Professional Documents
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Wheels of fortune
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WHEELS OF FORTUNE
he notion that the government of an advanced industrial democracy should help take care of citizens who cannot
care for themselves is not controversial.1 Acting on this concept, in 1956, Congress amended the Social Security Act to
establish what would become the Social Security Disability
Insurance program (SSDI),2 which awards Social Security payments to those whose disability makes them unemployable.
In 1990, Congress further expanded the federal governments role in assisting the disabled by passing the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),3 which requires employers, public entities, and commercial facilities to make
reasonable accommodations for disabled individuals. These
two legislative schemes are, in theory, complementary: the
federal approach is designed to facilitate the active lives and
employment prospects of disabled individuals to the extent
possible, while offering a safety net to those unable to work
on account of their disability.
In addition, nearly 3,000 cases are filed annually in federal courts under Titles II and III of the ADA, which
govern public transportation and accommodations,11 and
which permit attorneys to win bounties in lawsuits filed
against businesses for technical violations of the accomodation provisions.12 The number of these lawsuits has
grown more than 17 percent annually, on average, over
the last seven years (Figure 3).13 (The total number of threatened with legal action by letters from lawsuit mill
lawsuits filed represents only a fraction of the businesses plaintiffs firms demanding payment.)14
Figure 1. Attorney Fees for Social Security Disability
Claims Have Roughly Tripled Since 2001
1,600
1,429
1,348 1,350
1,320
1,226
1,119
1,400
1,200
998
1,000
880
800
549
600
400
635
718 737
425
200
40
20
3,500
3,000
2,838
3,181
2,422
2,500
1,982
2,000
1,500
2,963
1,698
1,256
1,000
500
0
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
The growth of SSDI has encouragedand has been encouraged byTrial Lawyers, Inc. In 2013, more than $1.2 billion was paid out by SSDI to lawyers: money secured straight
Figure 4. Social Security Disability Insurance Benefit
Payments Have Grown Dramatically Since the
Programs Inception
Social Security Disability Insurance
Benefit Payments ($, Millions)
160,000
140,130
140,000
124,216
120,000
100,000
80,000
54,983
60,000
40,000
20,000
0
15,515
57
568
3,085
1957
1960
1970
1980
24,829
1990
2000
2010
2013
heoretically, the SSDI application process is straightforward: if a person develops a medical condition that will
prevent him from working for one year or longer, or is terminal, and he has worked for a minimum of five of the preceding ten years, he is eligible to apply for disability benefits.21
The worker then files an application with the SSA, which
passes the application on to state-level employees at the Disability Determination Services (DDS) office,22 who determine
if the applicant is: a) eligible to apply; b) disabled to the
point that basic life activities are inhibited; and c) suffering from a condition on the SSAs central list of disabilities23
or unable to perform any kind of work that exists in the
national economy.24
$6,000 per applicant can become very lucrative very quickly: the Wall Street Journal reported that in 2010, nine of the
ten highest-earning SSDI lawyers made over $2 million in
fees (and all ten made over $1.5 million).44
Such high payouts flow to the litigation industry, notwithstanding that representatives awards in SSDI filings
are capped at the lesser of 25 percent or $6,000.43 Making
Part of the reason for the sharp rise in SSDI profits for
Trial Lawyers, Inc. is, ironically, the result of Congresss
2004 decision to change the existing law so that claim-
Mental
20
14
Heart/Circulatory
27
Heart/Circulatory
Respiratory
9
Mental
18
Nervous System/Senses
Respiratory
11
Musculo-Skeletal
5
Musculo-Skeletal
4
Infectious Disease
8
8
15
Cancer
8
35
Other
Infectious Disease
Cancer
Other
Unemployment Rate
4
3
2
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
Nervous System/Senses
A Conn Game
n 2011, a Wall Street Journal report examined the uncommonly high approval rate of West Virginia Administrative Law
Judge David B. Daugherty.51 Daugherty was known for processing a large volume of SSDI cases even before SSA began
pushing ALJs to begin processing claims more quickly in 2008
(Daugherty had processed an average of 1,160 claims annually
over the preceding four years).52
He then built his disability law practice through the aggressive use of advertisingincluding billboards, television and
radio commercials, and his presence at local eventswhich
he used to recruit a large number of claimants to represent.61
Conn even hired former Miss Kentucky USA, Kia Hampton, for
one of his commercials questioning the ethics of rival disability
firm Binder and Binder.62
The Senate staff report documented that once he attracted
clients, Conn maneuvered to ensure that his cases were seen
before Daugherty.63 With Conn becoming increasingly unavailable for hearings before any ALJ other than Daugherty,
accusations of judge shopping made their way to Hearing
Office Chief Administrative Law Judge Charlie Paul Andrus,
who was responsible for overseeing all staff and administrative procedures.
In July 2006, Andrus sent out a memorandum that reminded
the Huntington office that cases from Eric Conn and Bill Redd,
another attorney who also represented a high number of claimants, were to be assigned in strict rotation to prevent the appearance of judge shopping.64 Nonetheless, there was no ban on
Lexington Herald-Leader
The staff report focused on the relationship between Daugherty and Conn, who had pulled in
over $22 million in fees paid directly to himself
from the SSDI system dating back to 2001, including $3.8 million in Daughertys last full year
as an ALJ, the third-highest payout among all
Social Security lawyers in America.57 The staff
report documented a raft of improper practices by the Conn law firm to obtain disability
benefits, inappropriate collusion between Mr.
Conn and [Daugherty], and inept agency oversight which enabled the misconduct to continue for years.58
trailer in eastern Kentucky into one of the most lucrative disability firms nationwide.59 Having begun his career as an attorney before the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims,
Conn had resigned in 2002 amid allegations of professional
misconduct to avoid further investigatory proceedings.60
AP
NPR reports that when a mill closed in Aberdeen, Washington, many former employees ended up on disability. Two
had suffered heart attacks. One had broken his leg and ankle. Another had diabetes. One of the men who had suffered
a heart attack told NPRs reporter that his dad had a heart
attack and went back to work in the mill. He said that he
would have preferred to have gone back to work, too, but
disability was the next best option.75
inder and Binder is the undisputed king of the SSDI game.81 Founded
by Harry Binder in 1975 (Harrys brother Charles joined four years later), the law firm built an empire by aggressively advertising on television
and mass transit, often featuring Charles in a suit and cowboy hat.82
Binder and Binder was already successful when, a decade ago, Congress amended Social Security Disability rules to permit nonlawyers to
represent SSDI claimants.83 The law firm responded by hiring teams of
nonlawyers to process claims and significantly increased advertising to
pull in more clients.84 The firm raked in $88 million in 2010far more
than any other firmwith Charles alone receiving over $22 million in
direct payments from government coffers.85
Binder and Binder has come under criticism from SSA for backdating
documents, while former employees have alleged that the firm withheld documents adverse to clients interests from Social Security proceedings.86 The firm insists that it has never withheld a material fact,
but former employees describe a sticker system that the firm used to
sort records, with red stickers signifying documents not to be submitted; a memo attributed to Charles Binder instructed the firms workers
that a record should be submitted to the government if it is not harmful to the client (with not harmful in bold).87
medical and work reviews to ensure that beneficiaries continue to qualify for the program, yet the 2012 U.S. Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs
Subcommittee minority staff report noted that the agency
was facing a 1.5 million case backlog in Continuing Disability Reviewsin no small part due to the programs exponential growth.88
As such, SSDI is increasingly becoming something like a
permanent welfare program. In a 2013 article, Forbes noted
that of those beneficiaries who stopped receiving benefits in
2011, only 6 percent left to return to work, while 36 percent
died, and the majority, 52 percent, left merely by virtue of
reaching the retirement age and transitioning to traditional Social Security pension benefits.89 A 2013 NPR report
noted that less than 1 percent of Americans receiving SSDI
benefits in 2011 had returned to work by 2013.90
The Social Security Disability program has grown so big
that it has been running consistent deficitsoutstripping
8
receipts from the 1.8 percent payroll tax that funds it.91 The
total dollar payout of SSDI was approximately $144 billion
in 2013, up from $72 billion in 2003.92 After running a
$75 billion deficit in 2013, the program was projected to be
bankrupt by 2016 (see Figure 8).93
Although Social Security trust funds are somewhat magical accounting numbers, the total cost of SSDI, including
related Medicare spending, is hard to ignore: about $260
billion, which, as NPR notes, is eight times more than
[the U.S.] spend[s] on welfare and more than [the U.S.]
spend[s] on welfare, food stamps, the school lunch program,
and subsidized housing combined.94
Beyond SSDIs fiscal cost, the expanded disability rolls
under the program have, unsurprisingly, coincided with a
shrinking employment rate for disabled Americans,95 even
as advances in technologies, workplace environments, and
health care have led some scholars to argue that SSDIs conception of disability should be nearing extinction.96
250,000
215,773
200,000
203,550
179,907
153,850
150,000
122,666
90,445
100,000
50,000
0
20,000
15,000
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Between 2008 and 2014, the number of Americans classified as disabled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics rose
from 28 million to 30 million, while the total number of
disabled individuals employed fell 10 percent.97 The ready
availability of SSDIeased by aggressive advertising campaigns and legal maneuverings of plaintiffs lawyers like
Charles Binder and Eric Christopher Connhas contributed to this process, as well as to the bottom line of Trial
Lawyers, Inc.
small-business shakedown:
Litigation Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act
The Americans with Disabilities Act requires businesses to
help disabled individualsdefined as those with a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major
life activity98in two main ways: (1) by making reasonable efforts to accommodate them in all employment decisions (Title I); and (2) by accommodating them in public
transport, facilities, and telecommunications (Titles II, III,
and IV, respectively).99 Litigation under the ADA varies, depending on the title under which an action originates (see
box, page 10, How ADA Litigation Works).
14,893 15,575
17,734
19,453
21,451
10,000
5,000
0
2008
25,165
25,000
are big business for the plaintiffs bar, they are somewhat
less prone to abuse than some other forms of litigation
including Title III ADA claimsboth because EEOC
must prereview claims and because each disability claim
is bound to individual circumstances, thereby generally
preventing class-action lawsuits under the ADAs employment provisions.101
Title III ADA claims, which govern public accommodation
for the disabled, have generated what legal analyst Walter
Olson calls a lawsuit mill approach akin to that employed
by patent trolls.102 Under Title III, the ADA does not itself empower private individuals to sue for money damages
for facility-related claims (see box, How ADA Litigation
Works).103 Such money damages can only be pursued in
government actions; the statutes sole remedy for individuals is injunctive relief, where a court directs a business to
stop violating the law.104 ADA claims for injunctive relief
do, however, allow successfully suing attorneys to recover
attorney fees and costs.105
In addition, various states have their own laws enabling
individuals to file lawsuits for money based on ADA violationsnotably California, Florida, and New York.106
Although statutory awards permitted under these laws are
modest, they do offer disabled individuals an incentive to
cooperate with disability lawyers to file multiple claims alleging violationsgenerating multiple awards for the plaintiff and even heftier fees for the plaintiff s lawyer (see box,
page 11, Turning Disabilities into Dollars).
Trial Lawyers, Inc.
7,188
Florida
3,303
New York
1,322
Pennsylvania
677
Texas
651
0
Federal ADA
Accommodation
Lawsuits, 2005-13
Those suing a business for failing to comply with the accommodations provisionsfor inadequate structures (such as
wheelchair ramps), or signage, or any host of technical violationsfind businesses easy targets under the ADA. Although
individual plaintiffs cannot sue for damages under the accomodations provisions of the ADA, lawyers still have incentives
to bring such cases for injunctive relief (to remedy alleged
wrongs) because the ADA allows lawyers to collect costs and
reasonable attorney fees from the defendant in the event
of a successful suit.108 In addition, many statesincluding the
ADA-litigation hotbeds of California, Florida, and New York
have their own statutes allowing plaintiffs to collect damages in
suits alleging inadequate accommodation for disabled persons
consistent with violations of the federal ADA.109
An academic study of ADA Title III filings for 2010 determined that in all but one of the top ADA-litigation districts,
the top-filing lawyer filed at least 20 percent of all cases: in
four districts, the Top Lawyer accounted for over half of all
filings.113 Between 2005 and 2013, just 31 individuals filed
56 percent of all the ADA Title III lawsuits in California.114
One plaintiff, Scott Johnson, filed more than 3,000115typically on his own behalf, as Johnson is both a quadriplegic
and an attorney.116 A sole practitioner who drives a special
wheelchair van along with a service dog, Johnson typically
settles cases for $4,000$6,000.117 Other active disability attorneys in Californiaincluding Lynn Hubbard III,
Thomas Frankovich (see box, page 11, Turning Disabilities
into Dollars), and Morse Mehrbanfile multiple cases on
others behalf, reportedly settling for much larger sums.118
Mehrban, for instance, has used about a dozen plaintiffs
for about 90 percent of his ADA lawsuit filings.119 For the
purposes of ADA litigation, these plaintiffs have to be disabled but do not have to be model citizensor, indeed,
citizens at all, as shown by Alfredo Garcia, an illegal alien
who has faced weapons, drug, and burglary charges in addition to serving as a plaintiff in more than 600 of Mehrbans ADA lawsuits.120
Another of Mehrbans favorite litigants, Tom Mundy, was an
unemployed contractor when he netted $300,000 in a single
year in ADA lawsuits. As of 2010, Mundy had filed 523
lawsuits with Mehrban.121 Despite such success, Mehrban is
Thomas Frankovich
11
provide coverage, including separate discussions of bodily injury, advertising, and wrongful eviction coverage. The Frankovich Group even offers to represent defendants in a suit against
their insurer, should the insurer refuse to provide coverage.141
Rafeedie determined that Frankovichs law firm had engaged
in a pattern of unethical behavior designed ultimately to extort
money from businesses and their insurers and issued a prefiling order requiring Frankovich to seek leave of court before
filing any new complaints under Title III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.142 The judge also referred the matter to the
state bar, which determined in 2008 that there was not clear
and convincing evidence that Frankovich had committed
moral turpitude by engaging in a scheme to extort, though
the bar did reprove him for inappropriate contact with a defendant and issued various sanctions.143
Notwithstanding the bars reproval, Frankovich was soon up
to his old tricks. In the early months of 2010, for instance,
he filed at least 23 lawsuits against mostly small, minorityowned businesses in the Mission District of San Francisco.144
In 2013, he successfully petitioned the Central District of
California to vacate Judge Rafeedies prefiling order.145 In at
least one respect, Frankovich has changed: in 2008, he finally
moved his offices out of a 100-year-old Victorian home that
was wheelchair-inaccessible and into a new space that was
(mostly) ADA-compliant.146
ago, before passing the New York bar in 2010 and expanding his business to include the Big Apple.148
You stop by a hardware store and need to use the restroom but find there are no grab (support) bars (handrails) next to the toilet. You may be entitled to $4,000.
Youre in a restaurant and want to use the restroom mirror to make yourself presentable. The mirror is mounted
too high on the wall for you to use. You may be entitled
to $4,000.147
A Path to Reform
For some time, legislators have been trying to fix ADA litigation and the SSDI program. In 2000, then-Congressman
Mark Foley, Republican of Florida, introduced a bill, the
ADA Notification Act, which would have allowed businesses 90 days to remedy an alleged violation of ADA Title
III before legal action could commence.153 Democrat Tim
Johnson of South Dakota introduced an identical bill in the
Senate.154 Despite such bipartisan cooperation, neither bill
moved out of committeenot in 2000, nor in any of the
n winter 2013, Ben-Zion Bradley Weitz found himself before Sterling Johnson, a federal judge sitting in the Eastern District of New
York in Brooklyn, who had jurisdiction over an ADA lawsuit that
Weitz and Adam Shore had filed against local sandwich shops.157
In examining Shore and Weitzs case further, Johnson was sufficiently unimpressed that he drew a comparison between their
claims to the ADA litigation previously brought in California by
Tom Frankovich on behalf of Jarek Molski, which had drawn a California judges sanction and prompted a finding that Molski was a
vexatious litigant (see box, Turning Disabilities into Dollars).159
In his case, Johnson complained that the named plaintiff, Mr.
Costello, had repeatedly not shown up in court as requested.
Johnson even sent his law clerks to the defendants restaurants,
where they made notable discoveries: Upon recently visiting each
of the businesses that were named defendants in Plaintiffs eight
lawsuits, the Court was shocked to see that most if not all of the
alleged structural deficiencies preventing access to persons with
disabilities still exist.... In fact, many of the ADA violations alleged
in the complaints filed by Plaintiff did not even exist in the first
place. For example, in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges
that Subway [restaurant] fails to provide a wheelchair accessible restroom. However, during the Court-initiated trip, it was observed that
the Subway had no restroom at all.160
Although the Second Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently reversed
Johnsons decision161ruling that sending his law clerks out to investigate was inappropriateJudge Johnsons opinion threw into serious question ADA attorneys claims that their efforts are intended
primarily to improve facilities for disabled people (and are, accordingly, successful in achieving those ends).
13
Lower statutory damages awarded to a successful plaintiff from $4,000 to $1,000 if the alleged violation is fixed
within 60 days163
Give small businesses 30 days to fix an identified violation
without penalty and cap potential damages at $2,000164
Forbid demand for money letters under disability accommodation lawsuits165
AP
14
AP
15
Endnotes
Cf. John Rawls, A Theory OF Justice 1415 (1971) (arguing that social
and economic inequalities, for example inequalities of wealth and
authority, are just only if they result in compensating benefits for
everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of
society); F.A Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 285 (1960) (noting that
[i]n the Western world some provision for those threatened by the
extremes of indigence or starvation due to circumstances beyond their
control has long been accepted as a duty of the community).
2
See generally Social Security Act Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84880, 70 Stat. 807.
3
Pub. L. 101336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990)(codified in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.A. (West Supp.1991)).
4
See generally Center for Legal Poly, Manhattan Inst. For Poly Res., Trial
Lawyers, Inc., http://www.triallawyersinc.com/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2014).
5
Under current Social Security law, attorneys or other representatives
who successfully assist applicants seeking to qualify for SSDI are entitled
to receive 25 percent of back pay dating to the onset of disability, up
to a maximum of $6,000. See 42 U.S.C. 206(a)(2)(A), 1631(d)(2)(A).
6
Chart data are derived from information offered by the Social Security
Administration. See Statistics on Title II Direct Payments to Claimant
Representatives, Social Security: Official Social Security Website,
http://www.ssa.gov/representation/statistics.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2014).
7
This American Life: 490: Trends With Benefits, WBEZ (originally aired
Mar. 22, 2013), transcript available at http://www.thisamericanlife.org/
radio-archives/episode/490/transcript.
8
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) Charges, U.S. EEOC,
http://www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ada-charges.cfm
(last visited Sept. 29, 2014).
9
See Towers Watson, 2011 Update on U.S. Tort Cost Trends 3, http://
www.casact.org/library/studynotes/Towers-Watson-Tort-Cost-Trends.pdf
(showing U.S. tort costs shrinking or growing more slowly than gross
domestic product each year from 2004 through 2010, excluding 2010
costs associated with the BP oil spill).
10
Jon Hyman, How Much Does it Cost to Defend an Employment
Lawsuit?, Workforce Blog (May 14, 2013), http://www.workforce.com/
blogs/3-the-practical-employer/post/how-much-does-it-cost-to-defendan-employment-lawsuit.
11
Table C-2: U.S. District CourtsCivil Cases Commenced, by Basis of
Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit, During the 12-Month Periods Ending
December 31, 2012 and 2013, U.S. Courts, http://www.uscourts.
gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2013/
december/C02Dec13.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2014).
12
Under Title I of the ADA, which governs employment discrimination,
individuals who successfully allege discrimination based on disability
are entitled to recover monetary damages including back pay and
their attorneys are entitled to attorneys fees and costs. See 42 U.S.C.
2000e5(g)(1), 2000e5(k). Under Title III, which governs public
accommodations, individual claimants successfully alleging that a
commercial facility is not in compliance with the ADA are entitled solely
to injunctive relief, not monetary damages, but their attorneys are
entitled to recover costs and fees. See 42 U.S.C. 12188(a)(2); see also
American Bus Assn v. Slater, 231 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C.Cir.2000) (By specifying
the circumstances under which monetary relief will be available, Congress
evinced its intent that damages would be available in no others.).
13
Chart data are derived from U.S. Courts data. See United States
Courts: Statistical Tables Archive, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/
StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/StatisticalTables_Archive.aspx
(last visited Sept. 29, 2014).
1
16
See Walter Olson, ADA and the Chipotle Experience, Cato at Liberty (July
29, 2010, 1:37pm), http://www.cato.org/blog/ada-chipotle-experience.
15
See Tad DeHaven, The Rising Cost of Social Security Disability Insurance
Policy, Poly Analysis No. 733, 3 (Cato Inst., Aug. 2013), available at
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa733_web.pdf
(citing Edward D. Berkowitz, Americas Welfare State: From Roosevelt to
Reagan 15859 (Johns Hopkins University Press 1991)).
16
See Social Security Act Amendments of 1956, supra note 2. Chart
data are derived from information offered by the Social Security
Administration. See Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance:
Table 4.A2. Disability Insurance, 19572013, U.S. Social Security
Administration, Office of Retirement and Disability Policy, Annual
Statistical Supplement, 2014,
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2014/4a.html
(last visited Sept. 29, 2014).
17
See DeHaven, supra note 15, at 4; Social Security Amendments of
1958, Pub. L. No. 85-840, 72 Stat. 1021; Social Security Amendments
of 1967, Pub. L. 90-248, 173, 81 Stat. 877.
18
See id., at 5.
19
David H. Autor, The Unsustainable Rise of the Disability Rolls in the
United States: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Options 5 (MIT
Working Paper No 12-01, Nov. 2011), available at
http://economics.mit.edu/files/7388.
20
See DeHaven, supra note 15, at 5.
21
See Autor, supra note 19, at 4.
22
Minority Staff Report of S. Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 112TH Cong., Social
Security Disability Programs: Improving the Quality of Benefit Award Decisions
10 (Comm. Print 2012), available at http://www.coburn.senate.gov/
public//index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=6f2d2252-50e8-4257-8c6f0c342896d904 [hereinafter Senate Minority Staff Report 2012].
23
See DeHaven, supra note 15, at 9.
24
Senate Minority Staff Report 2012, supra note 22, at 10.
25
See Autor, supra note 19, at 4.
26
See Autor, supra note 19, at 10.
27
See DeHaven, supra note 15, at 10.
28
Id.
29
See Chana Joffe-Walt, Unfit for Work, NPR Planet Work (2013),
http://apps.npr.org/unfit-for-work.
30
Senate Minority Staff Report 2012, supra note 22, at 22.
31
See Joffe-Walt, supra note 29.
32
See Damian Paletta, Disability-Claim Judge Has Trouble Saying No:
Near-Perfect Approval Record, Social-Security Program Strained, Wall
St. J. (May 19, 2011), available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB
10001424052748704681904576319163605918524.
33
See id.
34
Staff Report of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs,
113TH Cong., How Some Legal, Medical, and Judicial Proffesionals Abused
Social Security Disability Programs for the Countrys Most Vulnerable: A
Case Study of the Conn Law Firm 8 (Comm. Print 2013), available at
http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_
id=0d1ad28a-fd8a-4aca-93bd-c7bf9543af36 [hereinafter Senate
Committee Report 2013].
35
See id. at 11.
36
Senate Minority Staff Report 2012, supra note 22, at 3-4.
37
Id. at 21.
38
Id. at 36.
39
Id. at 37.
40
See id. at 127.
41
See DeHaven, supra note 15, at 2.
14
Id. at 37-38.
Id. at 2.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 89-91.
71
Id. at 92.
72
60 Minutes: Disability USA (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 6, 2013),
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/disability-usa/.
73
WSAZ News Staff, The Associated Press, Police Report: Possible
Attempted Suicide by Former Judge, WSAZ News Channel 3 (Oct. 18,
2013), http://www.wsaz.com/news/headlines/Local_Social_Security_
Judge_Under_Scrutiny_122259399.html.
74
The Conn Law Firm & Associates, http://mrsocialsecurity.com/ (last visited
Sept. 30, 2014).
75
See Joffe-Walt, supra note 29.
76
See DeHaven, supra note 15, at 1.
77
See id. at 2.
78
Jordan Weissman, Disability Insurance: Americas $124 Billion Secret
Welfare Program, Atlantic (Mar. 25, 2013), available at http://www.
theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/03/disability-insurance-americas124-billion-secret-welfare-program/274302.
79
Disabled worker beneficiary statistics by calendar year, quarter, and
month, Social Security Admin.,
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/dibStat.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2014).
80
Senate Minority Staff Report 2012, supra note 22, at 1.
81
Binder & Binder, http://www.binderandbinder.com/ (last visited Sept. 30,
2014).
82
See Jillian Kay Melchior, Binder on Binder & Binder: A Disability Lawyer
Profits Off His Radical Political Ideas, Natl Rev. (July 8, 2013), available
at http://www.nationalreview.com/article/352741/binder-binder-binderjillian-kay-melchior; see also Binder & Binder, About Binder & Binder,
http://www.binderandbinder.com/About-Us/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2014).
83
See Social Security Protection Act of 2004, supra note 45.
84
Paletta & Searcey, supra note 44.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Senate Minority Staff Report 2013, supra note 22, at 13.
89
Richard Finger, Fraud And Disability Equal A Multibillion Dollar Black
Hole For Taxpayers, Forbes (Jan. 14, 2013), available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardfinger/2013/01/14/fraud-anddisability-equal-a-multibillion-dollar-balck-hole-for-taxpayers/.
90
Joffe-Walt, supra note 29.
91
See DeHaven, supra note 15, at 2.
92
Id.
93
See Melchior, supra note 82; see also Senate Minority Staff Report
2012, supra note 22, at 1.
94
This American Life, supra note 7.
95
See Autor, supra note 19, at 8; see also Senate Minority Staff Report
2012, supra note 22, at 1.
96
See Autor, supra note 19, at 5.
97
Based on data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. See Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Data Retrieval: Labor Force Statistics (CPS), Household Data,
Table A-6, http://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cpsatab6.htm (showing
September 2008 population of 27.8 million disabled individuals and
September 2014 population of 29.7 million individuals, and number of
employed disabled individuals falling from 5.8 million to 5.2 million over
the same time period) (last visited Sept. 29, 2014).
98
42 U.S.C.A. 12102(1)(A) (2009); 28 C.F.R. 36.104 (2010) available
at http://www.ada.gov/regs2010/titleIII_2010/titleIII_2010_regulations.
htm#a104.
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