THE PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM

Volume XXXI, No. 34, December 2000

ACTUALITY AND OBJECTIVITY IN HEGELS PHILOSOPHY

ANDR LCRIVAIN

Was vernnftig ist, das ist wirklich; und was wirklich ist, das ist vernnftig.
Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Vorrede

Hegel repeated and justified this perhaps too well-known formula many
1
times. He never disowned it; quite the contrary. It has been the object of countless criticisms. It deserves, on one hand, to be taken seriously, and, on the other
hand, to be subjected to critical reflection in order to place it within the context
of Hegels philosophy. One will notice first that Hegel has purposely chosen a
new term, wirklich or Wirklichkeit, which did not belong to the traditional philosophical vocabulary but has here undoubtedly an active and operative meaning.
Because, with Hegel, any identification is connected with a more or less complex process of differentiation, we intend to compare and differentiate some
terms which may seem to be closely connected with Wirklichkeit, in particular
reality (Realitt) and objectivity (Objectivitt). One could note in passing that
these two terms, as opposed to Wirklichkeit, do not have a Germanic root.
The Hegelian way of thinking never limits itself to noticing facts or describing objects or beings. Indisputably, it seeks to understand and know what there
is. In order to achieve this, it tries to recover the process through which meaning
is generated and created, to explain this complex and contradictory trajectory. It
reconstructs the categorical linkage which determines its main rhythmic structure, and by which each term gets its specific signification, its relative autonomy
and its one-sidedness, its abstractness or concreteness, from its locus in this linkage. In this respect, the conceptual matrix of the Science of Logic gives us the
possibility and the rigorous means to verify the validity and the content of each
term in use within the Hegelian corpus. The choice of each term is not haphazard, and their meanings are neither stipulated nor derived from common usage.
Their meanings are properly characterized as speculative, at once contradictory
and dialectical, because their semantics depends upon the logical exigencies of
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the genesis of the meaning. And when Hegel takes up the traditional categories
of philosophy, it is not only in order to facilitate the readers understanding of
complex and difficult works, but also to criticize and disqualify their previous
meaning, or to reinvest these concepts with a new meaning, as is logically required, since the history of philosophy is nothing but the very process through
which the concept of philosophy self-unfolds its truth. It is thus only under the
condition of following the active process of thinking that we will be able to acknowledge and ascribe to each term its proper meaning. Such is the aim of the
few remarks that follow, which will be primarily directed toward the categories
of actuality (Wirklichkeit) and Objectivity (Objectivitt).
Before launching any inquiry about these two terms, we must go back to what
Hegel himself considers to be the very beginning of the logical process. One
knows that it is only with pure being that such a process is put in motion. But
one knows as well that being and nothingness are two terms about which nothing can be stated and which are not only undetermined but undeterminable as
well. Were the logical process to stick strictly to them, it would never begin.
Nevertheless, such an impasse would only be the effect of a misunderstanding of
the logical function of these notions, more precisely of an approach which
would be treating them as purely static and separated. Conversely, this obstacle
can be overcome as soon as these terms are not grasped as separated from one
another but thought as indissociable moments of a relation which they presuppose and which provides the rationale for their truth: such is becoming, the first
concrete category of the Science of Logic: Pure being and pure nothingness are
the same thing. That which is truth is neither being nor nothingness, but the fact
that being does not vanish but has vanished into nothingness, and nothingness
into being. Their truth is not their state of non-differentiation, but the fact that
they are absolutely different, and that nevertheless, as equally immediate, each
disappears into the other. Their truth is thus this motion of the immediate disappearance of one into the other; and this is becoming, a motion where both are
made different, but by the intervention of a difference which is immediately dissolved.2
Nevertheless, this category of becoming is nothing but the processual
(processuelle) origin of the logical discourse. It does not designate any substantial or objective reality but only a doubled thought process, at once inverted and
contradictory, of that which emerges and the vanishes: Consequently, emerging
and vanishing are, not two kinds of becoming, but immediately one and the
same thing; they do not mutually overcome one another; one of the two does not
externally overcome the other one; but each one overcomes itself, and is in itself
the contrary of itself.3
With this logical and contradictory characterization of becoming in terms of
not being what it is we have already reached a dialectical understanding of
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what makes up the processual engine of the categorical linking, the processual
engine whose presence and efficiency we will encounter again in new and diversified modalities, more complex and more concrete, and in different levels of the
activity of thought. It is thus far from irrelevant to notice that in the lecture
Hegel gave in 18191820, the quotation we put in epigraph was phrased as:
4
What is rational becomes actual, and what is actual becomes rational.
This formulation indisputably underlines the processual and dialectical aspect
of the formula of the Preface of Principles of the Philosophy of Right by viewing
it from the perspective of becoming. It is nevertheless true that becoming does
not provide access to any kind of objective reality. It is only with the category of
being-there (Dasein) that a first form of consistent and real immediacy occurs.
This ontological structure is certainly quite poor and very abstract but it does
correspond to some sort of fragile and unstable equilibrium endowed with a
determinationto which the Da corresponds in German but without any
spatio-temporal connotationwhich provides a properly reflective side to it. It
is to this new modality that the first occurrence of the category of reality corresponds: Being-for-oneself and being-for-another are moments or differences
interior to being-there. They are being and nothingness differentiated within
being-there. . . . Being-there itself is first the immediate and simple unity of
being and nothingness. In so far as being and nothingness determined themselves in it in a more precise manner as moments that were just examined, it is
not under the first form of immediacy any more, but it is a reflective
being-there; it is being-there in so far as it determines itself as being-in-itself and
as being- for-another, and within which the unity of the former and the latter are
understood as its moments. As reflective being-there, it is reality.5
In fact this first occurrence of the term reality refers to a rather modest objective status. Being-there as unity internally split between being-in-itself and
being-for-another, which are its constitutive moments, remains bound to a finitude and a variability which significantly affects it in the sense that its determinations occur in a disorderly succession, a ceaseless alternation which belongs to
the most extreme exteriority. Being-there, as all ontological categories do, belongs indeed to the processual scheme of passing over (bergehen) which both
connects the determinations and keeps them in a reciprocal externality. And
what is true of determined or qualified being is true too for quantified being and
measured being. In the best of all cases, the reality which is here talked about is
close to what Hegel calls empirical actuality (leffectivit empirique).6
However, this expression invites us to introduce a decisive qualification. The
term reality will recur many times in the Hegelian texts, but, according to the
situation in which it will occur, its meaning will change. It will be loaded with
previous meanings, giving up, little by little, its abstractness and its onesidedness, for example by connoting not simply a mere external passing but
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designating a motion or an exteriorizing process, as will be the case with actuality (Wirklichkeit) in the Doctrine of Essence, or objectivity in the Doctrine of the
Concept. We will later be able to verify what is here a mere anticipation aimed
at underlining the determining function of processuality, provided to forestall future misunderstandings.
For the moment, at the end of the journey of being, with the degree of reality
which belongs to it, the dynamics of becoming and its contradictory negativity
have allowed the unfolding of all of the ontological determinations only under
the implied presence and the presupposition of the reflective determinations of
the essence, whose interiority somehow made up for and balanced the initial
overbearing exteriority of being. This is why, at the conclusion of the Logic of
Being, we have reached the becoming of the essence: Being, as not being what
7
it is, and being what it is not, as this simple negativity of itself, is essence.
At the end of its process of determination, being seems to have completely
disintegrated into essence, and its positivity seems to give way to the negativity
of essence alone: Being only is as the motion from nothing to nothing, thus it is
essence.8
Far from reducing being to this motion from nothing to nothing, the philosophical tradition never ceased to consider essence as the foundation and the
safeguard of the positivity and the validity of being. To do that, it has looked
upon essence as a kind of background world, in the depth of which being could
have its roots and from which its objective consistency would be acknowledged:
The truth of being is essence. Being is immediate. In so far as knowledge wants
to know about truth, what being is in itself and for itself, it does not stay with the
immediate and its determinations, but crosses this immediacy all the way with
the presupposition that behind being, there is something other than being itself,
and that this background constitutes the truth of being.9
One might as well admit that from the introduction of the process of the essence we are confronted with a daunting difficulty, generated by a tacit acceptance of a duality of being and essence. However, if essence is the result of the
unfolding process of the ontological determinations, it is a result only in the
sense that it enables and upholds the category of becoming, an interiorizing and
reflecting motion correlative to the determinations of being. What we learn from
the passing of being into essence is that it is no longer just a passing but an intricate and indissoluble reciprocal interweaving of being and essence. In place of
the becoming which was the processual modality characteristic of the exteriority
of the determinations of being, we now have the setting of essential determinations. This is a process of interiorization specific to the reflectivity and the
negativity of essence.
As one can easily ascertain, this essence does not entail any kind of loss,
shrinking, or disappearance of being. Philosophy has no other aim than knowing
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and understanding what is there. But it does not mean philosophy can fulfill its
aim by simply settling in the immediate. The whole process of being never
ceases to show and require the importance and the necessity of mediation, since
only the mediated immediate or the becoming immediate is able to convert the
negation of the negation into affirmation. Now, the sphere of the essence is the
sphere of mediation par excellence. Without ever losing sight of being which is
to be known, the Doctrine of the Essence will examine all the forms of dualism,
scientific, ontological, or metaphysical; it will test their relevance and it will
undertake their criticism, thus progressively exposing the unity and the
indissociable identity of the exteriority of being and the interiority of essence.
When the unfolding of the determinations of reflection is over, as it is in the fundamental relation, the essence reaches existence as a new form of immediacy
which will embody the reemergence of being, this time not as a modality of
being-there but as essential being which is nothing but the appearance of the essence: The Doctrine of Being contains the first proposition: being is essence.
The second propositionessence is beingmakes up the content of the first
section of the Doctrine of the Essence. But this being which the essence makes
of itself is essential being, an existent, a being that emerges out of negativity and
interiority.10
However, the reemergence of existence as the being of essence gives us only
a glimpse of a few of the multiple forms of opposition which are constituted and
crystallized around the category of appearance (Erscheinung). In fact, the status
of German idealism is at stake here, and more precisely Kantian transcendental
idealism, with its notion of the thing-in-itself and its distinction between the
phenomenal world and the noumenal world which now comes to the fore. It is
important to notice that this, the second section of the Doctrine of Essence, is the
locus where contradiction reaches its most extreme tension, where dual
oppositions appear at their most vivid and most irreducible. These oppositions
can be at least clarified if one puts them in motion, dynamizes them, in brief
shows how they are inserted in a relational process between the whole and its
parts, between force and its exteriorization, or (in its translation into immediacy)
between interior and exterior. The outcome of this journey leads to the recognition of the mediated and reflected identity of these oppositions, and it is precisely this unity of essence and existence which Hegel calls actuality (Die
Wirklichkeit): That which is something, is consequently totally as such in its
exteriority; its exteriority is its totality; it is its reflected unity in itself as well. Its
phenomenon is not only its reflection into another, but in itself, and consequently its exteriority. The exteriorization of that which is in itself, so far as its
content and its form are purely and simply identical, is nothing but the fact that
it exteriorizes itself. It is the revealing of its essence, in such a manner that this
essence is made of the fact that it is what reveals itself. The essential relation, in
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this identity of the phenomenon with its interior or essence, determines itself as
11
actuality.
This actuality constitutes the third section of the Doctrine of the Essence, and
it brings the Objective Logic, which encompasses the process of the determinations of Being and of its essentialities, to a close. Actuality corresponds to the
third and ultimate form of immediacy in this ensemble, after being-there and existence. It is not necessary to mention again the processual and logical status of
being-there, the limited and abstract meaning of which we have already noted.
On the other hand, it is important to be clear about what differentiates actuality
and existence. Existence is undoubtedly the first mode of appearance of the
essence, in the strict and rigorous sense of this expression, the reemergence
of being from and out of the fundamental relation when all the conditions are
gathered to allow its phenomenal coming-forth. It is precisely why the status of
existence still remains ambiguous, subject as it is to the ambivalent and contradictory duality of the Erscheinung: In so far as all the conditions are still interior, the abstraction of an actuality, they are universal, and it is the gathering up
of these (conditions) within a singularity through which they come into actuality. Conversely, the conditions are isolated, scattered phenomena which acquires
only in actuality unity and meaning and a being-there with universal value.12
Only actuality is able to provide a rationale for existence and the conditions it
requires. At the same time, one can notice that it is actuality that also provides
being-there with a dimension and a universal value to which it otherwise would
not have a legitimate claim. Summarizing the whole journey of being and essence, actuality determines a new mode of processuality which is distinct not
only from the passing-over (bergehen) of being but also from the coming-out
(Scheinen) of the determinations of reflection and from the appearing
(Erscheinen) of the phenomenon, which Hegel calls sich manifestieren or sich
offenbaren, self-manifestation or self-revelation. All these statements underline
the reflective, active, and open aspects of actuality. For more information and
confirmation, one might add that in the two last editions of the Encyclopedia
(18271830), Hegel reintroduces the category of existence among the determinations of reflection, thus stressing the gap between existence and actuality.
One might be surprised to discover that this third section of the Doctrine
of the Essence opens with a chapter called The Absolute. Nevertheless, the
essential relation, which first came in at the conclusion of the Erscheinung
section, has gotten rid of all the background worlds, from the thing-in-itself to
the first cause. Thus, actualityas we will see more closely laterrelies only
upon itself. This enables us to talk of self-manifestation or self-revelation, invested with an absolute status. And as actuality is this new and final form of
immediacy in the process of essence, it was necessary to start off by taking into
account an absolute understood as a totality given in its immediacy. In short,
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Hegels aim is to show why and how the absolute cannot remain some sort of ineffable escaping of determinations because a discourse about an undetermined
and non-mediated immediacy is indeed not possible. The only solution left is
to present it in its genesis, its self-presentation. Such is the response to the
unknowability of Kants thing-in-itself or Schellings absolute identity.
Without providing all the details of the analysis, we shall simply remind the
reader that it is only this mode and this alone which provides the absolute with
its determinateness and its actuality, because the absolute is nothing but the process of its own exposition as setting itself and negatively reflecting itself in
itself. All this means that the absolute is thinkable and conceivable only as a relational system, as the two last chapters of this section indicate and verify, and
this makes legitimate the designation of absolute relation as the conclusion of
this journey. But before getting there, one must radically criticize the assumed
meaning of the main categories of substance-based and/or dualist metaphysics,
such as necessity and contingency, substance and accident, and cause and effect.
We can nevertheless already notice that the speculative upgrading of the
mode (to the detriment of the immediate absolute and its attribute) works towards the recognition and the legitimization of contingency. The latter is neither
the presupposition nor the opposite of necessity, but it is identical to it because
contingency implies the return of being into essence, carrying in its recovered
immediacy its own mediation, and becoming for itself its own foundation: But
being is, conversely, essence as well, and the becoming is reflection or coming
out. Thus their exteriority is their interiority, their relation is absolute identity;
and the becoming of the actual into (something) possible, of being into nothingness, is a coinciding with itself. Contingency is absolute necessity; it is the presupposing of these first absolute actualities. . . . This identity of being with itself
after its negation, is now substance. It is this unity understood in its negation or
in its contingency; thus it is substance (understood) as relation to itself. The
blind but necessary act of becoming is moreover the proper exposition of the
Absolute, the motion of this same Absolute in itself, which, in its exteriorization,
shows itself as itself.13
This primacy ascribed to the mode does not mean its immediate
absolutization, but only the motion of presentation of an absolute considered
as determined, which continues the transposition of the mode into the selfdetermination of the absolute as modality. It is to this result that the second
chapter about actuality, whose title is also Actuality, leads by some sort of
structural doubling up. The chapter rejects the Kantian conception of modality
as espoused in the Critique of the Pure Reason under the denomination of the
Postulates of Empirical Thought, in which Kant ascribes to modality a mere
subjective meaning without any objective value.14 For Kants narrow and illegitimate interpretation, Hegels account will substitute, first, the formal unity of the
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possible and the actual, understood as contingency, next, their real unity understood as relative necessity, and finally, their absolute unity understood as absolute necessity. The outcome is that actuality is neither a thing nor a simple
relation but the very process from which any thing or relation results. Thus conceived, actuality must be understood in terms of activity, production, or carrying
out that which it has in itself as its foundation or its raison dtre: That which is
actual can act; its actuality makes something known through that which it brings
out in the open. Its being-in-relation to (something) else is the manifestation of
itself.15
While asserting itself as carrying-out and production, actuality identifies itself
as the speculative positivity of the negative and transforms itself from relative
necessity to absolute necessity. The process of actuality reverses the relation
between contingency and necessity. Necessity appears now as the foundation of
contingency or the rationale for it. In that foundation, the unity of being and
essence and the unity of the exteriority and the interiority are fully stated; immediate being has been invested with value. At the same time, with the productive
ability of actuality one has an implicit glimpse of the activity and self-unfolding
of the concept. We shall note as well that with this account of absolute necessity
we are close to what Spinoza meant by third-order knowledge or intuitive science: This kind of knowledge goes from the adequate idea of the formal
essence of some attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of
things.16
In fact, Hegel, in spite of the criticisms he raised against the Spinozist concept
of substance in the Remark which closes the presentation of the Absolute, alludes to this side of the Spinozist view: Generally speaking, the highest level of
subsisting by oneself of man consists in knowing himself as unreservedly determined by the absolute Idea, a kind of consciousness and an attitude which
Spinoza designates as amor intellectualis Dei.17
As with the last two chapters of the two preceding sections of the Doctrine of
Essence, this third chapter on actuality is devoted to the category of relation,
which now has become absolute. In fact, the exposition of the absolute, formerly
identified as the absolute necessity whose processual aspect was still implied,
here comes to a close. We already know that the totality of essence is rationally
structured. We have also been able to verify that the absolute itself is nothing
but a complex system of relations. Consequently, this last chapter presents the
authentically speculative refutation of the Spinozist conception of substance, as
interpreted by Hegel, by substituting for the Cause-God an explication of the
relations between substance and accident, cause and effect, up to their identification and reunification in the reciprocal relation which bears witness to their convertibility. This allows us to get from the actual substance to the subjective
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concept, and confirms here the exigencies of this process described earlier by
Hegel in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Mind.
If we summarize the points so far established, we now know that the absolute,
as immediate totality, whose essence entails existence, can only be explained
through its total exteriorization, without anything inside left over in the mode.
This carrying-out and setting-out of the absolute occurs under the differentiated
modalities of contingency, relative necessity, and absolute necessity. But by
confirming that the absolute necessity can only be absolute relation, this last
chapter of the Doctrine of the Essence constitutes the overcoming of the relational and doubled-up structure of the essence, which gathers itself up within the
unity of the concept. We note as well that if the second chapter reworked the
meaning of the principles of modality which Kant had summarized under the expression of Postulates of Empirical Thought, this last chapter takes up the categories and principles which correspond to what are, in the Critique of the Pure
Reason, the Analogies of Experience. This reversal of the Kantian order of chapters expresses and reveals the gap between the Kantian and the Hegelian accounts. Since Aristotle, the philosophical tradition never ceased to look upon
substance as a type of being that is the basis of identity, stability, and permanence. And even if Kant made substance a category of relation, he preserved its
function as a permanent substratum which underlies the delineation and confirmation of change. In contrast, Hegels substance as absolute relation is nothing
but pure processuality, so that it has no other presupposition than itself, and
brings about nothing but itself. Whereas actuality could act, as we have seen
above, substance does act. This Hegel calls its actuosity (Die Aktuositt), its
self-production through and by its accidents: This movement of the accidental
is the actuosity of substance, (understood) as the quiet coming out of itself into
the light of day. It is not active in respect of something but only in respect of itself (understood) as simple element without resistance.18
However, the relation of substantiality is not able to answer to all the exigencies of the absolute relation. The accidents do not really reach the substantiality
which produces them and expresses itself in them, because the exigencies of the
reflection into itself are not fully fulfilled. This is why the relation of substantiality passes over into the relation of causality. The cause finds in its effect a reality
which was missing in the notion of substance, which left certain formal aspects
unmediated. Recall that the relation of causality, which goes from a causality
still formal because of what came before, to a determined relation of causality,
then to action and reaction, which provides for the change of effect into cause,
finds its culmination in reciprocal action, the ultimate moment of the process of
actuality. This process is itself the actual genesis of this new unity which the
concept is, a complex unity of differentiated moments, posited as different
within the bosom of the identity which gathers them up. This motion of
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totalization and unification of substantiality and causality is the process by

which necessity and liberty are reconciled as well. The absolute necessity which
closes the chapter on actuality transfigures itself now into the free activity and
self-development of the concept, in other words into rationality, at first subjective, then objective, and finally absolute, whose outcome will be not only the
relative but the Absolute Idea: The process of necessity is such that through it,
the rigid exteriority, at first there, is overcome. Its interior is revealed, through
which it becomes apparent that the terms linked to one another are not in fact,
foreign to one another, but are only moments of a unique whole, each of which,
in its relation to the other, is by itself and connected with itself. This is the transfiguration of necessity into liberty, and this liberty is not just the liberty of the
abstract negation, but rather a concrete and positive liberty. From there, one may
now conclude how absurd it is to consider liberty and necessity as mutually excluding each other. Of course, necessity as such is still not liberty yet, but liberty
has necessity as a presupposition and has it in itself as overcome
(aufgehoben).19
Such is the meaning of actuality, speculatively understood, based upon our
understanding of the logical texts of the Science of Logic or the Encyclopedia.
The Objective Logic seems to have reached its aim, which was to show how
being, after having determined itself according all the modes of exteriority, recovered itself through the mediation of the interiority of the essence, made progressively but irreversibly a reflective and negative return to itself, and thus
overcame for good any duality. This is all to the benefit of the unitary structure,
still internally differentiated, which the absolute substance is. Along this journey, all the traditional categories of philosophy have been tested and their meaning confirmed or reworked under the light provided by the processual linking of
the acts of thinking.
But why did Hegel move beyond this result? Why and how should the Subjective Logic extend and complement the dialectical journey displayed in being
and essence? In fact, if the absolute substance that has become such as the result
of the process of actuality does indeed correspond to what was looked for, that is
to say the ultimate form of immediacy fully mediated, as dialectical unity encompassing being and essence, the objective logic comes to a close with this result without having addressed and, even less, clarified, what is implied by so
novel a structure.
How is the Subjective Logic able to provide us with the explanations which
the Objective Logic itself was unable to provide us? There is at least a paradox:
can the Objective Logic move us toward having a sense of the absolute substance, the free and subjective activity of the concept, but yet not fully conceive
it? Conversely, one may ask why the Subjective Logic will be devoting its entire
second section to the explication of the processual and structural modalities of
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objectivity. Does the latter duplicate actuality? Is it anything more than a

duplication?
To this, one can already answer that the Subjective Logic, more precisely the
Doctrine of the Concept, is the most original part of the Science of Logic, the
one in which the Hegelian dialectical logic exposes itself with its full power and
magnitude. The name chosen by Hegel should not confuse us. And even if the
first section deals with Subjectivity, through the clarification of the concept, the
judgment, and the syllogismwhich are indeed the traditional notions of logic
it is in order to substitute for their usually accepted formal understanding the
processual and dialectical development of their speculative meaning. But this
time, contrary to what happened in the Objective Logic, it is not in order to confront or refute the tradition. The self-unfolding of the concept takes place on its
own, by its own initiative and its full creative power. What is aimed at here is
not exposing in a subjective manner the process of the determinations of thinking, but instead proving that all of these determinations need to be filled out and
enriched by a motion of exteriorization and objectivation which seems to take
up, at another level and under a different register, that which the process of actuality had already shown us. To clarify in advance the issue at stake, we shall
admit that logical essences only concern reality and that their atemporality,
underlined by the etymology of essence in German (wesen), is valid only as involved in the actuality and objectivity of nature and spirit. Without the process
of objectivation, in which it invests itself totally, the subjective concept would
not escape abstraction and formalism, and we would then return to a Kantian
account of empty concepts without intuitions. We shall also notice that the radically novel character of the Doctrine of the Concept will be expressed by a new
mode of processuality, beginning with the self-development of the concept, that
is to say of the substance-subject, which emerged at the end of the objective
logic, proceeding to the subject-object which will be clarified in the second section, and ending with the idea as the unity of the concept and reality.20
The subjective concept has no other exteriority and objectivity other than the
one it provides to itself. It is certainly not a simple category or a form of thinking, but uniquely the generative process of the meaning of any reality and of any
truth: The idea is the unity of concept and objectivity, or truth, which should
not be looked upon only as an aim to which one could get close, while it (the
idea) will always remain a kind of beyond-here, but any actuality is only in so
far as it has in itself the idea and expresses it. The ob-ject, the objective and the
subjective world in general, should not simply be congruent with the idea, but
they are themselves the congruence of the concept and reality. The reality which
does not answer to (the calling of) the concept is simple phenomenon, the subjective, the contingent, and the arbitrary, which truth is not.21
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From the beginning of the first section of the Doctrine of the Conceptin
spite of the abstraction which characterizes this initial momentthis process of
development of the concept starts off with a differentiation of the universal,
which generates particularity and ends up in singularity. But it becomes obvious
right away, despite an apparently traditional terminology, that we are not dealing
here with a succession of determinations opposed to one another, but with the
self-development of the subjective and free concept in its differentiated moments. In this way, universality, particularity, and singularity are only products
explained as intra-conceptual differences of the activity of this totalizing and
complex unity, internally articulated, that Hegel calls a concept. It is true that
the concept seems to lose itself in this tension between its differentiated moments. What expresses best such a tension and this risk of loss, is the judgment,
this partition at the origin (Ur-teil) which, starting over from the being-there,
takes us again to the concept through the mediation of reflection and necessity.
Far from being, as the tradition wanted it, a mode of connecting, the act of judging is quite the contrary: it is that through which the original unity of the concept
manifests its power of division and splitting. The judgment bears witness to the
way the development of the concept takes charge of the critical, negative, and
divisive moments of understanding, through which it re-exposes and re-totalizes
all the modalities of becoming mentioned above: This meaning of judgment is
to be understood as the objective meaning of this same (judgment), and at the
same time as the true (form) of the anterior forms of becoming.22
As Hegel makes it clear in this text, it is about avoiding an interiority still too
subjective in order to make progress toward an objectivity, which will only be
reached after the syllogism works out a reconciliation by the switching of the
terms (extreme and middle) of its different figures. The subjective concept will
have thus totally unfolded its different moments (universality, particularity, and
singularity) and will have achieved its process of realization, reaching for itself
an actuality which initially was only in itself. This achievement is reached
through and made possible by the overcoming (Aufhebung) of the mediation:
The syllogism is mediation, the whole concept in its being-so. Its motion is the
overcoming of this mediation, in which nothing is in itself and for itself, but
each term is only through the mediation of another. Consequently the result is an
immediacy which has come to daylight through the overcoming of the mediation, a being which is identical to its mediation, a being which is concept established in itself through and by its being another. This being is consequently a
thing which is in and for itselfan objectivity.23
This second section develops the proper speculative meaning of the objectivity in the three chapters devoted respectively to Mechanism, Chemistry, and Teleology. This terminology should not confuse us. If it is true that these terms
seem to refer mainly to the content of positive and scientific disciplines, even
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borrowing some examples from them, we must nevertheless make clear what the
issue at stake in this section is. We should not forget that if the calling of philosophy is to conceive that which is, it is because the concept is not foreign to what
is real, but, on the contrary, is immanent in it. At the very beginning of the Philosophy of Nature, speaking about the teleological relationship, one of the forms
of objectivity, Hegel comes to the following conclusion: The teleological relationship requests for itself to be seized in a deeper manner than the external and
finite relationships; it requests to be looked upon according to the manner of the
concept, which by its nature speaks immanently and absolutely. Consequently it
24
is immanent in nature as such.
Hegel never lost his interest in the positive sciences; indeed he never ceased
to question them about their philosophical status, whether it be in the Philosophy
of Nature or in the Philosophy of Spirit. But the exigencies and the rigor of the
concept do not tolerate vagueness and representative confusions. One must
therefore precisely differentiate that which belongs to conceptual logic and that
which is the result of empirical generalizations: Philosophy should not be a narration of that which happens, but the knowledge of that which in it is true and
stems from truth. One must understand that which, in the narration, appears to
be pure happenstance.25 What is at stake here is nothing else but the functional
and structural modalities of the objectifying process of the concept, whether it
manifests itself in a mechanistic, chemical, or teleological manner; it does not
apparently matter whether this be in the realm or nature or in the realm of spirit.
Here too, through an anticipation which might be enlightening, what is at stake
is the testing and checking of the relevance, validity, and legitimacy of the Ontological Argument, the claim about relationship between thinking and being (or
existence) which has generated so many controversies since Anselm stated it
and Kant refuted it.26 One should add, in order to provide a balanced account,
that the exposition of teleology ends with the presentation of three syllogisms
which state the actual modalities of the realization of the freedom of the subjective concept, modalities involved in the exteriority and necessity of objectivity,
which confirm concretely the conclusion of the Doctrine of the Essence. Far
from being a secondary element of the Doctrine of the Concept, this second section works as a turntable which leads to the outcome of the whole logical process: the emergence of the idea, the unity and identity of the subjective concept
and objective reality. There are no more background worlds, first cause, or absolute origin left; what opens up now is a space for truth and liberty.
Nevertheless, objectivity seems to mean the mere advent of a new form of immediacy, coming after all the former ones, from being-there to existence to substantial actuality. But each of them got its specific meaning from the locus it
occupied in the processual linking of the acts of thinking and from the function it
fulfilled within the bosom of the logical articulation of the categories. Objectivity
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ACTUALITY AND OBJECTIVITY

enjoys a privilege: not only does it proceed from a sui genesis processual mode,
which the development (Entwicklung) of the concept is, but it designates, inside
the whole logical discourse, the ultimate reemergence of being out of its mediation. This is why it retotalizes within itself all the forms of immediacy prior to
itself, bestowing upon them additional concretization, wealth and truth: The
concept, even as formal (concept), already immediately contains being, in a truer
27
and richer manner. As negativity relating to itself, it is singularity.
It is precisely this rigorous respect paid to the processual linking which will
give back to the Ontological Argument the authentic meaning which Kant had
denied it. It is not about, as in the Objective Logic, going from being to concept,
but it is about explaining the movement of concretization and interiorization of
the exteriority through which the concept provides itself with its proper being,
up to the moment when its subjective form wholly coincides with its objective
content. It is easy to recognize here the criticism and the refutation of the
Kantian conception of objectivity implied by this account of the encounter between the subjective forms of thinking and their empirical intuitive contents.
For now, however, mechanismwhich should not be mistaken for the mere
mechanical interpretation of material phenomenaseems to force us to tackle
objectivity under its most abstract and exterior aspect, wherein the concept is at
risk of preserving nothing of its rich and complex subjective unity; rather, by
mixing with it, it is at risk of falling into the most extreme exteriority. It is this
contradiction which the concept will have to go through, reduce, and overcome
along the way of its process of objectivation: The object is consequently the absolute contradiction of what subsists in itself in diverse multiplicity and what
subsists not in itself completely in itself.28
The account of mechanism makes clear the modalities according to which this
contradiction mediates itself. It starts by recording the spreading-out of the conceptual unity into a plurality of diverse objects, each indifferent to the other and
autonomous: The mechanistically determined object is the immediate object,
the indifferent one. It contains, truly, the difference, but the diverse (elements)
29
behave as indifferent to each other and their linking is merely exterior.
At first, mechanism tackles the object according to a double exteriority, to itself and to the others, which is the presupposition the concept provides for itself
before it is able to posit this presupposition as its own. It does not yet recognize
its own immanent activity. Mechanism, which stems immediately from the overcoming of the mediation, expresses the misunderstanding or the concealment of
the conceptual energy and its creative power in things, because it only keeps
track of the results of the activity of the concept and does not care about the process which has enabled them to be. It is therefore not surprising if one sees here
some logical moments, overcome for a long time, for example, processes of
quantification which belong to the indifferent determination, creeping back at
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this point. This indifferent exteriority entails that the mechanical objects can
fuse, aggregate, or mix. The mechanical process itself will only, very partially
and insufficiently, be able to rid itself of the abstraction and one-sidedness
which characterizes objectivity in the sphere of mechanism, as the principle or
law of inertia bears witness. It is only with the absolute mechanism and the categories of gravity, center, and law, the latter being assimilated to a productive
ability, that the reinvestment and the interiorization of the mechanical exteriority
will begin to move toward the conceptual unity.
Concerned about the quasi-universal hegemony of mechanism, Hegel recognized its abstraction and its limits, and promoted and justified an alternative, dynamic conception of nature. But mechanism sought to encompass more than the
mere material, kinematic, and mechanical spheres. It reached out, for example,
to mnemological techniques in psychology, to the syllogistic organization of
economic relationships in the realm of needs, to the relation between individualcitizens and the power of government, and to the plans of politics: Mechanism,
as the first form of objectivity, is also this category which is offered at first to reflection when one looks upon the objective world, (a category) which this (first
form of objectivity) very often stays at. It is nevertheless a superficial and an impoverished way to think about the objective world. It cannot suffice either for
nature, still less, for the spiritual world.30
The rediscovery of the syllogistic process at the end of the account concerning
mechanism explains the reemergence of the totalizing, differentiating, and dynamic conceptual structure, which enables the transition toward a new sphere of
objectivity which Hegel will call chemism. In spite of being rather short, just a
few pages, this chapter fulfills an important logical function. First, it mediates
the extremes of objectivity which mechanism and teleology represent. Moreover, even if this title bears witness to Hegels undeniable interest in contemporary scientific disciplines, such as electromagnetism or post-Lavoisian
chemistry, it would be erroneous to limit chemism to these fields. In fact, Hegel
himself takes great care to warn the reader against any attempt to reduce the
content and the meaning of this chapter to the possible explanation of natural
phenomena: About the expression chemism, for the relationship of the difference of the objectivity, as it has been drawn, one can notwithstanding notice that
its objectivity should not be understood here as if this relationship were presenting itself only under the guise of the natural elements, chemism strictly so
called. The meteorological relationship should already be considered as a process whose parts are more of the nature of physical elements than chemical ones.
In the living, the sexual relationship finds itself under this schema; with the spiritual relationships of love, friendship, etc., as well. It constitutes their formal
base.31
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ACTUALITY AND OBJECTIVITY

In fact, in spite of the nature of the chosen examples (the acid-base relationship and the neutral product), what is really at stake in this chapter has to do
with the explanation, deeper than mechanism, of the contradiction between the
conceptualization of objectivity, as structure, on its way to being interiorized, on
one hand, and as the reciprocal relationships of objects in their exteriority, on
the other. Chemism has a generalized relational character since the specific
properties of the bodies stem directly from the phenomena of exchange, combination, or exclusion. Even before reaching the explanation of the chemical process, the consideration of the object bears witness of its processual structure:
The more determined bodies can not be presupposed as if one could foresee the
guise under which they behave thereafter in the process; they quite the contrary
have their first and essential determination only according to the locus which is
theirs in the chemical process.32
In other words, the chemical process corresponds, in the sphere of objectivity,
to the differentiating activity of the judgment in the sphere of subjectivity. This
implies that since the concept reaches the judgment only through an internal differentiation, similarly here the chemical objects have been negatively brought
back to the unity and to the totality of the process that engenders them. Thus
each body carries in itself, in its identity in itself, the necessity of its differentiating relationship to the others. The external aspect has undoubtedly been reduced
compared to the mechanical one, but it nevertheless remains external. The concept, which has wrestled with the first two moments of objectivity, will only be
able to free itself from the objective necessity by the mediation of the teleological relationship, the setting and the carrying through of an end: The liberation
of the concept which is still only present in itself in mechanism and chemism, is
the concept thus existing for itself as the end.33
The explanation of the teleological relationship, the last moment of the process of objectivation of the concept, will reveal itself as extremely complex but
will open up drastically new perspectives to which a fundamental function will
be assigned not only for the self-development of the concept but for the exposition of the whole logical process as well. Therefore this acknowledgement by
Hegel, which is also a warning to the reader: In so far as here, in the sphere of
objectivity, where its determinateness has the form of an indifferent exteriority,
the concept is in a reciprocal-action with itself, the presentation of its motion becomes difficult and complicated in double manner, since it is immediately itself
that which is doubled up, and because always a first one is also a second.34
If chemism reactivated objectively the differentiating activity of the judgment,
the teleological relationship will reinvest the syllogistic structure, not under the
still subjective and formal aspect of the permutability of the terms, but under the
concrete form of the relationship of the concept to itself through the mediation
of the objectivity: The relationship of finality is more than the judgment; it is
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the syllogism of the free and autonomous concept which syllogizes itself with it35
self through the objectivity.
In other words, the objectivity, which had emerged from the overcoming of
the mediation, will reestablish itself at the end of its process, thus reaching the
unification and the identification of the subjective identity and the objective
difference of the concept under the successive denominations: the concrete uni36
versal, the rational in its existence, and finally the Idea. If one wants to
understand the specificity and the originality of the meaning Hegel gives to the
teleological relationship, one should unfold for oneself the elements of its process. The category of finality has always been a major subject of philosophical
reflection: from Aristotle to Descartes, from Spinoza to Leibniz and Kant, it
never ceased to stir the most heated debates. One should therefore not be surprised to notice that Hegel took his own stand on this issue, on the one hand in
relation to some of the philosophers who came before him and, on the other
hand, in order to elaborate the speculative meaning of finality according to the
exigencies not only of the motion of objectivation of the concept but also
according to the locus it occupies and the function it fulfills within the entire
logical process: The objective world can offer mechanical and final causes;
their existence is not the yardstick of truth, but truth is rather the criterion
enabling the knowledge of these existences and the truth of their existence.37
If finality, as opposed to mechanism, seems to refer more to the realm of life
and its biological determinations, as will be verified in the following chapter of
the Science of Logic, nonetheless one should not narrow its meaning to biological determinations, since it deals as much, and even more, with anthropological,
political, and historical domains, and the religious as well, and consequently
with the whole realm of what Hegel calls Spirit, whether it be subjective, objective, or even absolute. We are coming here across the thread which has been
guiding us all along this paper, the quotation from the Preface to the Philosophy
of Right which provided the incentive for this enquiry.
Hegels denigration of a theological interpretation of finality is based upon
its purely exterior, finite, and contingent interpretation of finality. Mechanism
should at least be credited with offering an immanent understanding of its
objects acknowledged in their own contingency. One might add, indeed, that
this theological interpretation of finality very often comes with a providential
and miraculous heterogeneity between the transcendent cause and its finite and
worldly effects. Kant was able to rehabilitate teleology by rigorously differentiating external and internal finality, raising the latter to the level of reason and
the idea. Nevertheless, Kants presentation and the solution to the Third
Antinomy of the transcendental Ideas puts teleology in jeopardy since it assumes an opposition between liberty and necessity. Here, as it will become
clearer and clearer, lies the main issue concerning the teleological relationship,
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and consequently the process of objectivation of the concept. If, as Hegel

38
writes, the relation-of-finality proves itself as the truth of mechanism, it then
becomes indeed the fulfillment and the achievement of the process of
objectivation of the concept, that is to say the actual realization of liberty in the
world. The opposition of finality to mechanism and chemism is devoid of any
relevance, since teleology is nothing but their extension and their dialectical
reemergence, as it will be later become clear when considering the part performed by the means in order to reach the end. The absolute negativity thus
operates a return in itself by an Aufhebung of the immediate represented by
mechanism and the mediated represented by chemism.
At the beginning of the teleological relationship, there is what Hegel calls the
subjective end, a tension (Streben) or a drive (Trieb) which, in order to realize itself, presupposes a given world facing it. Nevertheless this end remains indeterminate as long as the decision (Entschluss) to get oneself involved in the world
and confront it in order to realize oneself does not intervene; in brief, it becomes
determinate with an opening and unfolding toward the end by an active motion
which effectuates the end. The term decision refers to a fundamental moment
of any activity. One will find it, for example, at the end of the Science of Logic,
when the absolute idea determines itself as nature, and in the Philosophy of
Right as well, where it corresponds to the unique and ultimate exercise of the
singular of power of the prince.39 Starting with the subjective setting of an end to
reach for, the structure of any actual realization, of any true and effective action,
becomes knowable. This is true in any domain: material, social, political, ethical, or spiritual. We thus know that every action is finalized and that every finality implies the unity and the identity of a subjective, conceptual, and rational
decision with an immediately given or presupposed objectivity.
Still this subjective end should have the use of the means of its realization.
The means play the role of a middle term between the end (and the subjective
decision) and the action objectively carried out. Nevertheless, this middle term
remains somehow formal since one and the same means can be used to satisfy
different ends, and since one and the same end can be obtained with various
means. An element of exteriority remains which confirms the relative independence of the means in relation to the end. The means belong indeed to the realm
of material and mechanical determinations by which the means are able to efficiently intervene upon the immediate objectivity. But when an object becomes a
mediated instance working for the end, it is not simply an object anymore. This
Hegel summarizes in a very dense statement: The means is object, in itself the
totality of the concept.40
However, this is still concept in itself and not as wholly developed and negatively reflected in itself. If the subjective project, providing itself with appropriate means, has begun a process of realization, a process has certainly started, but
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for all that this does not imply that it has reached the end of its objective fulfillment. The syllogistic linking of the moments of the finalized activity remain imperfect because we have, on one hand, the subjective end which has provided
itself with efficient objective means, which it has worked upon and used, and, on
the other hand, the intervention of this means upon the external objectivity always presupposed and immediately given: The means has also a side according
to which it still has an autonomy in respect to the end. The objectivity linked to
the means, because it is only immediately so, remains external to it; and consequently the presupposition still remains.41
The effective modalities of this process of liberation, which the motion of realization and fulfillment of the end are, still have to be explained. In order to get
there, the external objectivity must cease to be a simply immediate presupposition; it should negatively return to the end as set by the concept itself in the process of its own objectivation. The activity of the end acquires its rational status,
which was still implicit or in itself, both by its ability to generate more and more
efficient and highly performing means and by the growing mastery that they
provide over external necessity. In such a way, finality, which has nothing to do
with anything transcendent or magical, invests itself more and more and better
and better in the objective world, constantly utilizing the subordinate moments
which mechanism and chemism are. It is this thought-out and rational mastery
of objectivity which Hegel metaphorically calls the cunning of reason, in other
words the moving of the concept into the world, its self-objectivation by the
negative and reflective return of the exteriority into its subjective interiority. It is
in these terms that one should understand the progressive and irreversible penetration of the concept and rationality into the empirical realm of natural, political, and historical phenomena.
If we go beyond the metaphor, we obtain an explanation of the characteristics
of any process of liberation, since the cunning of reason designates the painstaking journey, often overlooked and unseen, through which liberty unfolds itself in the bosom of objectivity itself, as the necessity not only reflected and
interiorized, but used and mastered. In so doing, finality transcends the realm of
the exterior and finite finality to raise itself to the level of the infinite and free
rationality which the term idea expresses. The means has thus became an authentic middle term of a syllogism now objective and concrete since the rational
concept builds its own world and thus becomes immanent. The objectivation of
the concept is without leftovers or defects, as the actuality already was. But actuality remained dependent upon the relational duality of the essentialities, and
that is not the case any more with the self-determination of the concept, whose
finalized activity is nothing but its self-realization by and through things. Such
is indeed the speculative meaning of freedom, of which teleology offers a
processual explanation. Without this overlapping, this adequation and full
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coinciding of the subjective concept and objectivity, by the mediation of the

means and the end, freedom would remain at the most a purely formal claim, if
not an illusion. The objectivation of the concept is the only way to make sure of
and verify the effective realization of freedom, because without confronting necessity and eventually mastering it, this freedom would remain a mere empty
ought-to-be. At the end of these analysis, it appears now that the subjective and
free concept is both the means to its own end and the end which this means
reaches toward and fulfills; the reciprocal status of the terms is now invested in a
circular, objective, and concrete syllogistic structure: The motion of the end has
now reached the point that the moment of the exteriority (is) not merely posited
in the concept; the concept is not only an ought-to-be or an acting towards; as
concrete totality, it is identical to the immediate objectivity.42
In conclusion, the journey we just went through brought us from the essential
actuality whose task was to get past any dual structure or opposition in favor of
an absolute and relational substantiality, the ultimate expression of the full and
complete exteriorization of the essence, to the emergence of the concept as both
subjective and free. But the latter was still in itself, the advent of rationality in
an abstract manner. It was acknowledged that such an initially subjective rationality had to prove its own actuality, a conceptual one this time and not only an
essential one, and it totally unfolded itself in and by objectivity. The process of
finalized objectivation of the concept then designated the concrete carrying-out
of its own rationality, in brief, the accession of the idea. The idea is now the ultimate and authentic reemergence of being, not as being-there or essence, but as
conceptual and rational: Being has reached the meaning of truth since the idea
is unity of the concept and reality; Being is thus now only what idea is.43
One might prefer the wording from the course of 18191820 to the quotation
from the Preface to the Philosophy of Right, because there is a more processual
ring to it. Still it remains true that both expressions do correspond to the double
motion of progression, of rational concept toward its objective being, and of
abstract being toward essence, then from essence to rational and objectivized
concept. They both convey the motion through which thinking reaches the absolute knowledge of itself of being.
NOTES
1 G.W.F. Hegel, Enzyklopdie der philosophischen Wissenschaften in Grundrisse [henceforth
cited as Enz.] 6 Anmerkung; Encyclopdie des sciences philosophiques en abrg [henceforth
cited as Enc.] I. La Science de la Logique, tr. B. Bourgeois (Paris: Vrin, 1970), pp. 169170.
II. Philosophie de la Nature, tr. M. de Gandillac (Paris: Gallimard, 1970), p. 237. III.
Philosophie de lesprit, tr. B. Bourgeois (Paris: Vrin, 1988).

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2 G.W.F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik Gesammelte Werke 9, Band 11 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner,
1978) [henceforth cited as W.L. I.], Science de la logique, I. LEtre, tr. G. Jarzyck and P.-J.
Labarrire (Paris: Aubier-Montagne, 1972), 3 vols. [henceforth cited as S.L.], pp. 5960.
3 W.L. I., 57; S.L. I., p. 80.
4 Philosophie des Rechts, die Vorlesungen von 1819/1820, ed. D. Heinrich (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp,
1983) [henceforth cited as PR], quoted by J. F. Kervegan, Principes de la Philosophie du Droit
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998), p. 15.
5 W.L. I., 63, S.L. I., p. 89.
6 Enz. 16, Anmerkung; Enc. I., p. 182.
7 W.L. I., 232; S.L. I., p. 362.
8 G.W.F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, II. ed. G. Lasson. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1975)
[henceforth cited as W.L. II.] 14; S.L. II., p. 18.
9 W.L. II., 3; S.L. II., p. 1.
10 W.L. II., 101; S.L. II., p. 145.
11 W.L. II., 347; S.L. II., pp. 2245.
12 W.L. II., 347; S.L. III., p. 199.
13 W.L. II., 184; S.L. II., p. 267.
14 E. Kant, Critique de la raison pure, tr. A Tremesaygues et B. Picaud (Paris: Presses Universitaire
de France, 1983) [henceforth cited as CRP], pp. 200205.
15 W.L. II., 176; S.L. II., p. 256.
16 Spinoza, Eth., II, prop. 40, sc. 2.
17 Enz. 158, Zusatz; Enc. I. Add., p. 589.
18 W.L. II., 186; S.L. II., p. 271.
19 Enz. 158, Zusatz; Enc. I., Add., p. 589.
20 W.L. II., 409; S.L. III., p. 276.
21 W.L. II., 408/409; S.L. III., p. 276.
22 W.L. II., 269; S.L. III., p. 105.
23 W.L. II., 352; S.L. III., p. 105.
24 Enz. 245; Enc. II, p. 237.
25 W.L. II, 226; S.L. III., p. 210.
26 Saint Anselme de Cantorbery, Proslogion, tr. A. Koyr (Paris: Vrin, 1982). CRP, 425431.
27 W.L. II., 355; S.L. III., p. 210.
28 Enz. 194; Enc. I., p. 435.
29 Enz. 194, Zusatz; Enc. I., Add., p. 609.
30 Enz. 195; Zusatz; Enc., I., Add., p. 609.
31 W.L. II, 377; S.L. III., p. 240.
32 Enz. 334, Anmerkung; Enc. II., p. 318.
33 Enc. I, Add., p. 612.
34 W.L. II., 404; S.L. III., p. 270.
35 W.L. II., 390; S.L. III., p. 270.
36 W.L. II., 390, 392, 406; S.L. III., p. 253, 256, 271.
37 W.L. II., 384; S.L. III., p. 248.
38 Ibid.
39 Cf. W.L. II., 566; S.L. III., p. 393; see also PR; 275 sq.
40 W.L. II., 396; S.L. III., p. 260.
41 W.L. II., 396; S.L. III., p. 261.
42 W.L. II., 405; S.L. III., p. 271.
43 W.L. II., 409; S.L. III., p. 276.

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