Afghanistans uncertainties set to aggravate

December

10, 2014, 12:00 pm

Afghan labourers work at a plastics recycling factory in Herat on December
8, 2014. Poverty and an ongoing insurgency by the ousted Taliban still
pose a threat to the stability of the country. AFP
In considering the history of Western involvement in Afghanistan in
particular and South-West Asia in general, it must be remembered that
although the very latest compulsion for Western military incursion into the
region came with 9/11 and the Wests pursuit of the Al-Qaeda, the US first
came into South-West Asia in a major way, in contemporary times, in the
aftermath of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. The latter was a
watershed event that led to the US losing its influence and control in the
region. Until the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Western interests in the region
were upheld by the Shah of Iran.
Is Afghanistan being left to its own devices by the West? This is the poser
which is crying out for an answer in the wake of the news that the US and
NATO are winding-up combat operations in the war-torn country.
Senior US army personnel have been quoted saying that Afghanistan is
now in a position to look after its security and defence needs on its own.
That is, it is not in need of Western assistance on this score in view of the
fact that Afghan security forces are being seen as adequately trained by

the departing Western military experts.

However, Afghanistans travails are not showing
signs of abating. The Pakistani Taliban has with
mounting frequency carried out attacks against the
Afghan security forces and Western combat troops.
Suicide bombers too have not felt constrained in
their operations. Yet, the West believes that
Afghanistan could adequately meet her security
needs.
A quick look at the Western casualty toll in Afghanistan alone would
convince the observer of the baseless nature of Western optimism on the
countrys current security questions. It is reported that some 3,500 foreign
troops, including at least 2,210 US soldiers, have been killed in
Afghanistan since 2001 when the Western military incursion into the
country was launched. Besides, the Afghan security personnel killed in
action this year have risen to 4,634 from 4,350 in 2013. In addition are
the numerous Afghan civilians who have been killed over the years in
security-related incidents.
One is compelled to conclude, then, that the US and NATO are being
unrealistic in their estimation that Afghanistan could now be relied on to
look after her essential security needs. Rather, the observer cannot be
faulted for concluding that the Western troop withdrawal is somewhat
premature, raising the risk of leaving behind a security void, which cannot
be easily filled by the Afghan security forces. One also gets the impression
that the West is intent on hastily ridding itself of its obligations in
Afghanistan.
However, the observer would be wrong to project Afghanistan as currently
lacking in political development. The democratic system in its essentials is
entrenching itself in the country and it deserves abundant praise for the
basically trouble-free manner in which the power transition from former
President Hamid Karzai to his elected successors was effected after the
presidential poll months ago, which brought some knotty governance and
constitutional issues in its wake.
Nevertheless, it is an open question whether Afghanistan is currently selfsufficient from the security and defence viewpoints. The inference is
inescapable that Afghanistan still needs to go some distance in being
effectively self-supportive in the provision of security requirements.
Besides, too glaring a security vacuum in the country may leave her affairs

open to manipulation by powerful regional actors.

But it cannot be argued from the foregoing that a Western military
presence in Afghanistan is desirable and should be winked at.
Afghanistans sovereignty and right to political self-determination must be
recognized and protected by the international community and it is a
responsibility that falls on SAARC in particular to ensure that these needs
are adequately met. One would be nave in the extreme to depend on the
West to ensure these conditions in Afghanistan.
In considering the history of Western involvement in Afghanistan in
particular and South-West Asia in general, it must be remembered that
although the very latest compulsion for Western military incursion into the
region came with 9/11 and the Wests pursuit of the Al-Qaeda, the US first
came into South-West Asia in a major way, in contemporary times, in the
aftermath of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. The latter was a
watershed event that led to the US losing its influence and control in the
region. Until the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Western interests in the region
were upheld by the Shah of Iran. The Shahs support ensured that the US
had a strong military presence in the Gulf region, on which area the West
was dependent for a considerable quantity of its oil supplies.
These were some of the considerations that led to the US supporting the
Mujaheddin resistance in Afghanistan against the Soviet military presence
in the country throughout the eighties. However, it is one of the ironies of
regional politics that the Mujaheddin turned its guns on the West
subsequently in the guise of the Taliban, which is, of course, linked to the
Al-Qaeda.
In explaining the US current efforts to disengage from Afghanistan, in a
seeming haste, it would prove useful to base ones thinking on the
hypothesis that the conduct of the West is shaped by the US current
relative self-sufficiency in oil. Among others, this factor accounts for the
present drop in oil prices which is proving detrimental to the interests of
the main oil producing and exporting countries. That is, the US relative
self-provisioning of oil is enabling her to be less concerned about the geopolitics of South-West Asia.
These developments should, ideally, lead SAARC in particular to re-think its
strategies for self-sufficiency and collective well being. Less Western
interference in the affairs of this region would enable SAARC to charter a
course that would serve its collective interests with greater independence.
Such a project must be based on the premise that the main members of

SAARC should work towards narrowing their differences. These members

must see it as compulsory that they attach priority to the collective
interests of the region.
These projects, however, are of a long term nature. Their fulfillment
depends on SAARCs inculcation of a spirit of selflessness, which is not
easy to achieve in an 'anarchic' international situation. Meanwhile,
Afghanistan would need to forge ahead with democratic development
which alone would enable it defuse the political divisions which are earning
for it almost endemic internal discord.
However, 'anarchy' brings its 'blessings'. The crumbling of the Cold War,
while making the world somewhat 'unstable', opens-up some space for
independent political policy making and economic decision-making by less
prominent but resourceful states of the current international 'order'.
Afghanistan, along with SAARC, would do well to make good use of these
openings.
Posted by Thavam