ideologically bound to Basque nationalism
compared to past generations. Counter-initiatives in Spain and France appear to have focused on law
enforcement and intelligence operations resulting in arrests of members. There does not appear to be
many initiatives aimed at prevention or that directly address youth.

Background
Established in 1959, ETA (meaning "Basque
Homeland and Freedom") is a Basque Nationalist
group that was formed as a reaction to the
repression of Basque culture by the Franco
regime.142 ETA was not initially inclined towards
violent acts. Its tactics first consisted of graffiti,
displaying Basque Flags, and destroying
Francoist symbols.143 The groups shift to violent
tactics began as it took on new members from a
broader demographic, who argued that ETAs
strategy should include more violent actions.
ETA committed its first planned assassination in
1968, killing a police commissioner. As the group has evolved over the years, it has split into subgroups
(e.g. ETA-PM, ETA-M) several times, mostly due to disagreements among its members about strategy
and tactics. Ultimately, the subgroup that advocated a violent nationalist approach survived, shedding
members who had other ideological viewpoints.144
From the start ETA was a young, diverse organization comprised of members from around the Basque
Region. The founding members primarily were middle class, educated young nationalists who were
politically left-leaning and drew from a rural demographic. Over the first few years they began drawing
new support and recruits from young adults in the labor sector, many of whom may not necessarily have

141

Ibid.

142

Franco regime was from 1939-1975.

143

Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca, The Persistence of Nationalist Terrorism: the Case of ETA, (March 2008), 5-7.

144

Ludger Mees, Nationalism, Violence and Democracy: The Basque Clash of Identities (London, U.K.: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2003), 30.

43

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

been nationalists but believed in the self-determination of the Basque region.145 More recently new
recruits tend to be Spanish immigrants to the region that do not have as strong a tie to the Basque ethnic
identity as their earlier counterparts. It can be said that current ETA members have begun to fit a profile
similar to neo-Nazi supporters in other European countries that are characterized as middle-class,
juvenile, urban, and radical.
While ETA has traditionally been a youthful organization overall, there appears to have been a shift
towards recruiting even younger members. The percentage of the organization that is under 20 years-ofage went from less than 9 percent during years of Franco's rule (1970s), to around 60 percent by 2005.
Of those under twenty, 10-11 percent are under the age of eighteen. Additionally, the percentage of
school-aged recruits went from 5 percent during Franco's rule, to approximately 30 percent by the mid1990s. These school-aged youths, primarily secondary school students, account for the largest single
group that has joined ETA in recent years.146
Currently, ETA is not the same organization it was in its formative years. While the group has been active
for over four decades, it has had to regenerate in order to remain relevant. As a result, ETA no longer is
viewed as a major threat to stability as it was during the 1980s, but rather is seen as more of a protracted
violent phenomenon that systematically violates fundamental rights.147 ETA still maintains a core of
violent nationalists, albeit hailing from a completely different demographic than its original members. For
the time being, ETA relies on protracted street violence and the efforts of its youth group to remain
relevant.

Appeal
For many years ETA held a significant popular support base within the Basque Region. This was the case
particularly during the 1970s, where almost half of Basque adults perceived the Etarras (ETA members
or commandos) as being patriots or idealists, and less than 10 percent viewed them as criminals.148 This
perception continued into the 1980s when the new democratic government continued to utilize many of
Francos repressive tactics to combat ETA. These tactics caused anger and frustration on the part of a
broad group of people who supported the groups goals and motivated many to become recruits. During
this period, being a member of ETA also carried some social prestige that helped to encourage persons to
become members.149
However, in the mid-1980s the strategy of the group shifted toward less discriminating tactics (e.g. bombs
in public places), which produced higher numbers of casualties and alienated some of their supporters and

145

Fernando Reinares, Who are the Terrorists? Analyzing Changes in Sociological Profile among Members of
ETA, in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 27:465-488 (2005), 474.

146

Ibid., 474.

147

Rogelio Alonso and Fernando Reinares, Terrorism, Human Rights, and Law Enforcement in Spain, in
Terrorism and Political Violence, 17:1 (2005), 265.

148

Assia Alexieva, Targeting the Roots and Goals of ETA: A Counter-Terrorist Strategy to Consider? Journal of
IPS, ed. Meagan Donahue, (Spring 2006), 58.

149

Rogelio Alonso, Individual Motivations for Joining Terrorist Organizations: A Comparative Qualitative Study
on Members of ETA and IRA, in Tangled Roots: Social and Psychological Factors in the Genesis of Terrorism,
ed. J. Victoroff (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2006), 195.

44

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

original members.150 This loss of support was furthered by the fact that the Spanish government began to
repeal many of its harsh tactics. In recent years ETAs support base is estimated to have dwindled down
to approximately 10 percent of the Basque population.151
Today, ETA provides a means for young people to channel their anger and frustration by applying it to
their cause.152 The perceived lack of opportunities for young persons in the Basque cities has helped to
push some to join ETA, particularly for those students who neither desire to pursue their formal education
nor are prepared to enter the workforce. One former member recounts: There were those who didnt
want to finish their studies, only they didnt want to go out and get a job either. So then, it was like this
automatic thing. If you didnt get involved in something political, you turned into a druggie.153 Through
extensive studies of the group, Fernando Reinares (a Professor and Terrorism analyst in Madrid, Spain)
found this sentiment to be common among young members, many of whom are discontent or feel
marginalized. Joining ETA appears to be viewed by some as an acceptable option, especially among
youth who are raised in a culture of violence, where targets are dehumanized and violence is seen as an
acceptable tool.154 This view, in combination with ETAs stated goal, appears to make membership in the
group an appealing option to a portion of the youth population.

Why Youth?
In spite of the various shifts and changes the organization has undergone, ETA has always relied on
young recruits to sustain and replenish its ranks. The group utilizes its own youth organization, currently
called Jarrai-Haika-Segi or Segi (described in detail below), to assist in recruitment and to carry out nonviolent actions, namely extortion of local businesses for small amounts of money (often referred to as the
"Revolutionary Tax").155
ETAs ability to regenerate itself over the years is due in large part to its youth organization, Segi, that
helps the group directly socialize ETAs message, gather support from the younger population, and
identify future recruits.156 As ETAs strategy shifted in recent years, the role of its youth group has
expanded to include participation in protests, riots, and street violence, referred to as kale borroka.157
Though the young persons perpetrating the riots would deny direct involvement with ETA, kale borroka
is organized by ETA and carried out by its Segi youth group.
Kale borroka, its literal translation meaning street struggle, is a part of ETAs strategy of conveying a
message of an impromptu youth movement [that] is unhappy with the political situation in the Basque

150

Sanchez-Cuenca, 16.

151

Ibid, 15.

152

Assia Alexieva, 58.

153

Reinares, Who are the Terrorists? Analyzing Changes in Sociological Profile among Members of ETA, 485.

154

Alonso, 197.

155

Yonah Alexander, Michael Swetnam, Herbert Levine, ETA: Profile of a Terrorist Group (Ardsley, NY:
Transnational Publishers Inc, 2001), 22.

156

Ibid., 8.

157

Jan Mansvelt-Beck and Jan D. Markusse, Basque Violence: a Reappraisal of Culturalist Explanations,
European Journal of Sociology, Vol. 49 (2008), 114.

45

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

Country.158 Kale borroka entails youths approximately 16-25 years of age, who carry out attacks on
people and property.159 Beyond the small group of youths carrying out specific attacks during kale
borroka, often other young people will join in the violence. These people frequently are described as
drunk, on drugs or already associated with other gangs.160 While high-impact attacks claimed by ETA
have decreased, incidents involving kale borroka have increased. Members of the youth group that
participate in kale borroka carried out approximately 5000 acts of vandalism, between 1996 and 2000.161
Once young recruits become part of the formal ETA structure there does not appear to be evidence that
distinguishes the roles or responsibilities provided to them. Though little information was identified that
specifically delineates responsibilities by age it appears that, until the practice of kidnapping for extortion
stopped in the mid-1990s, younger members would be placed in charge of guarding hostages.162 One
place where clear discrepancies were addressed was in the role of male and female members in the
organization. Women who did join were held to a different standard within the organization. They had
more difficulty rising in the ranks and were given less direct responsibility for the violence.163

Approach
Overall, ETA has never been a large organization and maintains a group of several-hundred core
members. Traditionally, ETA relied primarily on self-recruitment or recruitment through gateway
organizations. Those wishing to join took the steps themselves to become a potential recruit for the
organization, such as participating in kale borroka or joining or supporting the Segi youth group.
During the 1970s and 1980s ETA could count on broad mobilization and was able to be more selective of
its recruits.164 Exposure to and socialization of the group during those years would occur through family
and social networks, youth clubs and political activism, and schoolsspecifically small, private, Basque
schools called ikastolas. Some debate has existed over the role the ikastolas specifically had in exposing
youth to violent nationalism. Though the schools promoted Basque culture and nationalism, it is difficult
to show a direct correlation between attendance in ikastolas and participation or support for violent
nationalism. Some connection has been drawn, however, to ikastolas and Basque nationalism in general.
This connection was clearer during the years of Franco's rule, as ikastolas were the only schools teaching
Euskara (Basque language) and Basque culture.165
No research, articles or general literature reviewed for this study or interviews conducted for this study
found ETA to be currently recruiting directly from schools in the region. However, at least one university158

Alexander, 31.

159

Ibid., 31.

160

Ibid., 11.

161

Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh, "From Revolutionary Dreams to Organizational Fragmentation: disputes over
Violence with ETA and Sendero Luminoso," Terrorism and Political Violence (2002), 84.

162

William Douglass and Joesba Zulaika, On the Interpretation of Terrorist Violence: ETA and the Basque
Political Process, Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol 32, no. 2 (Cambridge University Press: April
1990), 253.

163

Reinares, 471.

164

Reinares, 476.

165

Mansvelt-Beck and Markusse, 114.

46

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

level professor indicated that support for the group by some students has been apparent in the school
setting. Students have openly worn clothing to school that supports ETA, as well as shown other signs of
their support. Additionally, professors and other public figures in the region who have spoken out against
ETA have faced death threats. 166
Today, young people are socialized to ETA through friends, ETA-sympathetic media, exposure to a
culture of violence, and reinforcement of the value of its approach through its Segi youth group. As a
testament to the importance of the social-network of members, the average ETA member has a relative or
a friend within the organization.167 In addition to family and social networks encouraging young people to
engage in acts of violent nationalism, participation in kale borroka is used as a mechanism to identify
potential recruits. Those participating in the street violence prove themselves to be dedicated to the cause
by throwing Molotov cocktails, destroying businesses who failed to pay the Revolutionary Tax, and
attacking opponents of ETAincluding moderate-nationalists, schoolteachers, journalists, or anyone who
speaks out against ETAs tactics.
ETA also coordinates support, funding, propaganda and recruitment through an umbrella organization
called the Basque National Liberation Movement (MLNV).168 By coordinating with the MLNV, ETA has
been able to tap into their network of supporters from political, labor, media, and youth spheres. The
extent to which ETA coordinates activities through these specialized groups, businesses, and
organizations were revealed in a Spanish judicial investigation initiated in 1998 by the Spanish High
Court. The investigation found that for years some of these groups acted as a legal and open front for
ETA.169
In recent years, ETA has begun to use some new recruitment approaches that seem to reflect active, topdown approaches to gain new members. For example, the group released a recruitment video (accessible
online) during the summer of 2007 that appears to be intended to socialize ETAs cause and attract new
supporters.170 Dissemination of the video, a tactic that had not been used previously, is likely in response
to difficulties the group may be experiencing in finding new members and generating a support base.

Counter-initiatives
Counter-measures by the Spanish government have, for the most part, consisted of police and military
crackdowns on ETA members, leading to infiltration of the organization and arrests of its members and
leadership. During the years of Franco's rule and continuing into the 1980s this frequently included

166

Interview with Dr. Jan Mansvelt-Beck, February, 2009.

167

Sanchez-Cuenca, 15.

168

The MLNV is a network of groups that provides ETA a support base and connection in many facets of Basque
culture and demographics. The MLNV is a more generic term for the KAS (Koordinadora Abertazale Sozialista or
Patriotic Social Coordination), which has been in existence since 1978. The network includes a number or groups,
many of which are legal, some including: a political party (Herri Batasuna), a young group, a womens
organization, newspapers and media, a labor union, and various other groups. Ibid, 10.

169

Javier Tajadura, The Closing of the Newspaper EGIN: The newspaper EGIN, the fourth front of the terrorist
organization ETA, pub. Fundacion par la Libertad (2008),
http://www.paralalibertad.org/descargas/InformeLaberinto/J_Tajadura_Ingles.pdf.

170 Europol, TE-SAT 2008: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2008, (Netherlands, Europol Police Office:
2008), 31.

47

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

actions that violated basic civil rights (e.g. detention without cause, no notification of the attorney or
loved ones, beatings, torture), and often had a counter-productive effect. It was not until the mid-1990s
that Spain began to focus on passing policy to restrict ETAs support base by declaring organizations that
supported the terrorist organization to be illegal. This led to the closing of sympathetic newspapers,
media, and most importantly, in 2001, the banning of Herri Batsuna, ETAs political party, from the
political process. Attempts have also been made to dismantle ETAs funding and support networks,
exemplified by the expansion of terrorism-related information sharing between Spain and France in the
early 1990s.
Currently in Spain, the regional Basque government, or Basque Autonomous County (BAC), has primary
control over all local government issues such as taxation, education, and cultural affairs. In addition to
actions taken by the Spanish government to counter ETA, the regional government has begun to pass its
own initiatives. Though little information was found on the existence of BAC counter-initiatives that
specifically address ETA, some information alludes to programs in place to counter support for terrorism
and to boost the regions knowledge on Human Rights.
The BAC government recently published a plan designed to promote the teaching of human rights in the
Basque region. Within this plan, titled Basque Education Plan for Peace and Human Rights 2008-2011
(Plan vasco de educacion, para la paz y los, Derechos humanos), the government specifies improvements
needed within the education system, including changes to curriculum that address human rights issues.171
This plan also notes that schools within some areas of the region have insufficient curriculum on human
rights, and the Basque conflict is seldom taught in schools, with approximately22 percent of public
institutions and 9 percent of private schools addressing the issue. Along with calling for additional
instruction on human rights in schools, the plan also recommends approaches for increasing social
awareness of the issue. While not the focus of the document, ETA is noted in reference to infractions on
human rights. Currently, there is no indication that the plan is being implemented and some scholars have
expressed concerns that it is too ambitious and runs the risk of never being put into practice.
Some NGOs and private groups have gotten involved in countering support for ETA. Some of these
groups coordinate very closely with the local government and receive some funding, but others are strictly
private. The Gernika Gogoratuz Foundation is a research center that has been funded in part by the BAC
government to conduct research and community engagement activities aimed at promoting peace.172
Lokarri is a privately funded social organization that sponsors initiatives to promote the selfdetermination of the Basque people, similar to ETA, but does not use violence as a tool to reach their
goals.173 The group actively promotes opening dialogues among those in the Basque region. Finally,
Gesto por la Paz (Gesture for Peace) is a movement established in 1986 to raise awareness against ETAs
violence and to provide a voice against ETA.174

171

Departmento de Justicia, Empleo Y Seguridad Social (DJESS), Plan vasco de educacion, para la paz y los,
Derechos humanos, 2008-2011, The Basque Autonomous County Government: DJESS, (December 2007).

172

Gogoratuz Gernika, Peace Research Center, (2009), http://www.gernikagogoratuz.org/en/presentation.php.

173

Lokarri, http://www.lokarri.org/.

174

The Association for Peace in the Basque Country, http://www.gesto.org/engl/i_index.htm#.

48

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

Youth Radicalization in the Netherlands

There is no particular terrorist group that is recruiting school-aged youth in the Netherlands. It appears
that terrorist group recruitment and radicalization in the Netherlands has occurred primarily among the
immigrant population, with young second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants of Moroccan descent
among those most frequently involved. The primary venues identified as contributing to youth
involvement include a small number of radical mosques, some Islamic schools, and the Internet. Since
2004, virtually every Dutch government ministry and department has been involved in counterradicalization programs, creating a holistic approach to dealing with the growing problem of
radicalization among Dutch youth.

Background
Dutch officials now believe that, beginning in
1997, the Imams in control of four Salafist
mosque organizations in the Netherlands began
allowing individuals known or suspected of
involvement in international terrorism to frequent
their mosques and use them to recruit parishioners
for jihad.175 While these former militants appear to
have played a significant role in radicalizing and
recruiting youth, they may be less of a factor
currently. The advent of the Internet and
international jihadist propaganda now appears to
be a key factor in youth radicalization in the
Netherlands. Many of the Dutch Muslim youths who have been arrested for plotting terrorist attacks
admit they became radicalized through reading materials posted on Salafi websites.176

Appeal to Youth
Over the past twenty years, the rapid and accelerating pace of immigration to the Netherlands has
changed the character and composition of the once homogenous Dutch nation. It is these immigrant
communities, including their school-aged youth, that Dutch authorities believe exhibit the greatest
vulnerability to radicalization and recruitment by violent terrorist groups.
Dutch officials admit that certain radical Salafi organizations have, since the late 1980s, quietly garnered
a small but significant following among Dutch Muslims, especially among Muslim youth. This is because
of their hard-line and uncompromising message that promotes a militant and ultra-orthodox version of

175

Interviews with senior Dutch security and counterterrorism officials, 2008. See also National Security Service
(BVD), De Politieke Islam in Nederland [Political Islam in the Netherlands] (The Hague: BVD, May 1998);
National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb), Salafism in the Netherlands (The Hague: NCTb, May 2008),
50.

176

General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), Saoedische Invloeden in Nederland. Verbanded Tussen
Salafitische Missie, Radicaliseringsprocessen en Islamitisch Terrorisme [Saudi Influences in the Netherlands.
Links Between the Salafist Mission, Radicalization Processes and Islamic Terrorism] (The Hague: AIVD, June
2004), 8.

49

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

Islam. The danger posed by Salafism is that its simple message clearly resonates with angry and
disenfranchised Muslim youth living in the Netherlands who are searching for their identity. According to
a report by the Dutch National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism (NCTb), There is a large group of
Muslims, mostly young people, in non-Muslim western countries, who feel isolated within the societies in
which they live they are looking for their own identity and for a position to adopt in Western
society.177 In a search for identity, these youth may become radicalized through contact with extremists
or extremist media on the Internet.

Approach
There are a few key venues through which radicalization and recruitment is known to have taken place in
the Netherlands, to include radical religious institutions, some independent Islamic schools, and the
Internet.
Radical Islamic Religious Institutions
In interviews conducted for this study, a number of Dutch intelligence, security, and counterterrorism
officials indicated that the genesis of the spread of extremism in the Netherlands can be attributed to the
opening of the first of four militant Islamic religious institutions, which occurred in 1986. The four
mosques are known to have preached xenophobic messages to their parishioners and have served as a
recruiting venue by radicals.
For example, the Saudi-backed El Tawheed Mosque in Amsterdam distributed flyers to its parishioners
before Christmas warning them not to join in the Yuletide festivities, telling them: How can you join the
festivities of the enemy just as if it were your own? The mosques website posted a message about how
to deal with non-Muslim Dutch, indicating It is advised not to live amongst them and "We must never
make friends with them.178 A number of these Dutch mosques also sought to promulgate their radical
vision of Islam through a series of conferences and seminars, which catered to thousands of young
Muslim men from across Europe.179
Dutch officials believe that beginning in 1997 the Imams heading the four Salafist mosque organizations
in the Netherlands began allowing individuals known or suspected of involvement in international
terrorism to frequent their mosques and use them to recruit parishioners for jihad, including youth.180
Dutch security officials strongly believe that the Imams of these four Salafist mosques allowed these
recruiters, almost all of whom were foreigners who were well known to the congregants as being radical
militants, to regularly attend services at the mosque in order to identify Muslim youths who might make
suitable recruits. According to a report by the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD): For a
long time the leaders and imams of these and other mosques adopted a certain degree of indifference and
177

National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb), Jihadis and the Internet (The Hague: NCTb, May 2008), 91.

178

Transcript, Islamic Educational Books Encourage Hate Against Non-Believers, NOVA TV, by Peter ter Horst
and Siem Eikelenboom, producers, (December 21, 2001).

179

Desmond Butler, Sept. 11 Plotter Reportedly Sent Terror Funds Flowing Through Dutch Town, New York
Times, September 22, 2002; Ian Johnson and David Crawford, A Saudi Group Spreads Extremism in Law
Seminars, Taught in Dutch, Wall Street Journal, April 15, 2003, A1.

180

Interviews with senior Dutch security and counterterrorism officials, 2008. See also National Security Service
(BVD), De Politieke Islam in Nederland [Political Islam in the Netherlands]; National Coordinator for
Counterterrorism (NCTb), Salafism in the Netherlands, 50.

50

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

ambivalence (from feelings of ideological affinity) towards recruiters within or in the margins of the
mosque community.181
Independent Islamic Schools
The first Muslim primary schools opened in the Dutch cities of Rotterdam, The Hague, Eindhoven and
Amsterdam in 1988. In the 15 years that followed, the number of so-called Islamic Schools in the
Netherlands grew dramatically, reflecting the rise in the number of Muslims immigrating to Holland
during this timeframe. Islamic schools were treated as being outside the Dutch school system until 2002,
which meant the government did not regulate the curriculum taught or the textbooks used. The
organization responsible for regulating the curriculum taught at these schools is the Islamic School
Boards Organization (ISBO).182 There is considerable evidence that the ISBO did not perform credibly
during the 1990s in terms of actively and aggressively regulating the subjects taught at Islamic schools in
the Netherlands.
The Dutch National Security Service (BVD) eventually became concerned that the strictly religious
curriculum taught at some of these schools, especially at a small number of primary schools funded by the
Saudi-backed al-Waqf al-Islami Foundation in Eindhoven, bordered on being seditious because of the
overtly anti-integration and anti-democratic ideals being espoused by the teachers.183 In 2001and 2002,
the Dutch television news magazine Nova broadcast lengthy investigative reports about the controversial
content of some of the Arabic-language textbooks that the al-Waqf Foundation in Eindhoven was
distributing to the Muslim primary schools it subsidized throughout the Netherlands.
Many of the textbooks were found to contain hate-filled rhetoric directed at Christians, Jews, women, and
homosexuals. For example, one textbook used in Islamic schools educating children between the ages of
four and twelve years old contained the phrase: The prophet said: I have the peoples mandate to fight, to
wage war against the people until they confess that Allah is the only and true god and the Mohammed is
his prophet.184 Unlike the majority of the Islamic schools in the Netherlands, these Islamic primary
schools banned television, music, whistling, as well as literature that the schools deemed ran contrary to
Islam. Women were also required to dress according to Islamic rules, and were sent home if they were not
dressed accordingly. Corporal punishment was also widely used in direct contravention of Dutch law.185
Through these schools, it appears that the lack of proper oversight and regulation by the Dutch
government and the ISBO allowed radical extremists to operate schools that sought to radicalize their
students. School culture, textbooks, and curricula all reinforced extremist principals and a disdain for
Western ideals and values.

181

General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), Saoedische Invloeden in Nederland. Verbanded Tussen
Salafitische Missie, Radicaliseringsprocessen en Islamitisch Terrorisme [Saudi Influences in the Netherlands.
Links Between the Salafist Mission, Radicalization Processes and Islamic Terrorism], 7.

182

ISBO has been an influential voice within the Dutch Muslim community since its creation. Its former director,
Ra_it Bal, since 2004, has been a senior official with one of the two official bodies to serve as a liaison between
the Muslim community and the Dutch government, the Contact Body for Government and Muslims (CMO)

183

National Security Service (BVD), De Politieke Islam in Nederland [Political Islam in the Netherlands], 11.

184

Transcript, Islam op de Basisschool, [Islam at Primary School], NOVA TV, by Peter ter Horst and Siem
Eikelenboom, producers, February 18, 2002.

185

Ibid.

51

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The Internet as a Tool for Spreading Jihad

Dutch security authorities have been able to confirm that the Internet is used by extremists as a means to
spread violent jihadist propaganda and that it is influencing youth towards radicalization. By 2004, based
on interrogations of arrested Dutch militants, the Dutch security service knew that the Internet had
become one of the principal means of radicalizing Dutch Muslim youths and making them susceptible to
recruitment by terrorists.186
According to the Dutch security service, many of the Dutch Muslim youths who had been arrested for
plotting terrorist attacks had admitted that they had become radicalized through reading materials posted
on various Salafi websites. According to a report prepared by the Dutch security service: [Dutch]
youngsters have found their way to the websites of more or less radical Salafist mullahs. Rather
disconcerting in this respect is that some of these mullahs in Saudi Arabia render advice to young Dutch
Muslims via the Internet on subjects such as the jihad and martyrdom.187
Dutch home-grown terrorists have also used the Internet as a weapon. In September 2004, an 18 year-old
Muslim boy of Moroccan parentage named Yahya K was arrested for sending threatening e-mail
messages to a member of the Dutch parliament and to the Dutch security service. When police searched
the teenagers home, they found home made explosives made with chemical fertilizers that the boy had
assembled with the help of bomb-making instructions he found on the Internet.188
Conflict with Other Youth Populations
One factor that could have the potential to impact the radicalization of Muslim youths in the Netherlands
is the role of militant, right-wing Dutch youth who have routinely engaged in open combat with Muslim
youth for years. Commonly known as the Lonsdale Youth, this movement is dominated by extreme
nationalism and xenophobia that takes the form of hatred and violence directed at all immigrants,
especially the Dutch Muslim population. A report from 2005 cites a worrisome increase in violent
conflict between gangs of Lonsdale Youth and Muslim youth of Moroccan descent.189

Counter Initiatives
Since 2004, virtually every Dutch government ministry and department has been involved in counterradicalization programs, creating a holistic approach to dealing with the problem. Government
institutions, private sector groups, and the general public all play key roles in counter-radicalization
initiatives. In August 2007, the government announced that it was dedicating $38mil (U.S.) over four
years on programs aimed at preventing the growth of Islamist extremism, placing emphasis on programs

186

General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), Saoedische Invloeden in Nederland. Verbanded Tussen
Salafitische Missie, Radicaliseringsprocessen en Islamitisch Terrorisme [Saudi Influences in the Netherlands.
Links Between the Salafist Mission, Radicalization Processes and Islamic Terrorism], 8.

187

Ibid., 8.

188

Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, De Gewelddadige Jihad in Nederland [Violent Jihad in the
Netherlands: Current Trends in the Islamist Terrorist Threat] (The Hague: Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations, March 2006), 49.

189

General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), Lonsdale-Jongeren in Nederland: Feiten en Fictie van een
Vermeende Rechts-Extremistische Subcultuur [Lonsdale Youth in the Netherlands: Fact and Fiction of an Alleged
Right-Extremist Subculture] (The Hague: AIVD, May 2005).

52

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at the community and school levels that target the growing problem of radicalization among Dutch
youth.190
School-Based Initiatives
In the Netherlands, youth between the ages of 5 and 16 are required to go to school. As such, the school
system has been used as a location where young persons can be exposed to counter-radicalization
initiatives. In schools, curriculum has been developed to address radicalization as well as the factors that
are believed to lead to radicalization. For example, as part of a nationwide campaign called "Netherlands
Against Terrorism," materials were developed and provided to teachers to facilitate classroom discussions
on the topic of radicalization. Teachers have also been educated about extremism and potential indicators
of radicalization.
Local schools in the Amsterdam area have adopted a program of teaching a wide range of subjects
designed specifically for the children of Muslim immigrants. Starting at kindergarten, schools in
Amsterdam have started teaching basic lessons on the privileges and benefits of democracy.191 Since
2006, all primary and secondary schools in the Netherlands have been legally required to build citizenship
education and social integration into their curricula.192
The Ministry of Education and the Education Inspectorate also participate in government-wide efforts to
measure the prevalence or potential occurrences of radicalization in the country. In order to gauge or
detect emerging problems among youth, the Ministry of Education compiles detailed statistical reports of
inter- and intra-ethnic incidents based on daily, weekly, and monthly reports received from universities,
technical colleges, and grade schools throughout the Netherlands. The Education Inspectorate also keeps
close tabs on attendance and dropout rates among Muslim youths attending grade schools throughout the
country. These statistics are compiled with those provided by other agencies to paint a picture of the
current situation.193
Other Initiatives
Community-based initiatives and utilization of non-traditional partners are key components of the
Netherlands counter-radicalization efforts. The Institute for Multicultural Development (FORUM), the
largest non-governmental actor in the field of integration policy in the Netherlands, focuses on
developments and issues relating to the Dutch multicultural society in general and to the integration of
ethnic minorities in particular. FORUM has sponsored several programs and campaigns aimed at

190

Associated Press Netherlands Sets Plan on Extremism, New York Times, 27 August 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/28/world/europe/28dutch.html?r=1&fta=y&pagewanted.

191

From December 2007 interview conducted by HSI researchers with the Mayor of Amsterdam, Job Cohen, and
his staff.

192

UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, Inventory of Member State Programs and Initiatives Aimed
at Countering Radicalization and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism, (2008),
http://www.un.org/terrorism/pdfs/radicalization.pdf. For information on the civic education program administered
by the U.S. Department of Education, see Appendix I.

193

Based on communications held in January 2008 between the research team, a senior official with the NCTb, and
with Dr. Bob De Graaf of the University of Leiden, who was one of the senior academics who helped develop the
success or failure measurements systems used by the NCTb to measure the Dutch governments progress in
identifying and combating extremism

53

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

stemming the spread of radicalization by promoting citizen awareness and identity programs for youth.
One such example is a FORUM initiative called "Intergenerational Discussion Nights," which brings
together Muslim youth and their parents to watch a movie about the differences between generations and
discusses the content.194
Some counter-radicalization initiatives reach out to youth where those youth feel engaged and entertained,
in an effort to promote integration and acceptance. For example, the MaroquiStars Foundation,
established in 2003 by a professional Muslim soccer player, attempts to increase the social and cultural
participation of Moroccan youth in Dutch society and to improve the image of Moroccans in the
Netherlands.195 Volunteers for the foundation, who are often successful Moroccan professionals, serve as
positive role models for young persons by working with them on a variety of social projects, primarily
revolving around sports. The group also visits schools and organizes an annual soccer match between
Moroccan players and a Dutch team. MaroquiStars seeks to promote dialogue, mutual understanding, and
cooperation between persons with different backgrounds and beliefs.196

The Internet as a Terrorist Tool to Recruit and Radicalize Youth

All of the terrorist organizations researched for this study have utilized the Internet to varying degrees as
a tool for reaching out to their followers or potential supporters. In recent years, the use of the Internet by
terrorist groups has proliferated rapidly: in 1998 there were twelve active terrorist-related websites; by
2003, the number of sites had increased to over 2600; as of early 2009, there are estimated to be nearly
7000 active terrorist-related websites.197
Whereas terrorists indoctrination, recruitment, and training used to rely primarily on physical meetings
between recruits and recruiters (which often required time, coordination, and travel), the Internet can now
provide these connections quickly, easily, remotely, and anonymously. Terrorist groups are using this to
their advantage and are employing a wide array of online platforms to disseminate a variety of content.
As terrorists use of the Internet has flourished, so too has young persons use of this medium. Youth
increasingly use the Internet to stay in constant contact via e-mail and instant messaging, social
networking sites, as well as for entertainment, including routinely sharing online media such as video
clips.198
Some terrorist groups are now tailoring their online platforms specifically to attract youth audiences.
These groups are specifically targeting messages to young persons that promote radical ideology and

194

The Institute for Multicultural Development Forum,

http://www.onderzoekinformatie.nl/en/oi/nod/organisatie/ORG1236730/print

195

Maroquistars Website, http://www.maroquistars.nl/index.php?id=1&categorie=Home.

196

Ibid.

197

Dr. Gabriel Weimann, "The Internet as a Terrorist Tool to Recruit Youth" (presentation given at the Youth
Recruitment & Radicalization Roundtable, Arlington, Virginia, March 19, 2009).

198

Microsoft Digital Advertising Solutions and MTV Networks, Circuits of Cool: Key Themes and Findings,
(July 2007), 3, 5, 7.
http://advertising.microsoft.com/europe/WWDocs/User/Europe/ResearchLibrary/ResearchReport/Circuits_of_Coo
l_Booklet_FINAL.PDF

54

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violence through colorful cartoons, games, and videos that are posted online. To date, terrorist groups
appear to have been successful in reaching and radicalizing some young persons by way of the Internet.

Narrowcasting to Youth Audiences

Some terrorist groups have adopted the marketing strategy of narrowcasting their content to specific
audiences.199 With youth, they target different age groups and change the platforms, content, messaging,
and appeal depending on age. For example:

The Palestinian group Hamas specifically targets young children with its youth website, al-Fateh
(meaning The Conqueror), which features cartoons, Disney-like cartoon characters, and
colorful childrens stories. These characters are used to perpetuate messages of violence, promote
hatred of Israel, and praise jihad and martyrdom.200

Some groups have released videogames that are appealing to kids and adolescents. Hizballah
developed a series of games called Special Force and Special Force 2, which are first-personshooter games that simulate military missions against Israeli soldiers. According to one Hizballah
member: "In this game you can be a partner in the victory. Fight, resist and destroy your enemy's
Merkava tank in the game of force and victorySpecial Force 2 also offers mental and personal
training for those who play."201 Special Force 2 is available in Arabic, Farsi, and English.
Another online game is Night of Bush Capturing, which was released by the Global Islamic
Media Front in 2006. The goal of the game is for players to hunt and kill former President George
W. Bush.202 An advertisement for the game indicated it was being distributed for terrorist
children.203

Web forums and chat rooms appear to be used to reach older teens. These mediums are where
peer-to-peer interactions take place and where youth can move from passively gathering radical
information to actively participating in discussion of radical topics.

Special attention appears to focus on reaching out to young women over the Internet. For
example, young Muslim women may face traditional restrictions that can be overcome online.
They may communicate anonymously with other Muslim women, and even men, via the Internet
in ways that may not be socially acceptable in person. Dutch Muslim women have been recruited
as translators, developers of Dutch language jihadi literature and developers of Dutch jihadi
websites and software.204

199

Gabriel Weimann, Online Terrorists Prey on the Vulnerable, YaleGlobal Online (5 March 2008).

200

Ibid. See: http://www.al-fateh.net/

201

Matt Peckham, War by Proxy? Hezbollahs Anti-Israel Game" PC World (16 August 2007).

202

United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Violent Islamist Extremism,
the Internet, and the Home Grown Terrorist Threat Majority & Minority Staff Report 109th Cong, (8 May 2008),
9.

203

Gamepolitics.com, "Islamic Radicals Release 'Night of Bush Capturing' Game," Gamepolitics.com (18
September 2006), http://www.gamepolitics.com/2006/09/18/islamic-radicals-release-night-of-bush-capturinggame

204

National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb), Jihadis and the Internet, 65-66.

55

Recruitment & Radicalization of School-Aged Youth

The various platforms and messages used by terrorist groups online are intended to incite negative
sentiment toward enemies (or perceived enemies) to immunize young persons to violence, glorify
martyrs, and create bonds.
The Internet as a Radicalization Accelerant
The United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs noted the Internet
becomes a virtual echo chamber acting as a radicalization accelerant. 205 Youth are generally drawn
into radical Internet websites for three main reasons: they may run across radical content while exploring
the Internet for entertainment (such as video sites); they may be curiously seeking information on
ideologies, traditions, or heritage-related matter associated with the radical group; or, they may be looking
for a community with which they can identify. 206
The Internet plays a vital role in creating social bonds that are necessary for radicalization and
recruitment, as well as providing a venue for perpetuating radicalization among groups of recruits. If
youth have begun to explore these areas and have formed bonds with other like-minded individuals,
(whether they are peers in similar situations or recruiters, online or offline), their radicalization may then
progress inside these groups. Researchers have commented that the Internet can intensify a sense of
identity through the phenomenon of group polarization, in which members of a radicalizing group
perpetuate their radicalization through continued discussion, perhaps with the facilitation of a terrorist
recruiter.207
Self-Radicalization
There have been instances of young persons utilizing the Internet to self-radicalize into terrorist group
supporters or members. A notable example of self-radicalization is that of Aabid Hussein Khan, a 22year-old British Muslim who, with two others, founded a terrorist cell in the U.K.. In 1997, at only 12
years old, Khan quickly became an avid fan of anything he could find on the Internet relating to jihad and
the mujahideenand he began to use newsgroups and discussion forums to join with people in
discussing these issues208 Even at such a young age, and in the public Internets early years, Khan
fervently pursued an e-war strategy over the Internet and managed to create an underground, online
network of supporters in Europe, Canada, and the United States. These young men and women most of
whom had never met each other in person evolved into a tightly-knit circle who shared a common, all-

205

United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Violent Islamist Extremism,
the Internet, and the Home Grown Terrorist Threat Majority & Minority Staff Report 109th Cong, (8 May 2008),
11.

206

Katharina Von Knop, Countering Web-based Islamist Narratives: Conceptualizing an Information War and a
Counter-propaganda Campaign, in Hypermedia Seduction for Terrorist Recruiting, ed. B. Ganor et al., (2007),
246. This curiosity is very broad, and could range from simple intrigue with a particular group or ideology, to
doing research on ones own religious or ethnic heritage in order to have a better concept of self-identity. See also:
Frank Cilluffo, et al., NETworked Radicalization: A Counter-Strategy, Special Report by The George
Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute and The University of Virginia Critical Incident
Analysis Group, 9.

207

Christina L. Madden, Typing TERROR in a Crowded Chat, Policy Innovations (5 February 2008).

208

Evan Kohlmann, Anatomy of a Modern Homegrown Terror Cell: Aabid Khan et al, The NEFA Foundation
(September 2008), 2.

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consuming interest in computers and global mujahideen movements.209 Their cell was broken up by
British officials in June 2006.

Implications
Terrorist groups are using the Internet to reach a much larger and more global audience than was possible
just a decade ago. Some groups have rather sophisticated online presences, employing complex structures
and hosting mechanisms, an array of multi-media platforms, and the use of logos and branding. Some
groups are adapting (albeit slowly in some cases) to the Web 2.0 evolution, by utilizing online platforms
that are more interactive.
Online Characteristics and Structures
Terrorists usage of the Internet tends to reflect the organizational structures, sizes, and capabilities of
various groups. These groups fall into two general categories: highly-organized, hierarchical groups with
centralized websites, and diffusely-structured networks that distribute their content to a multitude of
small, private websites and forums through third-party distribution entities. Centralized websites may
feature various subsections relating to current events, leadership profiles, statements about the groups
ideologies and doctrines, propaganda, and contact information, and may also provide links to other group
websites that are dedicated to more specific topics or content. The most advanced terrorist websites can
track and capture information about the visitors browsing their websites, much like commercial sites.210
For example, Lebanese Hizballah condensed over 50 smaller group-related websites of varying subject
matter into approximately seven organized, topical categories on one centralized website.211 Hizballahs
website offers information on leadership figures and updates on the partys parliamentary, ministerial, and
political activities. It also provides texts of speeches and interviews, gives information on current and past
military conflicts, disseminates anti-Israeli propaganda, offers a regularly-updated news page featuring
current events stories, and provides a large online multimedia library that features audio, video, and photo
archives.212
The Sri Lankan terrorist group Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) benefit from a network of
several official websites that connect them to the global Tamil diaspora (most of whom resides in
Canada).213 This wide network serves two main purposes: to provide Sri Lankan Tamils abroad with a
Tamil news source; and, to leverage this sympathetic diaspora into providing funds back to the LTTE.
These sites are a significant source of the LTTEs fundraising.214
In contrast to structured websites of hierarchical groups, jihadist groups such as the al-Qaeda network
represent websites used by diffusely structured organizations. Their online presence reflects this
209

Ibid., 2-3.

210

Gabriel Weimann, Terrorists and Their Tools Part II, YaleGlobal Online (26 April 2004).

211

Gabriel Weimann, Hezbollah Dot Com: Hezbollahs Online Campaign, 11-13.

http://cmsprod.bgu.ac.il/NR/rdonlyres/34396BDB-6C0E-4931-A077-697451885123/34393/Weimannedited.pdf

212

See http://www.hizbollah.tv/ (Arabic) or http://english.hizbollah.tv/index.php (English).

213

Shyam Tekwani, The LTTEs Online Network and Its Implications for Regional Security, Working Paper No.
104, (Singapore: Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies, January 2006), 14.

214

Ibid., 14. See www.tamilcanadian.com for one of the largest sites.

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configuration in the makeup of their sites: an array of decentralized, mostly-unofficial, privately-owned

web pages, blogs, web forums, and online bulletin boards that post and re-post terrorists content such as
videos, statements, or religious doctrines. Despite the nebulous structure of these groups, there is a
common mode of media distribution among them. Because diffuse jihadist groups do not have the
organizational structures or technological capacities to create, produce, distribute, and maintain online
content on their own, they rely on virtual media production and distribution entities (MPDEs) to assist
the dissemination of their content.215
The process of utilizing MPDEs occurs in three general stages: First, jihadist groups (or in some cases,
jihadist scholars) create content usually texts or videos and either post them to a mother site, or
transmit them via e-mail. The recipients are trusted production and distribution websites media groups
or small publishing houses that maintain online catalogues of publications on similar topics.216 These
groups collect and organize material and then help redistribute it to masses of third-party recipients, such
as personal websites, blogs, or online discussion forums. The intent of redistribution is to spread the
content as prolifically as possible, so that many recipients will duplicate the content. This makes
eliminating the terrorists content more difficult for governments; if one site is shut down, there will
likely be many more mirror sites to fill its place.
Online Mediums and Content
Terrorist groups use several different kinds of mediums online to incite negative sentiment towards their
enemies or to inspire listeners. Videos distributed over the Internet are a versatile and effective means of
reaching audiences. While well-structured groups may have the capacity to create and host videos on their
own websites, YouTube enables anyone with Internet access the ability to upload videos, watch them, and
pass them on to others. Many of the online videos appear to be designed to either directly target youth
audiences or to be attractive to young persons. One such example is a jihadist rap video Dirty Kuffar,
designed to appeal to youth through their music.217 As mentioned above, some groups have also produced
video games that promote their violent ideology by allowing young persons to play the role of the
terrorist. Explicit photo galleries, recorded audio speeches, and text statements are also commonly used
mediums.
Other interactive Internet mediums used by terrorist groups include online web forums, chat rooms, and
even private e-mails. Web forums and chat rooms are places where curious youth may go to explore and
ask questions about political or religious issues, and where more opinionated forum members express
volatile views, redistribute content, and provoke each other. Forums also allow for participants to remain
anonymous, and many offer a degree of security through encrypted password-protection.218 Private online
forums and e-mails are used by terrorist recruiters to vet potential members. This is particularly the case
with jihadist recruiters who are looking for fighters to join the Iraqi insurgency. Recruits may be filtered

215

Daniel Kimmage, The Al-Qaeda Media Nexus: The Virtual Network Behind the Global Message, Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty (March 2008), 4.

216

Ibid., 9.

217

See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CefIYcKF_O0 for the video.

218

Hanna Rogan, Dynamics of the Jihadi Online Media Campaign (presentation given at the conference The
Jihadist Phenomenon: A Social Sciences Perspective in Menton, France, 26-28 October 2007), 10.

58

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based on their knowledge of the Arabic language and Islamic tenets, in order to sift out possible
imposters. 219 Those who are considered for recruitment may then be contacted via e-mail.
Finally, social networking websites are an emerging medium where terrorist groups are attempting to gain
a foothold in order to disseminate their messages and connect with potential sympathizers and recruits. If
terrorists manage to succeed in exploiting these platforms, they stand to reap a multitude of benefits. In a
single online location, they can connect with millions of users in pre-existing networks and user interest
groups, use these networks to disseminate text, photo, and video propaganda, search and view user
information, cull potential recruits, and contact potential recruits through private messages. In late 2008
Umar Abd al-Hakim, a Syrian member of the radical Islamic web forum al-Faloja, published a manual
titled Raiding Facebook: Theory and Practice as part of an online al-Nusra (meaning "invasion")
campaign.220 His Facebook campaign went so far as to designate seven online brigade commanders,
responsible for administering various content on the social networking site including doctrine, training
materials, and martyrdom videos.
Branding
Terrorist groups also use branding strategies to make their message easily recognizable and authentic to
their audiences. Hierarchical groups have been successful at branding their content. Now, more diffuse
militant groups are learning from them and beginning to adopt this method to establish authenticity. It is
easier for large, hierarchical organizations (like Hizballah and the LTTE) to brand their messages because
they possess name recognition, recognizable logos, have recognizable figureheads, and post their content
to their own official websites. It is more difficult for smaller, diffuse jihadist groups with fluctuating
online presences to establish this notoriety because it is harder to credibly discern what material
originated from which group. Diffuse groups remedy this by consistently using the same media
production and distribution entities to distribute their content. As media production distribution entities
become associated with specific jihadist groups, they become authenticators for the content of the group
as they distribute it to third parties. Additionally, many groups now attach specific logos, markers, or
other signatures to statements or videos before they are distributed, thus adding visual authentication to
the content.221
Evolving Towards Web 2.0
Internet mediums have, in the past three to four years, undergone significant changes in how they relate to
their audiences. Internet usage has evolved from a passive, individually directed information-seeking
process, Web 1.0, to an active, socially-connected, user-involved environment where users are compelled
to interact, discuss, create, and distribute content, often referred to as Web 2.0.
Terrorist groups are adapting to this trend. Their strengths still predominantly lie in Web 1.0 mediums
that are still useful to them in the form of informative propaganda sites. Nevertheless, terrorist groups are
attempting to adopt 2.0 qualities in areas of the Internet that are safe to them. Chat rooms, bulletin boards
and web forums are the most used mediums. Terrorist groups attempt to appeal to users through constant
219

Gabriel Weimann, www.terror.net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet, United States Institute of Peace
Special Report 116, (March 2004), 8.

220

Will McCants, Invading Facebook: Theory and Practice, (17 December 2008).
http://www.jihadica.com/invading-facebook-theory-and-practice/.

221

Kimmage, The Al-Qaeda Media Nexus: The Virtual Network Behind the Global Message, 9.

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connectivity and are bridging the way to more user-driven radical content. Additionally, selfradicalization is becoming a more prevalent by-product of radical content going 2.0. As youths
exploration of radical content becomes more self-driven, there is more potential for them to draw their
own conclusions and take their own actions.

Countering Terrorists Online

Initiatives that have been implemented to counter terrorist use of the Internet have been focused primarily
on two areas: monitoring or shutting down the sites, and countering radical online propaganda.
Monitoring and Disruption
Initiatives are in place to monitor and shut down terrorist websites. The goal is to undermine the abilities
of terrorists to broadcast their agendas online. These measures are generally undertaken by a law
enforcement and intelligence services. For example, Belgian Federal Police, Intelligence Services, and
Counter-Terrorist Joint Unit administer an Internet Open Source Platform that encourages people to
report websites hosting radical or illegal material. The government then investigates these websites. The
European Commission proposed a Europe-wide version of the Belgian program in 2007, called Check
the Web.222
Counter-Message
Counter-message measures attempt to confront and discredit radical propaganda and opinions. This
strategy entails de-legitimizing the core of extremist arguments, and focuses on reducing the impact of
radical messages on audiences. Counter-message initiatives often integrate government and private
entities to help construct and deliver the chosen narratives. Examples of these initiatives are evident in
Singapore, where the state has partnered with organizations and individuals to undertake several online
counter-message initiatives, including the government-funded website of the Religious Rehabilitation
Group (RRG). The RRG website features responses to misinterpretations of Islam, articles about
radicalism and moderate Islam, and a multimedia section.223
Singapores Islamic Religious Council (MUIS) has developed websites for youth, to include a site that
responds to religious queries and a site devoted to rebutting extremist ideologies. MUIS also hosts a web
portal where moderate religious officials develop content for youth audiences. 224 Some community
members in Indonesia have started online counter-radicalization interest groups and blogs. For example,
"Singaporean Muslims Against Terrorism," is a multimedia counter-ideology blog that features entries on
countering radical ideologies, along with photos, videos, and music.225

222

Tim Stevens and Peter R. Neumann, First Report of the Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that
Lead to Terrorism: Inventory of State Programmes, Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, International
Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ISCR), (London, U.K., January 2009), 16.

223

See: http://www.rrg.sg/.

224

See: http://counterideology.multiply.com and http://2jay.wordpress.com/avata/. Also see: Hassan, Singapores

Muslim Community-Based Initiatives Against JI.

225

Ibid.

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The U.K. government partially funds the grassroots Radical Middle Way movement, an initiative that
disseminates moderate, mainstream Islam to young British Muslims through engaging online mediums.226
The Saudi government supports an online "Tranquility Campaign that incorporates religious scholars,
psychologists, and sociologists who regularly visit websites and web forums to engage in dialogue with
radical participants.227

226

Cilluffo, 11. For the site itself, see: http://www.radicalmiddleway.co.uk/.

227

Ibid., 13.

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S ECTION III. S UMMARY & I MPLICATIONS

Terrorist groups are adaptive adversaries who use a variety of tools and tactics to reach potential recruits
and supporters, which too often include young persons. Groups systematically prey upon the
vulnerabilities of youth in various contexts, offering a range of incentives that are intended to make
membership in the group attractive. In some cases, young persons have also been forcibly recruited or
deceived into participating in terrorist activities.
Terrorist organizations have used schools as a recruitment venue in many locations throughout the world,
utilizing the education system to transmit group ideologies as well as provide mental and physical training
and indoctrination. However, the full extent of how schools are being used for recruitment and
radicalization of youth globally is not well understood. It is important for educators and others that work
with school-aged youth including those in public and private K-12 institutions, charter schools,
religious schools, colleges and universities, and trade schools to be aware that some young persons may
be vulnerable to recruitment and radicalization.
The Internet has also become a resource for disseminating terrorist propaganda and instructions to young
persons that might not otherwise have direct contact with group recruiters or supporters. Some terrorist
groups have established websites that are youth-oriented, with colorful comics, games, and links to
videos. These sites, many of which are available in English, help to get the groups propaganda and
messages out to a worldwide audience. It is necessary to promote awareness that any young person with
an Internet connection can access websites that promote terrorist groups or provide graphic depictions of
acts of terrorism that are commonly portrayed as acts of heroism. While there are discreet examples of
young persons who have become radicalized online, the magnitude to which this is occurring is not
known.
Although it appears that youth recruitment and radicalization is not occurring domestically to the extent
that it has happened elsewhere, the degree to which it may or may not be happening within the U.S. is
unknown. Similarly, it is not clear how the radicalization that is occurring in other countries might impact
us domestically. As has been shown by the situation in Europe, many of the young persons that are
perceived as being most vulnerable to radicalization or recruitment (based on incidents that have already
occurred) have been second- and third-generation immigrants. It is believed that these young persons
often struggle with identity problems, fail to integrate, and may feel excluded or marginalized
vulnerabilities that have been utilized by terrorists to gain their support.
It is important to gain a better understanding of our own immigrant populations and diaspora
communities, including those coming from areas affected by terrorism and conflict. It may be the case
that there are young persons coming into this country that have been exposed to radical groups or
information, and we dont have a grasp of if or how that might translate into dangerous behaviors.
Furthermore, it is necessary to determine if young immigrants or members of diaspora communities
within the U.S. might be experiencing some of the same pressures or prejudices that have been associated
with susceptibility to radicalization. Communities and educators would likely benefit from this
knowledge, enabling them to better address the needs of these young persons as well as identify and
prevent potential problems.

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Implications
While this study has led to a better understanding of how some terrorist groups are recruiting,
radicalizing, and utilizing school-aged youth, there is still a great deal of research and learning required to
further inform our understanding of this dynamic issue. It is necessary to gain a more comprehensive
understanding of youth radicalization, to identify practical implications, and to inform preventive
measures.
There likely are existing internal and external resources that could be utilized to help enhance our
knowledge of what makes some young persons susceptible to radicalization, as well as assist in
identifying approaches for countering potential threats. For example:

Although known cases of U.S.-based young persons that have radicalized or been recruited into
terrorist groups is limited, there are some examples that could be explored further to get a better
understanding of the context in which radicalization has occurred domestically. Recent events in
Minnesota, in which a number of young persons of Somali descent have left the U.S. allegedly to
train or fight alongside an al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist group, al-Shabaab, could provide insight into
the type of situational variables that make some persons or communities vulnerable. Similarly, there
are other examples (e.g., Adam Gadahn, John Walker Lindh) that could be explored further to
identify possible differences between susceptible individuals or communities across the U.S.

There have been programs in place domestically for decades that address youth participation in other
types of violent groups, including gangs. It is possible that information from other tangentially related
areas could help inform understanding of youth vulnerabilities, or could provide a framework for
addressing this issue. It would also be beneficial to determine if initiatives that have been
implemented to counter youth violence in general (e.g., anti-gang programs) can be utilized or
adapted to help prevent violent extremism.

It might be useful to look to the research and initiatives that have been carried out by some of our
closest allies that have had to address growing populations of radicalized youth. The United Kingdom
and the Netherlands have both implemented a variety of measures aimed at stemming radicalization
and tackling the underlying causes. Initiatives in both countries have utilized the education system
and enlisted a variety of community members who come in contact with young persons on a regular
basis (e.g., teachers, parents, religious leaders) to help identify and address youth that might be
susceptible to radical influences. These and other countries are likely to be able to provide valuable
lessons learned and best practices based on their experiences.

Just as terrorist organizations exploit situational factors and grievances and specifically tailor their
messages to appeal to youth, any initiatives that are developed to counter youth recruitment and
radicalization should also address underlying causes and contextual factors that make some young
persons and communities more susceptible. Initiatives should be locally tailored and should engage
members from across the community who are in a position to address specific underlying factors or
identify potential radicalization indicators. Counter-recruitment and radicalization initiatives must also
evolve with the young audiences they are intended to reach, adapt along with the adversaries, incorporate
new developments in technologies, and address changes within environments where young persons are
susceptible.
Given the apparent increase in youth involvement in terrorist organizations, and the changing
demographics of those involved or implicated, it is necessary to promote awareness that young persons

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are susceptible to terrorist recruitment and radicalization. It is also imperative that we make it
unacceptable for terrorist organizations to consider utilizing young persons to further their violent goals.

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A PPENDIX A. Y OUTH R ECRUITMENT &

R ADICALIZATION R OUNDTABLE 19 M ARCH 2009
The Homeland Security Institute and the U.S. Department of Education Office of Safe and Drug Free
Schools (OSDFS) hosted a one-day "Youth Recruitment and Radicalization Roundtable" on 19 March,
2009. The purpose of this session was to bring a select group of people together to discuss lessons learned
from youth recruitment and radicalization abroad; to discuss potential implications for the U.S.; and to
determine what role, if any, the education system can play in countering youth recruitment and
radicalization or in promoting resilience among youth.
Additionally, this session provided a forum for HSI and OSDFS to discuss its preliminary research
findings with a diverse audience of experts and stakeholders. Attendees included representatives from
across the U.S. government (including the Department of Justice, the National Counter Terrorism Center,
Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Education); school chiefs of police and Safe
School Center Directors from across the U.S.; and subject matter experts from academia and the private
sector (a list of participants follows).
The session consisted of a series of five presentations (each followed by question and answer sessions)
and an end-of-day discussion in which the attendees identified lessons learned and potential implications.
In addition to HSIs presentation of preliminary research observations contained in this report, four
subject matter experts provided briefings that addressed various aspects of youth recruitment and
radicalization. The presentations included:

Children at War: Understanding the Global Trend of Children Being Pulled into Conflict and
ViolenceDr. Peter Singer

The Internet as a Terrorist Tool to Recruit YouthDr. Gabriel Weimann

Understanding Radicalization: Trajectories, Vulnerabilities, Prevention, Detection & Counter

InitiativesDr. Anne Speckhard

Gang Recruitment and Utilization of YouthDr. Phelan Wyrick

Key points and recommendations from each of the presentations are highlighted below.

Children at War: Understanding the Global Trend of Children Being

Pulled into Conflict and Violence Dr. Peter Singer
Dr. Peter Singer is the director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign
Policy at the Brookings Institute. He recently published a book, Children at War, where he discusses the
nature and evolution of youths role in conflicts.
Key points from Dr. Singers presentation include:

The extent to which child soldiers (e.g., those under the age of 18) are currently being utilized to
participate in conflicts has never been seen before. More than 300,000 children (boys and girls)
are presently serving as combatants and are fighting in almost 75% of the worlds conflicts.
Approximately 80% of conflicts involve children under the age of 15, with an average age of
approximately 12 years old. This increase is linked to three trends:

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Lost generation: Many children within conflict areas are living in poverty. Some groups
provide social services that the state does not offer thereby becoming an attractive alternative
to impoverished youth.

Demographical imbalances: When demographics are out of balance and there is a

disproportionate sized young male population, conflict is more likely. Extended conflict
causes weakened social structures and psychological maladies, which steer children to
conflict.

The rise of post-modern war: With conflicts affecting many areas, many youth are growing
up into cultures of violence. Within these conflict zones the concept of conflict
entrepreneurs, or those who are taking advantage of the circumstances and creating armies
or stimulating violence (i.e. Charles Taylor in Liberia, using orphanages and boarding
schools), is becoming common. Also, proliferation and increase in weapon technology that is
easily usable by children contributes to the problem.

The integration of youth into conflict can create a cycle of violence in society. Youth who are not
reintegrated into society after serving as soldiers may not have any other skills but violence and
war, which contributes to an easy path back into violence.

There are two primary methods by which young persons are recruited: forcibly and voluntarily:

Forcible recruitment often is carried out through abduction raids. Those most at risk are youth
who are disconnected from their society/families such as street kids, refugees, and orphans.

Voluntary recruits come from the same pool as forcible recruits but the organization will
offer potential recruits goods and payment, enticement through indoctrination, persuasion by
the proliferation of propaganda materials, and/or peer pressure.

Dr. Singer offered the following recommendations for countering the utilization or targeting of youth to
participate in conflict:

Prevent and deter the recruitment of youth by naming and shaming persons and groups willing
to use youth for violence and conflict

Make it harder to access the weapons that are technologically easy for young persons to use, to
include going after wartime entrepreneurs who spread these weapons to conflict zones

Develop and enforce legal measures (recognized globally) stipulating that those who utilize child
soldiers will be liable for facing war crime charges. This should include the group leaders as well
as those who enable the leaders

Ultimately, the cycle of violence must be broken in order to reverse this trend. To accomplish
this, it is necessary to create social programs and support systems, to provide economic
assistance, and to help reintegrate the children into society. All support programs must include the
community, helping children feel accepted back into society. This ultimately provides the
children with more options so they are less likely to fall back into violent behavior.

The Internet as a Terrorist Tool to Recruit and Radicalize Youth Dr.

Gabriel Weimann
Dr. Gabriel Weimann has performed research into the areas of media effects, political campaigns,
persuasion and influence, media and public opinion, and modern terrorism and the mass media. As a

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Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), in Washington, DC, he conducted a multiyear study aimed at gaining a better understanding of how terrorist organizations and their supporters are
utilizing the Internet to target an array of messages to diverse audiences. His research included monitoring
the activity of terrorist organizations on the Internet in order to identify trends. Dr. Weimanns research is
summarized in his book entitled Terror in the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges.
Key points from Dr. Weimanns presentation include:

The Internet has become an important tool for the modern terrorist, becoming as essential as the
weapons they carry. Today, most terrorist organizations today are on-line in some fashion or
another.

Increased portability of Internet-accessible technology has, in part, helped increase the access that
many of these groups have to online communities.

In addition to the expansion of terrorist organizations activity online, there has been an increased
diffusion of Internet usage in developing nations. While current usage in developing countries is
still relatively low overall, the growth rate has been rapid particularly among young people.
Youth tend to access the Internet via public access points, such as libraries and Internet cafes.

Some sites are very complex and are posted in multiple languages, while others are static sites for
disseminating messages. Multiple language sites currently are dominated by jihadist groups.

As Internet usage has expanded, both by terrorists and potential supporters, tactics and forms
have also become more diverse and sophisticated. Terrorist organizations have begun to create
targeted messages to specific age and demographic groups. This process is referred to
narrowcasting. For example, they target children on the Internet with colorful, picture-laden
sites, or women by showing images of mothers proudly sending their children off to be martyrs.
In the past, terrorists used one website to target all audiences.

Terrorist groups do not necessarily recruit on-line, but use the Internet as a forum to begin the
initial stages of the ideological, radicalization process. Youth are enticed to participate as terrorist
organizations offer social bonds and outlets, creating virtual communities.

Online activities of terrorist organizations have exhibited a number of trends, to include:

Adopting new technologies, such as multi-media sites (e.g. You Tube or Aqsa Tube) in
addition to traditional web-pages.

E-Marketing their message specifically to children: Often this form of Internet marketing, or
propaganda, will play a large part in psychological training and socialization of children to
violence and suicide attacks. Specific methods in which they market themselves online to
children include: using comics, videos, video games and quizzes. Other tactics include using
interactive sites where children can be guided and instructed online via chat rooms or other
forums. This enables the group to reach out to youth outside of their immediate proximity.
Many of these chat rooms are hosted on U.S. websites (including Yahoo!).

Developing sites that celebrate martyrs after their death: Beyond use as a general propaganda
technique, this tactic assists with recruitment by showing the reward of service to the group.

Providing online training, or a resource for training material: Groups post how-to sites, where
they provide a multitude of manuals or standard operating procedures for would-be attackers.
A number of sites will also act as resource sites, providing lists of websites.

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Dr. Weimann offered the following comments and recommendations for countering terrorist websites:

It is not feasible to simply block websites because new sites will be created in their place.

Recommended tactics include monitoring websites, appealing to targeted populations, and

creating other websites (which serve as noise) aimed at providing alternatives.

Understanding Radicalization: Trajectories, Vulnerabilities, Prevention,

Detection & Counter InitiativesDr. Anne Speckhard
Dr. Speckhard served as co-director of the NATO sponsored Advanced Research Workshop on
Ideologies of Terrorism: Understanding and Countering the Social, Psychological and Political
Underpinnings of Terrorism, and serves on the NATO-Russia Counterterrorism Task Force and the
NATO Human Factors and Medicine Panel Exploratory Team on Psychosocial, Organisational and
Cultural Aspects of Terrorism. She has conducted a significant amount of research on radicalization and
how terrorist groups recruit members. She has interviewed over 350 would-be suicide bombers,
incarcerated militants, family members and close associates of terrorists, and others involved in terrorist
organizations. Her research has focused on gaining a better understanding of how various terrorist groups
recruit, indoctrinate, radicalize, and utilize members. She has also researched approaches for countering
terrorist group recruitment and for getting members to disengage.
Key points from Dr. Speckhards presentation include:

While it is hard to assess the likelihood of radicalization in the U.S. as compared to Europe, it
does occur in the U.S.

The economic status and social outlook of immigrant populations in Europe is different than
those in America. For example, immigrant populations in Europe are frequently isolated and
negative sentiments (e.g., that immigrants do not have the same advantages of native citizens) are
pervasive.

Muslim immigrants are targeted by terrorist groups because they are perceived to not be
integrated into their new society and they may still have close ties with their country of origin.
More specifically, alienated or marginalized Muslim youth in Europe are prime targets because
they are frequently highly educated and highly disenfranchised.

Terrorist groups may prey on individual grievances, offering a sense of identity, belonging, and
adventure.

Though instances of radicalization of the domestic population do not appear to be widespread,

there should be some concern about how the radicalization of European citizens could impact the
United States domestically. As a part of the visa waiver program, European citizens face lesser
travel restrictions, which could potentially enable relatively easy access for radicalized
individuals to enter the U.S.

Dr. Speckhard offered the following recommendations for countering radicalization:

A key aspect to any counter-initiative program is raising awareness of the problem. It is important
for communities to be made aware of the fact that radical ideology is spreading.

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The government should work towards understanding and de-legitimizing the militant jihadist
ideology.

Social networking sites should be monitored for signs of radical content.

A protocol should be developed for detecting and intervening when students begin to exhibit
radical or violent behavior (i.e. through their clothing, actions, statements, writings, etc.) and put
in place a reporting system for teachers, students, and family members to alert the authorities.

Gang Recruitment and Utilization of YouthDr. Phelan Wyrick

Dr. Phelan Wyrick is a Senior Policy Advisor to the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Justice
Programs (OJP) at the U.S. Department of Justice. For over a decade he has held senior positions in OJP
bureaus including the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention and the National Institute of
Justice. Dr. Wyrick developed and oversaw federal research, evaluation, and demonstration programs on
topics including street gangs, delinquency prevention, and criminal justice technology. Since 2006, Dr.
Wyrick has been a regular instructor on gang prevention at the International Law Enforcement Academy
in El Salvador.
Key points from Dr. Wyricks presentation include:

While there are interesting parallels that can be drawn between why young persons become
involved with terrorist organizations, and why they get involved with gangs, it is important to
emphasize that the processes involved are not the same.

Youth normally are thought to voluntarily join gangs as opposed to being recruited.

One of the biggest challenges to creating a model to deal with gangs is to first understand what
factors are universal. Many factors leading to the proliferation of gangs are either local issues or
personal grievances. Once the universal factors are identified, local officials can tailor the
counter-initiatives to meet their specific needs.

There are both push and pull factors that are associated with the reasons people join gangs.

Pull factors are generally environmental factors that make gang-life seem attractive. Just
because someone is influenced by push factors does not mean they are destined to become a
gang member. For example, in the worst communities in the U.S., most people are not gang
members. The factors are viewed to have more of a cumulative effect on someone. If
communities can intervene and get rid of a few of the risk factors, some youth will be far less
likely to join a gang.

Pull factors are more focused on the aspects of the gang that youth perceive as positive or
fulfilling. These factors generally relate to an individual, who may have unfulfilled needs.
Frequently, the gang will provide different things for different individuals but generally
include: respect (status/identity), fun/excitement (parties, drugs, alcohol, weapon use); sense
of family; and protection/money.

Ultimately, distilling what the pushes and pulls mean for individuals who join gangs is that
they really offer a mastery and command of violence. Youth look at gangs as a solution to
their problems, not as the problem itself. They reinforce that logic with the view that, were
family, were strong, and youre out there, weak and alone.

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Tactics used by gangs to appeal to youth include: throwing skip parties (where youth skip school
together and partake in various activities); peer pressure (e.g., where gang members use their
bond with the young person to encourage participation); generational membership; and online
advertising.

Dr. Wyrick offered the following recommendations for countering youth participation in gangs:

Approaches consisting entirely of law enforcement and response are not sufficient to produce
long-term change. Gangs must be viewed as a community problem versus solely a law
enforcement problem

A comprehensive understanding of the issues is necessary in order to address the problem. It is

necessary to develop an initial understanding of the community dynamics by collecting detailed
information on the community

Strategies should be comprehensive and should integrate a variety of community members into
the solution. Successful programs require strong and distributed leadership, access to data to
assess performance, experience with partnerships, and knowledge of the community.

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List of Youth Recruitment & Radicalization Roundtable Attendees

Analyst, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Office of Democracy and Governance
Analyst, National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC)
Analyst, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center
(HITRAC)
Analyst, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center
(HITRAC), Risk Integration and Analysis Branch (RIAB)
Analyst, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Government Facilities Sector, Federal Protective Service
Executive Agent, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Science & Technology Directorate
Social Science Analyst, National Institute of Justice
Social Science Analyst, National Institute of Justice
Project Manager, National Institute of Justice
Senior Social Science Analyst, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, National Institute of Justice
Acting Deputy Director for Research and Evaluation, National Institute of Justice
Senior Vice President, Hillard Heintz
Deputy Chief, Los Angeles Unified School District Police Department, California
Officer, Safety and Security, Chicago Public Schools, Illinois
Director, Office of Safety and Security, Fairfax County Public Schools, Virginia
Director, Safety and Security, Montgomery County Public Schools, Maryland
Officer, Sunnyside School District, Washington
Police Captain, Miami-Dade Public Schools Police Department
Director, Public Safety, Minnesota School Safety Center
Gang and Prevention Program Coordinator, Office of the Attorney General of Florida

This list does not include representatives that attended from the U.S. Department of Education or the Homeland
Security Institute.

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A PPENDIX B. C OOPERATIVE C IVIC E DUCATION AND

ECONOMIC EDUCATION EXCHANGE PROGRAM GRANT:
I NTERNATIONAL P ROGRAM A CTIVITIES IN C IVIC
E DUCATION
The U.S. Department of Educations Office of Safe and Drug Free Schools provides support for
international partnerships and exchange programs with emerging democracies in civic education and
economic education under the Cooperative Civic Education and Economic Education Exchange Program.
The program is authorized under Title II, Subpart 3, Section 2345 of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965, as amended by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C 6711-6716. This
subpart of the legislation also may be cited as the Education for Democracy Act. The Office of Safe
and Drug-Free Schools works in coordination with the U.S. Department of State to support the program.
The program was established in 1995.
The purpose of this program is to provide participants from the United States and eligible countries
(emerging democracies) with exemplary curriculum and teacher professional development programs in
civic and government education and economic education; assist in the adaptation, implementation and
institutionalization of the programs; create and implement programs for students that draw upon the
experiences of the participating countries; and provide support for independent research and evaluation to
determine the effects of educational programs on students' development of knowledge, skills, and traits of
character essential for the preservation and improvement of constitutional democracy, and on the effective
participation in and the preservation and improvement of an efficient market economy.
Organizations in the United States, with experience in the development of curricula and programs in civic
education and economic education for students in elementary and secondary schools in countries other
than the United States, are required to carry out the legislative mandates of this program. The following
organizations are currently funded by the program: Center for Civic Education, Calabasas, CA (Civitas:
An International Civic Education Exchange Program); Sage Colleges, Council on Citizenship Education,
Troy, NY (Civics Mosaic II); Constitutional Rights Foundation, Chicago, Illinois (Deliberating in a
Democracy); National Council on Economic Education, New York, NY (Economic International).
There are approximately seventy-five countries currently participating as partners with the numerous
projects funded to carry out the program objectives. Some of the partner countries involved in the projects
include: Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Latvia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Costa Rica, Chile,
Venezuela, Colombia, Egypt, Hungary, Poland, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia,
Macedonia, Mexico, Morocco, Senegal, Panama, Poland, Romania, Russia (Kaluga, Kalingrad,
Petersburg), Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, South Africa, Ukraine,
Venezuela, West Bank.
Several of the partnerships have acknowledged ongoing activities to recruit and or radicalize youth in
their countries or the participation of youth in conflict and post-conflict issues. The activities are taking
place through networks (family, social, religious) and schools, media and Internet, or gangs and youth
organizations. However, many of the partners emphasized the value of innovative, student centered,
active learning strategies in education and through civic education programs in the prevention of conflicts
or violent agendas.

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The following are examples of the program activities used in the funded projects:

Civitas: An International Civic Education Exchange Program

We the People: Project Citizen - a curriculum and teacher training program to promote an
understanding of the institutions of our constitutional democracy and the fundamental principles
and values upon which they are founded; to develop the skills necessary to participate as effective
and responsible citizens; and to develop an understanding of how to use the democratic processes
when participating in making decisions and managing conflict. The program attempts to help
students see the relationship of their experiences to the larger arena of social and political
engagement. The curriculum is focused on upper elementary and middle levels.

Elements of Democracy or Foundations of Democracy - a curriculum that explores the

fundamental terminology and processes surrounding the theory and practice of democracy (i.e.,
civil society, human rights, popular sovereignty, common good, representation, civic
participation, etc).

Civic Mosaic

Civic Mosaic - a program for teachers who seek to introduce a comparative political perspective
into their classrooms through a series of international teacher exchanges, research projects,
seminars and conferences. A textbook of comparative lessons has been developed and will be
published in 2008.

Deliberating in a Democracy

Deliberating in a Democracy project designed to improve teaching and learning of democratic

principles and the skills of civic deliberation related to democratic principles as applied in each
participating country. The emphasis is on direct person-to-person exchange of ideas and
experiences to give people a picture of democracy in action.

Economics International

Economics International focuses on assisting emerging democracies in the development of

free market economies to sustain their democratic societies.

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G LOSSARY OF T ERMS
Groups
Al-Qaeda (AQ) the Base
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) Basque Homeland and Freedom
Hamas Islamic Resistance Movement
Hizballah Party of God
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Islamic Congregation

Terms
Basque Autonomous Country - is an autonomous community in northern Spain; the capital is VitoriaGasteiz (Vitoria is the name in Spanish, Gasteiz in Basque) and Bilbao its largest city
Branding - a form of identification; making a message easily recognizable and authentic to its audiences
Caliphate - the era of Islam's ascendancy from the death of Mohammed until the 13th century
Chat Room - an online discussion site to share information via text with a group of other users
Counter-capacity Measures - initiatives to hamper and disrupt terrorists online capabilities, and focus on
monitoring and shutting down terrorist websites
Counter-message Measures - initiatives that attempt to confront and discredit radical beliefs and opinions;
focuses on marginalizing radical messages impact on audiences
Curriculum - all the courses of study offered by an educational institution
Diaspora - A dispersion of a people from their original homeland; the community formed by such a
people
Domestic Terrorist Group - terrorism involving groups based in, and operating entirely within a given
nation state without foreign direction
Fatwa - a legal opinion or ruling issued by an Islamic scholar
Halaqah informal study group
Imam - the title for a Muslim religious leader or chief
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) - a bomb constructed and deployed in ways other than in
conventional military action; they may be partially comprised of conventional military explosives, such as
an artillery round, attached to a detonating mechanism

The definitions provided are those most relevant to the focus of this study.

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International Terrorist Group - include those designated by the Secretary of State as Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (FTOs)
Intifada - is an Arabic word which literally means shaking off, though it is usually translated into
English as rebellion or uprising
Islamist - an orthodox Muslim; often characterized by moral conservatism, literalism, and the attempt to
implement Islamic values in all spheres of life
Jemaah religious community
Jihad - a religious war against infidels or Mohammedan heretics; also, any bitter war or crusade for a
principle or belief
Kale Borroka - organized street violence and protest; its literal translation means street struggle, and
refers to violent attacks on people and property
Madrassa - a building or group of buildings used for teaching Islamic theology and religious law,
typically including a mosque
Maghreb a region of North Africa, which consists of Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia
Martyr - a person who is put to death or endures great suffering on behalf of any belief, principle, or
cause
Mosque - a Muslim house of worship
Mujahideen plural term for Mujahid, or struggler; refers to an individual involved in jihad
Narrowcasting - dissemination of information to a narrow audience, not to the general public; aiming
media messages at specific segments of the public defined by values, preferences, or demographic
attributes
Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) - a term that has become widely accepted for referring to a
legally constituted, non-business organization created by natural or legal persons with no participation or
representation of any government
Pesantren - an Islamic boarding school located in Southeast Asia
Propaganda - information that is spread for the purpose of promoting some cause
Radicalization - the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use,
support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change
Recruitment - the act of getting recruits or enlisting people for an army or a cause
School-aged Youth - include students ranging from kindergarten through college, which generally include
young persons between the ages of five and twenty-two
Shariah Law - the code of law derived from the Koran and from the teachings and example of
Mohammed

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Social Networking Sites - online communities of people who share interests and/or activities, or who are
interested in exploring the interests and activities of others; most provide a variety of ways for users to
interact, such as e-mail and instant messaging services; examples include: Facebook, MySpace, and
Twitter
Terrorism - the unlawful use of force against persons or property to intimidate a government, the civilian
population, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives
Ustadz an Arabic word for teacher
Virtual Media Production and Distribution Entity (MPDE) - these groups collect and organize radical
Islamist material, and then help redistribute it to masses of third-party recipients, such as personal
websites, blogs, or online discussion forums
Wahhabism - a conservative form of Islam founded by Abdul Wahhab (1703-1792), known for its strict
observance of the Quran
Web 1.0 - passive, individually-directed information-seeking online environments
Web 2.0 - active, socially-connected, user-involved environments where users are compelled to interact,
discuss, create, and pass on content
Web Forum - a discussion site online

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