G.R. No.

L-48006 July 8, 1942

FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,
vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.
Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Jose G. Advincula for respondents.
BOCOBO, J.:
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto
Barredo, liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of
Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and
Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate
Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela
was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered
injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate
sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional. The court in the
criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino
Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in
the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the
Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First
Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest
from the date of the complaint. This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by
reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action was instituted. It
is undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving
on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to Barredo's responsibility, the Court of
Appeals found:
... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that he exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (See p. 22, appellant's brief.) In fact
it is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for
violation of the Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A) violation which appeared in the
records of the Bureau of Public Works available to be public and to himself. Therefore, he
must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the
Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil
action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held
responsible in the case. The petitioner's brief states on page 10:
... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to exercise all
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro Fontanilla
to prevent damages suffered by the respondents. In other words, The Court of Appeals
insists on applying in the case article 1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is
found in Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes said article to a civil
liability arising from a crime as in the case at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of
Book IV of the Civil Code, in the precise words of article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is
applicable only to "those (obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts or commission
not punishable by law.
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
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... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be imposed upon
him in this action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor (the crime of
Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of
his negligence in the selection or supervision of his servant or employee.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action
against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article
1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that
Fontanilla's negligence being punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability as an
employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal code, but Fontanilla has not been sued
in a civil action and his property has not been exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must
cut through the tangle that has, in the minds of many confused and jumbled together delitos
and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code and fault or negligence under articles
1902-1910 of the Civil Code. This should be done, because justice may be lost in a labyrinth,
unless principles and remedies are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided in our
inquiry by the luminous presentation of the perplexing subject by renown jurists and we are
likewise guided by the decisions of this Court in previous cases as well as by the solemn
clarity of the consideration in several sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely
apart and independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit
article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be
safely anchored.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as follows:
CIVIL CODE
ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts, and from acts and
omissions which are unlawful or in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.
xxxxxxxxx
ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be governed by the
provisions of the Penal Code.
ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not
punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this
book.
xxxxxxxxx
ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or
negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.
The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages
caused by the minor children who live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons subject to their
authority and living with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any damages
caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the service in which employed, or
on occasion of the performance of their duties.
The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but not if the
damage shall have been caused by the official upon whom properly devolved the duty of
doing the act performed, in which case the provisions of the next preceding article shall be
applicable.
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Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils
or apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned therein prove
that they are exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may recover from
the latter what he may have paid.
REVISED PENAL CODE
ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. Every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable.
ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. The exemption from criminal
liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article
11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced to the
following rules:
First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts committed by
any imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine
but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment shall devolve upon those
having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no
fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal
guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall
respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance
with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for whose benefit the
harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may
have received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which
each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even approximately, or when
the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town,
and, in all events, whenever the damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities
or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or
regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using violence or
causing the fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons,
those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property
exempt from execution.
ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of
establishment. In default of persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any
other persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or
special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft
within their houses lodging therein, or the person, or for the payment of the value thereof,
provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person
representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have
followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with
respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of
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robbery with violence against or intimidation against or intimidation of persons unless

committed by the innkeeper's employees.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in
the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
xxxxxxxxx
ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of
arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed."
It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad
enough to cover the driver's negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article 1093 limits
cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence,
the fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been crowded out.
It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse confounded." However, a closer study
shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the
distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasidelitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce
civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an
action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and unmistakable. This
legal institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the
Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as
culpa aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or
negligence under the Civil Code; for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es
de fazer emienda, porque, como quier que el non fizo a sabiendas en dao al otro, pero
acaescio por su culpa."
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article 1089,
one of the five sources of obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extracontractual: "los actos . . . en que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then
article 1093 provides that this kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI
of Book IV, meaning articles 1902-0910. This portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted
to the legal institution of culpa aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or
cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil
Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if
there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in
which "any king of fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all
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violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of
ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt.
(See Colin and Capitant, "Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-delicts and
the employer's primary and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica
Espaola" (Vol. XXVII, p. 414) says:
El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y comprende a
diferentes personas. Asi, existe una responsabilidad civil propiamente dicha, que en ningun
casl lleva aparejada responsabilidad criminal alguna, y otra que es consecuencia
indeclinable de la penal que nace de todo delito o falta."
The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises different
persons. Thus, there is a civil responsibility, properly speaking, which in no case carries with
it any criminal responsibility, and another which is a necessary consequence of the penal
liability as a result of every felony or misdemeanor."
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There had been a
collision between two trains belonging respectively to the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the
Ferrocarril del Norte. An employee of the latter had been prosecuted in a criminal case, in
which the company had been made a party as subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The
employee had been acquitted in the criminal case, and the employer, the Ferrocarril del
Norte, had also been exonerated. The question asked was whether the Ferrocarril
Cantabrico could still bring a civil action for damages against the Ferrocarril del Norte.
Maura's opinion was in the affirmative, stating in part (Maura, Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp.
511-513):
Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los hechos, todavia
menos parece sostenible que exista cosa juzgada acerca de la obligacion civil de indemnizar
los quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el choque de los trenes. El titulo en que se funda
la accion para demandar el resarcimiento, no puede confundirse con las responsabilidades
civiles nacidas de delito, siquiera exista en este, sea el cual sea, una culpa rodeada de
notas agravatorias que motivan sanciones penales, mas o menos severas. La lesion
causada por delito o falta en los derechos civiles, requiere restituciones, reparaciones o
indemnizaciones, que cual la pena misma ataen al orden publico; por tal motivo vienen
encomendadas, de ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y claro es que si por esta via se
enmiendan los quebrantos y menoscabos, el agraviado excusa procurar el ya conseguido
desagravio; pero esta eventual coincidencia de los efectos, no borra la diversidad originaria
de las acciones civiles para pedir indemnizacion.
Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no vendrian a cuento
y que tiene otro regimen), dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, de toda accion u
omision, causante de daos o perjuicios, en que intervenga culpa o negligencia. Es trivial
que acciones semejantes son ejercitadas ante los Tribunales de lo civil cotidianamente, sin
que la Justicia punitiva tenga que mezclarse en los asuntos. Los articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al
128 del Codigo Penal, atentos al espiritu y a los fines sociales y politicos del mismo,
desenvuelven y ordenan la materia de responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, en
terminos separados del regimen por ley comun de la culpa que se denomina aquiliana, por
alusion a precedentes legislativos del Corpus Juris. Seria intempestivo un paralelo entre
aquellas ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion de indemnizar a titulo de culpa civil; pero viene
al caso y es necesaria una de las diferenciaciones que en el tal paralelo se notarian.
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Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las

responsabilidades civiles, entre los que sean por diversos conceptos culpables del delito o
falta, las hacen extensivas a las empresas y los establecimientos al servicio de los cuales
estan los delincuentes; pero con caracter subsidiario, o sea, segun el texto literal, en defecto
de los que sean responsables criminalmente. No coincide en ello el Codigo Civil, cuyo
articulo 1903, dice; La obligacion que impone el articulo anterior es exigible, no solo por los
actos y omisiones propios, sino por los de aquellas personas de quienes se debe responder;
personas en la enumeracion de las cuales figuran los dependientes y empleados de los
establecimientos o empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea con ocasion de sus funciones.
Por esto acontece, y se observa en la jurisprudencia, que las empresas, despues de
intervenir en las causas criminales con el caracter subsidiario de su responsabilidad civil por
razon del delito, son demandadas y condenadas directa y aisladamente, cuando se trata de
la obligacion, ante los tribunales civiles.
Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando verdadero postulado de
nuestro regimen judicial la separacion entre justicia punitiva y tribunales de lo civil, de suerte
que tienen unos y otros normas de fondo en distintos cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos
de proceder, habiendose, por aadidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la Compaia
del Ferrocarril Cantabrico, que se reservo ejercitar sus acciones, parece innegable que la de
indemnizacion por los daos y perjuicios que le irrogo el choque, no estuvo sub judice ante
el Tribunal del Jurado, ni fue sentenciada, sino que permanecio intacta, al pronunciarse el
fallo de 21 de marzo. Aun cuando el veredicto no hubiese sido de inculpabilidad, mostrose
mas arriba, que tal accion quedaba legitimamente reservada para despues del proceso;
pero al declararse que no existio delito, ni responsabilidad dimanada de delito, materia unica
sobre que tenian jurisdiccion aquellos juzgadores, se redobla el motivo para la obligacion
civil ex lege, y se patentiza mas y mas que la accion para pedir su cumplimiento permanece
incolume, extraa a la cosa juzgada.
As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems less tenable that
there should be res judicata with regard to the civil obligation for damages on account of the
losses caused by the collision of the trains. The title upon which the action for reparation is
based cannot be confused with the civil responsibilities born of a crime, because there exists
in the latter, whatever each nature, a culpa surrounded with aggravating aspects which give
rise to penal measures that are more or less severe. The injury caused by a felony or
misdemeanor upon civil rights requires restitutions, reparations, or indemnifications which,
like the penalty itself, affect public order; for this reason, they are ordinarily entrusted to the
office of the prosecuting attorney; and it is clear that if by this means the losses and
damages are repaired, the injured party no longer desires to seek another relief; but this
coincidence of effects does not eliminate the peculiar nature of civil actions to ask for
indemnity.
Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults which are not
pertinent and belong to another scope) are derived, according to article 1902 of the Civil
Code, from every act or omission causing losses and damages in which culpa or negligence
intervenes. It is unimportant that such actions are every day filed before the civil courts
without the criminal courts interfering therewith. Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal
Code, bearing in mind the spirit and the social and political purposes of that Code, develop
and regulate the matter of civil responsibilities arising from a crime, separately from the
regime under common law, of culpa which is known as aquiliana, in accordance with
legislative precedent of the Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to make a detailed
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comparison between the former provisions and that regarding the obligation to indemnify on
account of civil culpa; but it is pertinent and necessary to point out to one of such differences.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their own way the civil
responsibilities among those who, for different reasons, are guilty of felony or misdemeanor,
make such civil responsibilities applicable to enterprises and establishments for which the
guilty parties render service, but with subsidiary character, that is to say, according to the
wording of the Penal Code, in default of those who are criminally responsible. In this regard,
the Civil Code does not coincide because article 1903 says: "The obligation imposed by the
next preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom another is responsible." Among the persons enumerated are the
subordinates and employees of establishments or enterprises, either for acts during their
service or on the occasion of their functions. It is for this reason that it happens, and it is so
observed in judicial decisions, that the companies or enterprises, after taking part in the
criminal cases because of their subsidiary civil responsibility by reason of the crime, are sued
and sentenced directly and separately with regard to the obligation, before the civil courts.
Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation between punitive justice
and the civil courts being a true postulate of our judicial system, so that they have different
fundamental norms in different codes, as well as different modes of procedure, and
inasmuch as the Compaa del Ferrocarril Cantabrico has abstained from taking part in the
criminal case and has reserved the right to exercise its actions, it seems undeniable that the
action for indemnification for the losses and damages caused to it by the collision was not
sub judice before the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it the subject of a sentence, but it
remained intact when the decision of March 21 was rendered. Even if the verdict had not
been that of acquittal, it has already been shown that such action had been legitimately
reserved till after the criminal prosecution; but because of the declaration of the nonexistence of the felony and the non-existence of the responsibility arising from the crime,
which was the sole subject matter upon which the Tribunal del Jurado had jurisdiction, there
is greater reason for the civil obligation ex lege, and it becomes clearer that the action for its
enforcement remain intact and is not res judicata.
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code, on which the
Spanish Civil Code is largely based and whose provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extracontractual are similar to those of the Spanish Civil Code, says, referring to article 1384 of
the French Civil Code which corresponds to article 1903, Spanish Civil Code:
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another), without
including the author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that
it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary
in the sense that it can not be instituted till after the judgment against the author of the act or
at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of the
employer) is in itself a principal action. (Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law, Spanish
translation, Vol. 20, pp. 734-735.)
Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430), declares
that the responsibility of the employer is principal and not subsidiary. He writes:
Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las acciones u omisiones
de aquellas personas por las que se debe responder, es subsidiaria? es principal? Para
contestar a esta pregunta es necesario saber, en primer lugar, en que se funda el precepto
legal. Es que realmente se impone una responsabilidad por una falta ajena? Asi parece a
primera vista; pero semejante afirmacion seria contraria a la justicia y a la maxima universal,
segun la que las faltas son personales, y cada uno responde de aquellas que le son
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imputables. La responsabilidad de que tratamos se impone con ocasion de un delito o culpa,

pero no por causa de ellos, sino por causa del causi delito, esto es, de la imprudencia o de
la negligencia del padre, del tutor, del dueo o director del establecimiento, del maestro, etc.
Cuando cualquiera de las personas que enumera el articulo citado (menores de edad,
incapacitados, dependientes, aprendices) causan un dao, la ley presume que el padre, el
tutor, el maestro, etc., han cometido una falta de negligencia para prevenir o evitar el dao.
Esta falta es la que la ley castiga. No hay, pues, responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno, sino en
la apariencia; en realidad la responsabilidad se exige por un hecho propio. La idea de que
esa responsabilidad sea subsidiaria es, por lo tanto, completamente inadmisible.
Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or omissions of
those persons for who one is responsible, subsidiary or principal? In order to answer this
question it is necessary to know, in the first place, on what the legal provision is based. Is it
true that there is a responsibility for the fault of another person? It seems so at first sight; but
such assertion would be contrary to justice and to the universal maxim that all faults are
personal, and that everyone is liable for those faults that can be imputed to him. The
responsibility in question is imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault, but not because of
the same, but because of the cuasi-delito, that is to say, the imprudence or negligence of the
father, guardian, proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever
anyone of the persons enumerated in the article referred to (minors, incapacitated persons,
employees, apprentices) causes any damage, the law presumes that the father, guardian,
teacher, etc. have committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage.
It is this fault that is condemned by the law. It is, therefore, only apparent that there is a
responsibility for the act of another; in reality the responsibility exacted is for one's own act.
The idea that such responsibility is subsidiary is, therefore, completely inadmissible.
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al Codigo Civil
Espaol," says in Vol. VII, p. 743:
Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su propia culpa,
doctrina del articulo 1902; mas por excepcion, se responde de la ajena respecto de aquellas
personas con las que media algun nexo o vinculo, que motiva o razona la responsabilidad.
Esta responsabilidad, es directa o es subsidiaria? En el orden penal, el Codigo de esta clase
distingue entre menores e incapacitados y los demas, declarando directa la primera (articulo
19) y subsidiaria la segunda (articulos 20 y 21); pero en el orden civil, en el caso del articulo
1903, ha de entenderse directa, por el tenor del articulo que impone la responsabilidad
precisamente "por los actos de aquellas personas de quienes se deba responder."
That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable only for his
own faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one is liable for the acts
of those persons with whom there is a bond or tie which gives rise to the responsibility. Is this
responsibility direct or subsidiary? In the order of the penal law, the Penal Code distinguishes
between minors and incapacitated persons on the one hand, and other persons on the other,
declaring that the responsibility for the former is direct (article 19), and for the latter,
subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but in the scheme of the civil law, in the case of article 1903,
the responsibility should be understood as direct, according to the tenor of that articles, for
precisely it imposes responsibility "for the acts of those persons for whom one should be
responsible."
Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has upheld the
principles above set forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and
distinct legal institution, independent from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability,
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and that an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly
responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.
One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21, 1910. In that
case, Ramon Lafuente died as the result of having been run over by a street car owned by
the "compaia Electric Madrilea de Traccion." The conductor was prosecuted in a criminal
case but he was acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a civil action against the street car
company, paying for damages in the amount of 15,000 pesetas. The lower court awarded
damages; so the company appealed to the Supreme Tribunal, alleging violation of articles
1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code because by final judgment the non-existence of fault or
negligence had been declared. The Supreme Court of Spain dismissed the appeal, saying:
Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado supuesto de que
el Tribunal a quo, al condonar a la compaia Electrica Madrilea al pago del dao causado
con la muerte de Ramon La fuente Izquierdo, desconoce el valor y efectos juridicos de la
sentencia absolutoria deictada en la causa criminal que se siguio por el mismo hecho,
cuando es lo cierto que de este han conocido las dos jurisdicciones bajo diferentes as
pectos, y como la de lo criminal declrao dentro de los limites de su competencia que el
hecho de que se trata no era constitutivo de delito por no haber mediado descuido o
negligencia graves, lo que no excluye, siendo este el unico fundamento del fallo absolutorio,
el concurso de la culpa o negligencia no califacadas, fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el
articulo 1902 del Codigo, y que alcanzan, segun el 1903, netre otras perosnas, a los
Directores de establecimientos o empresas por los daos causados por sus dependientes
en determinadas condiciones, es manifesto que la de lo civil, al conocer del mismo hehco
baho este ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la compaia recurrente a la indemnizacion del
dao causado por uno de sus empleados, lejos de infringer los mencionados textos, en
relacion con el articulo 116 de la Ley de Enjuciamiento Criminal, se ha atenido estrictamente
a ellos, sin invadir atribuciones ajenas a su jurisdiccion propia, ni contrariar en lo mas
minimo el fallo recaido en la causa.
Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken supposition that the
trial court, in sentencing the Compaia Madrilea to the payment of the damage caused by
the death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo, disregards the value and juridical effects of the
sentence of acquittal rendered in the criminal case instituted on account of the same act,
when it is a fact that the two jurisdictions had taken cognizance of the same act in its
different aspects, and as the criminal jurisdiction declared within the limits of its authority that
the act in question did not constitute a felony because there was no grave carelessness or
negligence, and this being the only basis of acquittal, it does no exclude the co-existence of
fault or negligence which is not qualified, and is a source of civil obligations according to
article 1902 of the Civil Code, affecting, in accordance with article 1903, among other
persons, the managers of establishments or enterprises by reason of the damages caused
by employees under certain conditions, it is manifest that the civil jurisdiccion in taking
cognizance of the same act in this latter aspect and in ordering the company, appellant
herein, to pay an indemnity for the damage caused by one of its employees, far from
violating said legal provisions, in relation with article 116 of the Law of Criminal Procedure,
strictly followed the same, without invading attributes which are beyond its own jurisdiction,
and without in any way contradicting the decision in that cause. (Emphasis supplied.)
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the street car
company. This is precisely what happens in the present case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not
been sued in a civil action, either alone or with his employer.
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Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but the
Supreme Tribunal of Spain said that this did not exclude the co-existence of fault or
negligence, which is not qualified, on the part of the conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil
Code. In the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so that if he
had even sued for his civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held
primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for
the same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility because
of his own presumed negligence which he did not overcome under article 1903. Thus,
there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of
the taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary
liability as an employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to
take, and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their rights.
It might be observed in passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and effective
method of relief, because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and
besides, he was probably without property which might be seized in enforcing any judgment
against him for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer was held
liable civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee (the conductor) in a previous
criminal case, with greater reason should Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held
liable for damages in a civil suit filed against him because his taxi driver had been convicted.
The degree of negligence of the conductor in the Spanish case cited was less than that of
the taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the former was acquitted in the previous criminal case
while the latter was found guilty of criminal negligence and was sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional.
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above quoted.)
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an action was
brought against a railroad company for damages because the station agent, employed by the
company, had unjustly and fraudulently, refused to deliver certain articles consigned to the
plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Spain held that this action was properly under article 1902 of
the Civil Code, the court saying:
Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los hechos que consigna
con relacion a las pruebas del pleito: 1., que las expediciones facturadas por la compaia
ferroviaria a la consignacion del actor de las vasijas vacias que en su demanda relacionan
tenian como fin el que este las devolviera a sus remitentes con vinos y alcoholes; 2., que
llegadas a su destino tales mercanias no se quisieron entregar a dicho consignatario por el
jefe de la estacion sin motivo justificado y con intencion dolosa, y 3., que la falta de entrega
de estas expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas el demandante le originaron daos y
perjuicios en cantidad de bastante importancia como expendedor al por mayor que era de
vinos y alcoholes por las ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse privado de servir los
pedidos que se le habian hecho por los remitentes en los envases:
Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro motivos que
integran este recurso, porque la demanda inicial del pleito a que se contrae no contiene
accion que nazca del incumplimiento del contrato de transporte, toda vez que no se funda
en el retraso de la llegada de las mercancias ni de ningun otro vinculo contractual entre las
partes contendientes, careciendo, por tanto, de aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo de
Comercio, en que principalmente descansa el fallo recurrido, sino que se limita a pedir la
reparaction de los daos y perjuicios producidos en el patrimonio del actor por la
injustificada y dolosa negativa del porteador a la entrega de las mercancias a su nombre
Page 10 of 91

consignadas, segun lo reconoce la sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente

sancionada en el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la Compaia
demandada como ligada con el causante de aquellos por relaciones de caracter economico
y de jurarquia administrativa.
Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts which it declares,
in relation to the evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice issued by the railroad company in
favor of the plaintiff contemplated that the empty receptacles referred to in the complaint
should be returned to the consignors with wines and liquors; (2) that when the said
merchandise reached their destination, their delivery to the consignee was refused by the
station agent without justification and with fraudulent intent, and (3) that the lack of delivery
of these goods when they were demanded by the plaintiff caused him losses and damages
of considerable importance, as he was a wholesale vendor of wines and liquors and he failed
to realize the profits when he was unable to fill the orders sent to him by the consignors of
the receptacles:
Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four assignments of error, as
the original complaint did not contain any cause of action arising from non-fulfillment of a
contract of transportation, because the action was not based on the delay of the goods nor
on any contractual relation between the parties litigant and, therefore, article 371 of the Code
of Commerce, on which the decision appealed from is based, is not applicable; but it limits to
asking for reparation for losses and damages produced on the patrimony of the plaintiff on
account of the unjustified and fraudulent refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods consigned
to the plaintiff as stated by the sentence, and the carrier's responsibility is clearly laid down in
article 1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in virtue of the next article, the defendant
company, because the latter is connected with the person who caused the damage by
relations of economic character and by administrative hierarchy. (Emphasis supplied.)
The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the
Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and
fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was
held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also
to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued.
Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365 [year
1907]), the trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of the defendant, because
the latter had negligently failed to repair a tramway in consequence of which the rails slid off
while iron was being transported, and caught the plaintiff whose leg was broken. This Court
held:
It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the necessary
conclusion from these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries through negligence lies
only in a criminal action in which the official criminally responsible must be made primarily
liable and his employer held only subsidiarily to him. According to this theory the plaintiff
should have procured the arrest of the representative of the company accountable for not
repairing the track, and on his prosecution a suitable fine should have been imposed,
payable primarily by him and secondarily by his employer.
This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject. Article 1093 of
the Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults or negligence not punished by the law,
subject to the provisions of Chapter II of Title XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:
"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or
negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
Page 11 of 91

"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is demandable, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be
responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages caused by
the minors who live with them.
xxxxxxxxx
"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be
employed or in the performance of their duties.
xxxxxxxxx
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove
that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to point out
that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide or
maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His obligation therefore is one 'not punished by
the laws' and falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may be a
broader one. We should be reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of
these scientific codes, such as is proposed by the defendant, that would rob some of these
articles of effect, would shut out litigants against their will from the civil courts, would make
the assertion of their rights dependent upon the selection for prosecution of the proper
criminal offender, and render recovery doubtful by reason of the strict rules of proof
prevailing in criminal actions. Even if these articles had always stood alone, such a
construction would be unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon their meaning by the
provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal),
which, though never in actual force in these Islands, was formerly given a suppletory or
explanatory effect. Under article 111 of this law, both classes of action, civil and criminal,
might be prosecuted jointly or separately, but while the penal action was pending the civil
was suspended. According to article 112, the penal action once started, the civil remedy
should be sought therewith, unless it had been waived by the party injured or been expressly
reserved by him for civil proceedings for the future. If the civil action alone was prosecuted,
arising out of a crime that could be enforced only on private complaint, the penal action
thereunder should be extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with those of articles 23
and 133 of our Penal Code on the same subject.
An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of these articles
suffices to show that the civil liability was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor even
to be suspended thereby, except as expressly provided in the law. Where an individual is
civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that the injured party should
seek out a third person criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to
the enforcement of the civil right.
Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be regarded as
subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees only while they are in process
of prosecution, or in so far as they determine the existence of the criminal act from which
liability arises, and his obligation under the civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is
not barred thereby unless by the election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal
proceeding had been instituted, growing our of the accident in question, the provisions of the
Penal Code can not affect this action. This construction renders it unnecessary to finally
determine here whether this subsidiary civil liability in penal actions has survived the laws
Page 12 of 91

that fully regulated it or has been abrogated by the American civil and criminal procedure
now in force in the Philippines.
The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears from the
briefs before us to have arisen from the interpretation of the words of article 1093, "fault or
negligence not punished by law," as applied to the comprehensive definition of offenses in
articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It has been shown that the liability of an employer
arising out of his relation to his employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as
derived from negligence punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1902 and 1093.
More than this, however, it cannot be said to fall within the class of acts unpunished by the
law, the consequence of which are regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code.
The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood to be those not growing out of
pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already formed give rise
to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those duties
are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. A typical application of this
distinction may be found in the consequences of a railway accident due to defective
machinery supplied by the employer. His liability to his employee would arise out of the
contract of employment, that to the passengers out of the contract for passage, while that to
the injured bystander would originate in the negligent act itself.
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of 9-year-old child
Salvador Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to recover damages resulting from the
death of the child, who had been run over by an automobile driven and managed by the
defendant. The trial court rendered judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the
sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This Court in affirming the judgment, said in part:
If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana Street, had to
stop his auto before crossing Real Street, because he had met vehicles which were going
along the latter street or were coming from the opposite direction along Solana Street, it is to
be believed that, when he again started to run his auto across said Real Street and to
continue its way along Solana Street northward, he should have adjusted the speed of the
auto which he was operating until he had fully crossed Real Street and had completely
reached a clear way on Solana Street. But, as the child was run over by the auto precisely at
the entrance of Solana Street, this accident could not have occurred if the auto had been
running at a slow speed, aside from the fact that the defendant, at the moment of crossing
Real Street and entering Solana Street, in a northward direction, could have seen the child in
the act of crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on the right to that on the left, and if the
accident had occurred in such a way that after the automobile had run over the body of the
child, and the child's body had already been stretched out on the ground, the automobile still
moved along a distance of about 2 meters, this circumstance shows the fact that the
automobile entered Solana Street from Real Street, at a high speed without the defendant
having blown the horn. If these precautions had been taken by the defendant, the deplorable
accident which caused the death of the child would not have occurred.
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a
criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the
Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper
subject-matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime
or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article
1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individually of a cuasi-delito or
culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard
to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a
Page 13 of 91

criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil
liability arising from his crime.
Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine. In Bernal
and Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of
the five-year-old child, Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil action to recover damages for the
child's death as a result of burns caused by the fault and negligence of the defendants. On
the evening of April 10, 1925, the Good Friday procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte.
Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal had come from another municipality
to attend the same. After the procession the mother and the daughter with two others were
passing along Gran Capitan Street in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant,
Ltd., owned by defendants J. V. House, when an automobile appeared from the opposite
direction. The little girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest, was so frightened by the
automobile that she turned to run, but unfortunately she fell into the street gutter where hot
water from the electric plant was flowing. The child died that same night from the burns. The
trial courts dismissed the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. But
this Court held, on appeal, that there was no contributory negligence, and allowed the
parents P1,000 in damages from J. V. House who at the time of the tragic occurrence was
the holder of the franchise for the electric plant. This Court said in part:
Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he nevertheless was
led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the
plaintiffs. It is from this point that a majority of the court depart from the stand taken by the
trial judge. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of
Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing
abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one
could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running
and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The doctrine announced in the much debated
case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of
the Civil Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and her
mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only
result in reduction of the damages.
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of
the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for
reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of
his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil
action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was for damages for
the death of the plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the
servant in driving an automobile over the child. It appeared that the cause of the mishap was
a defect in the steering gear. The defendant Leynes had rented the automobile from the
International Garage of Manila, to be used by him in carrying passengers during the fiesta of
Tuy, Batangas. Leynes was ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000 as damages to the
plaintiff. On appeal this Court reversed the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had
shown that the exercised the care of a good father of a family, thus overcoming the
presumption of negligence under article 1903. This Court said:
As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and diligence of
a good father of a family. He obtained the machine from a reputable garage and it was, so far
as appeared, in good condition. The workmen were likewise selected from a standard
garage, were duly licensed by the Government in their particular calling, and apparently
Page 14 of 91

thoroughly competent. The machine had been used but a few hours when the accident
occurred and it is clear from the evidence that the defendant had no notice, either actual or
constructive, of the defective condition of the steering gear.
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:
Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence, but also
provides when the liability shall cease. It says:
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove
that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there
was negligence on the part of the matter or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is
juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows
necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and
supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieve from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not
on that of his servant.
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33 Phil., 37
[year 1915]). In the latter case, the complaint alleged that the defendant's servant had so
negligently driven an automobile, which was operated by defendant as a public vehicle, that
said automobile struck and damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle. This Court, applying article
1903 and following the rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:
The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or director of
a business or enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while the servant is engaged
in his master's employment as such owner.
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was Cuison vs.
Norton & Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The latter case was an action for damages
brought by Cuison for the death of his seven-year-old son Moises. The little boy was on his
way to school with his sister Marciana. Some large pieces of lumber fell from a truck and
pinned the boy underneath, instantly killing him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya and Francisco
Bautista, who were working for Ora, an employee of defendant Norton & Harrison Co.,
pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide through reckless negligence and were sentenced
accordingly. This Court, applying articles 1902 and 1903, held:
The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship of pater familias.
This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that
of his servant. (Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes [1915], 30 Phil., 624; Cangco vs. Manila
Railroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.)
In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year 1930) the
plaintiff brought an action for damages for the demolition of its wharf, which had been struck
by the steamer Helen C belonging to the defendant. This Court held (p. 526):
The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed was a duly
licensed captain, authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage, and that the
appellee contracted his services because of his reputation as a captain, according to F. C.
Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the opinion that the presumption of liability against the
defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a
family in selecting Captain Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court in
the cases cited above, and the defendant is therefore absolved from all liability.
Page 15 of 91

It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is negatived by
the six cases above set forth. He is, on the authority of these cases, primarily and directly
responsible in damages under article 1903, in relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code.
Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We study first, City
of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A collision between a truck of the
City of Manila and a street car of the Manila Electric Co. took place on June 8, 1925. The
truck was damaged in the amount of P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman, was
prosecuted for the crime of damage to property and slight injuries through reckless
imprudence. He was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the City
of Manila for P1,788.27, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable to collect
the indemnity from Eustaquio, the City of Manila filed an action against the Manila Electric
Company to obtain payment, claiming that the defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main
defense was that the defendant had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This Court
held, in part, that this case was governed by the Penal Code, saying:
With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that the
provisions of the Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable language
authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The Civil Code negatives its application by
providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the
provisions of the Penal Code. The conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling
under article 604 of the Penal Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or
negligent act or omission not punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected
up with the Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code. In other words, the Penal
Code affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a case of
criminal negligence out of which civil liability arises and not a case of civil negligence.
xxxxxxxxx
Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to the Civil
Code. Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling would permit the master
to escape scot-free by simply alleging and proving that the master had exercised all diligence
in the selection and training of its servants to prevent the damage. That would be a good
defense to a strictly civil action, but might or might not be to a civil action either as a part of
or predicated on conviction for a crime or misdemeanor. (By way of parenthesis, it may be
said further that the statements here made are offered to meet the argument advanced
during our deliberations to the effect that article 0902 of the Civil Code should be disregarded
and codal articles 1093 and 1903 applied.)
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition, because the
Court of Appeals based its decision in the present case on the defendant's primary
responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code and not on his subsidiary liability arising
from Fontanilla's criminal negligence. In other words, the case of City of Manila vs. Manila
Electric Co., supra, is predicated on an entirely different theory, which is the subsidiary
liability of an employer arising from a criminal act of his employee, whereas the foundation of
the decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case is the employer's primary liability
under article 1903 of the Civil Code. We have already seen that this is a proper and
independent remedy.
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the defendant. A
motorman in the employ of the Manila Electric Company had been convicted o homicide by
simple negligence and sentenced, among other things, to pay the heirs of the deceased the
sum of P1,000. An action was then brought to enforce the subsidiary liability of the defendant
Page 16 of 91

as employer under the Penal Code. The defendant attempted to show that it had exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting the motorman, and therefore claimed
exemption from civil liability. But this Court held:
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1) that the exemption
from civil liability established in article 1903 of the Civil Code for all who have acted with the
diligence of a good father of a family, is not applicable to the subsidiary civil liability provided
in article 20 of the Penal Code.
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant case,
because the action there had for its purpose the enforcement of the defendant's subsidiary
liability under the Penal Code, while in the case at bar, the plaintiff's cause of action is based
on the defendant's primary and direct responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code. In
fact, the above case destroys the defendant's contention because that decision illustrates the
principle that the employer's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code is
different in character from his subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has failed to
recognize the distinction between civil liability arising from a crime, which is governed by the
Penal Code, and the responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code,
and has likewise failed to give the importance to the latter type of civil action.
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case need not
be set forth. Suffice it to say that the question involved was also civil liability arising from a
crime. Hence, it is as inapplicable as the two cases above discussed.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or
culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction
between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that
the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the
Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render it inescapable to
conclude that the employer in this case the defendant-petitioner is primarily and directly
liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to
dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little
understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple
negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault
or negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil
Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in
actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of
negligence even the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle
of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for
cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring
about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws,
disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use
the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such
ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the
Page 17 of 91

defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not
be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In
such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of
unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is,
to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to
compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True,
there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is
based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil
Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the
procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of
common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyance usually
do not have sufficient means with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be
required in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless
procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the
pathways of right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and
their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and
employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It
is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of
these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful
conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they
should reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor
selection and all for their negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable
and just that such responsibility should fall upon the principal or director who could have
chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the injured person who could not
exercise such selection and who used such employee because of his confidence in the
principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary
responsibility of the employer on the principle of representation of the principal by the agent.
Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the
employer and employee "vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del
dependiente en la de quien le emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality by the merging
of the person of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.") All these
observations acquire a peculiar force and significance when it comes to motor accidents, and
there is need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil
Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres
already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action
for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of
the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is
by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by
our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious
and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present
case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we
pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for
fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time
we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so
Page 18 of 91

that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will,
it is believed, make for the better safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an
ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not
depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely
directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and
efficacious redress.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the defendant-petitioner.

G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito
Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor,
defendants-appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.

BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965
in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion
to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant
Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant
Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of
the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the
said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of
intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now
Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was
relieved as guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the
defendants of such denial, reiterating the above grounds that the following order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14, 1965 and
after thoroughly examining the arguments therein contained, the Court finds the same to be
meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by
ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our
resolution the following assignment of errors:

Page 19 of 91

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM
OF DEFENDANTS THAT I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1,
RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION
3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RESADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE,
ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT
MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER
DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee
Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not
criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the
parties has favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably because
appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision. And
so, when appellants filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty.
Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss
above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our
resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal
case wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of.
Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was already
legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further
clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of
obligation which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607.
In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo
on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and mere culpa or fault,
with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the works of recognized
civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act can result in civil
liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come under both
the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified and
fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was
held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also
to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued. (pp.
615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
Page 20 of 91

It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a
criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the
Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper
subject matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime
or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article
1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or
culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard
to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a
criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil
liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of
the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for
reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of
his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil
action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to
dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little
understood, in the past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple
negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault
or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil
Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in
actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property- through any degree of
negligence - even the slightest - would have to be Idemnified only through the principle of
civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for
cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring
about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws,
disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use
the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such
ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the
defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not
be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In
such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there would be many instances of
unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil
Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres
already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action
for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of
the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is
by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by,
our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious
and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present
case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we
pointed out to the harms done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility
Page 21 of 91

for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high
time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural
channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal
Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding or private rights because it
realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil
action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and
entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and
efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts
from the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein
referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper
reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but
that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made
therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which
involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code
of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations "which are
derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene
shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it
is precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo
emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that
"killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal
meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin
and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and
made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice
Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil
Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no
longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the concept of
culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law,
whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the
new code, which is Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be
governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by
special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But
the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first
sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal
and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa
aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence
and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an
outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an
accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to
a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for
damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double
recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Page 22 of 91

Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the
same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth liftrather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in
applying the same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the
new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil
action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility
arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules
of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it is
"more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern
progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific
Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or
negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies
against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged
also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality
only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the
civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in
reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished
his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on
the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the
conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article
327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the
minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by
marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by
voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable
the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money
or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or
guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that
Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the
time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and
dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary
liability of presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of
Page 23 of 91

the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to
third persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a
minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the
assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter
into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol.
II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise
stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that
the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and
alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child
without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is
now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to
that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed
in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.

G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979

PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the Third Branch of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA City Judge of Mandaue City, Second Branch ROMEO
HILOT, VALERIANA PEPITO and CARLOS PEPITO, respondents-appellees.
Eriberto Seno for appellant.
Jose M. Mesina for appellees.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu rendered on November 5, 1970.
The background facts to the controversy may be set forth as follows:
Petitioner herein filed, on February 25, 1970, a Complaint in the City Court of Mandaue City,
Cebu, Branch II, for the recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his
automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and
Carlos Pepito, the last three being the private respondents in this suit. Subsequent thereto, a
criminal case was filed against the driver, Romeo Hilot, arising from the same accident. At
the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil
action pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of
the Rules of Court, which provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the same
offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be
found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered;
The City Court of Mandaue City in an Order dated August 11, 1970, ordered the suspension
of the civil case. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof, having been denied on
August 25, 1970, 1 petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, respondent Judge presiding, on September 11, 1970, alleging that the City Judge had

Page 24 of 91

acted with grave abuse of discretion in suspending the civil action for being contrary to law
and jurisprudence. 2
On November 5, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Petition for certiorari on the ground
that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the City Court in suspending the
civil action inasmuch as damage to property is not one of the instances when an
independent civil action is proper; that petitioner has another plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy under the law, which is to submit his claim for damages in the criminal case; that the
resolution of the City Court is interlocutory and, therefore, certiorari is improper; and that the
Petition is defective inasmuch as what petitioner actually desires is a Writ of mandamus
(Annex "R"). Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent Judge in an
Order dated November 14,1970 (Annex "S" and Annex "U").
Hence, this Petition for Review before this Tribunal, to which we gave due course on
February 25, 1971. 3
Petitioner makes these:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
1. THE TRIAL COURT, RESPONDENT JUDGE MATEO CANONOY, ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE TRIAL OF THE CIVIL CASE NO. 189 FILED IN THE CITY COURT OF
MANDAUE SHOULD BE SUSPENDED UNTIL AFTER A FINAL JUDGMENT IS RENDERED
IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
2. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IN ORDER TO AVOID DELAY THE
OFFENDED PARTY MAY SUBMIT HIS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
3. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FOR certiorari IS NOT
PROPER, BECAUSE THE RESOLUTION IN QUESTION IS INTERLOCUTORY.
4. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION IS DEFECTIVE. 4
all of which can be synthesized into one decisive issue: whether or not there can be an
independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action.
From the Complaint filed by petitioner before the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, it is
evident that the nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated principally
on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is caned a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts
or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages cause by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
(1903a)
Thus, plaintiff made the essential averments that it was the fault or negligence of the driver,
Romeo Hilot, in the operation of the jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the
collision between his automobile and said jeepney; that damages were sustained by
petitioner because of the collision; that there was a direct causal connection between the
damages he suffered and the fault and negligence of private respondents.
Page 25 of 91

Similarly, in the Answer, private respondents contended, among others, that defendant,
Valeriana Pepito, observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees,
particularly of her co-defendant Romeo Hilot, a defense peculiar to actions based on quasidelict. 5
Liability being predicated on quasi-delict the civil case may proceed as a separate and
independent civil action, as specifically provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But
the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. (n)
The crucial distinction between criminal negligence and quasi-delict, which is readily
discernible from the foregoing codal provision, has been expounded in Barredo vs. Garcia, et
al., 73 Phil. 607, 620-621, 6 thus:
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple
imprudence. if we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault
or negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil
Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in
actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of
negligence even the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle of
civil hability arising from crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for
quasidelito or culpa aquiliana We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring
about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws,
disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use
the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such
ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 11910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the
defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which cannot
be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In
such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, otherwise, there would be many instances of
unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendants liability effective, and that is, to
sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling
the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining a reliel True, there is
such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on
the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs because the procedure
indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common
knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyances usually do not
have sufficient means with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required
in all cases to go through this round-about, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure?
In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right
and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and
their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and
employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It
is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of
Page 26 of 91

these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful
conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they
should reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor
selection and all for their negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable
and just that such responsibility should fail upon the principal or director who could have
chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the such employee because of his
confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this
primary responsibility of the employer on the principle of representation of the principal by
the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third
persons the employer and employee vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por
refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien la emplea y utihza (become as one
personality by the merging of the person of the employee in that of him who employs and
utilizes him.) All these observations acquire a peculiar force and significance when it comes
to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of
owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil
Code on this subject, which has given rise to overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for
culpaaquiliana there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the
Civil responsibility arising from crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by
invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by
our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious
and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present
case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we
pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for
fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time
we cause the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so
that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will,
it is believed, make for the bet ter safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an
ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not
depending on the issues, stations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed
by the party wronged or his counsel is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious
redress. (Garcia vs. Florida 52 SCRA 420, 424-425, Aug. 31, 1973). (Emphasis supplied)
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in
section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, reading:
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and
2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Are independent civil action entirely separate and
distinct from the c action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the
criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil
action shag proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
Significant to note is the fact that the foregoing section categorically lists cases provided for
in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, supra, as allowing of an "independent civil action."
Tested by the hereinabove-quoted legal tenets, it has to be held that the City Court, in
surrounding the civil action, erred in placing reliance on section 3 (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court, supra which refers to "other civil actions arising from cases not included in the
section just cited" (i.e., Section 2, Rule 111 above quoted), in which case 6 once the criminal
action has being commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be
Page 27 of 91

prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found, until final
judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered." Stated otherwise, the civil action
referred to in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be
suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the criminal
offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict
Article 31 of the Civil Code then clearly assumes relevance when it provides:
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
For obviously, the jural concept of a quasi-delict is that of an independent source of
obligation "not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony." Article 1157 of the
Civil Code bolsters this conclusion when it specifically recognizes that:
Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)
(Emphasis supplied)
It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based on quasi-delict. The concept of
quasidelica as enunciated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it
includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. 7 It makes no distinction
between "damage to persons" on the one hand and "damage to property" on the other.
Indeed, the word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the
harm done. And with respect to harm it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and
property since "harm" is not limited to personal but also to property injuries. In fact, examples
of quasi-delict in the law itself include damage to property. An instance is Article 2191(2) of
the Civil Code which holds proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke
which may be harmful to persons or property."
In the light of the foregoing disquisition, we are constrained to hold that respondent Judge
gravely abused his discretion in upholding the Decision of the City Court of Mandaue City,
Cebu, suspending the civil action based on a quasi-delict until after the criminal case is
finally terminated. Having arrived at this conclusion, a discussion of the other errors assigned
becomes unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for, the Decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside, and the City Court of Mandaue
City, Cebu, Branch 11, is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of Civil Case No. 189 of
that Court.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990

NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and MISSIONARIES OF
OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.
Page 28 of 91

Lope E. Adriano for petitioners.

Padilla Law Office for private respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:
The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is whether a
corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and
contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can
be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasidelicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land
situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent,
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial
lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a
young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences,
endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and
exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal Case No.
TG-907-82, before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City), against
Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of herein
respondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against respondent
corporation, this time a civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748, for damages with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same court. 1
On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and opposition
to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hearings were conducted including ocular
inspections on the land. However, on April 26, 1984, the trial court, acting on respondent
corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the civil action, issued an order suspending
further hearings in Civil Case No, TG-748 until after judgment in the related Criminal Case
No. TG-907-82.
Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 1984, the trial court
issued on August 27, 1984 the disputed order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 for lack of
jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still
unresolved. Said order was anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules
of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be
instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action
cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." 2
Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court. 3
On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division, promulgated a
decision 4 affirming the questioned order of the trial court. 5 A motion for reconsideration filed
by petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated May 19, 1986. 6
Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748 in accordance with
Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend that the trial court and the
Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 since it is predicated on a quasidelict. Petitioners have raised a valid point.
Page 29 of 91

It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in
the complaint as constituting the cause of action. 7 The purpose of an action or suit and the
law to govern it, including the period of prescription, is to be determined not by the claim of
the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its
allegations and prayer for relief. 8 The nature of an action is not necessarily determined or
controlled by its title or heading but the body of the pleading or complaint itself. To avoid
possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities, pleadings as well as remedial
laws should be liberally construed so that the litigants may have ample opportunity to prove
their respective claims. 9
Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No.
TG-748:
4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso), Silang, Cavite, adjacent on
the right side of the aforesaid land of plaintiffs, defendant constructed waterpaths starting
from the middle-right portion thereof leading to a big hole or opening, also constructed by
defendant, thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence situated on the right side
of its cemented gate fronting the provincial highway, and connected by defendant to a man
height inter-connected cement culverts which were also constructed and lain by defendant
cross-wise beneath the tip of the said cemented gate, the left-end of the said inter-connected
culverts again connected by defendant to a big hole or opening thru the lower portion of the
same concrete hollowblocks fence on the left side of the said cemented gate, which hole or
opening is likewise connected by defendant to the cemented mouth of a big canal, also
constructed by defendant, which runs northward towards a big hole or opening which was
also built by defendant thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence which
separates the land of plaintiffs from that of defendant (and which serves as the exit-point of
the floodwater coming from the land of defendant, and at the same time, the entrance-point
of the same floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year after year, during rainy or stormy
seasons.
5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside the land of plaintiffs,
defendant also constructed an artificial lake, the base of which is soil, which utilizes the water
being channeled thereto from its water system thru inter-connected galvanized iron pipes
(No. 2) and complimented by rain water during rainy or stormy seasons, so much so that the
water below it seeps into, and the excess water above it inundates, portions of the adjoining
land of plaintiffs.
6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendant's aforementioned water
conductors, contrivances and manipulators, a young man was drowned to death, while
herein plaintiffs suffered and will continue to suffer, as follows:
a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded and converted to deep, wide and long canals,
such that the same can no longer be planted to any crop or plant.
b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on several occasions, washed away.
c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs and their laborers are always in
danger.
d) Plants and other improvements on other portions of the land of plaintiffs are exposed to
destruction. ... 10
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict
are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the
defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
Page 30 of 91

cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred
by the plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an
assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the
damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which
may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the
Civil Code and held that "any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike,
stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing
loss and damages to a third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and
enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and
damages to the injured party.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property
subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint
sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to
the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the
complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of
respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal
connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation
between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the
Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as
to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS.
Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each
must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and
interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his
land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so
that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and
expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner
or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his
act or omission constituting fault or negligence, thus:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this chapter.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable
by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or
not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party
is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. 13
The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But
the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
Page 31 of 91

According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first
sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal
and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct
and independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin,
having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence.
Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito"
has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain ... 14
In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own,
and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction
exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or
culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability
arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa
extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal
case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal
where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in
which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil
liability.
In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is
entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code.
There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated
in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or
acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the
clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court affirming the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch
18 (Tagaytay City) dated August 17, 1984 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial
court is ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and
Emmanuel R. Andamo vs. Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette Inc." and to proceed with
the hearing of the case with dispatch. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against
respondent corporation.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995

MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and in behalf of the minor children KRIZTEEN
ELIZABETH, BEVERLY MARIE and NAPOLEON II, all surnamed DULAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Eighth Division, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court National Capital Region, Quezon
City, Br. 84, SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., and
SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION, respondents.

BIDIN, J.:
This petition for certiorari prays for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October 29, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 24646 which affirmed the order of the Regional Trial
Page 32 of 91

Court dismissing Civil Case No. Q-89-1751, and its resolution dated November 17, 1991
denying herein, petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay
occurred at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which
Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty.
Napoleon Dulay.
Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own
behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed on February 8, 1989 an action for damages
against Benigno Torzuela and herein private respondents Safeguard Investigation and
Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"),
alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-89-1751 among others alleges the following:
1. . . .
Defendants SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., (Defendant
Safeguard) and SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION (Defendant Superguard) are
corporations duly organized and existing in accordance with Philippine laws, with offices at
10th Floor, Manufacturers Building, Inc., Plaza Santa Cruz, Manila. They are impleaded as
alternative defendants for, while the former appears to be the employer of defendant
BENIGNO TORZUELA (defendant TORZUELA), the latter impliedly acknowledged
responsibility for the acts of defendant TORZUELA by extending its sympathies to plaintiffs.
Defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA is of legal age, an employee of defendant SAFEGUARD
and/or defendant SUPERGUARD and, at the time of the incident complained of, was under
their control and supervision. . . .
3. On December 7, 1988 at around 8:00 a.m., defendant TORZUELA, while he was on duty
as security guard at the "Big Bang sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila
shot and killed NAPOLEON V. DULAY with a .38 caliber revolver belonging to defendant
SAFEGUARD, and/or SUPERGUARD (per Police Report dated January 7, 1989, copy
attached as Annex A);
4. The incident resulting in the death of NAPOLEON V. DULAY was due to the concurring
negligence of the defendants. Defendant TORZUELA'S wanton and reckless discharge of
the firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD was the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury, while the negligence of defendant
SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its having failed to exercise the diligence of
a good father of a family in the supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury.
xxx xxx xxx
(Rollo, pp. 117-118)
Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's
fees. The said Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 was raffled to Branch 84 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, presided by respondent Judge Teodoro Regino.
On March 2, 1989, private respondent SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the complaint does not state a valid cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed
that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the
alleged act of shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is
governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. Every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable.
Page 33 of 91

Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint for damages based on

negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners,
cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the private respondent argued that
petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a
criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability (Rollo, p.
55-59).
Respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on
the ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees (Rollo, p. 96).
Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against the private
respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which
provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or an industry.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners contended that a suit against alternative defendants is allowed under Rule 3,
Section 13 of the Rules of Court. Therefore, the inclusion of private respondents as
alternative defendants in the complaint is justified by the following: the Initial Investigation
Report prepared by Pat. Mario Tubon showing that Torzuela is an employee of
SAFEGUARD; and through overt acts, SUPERGUARD extended its sympathies to
petitioners (Rollo, pp. 64 and 98).
Meanwhile, an Information dated March 21, 1989 charging Benigno Torzuela with homicide
was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati and was docketed as Criminal Case No.
89-1896.
On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge Regino issued an order granting SUPERGUARD'S
motion to dismiss and SAFEGUARD'S motion for exclusion as defendant. The respondent
judge held that the complaint did not state facts necessary or sufficient to constitute a quasidelict since it does not mention any negligence on the part of Torzuela in shooting Napoleon
Dulay or that the same was done in the performance of his duties. Respondent judge ruled
that mere allegations of the concurring negligence of the defendants (private respondents
herein) without stating the facts showing such negligence are mere conclusions of law (Rollo,
p. 106). Respondent judge also declared that the complaint was one for damages founded
on crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as
distinguished from those arising from, quasi-delict. The dispositive portion of the order dated
April 13, 1989 states:
WHEREFORE, this Court holds that in view of the material and ultimate facts alleged in the
verified complaint and in accordance with the applicable law on the matter as well as
precedents laid down by the Supreme Court, the complaint against the alternative
defendants Superguard Security Corporation and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co.,
Inc., must be and (sic) it is hereby dismissed. (Rollo, p. 110)
The above order was affirmed by the respondent court and petitioners' motion for
reconsideration thereof was denied.
Page 34 of 91

Petitioners take exception to the assailed decision and insist that quasi-delicts are not limited
to acts of negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary, citing Andamo v.
IAC (191 SCRA 195 [1990]). Thus, petitioners insist that Torzuela' s act of shooting Napoleon
Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.
Petitioners further contend that under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, private
respondents are primarily liable for their negligence either in the selection or supervision of
their employees. This liability is independent of the employee's own liability for fault or
negligence and is distinct from the subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code. The civil action against the employer may therefore proceed independently of
the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111 Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners submit
that the question of whether Torzuela is an employee of respondent SUPERGUARD or
SAFEGUARD would be better resolved after trial.
Moreover, petitioners argue that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under
Article 33 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, petitioners cite Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Rule 111. . . . .
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently In the cases provided for in Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action which
has been reserved may be brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of the
criminal action, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
The term "physical injuries" under Article 33 has been held to include consummated,
frustrated and attempted homicide. Thus, petitioners maintain that Torzuela's prior conviction
is unnecessary since the civil action can proceed independently of the criminal action. On the
other hand, it is the private respondents' argument that since the act was not committed with
negligence, the petitioners have no cause of action under Articles 2116 and 2177 of the New
Civil Code. The civil action contemplated in Article 2177 is not applicable to acts committed
with deliberate intent, but only applies to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code. Torzuela's act of shooting Atty. Dulay to death, aside from being purely
personal, was done with deliberate intent and could not have been part of his duties as
security guard. And since Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers only: acts done within
the scope of the employee's assigned tasks, the private respondents cannot be held liable
for damages.
We find for petitioners.
It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted for homicide for the fatal shooting
of Napoleon Dulay. Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless
the offended party waives the civil action , reserves his right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from
the same act or omission of the accused. (Emphasis supplied)
It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the
criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement
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of express reservation (Yakult Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990]). This is
precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this case. However, the private respondents
opposed the civil action on the ground that the same is founded on a delict and not on a
quasi-delict as the shooting was not attended by negligence. What is in dispute therefore is
the nature of the petitioner's cause of action.
The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as
constituting the cause of action (Republic v. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]). The purpose of
an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party
filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its
allegations and prayer for relief. (De Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, 112 SCRA
243 [1982]). An examination of the complaint in the present case would show that the
plaintiffs, petitioners herein, are invoking their right to recover damages against the private
respondents for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Benigno Torzuela's act
of shooting and killing Napoleon Dulay, as stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of
Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Wellentrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence,
but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano
v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that:
. . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable
by law" but also acts criminal in character; whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he
is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and
would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to
in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasidelict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case
that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary
and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. (Emphasis supplied)
The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court (191
SCRA 195 [1990]), wherein the Court held:
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts criminal in
character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a civil action lies
against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is prosecuted or found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually also
charged criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary. [citing Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472] (Emphasis supplied)
Private respondents submit that the word "intentional" in the Andamo case is inaccurate
obiter, and should be read as "voluntary" since intent cannot be coupled with negligence as
Page 36 of 91

defined by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of more substantial
reasons, this Court will not disturb the above doctrine on the coverage of Article 2176.
Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries
intentionally committed pursuant to the ruling in Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA 193 [1983]), and
that the actions for damages allowed thereunder are ex-delicto. However, the term "physical
injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death
(Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 638 [1965); Carandang v.
Santiago, 97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised
Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and
attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293 [1983]). Although in the Marcia case
(supra), it was held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the
crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted however, that Torzuela, the
accused in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas
the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a
civil action based on Article 33 lies.
Private respondents also contend that their liability is subsidiary under the Revised Penal
Code; and that they are not liable for Torzuela's act which is beyond the scope of his duties
as a security guard. It having been established that the instant action is not ex-delicto,
petitioners may proceed directly against Torzuela and the private respondents. Under Article
2180 of the New Civil Code as aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the negligence of
the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the
part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167
SCRA 363 [1988]). The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it
is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of
the insolvency of such employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]).
Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are intentional and
voluntary, it was therefore erroneous on the part of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's
complaint simply because it failed to make allegations of attendant negligence attributable to
private respondents.
With respect to the issue of whether the complaint at hand states a sufficient cause of action,
the general rule is that the allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of
action against the defendants if, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid
judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exist if the
following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means
and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of
such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of
the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
damages (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, 210 SCRA 33 [1992]); Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Pundogar, 218 SCRA 118 [1993])
This Court finds, under the foregoing premises, that the complaint sufficiently alleged an
actionable breach on the part of the defendant Torzuela and respondents SUPERGUARD
and/or SAFEGUARD. It is enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot
Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was
on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and
Page 37 of 91

responsible for his acts. This does not operate however, to establish that the defendants
below are liable. Whether or not the shooting was actually reckless and wanton or attended
by negligence and whether it was actually done within the scope of Torzuela's duties;
whether the private respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family; and whether the defendants are actually liable, are
questions which can be better resolved after trial on the merits where each party can present
evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses. In determining whether the
allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind
that the complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a
cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case
(Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a
sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed
regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants (Rava Dev't. Corp. v.
CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the
complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been
defectively stated, is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA
50 [1969]). Since the petitioners clearly sustained an injury to their rights under the law, it
would be more just to allow them to present evidence of such injury.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals as well as the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated April
13, 1989 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 is remanded to
the Regional Trial Court for trial on the merits. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-35095 August 31, 1973

GERMAN C. GARCIA, LUMINOSA L. GARCIA, and ESTER FRANCISCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MARIANO M. FLORIDO OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL, MARCELINO INESIN, RICARDO VAYSON, MACTAN TRANSIT
CO., INC., and PEDRO TUMALA Y DIGAL, respondents.
Paulino A. Conol for petitioners.
Dominador M. Canastra and Wilfredo C. Martinez for private respondents.
Hon. Mariano M. Florido for and in his own behalf.

ANTONIO, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental,
Branch III, in Civil Case No. 2850 (German C. Garcia, et al. vs. Marcelino Inesin et al.) dated
October 21, 1971, dismissing petitioners' action for damages against respondents, Mactan
Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala "without prejudice to refiling the said civil action after
conviction of the defendants in the criminal case filed by the Chief of Police of Sindangan
Zamboanga del Norte", and from the order of said Court dated January 21, 1972, denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital,
together with his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital,
hired and boarded a PU car with plate No. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and operated by
Page 38 of 91

respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip
from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City, for the purpose of attending a conference of chiefs
of government hospitals, hospital administrative officers, and bookkeepers of Regional
Health Office No. 7 at Zamboanga City. At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating
a slight curve on the national highway at kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan,
Zamboanga del Norte, said car collided with an oncoming passenger bus (No. 25) with plate
No. 77-4 W Z.N. 71 owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by
defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid collision, petitioners sustained various
physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization.
Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of the
accident driving their respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a reckless, grossly negligent and
imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the
passengers aboard the PU car, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and
Ester Francisco, filed on September 1, 1971 with respondent Court of First Instance of
Misamis Occidental an action for damages (Civil Case No. 2850) against the private
respondents, owners and drivers, respectively, of the PU car and the passenger bus that
figured in the collision, with prayer for preliminary attachment.
On September 16, 1971, Marcelino Inesin and Ricardo Vayson filed their answer in the
aforementioned Civil Case No. 2850 admitting the contract of carriage with petitioners but
alleged, by way of defense, that the accident was due to the negligence and reckless
imprudence of the bus driver, as when Ricardo Vayson, driver of the PU car, saw the
oncoming passenger bus No. 25 coming from the opposite direction ascending the incline at
an excessive speed, chasing another passenger bus, he had to stop the PU car in order to
give way to the passenger bus, but, in spite of such precaution, the passenger bus bumped
the PU car, thus causing the accident in question, and, therefore, said private respondents
could not be held liable for the damages caused on petitioners.
On September 29, 1971, respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, filed a
motion to dismiss on three (3) grounds, namely: 1) that the plaintiffs (petitioners) had no
cause of action; 2) that the complaint carries with it a prayer for attachment but without the
requisite verification, hence defective under the provision of Sec. 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of
Court; and 3) that the defendants (respondents), Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and its driver,
accused Pedro Tumala, had operated said passenger bus with maximum care and
prudence.
The principal argument advanced in said motion to dismiss was that the petitioners had no
cause of action for on August 11, 1971, or 20 days before the filing of the present action for
damages, respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal Case No. 4960 of the
Municipal Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, in a complaint filed by the Chief of
Police for "double serious and less serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence",
and that, with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case, no civil action could be filed
subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3
of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, and, therefore, the filing of the instant civil action is
premature, because the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until
after final judgment has been rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala guilty of negligence;
that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code, is not applicable because Art. 33 applied only to the
crimes of physical injuries or homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence of the driver.
On October 14, 1971, petitioners filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss alleging that
the aforesaid action for damages was instituted not to enforce the civil liability of the
respondents under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code but for their civil liability on quasiPage 39 of 91

delicts pursuant to Articles 2176-2194, as the same negligent act causing damages may
produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Revised Penal Code or create an action
for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code, and the party seeking
recovery is free to choose which remedy to enforce.
In dismissing the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 2850, the lower court sustained
the arguments of respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, and declared that
whether or not "the action for damages is based on criminal negligence or civil negligence
known as culpa aquiliana in the Civil Code or tort under American law" there "should be a
showing that the offended party expressly waived the civil action or reserved his right to
institute it separately" and that "the allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must not
be tainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or regulations" and because of
the prayer in the complaint asking the Court to declare the defendants jointly and severally
liable for moral, compensatory and exemplary damages, the Court is of the opinion that the
action was not based on "culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict."
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on January 21, 1972,
hence this appeal on certiorari.
There is no question that from a careful consideration of the allegations contained in the
complaint in Civil Case No. 2850, the essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under
Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present, namely: a) act or omission of the
private respondents; b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the
operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision
of the bus with the passenger car; c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by
petitioners as a result of the collision; d) existence of direct causal connection between the
damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private respondents; and e) the absence
of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties. The circumstance that the complaint
alleged that respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver drove the vehicle "at a fast clip
in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic rules and without
due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car" does not detract from the
nature and character of the action, as one based on culpa aquiliana. The violation of traffic
rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the protection of the
interests of others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners. Certainly excessive speed in
violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence. Since the same negligent act
resulted in the filing of the criminal action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court
(Criminal Case No. 4960) and the civil action by petitioners, it is inevitable that the averments
on the drivers' negligence in both complaints would substantially be the same. It should be
emphasized that the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising
from a crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or
culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code. This distinction has
been amply explained in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al. (73 Phil. 607, 620-621). 1
It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court
which became effective on January 1, 1964, in the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39
and 2177 of the Civil Code, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
civil action, may be instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case,
provided said party has reserved his right to institute it separately, but it should be noted,
however, that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit when such
reservation shall be made. In Tactaquin v. Palileo, 2 where the reservation was made after
the tort-feasor had already pleaded guilty and after the private prosecutor had entered his
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appearance jointly with the prosecuting attorney in the course of the criminal proceedings,
and the tort-feasor was convicted and sentenced to pay damages to the offended party by
final judgment in said criminal case, We ruled that such reservation is legally ineffective
because the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant. We explained in Meneses vs. Luat 3 that when the criminal action for physical
injuries against the defendant did not proceed to trial as he pleaded guilty upon arraignment
and the Court made no pronouncement on the matter or damages suffered by the injured
party, the mere appearance of private counsel in representation of the offended party in said
criminal case does not constitute such active intervention as could impart an intention to
press a claim for damages in the same action, and, therefore, cannot bar a separate civil
action for damages subsequently instituted on the same ground under Article 33 of the New
Civil Code.
In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action
instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said
criminal action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused.
It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages,
petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal
case, and have opted instead to recover them in the present civil case.
As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the former
has ceased to be involved in the criminal action. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his
right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil
action or expressly reserved his right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the
civil action. For by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared.
As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a
civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual.
The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent
negligence, having always had its own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of
the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may
proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of
the result of the latter. Hence, "the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to ...
Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles,
for these articles were drafted ... and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general
rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso which is procedural, may also
be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the
Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso." 4 But in
whatever way We view the institution of the civil action for recovery of damages under quasidelict by petitioners, whether as one that should be governed by the provisions of Section 2
of Rule 111 of the Rules which require reservation by the injured party considering that by
the institution of the civil action even before the commencement of the trial of the criminal
case, petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where
reservation to file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article
33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the offended party to
do so does not bar him from bringing the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the
case, We find no legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the decision and order appealed from are hereby reversed and set aside,
and the court a quo is directed to proceed with the trial of the case. Costs against private
respondents.
Page 41 of 91

G.R. No. L-4977 March 22, 1910

DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
W. H. Lawrence, for appellant.
W. L. Wright, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David
Taylor, a minor, by his father, his nearest relative.
The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an
electric light system in the city of Manila. Its power plant is situated at the eastern end of a
small island in the Pasig River within the city of Manila, known as the Isla del Provisor. The
power plant may be reached by boat or by crossing a footbridge, impassable for vehicles, at
the westerly end of the island.
The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15
years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his
age, and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics.
On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12
years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one
Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a
miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys,
impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which both
seem to have taken in machinery, spent some time in wandering about the company's
premises. The visit was made on a Sunday afternoon, and it does not appear that they saw
or spoke to anyone after leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy.
After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal,
they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company
dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty
brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately of the size
and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin wires by
means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity. They are intended for use in
the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable
explosive power. After some discussion as to the ownership of the caps, and their right to
take them, the boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took
end, and carried them home. After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie
Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to the home of the boy Manuel. The boys
then made a series of experiments with the caps. They trust the ends of the wires into an
electric light socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap with a stone and
failed. Manuel looked for a hammer, but could not find one. Then they opened one of the
caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches,
and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion
followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who when the boys
proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and started to run
away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and
David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured
his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were
called in to care for his wounds.
Page 42 of 91

The evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps came to be on the
defendant's premises, nor how long they had been there when the boys found them. It
appears, however, that some months before the accident, during the construction of the
defendant's plant, detonating caps of the same size and kind as those found by the boys
were used in sinking a well at the power plant near the place where the caps were found;
and it also appears that at or about the time when these caps were found, similarly caps
were in use in the construction of an extension of defendant's street car line to Fort William
McKinley. The caps when found appeared to the boys who picked them up to have been
lying for a considerable time, and from the place where they were found would seem to have
been discarded as detective or worthless and fit only to be thrown upon the rubbish heap.
No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to prohibit or prevent
visitors from entering and walking about its premises unattended, when they felt disposed so
to do. As admitted in defendant counsel's brief, "it is undoubtedly true that children in their
play sometimes crossed the foot bridge to the islands;" and, we may add, roamed about at
will on the uninclosed premises of the defendant, in the neighborhood of the place where the
caps were found. There is evidence that any effort ever was made to forbid these children
from visiting the defendant company's premises, although it must be assumed that the
company or its employees were aware of the fact that they not infrequently did so.
Two years before the accident, plaintiff spent four months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of
the interisland transports. Later he took up work in his father's office, learning mechanical
drawing and mechanical engineering. About a month after his accident he obtained
employment as a mechanical draftsman and continued in that employment for six months at
a salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears that he was a boy of more than average intelligence,
taller and more mature both mentally and physically than most boys of fifteen.
The facts set out in the foregoing statement are to our mind fully and conclusively
established by the evidence of record, and are substantially admitted by counsel. The only
questions of fact which are seriously disputed are plaintiff's allegations that the caps which
were found by plaintiff on defendant company's premises were the property of the defendant,
or that they had come from its possession and control, and that the company or some of its
employees left them exposed on its premises at the point where they were found.
The evidence in support of these allegations is meager, and the defendant company,
apparently relying on the rule of law which places the burden of proof of such allegations
upon the plaintiff, offered no evidence in rebuttal, and insists that plaintiff failed in his proof.
We think, however, that plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding in accord with his
allegations in this regard.
It was proven that caps, similar to those found by plaintiff, were used, more or less
extensively, on the McKinley extension of the defendant company's track; that some of these
caps were used in blasting a well on the company's premises a few months before the
accident; that not far from the place where the caps were found the company has a
storehouse for the materials, supplies and so forth, used by it in its operations as a street
railway and a purveyor of electric light; and that the place, in the neighborhood of which the
caps were found, was being used by the company as a sort of dumping ground for ashes
and cinders. Fulminating caps or detonators for the discharge by electricity of blasting
charges by dynamite are not articles in common use by the average citizen, and under all the
circumstances, and in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, we think that the discovery
of twenty or thirty of these caps at the place where they were found by the plaintiff on
defendant's premises fairly justifies the inference that the defendant company was either the
owner of the caps in question or had the caps under its possession and control. We think
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also that the evidence tends to disclose that these caps or detonators were willfully and
knowingly thrown by the company or its employees at the spot where they were found, with
the expectation that they would be buried out of the sight by the ashes which it was engaged
in dumping in that neighborhood, they being old and perhaps defective; and, however this
may be, we are satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding that the company
or some of its employees either willfully or through an oversight left them exposed at a point
on its premises which the general public, including children at play, where not prohibited from
visiting, and over which the company knew or ought to have known that young boys were
likely to roam about in pastime or in play.
Counsel for appellant endeavors to weaken or destroy the probative value of the facts on
which these conclusions are based by intimidating or rather assuming that the blasting work
on the company's well and on its McKinley extension was done by contractors. It was
conclusively proven, however, that while the workman employed in blasting the well was
regularly employed by J. G. White and Co., a firm of contractors, he did the work on the well
directly and immediately under the supervision and control of one of defendant company's
foremen, and there is no proof whatever in the record that the blasting on the McKinley
extension was done by independent contractors. Only one witness testified upon this point,
and while he stated that he understood that a part of this work was done by contract, he
could not say so of his own knowledge, and knew nothing of the terms and conditions of the
alleged contract, or of the relations of the alleged contractor to the defendant company. The
fact having been proven that detonating caps were more or less extensively employed on
work done by the defendant company's directions and on its behalf, we think that the
company should have introduced the necessary evidence to support its contention if it
wished to avoid the not unreasonable inference that it was the owner of the material used in
these operations and that it was responsible for tortious or negligent acts of the agents
employed therein, on the ground that this work had been intrusted to independent
contractors as to whose acts the maxim respondent superior should not be applied. If the
company did not in fact own or make use of caps such as those found on its premises, as
intimated by counsel, it was a very simple matter for it to prove that fact, and in the absence
of such proof we think that the other evidence in the record sufficiently establishes the
contrary, and justifies the court in drawing the reasonable inference that the caps found on its
premises were its property, and were left where they were found by the company or some of
its employees.
Plaintiff appears to have rested his case, as did the trial judge his decision in plaintiff's favor,
upon the provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles 1902, 1903,
and 1908 of that code.
ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and illicit acts
and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.
ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is
fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be
responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages caused by
the minors who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx

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Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for damages caused
by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on
account of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove
that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.
ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused
1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due diligence, and
for kindling of explosive substances which may not have been placed in a safe and proper
place.
Counsel for the defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his contention that the
facts proven at the trial do not established the liability of the defendant company under the
provisions of these articles, and since we agree with this view of the case, it is not necessary
for us to consider the various questions as to form and the right of action (analogous to those
raised in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359), which would,
perhaps, be involved in a decision affirming the judgment of the court below.
We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the generally
accepted doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff in an action such as that under
consideration, in order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent
evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose
acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.
These proposition are, of course, elementary, and do not admit of discussion, the real
difficulty arising in the application of these principles to the particular facts developed in the
case under consideration.
It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps been left
exposed at the point where they were found, or if their owner had exercised due care in
keeping them in an appropriate place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not have been
injured had he not, for his own pleasure and convenience, entered upon the defendant's
premises, and strolled around thereon without the express permission of the defendant, and
had he not picked up and carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its
premises, and had he not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a
match to its contents.
But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and inexperience, his entry
upon defendant company's premises, and the intervention of his action between the
negligent act of defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the accident
which resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the
accident, which should be deemed to be the direct result of defendant's negligence in leaving
the caps exposed at the place where they were found by the plaintiff, and this latter the
proximate cause of the accident which occasioned the injuries sustained by him.
In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid down in many of
the courts of last resort in the United States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and
"Turntable" cases, and the cases based thereon.
In a typical cases, the question involved has been whether a railroad company is liable for an
injury received by an infant of tender years, who from mere idle curiosity, or for the purposes
of amusement, enters upon the railroad company's premises, at a place where the railroad
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company knew, or had good reason to suppose, children would be likely to come, and there
found explosive signal torpedoes left unexposed by the railroad company's employees, one
of which when carried away by the visitor, exploded and injured him; or where such infant
found upon the premises a dangerous machine, such as a turntable, left in such condition as
to make it probable that children in playing with it would be exposed to accident or injury
therefrom and where the infant did in fact suffer injury in playing with such machine.
In these, and in great variety of similar cases, the great weight of authority holds the owner of
the premises liable.
As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (17 Wall. (84 U. S.), 657), wherein the principal
question was whether a railroad company was liable for in injury received by an infant while
upon its premises, from idle curiosity, or for purposes of amusement, if such injury was,
under circumstances, attributable to the negligence of the company), the principles on which
these cases turn are that "while a railroad company is not bound to the same degree of care
in regard to mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to passengers
conveyed by it, it is not exempt from responsibility to such strangers for injuries arising from
its negligence or from its tortious acts;" and that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is
not to be judged by the same rule which governs that of adult. While it is the general rule in
regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault
or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in
regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according to
his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the
circumstances of the case."
The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout was vigorously controverted and
sharply criticized in several state courts, and the supreme court of Michigan in the case of
Ryan vs. Towar (128 Mich., 463) formally repudiated and disapproved the doctrine of the
Turntable cases, especially that laid down in Railroad Company vs. Stout, in a very able
decision wherein it held, in the language of the syllabus: (1) That the owner of the land is not
liable to trespassers thereon for injuries sustained by them, not due to his wanton or willful
acts; (2) that no exception to this rule exists in favor of children who are injured by dangerous
machinery naturally calculated to attract them to the premises; (3) that an invitation or license
to cross the premises of another can not be predicated on the mere fact that no steps have
been taken to interfere with such practice; (4) that there is no difference between children
and adults as to the circumstances that will warrant the inference of an invitation or a license
to enter upon another's premises.
Similar criticisms of the opinion in the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout were indulged in
by the courts in Connecticut and Massachusetts. (Nolan vs. Railroad Co., 53 Conn., 461;
154 Mass., 349). And the doctrine has been questioned in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, New
Hampshire, and perhaps in other States.
On the other hand, many if not most of the courts of last resort in the United States, citing
and approving the doctrine laid down in England in the leading case of Lynch vs. Nurding (1
Q. B., 29, 35, 36), lay down the rule in these cases in accord with that announced in the
Railroad Company vs. Stout (supra), and the Supreme Court of the United States, in a
unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Harlan in the case of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs.
McDonal and reconsidered the doctrine laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout, and after an
exhaustive and critical analysis and review of many of the adjudged cases, both English and
American, formally declared that it adhered "to the principles announced in the case of
Railroad Co. vs. Stout."
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In the case of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. MacDonald (supra) the facts were as follows:
The plaintiff, a boy 12 years of age, out of curiosity and for his own pleasure, entered upon
and visited the defendant's premises, without defendant's express permission or invitation,
and while there, was by accident injured by falling into a burning slack pile of whose
existence he had no knowledge, but which had been left by defendant on its premises
without any fence around it or anything to give warning of its dangerous condition, although
defendant knew or had reason the interest or curiosity of passers-by. On these facts the
court held that the plaintiff could not be regarded as a mere trespasser, for whose safety and
protection while on the premises in question, against the unseen danger referred to, the
defendant was under no obligation to make provision.
We quote at length from the discussion by the court of the application of the principles
involved to the facts in that case, because what is said there is strikingly applicable in the
case at bar, and would seem to dispose of defendant's contention that, the plaintiff in this
case being a trespasser, the defendant company owed him no duty, and in no case could be
held liable for injuries which would not have resulted but for the entry of plaintiff on
defendant's premises.
We adhere to the principles announced in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra). Applied to the case
now before us, they require us to hold that the defendant was guilty of negligence in leaving
unguarded the slack pile, made by it in the vicinity of its depot building. It could have
forbidden all persons from coming to its coal mine for purposes merely of curiosity and
pleasure. But it did not do so. On the contrary, it permitted all, without regard to age, to visit
its mine, and witness its operation. It knew that the usual approach to the mine was by a
narrow path skirting its slack pit, close to its depot building, at which the people of the village,
old and young, would often assemble. It knew that children were in the habit of frequenting
that locality and playing around the shaft house in the immediate vicinity of the slack pit. The
slightest regard for the safety of these children would have suggested that they were in
danger from being so near a pit, beneath the surface of which was concealed (except when
snow, wind, or rain prevailed) a mass of burning coals into which a child might accidentally
fall and be burned to death. Under all the circumstances, the railroad company ought not to
be heard to say that the plaintiff, a mere lad, moved by curiosity to see the mine, in the
vicinity of the slack pit, was a trespasser, to whom it owed no duty, or for whose protection it
was under no obligation to make provisions.
In Townsend vs. Wathen (9 East, 277, 281) it was held that if a man dangerous traps, baited
with flesh, in his own ground, so near to a highway, or to the premises of another, that dogs
passing along the highway, or kept in his neighbors premises, would probably be attracted by
their instinct into the traps, and in consequence of such act his neighbor's dogs be so
attracted and thereby injured, an action on the case would lie. "What difference," said Lord
Ellenborough, C.J., "is there in reason between drawing the animal into the trap by means of
his instinct which he can not resist, and putting him there by manual force?" What difference,
in reason we may observe in this case, is there between an express license to the children of
this village to visit the defendant's coal mine, in the vicinity of its slack pile, and an implied
license, resulting from the habit of the defendant to permit them, without objection or
warning, to do so at will, for purposes of curiosity or pleasure? Referring it the case of
Townsend vs. Wathen, Judge Thompson, in his work on the Law of Negligence, volume 1,
page 305, note, well says: "It would be a barbarous rule of law that would make the owner of
land liable for setting a trap thereon, baited with stinking meat, so that his neighbor's dog
attracted by his natural instinct, might run into it and be killed, and which would exempt him
from liability for the consequence of leaving exposed and unguarded on his land a
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dangerous machine, so that his neighbor's child attracted to it and tempted to intermeddle
with it by instincts equally strong, might thereby be killed or maimed for life."
Chief Justice Cooley, voicing the opinion of the supreme court of Michigan, in the case of
Powers vs. Harlow (53 Mich., 507), said that (p. 515):
Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon childlike instincts and impulses;
and others who are chargeable with a duty of care and caution toward them must calculate
upon this, and take precautions accordingly. If they leave exposed to the observation of
children anything which would be tempting to them, and which they in their immature
judgment might naturally suppose they were at liberty to handle or play with, they should
expect that liberty to be taken.
And the same eminent jurist in his treatise or torts, alluding to the doctrine of implied
invitation to visit the premises of another, says:
In the case of young children, and other persons not fully sui juris, an implied license might
sometimes arise when it would not on behalf of others. Thus leaving a tempting thing for
children to play with exposed, where they would be likely to gather for that purpose, may be
equivalent to an invitation to them to make use of it; and, perhaps, if one were to throw away
upon his premises, near the common way, things tempting to children, the same implication
should arise. (Chap. 10, p. 303.)
The reasoning which led the Supreme Court of the United States to its conclusion in the
cases of Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra) and Union Pacific Railroad Co. vs. McDonald (supra)
is not less cogent and convincing in this jurisdiction than in that wherein those cases
originated. Children here are actuated by similar childish instincts and impulses. Drawn by
curiosity and impelled by the restless spirit of youth, boys here as well as there will usually
be found whenever the public is permitted to congregate. The movement of machinery, and
indeed anything which arouses the attention of the young and inquiring mind, will draw them
to the neighborhood as inevitably as does the magnet draw the iron which comes within the
range of its magnetic influence. The owners of premises, therefore, whereon things attractive
to children are exposed, or upon which the public are expressly or impliedly permitted to
enter or upon which the owner knows or ought to know children are likely to roam about for
pastime and in play, " must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly." In such
cases the owner of the premises can not be heard to say that because the child has entered
upon his premises without his express permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner
owes no duty or obligation whatever. The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to
prevent the child from entering his premises at a place where he knows or ought to know that
children are accustomed to roam about of to which their childish instincts and impulses are
likely to attract them is at least equivalent to an implied license to enter, and where the child
does enter under such conditions the owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to guard
the child against injury from unknown or unseen dangers, placed upon such premises by the
owner, is clearly a breach of duty, responsible, if the child is actually injured, without other
fault on its part than that it had entered on the premises of a stranger without his express
invitation or permission. To hold otherwise would be expose all the children in the community
to unknown perils and unnecessary danger at the whim of the owners or occupants of land
upon which they might naturally and reasonably be expected to enter.
This conclusion is founded on reason, justice, and necessity, and neither is contention that a
man has a right to do what will with his own property or that children should be kept under
the care of their parents or guardians, so as to prevent their entering on the premises of
others is of sufficient weight to put in doubt. In this jurisdiction as well as in the United States
all private property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used
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as to injure the equal rights and interests of the community (see U. S. vs. Toribio,1 No. 5060,
decided January 26, 1910), and except as to infants of very tender years it would be absurd
and unreasonable in a community organized as is that in which we lived to hold that parents
or guardian are guilty of negligence or imprudence in every case wherein they permit
growing boys and girls to leave the parental roof unattended, even if in the event of accident
to the child the negligence of the parent could in any event be imputed to the child so as to
deprive it a right to recover in such cases a point which we neither discuss nor decide.
But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's
express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for
injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury were
attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that under all the
circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on
its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which
therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and,
on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap
and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the
resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly
responsible for the injuries thus incurred.
Plaintiff contends, upon the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that because of
plaintiff's youth the intervention of his action between the negligent act of the defendant in
leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the explosion which resulted in his injury
should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident; and it is because we can
not agree with this proposition, although we accept the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo
cases, that we have thought proper to discuss and to consider that doctrine at length in this
decision. As was said in case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra), "While it is the general rule in
regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault
or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in
regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according to
his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the
circumstances of the case." As we think we have shown, under the reasoning on which rests
the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, no fault which would relieve defendant of
responsibility for injuries resulting from its negligence can be attributed to the plaintiff, a wellgrown boy of 15 years of age, because of his entry upon defendant's uninclosed premises
without express permission or invitation' but it is wholly different question whether such youth
can be said to have been free from fault when he willfully and deliberately cut open the
detonating cap, and placed a match to the contents, knowing, as he undoubtedly did, that his
action would result in an explosion. On this point, which must be determined by "the
particular circumstances of this case," the doctrine laid down in the Turntable and Torpedo
cases lends us no direct aid, although it is worthy of observation that in all of the "Torpedo"
and analogous cases which our attention has been directed, the record discloses that the
plaintiffs, in whose favor judgments have been affirmed, were of such tender years that they
were held not to have the capacity to understand the nature or character of the explosive
instruments which fell into their hands.
In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more
mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as
a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the
injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well
qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that,
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despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap
with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to
produce an explosion, as described by the little girl who was present, admit of no other
explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts
to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about
by the application of a match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what he
was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the
explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was
within him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap, became frightened
and ran away.
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion
which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did
not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less
dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and
knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to his maturity
and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of
him, or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred
by him under such circumstances.
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity
to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it
negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such
acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very
nature of things the question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to
understand the character of his own acts and their consequences; and the age at which a
minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily depends of his own acts and their
consequences; and at the age at which a minor can be said to have such ability will
necessarily vary in accordance with the varying nature of the infinite variety of acts which
may be done by him. But some idea of the presumed capacity of infants under the laws in
force in these Islands may be gathered from an examination of the varying ages fixed by our
laws at which minors are conclusively presumed to be capable of exercising certain rights
and incurring certain responsibilities, though it can not be said that these provisions of law
are of much practical assistance in cases such as that at bar, except so far as they illustrate
the rule that the capacity of a minor to become responsible for his own acts varies with the
varying circumstances of each case. Under the provisions of the Penal Code a minor over
fifteen years of age is presumed to be capable of committing a crime and is to held criminally
responsible therefore, although the fact that he is less than eighteen years of age will be
taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance (Penal Code, arts. 8 and 9). At 10
years of age a child may, under certain circumstances, choose which parent it prefers to live
with (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 771). At 14 may petition for the appointment of a guardian
(Id., sec. 551), and may consent or refuse to be adopted (Id., sec. 765). And males of 14 and
females of 12 are capable of contracting a legal marriage (Civil Code, art. 83; G. O., No. 68,
sec. 1).
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be
sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of
the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to
understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which
would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury
incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful
Page 50 of 91

and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been
incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the
accident which inflicted the injury.
The rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non intelligitur
sentire. (Digest, book 50, tit. 17 rule 203.)
The Patidas contain the following provisions:
The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own
fault, and that he can not demand reparation therefor from another. (Law 25, tit. 5, Partida 3.)
And they even said that when a man received an injury through his own acts the grievance
should be against himself and not against another. (Law 2, tit. 7, Partida 2.)
According to ancient sages, when a man received an injury through his own acts the
grievance should be against himself and not against another. (Law 2, tit. 7 Partida 2.)
And while there does not appear to be anything in the Civil Code which expressly lays down
the law touching contributory negligence in this jurisdiction, nevertheless, the interpretation
placed upon its provisions by the supreme court of Spain, and by this court in the case of
Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359), clearly deny to the plaintiff in the
case at bar the right to recover damages from the defendant, in whole or in part, for the
injuries sustained by him.
The judgment of the supreme court of Spain of the 7th of March, 1902 (93 Jurisprudencia
Civil, 391), is directly in point. In that case the court said:
According to the doctrine expressed in article 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or negligence is a
source of obligation when between such negligence and the injury there exists the relation of
cause and effect; but if the injury produced should not be the result of acts or omissions of a
third party, the latter has no obligation to repair the same, although such acts or omission
were imprudent or unlawful, and much less when it is shown that the immediate cause of the
injury was the negligence of the injured party himself.
The same court, in its decision of June 12, 1900, said that "the existence of the alleged fault
or negligence is not sufficient without proof that it, and no other cause, gave rise to the
damage."
See also judgment of October 21, 1903.
To similar effect Scaevola, the learned Spanish writer, writing under that title in his
Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil (1902 Anuario, p. 455), commenting on the decision of March
7, 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or negligence gives rise to an obligation when between it and
the damage there exists the relation of cause and effect; but if the damage caused does not
arise from the acts or omissions of a third person, there is no obligation to make good upon
the latter, even though such acts or omissions be imprudent or illegal, and much less so
when it is shown that the immediate cause of the damage has been the recklessness of the
injured party himself.
And again
In accordance with the fundamental principle of proof, that the burden thereof is upon the
plaintiff, it is apparent that it is duty of him who shall claim damages to establish their
existence. The decisions of April 9, 1896, and March 18, July, and September 27, 1898, have
especially supported the principle, the first setting forth in detail the necessary points of the
proof, which are two: An act or omission on the part of the person who is to be charged with
the liability, and the production of the damage by said act or omission.
This includes, by inference, the establishment of a relation of cause or effect between the act
or omission and the damage; the latter must be the direct result of one of the first two. As the
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decision of March 22, 1881, said, it is necessary that the damages result immediately and
directly from an act performed culpably and wrongfully; "necessarily presupposing a legal
ground for imputability." (Decision of October 29, 1887.)
Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven by him who alleges it. (Scavoela,
Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil, vol. 6, pp. 551-552.)
(Cf. decisions of supreme court of Spain of June 12, 1900, and June 23, 1900.)
Finally we think the doctrine in this jurisdiction applicable to the case at bar was definitely
settled in this court in the maturely considered case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific
Co. (supra), wherein we held that while "There are many cases (personal injury cases) was
exonerated," on the ground that "the negligence of the plaintiff was the immediate cause of
the casualty" (decisions of the 15th of January, the 19th of February, and the 7th of March,
1902, stated in Alcubilla's Index of that year); none of the cases decided by the supreme
court of Spain "define the effect to be given the negligence of its causes, though not the
principal one, and we are left to seek the theory of the civil law in the practice of other
countries;" and in such cases we declared that law in this jurisdiction to require the
application of "the principle of proportional damages," but expressly and definitely denied the
right of recovery when the acts of the injured party were the immediate causes of the
accident.
The doctrine as laid down in that case is as follows:
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be
considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be made
between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have
been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but
contributing to his own proper hurt. For instance, the cause of the accident under review was
the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This produces the event giving
occasion for damagesthat is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this
event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it
was an element of the damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place
wholly or partly through his act or omission of duty, that would have been one of the
determining causes of the event or accident, for which he would have been responsible.
Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can
not recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury,
he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such
injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.
We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated, the immediate cause of the
explosion, the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in putting a
match to the contents of the cap, and that having "contributed to the principal occurrence, as
one of its determining factors, he can not recover."
We have not deemed it necessary to examine the effect of plaintiff's action in picking up
upon defendant's premises the detonating caps, the property of defendant, and carrying the
relation of cause and effect between the negligent act or omission of the defendant in leaving
the caps exposed on its premises and the injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff by the explosion
of one of these caps. Under the doctrine of the Torpedo cases, such action on the part of an
infant of very tender years would have no effect in relieving defendant of responsibility, but
whether in view of the well-known fact admitted in defendant's brief that "boys are snappersup of unconsidered trifles," a youth of the age and maturity of plaintiff should be deemed
without fault in picking up the caps in question under all the circumstances of this case, we
neither discuss nor decide.
Page 52 of 91

Twenty days after the date of this decision let judgment be entered reversing the judgment of
the court below, without costs to either party in this instance, and ten days thereafter let the
record be returned to the court wherein it originated, where the judgment will be entered in
favor of the defendant for the costs in first instance and the complaint dismissed without day.
So ordered.

G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984

ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY
BEDENIA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
Sisenando Villaluz, Sr. for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals' decision which reversed the
trial court's judgment of conviction and acquitted the petitioners of the crime of grave
coercion on the ground of reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittal ordered them to pay
jointly and severally the amount of P9,000.00 to the complainants as actual damages.
The petitioners were charged under the following information:
The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, PEPITO
BEDENIA, YOLLY RICO, DAVID BERMUNDO, VILLANOAC, ROBERTO ROSALES,
VILLANIA, ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE ORTEGA, JR., RICARDO CELESTINO, REALINGO
alias "KAMLON", JOHN DOE alias TATO, and FOURTEEN (14) RICARDO DOES of the
crime of GRAVE COERCION, committed as follows:
That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, in the municipality
of Jose Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito
Bedenia, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo, Villanoac, Roberto Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido,
Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo Celestino, Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias Tato, and
Fourteen Richard Does, by confederating and mutually helping one another, and acting
without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means
of threats, force and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall
located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by
subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally demolishing and
destroying said stall and the furnitures therein by axes and other massive instruments, and
carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise, to the damage and prejudice of the said
Antonio Vergara and his family in the amount of P30,000.00 in concept of actual or
compensatory and moral damages, and further the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy
Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being policemen,
except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and
that it was committed with evident premeditation.
The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth Judicial District rendered a decision,
the dispositive portion of which states that:
Page 53 of 91

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Roy Padilla, Filomeno
Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of grave coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE
(5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory
damages in the amount of P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and
another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly and severally, and all the accessory
penalties provided for by law; and to pay the proportionate costs of this proceedings.
The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon', David Bermundo, Christopher Villanoac,
Godofredo Villania, Romeo Garrido, Roberto Rosales, Ricardo Celestino and Jose Ortega,
are hereby ordered acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for their criminal participation
in the crime charged.
The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. They contended
that the trial court's finding of grave coercion was not supported by the evidence. According
to the petitioners, the town mayor had the power to order the clearance of market premises
and the removal of the complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted municipal
ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a nuisance per se. The petitioners stated
that the lower court erred in finding that the demolition of the complainants' stall was a
violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two
(72) hours to vacate the market premises. The petitioners questioned the imposition of prison
terms of five months and one day and of accessory penalties provided by law. They also
challenged the order to pay fines of P500.00 each, P10,000.00 actual and compensatory
damages, P30,000.00 moral damages, P10,000.00 exemplary damages, and the costs of
the suit.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment appealed from in the sense that the
appellants are acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt. but they are ordered to pay jointly
and severally to complainants the amount of P9,600.00, as actual damages.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the
defendants-appellants as to criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil liability. The
Court of Appeals denied the motion holding that:
xxx xxx xxx
... appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt whether the crime of coercion was
committed, not on facts that no unlawful act was committed; as their taking the law into their
hands, destructing (sic) complainants' properties is unlawful, and, as evidence on record
established that complainants suffered actual damages, the imposition of actual damages is
correct.
Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil action, contending that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW OR GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONERS PAYMENT OF DAMAGES
TO COMPLAINANTS AFTER ACQUITTING PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME CHARGED
FROM WHICH SAID LIABILITY AROSE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED
DECEMBER 26, 1974 THAT SINCE APPELLANTS' ACQUITTAL WAS BASED ON
REASONABLE DOUBT, NOT ON FACTS THAT NO UNLAWFUL ACT WAS COMMITTED,
THE IMPOSITION OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IS CORRECT.
III
Page 54 of 91

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL INCONSISTENCY, IF NOT PLAIN

JUDICIAL ERROR, IN HOLDING IN ITS APPEALED RESOLUTION THAT PETITIONERS
COMMITTED AN UNLAWFUL ACT, THAT IS TAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR HANDS,
DESTRUCTING (sic) 'COMPLAINANTS' PROPERTIES', AFTER HOLDING IN ITS MAIN
DECISION OF NOVEMBER 6,1974 THAT THE ACTS FOR WHICH THEY WERE
CHARGED DID NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE COERCION AND THEY WERE NOT
CHARGED OF ANY OTHER CRIME.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS HEREIN,
APPELLANTS IN CA-G.R. NO. 13456CR, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, TO PAY
COMPLAINANTS P9,600.00 IN SUPPOSED ACTUAL DAMAGES.
The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the respondent court committed
a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after
acquitting them from the criminal charge.
Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is included in the criminal
action is that arising from and as a consequence of the criminal act, and the defendant was
acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil liability arising from the criminal case), no civil liability
arising from the criminal charge could be imposed upon him. They cite precedents to the
effect that the liability of the defendant for the return of the amount received by him may not
be enforced in the criminal case but must be raised in a separate civil action for the recovery
of the said amount (People v. Pantig, 97 Phil. 748; following the doctrine laid down in Manila
Railroad Co. v. Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar, 49 O.G. 3874; Pueblo contra Abellera, 69 Phil.
623; People v. Maniago 69 Phil. 496; People v. Miranda, 5 SCRA 1067; Aldaba v. Elepafio
116 Phil. 457). In the case before us, the petitioners were acquitted not because they did not
commit the acts stated in the charge against them. There is no dispute over the forcible
opening of the market stall, its demolition with axes and other instruments, and the carting
away of the merchandize. The petitioners were acquitted because these acts were
denominated coercion when they properly constituted some other offense such as threat or
malicious mischief.
The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:
For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing provision, the violence must be employed
against the person, not against property as what happened in the case at bar. ...
xxx xxx xxx
The next problem is: May the accused be convicted of an offense other than coercion?
From all appearances, they should have been prosecuted either for threats or malicious
mischief. But the law does not allow us to render judgment of conviction for either of these
offenses for the reason that they were not indicted for, these offenses. The information under
which they were prosecuted does not allege the elements of either threats or malicious
mischief. Although the information mentions that the act was by means of threats', it does not
allege the particular threat made. An accused person is entitled to be informed of the nature
of the acts imputed to him before he can be made to enter into trial upon a valid information.
We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been proved in accordance with law.
While appellants are entitled to acquittal they nevertheless are liable for the actual damages
suffered by the complainants by reason of the demolition of the stall and loss of some of their
properties. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it that of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 3 (c), Rev. Rules of Court; Laperal v. Aliza, 51
OG.R. 1311, People v. Velez, 44 OG. 1811). In the instant case, the fact from which the civil
Page 55 of 91

might arise, namely, the demolition of the stall and loss of the properties contained therein;
exists, and this is not denied by the accused. And since there is no showing that the
complainants have reserved or waived their right to institute a separate civil action, the civil
aspect therein is deemed instituted with the criminal action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rev. Rules of
Court).
xxx xxx xxx
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that when a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged is impliedly instituted with it. There is no implied institution when the offended party
expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately. (Morte Sr. v.
Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221).
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively
to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. (Elcano v. Hill,
77 SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words, the civil liability which is also
extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime.
As easily as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo v.
Garcia, et at. 73 Phil. 607 laid down the rule that the same punishable act or omission can
create two kinds of civil liabilities against the accused and, where provided by law, his
employer. 'There is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime and the liability arising
from the same act as a quasi-delict. Either one of these two types of civil liability may be
enforced against the accused, However, the offended party cannot recover damages under
both types of liability. For instance, in cases of criminal negligence or crimes due to reckless
imprudence, Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included in the preceding
section the following rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it
in the Jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable
for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it
includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the
civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt
(PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases;
where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only
civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in
the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who
thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil
liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was
acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial
Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623). Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that:
Page 56 of 91

When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon
motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for
damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall
so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of
the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case would not
constitute an obstacle to the filing of a civil case based on the same acts which led to the
criminal prosecution:
... The finding by the respondent court that he spent said sum for and in the interest of the
Capiz Agricultural and Fishery School and for his personal benefit is not a declaration that
the fact upon which Civil Case No. V-3339 is based does not exist. The civil action barred by
such a declaration is the civil liability arising from the offense charged, which is the one
impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Section 1, Rule III, Rules of Court.) Such a
declaration would not bar a civil action filed against an accused who had been acquitted in
the criminal case if the criminal action is predicated on factual or legal considerations other
than the commission of the offense charged. A person may be acquitted of malversation
where, as in the case at bar, he could show that he did not misappropriate the public funds in
his possession, but he could be rendered liable to restore said funds or at least to make a
proper accounting thereof if he shall spend the same for purposes which are not authorized
nor intended, and in a manner not permitted by applicable rules and regulations. (Republic v.
Bello, 120 SCRA 203)
There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed
considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the
criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due process has been accorded the
accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charged. The constitutional presumption
of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense
counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a
more studied consideration by the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and
precedents. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted
would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with
all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.
The trial court found the following facts clearly established by the evidence adduced by both
the prosecution and the defense:
xxx xxx xxx
(9) In the morning of February 8, 1964, then Chief Galdones, complying with the instructions
contained in said Memorandum No. 32 of the Mayor, and upon seeing that Antonio Vergara
had not vacated the premises in question, with the aid of his policemen, forced upon the
store or stall and ordered the removal of the goods inside the store of Vergara, at the same
time taking inventory of the goods taken out, piled them outside in front of the store and had
it cordoned with a rope, and after all the goods were taken out from the store, ordered the
demolition of said stall of Antonio Vergara. Since then up to the trial of this case, the
whereabouts of the goods taken out from the store nor the materials of the demolished stall
have not been made known.
The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that:
Page 57 of 91

On the morning of February 8th, because the said Vergaras had not up to that time complied
with the order to vacate, the co-accused Chief of Police Galdones and some members of his
police force, went to the market and, using ax, crowbars and hammers, demolished the stall
of the Vergaras who were not present or around, and after having first inventoried the goods
and merchandise found therein, they had them brought to the municipal building for
safekeeping. Inspite of notice served upon the Vergaras to take possession of the goods and
merchandise thus taken away, the latter refused to do so.
The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated them were:
Cost of stall construction P1,300.00
Value of furniture and equipment
judgment destroyed 300.00
Value of goods and equipment taken 8,000.00
P9,600.00
It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall of the complainants Vergaras
and carted away its contents. The defense that they did so in order to abate what they
considered a nuisance per se is untenable, This finds no support in law and in fact. The
couple has been paying rentals for the premises to the government which allowed them to
lease the stall. It is, therefore, farfetched to say that the stall was a nuisance per se which
could be summarily abated.
The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that they caused the destruction of the
complainant's market stall and had its contents carted away. They state:
On February 8, 1964, despite personal pleas on Vergaras by the Mayor to vacate the
passageways of Market Building No. 3, the Vergaras were still in the premises, so the
petitioners Chief of Police and members of the Police Force of Jose Panganiban, pursuant to
the Mayor' 6 directives, demolished the store of the Vergaras, made an inventory of the
goods found in said store, and brought these goods to the municipal building under the
custody of the Municipal Treasurer, ...
The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited, that
"when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted." According to some scholars, this provision of substantive law
calls for a separate civil action and cannot be modified by a rule of remedial law even in the
interests of economy and simplicity and following the dictates of logic and common sense.
As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco:
... if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil action but inadequate to justify
a conviction in the criminal action, may it render judgment acquitting the accused on
reasonable doubt, but hold him civilly liable nonetheless? An affirmative answer to this
question would be consistent with the doctrine that the two are distinct and separate actions,
and win (a) dispense with the reinstituting of the same civil action, or one based on quasidelict or other independent civil action, and of presenting the same evidence: (b) save the
injured party unnecessary expenses in the prosecution of the civil action or enable him to
take advantage of the free services of the fiscal; and (c) otherwise resolve the unsettling
implications of permitting the reinstitution of a separate civil action whether based on delict,
or quasi-delict, or other independent civil actions.
... But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the manner here suggested, Art. 29 of the Civil
Code should be amended because it clearly and expressly provides that the civil action
based on the same act or omission may only be instituted in a separate action, and
therefore, may not inferentially be resolved in the same criminal action. To dismiss the civil
Page 58 of 91

action upon acquittal of the accused and disallow the reinstitution of any other civil action,
would likewise render, unjustifiably, the acquittal on reasonable doubt without any
significance, and would violate the doctrine that the two actions are distinct and separate.
In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seems evident that there is much sophistry and no
pragmatism in the doctrine that it is inconsistent to award in the same proceedings damages
against the accused after acquitting him on reasonable doubt. Such doctrine must recognize
the distinct and separate character of the two actions, the nature of an acquittal on
reasonable doubt, the vexatious and oppressive effects of a reservation or institution of a
separate civil action, and that the injured party is entitled to damages not because the act or
omission is punishable but because he was damaged or injured thereby (Sangco, Philippine
Law on Torts and Damages, pp. 288-289).
We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to grant
damages despite a judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt. What Article 29 clearly
and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been acquitted
in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal
for the same criminal act or omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the
remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed
but there is no statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode
of recovering damages.
There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of
acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand
side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not,
however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the act from which civil
liability might arise did not exist.
A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a trivial requirement, a provision
which imposes an uncalled for burden before one who has already been the victim of a
condemnable, yet non-criminal, act may be accorded the justice which he seeks.
We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at the intent of the
legislator that they could not possibly have intended to make it more difficult for the
aggrieved party to recover just compensation by making a separate civil action mandatory
and exclusive:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil
liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to
numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that
inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the the criminal offense, when the latter is
not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable
consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal
liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two
liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the
other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is
for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party... it is just and proper that, for the
purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why
should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation
of every private right to be proved only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the
Page 59 of 91

aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the
criminal law? (Code Commission, pp. 45-46).
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or
more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a
separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely
remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the
civil aspects of the case. The offended party may, of course, choose to file a separate action.
These do not exist in this case. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the
trial, appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to
require at this time a separate civil action to be filed.
With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in
awarding damages despite a judgment of acquittal.
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and
dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 147703 April 14, 2004

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes final
and executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a notice of
appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both
the primary civil liability of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the
employer are carried in one single decision that has become final and executory.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
March 29, 20002 and the March 27, 20013 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAGR CV No. 59390. Petitioners appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed in the first Resolution
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the appeal is
ordered DISMISSED."4
The second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.5
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:
"On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was found guilty and
convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical
injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years,
nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to pay damages as follows:
a. to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death,
plus the sum of P25,383.00, for funeral expenses, his unearned income for one year at
P2,500.00 a month, P50,000.00 as indemnity for the support of Renato Torres, and the
further sum of P300,000.00 as moral damages;
Page 60 of 91

b. to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death,
the sum of P237,323.75 for funeral expenses, her unearned income for three years at
P45,000.00 per annum, and the further sum of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages and
P200,000.00 as attorneys fees[;]
c. to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the
sum of P22,838.00 as funeral expenses, the sum of P20,544.94 as medical expenses and
her loss of income for 30 years at P1,000.00 per month, and the further sum of P100,000.00
for moral damages;
d. to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of P229,654.00 as hospital expenses, doctors fees of
P170,000.00 for the orthopedic surgeon, P22,500.00 for the [n]eurologist, an additional
indemnity [of] at least P150,000.00 to cover future correction of deformity of her limbs, and
moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00;
e. to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of P3,561.46 as medical expenses, P2,000.00 as loss of
income, and P25,000.00 as moral damages;
f. to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of P19,800.47 as medical expenses, P800.00 for
loss of income, and P25,000.00 as moral damages;
g. to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of P580.81 as medical expenses, P4,600.00 as actual
damages and her loss earnings of P1,400.00 as well as moral damages in the amount of
P10,000.00;
h. to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of P12,473.82 as hospital expenses, P14,530.00 as
doctors fees, P1,000.00 for medicines and P50,000.00 as moral damages;
i. to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of P155.00 for medical expenses, P87.00 for
medicines, P1,710.00 as actual damages and P5,000.00 as moral damages;
j. to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of P1,395.00 for hospital bills, P500.00 for medicine,
P2,100.00 as actual damages, P1,200.00 for loss of income and P5,000.00 as moral
damages;
k. to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner of the Toyota Hi-Ace Van, the
amount of P250,000.00 as actual damages for the cost of the totally wrecked vehicle; to the
owner of the jeepney, the amount of P22,698.38 as actual damages;
"The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall be
liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had
become final and executory.
"Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mention[ing] that
Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant
jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by [petitioner], filed a
notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court. We affirmed the denial of the notice of
appeal filed in behalf of accused.
"Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of appeal from the judgment of
the trial court. On April 29, 1997, the trial court gave due course to [petitioners] notice of
appeal. On December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its brief. On December 9, 1998, the Office of
the Solicitor General received [a] copy of [petitioners] brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG
moved to be excused from filing [respondents] brief on the ground that the OSGs authority
to represent People is confined to criminal cases on appeal. The motion was however denied
per Our resolution of May 31, 1999. On March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor filed
the instant motion to dismiss."6 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil
action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the
Page 61 of 91

accused-employee, the employers subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute independently the civil
liability fixed in the criminal case against the accused-employee would be to amend, nullify or
defeat a final judgment. Since the notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been
dismissed by the CA, then the judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became
final and executory. Included in the civil liability of the accused was the employers subsidiary
liability.
Hence, this Petition.7
The Issues
Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:
"A. Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accusedemployee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.
"B. Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of Appeals (158 SCRA 57) and Yusay v.
Adil (164 SCRA 494) apply to the instant case."8
There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an adjunct to Item A.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Propriety of Appeal by the Employer
Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC Decision, petitioner
contends that the judgment of conviction against the accused-employee has not attained
finality. The former insists that its appeal stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the
latter had jumped bail. In effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of that of the
accused-employee.
We are not persuaded.
Appeals in Criminal Cases
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states thus:
"Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in
double jeopardy."
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but the
government may do so only if the accused would not thereby be placed in double jeopardy.9
Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that the accused should have
been given a more severe penalty.10 On the other hand, the offended parties may also
appeal the judgment with respect to their right to civil liability. If the accused has the right to
appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended parties should have the same right to appeal
as much of the judgment as is prejudicial to them.11
Appeal by the Accused Who Jumps Bail
Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court may, upon motion
or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. The
second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:
"The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the
appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country during the pendency of the appeal."12
This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they
abscond. Unless they surrender or submit to the courts jurisdiction, they are deemed to have
waived their right to seek judicial relief.13
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Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail during the appeal, but
also to one who does so during the trial. Justice Florenz D. Regalado succinctly explains the
principle in this wise:
"x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his arraignment and during the trial,
but the trial in absentia proceeded resulting in the promulgation of a judgment against him
and his counsel appealed, since he nonetheless remained at large his appeal must be
dismissed by analogy with the aforesaid provision of this Rule [Rule 124, 8 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure]. x x x"14
The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to the
jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment
against them.15 While at large, they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to
have waived the appeal.16
Finality of a Decision in a Criminal Case
As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7 of Rule 120 of
the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:
"A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before
it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a
judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the
sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in
writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation."
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the
proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the
judgment against him has become final and executory.17
Liability of an Employer in a Finding of Guilt
Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers, as
follows:
"In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons
or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases
where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall
have been committed by them or their employees.
"Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within
their houses from guests lodging therein, or for payment of the value thereof, provided that
such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing
him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the
directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to
the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with
violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeepers employees."
Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to Article 103
which reads:
"The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to
employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies
committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of
their duties."
Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now address the main issue raised by
petitioner.
Civil Liability Deemed Instituted in the Criminal Prosecution
At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what
civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution.
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Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

"When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.
"x x x x x x x x x"
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly
instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action.18 Hence,
the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may
be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the
employee.19
It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions
and allowed these to proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions
referred to in Articles 32,20 33,21 3422 and 217623 of the Civil Code shall remain "separate,
distinct and independent" of any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are some
direct consequences of such revision and omission:
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in
the criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the crime
charged does not extinguish the right to bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same
act or omission.24
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the
crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasidelicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex
delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject
to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the
remaining civil interest therein.25
This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which states that
"[e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."26
Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal case and is
conclusively bound by the outcome thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be accorded the
right to pursue the case to its logical conclusion -- including the appeal.
The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal case,
which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee.
In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing with the subsidiary
liability of employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can be applied to it, because "in all
th[o]se cases, the accuseds employer did not interpose an appeal."27 Indeed, petitioner
cannot cite any single case in which the employer appealed, precisely because an appeal in
such circumstances is not possible.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly
speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees.28
Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed
in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of
supplying the latters lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on
their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.
Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard Against Double Jeopardy
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Petitioners appeal obviously aims to have the accused-employee absolved of his criminal
responsibility and the judgment reviewed as a whole. These intentions are apparent from its
Appellants Brief29 filed with the CA and from its Petition30 before us, both of which claim that
the trial courts finding of guilt "is not supported by competent evidence."31
An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the constitutional safeguard
against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to a review by the appellate court.
The latter is then called upon to render judgment as law and justice dictate, whether
favorable or unfavorable to the appellant.32 This is the risk involved when the accused
decides to appeal a sentence of conviction.33 Indeed, appellate courts have the power to
reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lower court and to increase or reduce the
penalty it imposed.34
If the present appeal is given course, the whole case against the accused-employee
becomes open to review. It thus follows that a penalty higher than that which has already
been imposed by the trial court may be meted out to him. Petitioners appeal would thus
violate his right against double jeopardy, since the judgment against him could become
subject to modification without his consent.
We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why the accused effectively waived his
right to appeal by jumping bail. It is clear, though, that petitioner may not appeal without
violating his right against double jeopardy.
Effect of Absconding on the Appeal Process
Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure,
the accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of
the court below final.35 Having been a fugitive from justice for a long period of time, he is
deemed to have waived his right to appeal. Thus, his conviction is now final and executory.
The Court in People v. Ang Gioc36 ruled:
"There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself,
but the right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the
accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by
implication. When the accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for
decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered
against him. x x x."37
By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the court and placed
himself in a position to speculate on his chances for a reversal. In the process, he kept
himself out of the reach of justice, but hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his option.38
Such conduct is intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court.39
Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who refuses to surrender
to the proper authorities becomes final and executory.40
Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the criminal case against the
accused-employee; that by jumping bail, he has waived his right to appeal; and that the
judgment in the criminal case against him is now final.
Subsidiary Liability Upon Finality of Judgment
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Petitioner argues that the
rulings of this Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc.,41 Alvarez v. CA42 and Yusay
v. Adil43 do not apply to the present case, because it has followed the Courts directive to the
employers in these cases to take part in the criminal cases against their employees. By
participating in the defense of its employee, herein petitioner tries to shield itself from the
undisputed rulings laid down in these leading cases.
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Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary liability, petitioner lost
track of the most basic tenet they have laid down -- that an employers liability in a finding of
guilt against its accused-employee is subsidiary.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the
adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latters insolvency.44 The
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability -- Articles 102 and 103 -- are
deemed written into the judgments in the cases to which they are applicable.45 Thus, in the
dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary
liability of the employer.
In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended party, the
judgment of conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable.46 In effect and
implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.47
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to
amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court.48 By the same
token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the
latters consent would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the
judgment.
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the
employer not only with regard to the formers civil liability, but also with regard to its amount.
The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.49
Before the employers subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be adequate
evidence establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees; (2)
that the former are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the crime was committed by
the employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4) that the execution against the latter
has not been satisfied due to insolvency.50
The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil action. But the
determination must be based on the evidence that the offended party and the employer may
fully and freely present. Such determination may be done in the same criminal action in
which the employees liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced;51 and in a hearing set
for that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the
execution of the judgment.
Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its accused-employee does
not mean that its liability has transformed its nature; its liability remains subsidiary. Neither
will its participation erase its subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since the accusedemployees conviction has attained finality, then the subsidiary liability of the employer ipso
facto attaches.
According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the finality of conviction
could be the proper sanction to be imposed upon the accused for jumping bail, the same
sanction should not affect it. In effect, petitioner-employer splits this case into two: first, for
itself; and second, for its accused-employee.
The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one criminal case against
the accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both criminal and civil aspects. It is the height of
absurdity for this single case to be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an
entity whose liability is dependent upon the conviction of the former.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil
liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and
enforceable by reason of his flight, then the formers subsidiary civil liability has also become
Page 66 of 91

immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary

liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.
No Deprivation of Due Process
As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we reiterate that what is
sought to be enforced is the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon the
employees criminal negligence. In other words, the employer becomes ipso facto
subsidiarily liable upon the conviction of the employee and upon proof of the latters
insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only his primary civil liability, but also
his employers subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence.52
It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process.53 It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin, a remedy that may be
exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing such exercise.54
Hence, the legal requirements must be strictly complied with.55
It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the rules on appeal as merely harmless
and trivial technicalities that can be discarded.56 Indeed, deviations from the rules cannot be
tolerated.57 In these times when court dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, such
rules have to be followed by parties with greater fidelity, so as to facilitate the orderly
disposition of those cases.58
After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. If the
proper losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, then the
former has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.59
In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it participated in the
proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the employer was deprived of due
process. It might have lost its right to appeal, but it was not denied its day in court.60 In fact, it
can be said that by jumping bail, the accused-employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of
the right to appeal.
All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the accused. It should
be clear that only after proof of his insolvency may the subsidiary liability of petitioner be
enforced. It has been sufficiently proven that there exists an employer-employee relationship;
that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; and that the employee has been
adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge
of his duties. The proof is clear from the admissions of petitioner that "[o]n 26 August 1990,
while on its regular trip from Laoag to Manila, a passenger bus owned by petitioner, being
then operated by petitioners driver, Napoleon Roman, figured in an accident in San Juan, La
Union x x x."61 Neither does petitioner dispute that there was already a finding of guilt against
the accused while he was in the discharge of his duties.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-12191 October 14, 1918

JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellee.
Ramon Sotelo for appellant.
Kincaid & Hartigan for appellee.
Page 67 of 91


FISHER, J.:
At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this litigation the plaintiff, Jose Cangco, was
in the employment of Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk, with a monthly wage
of P25. He lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is located upon
the line of the defendant railroad company; and in coming daily by train to the company's
office in the city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which
entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge. Upon the occasion in question,
January 20, 1915, the plaintiff arose from his seat in the second class-car where he was
riding and, making, his exit through the door, took his position upon the steps of the coach,
seizing the upright guardrail with his right hand for support.
On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement
platform which begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from the
company's office and extends along in front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the
length of several coaches. As the train slowed down another passenger, named Emilio
Zuiga, also an employee of the railroad company, got off the same car, alighting safely at
the point where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground. When the train had
proceeded a little farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off also, but one or both of his
feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from
under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at once rolled from the platform and
was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It
appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six
meters before it came to a full stop.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the railroad station
was lighted dimly by a single light located some distance away, objects on the platform
where the accident occurred were difficult to discern especially to a person emerging from a
lighted car.
The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the platform where the plaintiff
alighted is found in the fact that it was the customary season for harvesting these melons
and a large lot had been brought to the station for the shipment to the market. They were
contained in numerous sacks which has been piled on the platform in a row one upon
another. The testimony shows that this row of sacks was so placed of melons and the edge
of platform; and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot alighted
upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped upon the platform. His statement that
he failed to see these objects in the darkness is readily to be credited.
The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it appeared that
the injuries which he had received were very serious. He was therefore brought at once to a
certain hospital in the city of Manila where an examination was made and his arm was
amputated. The result of this operation was unsatisfactory, and the plaintiff was then carried
to another hospital where a second operation was performed and the member was again
amputated higher up near the shoulder. It appears in evidence that the plaintiff expended the
sum of P790.25 in the form of medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in
connection with the process of his curation.
Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila to recover damages of the defendant company, founding his action upon the
negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons
upon the platform and leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of
passenger alighting from the company's trains. At the hearing in the Court of First Instance,
Page 68 of 91

his Honor, the trial judge, found the facts substantially as above stated, and drew therefrom
his conclusion to the effect that, although negligence was attributable to the defendant by
reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers
passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution
in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded form recovering. Judgment was
accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed.
It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence
in piling these sacks on the platform in the manner above stated; that their presence caused
the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train; and that they therefore constituted an
effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the
defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by
the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. In resolving this problem it is necessary that each
of these conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility of the defendant company
and the contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be separately examined.
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract
of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered
arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to
exercise due care in its performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate,
differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence
of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of
the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is
not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations
or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not
to culpa contractual.
Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code,
clearly points out this distinction, which was also recognized by this Court in its decision in
the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. rep., 359). In commenting upon
article 1093 Manresa clearly points out the difference between "culpa, substantive and
independent, which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation between persons not
formerly connected by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an accident in the performance
of an obligation already existing . . . ."
In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was made to rest squarely upon the
proposition that article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to acts of negligence which
constitute the breach of a contract.
Upon this point the Court said:
The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code] are applicable are
understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another.
But where relations already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or
quasi-contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to article 1101, 1103, and 1104 of
the same code. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359 at 365.)
This distinction is of the utmost importance. The liability, which, under the Spanish law, is, in
certain cases imposed upon employers with respect to damages occasioned by the
negligence of their employees to persons to whom they are not bound by contract, is not
based, as in the English Common Law, upon the principle of respondeat superior if it
were, the master would be liable in every case and unconditionally but upon the principle
announced in article 1902 of the Civil Code, which imposes upon all persons who by their
fault or negligence, do injury to another, the obligation of making good the damage caused.
One who places a powerful automobile in the hands of a servant whom he knows to be
Page 69 of 91

ignorant of the method of managing such a vehicle, is himself guilty of an act of negligence
which makes him liable for all the consequences of his imprudence. The obligation to make
good the damage arises at the very instant that the unskillful servant, while acting within the
scope of his employment causes the injury. The liability of the master is personal and direct.
But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection and
direction of the servant, he is not liable for the acts of the latter, whatever done within the
scope of his employment or not, if the damage done by the servant does not amount to a
breach of the contract between the master and the person injured.
It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection and control of the
servant relieves the master from liability for the latter's acts on the contrary, that proof
shows that the responsibility has never existed. As Manresa says (vol. 8, p. 68) the liability
arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which,
without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another. A
master who exercises all possible care in the selection of his servant, taking into
consideration the qualifications they should possess for the discharge of the duties which it is
his purpose to confide to them, and directs them with equal diligence, thereby performs his
duty to third persons to whom he is bound by no contractual ties, and he incurs no liability
whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his servants, even within the scope of their
employment, such third person suffer damage. True it is that under article 1903 of the Civil
Code the law creates a presumption that he has been negligent in the selection or direction
of his servant, but the presumption is rebuttable and yield to proof of due care and diligence
in this respect.
The supreme court of Porto Rico, in interpreting identical provisions, as found in the Porto
Rico Code, has held that these articles are applicable to cases of extra-contractual culpa
exclusively. (Carmona vs. Cuesta, 20 Porto Rico Reports, 215.)
This distinction was again made patent by this Court in its decision in the case of Bahia vs.
Litonjua and Leynes, (30 Phil. rep., 624), which was an action brought upon the theory of the
extra-contractual liability of the defendant to respond for the damage caused by the
carelessness of his employee while acting within the scope of his employment. The Court,
after citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, said:
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there
was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that that
presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It
follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection
and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not
on that of his servant. This is the notable peculiarity of the Spanish law of negligence. It is, of
course, in striking contrast to the American doctrine that, in relations with strangers, the
negligence of the servant in conclusively the negligence of the master.
The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect that in case of extra-contractual
culpa based upon negligence, it is necessary that there shall have been some fault
attributable to the defendant personally, and that the last paragraph of article 1903 merely
establishes a rebuttable presumption, is in complete accord with the authoritative opinion of
Manresa, who says (vol. 12, p. 611) that the liability created by article 1903 is imposed by
reason of the breach of the duties inherent in the special relations of authority or superiority
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existing between the person called upon to repair the damage and the one who, by his act or
omission, was the cause of it.
On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or omissions
of their servants or agents, when such acts or omissions cause damages which amount to
the breach of a contact, is not based upon a mere presumption of the master's negligence in
their selection or control, and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regard
does not relieve the master of his liability for the breach of his contract.
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual
obligation has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties which civilized
society imposes upon it members, or which arise from these relations, other than contractual,
of certain members of society to others, generally embraced in the concept of status. The
legal rights of each member of society constitute the measure of the corresponding legal
duties, mainly negative in character, which the existence of those rights imposes upon all
other members of society. The breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent or
to mere inattention, if productive of injury, give rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured
party. The fundamental distinction between obligations of this character and those which
arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the
wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in
contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty
assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation.
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or
omission, it is competent for the legislature to elect and our Legislature has so elected
whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable, or, on the contrary, for reasons of
public policy, to extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to
include responsibility for the negligence of those person who acts or mission are imputable,
by a legal fiction, to others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control
over them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual
liability with certain well-defined exceptions to cases in which moral culpability can be
directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having
failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of one's agents or servants, or in the
control of persons who, by reason of their status, occupy a position of dependency with
respect to the person made liable for their conduct.
The position of a natural or juridical person who has undertaken by contract to render service
to another, is wholly different from that to which article 1903 relates. When the sources of the
obligation upon which plaintiff's cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the
burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence if he does not his action fails.
But when the facts averred show a contractual undertaking by defendant for the benefit of
plaintiff, and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to perform the contract, it is not
necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether the breach of the contract is due to
willful fault or to negligence on the part of the defendant, or of his servants or agents. Proof
of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery.
As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing creditor
should assume the burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon which his action is
based; while on the contrary, in a case of negligence which presupposes the existence of a
contractual obligation, if the creditor shows that it exists and that it has been broken, it is not
necessary for him to prove negligence. (Manresa, vol. 8, p. 71 [1907 ed., p. 76]).
As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the breach of a contract to show that the
breach was due to the negligent conduct of defendant or of his servants, even though such
Page 71 of 91

be in fact the actual cause of the breach, it is obvious that proof on the part of defendant that
the negligence or omission of his servants or agents caused the breach of the contract would
not constitute a defense to the action. If the negligence of servants or agents could be
invoked as a means of discharging the liability arising from contract, the anomalous result
would be that person acting through the medium of agents or servants in the performance of
their contracts, would be in a better position than those acting in person. If one delivers a
valuable watch to watchmaker who contract to repair it, and the bailee, by a personal
negligent act causes its destruction, he is unquestionably liable. Would it be logical to free
him from his liability for the breach of his contract, which involves the duty to exercise due
care in the preservation of the watch, if he shows that it was his servant whose negligence
caused the injury? If such a theory could be accepted, juridical persons would enjoy
practically complete immunity from damages arising from the breach of their contracts if
caused by negligent acts as such juridical persons can of necessity only act through agents
or servants, and it would no doubt be true in most instances that reasonable care had been
taken in selection and direction of such servants. If one delivers securities to a banking
corporation as collateral, and they are lost by reason of the negligence of some clerk
employed by the bank, would it be just and reasonable to permit the bank to relieve itself of
liability for the breach of its contract to return the collateral upon the payment of the debt by
proving that due care had been exercised in the selection and direction of the clerk?
This distinction between culpa aquiliana, as the source of an obligation, and culpa
contractual as a mere incident to the performance of a contract has frequently been
recognized by the supreme court of Spain. (Sentencias of June 27, 1894; November 20,
1896; and December 13, 1896.) In the decisions of November 20, 1896, it appeared that
plaintiff's action arose ex contractu, but that defendant sought to avail himself of the
provisions of article 1902 of the Civil Code as a defense. The Spanish Supreme Court
rejected defendant's contention, saying:
These are not cases of injury caused, without any pre-existing obligation, by fault or
negligence, such as those to which article 1902 of the Civil Code relates, but of damages
caused by the defendant's failure to carry out the undertakings imposed by the
contracts . . . .
A brief review of the earlier decision of this court involving the liability of employers for
damage done by the negligent acts of their servants will show that in no case has the court
ever decided that the negligence of the defendant's servants has been held to constitute a
defense to an action for damages for breach of contract.
In the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the court held that the owner of a
carriage was not liable for the damages caused by the negligence of his driver. In that case
the court commented on the fact that no evidence had been adduced in the trial court that
the defendant had been negligent in the employment of the driver, or that he had any
knowledge of his lack of skill or carefulness.
In the case of Baer Senior & Co's Successors vs. Compania Maritima (6 Phil. Rep., 215), the
plaintiff sued the defendant for damages caused by the loss of a barge belonging to plaintiff
which was allowed to get adrift by the negligence of defendant's servants in the course of the
performance of a contract of towage. The court held, citing Manresa (vol. 8, pp. 29, 69) that if
the "obligation of the defendant grew out of a contract made between it and the plaintiff . . .
we do not think that the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 are applicable to the case."
In the case of Chapman vs. Underwood (27 Phil. Rep., 374), plaintiff sued the defendant to
recover damages for the personal injuries caused by the negligence of defendant's chauffeur
while driving defendant's automobile in which defendant was riding at the time. The court
Page 72 of 91

found that the damages were caused by the negligence of the driver of the automobile, but
held that the master was not liable, although he was present at the time, saying:
. . . unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for a length of time as to give the
owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct the driver to desist therefrom. .
. . The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such length of
time that the owner by his acquiescence, makes the driver's acts his own.
In the case of Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co. and Bachrach Garage & Taxicab Co. (33 Phil.
Rep., 8), it is true that the court rested its conclusion as to the liability of the defendant upon
article 1903, although the facts disclosed that the injury complaint of by plaintiff constituted a
breach of the duty to him arising out of the contract of transportation. The express ground of
the decision in this case was that article 1903, in dealing with the liability of a master for the
negligent acts of his servants "makes the distinction between private individuals and public
enterprise;" that as to the latter the law creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence in the
selection or direction of servants; and that in the particular case the presumption of
negligence had not been overcome.
It is evident, therefore that in its decision Yamada case, the court treated plaintiff's action as
though founded in tort rather than as based upon the breach of the contract of carriage, and
an examination of the pleadings and of the briefs shows that the questions of law were in fact
discussed upon this theory. Viewed from the standpoint of the defendant the practical result
must have been the same in any event. The proof disclosed beyond doubt that the
defendant's servant was grossly negligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause
of plaintiff's injury. It also affirmatively appeared that defendant had been guilty of negligence
in its failure to exercise proper discretion in the direction of the servant. Defendant was,
therefore, liable for the injury suffered by plaintiff, whether the breach of the duty were to be
regarded as constituting culpa aquiliana or culpa contractual. As Manresa points out (vol. 8,
pp. 29 and 69) whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the performance of a
contractual undertaking or its itself the source of an extra-contractual undertaking obligation,
its essential characteristics are identical. There is always an act or omission productive of
damage due to carelessness or inattention on the part of the defendant. Consequently, when
the court holds that a defendant is liable in damages for having failed to exercise due care,
either directly, or in failing to exercise proper care in the selection and direction of his
servants, the practical result is identical in either case. Therefore, it follows that it is not to be
inferred, because the court held in the Yamada case that defendant was liable for the
damages negligently caused by its servants to a person to whom it was bound by contract,
and made reference to the fact that the defendant was negligent in the selection and control
of its servants, that in such a case the court would have held that it would have been a good
defense to the action, if presented squarely upon the theory of the breach of the contract, for
defendant to have proved that it did in fact exercise care in the selection and control of the
servant.
The true explanation of such cases is to be found by directing the attention to the relative
spheres of contractual and extra-contractual obligations. The field of non- contractual
obligation is much more broader than that of contractual obligations, comprising, as it does,
the whole extent of juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking,
concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does
not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual
relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act
which constitutes the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed
between the parties.
Page 73 of 91

The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry
him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article
1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance
could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants.
The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the
negligent conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of
its contractual obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains, the
direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory
negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a complete stop before alighting.
Under the doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case (supra), if the
accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant's
negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages should be
apportioned. It is, therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of
negligence.
It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before
alighting, the particular injury suffered by him could not have occurred. Defendant contends,
and cites many authorities in support of the contention, that it is negligence per se for a
passenger to alight from a moving train. We are not disposed to subscribe to this doctrine in
its absolute form. We are of the opinion that this proposition is too badly stated and is at
variance with the experience of every-day life. In this particular instance, that the train was
barely moving when plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by the fact that it came to stop
within six meters from the place where he stepped from it. Thousands of person alight from
trains under these conditions every day of the year, and sustain no injury where the company
has kept its platform free from dangerous obstructions. There is no reason to believe that
plaintiff would have suffered any injury whatever in alighting as he did had it not been for
defendant's negligent failure to perform its duty to provide a safe alighting place.
We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed in
Thompson's work on Negligence (vol. 3, sec. 3010) as follows:
The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in
attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to
be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the
passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by
the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or should be used
by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use
under similar circumstances, to avoid injury." (Thompson, Commentaries on Negligence, vol.
3, sec. 3010.)
Or, it we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court in Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil.
rep., 809), we may say that the test is this; Was there anything in the circumstances
surrounding the plaintiff at the time he alighted from the train which would have admonished
a person of average prudence that to get off the train under the conditions then existing was
dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted from alighting; and his failure so to desist
was contributory negligence.1awph!l.net
As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from which a conclusion can be
drawn to the effect that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence is that he stepped off
the car without being able to discern clearly the condition of the platform and while the train
was yet slowly moving. In considering the situation thus presented, it should not be
overlooked that the plaintiff was, as we find, ignorant of the fact that the obstruction which
was caused by the sacks of melons piled on the platform existed; and as the defendant was
Page 74 of 91

bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to its passengers facilities for safe
egress from its trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in the absence of some
circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the platform was clear. The place, as we have
already stated, was dark, or dimly lighted, and this also is proof of a failure upon the part of
the defendant in the performance of a duty owing by it to the plaintiff; for if it were by any
possibility concede that it had right to pile these sacks in the path of alighting passengers,
the placing of them adequately so that their presence would be revealed.
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this case
the following circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon
a level higher than that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the
steps of the car to the spot where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the
platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. The nature of
the platform, constructed as it was of cement material, also assured to the passenger a
stable and even surface on which to alight. Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the
vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while
the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. In
determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act that is to say,
whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly the age, sex, and physical condition
of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and
should be considered. Women, it has been observed, as a general rule are less capable than
men of alighting with safety under such conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel
obstructs the free movement of the limbs. Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly
familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of the train at this station.
There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the
step which he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting.
Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was
yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not
guilty of contributory negligence.
The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was earning P25 a month
as a copyist clerk, and that the injuries he has suffered have permanently disabled him from
continuing that employment. Defendant has not shown that any other gainful occupation is
open to plaintiff. His expectancy of life, according to the standard mortality tables, is
approximately thirty-three years. We are of the opinion that a fair compensation for the
damage suffered by him for his permanent disability is the sum of P2,500, and that he is also
entitled to recover of defendant the additional sum of P790.25 for medical attention, hospital
services, and other incidental expenditures connected with the treatment of his injuries.
The decision of lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum
of P3,290.25, and for the costs of both instances. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966

AIR FRANCE, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for petitioner.
Bengzon Villegas and Zarraga for respondent R. Carrascoso.

Page 75 of 91

SANCHEZ, J.:
The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael
Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the
portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these various amounts with interest at the legal rate, from
the date of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the
costs of suit.
On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's
plane ticket from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other
respects", with costs against petitioner.
The case is now before us for review on certiorari.
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported by the evidence of record",
are:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for
Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air
Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome.
From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the
defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying
because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the
Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat,
the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat
would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G.
Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found
out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they
came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white
man" (Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first
class" seat in the plane.3
1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the findings" 4 of
respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioner charges that respondent court failed to make
complete findings of fact on all the issues properly laid before it. We are asked to consider
facts favorable to petitioner, and then, to overturn the appellate court's decision.
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be rendered by any
court of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based". 5 This is echoed in the statutory demand that a judgment determining the
merits of the case shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based"; 6 and that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of
fact on all issues properly raised before it". 7
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct attack. 8 The
law, however, solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the
court's conclusion is drawn. 9 A court of justice is not hidebound to write in its decision every
bit and piece of evidence 10 presented by one party and the other upon the issues raised.
Neither is it to be burdened with the obligation "to specify in the sentence the facts" which a
party "considered as proved". 11 This is but a part of the mental process from which the Court
draws the essential ultimate facts. A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that
prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains
the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is no error for said court to withhold
therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the defense".
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Because as this Court well observed, "There is no law that so requires". 12 Indeed, "the mere
failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for
refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the
provisions of law and the Constitution". It is in this setting that in Manigque, it was held that
the mere fact that the findings "were based entirely on the evidence for the prosecution
without taking into consideration or even mentioning the appellant's side in the controversy
as shown by his own testimony", would not vitiate the judgment. 13 If the court did not recite
in the decision the testimony of each witness for, or each item of evidence presented by, the
defeated party, it does not mean that the court has overlooked such testimony or such item
of evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal presumptions are that official duty has been regularly
performed, and that all the matters within an issue in a case were laid before the court and
passed upon by it. 15
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe defined as "the
written statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court ... and essential to support the
decision and judgment rendered thereon". 16 They consist of the court's "conclusions" with
respect to the determinative facts in issue". 17 A question of law, upon the other hand, has
been declared as "one which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties." 18
2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 19 That judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It is not
appropriately the business of this Court to alter the facts or to review the questions of fact. 20
With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals support its judgment.
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner
a first class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and
complete intent and agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have
confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class
protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he
would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class
seats.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in its brief
before the Court of Appeals under its third assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court
erred in finding that plaintiff had confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first class seats on
the "definite" segments of his journey, particularly that from Saigon to Beirut". 21
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:
Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class ticket was
no guarantee that the passenger to whom the same had been issued, would be
accommodated in the first-class compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to
make arrangements upon arrival at every station for the necessary first-class reservation.
We are not impressed by such a reasoning. We cannot understand how a reputable firm like
defendant airplane company could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to
honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of first-class tickets and yet it
allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the
ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or riot the tickets it
issues are to be honored or not.22
Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of petitioner's
contention, thus:
Page 77 of 91

On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class" ticket, there can be no
question. Apart from his testimony, see plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-1", "B", "B-1," "B-2", "C" and
"C-1", and defendant's own witness, Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's testimony and
testified as follows:
Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what you know, what does this OK mean?
A. That the space is confirmed.
Q. Confirmed for first class?
A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169)
xxxxxxxxx
Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael
Altonaga that although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the
ticket was subject to confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the testimony
of said witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail over written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits
"A", "A-l", "B", "B-l", "C" and "C-1" belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show
that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any reservation whatever.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that
the reservation for a "first class" accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court
cannot believe that after such confirmation defendant had a verbal understanding with
plaintiff that the "first class" ticket issued to him by defendant would be subject to
confirmation in Hongkong. 23
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of a few pesos in
the amount refunded on Carrascoso's ticket, the decision of the Court of First Instance was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that such a judgment
of affirmance has merged the judgment of the lower court. 24 Implicit in that affirmance is a
determination by the Court of Appeals that the proceeding in the Court of First Instance was
free from prejudicial error and "all questions raised by the assignments of error and all
questions that might have been raised are to be regarded as finally adjudicated against the
appellant". So also, the judgment affirmed "must be regarded as free from all error". 25 We
reached this policy construction because nothing in the decision of the Court of Appeals on
this point would suggest that its findings of fact are in any way at war with those of the trial
court. Nor was said affirmance by the Court of Appeals upon a ground or grounds different
from those which were made the basis of the conclusions of the trial court. 26
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat,
notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an
air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can a
passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees, to
strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement to the
contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a
rule, a written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously
unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier,
adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the case here. The lower courts
refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket.
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there are facts upon
which the Court of Appeals predicated the finding that respondent Carrascoso had a first
class ticket and was entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in the
Saigon to Beirut leg of the flight. 27 We perceive no "welter of distortions by the Court of
Appeals of petitioner's statement of its position", as charged by petitioner. 28 Nor do we
subscribe to petitioner's accusation that respondent Carrascoso "surreptitiously took a first
Page 78 of 91

class seat to provoke an issue". 29 And this because, as petitioner states, Carrascoso went to
see the Manager at his office in Bangkok "to confirm my seat and because from Saigon I
was told again to see the Manager". 30 Why, then, was he allowed to take a first class seat in
the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if another had a better right to the seat?
4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages. Petitioner's trenchant claim
is that Carrascoso's action is planted upon breach of contract; that to authorize an award for
moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith;31 and that the decision of
the Court of Appeals fails to make a finding of bad faith. The pivotal allegations in the
complaint bearing on this issue are:
3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the Philippine Air Lines for a
valuable consideration, the latter acting as general agents for and in behalf of the defendant,
under which said contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff,
First Class passage on defendant's plane during the entire duration of plaintiff's tour of
Europe with Hongkong as starting point up to and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila, ... .
4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon and from Saigon to
Bangkok, defendant furnished to the plaintiff First Class accommodation but only after
protestations, arguments and/or insistence were made by the plaintiff with defendant's
employees.
5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but instead furnished plaintiff
only Tourist Class accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca, ... the
plaintiff has been compelled by defendant's employees to leave the First Class
accommodation berths at Bangkok after he was already seated.
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the inconvenience and
embarrassments brought by defendant's breach of contract was forced to take a Pan
American World Airways plane on his return trip from Madrid to Manila.32
xxxxxxxxx
2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class accommodations
aforesaid, plaintiff suffered inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby
causing plaintiff mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and
the like injury, resulting in moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00. 33
xxxxxxxxx
The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to furnish
plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second,
That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at
Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled
Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was already, seated" and
to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience,
embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that there is
no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is
there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. 34 The contract
was averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the action is put
on wrongful expulsion.
Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial, respondent's counsel
placed petitioner on guard on what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the
plane in Bangkok, Carrascoso was ousted by petitioner's manager who gave his seat to a
white man; 35 and (b) evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was presented
without objection on the part of the petitioner. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to
Page 79 of 91

whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral
damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment
thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required. 36 On the question of bad faith, the
Court of Appeals declared:
That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane
belonging to the defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist
class not only without his consent but against his will, has been sufficiently established by
plaintiff in his testimony before the court, corroborated by the corresponding entry made by
the purser of the plane in his notebook which notation reads as follows:
"First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the
captain refused to intervene",
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a co-passenger. The
captain of the plane who was asked by the manager of defendant company at Bangkok to
intervene even refused to do so. It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of defendant ever
contradicted or denied this evidence for the plaintiff. It could have been easy for defendant to
present its manager at Bangkok to testify at the trial of the case, or yet to secure his
disposition; but defendant did neither. 37
The Court of appeals further stated
Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white
man. Hence, if the employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him
when all the seats had already been taken, surely the plaintiff should not have been picked
out as the one to suffer the consequences and to be subjected to the humiliation and
indignity of being ejected from his seat in the presence of others. Instead of explaining to the
white man the improvidence committed by defendant's employees, the manager adopted the
more drastic step of ousting the plaintiff who was then safely ensconsced in his rightful seat.
We are strengthened in our belief that this probably was what happened there, by the
testimony of defendant's witness Rafael Altonaga who, when asked to explain the meaning
of the letters "O.K." appearing on the tickets of plaintiff, said "that the space is confirmed for
first class. Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another witness for defendant, who was the chief of
the Reservation Office of defendant, testified as follows:
"Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what reservation the passenger has
arranged with you?
A They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation." (t.s.n., p. 247, June 19, 1959)
In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has said on this point:
Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, "white man" have a "better right"
to the seat occupied by Mr. Carrascoso? The record is silent. The defendant airline did not
prove "any better", nay, any right on the part of the "white man" to the "First class" seat that
the plaintiff was occupying and for which he paid and was issued a corresponding "first
class" ticket.
If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant's Manager in Bangkok, the
defendant could have easily proven it by having taken the testimony of the said Manager by
deposition, but defendant did not do so; the presumption is that evidence willfully suppressed
would be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par (e), Rules of Court]; and, under the
circumstances, the Court is constrained to find, as it does find, that the Manager of the
defendant airline in Bangkok not merely asked but threatened the plaintiff to throw him out of
the plane if he did not give up his "first class" seat because the said Manager wanted to
accommodate, using the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, the "white man".38
Page 80 of 91

It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted portion first transcribed did
not use the term "bad faith". But can it be doubted that the recital of facts therein points to
bad faith? The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class
seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him
suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to
another passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith.
Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in
law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design
or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose." 39
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express finding of bad faith in the
judgment of the Court of First Instance, thus:
The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of transportation with plaintiff in
bad faith, with the aggravating circumstances that defendant's Manager in Bangkok went to
the extent of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many passengers to have him thrown
out of the airplane to give the "first class" seat that he was occupying to, again using the
words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a "white man" whom he (defendant's Manager)
wished to accommodate, and the defendant has not proven that this "white man" had any
"better right" to occupy the "first class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and
for which the corresponding "first class" ticket was issued by the defendant to him.40
5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be
essayed. It is well settled in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager,
petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the
provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable. 42
6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation. 43 And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the
public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the
comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a
relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees,
naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the
carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are
entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and
abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of
employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. 44
Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's check, it was a breach of
contract and a tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to
falsely notify her that the check was worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection,
though the language used was not insulting and she was not ejected." 46 And this, because,
although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature"
nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". 47 And in another case,
"Where a passenger on a railroad train, when the conductor came to collect his fare
tendered him the cash fare to a point where the train was scheduled not to stop, and told him
that as soon as the train reached such point he would pay the cash fare from that point to
destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger which justified the conductor
Page 81 of 91

in using insulting language to him, as by calling him a lunatic," 48 and the Supreme Court of
South Carolina there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said passenger.
1awphl.nt
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of
Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a
violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier a case of quasi-delict. Damages are
proper.
7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony, thus
Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser?
A When we left already that was already in the trip I could not help it. So one of the
flight attendants approached me and requested from me my ticket and I said, What for? and
she said, "We will note that you transferred to the tourist class". I said, "Nothing of that kind.
That is tantamount to accepting my transfer." And I also said, "You are not going to note
anything there because I am protesting to this transfer".
Q Was she able to note it?
A No, because I did not give my ticket.
Q About that purser?
A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you don't have enough
leg room, I stood up and I went to the pantry that was next to me and the purser was there.
He told me, "I have recorded the incident in my notebook." He read it and translated it to me
because it was recorded in French "First class passenger was forced to go to the
tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene."
Mr. VALTE
I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because the best evidence
would be the notes. Your Honor.
COURT
I will allow that as part of his testimony. 49
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in
his notebook reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his
will, and that the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's
testimony above] which is incompetent. We do not think so. The subject of inquiry is not the
entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription of
the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. 49a
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the
impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had
not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res
gestae. 50 For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of
the declarant". 51 The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was
spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has
been guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res
gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner.
It would have been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's
testimony. If it were really true that no such entry was made, the deposition of the purser
could have cleared up the matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to
grant exemplary damages in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that
Page 82 of 91

defendant should have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent

manner." 53 The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits
into this legal precept. And this, in addition to moral damages.54
9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a
similar judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt
that it is but just and equitable that attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do not intend to break
faith with the tradition that discretion well exercised as it was here should not be
disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals, thus: P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary
damages, and P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily
with the trial court. 56 The Court of Appeals did not interfere with the same. The dictates of
good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and
circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof.57
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible
error. We accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.

[G.R. No. 138569. September 11, 2003]

THE CONSOLIDATED BANK and TRUST CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and L.C. DIAZ and COMPANY, CPAs, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] of the Court of Appeals
dated 27 October 1998 and its Resolution dated 11 May 1999. The assailed decision
reversed the Decision[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8,
absolving petitioner Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation, now known as Solidbank
Corporation (Solidbank), of any liability. The questioned resolution of the appellate court
denied the motion for reconsideration of Solidbank but modified the decision by deleting the
award of exemplary damages, attorneys fees, expenses of litigation and cost of suit.
The Facts
Solidbank is a domestic banking corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws.
Private respondent L.C. Diaz and Company, CPAs (L.C. Diaz), is a professional
partnership engaged in the practice of accounting.
Sometime in March 1976, L.C. Diaz opened a savings account with Solidbank, designated
as Savings Account No. S/A 200-16872-6.
On 14 August 1991, L.C. Diaz through its cashier, Mercedes Macaraya (Macaraya), filled
up a savings (cash) deposit slip for P990 and a savings (checks) deposit slip for P50.
Macaraya instructed the messenger of L.C. Diaz, Ismael Calapre (Calapre), to deposit the
money with Solidbank. Macaraya also gave Calapre the Solidbank passbook.
Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the two deposit slips and the
passbook. The teller acknowledged receipt of the deposit by returning to Calapre the
duplicate copies of the two deposit slips. Teller No. 6 stamped the deposit slips with the
words DUPLICATE and SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK HEAD OFFICE. Since the
transaction took time and Calapre had to make another deposit for L.C. Diaz with Allied
Bank, he left the passbook with Solidbank. Calapre then went to Allied Bank. When Calapre
Page 83 of 91

returned to Solidbank to retrieve the passbook, Teller No. 6 informed him that somebody got
the passbook.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] Calapre went back to L.C. Diaz and reported the incident
to Macaraya.
Macaraya immediately prepared a deposit slip in duplicate copies with a check of P200,000.
Macaraya, together with Calapre, went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the
deposit slip and check. The teller stamped the words DUPLICATE and SAVING TELLER
6 SOLIDBANK HEAD OFFICE on the duplicate copy of the deposit slip. When Macaraya
asked for the passbook, Teller No. 6 told Macaraya that someone got the passbook but she
could not remember to whom she gave the passbook. When Macaraya asked Teller No. 6 if
Calapre got the passbook, Teller No. 6 answered that someone shorter than Calapre got the
passbook. Calapre was then standing beside Macaraya.
Teller No. 6 handed to Macaraya a deposit slip dated 14 August 1991 for the deposit of a
check for P90,000 drawn on Philippine Banking Corporation (PBC). This PBC check of L.C.
Diaz was a check that it had long closed.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] PBC subsequently
dishonored the check because of insufficient funds and because the signature in the check
differed from PBCs specimen signature. Failing to get back the passbook, Macaraya went
back to her office and reported the matter to the Personnel Manager of L.C. Diaz, Emmanuel
Alvarez.
The following day, 15 August 1991, L.C. Diaz through its Chief Executive Officer, Luis C.
Diaz (Diaz), called up Solidbank to stop any transaction using the same passbook until L.C.
Diaz could open a new account.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] On the same day, Diaz formally wrote
Solidbank to make the same request. It was also on the same day that L.C. Diaz learned of
the unauthorized withdrawal the day before, 14 August 1991, of P300,000 from its savings
account. The withdrawal slip for the P300,000 bore the signatures of the authorized
signatories of L.C. Diaz, namely Diaz and Rustico L. Murillo. The signatories, however,
denied signing the withdrawal slip. A certain Noel Tamayo received the P300,000.
In an Information[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] dated 5 September 1991, L.C. Diaz charged its
messenger, Emerano Ilagan (Ilagan) and one Roscon Verdazola with Estafa through
Falsification of Commercial Document. The Regional Trial Court of Manila dismissed the
criminal case after the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Dismiss on 4 August 1992.
On 24 August 1992, L.C. Diaz through its counsel demanded from Solidbank the return of its
money. Solidbank refused.
On 25 August 1992, L.C. Diaz filed a Complaint[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] for Recovery of a Sum of
Money against Solidbank with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. After trial, the
trial court rendered on 28 December 1994 a decision absolving Solidbank and dismissing the
complaint.
L.C. Diaz then appealed[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] to the Court of Appeals. On 27 October 1998,
the Court of Appeals issued its Decision reversing the decision of the trial court.
On 11 May 1999, the Court of Appeals issued its Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration of Solidbank. The appellate court, however, modified its decision by deleting
the award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In absolving Solidbank, the trial court applied the rules on savings account written on the
passbook. The rules state that possession of this book shall raise the presumption of
ownership and any payment or payments made by the bank upon the production of the said
book and entry therein of the withdrawal shall have the same effect as if made to the
depositor personally.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
Page 84 of 91

At the time of the withdrawal, a certain Noel Tamayo was not only in possession of the
passbook, he also presented a withdrawal slip with the signatures of the authorized
signatories of L.C. Diaz. The specimen signatures of these persons were in the signature
cards. The teller stamped the withdrawal slip with the words Saving Teller No. 5. The teller
then passed on the withdrawal slip to Genere Manuel (Manuel) for authentication. Manuel
verified the signatures on the withdrawal slip. The withdrawal slip was then given to another
officer who compared the signatures on the withdrawal slip with the specimen on the
signature cards. The trial court concluded that Solidbank acted with care and observed the
rules on savings account when it allowed the withdrawal of P300,000 from the savings
account of L.C. Diaz.
The trial court pointed out that the burden of proof now shifted to L.C. Diaz to prove that the
signatures on the withdrawal slip were forged. The trial court admonished L.C. Diaz for not
offering in evidence the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) report on the authenticity of
the signatures on the withdrawal slip for P300,000. The trial court believed that L.C. Diaz did
not offer this evidence because it is derogatory to its action.
Another provision of the rules on savings account states that the depositor must keep the
passbook under lock and key.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] When another person presents the
passbook for withdrawal prior to Solidbanks receipt of the notice of loss of the passbook,
that person is considered as the owner of the passbook. The trial court ruled that the
passbook presented during the questioned transaction was now out of the lock and key and
presumptively ready for a business transaction.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
Solidbank did not have any participation in the custody and care of the passbook. The trial
court believed that Solidbanks act of allowing the withdrawal of P300,000 was not the direct
and proximate cause of the loss. The trial court held that L.C. Diazs negligence caused the
unauthorized withdrawal. Three facts establish L.C. Diazs negligence: (1) the possession of
the passbook by a person other than the depositor L.C. Diaz; (2) the presentation of a signed
withdrawal receipt by an unauthorized person; and (3) the possession by an unauthorized
person of a PBC check long closed by L.C. Diaz, which check was deposited on the day of
the fraudulent withdrawal.
The trial court debunked L.C. Diazs contention that Solidbank did not follow the
precautionary procedures observed by the two parties whenever L.C. Diaz withdrew
significant amounts from its account. L.C. Diaz claimed that a letter must accompany
withdrawals of more than P20,000. The letter must request Solidbank to allow the
withdrawal and convert the amount to a managers check. The bearer must also have a
letter authorizing him to withdraw the same amount. Another person driving a car must
accompany the bearer so that he would not walk from Solidbank to the office in making the
withdrawal. The trial court pointed out that L.C. Diaz disregarded these precautions in its
past withdrawal. On 16 July 1991, L.C. Diaz withdrew P82,554 without any separate letter of
authorization or any communication with Solidbank that the money be converted into a
managers check.
The trial court further justified the dismissal of the complaint by holding that the case was a
last ditch effort of L.C. Diaz to recover P300,000 after the dismissal of the criminal case
against Ilagan.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint.
The Court further renders judgment in favor of defendant bank pursuant to its counterclaim
the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as attorneys fees.
With costs against plaintiff.
Page 85 of 91

SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals ruled that Solidbanks negligence was the proximate cause of the
unauthorized withdrawal of P300,000 from the savings account of L.C. Diaz. The appellate
court reached this conclusion after applying the provision of the Civil Code on quasi-delict, to
wit:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this chapter.
The appellate court held that the three elements of a quasi-delict are present in this case,
namely: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or
some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and
effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the
plaintiff.
The Court of Appeals pointed out that the teller of Solidbank who received the withdrawal slip
for P300,000 allowed the withdrawal without making the necessary inquiry. The appellate
court stated that the teller, who was not presented by Solidbank during trial, should have
called up the depositor because the money to be withdrawn was a significant amount. Had
the teller called up L.C. Diaz, Solidbank would have known that the withdrawal was
unauthorized. The teller did not even verify the identity of the impostor who made the
withdrawal. Thus, the appellate court found Solidbank liable for its negligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees.
The appellate court ruled that while L.C. Diaz was also negligent in entrusting its deposits to
its messenger and its messenger in leaving the passbook with the teller, Solidbank could not
escape liability because of the doctrine of last clear chance. Solidbank could have averted
the injury suffered by L.C. Diaz had it called up L.C. Diaz to verify the withdrawal.
The appellate court ruled that the degree of diligence required from Solidbank is more than
that of a good father of a family. The business and functions of banks are affected with
public interest. Banks are obligated to treat the accounts of their depositors with meticulous
care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their clients. The
Court of Appeals found Solidbank remiss in its duty, violating its fiduciary relationship with
L.C. Diaz.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and
a new one entered.
1. Ordering defendant-appellee Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation to pay plaintiffappellant the sum of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00), with interest thereon at
the rate of 12% per annum from the date of filing of the complaint until paid, the sum of
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation as well as the cost of suit; and
2. Ordering the dismissal of defendant-appellees counterclaim in the amount of
P30,000.00 as attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
Acting on the motion for reconsideration of Solidbank, the appellate court affirmed its
decision but modified the award of damages. The appellate court deleted the award of
exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Invoking Article 2231[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] of the
Civil Code, the appellate court ruled that exemplary damages could be granted if the
Page 86 of 91

defendant acted with gross negligence. Since Solidbank was guilty of simple negligence
only, the award of exemplary damages was not justified. Consequently, the award of
attorneys fees was also disallowed pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code. The expenses
of litigation and cost of suit were also not imposed on Solidbank.
The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, our decision dated October 27, 1998 is affirmed with
modification by deleting the award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees, expenses of
litigation and cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Solidbank seeks the review of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals on these
grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER BANK
SHOULD SUFFER THE LOSS BECAUSE ITS TELLER SHOULD HAVE FIRST CALLED
PRIVATE RESPONDENT BY TELEPHONE BEFORE IT ALLOWED THE WITHDRAWAL OF
P300,000.00 TO RESPONDENTS MESSENGER EMERANO ILAGAN, SINCE THERE IS
NO AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE SAVINGS
ACCOUNT, NOR IS THERE ANY BANKING LAW, WHICH MANDATES THAT A BANK
TELLER SHOULD FIRST CALL UP THE DEPOSITOR BEFORE ALLOWING A
WITHDRAWAL OF A BIG AMOUNT IN A SAVINGS ACCOUNT.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR
CHANCE AND IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER BANKS TELLER HAD THE LAST
OPPORTUNITY TO WITHHOLD THE WITHDRAWAL WHEN IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT
THE TWO SIGNATURES OF RESPONDENT ON THE WITHDRAWAL SLIP ARE GENUINE
AND PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PASSBOOK WAS DULY PRESENTED, AND
CONTRARIWISE RESPONDENT WAS NEGLIGENT IN THE SELECTION AND
SUPERVISION OF ITS MESSENGER EMERANO ILAGAN, AND IN THE SAFEKEEPING
OF ITS CHECKS AND OTHER FINANCIAL DOCUMENTS.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE INSTANT CASE IS
A LAST DITCH EFFORT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO RECOVER ITS P300,000.00
AFTER FAILING IN ITS EFFORTS TO RECOVER THE SAME FROM ITS EMPLOYEE
EMERANO ILAGAN.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT MITIGATING THE DAMAGES
AWARDED AGAINST PETITIONER UNDER ARTICLE 2197 OF THE CIVIL CODE,
NOTWITHSTANDING ITS FINDING THAT PETITIONER BANKS NEGLIGENCE WAS
ONLY CONTRIBUTORY.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is partly meritorious.
Solidbanks Fiduciary Duty under the Law
The rulings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals conflict on the application of the law.
The trial court pinned the liability on L.C. Diaz based on the provisions of the rules on
savings account, a recognition of the contractual relationship between Solidbank and L.C.
Diaz, the latter being a depositor of the former. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals
applied the law on quasi-delict to determine who between the two parties was ultimately
negligent. The law on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is generally applicable when there is no
pre-existing contractual relationship between the parties.
Page 87 of 91

We hold that Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence, or culpa
contractual.
The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code on simple loan.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] Article 1980 of the Civil Code expressly provides
that x x x savings x x x deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed
by the provisions concerning simple loan. There is a debtor-creditor relationship between
the bank and its depositor. The bank is the debtor and the depositor is the creditor. The
depositor lends the bank money and the bank agrees to pay the depositor on demand. The
savings deposit agreement between the bank and the depositor is the contract that
determines the rights and obligations of the parties.
The law imposes on banks high standards in view of the fiduciary nature of banking. Section
2 of Republic Act No. 8791 (RA 8791),[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] which took effect on 13 June
2000, declares that the State recognizes the fiduciary nature of banking that requires high
standards of integrity and performance.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] This new provision in the
general banking law, introduced in 2000, is a statutory affirmation of Supreme Court
decisions, starting with the 1990 case of Simex International v. Court of Appeals,[if !
supportFootnotes][20][endif] holding that the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its
depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their
relationship.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
This fiduciary relationship means that the banks obligation to observe high standards of
integrity and performance is deemed written into every deposit agreement between a bank
and its depositor. The fiduciary nature of banking requires banks to assume a degree of
diligence higher than that of a good father of a family. Article 1172 of the Civil Code states
that the degree of diligence required of an obligor is that prescribed by law or contract, and
absent such stipulation then the diligence of a good father of a family.[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif]
Section 2 of RA 8791 prescribes the statutory diligence required from banks that banks
must observe high standards of integrity and performance in servicing their depositors.
Although RA 8791 took effect almost nine years after the unauthorized withdrawal of the
P300,000 from L.C. Diazs savings account, jurisprudence[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] at the time of
the withdrawal already imposed on banks the same high standard of diligence required
under RA No. 8791.
However, the fiduciary nature of a bank-depositor relationship does not convert the contract
between the bank and its depositors from a simple loan to a trust agreement, whether
express or implied. Failure by the bank to pay the depositor is failure to pay a simple loan,
and not a breach of trust.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] The law simply imposes on the bank a higher
standard of integrity and performance in complying with its obligations under the contract of
simple loan, beyond those required of non-bank debtors under a similar contract of simple
loan.
The fiduciary nature of banking does not convert a simple loan into a trust agreement
because banks do not accept deposits to enrich depositors but to earn money for
themselves. The law allows banks to offer the lowest possible interest rate to depositors
while charging the highest possible interest rate on their own borrowers. The interest spread
or differential belongs to the bank and not to the depositors who are not cestui que trust of
banks. If depositors are cestui que trust of banks, then the interest spread or income
belongs to the depositors, a situation that Congress certainly did not intend in enacting
Section 2 of RA 8791.
Solidbanks Breach of its Contractual Obligation
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Article 1172 of the Civil Code provides that responsibility arising from negligence in the
performance of every kind of obligation is demandable. For breach of the savings deposit
agreement due to negligence, or culpa contractual, the bank is liable to its depositor.
Calapre left the passbook with Solidbank because the transaction took time and he had to
go to Allied Bank for another transaction. The passbook was still in the hands of the
employees of Solidbank for the processing of the deposit when Calapre left Solidbank.
Solidbanks rules on savings account require that the deposit book should be carefully
guarded by the depositor and kept under lock and key, if possible. When the passbook is in
the possession of Solidbanks tellers during withdrawals, the law imposes on Solidbank and
its tellers an even higher degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook.
Likewise, Solidbanks tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they
return the passbook only to the depositor or his authorized representative. The tellers know,
or should know, that the rules on savings account provide that any person in possession of
the passbook is presumptively its owner. If the tellers give the passbook to the wrong
person, they would be clothing that person presumptive ownership of the passbook,
facilitating unauthorized withdrawals by that person. For failing to return the passbook to
Calapre, the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz, Solidbank and Teller No. 6
presumptively failed to observe such high degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook,
and in insuring its return to the party authorized to receive the same.
In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract, there is a presumption
that the defendant was at fault or negligent. The burden is on the defendant to prove that he
was not at fault or negligent. In contrast, in culpa aquiliana the plaintiff has the burden of
proving that the defendant was negligent. In the present case, L.C. Diaz has established
that Solidbank breached its contractual obligation to return the passbook only to the
authorized representative of L.C. Diaz. There is thus a presumption that Solidbank was at
fault and its teller was negligent in not returning the passbook to Calapre. The burden was
on Solidbank to prove that there was no negligence on its part or its employees.
Solidbank failed to discharge its burden. Solidbank did not present to the trial court Teller
No. 6, the teller with whom Calapre left the passbook and who was supposed to return the
passbook to him. The record does not indicate that Teller No. 6 verified the identity of the
person who retrieved the passbook. Solidbank also failed to adduce in evidence its standard
procedure in verifying the identity of the person retrieving the passbook, if there is such a
procedure, and that Teller No. 6 implemented this procedure in the present case.
Solidbank is bound by the negligence of its employees under the principle of respondeat
superior or command responsibility. The defense of exercising the required diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees is not a complete defense in culpa contractual,
unlike in culpa aquiliana.[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif]
The bank must not only exercise high standards of integrity and performance, it must also
insure that its employees do likewise because this is the only way to insure that the bank will
comply with its fiduciary duty. Solidbank failed to present the teller who had the duty to
return to Calapre the passbook, and thus failed to prove that this teller exercised the high
standards of integrity and performance required of Solidbanks employees.
Proximate Cause of the Unauthorized Withdrawal
Another point of disagreement between the trial and appellate courts is the proximate cause
of the unauthorized withdrawal. The trial court believed that L.C. Diazs negligence in not
securing its passbook under lock and key was the proximate cause that allowed the impostor
to withdraw the P300,000. For the appellate court, the proximate cause was the tellers
Page 89 of 91

negligence in processing the withdrawal without first verifying with L.C. Diaz. We do not
agree with either court.
Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have
occurred.[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] Proximate cause is determined by the facts of each case
upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.[if !supportFootnotes][27]
[endif]

L.C. Diaz was not at fault that the passbook landed in the hands of the impostor. Solidbank
was in possession of the passbook while it was processing the deposit. After completion of
the transaction, Solidbank had the contractual obligation to return the passbook only to
Calapre, the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz. Solidbank failed to fulfill its contractual
obligation because it gave the passbook to another person.
Solidbanks failure to return the passbook to Calapre made possible the withdrawal of the
P300,000 by the impostor who took possession of the passbook. Under Solidbanks rules on
savings account, mere possession of the passbook raises the presumption of ownership. It
was the negligent act of Solidbanks Teller No. 6 that gave the impostor presumptive
ownership of the passbook. Had the passbook not fallen into the hands of the impostor, the
loss of P300,000 would not have happened. Thus, the proximate cause of the unauthorized
withdrawal was Solidbanks negligence in not returning the passbook to Calapre.
We do not subscribe to the appellate courts theory that the proximate cause of the
unauthorized withdrawal was the tellers failure to call up L.C. Diaz to verify the withdrawal.
Solidbank did not have the duty to call up L.C. Diaz to confirm the withdrawal. There is no
arrangement between Solidbank and L.C. Diaz to this effect. Even the agreement between
Solidbank and L.C. Diaz pertaining to measures that the parties must observe whenever
withdrawals of large amounts are made does not direct Solidbank to call up L.C. Diaz.
There is no law mandating banks to call up their clients whenever their representatives
withdraw significant amounts from their accounts. L.C. Diaz therefore had the burden to
prove that it is the usual practice of Solidbank to call up its clients to verify a withdrawal of a
large amount of money. L.C. Diaz failed to do so.
Teller No. 5 who processed the withdrawal could not have been put on guard to verify the
withdrawal. Prior to the withdrawal of P300,000, the impostor deposited with Teller No. 6 the
P90,000 PBC check, which later bounced. The impostor apparently deposited a large
amount of money to deflect suspicion from the withdrawal of a much bigger amount of
money. The appellate court thus erred when it imposed on Solidbank the duty to call up L.C.
Diaz to confirm the withdrawal when no law requires this from banks and when the teller had
no reason to be suspicious of the transaction.
Solidbank continues to foist the defense that Ilagan made the withdrawal. Solidbank claims
that since Ilagan was also a messenger of L.C. Diaz, he was familiar with its teller so that
there was no more need for the teller to verify the withdrawal. Solidbank relies on the
following statements in the Booking and Information Sheet of Emerano Ilagan:
xxx Ilagan also had with him (before the withdrawal) a forged check of PBC and indicated the
amount of P90,000 which he deposited in favor of L.C. Diaz and Company. After
successfully withdrawing this large sum of money, accused Ilagan gave alias Rey (Noel
Tamayo) his share of the loot. Ilagan then hired a taxicab in the amount of P1,000 to
transport him (Ilagan) to his home province at Bauan, Batangas. Ilagan extravagantly and
lavishly spent his money but a big part of his loot was wasted in cockfight and horse racing.
Ilagan was apprehended and meekly admitted his guilt.[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] (Emphasis
supplied.)
Page 90 of 91

L.C. Diaz refutes Solidbanks contention by pointing out that the person who withdrew the
P300,000 was a certain Noel Tamayo. Both the trial and appellate courts stated that this
Noel Tamayo presented the passbook with the withdrawal slip.
We uphold the finding of the trial and appellate courts that a certain Noel Tamayo withdrew
the P300,000. The Court is not a trier of facts. We find no justifiable reason to reverse the
factual finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The tellers who processed the
deposit of the P90,000 check and the withdrawal of the P300,000 were not presented during
trial to substantiate Solidbanks claim that Ilagan deposited the check and made the
questioned withdrawal. Moreover, the entry quoted by Solidbank does not categorically state
that Ilagan presented the withdrawal slip and the passbook.
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss.[if !supportFootnotes][29]
[endif] Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him from
recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the
last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.[if !
supportFootnotes][30][endif]

We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present case. Solidbank is liable for
breach of contract due to negligence in the performance of its contractual obligation to L.C.
Diaz. This is a case of culpa contractual, where neither the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate the defendant from
liability.[if !supportFootnotes][31][endif] Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff
merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the plaintiff but does not exculpate the
defendant from his breach of contract.[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif]
Mitigated Damages
Under Article 1172, liability (for culpa contractual) may be regulated by the courts, according
to the circumstances. This means that if the defendant exercised the proper diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employee, or if the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence, then the courts may reduce the award of damages. In this case, L.C. Diaz was
guilty of contributory negligence in allowing a withdrawal slip signed by its authorized
signatories to fall into the hands of an impostor. Thus, the liability of Solidbank should be
reduced.
In Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals,[if !supportFootnotes][33][endif] where the Court
held the depositor guilty of contributory negligence, we allocated the damages between the
depositor and the bank on a 40-60 ratio. Applying the same ruling to this case, we hold that
L.C. Diaz must shoulder 40% of the actual damages awarded by the appellate court.
Solidbank must pay the other 60% of the actual damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioner Solidbank Corporation shall pay private respondent L.C. Diaz and Company,
CPAs only 60% of the actual damages awarded by the Court of Appeals. The remaining
40% of the actual damages shall be borne by private respondent L.C. Diaz and Company,
CPAs. Proportionate costs.
SO ORDERED.

Page 91 of 91