SPECPRO+CASE+DIGESTS+ Rule 73 To 78

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests
RULE 73
RULE 73
ISSUE: Whether questions of jurisdiction by reason of

residence may be raised by means of certiorari
BENEDICTO v. JAVELLANA (10 Phil 197)

Facts:
MAXIMO Jalandoni- testator; will provides:
Hacienda Lantad- divided, to Maximo and other to
sisters. On the entire estate, an obligation was
imposed that all debts shall be paid, provided that of
the products which each parcel may yield shall be
devoted to the payment of debts and should the be
insufficient, 2/3 or total amount shall be applied; in
GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
A-1
VDA DE MANZANERO v. CFI of BATANGAS (61 Phil 850)

FACTS:
1. Esteban Manzanero (Esteban) died in the provincial
hospital of Albay.
2. His brother, Fortunato filed a sworn application with
CFI of Batangas (CFI) praying for a summary
settlement of Estebans estate. He likewise alleged that
Esteban had no property except a life insurance policy
worth PhP5,000 and that Esteban was indebted to him
for PhP500. More importantly, he alleged that Esteban
had legal residence in Batangas.
3. CFI issued an order for hearing and directed that notice
be published in a newspaper in Batangas.
4. Petitioner (wife of Esteban) did not appear at the
scheduled hearing. Nevertheless, the judge ruled that
Esteban was a resident of Batangas, and that his
property (insurance policy worth PhP5,000) be
distributed after payment of PhP500 to Fortunato.
5. Thus, Filipinas Assurance Company was directed to pay
the heirs of Esteban, the proceeds of his insurance
policy. Net proceeds of the insurance policy were sent
to the heirs, pursuant to the order.
6. Petitioner prayed that the money be returned and
delivered to her.
Page
SANDOVAL v. SANTIAGO (83 Phil 784)
RULING: (Not for this case.)

1. Under Section 603 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
jurisdiction assumed by CFI for settlement of the
estate, so far as it depends on the place of residence of
the person or location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal
from that court, in the original case, or when the want
of jurisdiction appears on the record.
2. The want of jurisdiction, in this case, does not clearly
appear from the pleadings and records of the CFI.
3. The communication of the municipal treasurer of Albay
stating that Esteban was a registered voter therein,
and that he resided there before his death, does not
form part of the record of the CFI.
4. Since lack of jurisdiction does not appear from the
records, certiorari does not lie.
5. Under the law, petitioner has a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy for the enforcement of her rights.
CASIANO v. MALOTO (70 SCRA 232)

Facts:
- Adriana Maloto Died in Iloilo City on 10/20/63 her
place of Residence, and her niece and nephews
(Aldina, Constancio, Panfilo, and Felino) commenced
intestate proceedings believing their aunt died
intestate.
The niece and nephews executed an extra-judicial

partition of Adrianas estate which was approved by
the court on 3/21/64, and each got share each
On 4/1/67 a document dated 1/3/40 surfaced
purporting to be Adrianas Will, which shows that the
niece and nephews still as heirs, but with Aldina and
Constancio getting a bigger share (w/ Asiso de Molo,
Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor as
devisees/legatees)
Aldina and Constancio (together w/ the other
devisees/legatees of the Will) filed an MR to the
previous special proceedings No. 1736 for annulment
of such proceedings and allowance of the Will, this of
course was opposed by the other 2 nephews Panfilo
and Felino
The court denied the MR for being filed out of time,
and the petitioners (Adriana, Constancio etc.) filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus which was
likewise denied by the SC because the more
appropriate remedy is to initiate separate proceedings
for the probate of the alleged will in question
Thus, the petitioners filed for the probate of the will,
now special proceedings No. 2176, and the oppositors
contested claiming the testatrix had revoked and
destroyed the will, and the previous intestate
proceedings constitute res judicata. The Probate Court
dismissed the proceedings on the ground of res
judicata, and the finding of the court in the previous
special proceeding No. 1736 that the will had been
destroyed and revoked.
3D (2008-2009)
Page
case of balance of such products, it shall remain with

the administrator for settlement of other charges.
MAXIMINO- petitioned the administrator Javellana
that he be directed to pay MAXIMINO a sum in lieu of
land donated to him; products of the land had already
been applied to payment debts and liabilities
Issue: W/N MAXIMINO is entitled to payment in lieu of land
donated?
Held:
The will of MAXIMO must be complied with. All those
who are benefited have not received from the testator
a universal succession to his estate but merely as
legatees without right to receive their share of the
property of the deceased until after his debts have
been paid.
Any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection
to the authentication and every demand or claim
which any heir, legatee or party in interest in a
testate or intestate succession may make, must be
acted upon and decided within same special
proceedings, not in a separate action.
A-2

RULE 73

RULE 73
Held:
No to Both.
This Petition is meritorious. The motion to reopen proceedings
was filed out of time, and it is not proper to make a finding in
an intestate estate proceeding that the discovered will had
been revoked, it had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition
for probate of the alleged will. Thus, the finding in special
proceeding No. 1736 is not a bar to the present petition, and
the lower court is directed to proceed to hear the petition in
special proceeding No. 2176
CUIZON v. RAMOLETE (129 SCRA 495)
BERNARDO v. CA (7 SCRA 367)
Facts:
Eusebio Capili died before her wife Hermogena Reyes.
Eusebios will was admitted to probate wherein he left his
properties to his wife and cousins. Hermogena Reyes then
during the pendency of the probate proceedings died
intestate, thus she was substituted by her collateral relatives
as petitioned by Bernardo, the executor of Eusebios estate
The probate court then issued an order declaring the donation

void as it is prohibited by law and disapproved both projects
of partition, ordering the executor to file another dividing the
property of Eusebio according to the will noting that such
properties were conjugal properties of the deceased spouses.
Issue:
Whether the probate court erred in applying the exception to
the general rule that it has no power to adjudicate title in a
probate proceedings?
Held: NO
Ratio:
The Court consistently held that as a general rule, question as
to title of property cannot be passed upon on testate or
intestate proceedings, except when one of the parties prays
merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the
property, in which case the probate court may pass
provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final
3D (2008-2009)
A-3
Whether the court in intestate, special proceeding No. 1736

had jurisdiction to rule on the discovered will?
Whether the finding that the will was revoked and destroyed
in special proceeding No. 1736 constitutes res judicata in
special proceeding No. 2176?
Bernardo then filed a project of partition in accordance with

the will of Eusebio which however was opposed by
Hermogenas relatives. They submitted their own project of
partition claiming that of the properties mentioned in the
will of Eusebio on the theory that the properties belonged not
to Eusebio but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses. This
was questioned by Bernardo claiming that the properties
belonged exclusively to Eusebio and not to the conjugal
partnership because Hermogena donated to Eusebio her half
share of such partnership.
Page
Issue:

RULE 73
URIARTE v. CFI NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (33 SCRA 252)

Facts:
Don Juan Uriarte y Goite died. Vicente Uriarte filed with the
CFI of Negros Occidental a petition for the settlement of the
estate of the late Don Juan (Special Proceeding No. 6344)
alleging that, as a natural son of the latter, he was his sole
heir, and that, during the lifetime of said decedent, Vicente
had instituted a civil case in the same Court for his compulsory
acknowledgment as such natural son.
Vicente Uriarte opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss

contending that, as the Negros Court was first to take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the deceased
Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over
same pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. The
Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's motion to
dismiss and dismissed the Special Proceeding No. 6344
pending before it.
Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special Proceeding
No. 51396 pending in the Manila Court, asking for leave to
intervene therein; for the dismissal of the petition and the
annulment of the proceedings had in said special proceeding.
This motion was denied by said court.
3D (2008-2009)
A-4
In this case the matter in controversy is the question of

ownership of certain properties involved whether they
belong to the conjugal partnerships or to the husband
exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of
the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the
conjugal partnership in order to determine the state of the
decedent which is to be distributed among the heirs including
of course the widow represented by her collateral relatives
upon petition of the executor himself and who have appeared
voluntarily. There are no third parties whose rights may be
affected. Therefore the claim being asserted is one belonging
to an heir to the testator, and, consequently it complies with
the requirement of the exception that the parties interested
are all heirs claiming title under the testator.
Higinio Uriarte, nephew of the deceased, filed an opposition

to the petition alleging that Don Juan had executed a Will in
Spain. He further questioned Vicente's capacity and interest to
commence the intestate proceeding. Juan Uriarte Zamacona,
the other private respondent, commenced Special Proceeding
No. 51396 in the CFI of Manila for the probate of a document
alleged to be the last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite,
and on the same date he filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344
of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the same on the
following grounds: (1) that, as the deceased Juan Uriarte y
Goite had left a last will, there was no legal basis to proceed
with said intestate proceedings, and (2) that Vicente Uriarte
had no legal personality and interest to initiate said intestate
proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of the
decedent.
Page
determination in a separate action. It has also been held that

when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is
optional to them to submit to the probate court a question as
to title to property, and when so submitted said probate court
may definitely pass judgment thereon. Provided that interests
of third persons are not prejudiced.

RULE 73
In accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction,

testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings
for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if
in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court
of first instance it is found it that the decedent had left a last
2. Whether the Manila Court erred in not dismissing Special

Proceeding No. 51396 notwithstanding prior filing of Special
Proceeding No. 6344 in the Negros Court - NO
Wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect, and, in
the light of the circumstances obtaining in the instant case,
Vicente Uriarte has waived the right to raise such objection or
is precluded from doing so by laches.
Vicente Uriarte knew of the existence of a will

executed by Don Juan since 1961 when Higinio Uriarte
filed his opposition to the initial petition filed in Special
Proceeding No. 6344;
Vicente Uriarte likewise was served with notice of the

existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the
Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its
probate with the Manila Court since 1962 when Juan
Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of
Special Proceeding No. 6344.
All these notwithstanding, it was only in1963 that he

filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No.
3D (2008-2009)
A-5
While the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance over "all

matters of probate" is beyond question, the matter of venue,
or the particular Court of First Instance where the special
proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that the
estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time
of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court
of first instance in the province in which he resided at the time
of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
court of first instance of any province in which he had estate.
Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is that of a nonresident alien (like the deceased) the Courts of First Instance
in provinces where the deceased left any property have
concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper
special proceeding for the settlement of his estate. In the case
before Us, these Courts of First Instance are the Negros and
the Manila Courts - province and city where the deceased left
considerable properties.
Page
Held:
1. Whether or not the Negros Court erred in dismissing Special
Proceeding No. 6344 - NO
will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace

the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an
administrator had already been appointed, the latter being
required to render final account and turn over the estate in his
possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This,
however, is understood to be without prejudice that should
the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the
proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted
to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of
a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the

probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all
the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would
put a premium on his negligence. This Court is not inclined to
annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the
latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result
would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some
other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the
present where the objection against said proceedings is raised
too late.
Vicente Uriarte is entitled to prosecute Civil Case No. 6142
until it is finally determined, or intervene in Special Proceeding
No. 51396 of the Manila Court, if it is still open, or to ask for
its reopening if it has already been closed, so as to be able to
submit for determination the question of his acknowledgment
as natural child of the deceased testator, said court having, in
its capacity as a probate court, jurisdiction to declare who are
the heirs of the deceased testator and whether or not a
particular party is or should be declared his acknowledged
natural child.
PCIB v. ESCOLIN (56 SCRA 266)
FACTS:
- CHARLES Hodges and LINNIE Hodges were spouses.
- Both executed similar wills, whereas the decedents entire
estate shall go to the surviving spouse and that spouse may do
whatever s/he pleases, with the condition that when the

surviving spouse likewise passes away, the residual estate
shall pass on to the surviving brothers/sisters of the (first)
decedent [and if brother or sister dies, the corresponding
heirs shall represent, etc.]
- LINNIE Hodges died ahead of CHARLES. CHARLES was the
named administrator in LINNIEs will.
- As administrator, CHARLES was allowed by the probate court
to do several acts of administration, including continuing the
business run by CHARLES and LINNIE.
- CHARLES made annual reports to the probate court and at
some point he allegedly renounced all the inheritance he got
from LINNIE *in favor of LINNIEs siblings+.
- Shortly after this alleged renunciation, on December 25,
1962, CHARLES died.
- CHARLES died without having ever liquidated or closed or
distributed LINNIEs estate.
- Upon CHARLES death, AVELINA Magno was named
administratrix of LINNIEs estate and as Special Administratrix
of CHARLES estate. Nothing else happened in LINNIEs estate
henceforth. (AVELINA was assigned because she was the one
employee closest to the spouses and she had been with them
for more than a decade.)
- AVELINA carried on acts of administration in both estates
until she was joined by CHARLES brother, JOE Hodgens, as coadministrator in CHARLES estate.
- AVELINA and JOE were subsequently replaced by several
other individuals until only PCIB was appointed sole
administrator (there were no records of why the changes took
place and why PCIB ended up the sole admin)
3D (2008-2009)
Page
51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to

intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of all
the proceedings had therein up to that date.
A-6

RULE 73

RULE 73
RULING:
(1) Yes, LINNIEs estate still exists and the proceedings
therefor have not closed.
While it is true that LINNIE adjudicated her entire estate to
CHARLES, she still had her own estate for which the
proceedings in which AVELINA is administratrix could proceed.
LINNIEs estate consists of those properties which are her part
in the conjugal partnership. However, given the murky factual
circumstances, the Court cannot make a final determination
which of the properties in the conjugal partnership belong to
LINNIEs estate.
The Supreme Court stated that two hanging issues are better
left to the trial court since these are issues of fact: (a) whether
CHARLES indeed renounced LINNIEs inheritance and (b)
whether there is a conflict of applicable laws (laws of the
Philippines and that of Texas, where the couple has
properties), applying the renvoi doctrine and Art. 16 of the
Civil Code.
For the meantime, the Supreme Court advised both
the administrators to act in conjunction with the other and
never proceed with one estate independently.
DEL ROSARIO v. DEL ROSARIO (67 Phil 652)
FACTS:
3D (2008-2009)
A-7
ISSUE: (1) Whether there exists, still, LINNIEs estate (on the
theory that her estate is practically closed since she
bequeathed everything to her husband)?
(2) If so, how much does she still have that would go to
her siblings? Are the siblings entitled to anything (on the
theory that the will contained substitutions)?
(2) LINNIEs siblings (or representatives) are entitled to

LINNIEs estate which should not be less than one-fourth of the
community estate at the time of her death, minus whatever
CHARLES may have gratuitously disposed of during his
administration and as sole heir. If CHARLES sold the properties
for consideration, such consideration shall continue to form
part of LINNIEs estate.
With regard to the alleged substitutions, there was no
legal substitution to begin with. CHARLES being named by
LINNIE as her sole heir (they had no other heirs), albeit subject
to the condition that LINNIEs relatives would inherit whatever
is left, but CHARLES not having to preserve anything for the
subsequent heirs this setup is not the substitution
contemplated under the Civil Code. Neither is this prohibited
by law.
Page
- Both proceedings in LINNIEs and CHARLES estates

proceeded independent of each other AVELINA acting as
admin for LINNIEs estate and PCIB for CHARLES.
- Both administrators hired lawyers and eventually had to pay
substantial amounts out of the estate. Both proceedings went
on independently until such time that conflicts arose between
administrators with respect to safekeeping the properties,
liquidating the estate, etc.
- The instant petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed by
PCIB against the court which handled both estate proceedings.
The judge (ESCOLIN) kept approving motions apparently from
both estates, which led to confusing or even conflicting issues.

RULE 73
RULING:
Yes. The appealed judgment is affirmed.
3D (2008-2009)
A-8
ISSUE: Whether granting the demurrer was proper.
DOLAR v. ROMAN CATHOLIC (68 Phil 727)

FACTS:
1. The deceased had two wives. He had 5 children from
his first marriage, and another 4 children from the
second.
2. He left a will, setting out his properties and distributing
the same to wife #2 and his children by both
marriages. He also left a legacy of PhP8,000 to be
spent for the altar of the church in Dumangas, ordering
that the sum be taken from the fruits of all the
properties before partition.
3. Wife #2 was appointed administratix. She filed a
project of partition which was not approved because
of opposition of certain heirs. Another project of
partition was filed which was also not approved
because of the opposition of the Bishop of Jaro, who
represented the Church of Dumangas. It should be
Page
- RAMON del Rosario (husband) died in 1895 and

FLORENCIA Arcega (wife) in 1933.
- RAMON died intestate and FLORENCIA administered
the conjugal properties.
- FLORENCIA acquired other properties using the fruits
of the conjugal ones.
- After RAMON died, his intestate was not commenced
and the conjugal properties were not liquidated until
FLORENCIA died, after which the latter's testamentary
proceedings were initiated and are now in progress.
- The heirs of both spouses brought this action to
recover their share not only in the conjugal properties
left by RAMON but also in those acquired by
FLORENCIA with the products of said properties.
- A demurrer (by other heirs) was interposed to the
complaint on the ground that there is another action
pending between the same parties and for the same
cause of action; that there is a defect of party plaintiffs
and party defendants, and that the complaint does not
allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
- The (probate) court sustained this demurrer and
dismissed the case. From this resolution an appeal was
taken.
Whatever law might be applicable the intestate of

RAMON del Rosario not having been commenced upon his
death in 1895 until his widow FLORENCIA Arcega also died in
1933, and the testamentary proceedings of FLORENCIA Arcega
having been subsequently initiated, wherein, among other
things, the liquidation of her conjugal properties with the
deceased RAMON del Rosario should be made the
pendency of these testamentary proceedings of the deceased
wife excludes any other proceeding aimed at the same
purpose (Zaide vs. Concepcion and Quintana, 32 Phil., 403). At
any rate, the plaintiffs have a right to intervene in these
proceedings as parties interested in the liquidation and
partition of the conjugal properties of the deceased spouses.

RULE 73
RULING:
1. Unless wife #2 and the heirs by both marriages, as well
as the Bishop of Jaro and other creditors of the estate,
come to an agreement, the partition should be made
with the intervention of all the interested parties
according to law.
2. Thus
a. All debts and administration expenses shall first
be paid
b. Conjugal properties of 1st marriage must be
liquidated to determine the shares of the
children (as heir of wife #1) and the deceased.
c. Conjugal properties of 2nd marriage must also
be liquidated to determine the share of wife #2
and that of the deceased.
d. Properties corresponding to the deceased
(from process (b) and (c)) constitute his estate.
e. Estate shall be partitioned among the ff heirs
i. Children by 1st and 2nd marriage
ii. Wife #2
ALFONSO v. NATIVIDAD (6 Phil 240)

Facts:
Alfonso: administrator of the estate of Pedro ANGELES;
sued NATIVIDAD and FLORES for the recovery of 2
separate parcels of land
NATIVIDAD land:
- ANGELES and wife obtained a loan from
NATIVIDAD and as security pledged the title deed.
Upon death of ANGELES and subsequently the
wife, NATIVIDAD waited for heirs to appear and
pay the debt.
- Claims that the property belonged wife
3D (2008-2009)
A-9
ISSUE: Distribution of the estate
f. As there are forced heirs (yeah!), the legacy

should be taken from the free portion only
(remaining 1/3). The heirs may deliver to the
legatee (Bishop of Jaro) properties equivalent
to the 1/3 free portion since the legacy is by
way of usufruct.
g. The fruits of the property already received or to
be received shall answer for the legacy with
respect to 1/3 portion only. The remaining 2/3
shall accrue to the heirs.
h. The legal usufruct of wife #2 shall be taken
from the third available for betterment.
3. After partition, the properties corresponding to the
heirs as legitime shall be delivered.
4. As to the free third, it shall belong to all the forced
heirs in equal parts, subject to the legacy as to its
fruits.
Page
noted that the second project of partition was not

concurred in by the heirs of the first marriage.
4. In disapproving the 2nd project of partition, the court
ordered Wife #2 to take immediate possession of all
the properties and pay from the proceeds thereof, the
legacy of PhP8,000. Wife #2 and the heirs (by the 2nd
marriage) appealed the disapproval of the project of
partition.

RULE 73
CRUZ v. DE JESUS (52 Phil 870)

Facts:
- This is an appeal made by the petitioners (including the
surviving husband) in which the court denied their
complaint to liquidate and partition the property left
by the deceased Juliana Nabong
- The petitioners claim that Juliana Nabong left no debts,
and partition is asked for in the regular court
- This court ruled that the proper action for property
belonging to the conjugal partnership (especially since
the surviving spouse is a party) should be in an
intestate/testate proceeding for the settlement of the
deceaseds estate
Issue:
Whether or not an action lies for the liquidation and partition
of the property of a conjugal partnership dissolved by the
death of the wife, said property having been in the possession
of the surviving spouse for many years, without his having
made any inventory thereof, nor liquidated and partitioned it,
and it not appearing that there is any debt to pay?
Sec 685 of Act No. 190 established two methods of liquidating

the property of a conjugal partnership, if the marriage is
dissolved by the death of one of the spouses:
a) by testate/intestate proceedings
3D (2008-2009)
A-10
Held:
Yes, an action lies for liquidation and partition.
Page
FLORES land:
- Land belonged to conjugal partnership. Land was
sold to Alejandro with right to repurchase.
ANGELES failed to exercise right of repurchase.
After his death, wife (TOMASA) repurchased land
and sold to FLORES.
Issue: W/N Alfonso is entitled to maintain the action for the
recovery of the lands?
Held:
FLORES land: the repurchase of land by TOMASA gave
her the sole ownership; heirs of husband acquired no
rights by her repurchase.
NATIVIDAD land: in the absence of proof that money
with which land was bought belonged to the wife,
declared to be conjugal property.
o Conjugal partnership dissolved by the death of
the husband. As to settlement of partnership
affairs: debts and obligations of the partnership
affairs shall be discharged, then of the net
proceeds be considered as the exclusive
property of the deceased spouse. It is necessary
to that the executor or administrator appointed
is the one entitled to the custody of the
property while settlement is being made
o No lien in favor of NATIVIDAD over the land nor
entitle him to retain it until his debt was paid
all other property of the partnership will be
held for payment of debts.

RULE 73
DE LA RAMA v. DE LA RAMA (7 Phil 745)

VILLACORTE v. MARIANO (89 Phil 160)
Facts:
Leon Calimon married thrice. With his first wife Adriana Carpio
he had three children Canuta, Tranquilina, Maria and
Enriqueta. He then married Venacia Inducil who has a child by
previous marriage, Tiburcio Villacorta. Venancia and Leon did
not have any children. Leon thenafter married Macaria
Mariano, they did not have any children as well.
Petitioners here are the widow and daughter of Tiburcio
seeking to recover 38 parcels of land from Canuta and her
sisters and Macaria Mariano. Mariano in her answer claimed
that the lots were owned exclusively by Leon Calimon but
later on filed another answer asserting that all the realities has
been acquired during her coverture with Leon and she also
filed a cross claim against Canuta and her sisters demanding
the recognition of her rights as surviving spouse. She claimed
that through deceit, the sisters made her sign three
documents assigning to her a riceland, a fishpond and 2,400
and renouncing her interest and rights in the estate of Leon as
he Court then concluded that the three documents were valid

and binding and that as a consequence the Calimon sisters are
entitled to continue possessing the land and properties
assigned to them.
Issue:
Whether the lower court erred in finding that the properties
belong to the sisters without previously requiring an inventory
and liquidation of the conjugal properties of the deceased
Leon and Macaria.
Held: NO
Ratio:
It was unnecessary to prepare the inventory and make the
liquidation because the parties interested the widow and
the children, already reached a compromise. Macaria cannot
get away from her commitment and claim that she did not
know the contents of the documents she signed. The said
documents are valid and binding, and it was shown that only
when there was delay in the delivery of one of the properties
assigned to her did she question the validity of the
documents.
CALMA v. TANEDO (68 Phil 594)
Facts:
3D (2008-2009)
A-11
When the marriage is dissolved by death of the wife, the

husbands power of management ceases and is shifted to the
administrator in the testate/intestate proceedings to the end
that there are any debts to be paid. If there are no debts, as in
this case the liquidation and partition may be made in
ordinary proceedings for that purpose.
well as her participation in the conjugal partnership with him.

The sisters then after partitioned the properties, this was also
thumbmarked by their stepmother Macaria.
Page
b) by ordinary proceeding for liquidation and partition

RULE 73
Held:
The sale of the property made by the sheriff in execution of
the judgment rendered against Eulalio Calma for the collection
of the indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal property,
is void and said property should be deemed subject to the
testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit.
The probate proceedings were instituted in accordance with
Act No. 3176:
SEC. 685. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the
husband or wife, the community property shall be
In case it is necessary to sell any portion of said community

property in order to pay the outstanding debts and obligations
of the same, such sale shall be made in the manner and with
the formalities established by this Code for the sale of the
property of deceased persons. Any sale, transfer, alienation or
disposition of said property effected without said formalities
shall be null and void, except as regards the portion that
belonged to the vendor at the time the liquidation and
partition was made.
The testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit having
been instituted, the liquidation and partition of the conjugal
property by reason of her marriage to Eulalio Calma should be
made in these proceedings, to the exclusion of any other
proceeding for the same purpose.
When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the wife, the
legal power of management of the husband ceases, passing to
the administrator appointed by the court in the testate or
intestate proceedings instituted to that end if there be any
debts to be paid. Thus, Eulalio Calma having ceased as legal
administrator of the conjugal property had with his wife
3D (2008-2009)
A-12
In the probate proceedings in the CFI of Tarlac, Maria Calma

was appointed judicial administratrix of the properties of the
deceased. While these probate proceedings were pending,
Esperanza Tanedo filed a suit for collection against Eulalio
Calma. The CFI of Tarlac rendered judgment for the payment
of this sum. In the execution of this judgment, despite the
third party claim filed by Fausta Macasaquit, the conjugal
property was sold by the sheriff. Maria Calma, as
administratrix of the estate of Fausta Macasaquit, brought an
action to ask that the sale made by the sheriff of the property
be annulled and that the estate of Fausta Macasaquit be
declared the sole and absolute owner thereof.
inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts

thereof shall be paid, in the testamentary or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse, in accordance with the
provisions of this Code relative to the administration and
liquidation and partition proceeding, unless the parties, being
all of age and legally capacitated, avail themselves of the right
granted to them by this Code of proceeding to an extrajudicial
partition and liquidation of said property.
Page
The spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit were the

owners of a certain property. They were indebted to
Esperanza Taedo, and these debts were chargeable against
the conjugal property. Fausta Macasaquit died leaving a will
wherein she appointed her daughter, Maria Calma, as
administratrix of her properties.

RULE 73
Fausta Macasaquit, no complaint can be brought against him

for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said
conjugal property, and that the action should be instituted in
the testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta
Macasaquit in the manner provided by law, by filing it first
with the committee on claims.
5) Potenciano's children, Victor and Lourdes, intervened by

filing cross-complaint alleging that option to purchase null and
void as to share of their dead mom because they inherited her
share and as to their dad, Victor and Lourdes were exercising
right of redemption as co-owners of property.
6) Paz amended complaint:
2) House and lot conjugal property in reality, even if reg in

husband's name only
3) One year repurchase period was "extendible to another
year" but extensions were granted. Period lapsed w/o
repurchase so defendant Potenciano consolidated title w/ RD
of Laguna.
4) Potenciano gave plaintiff Paz Ocampo option to repurchase
property w/in 5 years + 5 yr lease. Paz sought to exercise
option by tendering payment to Potenciano but tender was
rejected. Paz deposited money in court and brought action as
administratrix of husband's estate to have property reinstated
to them.
b) option agreement was really extension of the mortgage

c) valid tender of payment w/in the period
7) CFI gave judgment in favor of Paz and kids (sub after her
death). CA found that pacto de retro sale was really a
mortgage so Potencianos had no right to consolidate title over
the property. However, CA said that mortgage novated by
option agreement for the repurchase of mortgaged property.
Potenciano siblings argue that this was error because
Potenciano dad had no authority to enter into agreement
after wife's death. SC agrees.
ISSUE: W/n CA erred in supposing that surviving spouse had
such authority as de facto administrator of conjugal estate?
HELD: YES, CA erred, Potenciano dad no authority to enter
into option ag'mt.
1) The decisions laying down the rule that, upon the
dissolution of the marriage by the death of the wife, the
husband must liquidate the partnership affairs, are now
3D (2008-2009)
A-13
1) Edilberto Ocampo, husband of Paz Yatco (plaintiff Ocampo),

executed a deed of sale w/ pacto de retro on a town lot w/
house in favor of Conrado Potenciano (defendant) and his
wife. Edilberto also made a document where vendees where
leasing to him house and lot during the redemption period.
a) pacto de retro sale was really a mortgage
Page
OCAMPO v. POTENCIANO (89 Phil 160)

FACTS:

RULE 73
3) Tender and consignation of Paz must be held to produce

their legal effect, to relieve debtor from liability.
4) Thus, Victor and Lourdes (appellant children) Potenciano
acquired nothing because ownership of property never passed
to their parents
PRADO v. NATIVIDAD (47 Phil 776)
DE LA RAMA v. DE LA RAMA (25 Phil 437)
Facts:
The plaintiff Agueda charged her husband with
adultery and prayed for a divorce, alimony pendente
lite and division of the conjugal partnership.
Defendant Esteban denied the charge of adultery and
countered by charging his wife with adultery as well.
Judgment was rendered in favor of Agueda granting
her the sum of P81,042.76 as her share in the conjugal
share.
Upon appeal to SC of the Phils, the decision was
overturned based on the reasoning that the evidence
showed both spouses were guilty of adultery and
therefore divorce was not available to either party.
Appeal to the SC of US resulted in upholding the

decision of the lower court as to granting the divorce
prayed for by the plaintiff. However, as to the other
issues (alimony, share in the conjugal partnership) the
case was remanded back to the SC of the Phils for
further proceeding.
Plaintiff insists that SC of the Phils should merely affirm
the judgment of CFI as per SC of US judgment.
Defendant on the other hand states that error was
incurred in fixing the amount of the half of said alleged
conjugal property at P81,042.75, without having
examined the necessary antecedents and data
Held:
SC of US merely decided on the issue of adultery and
did not touch on the issue regarding division of the
conjugal partnership. It remanded the case to SC of
Phils precisely to decide on the issues it did not
address.
CFI erred in fixing the amount at P81,042.75.
Article 1418 provides, except in certain cases, an
inventory shall at once be made.
We have held in the case of Alfonso vs. Natividad that
when the partnership is dissolved by the death of the
husband this inventory must be made in the
proceedings for the settlement of his estate.
In the case of Prado vs. Lagera we ruled that the
inventory thus formed must include the bienes
parafernales of the wife.
It is very evident from the provisions of the Civil Code
that the inventory includes the capital of the husband,
the dowry of the wife, the bienes parafernales of the
3D (2008-2009)
A-14
2) Option agreement was nothing more than mere extension

of time for payment of mortgage debt since the real
transaction was the equitable mortgage
Page
obsolete. PRESENT RULE: when the marriage is dissolved by

death of either husband or wife, the partnership affairs must
be liquidate in the testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse (Rule 75, Sec. 2)

RULE 73
FULGENCIO v. GATCHALIAN (21 Phil 252)

Facts:
Plaintiff Josefa Fulgencio was the administratrix of the
intestate estate of Dionisio Fulgencio (deceased).
Defendant Gatchalian was the second wife of deceased.
Gatchalian and the other defendants had control of the
properties of the deceased and were sued by Fulgencio in
order to be compelled delivery of the said properties to the
latter (Fulgencio, who was the administratrix).
Fernando Fulgencio, legitimate son of the deceased by the
latters first marriage, intervened in the suit in order to
protect his rights in the estate of the deceased.
Gatchalian claimed that she should not be compelled to
deliver the entirety of the properties demanded because
some of it were her own and not part of the conjugal
partnership.
Note that there was an agreement between the parties
conceding that certain properties (drygoods store, bakery,
cigar and cigarette stand, bazaar) were paraphernal properties
of the deceased.
Held:
YES.
Article 1407 of the Civil Code provides: All the property of the
marriage shall be considered as partnership property until it is
proven that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the
wife.
3D (2008-2009)
A-15
Issue:
Whether Gatchalian could be compelled to deliver all the
properties demanded from her.
Page
wife, and all the property acquired by the partnership

during its existence.
After this inventory has been made it is provided by
article 1421 that there shall be first paid the dowry of
the wife, in the second place the bienes parafernales of
the wife, in the third place the debts and obligations of
the conjugal partnership, and in the fourth place the
capital of the husband
Conjugal property which is to be divided when the
partnership is dissolved is determined not with
reference to the income or profits which may have
been received during the partnership by the spouses,
but rather by the amount of the actual property
possessed by them at such dissolution after making the
deductions and payments aforesaid. This is positively
provided by article 1424.
An examination of the decision of the Court of First
Instance shows that no attempt was made to comply
with any one of these statutory provision. (No
inventory, no paying of the wifes bienes parafernales,
etc.) and their decision was based on the profits made
by conjugal partnership after its formation.
The theory of the Civil Code is that the conjugal
property is the actual property which is left at the
dissolution of the partnership. It can, therefore, never
be determined by adding up the profits, which had
been made each year during its existence, and then
saying that result is the conjugal property.
The case is remanded to the court below for the purpose of
liquidating the conjugal partnership
LUKBAN v. REPUBLIC (98 Phil 574)

Facts: Petitioner Lourdes G. Lukban contracted marriage with
Francisco Chuidian on Dec. 10, 1933. On dec. 27 of the same
year, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarreland since
then he has not been heard from despite diligent search made
by her. She believes that he is already dead for he has been
absent for more than 20 years and because she intends to
marry again, she desires that her civil status be defined in
order that she be relieved of any liability under the law.
A petition was filed in the Court of first instance of Rizal for a
declaration that petitioner Lourdes is the widow of her
husband Francisco who is presumed to be dead and has no
legal impediment to contract a subsequent marriage.
Issue: Whether or not the petition filed be Petitioner Lourdes
has merit.
Held: No. A petition for judicial declaration that petitioners

husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained
because it is not authorized by law, and if such declaration
cannot be made in a special proceeding, much less can the
court determine the status of petitioner as a widow since this
matter must of necessity depend upon the fact of death of the
husband. This the court can declare upon proper evidence,
but not to decree that he is presumed to be dead.
The philosophy behind this ruling of the Court is that judicial
pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executor,
would still be prima facie presumption only. It is still
disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of
judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only
question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a
competent court has to pass. It is therefore clear that a
judicial declaration that a person presumptively dead, because
he had been unheard from in seven years, being a
presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof,
cannot reach the stage of finality or become final.
Regarding Petitioners reliance on the Hagans vs. Wislizenus,
alleging that the remedy she is seeking for can be granted in
the present proceedingwhile it is true that a special
proceeding is an application or proceeding to establish the
status, right of a party or a particular fact, that remedy can be
invoked if the purpose is to seek the declaration of death of
the husband, and not, as in the present case, to establish a
presumption of death. If it can be satisfactorily proven that
the husband is dead, the court would not certainly deny a
declaration to that effect.
3D (2008-2009)
Page
If it be not proven conclusively that the property claimed by

the administratrix is paraphernalia and belongs exclusively to
the defendant Benita Gatchalian, it must be deemed to be
conjugal partnership property, liable for the debts of the
conjugal partnership, and therefore, by virtue of the
preinserted agreement, the administratrix has a right to be
placed in possession of the same for the purpose of its
inventory in the special proceedings, without prejudice to the
rights of the widow Benita Gatchalian in relation to her own
property or to that of the nature of paraphernalia, for, once
the inventory of the property of the intestate estate has been
made, the latter will have the same opportunity to claim the
exclusion of the property belonging to her exclusively and that
of the nature of paraphernalia.
A-16

RULE 73

RULE 74
RULE 74
UTULO v. VDA DE GARCIA (66 Phil 302)
As a general rule, when a person dies and fails to leave
Leona and 3 children Juan, Patrocinio and Luz

During the pendency of the administration
proceedings of the fathers estate, Luz died w/o any
legitimate descendants; her only forced heirs were
her mother and husband Pablo Utulo
The only property Luz left was her share in her fathers
estate
Pablo Utulo commenced the judicial administration of
Luzs estate; he asked the court to be the
administrator
Leona opposed saying that since the deceased left no
indebtedness, there was no occasion for judicial
administration; and if there is, she had better right
Pablo claims that it was necessary for him to be named
the administrator so that he may have legal capacity
to appear in the intestate proceedings of Juan
Pablo was named administrator; Leonas appeal was
granted; thus the petition
Issue:
whether there was a need for appointment of
administrator
HERNANDEZ v. ANDAL (78 Phil 196)

Facts:
-PF (Cresencia Hernandez), intervenors (Maria and Aquilina
Hernandez) and Pedro and Basilia Hernandez who are not
GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
B-1
Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate leaving his spouse
a will or he had left one but failed to name an

executor, the competent court should appoint a
qualified administrator
Exceptions: (1) when all the heirs are of lawful age and
there are no debts due from the estate of the
deceased, the heirs may agree in writing to partition
of the property without instituting the judicial
administration; (2) where the property left does not
exceed P6,000, summary partition may be had
without instituting the judicial administration and the
appointment of an administrator
In these instances, the heirs are not bound to submit
the property to judicial administration or to apply for
the appointment of an administrator in court it is
costly, superfluous, and unnecessary since the heirs
own the property from the moment of death of the
decedent
Pablos appointment as administrator was not
necessary in order that he may have standing in the
proceedings of Juans estate; he could appear by right
of representation
Page
Facts:
Held: There was no need for appointment of administrator

RULE 74
Held:
[1.] Yes. There is a conflict of authority as to whether an
agreement of partition is such a contract as is required to be
in writing under the statute of frauds. The reason for the rule
that excludes partition from the operation of the SOF is that
partition is not a conveyance but simply a separation and
designation of that part of the land which belongs to each
tenant in common.
-the law has been uniformly interpreted to be applicable to
executory and not to completed or executed contracts.
Performance of the contract takes it out of the operation of
the statute. SOF does not declare the contracts therein
enumerated void and of no legal effect but only makes
ineffective the action for specific performance.
-On gen. principle, courts of equity have enforced oral
partition when it has been completely or partly performed.
-Sec. 1 of Rule 74 contains no express or clear declaration that
the public instrument therein required is to be constitutive of
a contract of partition or an inherent element of its
effectiveness as between the parties. The requirement that a
partition be put in a public document and registered has for its
purpose the protection of the creditors and the heirs
themselves against tardy claims. Hence, the intrinsic validity
of the partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is
not affected when there are no creditors or the rights of the
creditors are not affected, as in this case.
3D (2008-2009)
B-2
Issues:
[1.]W/N lower court erred in refusing to admit oral evidence
for proving a contract of partition among the heirs on the
ground that it was not admissible.
[2.]W/N appeal should be dismissed since the findings and

conclusions in the appealed decision were not assigned as
errors.
Page
parties here, are brother and sisters. They acquired in

common from their father a parcel of land.
-Intervenors sold 1800 sq. m. of this parcel to DF Zacarias
Andal and his wife for P860. This portion purports to be the
combined share of the intervenors in the larger parcel
pursuant to an alleged verbal partition among the siblings.
-After the sale, PF attempted to repurchase the land sold to
Andal offering P150 which she said was the amount DF had
paid for intervenors shares, but it is alleged that DF refused.
-PF filed a supplemental complaint wherein she announced in
open court that she was willing to repurchase said property
for P860 plus expenses.
-However, on a certain date, DF executed a deed of sale for
P970 in favor of intervenors.
-In trial, when asked whether the land described in PFs
complaint was the object of partition among the co-owners,
PFs counsel objected on the ground that the best evidence
was the document of partition itself, asserting that under ROC,
agreement affecting real estate may not be proved except by
means of writing subscribed by the person against whom the
proof is offered.
-Court ruled that under Rules 73 and 123 of the ROC (statute
of frauds) and art. 1243 of Civil Code, parol evidence of
partition was inadmissible. It declared that the resale of the
land by DF to intervenors were illegal and in bad faith. To this,
DF and intervenors appealed.
TORRES v. TORRES (10 SCRA 185)

FACTS:
- PAZ E. Siguion Torres died intestate on December 18,
1959.
- ALBERTO S. Torres (petitioner), claiming to be one of the four
legitimate children of Paz, petitioned to be administrator of
the properties left by the decedent (aggregate value of about
P300,000.00). He also claimed he was not aware of any debt
left by the decedent.
- ALBERTOS petition was opposed by CONCHITA Torres, one
of the heirs, on the ground that on January 27, 1960, the heirs
of the deceased (including petitioner) had already entered
into an extrajudicial partition and settlement of the estate,
pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 74.
- The extrajudicial deed of partition of the estate
contains the following provisions:
1. That they (ALBERTO, ANGEL, EDUARDO

and CONCHITA, all surnamed Torres) are
the only legitimate children who survive the
deceased Paz Siguion Vda. de Torres;
xxx
xxx
xxx
3. That the said decedent died without
leaving any will and her only surviving heirs
are the aforementioned parties who are her
legitimate children;
4. That the deceased left no debts;
xxx
xxx
xxx
6. That pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of
the Rules of Court and in view of the
difficulty of making a physical division of the
above properties, the parties have agreed to
settle the aforementioned estate by
continuing the co-ownership on all the
above properties in the following
proportion:
ALBERTO Torres undivided interest
ANGEL Torres undivided interest
EDUARDO Torres undivided interest
CONCHITA Torres undivided interest
(Emphasis supplied.)
- ALBERTO, while admitting that such extrajudicial partition
was signed by the heirs, contended that attempts at the actual
designation of their respective shares had failed thus needing
the court's intervention. He also claimed that some properties
of considerable value were not included in said extrajudicial
partition. In another pleading, he claimed that the decedent
had an outstanding debt of P50,000.
3D (2008-2009)
Page
[2.] No. An unassigned error closely related to an error

properly assigned, or upon which the determination of the
question raised by the error properly assigned is dependent,
will be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the
failure to assign it as error.
-in this case, the evidence on parol partition tendered by DF
and intervenors was ruled out and the complain of this
exclusion as error. In this manner, the assignment of error
squarely meets and attacks the opinion and judgment of the
trial court. An analysis of the case will show that on the
validity of the alleged partition hangs the result of the entire
litigation and on the validity depends in turn the competence
of the excluded evidence.
B-3

RULE 74
ISSUE:
Whether administration or a special proceeding

for the settlement of the estate is necessary.
RULING: No.
The claim of the decedents debts is unsubstantiated.
ALBERTO did not specify from whom and in what manner the
said debt was contracted. The bare allegation that "the estate
has an existing debt of P50,000.00 from third persons" cannot
be considered as concise statement to constitute a cause of
action.
If other properties are not included in the deed of
extrajudicial partition in the possession of one of the heirs, the
questions such as the titles and their partition if proven to
belong to the intestate can be properly and expeditiously
litigated in an ordinary action of partition and not in an
administration proceeding.
Thus, where the decedent left no debts and heirs or
legatees are all of age, as in this case, there is no necessity for
the institution of special proceedings and the appointment
of an administrator for the settlement of the estate, because
the same can be effected either extra-judicially or through an
ordinary action for partition. If there is an actual necessity for
court intervention in view of the heirs' failure to reach an
agreement as to how the estate would be divided physically,
the heirs still have the remedy of an ordinary action for
partition under Rule 74.
ARCILLAS v. MONTEJO (26 SCRA 197)

FACTS:
1. 2 petitions were filed in relation to the LOT owned by
the decedent Arcillas.
2. Petition #1 was filed by Geronimo (one of the heirs) in
order to cancel the TCT covering said LOT and the
issuance of a new TCT in the names of the heirs in the
corresponding portions alleged in the petition. This
petition was based on a claim that several other heirs
executed separate sales of their respective shares and
participation in said LOT to Vicente (one of the private
respondents).
3. Petition #2 was filed by the other children of the
deceased praying for issuance of letters of
administration in favor of PETITIONER preparatory to
the final settlement of the deceaseds estate.
4. PETITIONER opposed Petition #1 inasmuch as the
subject matter thereof was included in the estate of
the deceased for which a petition for administration
was awaiting resolution (Petition #2).
5. Geronimo, on the other hand, opposed Petition #2
arguing that inasmuch as the LOT was the only
property of the deceased, and that the deceased left
no debts, the petition for administration was improper.
6. Court denied Petition #2 and instead, gave due course
to Petition #1.
7. PETITIONER filed for certiorari with mandamus and
preliminary injunction.
3D (2008-2009)
Page
- On July 21, 1961, the court, finding that an extrajudicial

settlement had already been entered into by the heirs,
dismissed ALBERTOS petition.
B-4

RULE 74

RULE 74
The aforementioned rule is not mandatory or

compulsory, as may be seen from the use of the word
may. Thus, the rule does not preclude the heirs from
instituting administration proceedings despite the fact
that the estate left no debts and that all the heirs are
of legal age.
2. No. Petition #2 was premised on Section 112 of Act
496, which authorizes a person in interest to ask the
court for any erasure, alteration, or amendment of a
certificate of title upon the ground that registered
interests of any description, whether vested,
contingent, expectant or inchoate have terminated
and ceased.
Absent the foregoing, the case becomes controversial

and should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in
the case where the incident properly belongs.
ERMAC v. MEDELO (64 SCRA 359)
Facts:
Spouses Ermac and Mariquit both died leaving a
parcel of land as the only property to be inherited by
heirs
MEDELO: grandson filed petition for summary
settlement of the estate.
ERMAC: moved for reconsideration of the order of
settlement claiming the land as belonging to him and
his wife.
Issue: W/N the approval of the project of partition was valid
despite the claim of ERMAC in a separate civil action?
Held:
The policy of the law is to terminate proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased persons
with the least loss of time.
o Small estates: summary procedure dispensing
with appointment of administrator
3D (2008-2009)
B-5
RULING: The Special Proceeding (Petition #2) should be

reinstated.
1. No. Section 1, Rule 74 provides that if the decedent
left no will and no debts and the heirs and legatees are
all of age, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves by
means of a public instrument filed in the Register of
Deeds. In case of disagreement, they may do so in an
ordinary action of partition.
However, said relief can only be granted if

a. There is unanimity among the parties, or
b. There is no adverse claim or serious objection on
the part of any interested party
Page
ISSUES:
1. Whether the administration proceedings (Petition #2),
upon the averment that the estate left no debts and all
the heirs are of age, was properly dismissed
2. Whether the cadastral action (Petition #1) was the
more proper proceeding under the circumstances

RULE 74
Issue: Was Agcaoili a buyer in bad faith? Using Sec 4 Rule 74,
do the petitioners have a lien on the title?
Held: No to Both
Agcaoili is not expected to know Celerinas relatives even if he
is a townmate. There is no clear proof he knew of the
existence of petitioners.
The lien petitioners speak of is effective only for a period of
two years. From September 28, 1946, when a TCT was issued
to Celerina, to September 8, 1949 when the deed of sale in
favor of Agcaoili was issued and registered, more than two
years had elapsed
The right to have such lien cancelled became vested on
appellee Agcaoili and that the same had become functus
oficio.
Also, there being no fraud in the transaction on the part of
Agcaoili, nor proof that he knew of any legal infirmity in the
3D (2008-2009)
B-6
CARREON v. AGCAOILI (1 SCRA 521)

Facts:
- During the marriage of Bonifacio Carreon and Celerina
Dauag the registered land subject of this case was
acquired. After the death of Carreon, his widow
Celerina executed an affidavit adjudicating to herself
alone the said land
- She declared she was the only heiress of her husband.
The OCT was cancelled and a TCT was issued in her
name.
- There was however annotated on her certificate a lien
to the effect that her title was subject to Section 4 of
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court (if within 2 years an heir
deprived of his share in the estate reappears such heir
may compel settlement)
- Celerina mortgaged the property for 1,200 to PNB,
when her loan was due she sold the property for 3,000
to Agcaoili, thus the mortgage was paid and the land
transferred to herein respondent
- the children of Celerina with the deceased husband
filed a complaint against the spouses Agcaoili seeking
to have the deed of sale executed by their mother
declared as one of mortgage and to recover one half

pro-indiviso of the land described in the complaint,
they claimed that Agcaoili was in bad faith knowing
that Celerina was not the only heir of her husband, and
thus he was holding the land in trust for them
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment upon
the plea that the main averments of the complaint
even if admitted do not constitute a cause of action
and supported their plea with certain documentary
evidence. The court ruled in favor of Agcaoili stating
the petitioners averments had no basis
Page
Not proper to delay the summary settlement of a

deceased person just because an heir or a third person
claims that certain properties do not belong to the
estate; properly ventilated in an independent action
and probate court should proceed to the distribution
of the estate (subject to the results of suit).
Appropriate step: proper annotation of lis pendens

RULE 74
ISSUE: Whether MCMICKING can claim from BARRETOs

estate.
HELD: No.
The court based its ruling on these:
SEC. 596. Settlement of intestate estates, without legal
proceedings, in certain cases. Whatever all the heirs of
a deceased person are of lawful age and legal capacity,
SEC. 597. In such case distributees liable for debts. But

if it shall appear, at any time within two years after
such settlement and distribution of the estate, that
there are debts outstanding against the estate which
have not been paid, any creditor may compel the
settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner
hereinafter provided, unless his debt shall be paid,
with interest; and the administrator appointed by the
court may recover the assets of the estate from those
who have received them, for the purpose of paying the
debts; and the real estate belonging to the deceased
shall remain charged with the liability to creditors for
the full period of two years after such distribution,
notwithstanding any transfers thereof that may have
been made.
We are of the opinion that the judgment must be affirmed.
We base our affirmance upon the ground that Doroteo
Velasco, for whom the deceased Pio de la Guardia Barretto
was surety, would not have been liable himself had this action
been commenced against him. If the principal is not liable
upon the obligation, the surety cannot be.
3D (2008-2009)
B-7
McMICKING v. SY CONBIENG (21 Phil 211)

FACTS:
- When Margarita JOSE died, his estate was administered by
PALANCA with Dy CUNYAO and Mariano Lao SEMPCO as
sureties.
- When Mariano LAO SEMPCO died, his estate was
administered by Doroteo VELASCO, and Mariano VELASCO and
BARRETO were the sureties.
- When BARRETO died SY CONBIENG administered his estate.
- Along the way PALANCA absconded with about 4/5 of JOSEs
estate.
- The court then appointed MCMICKING who then tried to
claim on the surety LAO SEMPCO.
- But since LAO SEMPCOs estate cannot pay, MCMICKING
brought an action to claim against LAO SEMPCOs surety
BARRETO (whose estate is administered by SY CONBIENG).
- Trial court ruled in favor of SY CONBIENG and dismissed
MCMICKINGs claim. Hence this appeal.
and their are no debts due from the intestate estate,

or all the debts have been paid by the heirs, the heirs
may, by a family council as shown under Spanish law,
or by agreement between themselves, duly executed
in writing, apportion and divide the estate among
themselves, as they may see fit, without proceedings in
court.
Page
title of his vendor, he is not deemed to be holding the land in

trust for the children of Celerina Dauag

RULE 74
PERIERA v. CA (174 SCRA 154)

Facts:
Andres Periera died intestate, with no debts. He was survived
be his wife of 10 months Victoria Periera who is a nurse in
London and his sister Rita Nagac. Rita instituted as special
proceeding for the issuance of letters if administration in her
favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased which is said to
include his death benefits from PAL, bank accounts in PNB and
PCIB and a 300 sq mt land in Las Pinas. Victoria filled a motion
to dismiss the petition alleging that there is no estate of the
3D (2008-2009)
B-8
In answer the court explained:

as already seen, in order that it be a reason for such
appointment and administration, the claim must be presented
within two years [it was presented in 5] from the date of the
partition and distribution.
Summarizing, we have seen that lack of opportunity,
either by want of notice or otherwise, and the consequent
failure to present a claim before partition, is, under the
sections we are discussing, of no consequence whatever in so
far as the validity of the partition is concerned.
We have also seen that the fact that there were debts
outstanding and unpaid at the time the partition took place is
of no importance so far as the validity of the partition is
concerned, leaving out account the question of fraud to which
we have already adverted and left undecided.
We have also seen that the fact such claim exists and is
valid and subsistent against the estate is of no consequence
whatever with respect to the right of its holder to require an
administration of the estate unless such claim is discovered

and presented within two years.
The fact that the claim in the case at bar was, during a
certain period, a contingent one is of no importance. The
sections under discussion make no distinction between claims.
The creditor himself is not without duties. In the case
at bar it was five years after the petition before the alleged
creditor made any attempt whatsoever to "discover" or
present his claim. He knew of the death of OCAMPO very soon
after it occurred. He knew that it was among the possibilities
that OCAMPO'S estate might be called upon to respond for
the failure of PALANCA to perform his duty as administrator. It
was his duty to see to it that he would be protected in that
event. Nevertheless he permitted the estate of OCAMPO to be
partitioned and distributed without protest and without the
presentation of his contingent claim, and sat quiet and passive
for nearly five years thereafter knowing that it was very
probable that the property of the estate was being consumed,
incumbered, and transferred by the persons among whom it
had been distributed.
Page
- For the court ruled that VELASCO having performed his

original obligation partitioning the estate was from that point
on free from liability; and so it follows that his sureties were
also free.
- And that any new claim arising within the two years
necessitates the appointment of a new administrator and new
sureties. For the original sureties secured only one obligation
and not two.
- The court then explained that MCMICKING seemed to argue
that if the estate has any outstanding debts after partition
that the partition itself is invalid. It is not so.

RULE 74
Held: NO
Ratio:
As a general rule, when a person dies leaving property, the
same should be judicially administered and the competent
court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order
established in Sec 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will
or in case he left one should he failed to name an executor. An
exemption to this rule is established in Section 1 of Rule 74,
when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts
due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the
property without instituting the judicial administration or
applying for appointment of an administrator.
Section 1 of Rule 74 however does not preclude the heirs from
instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has
no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good
reasons to an ordinary action for partition. Where partition is
possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be
burdened with an administration proceeding without good
and compelling reasons.
In this case, the only two surviving heirs are the spouse and
sister who are both or age. They admit that there are no
debts. The estate is also not substantial. What is apparent is
that these two heirs are not in good terms and that Rita wants
to administer the estate because she wants to take possession
of the properties, this is not a compelling reason which will
necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of the
deceased.
JEREZ v. NIETES (30 SCRA 905)
Facts:
In 1960 Nicolas Jalandoni died. A special proceeding for the
settlement of his estate was filed before the CFI of Iloilo, and
his widow, Lucrecia Jerez, was appointed as administratrix. In
1966, a project of partition and final accounting was
submitted, and the respondent Judge Nietes approved the
same.
Lucilo Jalandoni, alleging that he is an acknowledged natural
child of the late Nicolas Jalandoni, and Victoria Jalandoni de
Gorriceta, alleging that she is an illegitimate daughter, sought
to be allowed to intervene on the ground that they were
3D (2008-2009)
B-9
Issue:
Whether a judicial administration proceeding is necessary
where there are no debts left by the decedent as in this case?
It has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without

leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of
age of not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial
administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for
the appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been
uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration
and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and
unnecessary proceedings.
Page
deceased for purposes of administration or that if there is an

estate letters of administration be issued in her favor as
surviving spouse. The trial court appointed Rita as
administrator which Victoria is now questioning.

RULE 74
preterited in the project of partition which they would have

respondent Judge reject for being contrary to law. Judge
Nietes allowed intervention and reopened the proceedings to
permit the movants "to present whatever evidence they may
have to show their right to participate in the estate of the
deceased." The widow and legitimate children of Nicolas
Jalandoni filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
CA, which denied such petition to annul and set aside the
order of respondent Judge.
There must be proof beyond allegations in such motion to

show the interest of the private movants. In the absence
thereof, the action taken by respondent Judge could be
considered premature. "No one may quibble over the
existence of the court's discretion on whether to admit or
reject intervention. But such discretion is not unlimited."
Held:
Judge Nietes is directed to require private respondents Lucilo
Jalandoni and Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta to present
evidence to justify their right to intervene in Special
Proceeding No. 1562 re Intestate Estate of Nicolas H.
Jalandoni pending before such sala.
3D (2008-2009)
Page
Although the recognition of their right to intervene appeared

to be tentative and conditional, it cannot be denied that they
were given a standing sufficient to set aside the project of
partition. However, the verified motion on the part of private
respondents (Lucilo and Victoria) did not suffice to call into
play the power of respondent Judge to allow intervention.
B-10
Doctrine of liberality as to pleas for intervention: rather than

require any party who can allege a grievance that his interest
was not recognized in a testate or intestate proceeding to file
a separate and independent action, he may within the
reglementary period secure the relief that is his due by a
reopening of the case even after a project of partition and
final accounting had been approved.

RULES 75 to 77
RULES 75 76
FERNANDEZ v. DIMAGIBA (21 SCRA 428)
FACTS:
1) Ismaela Dimagiba (respondent) submitted petition for probate
of purported will of Benedicta delos Reyes as the sole heir of
deceased. Later, heirs Dionisio Fernandez, et. al. (oppositors) filed
opposition to the probate on grounds of forgery, vices of consent,
laches, and revocation of the will on deeds of sale.
2) CFI found will genuine and properly executed but deferred
resolution on estoppel and revocation grounds until intrinsic
validity will be passed upon. Oppositors insisted that estoppel and
revocation issues be considered but CFI overruled claim until
opportune time. Later, CFI ruled that Benedictas will was
unrevoked by deeds of sale.
3) CA admitted will to probate and upheld finality for lack of
opportune appeal, that it was appealable independently of issue
of revocation, affirmed CFI.
ISSUES:
1) W/n decree of CFI allowing probate had become final for lack
of appeal?
2) W/n order overruling estoppel had become final?
3) w/n Benedictas will had been impliedly revoked by her deeds
of sale?
testator and proper execution and witnessing of his last will and
testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and
unenforceable or otherwise. As such, the probate order is final
and appealable, and it is so recognized by express provisions of
Sec. 1 of Rule 109 (see enumeration of 6 instances when appeal
may be taken in specpro)
2) YES, CA correct, order overruling estoppel final. Estoppel
cannot be raised in probate proceedings: The presentation and
probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being primarily
designed to protect the testators expressed wishes , w/c are
entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedents ownership
and right of dispossession within legal limits. It would be a non
sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of
estoppel. W/n the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is
still appealable or not , the defense is patently meritorious.
3) NO, revocation of will doubtful; CA correct, existence of any
change from original intent of testatrix Benedicta is rendered
doubtful by the circumstance that subsequent alienations made in
favor of legatee Dimagiba and she paid no consideration
whatsoever, making it more doubtful that in conveying property
to legatee, testatrix Benedicta merely intended to comply in
advance with her testament, rather than a departure therefrom.
3D (2008-2009)
Page
1) YES, CA correct, CFI decree allowing probate is final.

Finality of probate decree: A probate decree finally and
definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the
C-1
HELD:

RULES 75 to 77
1. Whether the probate of petitioners deceased wifes will is a

bar to prosecution of forgery. YES.
2. Whether petitioner was denied constitutional right to speedy
trial. YES.
HELD:
Several foreign decisions were cited. Can go either way. Others
saying that can be impugned on ground of fraud. Sec. 306 of Code
of Civil Procedure said that in an action or special proceeding, the
judgment or order is conclusive upon the title of the thing, the will
or administration or condition or relation of the person provided
that only be a prima facie evidence of the death of the testator
conclusive as to its DUE EXECUTION (Sec. 625). Sec. 625 was taken
almost bodily from Statutes of Vermont. Conclusive as to its due
execution against the whole world (in rem), reason why
publication is a prerequisite. Conclusive presumption that
judgment or order of a court when declared by this Code of Civil
Procedure are conclusive. State v. McGlynn (U.S. case). Although
in said case the information was filed by the State to set aside the
probate on forgery, we do not see difference in principle. ONLY A
SUBTLE DISTINCTION between setting aside a probate decree and
declaring probated will to be forgery. You would still disturb the
decree.
No fixed standard and conflict of authorities so the Court
chose the most consistent with statutory law. Here, forgery is
discovered after probate and prosecution before the prescription.
Code provides an adequate remedy to any party adversely
affected by probate application for relief within reasonable
time but no case exceeding SIX MONTHS after court judgment.
Page
ISSUES:
C-2
MERCADO v. SANTOS (66 SCRA 215)

FACTS:
Mercado filed in CFI Pampanga a petition for probate of
will of deceased wife Ines Basa. Without any opposition and upon
testimony of witness Gabino (attesting witness), admitted to
probate. THREE YEARS LATER, five invtervenors moved ex parte to
reopen the probate alleging lack of jurisdiction. DENIED because
of ex parte. Second filing of the motion to open the proceeding,
again denied.
SIXTEEN MONTHS AFTER THE PROBATE OF THE WILL,
intervenor Basa de Leon filed with Justice of Peace of San
Fernando, Pampanga a complaint against Mercado for falsification
or forgery of the will. Mercado was arrested. Complainant
withdrew complaint.
THREE MONTHS later, same intervenor charged Mercado
for same offense in Mexico, Pampanga. The complaint was
dismissed after investigation, at the instance of complainant due
to his poor health.
NINE MONTHS later, same charge against same person.
This time filed by fiscal of Pampanga in Justice of Peace Court of
Mexico. Case dismissed after investigation because will was
already probated.
Provincial Fiscal moved in CFI Pampanga for
reinvestigation. CFI Granted. FOURTH TIME, Mercado was
arrested.
Mercado filed a demurrer on ground of probate.
Overruled. Case proceeded to trial. He filed with CA an injunction.
CA issued injunction.
3D (2008-2009)

RULES 75 to 77
BALANAY v. MARTINEZ (64 SCRA 452)

Facts:
3D (2008-2009)
C-3
SUMILANG v. RAMAGOSA (21 SCRA 1369)

Facts:
Mariano Sumilang filed for the probate of alleged last will
and testament of Hilarion Ramagosa.
The petition was opposed by two sets of oppositors,
appellants herein, who questioned the due execution of
the document.
After petitioner presented evidence and rested his case,
oppositors moved for the dismissal of the petition on the
ground that decedent revoked his will by implication of
law six years before his death by selling the parcels of land
described therein to his brother.
On the other hand, petitioner moved to strike out
oppositors pleadings on the ground that the oppositors
have no interest in the probate of the will as they have no
relationship with the decedent within the fifth degree.
The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioner stating that
the allegations of the oppositors goes to the very intrinsic
value of the will and since the oppositors have no standing
to oppose the probate of the will as they are strangers,
their pleadings are ordered stricken out from the record.
Held:
The petition below being for the probate of a will, the
court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity
thereof. The testator's testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the
resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic

validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the
legality of any devise or legacy is premature (Nuguid vs.
Nuguid)
To establish conclusively as against everyone and once for
all, the facts that a will was executed with the formalities
required by law and that the testator was in a condition to
make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings . . . for
the probate of a will. The judgment in such proceedings
determines and can determine nothing more. (Alemany, et
al. vs. CFI of Manila)
True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal
of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing the
validity of the testamentary provisions is another.iThe first
decides the execution of the document and the
testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates
to descent and distribution
The revocation invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not
an express one, but merely implied from subsequent acts
of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an abandonment of
the original intention to bequeath or devise the properties
concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the
will itself, but merely the particular devise or legacy.
Page
Criminal action will not lie against forger of a will which

had been admitted to probate by a court of competent
jurisdiction.

RULES 75 to 77
The probate of the will was further opposed by Atty. Montaa

(who purported to be a lawyer of Balanay Jr) and two others,
saying that the will was void because it effected a compromise on
future legitimes and that no notice to creditors were issued. The
probate court listened to them and converted the testate
proceeding into an intestate proceeding.
Held:
1. YES. The probate court acted correctly in passing upon the
wills intrinsic validity even before its formal validity has
been established. The probate of a will might become an
idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically
void. Where practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it
is probated, the court should meet the issue.
2. NO. The will should have been upheld, considering that its
alleged defects have been cured by the husbands
conformity. The husbands conformity had the effect of
validating the will, without prejudice to the rights of
creditors and legitimes of compulsory heirs.
The rule is that the invalidity of one of several
dispositions contained in a will does not result in the
invalidity of the other dispositions if the first invalid
disposition had not been made. An interpretation that will
render a testamentary disposition operative takes
precedence over a construction that will nullify a provision
of the will.
3D (2008-2009)
C-4
Her son, Felix Balanay, Jr. (Balanay Jr.) filed a petition for probate
of the will. This was opposed by his father (Balanay Sr.) and
Avelina Antonio on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity,
undue influence, and preterition. Balanay Sr. later withdrew this
opposition through a Conformation of Division and Renunciation
of Hereditary Rights wherein he waived and renounced his
hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their six children.
Issue:
1. Whether it was correct to pass upon the intrinsic validity
of the will before ruling on its allowance or formal validity.
2. Whether the probate court was correct in declaring that
the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding
into an intestate proceeding.
3. Whether it was correct to issue notice to creditors without
first appointing an executor or regular administrator.
Page
Testator Leodegaria Julian (Julian) died at the age of 67. She was
survived by her husband and six children. In her will, she stated
that:
(a) That she was the owner of the southern half of 9
conjugal lots;
(b) That she was the absolute owner of 2 parcels of land
which she inherited from her father;
(c) That it was her desire that her properties should not be
divided among her heirs during her husbands lifetime and
that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of
her properties.
(d) That after her husbands death, that her paraphernal and
all conjugal lands be divided in the manner set forth in the
will.
In effect, Julian disposed of in her will her husbands conjugal
assets.

RULES 75 to 77
Thus, with respect to provision (a) above, the illegal

declaration does not nullify the will. It may be disregarded.
As to provision (c), it would at most be effective only from
the date of her death unless there are compelling reasons
for terminating the co-ownership.
3. NO. A notice of creditors is not in order if only a special
administrator has been appointed. It is the executor or
regular administrator who is supposed to oppose the
claims against the estate and to pay such claims when duly
allowed.
While the action for reconveyance was still pending, the probate
court issed an order of executionand garnishment on August 20
1980, resolving the issue of ownership of the royalties payable to
Atlas and granting the legacy to Quemada. The probate court
issued an order on Nov. 1980 declaring that the probate order of
1972 indeed resolved the issue of ownership and the intrinsic
validity of the will.
Issue: whether or not the probate order resolved with finality the
questions of ownership and intrinsic validity as stated in the Nov.
1980 order
3D (2008-2009)
Page
Facts: the deceased Alvaro Pastor Sr. Was survived by his wife,
two legitimate children, Pastor Jr. and Sofia and an illegitimate
child, Quemada. Quemada filed a petition for the probate of the
alleged will of the deceased. The will contained only 1
testamentary disposition, which was a legacy in favor of Quemada
consisting of 30% of the $2% share of Pastor Sr. In the operation
of Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. Of some
mining claims.
Quemada was appointed special administrator. As such, Quemada
filed an action for reconveyance against Pastor Jr. and his wife,
regarding some roperties allegedly forming part of Pastor Sr.s
estate, including the property subject of the legacy.
Pastor Jr. and his wife files their opposition to the petition for
probate and the order appointing Quemada as special
administrator. However, the probate court admitted the will to
probate in 1972. In 1980, the probate court set a hearing on the
intrinsic validity of the will and required the parties to submit
their position papers as to how the inheritance would be divided.
Held: No. In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the

issue is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will, that is
whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the
will in accordance with the formalities required by law.
As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter
which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the
purpose of determining whether a certain property should or
should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the
probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such
determination is only provisional and not conclusive, and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
Without a final authoritative adjudication of the issue as to what
properties compose the estate of Pastor Sr. In the face of
conflicting claims involving properties not in the name of the
testator and in the absence of a resolution as to the intrinsic
validity of the will, there was no basis for the probate court to
hold that the 1972 probate order that Quemada is entitled to
payment of the questioned legacy.
C-5
PASTOR v. CA (122 SCRA 885)

RULES 75 to 77
US v. CHIU GUIMCO (36 Phil 917)
In 1915, Ramon Contreras, acting on behalf of Uy Cuan

and her child, made inquiries and urged Chiu Guimco to
produce the will
When he refused to do so, a criminal complaint against
him, was filed under section 628 of the Code of Civil
Procedure
The court found him guilty and sentenced him to pay a
fine and imprisonment until he delivers the will
Facts:
Issue:
whether the judge had jurisdiction to impose the sentence
of imprisonment on the accused
629 can only be applied when a court is acting in the

exercise of its jurisdiction over the administration of the
estates of deceased persons
Where administration proceedings are not already
pending, the court, before taking action under 629,
should require that there be before it some petition,
information, or affidavit of such character as to make
action by the court under 629 appropriate
Furthermore, it is not permissible in a prosecution under
628 to superimpose upon the penalty of fine therein
prescribed the additional penalty of imprisonment
prescribed in 629
And, the order for the accused to produce the will is an
infringement of the right against self-incrimination the
mere production of the will by him would be conclusive
3D (2008-2009)
C-6
Held: Judge had NO jurisdiction
Page
Joaquin Cruz (aka Piaua) lived as a Chinese merchant in the

municipality of Gingoog , Misamis
In 1898, he visited China wherein he was married to a
Chinese woman Uy Cuan and had one child
In 1902, after his return from China , he was married to a
Filipino Maria Villafranca
In 1910, Joaquin again visited China , leaving his brother,
defendant Chiu Guimco, in charge of his property and his
business; he died during this visit to China
Apparently, before he left for China , he executed a will
before Anastacio Servillon, a notary public, in which Chiu
Guimco and Co-Iden were named executors
The executors filed a petition for the probate of the will.
However, the will itself was not produced and nothing
further was done in the matter of the probate
Chiu Guimco entered into an agreement with Maria
whereby in consideration of the conveyance of a certain
property she relinquished in favor of other persons
interested in the estate all her other claims
In 1914, Uy Cuan came to the Philippines for the
settlement of Joaquins estate; it was agreed that Uy Cuan
and her child were to receive 40 percent of the estate, 40
to Chiu Guimco and 40 to another brother in China named
Chiu Tamco
They also entered into a contract wherein Chiu Guimco
shall pay P350 per quarter for the rental of Uy Cuans
interest in the real estate of Joaquin
RODRIGUEZ v. BORJA (17 SCRA 418)

Facts:
-Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on Feb. 12, 1963. On March 4, 1963,
Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan (respondents) delivered
to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and
testatment of Fr. Rodriguez. On March 9, 1963, Maria Rodriguez
and Angela Rodriquez (petitioners), through counsel filed a
petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged
will. On March 11, 1963, before the Court could act on the
petition, the same was withdrawn. On March 12, 1963,
petitioners filed before the CIF of Rizal a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez. On same day,
(March 12), defendants filed a petition for the probation of the
will delivered by them on March 4.
-petitioners contend that the intestate proceedings in the CIF of
Rizal was filed at 8:00AM on March 12, while the petition for
probate in the CIF of Bulacan at 11AM, so the latter Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate.
-defendants contend that CIF of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over
the case upon delivery of the will, hence the case in this court has
precedence over petitioners.
-CIF of Bulacan denied MD of petitioners. MR denied.
Issue: Which court has jurisdiction? CIF of Bulacan
Held:
-The jurisdiction of the CIF of Bulacan became vested upon the
delivery of the will of the Fr. Rodriquez on March 4 even if no
petition for its allowance was filed yet because upon the will
being deposited, the court could, motu proprio have taken steps
to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the
corresponding notices to what is prescribed by Sec. 3, Rule 76 of
the Revised Rules of Court, to wit: When a will is deliver to, or
a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the Court
having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time and place for
proving the will xxx and shall cause notice of such time and place
to be published xxx
-where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the
will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the
will was delivered. Since the will was delivered to the court of
Bulacan on March 4 while petitioners initiated intestate
proceedings in court of Rizal only on March 12, the precedence
and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable
-As to petitioners objection that the Bulacan court did not have
jurisdiction because the decedent was domiciled in Rizal, court
ruled that the power to settle the decedent;s estates is conferred
by law upon all CIFs, and the domicile of the testator only affects
the venue but not the jurisdiction of the court.
-Furthermore, the estate proceedings having been initiated in
Bulacan court ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a
case of wron venue by express provisions of Rule 73.
-Court also held that petitioners, in commencing intestate
proceedings in Rizal, were in bad faith, patently done to divest the
Bulacan court of the precedence awarded it by the Rules.
-Lastly, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to
testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid
and operative will (Art. 960 of Civil Code).
3D (2008-2009)
Page
that he had possession of it as charged in the criminal

complaint
C-7

RULES 75 to 77
Manila. Hearing was set after publication and notice were

made.
- ANA del Val Chan claiming to be an adopted child of
FRANCISCA Mortera (deceased sister of MARIA) as well as
an acknowledged natural child of JOSE Mortera (deceased
brother of the MARIA) filed an opposition to the
probate of the will alleging that: (1) said will was not
executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix was
physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the
time of its execution; (3) the will was executed under
duress, threat or influence of fear; and that (4) the will is
inoperative as to the share of RENE Teotico because the
latter was the physician who took care of the testatrix
during her last illness.
- VICENTE B. Teotico filed a motion to dismiss the
opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal
personality to intervene.
- The probate court, after due hearing, allowed the
oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of FRANCISCA
Mortera.
- After the parties had presented their evidence, the
probate court rendered its decision admitting the will to
probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of
RENE Teotico void with the statement that the portion to
be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's
heirs by way of intestate succession.
ISSUES:
(1) Has oppositor ANA del Val Chan the right to intervene
in this proceeding?
(2) Has the will in question been duly admitted to
probate?
3D (2008-2009)
Page
TEOTICO v. DEL VAL (13 SCRA 406)

FACTS:
- MARIA Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July
14, 1955 in the City of Manila leaving properties worth
P600,000.00.
- She left a will written in Spanish which she executed at
her residence.
- She affixed her signature at the bottom of the will and on
the left margin of each and every page thereof in the
presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar C. Sanchez, and Modesto
Formilleza, who in turn affixed their signatures below the
attestation clause and on the left margin of each and every
page of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each
other.
- Said will was acknowledged before Notary Public
Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix and her witnesses.
- In said will the testatrix stated that she was possessed of
the full use of her mental faculties; that she was free from
illegal pressure or influence of any kind from the
beneficiaries of the will and from any influence of fear or
threat; that she freely and spontaneously executed said
will and that she had neither ascendants nor descendants
of any kind such that she could freely dispose of all her
estate.
- MARIA left P20,000.00 to RENE A. Teotico, husband of
her niece JOSEFINA Mortera.
- JOSEFINA was also instituted as the sole and universal
heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise
disposed of in the will.
- On July 17, 1955, VICENTE B. Teotico filed a petition for
the probate of the will before the Court of First Instance of
C-8

RULES 75 to 77

RULES 75 to 77
(1) No, the oppositor has no right to intervene.

It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person
may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he
must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the
property to be affected by it either as executor or as a
claimant of the estate; and an interested party has been
defined as one who would be benefited by the estate such
as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a
creditor. And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that in
civil actions as well as special proceedings, the interest
required in order that a person may be a party thereto
must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or
contingent.
Under the terms of the will, oppositor ANA del Val
Chua has no right to intervene because she has no interest
in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator. She
is also not a legal heir because her adoption only created a
(2) Yes the will has been duly admitted to probate.

All three instrumental witnesses testified, among
other things, that it was the testatrix herself who asked
that they act as witnesses to the will and that it was the
testatrix who first signed the will and they signed
successively in the presence of each other and of the
testatrix. This evidence which has not been successfully
refuted proves conclusively that the will was duly executed
because it was signed by the testatrix and her
instrumental witnesses and the notary public in the
manner provided for by law.
The claim that the will was procured by improper
pressure and influence is also belied by the evidence. The
mere claim that JOSEFINA Mortera and her husband RENE
Teotico had the opportunity to exert pressure on the
testatrix simply because she lived in their house several
years prior to the execution of the will and that she was
old and suffering from hypertension in that she was
virtually isolated from her friends for several years prior to
her death is insufficient to disprove what the instrumental
witnesses had testified that the testatrix freely and
voluntarily and with full consciousness of the solemnity of
the occasion executed the will under consideration. The
exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must
be supported by substantial evidence and must be of a
kind that would overpower and subjugate the mind of the
testatrix as to destroy her free agency and make her
express the will of another rather than her own. The
3D (2008-2009)
C-9
RULING:
With the exception of that portion of the decision which
declares that the will in question has been duly executed
and admitted the same to probate, the rest of the decision
is set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the court a
quo for further proceedings.
relationship between her and her adoptive parents. She

does not have a relationship with the decedent.
Page
(3) Did the probate court commit an error in passing on

the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and in
determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated
by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. RENE
Teotico?

RULES 75 to 77
FERNANDO v. CRISOSTOMO (90 SCRA 585)

FACTS:
1. Hermogenes Fernando (GUARDIAN) was appointed as
guardian of Crisostomo and his minor children.
2. When Crisostomo died, GUARDIAN filed a motion for the
approval of an extrajudicial settlement of the minor
childrens parents (Crisostomo and his wife, who also
died).
3. The court denied the motion and the extrajudicial
settlement was declared null and void. (ORDER 1)
4. Germano Crisostomo (brother of deceased and one of the
private respondents) filed a petition to open the instate
proceedings of the deceased spouses and the
appointment of himself and his sister as co-administrators
of the estate.
5. GUARDIAN (ever bibo!) opposed and moved for the
dismissal of the instate proceedings, arguing that the
properties left by the deceased spouses were already in
his possession as guardian. The court denied his motion to
dismiss. (ORDER 2)
6. Germano Crisostomo and his sister were appointed coadministrators of the estate of the deceased spouses.
7. GUARIAN appealed from ORDER 1 and ORDER 2.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the court should have denied the petition for the
opening of the intestate proceedings (or dismissed the
same upon motion of GUARDIAN)
3D (2008-2009)
C-10
(3) The pronouncement made by the court a quo declaring

invalid the legacy made to Dr. RENE Teotico in the will
must be set aside as having been made in excess of its
jurisdiction.
The Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of
the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in a
probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to
determine if the will has been executed in accordance with
the requirements of the law.
The authentication of a will decides no other
questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the
testator and the compliance with those requisites or
solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of
wills. It does not determine nor even by implication
prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions, these
may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding
its authentication. The questions relating to these points
remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after
the will has been authenticated.
Another reason why said pronouncement should
be set aside is that the legatee was not given an
opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for he was
not allowed to intervene in this proceeding. As a corollary,
the other pronouncements touching on the disposition of
the estate in favor of some relatives of the deceased

should also be set aside for the same reason.
Page
burden is on the person challenging the will that such

influence was exerted at the time of its execution, a
matter which here was not done, for the evidence
presented not only is insufficient but was disproved by the
testimony of the instrumental witnesses.

RULES 75 to 77
ARAUJO v. CELIS (6 Phil 459)

Facts:
ROSARIO: inherited hacienda Pangpang and other
property from her mother; subsequently married Jose;
died leaving no descendants or ascendants but only
collateral relatives
CELIS: father-in-law of ROSARIO; in possession of property
claiming that ROSARIO bequeathed all her property to
husband and he died without a will so CELIS succeeded to
all his property, lawfully acquiring that the belonged to
ROSARIO
o Presented parol evidence claiming that the original
had been lost
ARAUJO: claiming as heirs
Issue: W/N ROSARIO executed a valid will entitling CELIS to the
land?
Held:
Witness Delgado: an action was brought against her by
Jose Araujo involving the hacienda and as solicitor there
came into possession a copy of the will duly recorded and
3D (2008-2009)
C-11
RULING:
1. The Court had actually issued several resolutions which
constitute res judicata with regard to the present appeal,
to wit a. The judge acted within his jurisdiction in appointing
petitioners (Germano and sister) as administrators,
inasmuch as said petitioners have interest, as next
of kin, to petition for letters of administration. The
guardian of the minor children of the deceased is
not, as such, administrator of the estate of the
deceased until and after said estate has been
acquired by or adjudicated to the minors by proper
proceedings.
b. The jurisdictional facts are the death of the
decedent, his residence at the time of his death in
the province where probate court is sitting, or if he
is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left
his estate in such province. The name and
competency of the person(s) for whom letters of
administration are prayed is not a jurisdictional
fact. The guardian of the minors has no right to
administer the properties of the deceased until
said properties have been adjudicated or awarded
to them either by extrajudicial or judicial partition.
Since no partition has yet been made, the
properties of the deceased have never been placed
under the administration of the guardian of his
minor children.
2. There is no error in the appointment of German

Crisostomo and his sister as co-administrators, no
evidence having been presented by the GUARDIAN why
they should not be appointed, either on account of their
incompetency or lack of moral qualifications.
3. The claim of GUARDIAN, by virtue of the previous
resolutions of the court, that the instate proceedings
should be dismissed, has to be denied.
Page
2. Whether the project of partition submitted by GUARDIAN

should have been approved

RULES 75 to 77
On May 14, 1934, Jose B. Suntay died in the City of Amoy,

China. He married twice, the first time to Manuela T. Cruz
with whom he had several children (including Apolonio,
Respondent herein) and the second time to Maria
Natividad Lim Billian with whom he had a son.
Apolonio Suntay, eldest son of the deceased by his first
marriage, filed for intestate proceedings
Later, and in the same court, Maria Lim Billian (Petitioner
& 2nd wife) also instituted the present proceedings for the
probate of a will allegedly left by the deceased.
Lim Billian claimed that before the deceased died in China
he left with her a sealed envelope (Exhibit A) containing
his will and, also another document (Exhibit B of the
petitioner) said to be a true copy of the original contained
in the envelope.
The will was executed in the Philippines, with Messrs. Go

Toh, Alberto Barretto and Manuel Lopez as attesting
witnesses.
On August 25, 1934, Go Toh, as attorney-in-fact of the
petitioner, arrived in the Philippines with the will in the
envelope and its copy Exhibit B.
While Go Toh was showing this envelope to Apolonio
Suntay and Angel Suntay, children by first marriage of the
deceased, they snatched and opened it, after getting its
contents and throwing away the envelope, they fled.
Respondents deny that they have the will.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged will was lost? And if can still be
probated?
Held:
Yes to both
The evidence is sufficient to establish the loss of the document
contained in the envelope. Respondents' answer admits that,
according to Barretto (attesting witness) he prepared a will of the
deceased to which he later became a witness together with Go
Toh and Manuel Lopez, and that this will was placed in an
envelope which was signed by the deceased and by the
instrumental witnesses. (Also Go Toh and Lopez corroborated the
statement that the brothers Suntay took the contents of the
envelope, and the brothers did not adduce evidence to the
contrary)
In court there was presented and attached to the case an open
and empty envelope signed by Jose B. Suntay, Alberto Barretto,
3D (2008-2009)
C-12
LIM BILLIAN v. SUNTAY (63 Phil 793)

Facts:
Page
probated; never saw the original because it was retained

by the notary; signed by two witnesses only; loss due to
burning of the papers and archives of the court of Pototan
by insurgents
o Will signed by two witnesses could not be valid
under the law in force at the time and could not
have been probated and recorded
Testimony was absolutely insufficient to establish
satisfactory manner of loss of alleged will and the court
should not have allowed secondary evidence introduced
as to the contents of the will.

RULES 75 to 77
BASA v. MERCADO (61 Phil 632)

FACTS:
- The estate of Ines Basa was allowed in probate by court, and
eventually adjudicated it in favor of the administrator who was
also the sole heir.
- The petitioner contests the jurisdiction of the probate court
alleging that there was failure to comply with the notice
requirements in Sec. 630.
- Sec. 630. Court to appoint hearing on will. When a will is
delivered to a court having jurisdiction of the same, the court shall
appoint a time and place when all concerned may appear to
contest the allowance of the will, and shall cause public notice
thereof to be given by publication in such newspaper or
newspapers as the court directs of general circulation in the
province, three weeks successively, previous to the time
appointed, and no will shall be allowed until such notice has been
given. At the hearing all testimony shall be taken under oath,
reduced to writing and signed by the witnesses.
- They allege that notice was only published for the first two
weeks and the hearing conducted on the third.
ISSUE: Whether the probate court had jurisdiction over the
estate.
It will be noted that in the above cited case the last of the three
publications was on December 18, 1919, and the hearing on the
administrators final account was set for December 19 of that
year, only 15 days after the date of the first publication.
In view of the foregoing, it is held that the language used in Sec.
630 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice,
referred to therein, should be published for three full weeks
before the date set for the hearing on the will. In other words,
the first publication of the notice need not be made 21 days
before the day appointed for the hearing.
DE ARANZ v. GALING (161 SCRA 628)
Facts:
Joaquin R-Infante filed with the RTC of Pasig a petition for probate
and allowance of the last will and testament of Monserrat RInfante y G-Pola. The petition specified the names and addresses
of the petitioners as lagatees and devisees. The probate court
then issued an order setting the petition for hearing. This order
was published in Nueva Era a newspaper of general circulation
once a week for three consecutive weeks. Joaquin was then
allowed to present evidence ex-parte and was appointed
executor.
The petitioners filed an MR alleging that as named legatees no
notices were sent to them as required by Section 4 of Rule 76 and
they prayed that they be given time to file their opposition. This
was denied.
3D (2008-2009)
C-13
The loss of the will justifies the presentation of secondary

evidence of its contents and of whether it was executed with all
the essential and necessary legal formalities.
HELD: Yes, it had.
Page
Go Toh and Manuel Lopez. It is undeniable that this envelope

Exhibit A is the same one that contained the will executed by the
deceased and drafted by Barretto.

RULES 75 to 77
Issue:
Whether or not the requirement under Section 4, Rule 76 is
mandatory and the omission constitutes a reversible error for
being constitutive of grave abuse of discretion?
of naturalization at Chicago, after which he visited family in

Sweden. When this visit was concluded, the deceased returned to
Manila. In Manila he had 3 children with Alejandra Ibaez:
Mercedes, Encarnacion, and Victor. Emil Johnson also had 2
children with Simeona Ibaez: Eleonor and Alberto.
Held: YES
IN RE: ESTATE OF JOHNSON (39 Phil 156)

Facts:
Emil H. Johnson was born in Sweden in 1877; in 1893, he
emigrated to the United States and lived in Chicago, Illinois. In
1898, at Chicago, he married Rosalie Ackeson, and immediately
afterwards left for the Philippine Islands as a US Army soldier. A
daughter, Ebba Ingeborg, was born a few months after their
marriage. After Johnson was discharged as a soldier from the
service of the United States he continued to live in the Philippines.
In 1902, Rosalie Johnson was granted a decree of divorce on the
ground of desertion. In 1903, Emil Johnson procured a certificate
The hearing on said application was set, and three weeks

publication of notice was ordered. In the hearing, witnesses were
examined relative to the execution of the will; and thereafter the
document was declared to be legal and was admitted to probate.
Victor Johnson was appointed sole administrator of the estate.
The will gives to his brother Victor shares of the corporate stock in
the Johnson-Pickett Rope Company; to his father and mother,
P20,000; to his daughter Ebba Ingeborg, P5,000; to Alejandra
Ibaez, P75 per month, if she remains single; to Simeona Ibaez,
P65 per month, if she remains single. The rest of the property is
left to the testator's five children - Mercedes, Encarnacion, Victor,
Eleonor and Alberto.
About three months after the will had been probated, the
attorneys for Ebba Ingeborg Johnson entered an appearance in
3D (2008-2009)
C-14
In this case, there is no question that the places of residence of

the petitioners are known to the probate court. The requirement
of the law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere
publication of the notice of hearing for three consecutive weeks in
a newspaper of general circulation.
Page
Ratio:
It is clear for the Rule that notice in time and place of the hearing
for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated,
or other known heirs, legatees and devisees residing in the
Philippines at their places of residence, if such place of residence
be known.
He died in Manila, leaving a holographic will. This will, signed by

himself and 2 witnesses only, instead of the 3 required witnesses,
was not executed in conformity with Philippine law. A petition
was presented in the CFI of Manila for the probate of this will, on
the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of
the State of Illinois, United States of America; that the will was
duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and
hence could properly be probated here.

RULES 75 to 77
1. Whether the court had jurisdiction YES

The proceedings for the probate of the will were regular and that
the publication was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to
entertain the proceeding and to allow the will to be probated.
"The proceeding as to the probate of a will is essentially one in
rem, and in the very nature of things the state is allowed a wide
latitude in determining the character of the constructive notice to
be given to the world in a proceeding where it has absolute
possession of the res. It would be an exceptional case where a
court would declare a statute void, as depriving a party of his
property without due process of law, the proceeding being strictly
in rem, and the res within the state, upon the ground that the
constructive notice prescribed by the statute was unreasonably
short." (Citing In re Davis)
2. Whether the order of probate can be set aside in this
proceeding on the other ground stated in the petition, namely,
that the testator was not a resident of the State of Illinois and that
the will was not made in conformity with the laws of that State. NO
Section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure:

Will made here by alien. A will made within the Philippine
Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country,
which is executed in accordance with the law of the state
or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which
might be proved and allowed by the law of his own state
or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the
Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if
executed according to the laws of these Islands.
3. Whether the will should not have been probated because it was
void NO (will was validly probated)
The probate of the will does not affect the intrinsic validity of its
provisions, the decree of probate being conclusive only as regards
the due execution of the will.
If, therefore, upon the distribution of this estate, it should appear
that any legacy given by the will or other disposition made therein
is contrary to the law applicable in such case, the will must
necessarily yield upon that point and the law must prevail. The
intrinsic validity of the provisions of this will must be determined
by the law of Illinois and not, as the appellant apparently assumes,
by the general provisions here applicable in such matters; for in
the second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code it is declared
that "legal and testamentary successions, with regard to the order
of succession, as well as to the amount of the successional rights
3D (2008-2009)
C-15
Held:
The CFI found that the testator was a citizen of the State of Illinois
and that the will was executed in conformity with the laws of that
State, the will was necessarily and properly admitted to probate.
Page
her behalf and noted an exception to the other admitting the will
to probate. On October 31, 1916, the same attorneys moved the
court to vacate the order of March 16 and also various other
orders in the case.

RULES 75 to 77
ISSUE: w/n the probate court correctly dismissed the petition

simply because the original petitioner (executor Generoso) died
before the petition could be heard and/or terminated (did death
of Generoso divest the court of jurisdiction on the theory that
amended petition of substitute sister required new publication)?
HELD: NO, probate court incorrect in dismissing petition.
1) When court vested w/ jurisdiction: The jurisdiction of the court
became vested upon the filing of the original petition and upon
compliance with Secs. 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of Rules of Court
2) Jurisdiction of the court continues until termination of the case
and remains unaffected by subsequent events. Parties who could
have come in and opposed the original petition as what Felipe, et.
al. did, could still come in and oppose, having already been
3D (2008-2009)
C-16
ABUT v. ABUT (45 SCRA 326)

FACTS:
1) Generoso Abut (petitioner), child of deceased Cipriano from 2nd
marriage, executor in deceaseds alleged will, filed a petition for
approval of will and letters testamentary. Court set hearing.
2) Opposition was filed by Felipe Abut (oppositors) and other
children from 1st marriage . Generoso Abut died before Court
could start formal hearing so Gavina Abut (sister) asked Court to
substitute her.
3) Court dismissed Generosos petition w/o prejudice to filing
another pursuant to Rules of Court.
notified of the pendency of proceeding by the publication of the

notice.
3) Jurisdiction over persons interested, how acquired: A
proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with
the corresponding publication of the petition the courts
jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the
settlement of the estate of the deceased. All that sec. 4 of Rule 76
provides is that those heirs (additional heirs names in the
amended petition but not included in the original petition) be
notified of the hearing for the probate of the will, either mail or
personally.
4) Effect of absence of notice to individual heirs: Service of notice
on individual heirs or legatees or devisees is a matter of
procedural convenience, not jurisdictional requisite. So much so
that even if the names of some legatees or heirs had been
omitted from the petition for allowance of the will and therefore
were not advised -- the decree allowing the will does not ipso
facto become void for want of jurisdiction
Page
and to the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated

by the laws of the nation of the person whose succession is in
question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the
country where it may be situate."

RULES 75 to 77
HELD: If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no

other copy is available, the will cannot be probated because the
only and best evidence is the handwriting of the testator in the
said will. Comparison is necessary. But a photostatic copy or Xerox
may be allowed because comparison can be made with the
standard writings of decedent. Footnote 8 of Gan v. Yap says
perhaps it may proved by a photographic or photostatic copy
Order of the lower court (dismissing order) was set aside.
Fausto Gan initiated probate proceedings on the

holographic will of Felicidad Yap.
Idelfonso Yap, husband of decedent opposed the
proceedings on the ground that his wife never executed a
will.
The holographic will was never presented in court. Instead
a description of its contents was testified by the
decedents niece along with the following narration:
o Felicidad confided in her cousin Vicente that she
desired to make a will without the knowledge of
her husband. Upon consultation with a law
student, Felicidad found out that it could be done
by without any witness, provided the document
was entirely in her handwriting, signed and dated
by her. So Felicidad made a holographic will in the
presence of her niece, Felina Esguerra. Felicidad let
Primitivo Reyes, Rosario Gan Jimenez and Socorro
Olarte to read her will.
o When Felicidad was confined in the hospital for her
last illness, she entrusted the said will, which was
contained in a purse, to Felina Esguerra. But a few
hours later, the Felicidads husband, asked Felina
for the purse: and being afraid of him by reason of
his well-known violent temper, she delivered it to
him. Thereafter, in the same day, Ildefonso Yap
returned the purse to Felina, only to demand it the
next day shortly before the death of Felicidad.
Again, Felina handed it to him but not before she
3D (2008-2009)
C-17
ISSUE: Whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be

found cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic
copy. YES.
GAN v. YAP (104 Phil 509)

Facts:
Page
RODELAS v. ARANZA (119 SCRA 16)

FACTS:
Rodelas filed a petition with CFI Rizal for probate of
holographic will of Bonilla and issuance of letter of administration
to her. It was opposed by the appellees on grounds that
stopped from claiming deceased left a will after failing to produce
will within 20 days as required by RULE 75, alleged copy does not
contain a disposition and not a will, only a copy of the holographic
will (using Gan v. Yap), deceased left no will. Petition to dismiss
saying that the will was proved using secondary evidence unlike
ordinary will. MTD denied.

RULES 75 to 77
Held: No!
The Rules of Court (1940) allow proof (and probate) of a
lost or destroyed will by secondary evidence the testimony
of witnesses, in lieu of the original document. Yet such
Rules could not have contemplated holographic wills
which could not then be validly made here.
Holographic will is usually done by the testator and by
himself alone, to prevent others from knowing either its
execution or its contents, the above article 692 could not
have the idea of simply permitting such relatives to state
whether they know of the will, but whether in the face of
the document itself they think the testator wrote it.
Obviously, this they can't do unless the will itself is
presented to the Court and to them.
the courts will not distribute the property of the deceased
in accordance with his holographic will, unless they are
shown his handwriting and signature.
we reach the conclusion that the execution and the
contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be
proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen
and/or read such will.
In fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish
and probate a lost holographic will, we think the evidence
submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with
improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure
3D (2008-2009)
C-18
Issue: May a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of

witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who declare that it was
in the handwriting of the testator?
Page
had taken the purse to the toilet, opened it and

read the will for the last time.
The trial judge refused to credit the petitioner's evidence
as to the existence of a holographic will on the following
grounds: (these grounds were upheld by the SC upon
appeal)
o if according to his evidence, the decedent wanted
to keep her will a secret, so that her husband
would not know it, it is strange she executed it in
the presence of Felina Esguerra, knowing as she did
that witnesses were unnecessary
o in the absence of a showing that Felina was a
confidant of the decedent it is hard to believe that
the latter would have allowed the former to see
and read the will several times;
o it is improbable that the decedent would have
permitted Primitivo Reyes, Rosario Gan Jimenez
and Socorro Olarte to read her will, when she
precisely wanted its contents to remain a secret
during her lifetime;
o it is also improbable that her purpose being to
conceal the will from her husband she would carry
it around, even to the hospital, in her purse which
could for one reason or another be opened by her
husband;
o if it is true that the husband demanded the purse
from Felina in the U.S.T. Hospital and that the will
was there, it is hard to believe that he returned it
without destroying the will, the theory of the
petitioner being precisely that the will was
executed behind his back for fear he will destroy it.

RULES 75 to 77
Ordinary Wills
The gurantee of aunthencity is
the
testimony
of
the
subscribing or instrumental
witnesses
if the ordinary will is lost, the
subscribing
witnesses
are
available to authenticate
it is quite hard to convince
three witnesses (four with the
notary) deliberately to lie. And
then their lies could be checked
and exposed
in the case of a lost will, the
three subscribing witnesses
would be testifying to a fact
which they saw, namely the act
of the testator of subscribing
the will;
GAGO v. MAMUYAC (49 Phil 902)

Facts:
Holographic Wills
The
only
guarantee
of
authenticity is the handwriting
itself
The loss of the holographic will
entails the loss of the only
medium of proof
if
oral
testimony
were
admissible only one man could
engineer the fraud this way
the witnesses would testify as

to their opinion of the
handwriting
which
they
allegedly saw, an opinion which
can not be tested in court, nor
directly contradicted by the
oppositors,
because
the
handwriting itself is not at
hand.
Issue:
Whether the second will can be denied probate on the ground
that it has been revoked and cancelled.
Held:
YES. The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or
cancellation of a will to be preserved. It therefore becomes
difficult at times to prove the revocation or cancellation of wills.
The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken place must
either remain unproved of be inferred from evidence showing
that after due search the original will cannot be found. Where a
will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the
possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in
the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was
cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is
shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot
be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has
been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or
3D (2008-2009)
C-19
Why may ordinary wills be proved by testimonial evidence

unlike holographic wills?
Action to obtain probation of the will of Miguel Mamuyac.

Francisco Gago presented a petition for the probate of the will
(dated 1918) of Miguel Mamuyac. This petition was denied on the
ground that the deceased executed a second will (dated 1919).
The petition for probation of the second will was disallowed on
the ground that the same had been cancelled and revoked in the
year 1920. It was also proven that the said second will presented
to the court for probate was a mere carbon copy of its original
which remained in the possession of the testator, who revoked it
before his death. There were also testimonies and other evidence
to establish that Mamuyac executed another will in 1920
(purportedly a third will).
Page
up to that "clear and distinct" proof required by Rule 77,

sec. 6

RULES 75 to 77
ALDANESE v. SALUTILLO (47 Phil 548)

Facts: Salome Avila, a widow and resident of Cebu, died in the
Province of Rizal on May 4, 1924. The subject will in the case is
dated May 3, 1924, which appears to be executed in due form and
is witnessed by Moreta, Borromeo and Rafols, all residents of the
City of Manila. The deceased left no descendants not ascendants
and under the will, the greater part of the estate will go to
Petitioner Vicente Aldanese and his sister Enriqueta.
The petition for probate of the will was presented in the CFI of
Cebu and was set down for hearing by order the court. After due
publication of the order, Canuto, Teodora, Feliciano, and
Raymundo, all surnamed Salutillo and Valeria Llanos appeared as
opponents. The petitioner presented a motion asking the court to
Issue: Whether or not the depositions were admissible as

evidence
Held: The depositions in question would appear to be in due form
and would ordinarily be admissible. But the record indicates that
the failure of the opponents to be represented at the examination
of the witnesses was due to the fact that they were mislead by
the petitionera action in seeking special authorization from the
court for the taking of the sdeposition. In the interest of justice,
the court thinks that the deposition should be retaken and the
opponents given another opportunity to examine the witnesses.
It is true that the rule prevailing in this jurisdiction is that when a
will is contested, the attesting witnesses must be called upon to
prove the will or a showing must be made that they cannot be
had, but that does not necessarily mean that they must be
brought bodily before the court. It is their testimony which is
needed and not their actual personal presence in the courtroom.
When an attesting witness to a will resides outside of the province
where the will is offered for probate and 30 miles or more from
3D (2008-2009)
C-20
In a proceeding to probate a will the burden of proofs is upon the

proponent clearly to establish not only its execution but its
existence. Having proved its execution by the proponents, the
burden is on the contestant to show that it has been revoked.
Copies of wills should be admitted by the courts with great
caution. When it is proven, however, by proper testimony that a
will was executed in duplicate and each copy was executed with
all the formalities and requirements of the law, then the duplicate
may be admitted in evidence when it is made to appear that the
original has been lost and was not cancelled or destroyed by the
testator.
authorize the taking of the depositions of the witnesses to the will

on the ground that being residents of the City of Manila, said
witnesses were unable to appear personally before the CFI of
Cebu. The motion was granted.
This was opposed by the filing of the opponents of a motion
asking that the order authorizing the taking of the depositions be
revoked. Such motion was granted, revoking the first order which
allowed the taking of the deposition on the ground that it has not
been sufficiently shown that it was impossible for the witnesses to
appear personally before the court, therefore, their depositions
would be inadmissible as evidence.
Page
authority of the testator. The force of the presumption of

cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly,
being weak or strong according to the circumstances, is never
conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was not
destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it.

RULES 75 to 77
Facts:
Martin Delfinado appeared through his attorney and files
an opposition to the allowance of the will of his father
Celestino Delfinado alleging that the will was not signed
by the deceased nor by any other person, in his presence
and by his express direction, and the attestation does not
comply with law
Petitioner, widow of the deceased, presented as witnesses
herself, Antonio Flor Mata (a justice of the peace of
Tayug) and Paciano Romero; Opposition had only 1
witness- Martin
The will was probated despite the fact that 2 of the
witnesses were not present
Issue: whether the court erred in admitting the will to probate
without having 2 of the subscribing witnesses called, although
they were living within the jurisdiction of the court or for not
requiring any showing why they were not produced
Held: Court erred in probating the will?
Our code provides that noncontested wills may be
admitted to probate upon the testimony of one of the
subscribing witnesses, but is silent as to the manner in
which they shall be proved when contested
AVERA v. GARCIA (42 Phil 145)

Facts:
-In the probate proceedings instituted by Avera for the will of
Esteban Garcia, contest was made by Marno Garcia and Juan
Rodriquez. During hearing, the proponent of the will introduced
one of the three attesting witnesses who testified that the will
was executed with all necessary external formalities and that the
testatpr was at the time in full possession of disposing faculties.
The witness was collaborated by the person who wrote the will at
the request of the testator. Two of the attesting witnesses were
not introduced nor their absence accounted for. On the other
hand, opponent introduced a single witness who testified that at
the time the will was made, the testator was so debilitated as to
be unable to comprehend what he was about. Trial court found
3D (2008-2009)
C-21
CABANG v. DELFINADO (34 Phil 291)
Provisions are also made for supplying the testimony of

the 3 subscribing witnesses when they cannot be called.
The provisions of the Vermont Statutes are essentially the
same. And as such, we may therefore call to our aid the
decisions of the SC of that State and the law upon which
those decisions rest in determining the intention of the
Philippine Legislature
The rule that the attesting witnesses must be called to
prove a will for probate is one of preference; not to be
confused with quantity
Where the will is contested, it is necessary that the 3
subscribing witnesses be present to testify as to the due
execution of the will; exceptions are that the witnesses
were dead, beyond the jurisdiction of the court or insane
There was failure to explain the absence of the other 2
witnesses to the will
Page
the place where the probate proceedings are held, his testimony
may be taken in the form of a deposition in accordance with sec.
406 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
placed, while they are engaged in other discussions more

simulated than real.
Issues:
[1.]W/N a will can be admitted to probate upon the proof of a
single attesting witness, without producing or accounting for the
absence of the others
[2.]W/N the will is rendered invalid due to the fact that the
signature of the testator and the attesting witnesses are written
on the right margin of each page instead of the left margin.
[2.]No. A will otherwise properly executed in accordance with the

requirements of existing law is not rendered invalid by the fact
that the paginal signatures of the testator and the attesting
witnesses appear in the right margin instead of the left.
-The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of the
wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth
and authenticity. So when an interpretation already given assures
these ends, any other interpretation that adds nothing but
demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and
frustrative of the testators last will, must be disregarded.
Held:
[1.] Yes. When the petition for probate of a will is contested, the
proponent should introduce all three of the attesting witnesses, if
alive and within reach of the process of the court; and the
execution of the will cannot be considered sufficiently proved by
the testimony of only one, without satisfactory explanation of the
failure to produce the other two. Nevertheless, where the
attorney for the contestants raised no question upon this point in
the court below either at the hearing upon the petition or in the
motion to rehear, as in this case, the objection to the probate of
the will on this ground cannot be made for the first time.
-reasons why appellate courts are disinclined to permit questions
raised for the first time in the second instance: (a) it eliminates
the judicial criterion of the CIF upon the point there presented
and makes the appellate court in effect a CIF with reference to
that point, unless the case is remanded for a new trial; (b)if
permits, if it does not encourage, attorneys to trifle with the
administration of justice by concealing from the trial court and
from their opponent the actual point upon which reliance is
SOLIVIO v. CA (182 SCRA 119)

Facts:
-This case involves the estate of the Esteban Javellana, Jr.,
novelist, who died a bachelor and survived by the ff relatives: (1)
Petitioner, his maternal aunt; (2) Private Respondent, sister of his
deceased father.
- Esteban Jr. was raised by his mother and petitioner. When his
mother died, she left all her properties to her only child, Esteban
Jr. and titles to the properties were transferred to the latter in
due time.
-During his lifetime, Esteban Jr. expressed to petitioner his plan to
place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help
poor but deserving students obtain a college education.
Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack without fulfilling such.
-Petitioner filed Spl. Proceeding for her appointment as special
administratrix of the estate of Esteban Jr., and later filed an
3D (2008-2009)
Page
that testator was of sound mind and the will was properly
executed, hence admitted will to probate.
C-22

RULES 75 to 77

RULES 75 to 77
Held.
[2.] No, but the charge of extrinsic fraud was unwarranted: (1)
Defendant was aware of the Spl. Proceeding intended to be file by
petitioner as admitted in her complaint. Evidently, she was not
prevented from intervening but she stayed away by choice. (2)
Probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of the time
and place of hearing is required to be published. The publication
was constructive notice to the whole world. Defendant was not
deprived of her right to intervene for she had actual and
constructive notice of the same.
[3.] No. The property of the deceased is not reservable property
for he was not and ascendant, but the descendant of his mother
from whom he inherited the properties in question. Reserva
Troncal (Art.891) applies to properties inherited by an ascendant
from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or a
brother or a sister.
-Since the deceased died without descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews,
3D (2008-2009)
C-23
Issues:
[1.]W/N RTC Branch 26 had jurisdiction to entertain civil case for
partition and recovery of defendant;s share of the estate even
while probate proceedings were still pending in Branch 23.
[2.] W/N defendant was prevented from intervening in Spl.
Proceeding through extrinsic fraud
*3.+W/N decedents properties were subject of reserve troncal in
favor of defendant
[4.]W/N defendant may recover her share of the estate after she
had agreed to place the same in the foundation
*1.+ No. Branch 26 lacked jurisdiction to entertain defendants

action for partition and recovery of her share of the estate while
probate proceedings for settlement of the estate were still
pending in Branch 23 of same court, there being no orders yet for
the submission and approval of the administratrixs inventory and
accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and
terminating the proceedings. It is such order that brings to a close
the intestate proceedings, puts an end to the administration and
relieves the administrator from his duties.
-the separate action was improperly filed for it is the probate
court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal
distribution of the estate.
Page
amended petition praying that letters of administration be issued

to her; the she be declared the sole heir; and that after payment
of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate
be adjudicated to her. After due publication and hearing, she was
declared sole heir. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to
pay for taxes and proceeded to set up the foundation.
-4 months later, Defendant filed an MR o the courts order
declaring petitioner as sole heir because she too was an heir of
the deceased. MR was denied for tardiness and instead of
appealing, Defendant filed case for partition, recovery of
possession, ownership and damages. Court rendered judgment in
favor of defendant, and upon the latters motion, court ordered
the execution of judgment pending appeal and required
petitioner to submit inventory and accounting of estate.
-in her MR, petitioner averred that the properties were already
transferred to the foundation. MR denied. On appeal, CA
affirmed TC judgment. Hence this petition.

RULES 75 to 77
MANALO v. PAREDES (SEE case under JURISDICTION)

Facts:
Laureana Hidalgo, surviving spouse of decedent, filed for
an application for letters of administration of the estate
left by Villegas, who, according to the application, died
intestate
Justina Mendieta, Lazaro Mendieta, Daria Mendieta and
Melecio Fule, supposed testamentary executor, filed a
motion with the court, praying for the probate of the
supposed will of Francisco Villegas, wherein most of his
property was given as a legacy to said Justina Mendieta,
the latter's children and the legitimate wife of the
deceased Francisco Villegas.
Laureana Hidalgo entered her objection to the probate of
the will
Subsequently, Laureana and Justina submitted to the court

an agreement which stated that Justina is withdrawing her
application for probate and that said will be held not
allowable to probate. Justina acknowledged that the
deceased died intestate, without leaving any more heirs
than his legitimate wife, Laureana Hidalgo, and his two
adulterous children, Lazaro and Daria Mendieta, and that
the property of the deceased be distributed in accordance
with said agreement.
The court on October 25, 1924, approved said agreement
and rendered judgment accordingly.
On January 7, 1925, one Gelacio Malihan, who claimed to
be first cousin of the deceased Francisco Villegas, filed
with the court a new application for the probate of the
same supposed will of the deceased Francisco Villegas
Held:
The proceeding for the probate of a will is a proceeding in
rem, and the court acquires jurisdiction over all the
persons interested through the publication of the notice
prescribed by section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
and any order that may be entered is binding against all of
them.
Through the publication ordered by the lower court of the
application for the probate of the supposed will of
Francisco Villegas said court acquired jurisdiction over all
such persons as were interested in the supposed will,
including Gelacio Malihan
All the parties became bound by said judgment; and if any
of them or other persons interested were not satisfied
with the court's decision, they had the remedy of appeal
to correct any injustice that might have been committed,
3D (2008-2009)
C-24
[4.] No. However, in as much as defendant agreed to deliver the

estate of the deceased to the foundation, as confirmed and
ratified in her motion to reopen and/or reconsider order which
she filed, she is bound by that agreement. Though it is true that
she did not waive her inheritance in favor of petitioner but she did
agree to place all of the estate to the foundation. Being a judicial
admission, it is conclusive and no evidence need be presented to
prove the agreement.
Page
nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his estate are

Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code. Hence, the CA correctly
held that petitioner and defendant being relatives of the
decedent within the third degree in the collateral lines, each shall
succeed to the estate without distinction and is entitled to
share and share alike.

RULES 75 to 77
Riera, the widow of Pons, was residing in Palma de Mallorca in the

Balearic Islands at the time of the death of Pons. She only learned
of the probate proceedings on November 14, 1918. Her lawyers
appeared in the CFI on November 29, 1918 and moved that the
order of probate be set aside to allow Riera to enter opposition,
invoking Sec. 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This was denied
by the CFI on the ground that more than six months had elapsed
since the date of the probate.
Riera questioned the formal validity of the will, and that the
document produced was not the original.
Issue:
Held:
NO. The reliefs provided by Sec. 513 are not applicable to probate
proceedings. Sec. 513 reads:
Sec. 513. When a judgment is rendered by a Court of First
instance upon default, and a party thereto is unjustly deprived of
a hearing by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence,
and the CFI which rendered the judgment has finally adjourned so
that no adequate remedy exists in that court, the party so
deprived of a hearing may present his petition to the Supreme
Court within sixty days after he first learns of the rendition of such
judgment, and not thereafter, setting forth the facts and praying
to have such judgment set aside.
Upon default
Though the action taken by a CFI in the probate of a will is
properly denominated as a judgment, it is not a judgment
rendered upon default even though no person appears to oppose
the probate.
By fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence
It is not alleged that any fraud has been attempted or committed,
or that the document probated is any other than a testamentary
memorial in which the decedent actually gave expression to his
3D (2008-2009)
C-25
RIERA v. PALMAROLI (40 Phil 105)

Facts:
Juan Pons y Coll, a Spanish subject residing in the Philippines, died
in Manila. Palmaroli, the Consul General for Spain in the
Philippines, filed a petition to admit his will for probate. An order
admitting the will to probate was entered on May 20, 1918.
Can a party who is interested in the estate of a deceased person,

and who has been prevented by inevitable conditions from
opposing the probate of the will, obtain from the Supreme Court,
under Sec. 513 of the Code of CivPro, an order for rehearing in the
CFI, it being alleged that the will was not executed with the
formalities required by law and hence was improperly admitted to
probate?
Page
and cannot now through the special remedy of

mandamus, obtain a review of the proceeding upon a new
application for the probate of the same will in order to
compel the respondent judge to comply with his
ministerial duty imposed by section 330 of the Code of
Civil Procedure; because this remedy, being extraordinary,
cannot be used in lieu of appeal, or writ of error; especially
when the parties interested have agreed to disregard the
testamentary provisions and divide the estate as they
pleased, each of them taking what pertained to him.

RULES 75 to 77
When, however, the CFI has, be the expiration of six months, lost
the power to relieve from its own judgment under Sec. 113, the
remedy conceded by Sec. 513 may be resorted to, under
conditions stated in that section; and apart from the restriction
that the petition shall be filed within sixty days after the party
aggrieved first learns of the rendition of judgment, there is no
positive limitation as to the time within which the petition may be
filed in the SC.
Therefore, the Supreme Court cannot grant relief because the
remedy conceded in Sec. 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure has
no application to orders admitting wills to probate.
MANAHAN v. MANAHAN (58 Phil 448)
Facts: Petitioner Tiburcia Manahan, niece of the testatrix,
instituted special proceedings for the probate of the will of the
deceased Donata Manahan, who died in Bulacan. She was named
Issues:
1. Whether or not Appellant was an interested party, thus,
should have been notified of the probate
2. Whether or not the court did probate the will and not just
limit itself to decreeing its authentication
3. Whether the will is void
Held:
1. No. She was not entitled to notification of the probate of
the will neither had she the right to expect it for she was
not an interested party. The testatrix died leaving a will in
which the appellant has not been instituted as heir and
3D (2008-2009)
C-26
The CFI which rendered the judgment has finally adjourned so that
no adequate remedy exists in that court
The Supreme Court will not entertain a petition filed under Sec.
513 to set aside a judgment and obtain a new trial in a CFI where
the latter court can still grant relief upon the same state of facts
under Sec. 113. The jurisdiction of the SC depends upon the lack
of remedy in the CFI.
as the executrix in said will. The court set the date for the hearing
and the necessary notice required by law was published
accordingly. On the hearing day, no opposition was filed, and after
the presentation of evidence, the court admitted the will to
probate.
1 yr. And 7 months later, Appellant Engracia Manahan,
deceaseds sister, filed a motion for reconsideration and a new
trial praying that the order admitting the will to probate be
vacated and the authenticated will be declared null and void. It
was denied. Appellant Manahan then appealed from the
judgment admitting the will to probate. She alleged that (1) she
was an interested party in the testamentary proceedings and as
such, was entitled to and should have been notified of the
probate of the will, (2) that the court, in its order, did not really
probate the will but limited itself to decreeing its authentication
and (3) the will is void on the ground that the external formalities
prescribed by law were not complied with.
Page
desires with regard to the disposition of his property. But if fraud

had been allegedas, for instance, if it were alleged that the
purported will is a forged documentthe remedy, if any exists,
would not be found in a proceeding under Sec. 513, but in an
original action in the CFI.

RULES 75 to 77
Page
C-27
not being a forced heir, she did not acquire any

successional right.
2. Yes. The court really decreed the authentication and
probate of the will, which is only the pronouncement
required of the trial court by law in order that the will may
be considered valid and duly executed in accordance with
law. Authentication and probate are synonymous in this
case.
3. No. It is valid, once a will has been authenticated and
admitted to probate, questions relative to its validity can
no longer be raised on appeal. The decree of probate is
conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and it
cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by
law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent
action or proceeding.
3D (2008-2009)

RULES 75 to 77
Issue: Whether or not the will should be probated.

Held: No. The fact that the municipal district court in Amoy, China
is a probate court must be proved. The law of China on procedure
in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal
requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931
should also be established by competent evidence. In this case,
there is no proof on these points. Therefore, the will and the
alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in
accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts
and principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills.
FLUEMER v. HIX (54 Phil. 610)
Facts: A.W. Fluemer, special administrator of the estate of Edward
Randolph Hix filed a petition for the probate of the latters last
will and testament allegedly executed in Elkins, West Virginia on
November 3, 1925. Fluemer submitted a copy of Section 3868 of
Issue: Whether or not the submission of the will and the copy of
the annotation is sufficient to allow probate of the will.
Held: No. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do nor prove
themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are
not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various
States of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as a fact.
Here the requirements of the law were not met. First, there is no
showing that the book from which an extract was taken was
printed and published under the authority of the State of West
Virginia. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the
certificate of the officer having charge of the original. No evidence
was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West
Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed. In
addition, the due execution of the will was not established. Lastly,
it was necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had
his dominical in West Virginia and not in the Philippine Islands. All
of these are required to be proved under the Philippine Code of
Civil Procedure.
MICIANO v. BRIMO (50 Phil. 867)
Facts: The judicial administrator of the estate of Joseph Brimo
filed a scheme of partition with the Philipppine Courts. Andre
Brimo, of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it, saying that
the partition puts into effects the provision of Joseph Brimos will
which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality. The court, however, approved it.
3D (2008-2009)
C-28
SUNTAY v. SUNTAY (95 Phil. 500)

Facts: Jose B. Suntay died in the city of Amoy, Fookien province,
Republic of China, leaving real and personal properties in the
Philippines and a house in Amoy. He was survived by hi children
by the first marriage (9) and his surviving widow (2nd wife). Years
after Joses death, Silvino (son) filed a petition for intestate
proceedings praying for the probate of the will. The will was in
Chinese characters executed on January 4, 1931 and was allegedly
filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court. The CFI of
Bulacan disallowed the probate.
Acts 1882, c.84 as found in an annotation of the West Virginia

Code.
Page
RULE 77

RULES 75 to 77
LEON & GHEZZI v. MANUFACTURERS LIFE INSURANCE CO. (90

Phil. 459)
Facts: Basil Gordon Butler, a resident of the Philippines, died in
New York leaving a will which was duly probate in the Surrogates
Court of New York country on August 3. The estate having been
settled, the proceedings were closed. The will devised his estate
and personal effects to Mercedes de Leon (residing in the
Philippines) but since Mercedes is not of sound judgments and
discretion in handling of money (she is a minor at the time she
became devisee), she will only be given a sum o fmoney sufficient
for her current needs. James Ross, the trustee, bought an annuity
from Manufacturers Life Insurance where a monthly payment of
$57.60 will be given to Mercedes during her lifetime. On
September 4, 1948, Mercedes presented Butlers will for probate
in the CFI of Manila. Mercedes and the appointed administrator
(Ghezzi) filed a motion for the citation of the manager of
Manufacturers Life Insurance , Manila Branch to render a
complete accounting of certain funds. (Basically Mercedes filed
Issue: Whether or not the administratrix (Ghezzi) can administer

the properties of Butler.
Held: No. The general rule is that the administration extends only
to the assets of a decedent found within the state or country
where it was granted. Hence, the funds in question (annuity) are
outside the jurisdiction of the probate court of Manila. Having
been invested in an annuity in Canada under a contract executed
in that country, Canada is the situs of the money. There is no
showing or allegation that the funds have been transferred or
removed to the Manila branch. Even if the money were in the
hands of the Manila branch, yet it no longer forms part of Butlers
estate and is beyond the control of the court because it has
passed completely in the hands of the company by virtue of the
contract of annuity.
3D (2008-2009)
C-29
Held: Yes. The fact is that Andre did not prove that said
testamentary disposition are not in accordance with the Turkish
laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what
the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of
evidence o n such laws, they are presumed to be the same as
those of the Philippines. There is therefore no evidence in the
record that the national law of the testator was violated in the
testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary
to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed.
this petition for probate so that she can get hold at once of the
entire amount invested in the annuity.) The court denied the
motion.
Page
Issue: Whether or not the scheme of partition should be

approved.

RULES 78 to 87
Guerrero, (as guardian of the minors Munoz) commenced an

action against Teran to recover the sum of P4,129.56 and costs.
The amount represents the amount due by the estate of Antonio
Munoz, which Teran had been the administrator, to the minors
Munoz.
The lower court found from the evidence that the estate
of Antonio Munoz owed the plaintiff the sum of P3,447.46.
Issue:
Whether Teran is liable.
Held:
No Teran is not liable.
Teran was appointed as the administrator of the estate of
Antonio Sanchez and guardian of the minors Munoz only for the
period September 17, 1901 to March 17, 1902. However, from
March 18, 1902 to October 6, 1906, Teran was replaced by Maria
Munoz as the guardian of the minors Munoz.
Therefore, Maria Munoz is responsible to said minors for
the administration of their interest in the estate of Antonio
Sanchez from the time of her acceptance of said appointment on
March 18, 1902 up to the time of her removal on October 6, 1906
based on the ground that she was not a resident of the
Philippines. If during this time she allowed other persons to
Side issue: Appointment of Resident Administrators or Guardians

There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint
residents only as administrators or guardians. However,
notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the
courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as
administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to
the jurisdiction of our courts here.
NAVAS v. GARCIA (44 Phil. 711)

Facts:
Navas is the surviving spouse of Geronima Uy. He is contesting an
order of the Court of First Instance of Samar which appointed Jose
Garcia as the administrator of the estate of Geronima Uy. He
maintains that he should be appointed as administrator instead of
Jose Garcia.
Issue: Whether the lower court erred in not appointing him as
administrator.
ANGEL-GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
D-1
GUERRERO v. TERAN (13 Phil 212)

Facts:
handle the property of her wards and if any mismanagement or

loss occurred thereby, the responsibility must fall upon her.
However, she may have a right of action against such persons for
any loss occasioned by their negligence or corruption.
Since the record did not disclose that any of the amounts
claimed by the plaintiff arose during the time while the said
defendant was administering their interest therein, only the sum
of P188.39 (the amount acknowledged by defendant in the lower
court as his liability)
Page
RULES 78 to 87

RULES 78 to 87
Held: No, the lower court did not commit an error.

It is well settled that a probate court cannot arbitrarily
disregard the preferential rights of the surviving spouse to the
administration of the estate of the deceased spouse. But, if the
person enjoying such preferential right is unsuitable, the court
may appoint another person. The determination of a persons
suitability as administrator rest, to a great extent, in the sound
judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and
such judgment will not be interfered with on appeal unless it
appears affirmatively that the court below was in error.
In the present case, it appeared on record that appellant
had adverse interests in the estate of such a character as to
render him unsuitable as administrator. Unsuitableness may
consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those
immediately interested in the estate.
The heirs of Maria, Telesfor and Ceasaria opposed the order

appointing Father Mercado as executor. Their opposition was
based on the alleged unfitness and incapacity of Father Mercado
to discharge his duties as executor for the following reasons: (1)
Notwithstanding their opposition, Father Mercado contracted the
services of 2 lawyers to represent him in these proceedings for
the sole purposes of repaying the obligations he owed to one of
the lawyer. (2) He cannot be impartial because the church of San
Nicolas is one of the legatees named in the will. (3) The estate has
no debts and the heirs are all of age and are willing to secure
payment of all the legacies, thus there is no necessity of making
the estate incur unnecessary expenses such as executors fees. (4)
Appellants are better able to protect the interest of the estate. (5)
Atty. Revilles, husband of Cesarea is willing to render services free
of charge.
Monsignor Gorordo, a retired bishop of Cebu, died leaving a will

instituting his sister Maria as the universal heir to his estate, and
in case of her death, his nieces Telesfor and Cesarea. He named
Father Mercado as executor, and in the absence of the latter,
Father Espina.
The will of Monsignor Gorordo was probated and the Court of
First Instance of Cebu confirmed the appointment of Father
Mercado as executor.
Held: No, the lower court did not commit an error.

The reasons advances by the appellants do not seem to
carry sufficient weight to warrant the reversal of the appealed
orders. The evidence shows that when the deceased bishop made
his will naming said priest in preference to anybody else, he was
in the full enjoyment of his intellectual faculties. Under the
circumstances, it is not only just but also right to fully comply with
his last will because it is to be assumed that he had good reasons
for so doing. While the court should not be deprived of its power
not to appoint, in certain cases, one who is unworthy of the trust,
notwithstanding the fact that he was named as such by the
testator; it is also true that for this to be done, the unworthiness,
3D (2008-2009)
Page
MERCADO v. vda. de JAEN (64 Phil. 75)

Facts:
D-2
Issue: Whether the lower court committed an error in denying the

opposition to appoint Father Mercado as executor.

RULES 78 to 87
Carlos Palanca died leaving a will appointing Roman Ozaeta,

former associate justice of the SC, as executor if Manuel Roxas
fails to qualify. Upon Palancas death, and Roxas having died
previously, Ozaeta presented a petition for the probate of the will,
at the same time praying that he be appointed special
administrator. Some of the heirs of Palanca opposed the petition.
The court then appointed Philippine Trust Company, a
non-applicant and a stranger to the proceedings special
administrator. Later on, Philippine Trust Company presented a
petition to resign as special administrator due to incompatibility
of interest since it had granted a loan to Angel Palanca, one of the
Issue: Whether a probate court, which had already admitted a will

to probate, may appoint as special administrator any person other
than the executor named in the will.
Held: No, the executor named in a will should be appointed.
Rule 81 of the Rules of Court grants discretion to the
probate court to appoint, or not to appoint, a special
administrator. It is silent as to the person who may be appointed
as special administrator, unlike Rule 79 which expressly gives the
order of preference of the persons who may be appointed regular
administrator. The appointment of special administrators is not
governed by the rules regarding the appointment of regular
administrators. But the fact that a judge is granted discretion does
not authorize him to become partial, or to make his personal likes
and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. And
there is no reason why the same fundamental and legal principles
governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be
taken into account in the appointment of the special
administrator.
3D (2008-2009)
D-3
OZAETA v. PECSON and BPI (93 Phil. 416)

Facts:
heirs. The court then appointed Sebastian Palanca, one of the

heirs, as special administrator.
Subsequently, the court admitted the will to probate and
appointed Ozaeta as regular administrator.
Pending the appeal of the order admitting the will to
probate, the court appointed BPI as special administrator.
Ozaeta claims that the reason why the judge refuses to
appoint him as special administrator is due to his personal dislike
of him. However, the judge contends Ozaeta as biased to one
group of heirs.
Page
incapacity, ineptitude and unfitness of such person must be

manifest and real and not merely imaginary.
With regards to the reasons espoused by the heirs, the
court ruled that: Reason 1 The court accepted the explanation
of Father Mercado as to why he engaged the services of the
lawyers (i.e., he has confidence in them). Reason 2 The parish of
Father Mercado is not a legatee in the will. Moreover, the will
does not give Father Mercado, as executor, even the right to
intervene in the distribution and disposition of the P10,000
legacy. Reason 3 There is a necessity to name an executor since
the will contains so many provisions and it is premature to assert
that the estate has no obligation to pay. Reason 4 and 5 The
heirs and Atty. Revilles is not in a better position to protect the
estate since it would be no more immune from irregularities. In
addition the interest of the legatees is more than that of the heirs.

RULES 78 to 87
RULING: Appeal denied. Trial Courts appointment of APOLINARIO

is upheld.
The lower court having been of the opinion that
APOLINARIO de Guzman deserves appointment of coadministrator, and it being discretionary on its part to determine
who should be appointed administrator of the properties of a
deceased person, We believe it unjustified for us to meddle in the
exercise of such discretion, it not appearing that said court has
committed a grave abuse thereof.
The same reasons are applicable to the case under
consideration, inasmuch as the appointed co-administrator,
Apolinario de Guzman as brother of Nicolasa de Guzman whom
the latter needs to help her in the administration of the
properties left by their deceased father, many of which consist in
3D (2008-2009)
D-4
DE GUZMAN v. LIMCOLIOC (68 Phil. 673)

FACTS:
This is a case regarding the intestate estate of PROCESO de
Guzman, which was substantially comprised of fisheries situated
in the provinces. The heirs of PROCESO NICOLASA and
APOLINARIO have been appointed as co-administrators of the
estate. The court ordered APOLINARIOS appointment but he shall
not receive compensation for his services.
The instant case (procedurally) is an appeal by oppositorappellant ANGELA Limcolioc (de Guzman childrens half-sibling)
from the said order of the court. She assails APOLINARIOs fitness
as co-administrator. She alleges that APOLINARIO is not
trustworthy (because when PROCESO was alive, PROCESO filed a
complaint against APOLINARIO on the ground that the latter, as
administrator of PROCESOs estate, misappropriated from
P12,000 to P15,000 to buy a fishery, a De Soto sedan, and a duck
farm in Los Baos, and loaned money and made deposits in the
Philippine National Bank). ANGELA also alleged that APOLINARIO
has a great interest in PROCESOs estate.
In the case of Nicolas de Guzman vs. Angela Limcolioc, G.R.
No. 46134, wherein the parties are the same as those in this case,
this court, in a judgment rendered on April 18, 1939, stated as
follows:
The principal consideration reckoned with in the

appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased
person is the interest in said estate of the one be appointed as
such administrator. This is the same consideration which the law
takes into account in establishing the preference of the widow to
administer the estate of her husband, upon the latter's death,
because she is supposed to have an interest therein as a partner
in the conjugal partnership. But this preference established by law
is not absolute, if there are other reasons justifying the
appointment of an administrator other than the surviving spouse.
If the interest in the estate is what principally determines the
preference in the appointment of an administrator of the estate
of a deceased person, and if, under the circumstances of each
case, it develops that there is another who has more interest
therein than the surviving spouse, the preference established in
the latter's favor falls to the ground.
Page
Based on US Jurisprudence, since the will appointing him

regular administrator has been admitted to probate by the trial
judge, he should now be appointed special administrator during
the pendency of the appeal against the order admitting the will to
probate. Mandamus lies to compel such appointment.

RULES 78 to 87
ISSUE: Whether the order cancelling the letters of administration

granted to GONZALES should be nullified on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion, as her removal was not shown to be anchored
on any of the grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules
of Court
RULING: Yes, there was grave abuse of discretion. GONZALES
reinstated.
1. In the appointment of the administrator, the principal
consideration reckoned with is the interest of the estate.
The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those
who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical
administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer
the consequences of waste, improvidence or
mismanagement, have the highest interest and most
influential motive to administer the estate correctly.
2. Administrators have such an interest in the execution of
their trust as entitle them to protection from removal
3D (2008-2009)
D-5
GONZALES v. AGUINALDO (190 SCRA 112)

FACTS:
1. In the intestate proceedings of the deceased Ramona
Gonzales, two of her four children GONZALES and OLBES
were appointed as co-administratrices.
2. Later on, while GONZALES was in the US to accompany her
husband who was receiving medical treatment there,
OLBES filed a motion to remove GONZALES as coadministratrix on the ground that she is incapable or
unsuitable to discharge the trust and had committed acts
and omissions detrimental to the interest of the estate
and the heirs.
3. An order was issued requiring GONZALES and other parties

to file their opposition. The other child of the deceased,
Fabis, was the only one who opposed the removal of
GONZALES.
4. Thereafter, the letters of administrator granted to
GONZALES was cancelled. It was held that although it
would be in the best interest of the estate to have the two
children as administrators, since GONZALES was presently
absent and left OLBES to manage the estate, there should
be now only one administrator of the estate.
5. The motion for reconsideration of her removal was
subsequently denied.
Page
fisheries situated in the provinces is as interested as his sister

in that said properties be duly administered and conserved for the
benefit of the heirs.
It is true that Apolinario de Guzman's father, Proceso de
Guzman, in life, filed a complaint against his son on the ground
that the latter, as administrator of his father's estate,
misappropriated from P12,000 to P15,000 to buy a fishery, a De
Soto sedan, and a duck farm in Los Baos, and loaned money and
made deposits in the Philippine National Bank, but said complaint
was dismissed at the instance of the father himself.
In the present case, aside from the fact that Apolinario de
Guzman, as co-administrator, will administer properties in which
he has a greater share than that of the oppositor, the childless
widow of the deceased by a second marriage, and will act merely
as a helper of his sister, there is no ground to believe that he
would squander said properties and the products thereof.
JOHANNES v. HARVEY (43 Phil. 175)

Facts:
Theodora Johannes died intestate in Singapore. Husband,

brothers and sister remainedall were residents of
Singapore except for Alfred (brother) who lives in Manila.
B.E. Johannes (husband) was named as administrator of
the property within the jurisdiction of the Straits
Settlements [under the British Law, the husband is entitled
to the whole of the estate of his wife if she die intestate
Upon petition, Alfred was appointed administrator of the
Manila estate consisting of sum in the Manila banks.
B.E. contends that the appointment of Alfred was in excess
of its jurisdiction and administration in Manila jurisdiction
is unnecessary.
Issue: w/n the appointment of Alfred was made in excess of the
Manila courts jurisdiction?
Held: No. It is often necessary to have more than one
administrator of an estate.
When a person dies intestate owning property in the
country of domicile as well as in a foreign country,
administration is had in both countries.
Principal administration: that which is granted in the
jurisdiction of decedents last domicile; other
administration, subsidiary to the principal administration is
called ancilliary administration
A grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have
any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is
granted
Ancilliary administration: proper whenever a person dies
leaving in a country other than that of domicile, property
3D (2008-2009)
Page
without just cause. Hence, section 2 of Rule 92 provides

the legal and specific causes authorizing the removal of an
administrator. Thus, a court must have some fact legally
before it, in order to justify a removal.
3. IN this case, the removal was not based on any of the
causes specified in OLBES motion. Neither was there a
determination of the validity of the charges brought
against GONZALES. On the other hand, the removal was
based on the fact that conflicts and misunderstandings
existed between GONZALES and OLBES and that the
former had been absent from the country for a little less
than a year.
4. Contrary to the bare allegations of failure to manage and
incompetence, it was shown that despite being in the US,
GONZALES continued to perform her duties (sending a
letter of authorization to OLBES to receive interests
accruing from Land Bank). Also, temporary absence in the
state does not disqualify one to be an administrator of the
estate.
5. Reliance by the lower court on the fact that 2 of the 4 heirs
do not wish to reinstate GONZALES is misplaced. Removal
of an administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices
and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate, nor
on the belief of the court that it would result in orderly
and efficient administration.
D-6

RULES 78 to 87

RULES 78 to 87
Held:
No.
The beneficiaries under the will of Francisco Varela Calderon,
granting that they are illegitimate children, are not incapacitated
to take property under the will of their father. The CC provides
that a person who has no forced heirs may dispose by will of all
his property or any part of it in favor of any person qualified to
acquire.
The appellants in this case are not forced heirs of the deceased
and therefore have no right to any part of the property left by the
testator, once he had disposed of the same by will. If any of them
were forced heirs they would be entitled to intervene in this case
and protect their interest in so far as they may have been
prejudiced by the will. It is evident therefore that they have not
been injured or prejudiced in any manner whatsoever. Only
forced heirs whose rights have been prejudiced have a right to
intervene in a case of this character.
TRILLANA v. CRISOSTOMO (89 Phil 710)
GUTIERREZ v. VILLEGAS (5 SCRA 313)
3D (2008-2009)
D-7
GUTIERREZ de OCAMPO v. VALERA CALDERON (59 Phil 631)

Facts:
- Francisco Varela Calderon was a bachelor, a citizen of the
Philippine Islands, and at the time he made his will was
residing temporarily in France and that at the time of his
death he left no ascendants.
- The appellants are brothers and sisters of full blood of the
deceased and have filed an opposition to the project of
partition of their deceased brother Calderon, the lower
court denied their intervention
- Appellants are not the deceaseds forced heirs. Article 763
of the Civil Code reads: "Any person who has no forced
heirs may dispose by will of all his property or any part of
it in favor of any person qualified to acquire it. . . .
- The appellants contend that the beneficiaries
(respondents herein) under the will of Francisco Varela
Calderon are illegitimate children and that they are not
qualified to inherit from the deceased, but are only
entitled to support.
Issue:
Did the trial court err in refusing to allow the appellants to
intervene?
Page
to be administered in the nature of assets, liable for his

individual debts or to be distributed among heirs
o PROPER PROCEDURE: ancilliary administrator to
pay claims of creditors, settle accounts and remit
the surplus to the domiciliary jurisdiction
Universal rule giving surviving spouse preference when an
administrator is to be appointed, unless for strong reasons
the spouse is unsuitable for the responsibility (nonresidence is a factor to be considered)

RULES 78 to 87
Difference with Santos doctrine: Santos case held that the

assigning heir remains an interested person. That case involved an
assignment between co-heirs pendente lite, during the course of
settlement proceedings. Given that the settlement court had
already acquired jurisdiction over the properties of estate, any
assignment regarding the same had to be approved by said court.
And since the approval the court is not deemed final until the
estate is closed the assigning heir remains an interested person in
proceedings even after said approval, which can be vacated is
given. In the instant case, the assignment took place when no
settlement proceedings was pending. The properties subject
3D (2008-2009)
D-8
Held: SC affirmed the dismissal order.
The Rules of Court provides that a petition for administration and

settlement of an estate must be filed by an "interested person"
(See. 2, Rule 79). Allowing that the assignment must be deemed a
partition as between the assignor and assignee, the same does
not need court approval to be effective as between the parties.
An extrajudicial partition is valid as between the participants even
if the requisites of Sec. 1, Rule 74 for extrajudicial partition are
not followed, since said requisites are for purposes of binding
creditors and non-participating heirs only. Should it be contended
that said partition was attended with fraud, lesion or inadequacy
of price, the remedy is to rescind or to annul the same in an action
for that purpose. And in the meanwhile, assigning heir cannot
initiate a settlement proceedings, for until the deed of assignment
is annulled or rescinded, it is deemed valid and effective against
him, so that he is left without that "interest" in the estate
required to petite for settlement proceedings. Also, since there
was really no settlement proceedings in the first place, the
petition to intervene must be denied.
Page
DURAN v. DURAN (20 SCRA 379)

Facts:
Pio Duran died intestate. His alleged heirs are Josefina
Duran (surviving spouse) and brothers and sisters,
nephews and nieces.
Cipriano Duran, Pio's brother, executed a Deed of
Assignment renouncing his hereditary rights to Pio's estate
in favor of Josefina. He filed a petition for intestate
proceedings to settle Pio Duran's estate, further asking
that he be named the administrator. He also filed an ex
parte motion to be appointed special administrator.
Josefina opposed, saying Cipriano is not an "interested
person" in the estate, in view of the deed of transfer and
renunciation; she asked to be appointed administratrix. In
response, Cipriano alleged that Josefina Duran was not the
decedent's wife and that the deed of assignment was
procured thru fraud. Another brother, Miguel Duran, filed
a petition to be joined as co-petitioner of Cipriano.
Josefina moved to strike as an improper attempt to
intervene in the case.
CFI: dismissed the petition of Cipriano for his lack of
interest in the estate, based on the deed of transfer
executed by Cipriano. The court declared itself without
power to examine in said proceedings, collaterally, the
alleged fraud, inadequacy of price and lesion that would
render it rescissible or voidable. Miguel's petition was also
dismissed. Cipriano and Miguel appealed to the SC.

RULES 78 to 87
GARCIA FULE v. CA (supra, Rule 73)
ROXAS v. PECSON (82 Phil 407)

Facts:
Upon Pablo Roxas death, Maria his sister and Pedro his
brother (private respondents in this case), filed a petition
for the administration of Pablos estate in a special
intestate proceeding in Bulucan.
Maria was appointed special administratrix
However, a few days later, Natividad the widow
(petitioner of this case) filed a petition for the probate of
Pablos alleged will and for her appointment as executrix
of his estate.
The intestate proceedings were dismissed upon
agreement of the parties.
Maria and Pedro opposed probate of the will and objected
to the appointment of Natividad as special administratrix.
However, since she qualified, the widow was appointed to
the position.
CFI refused to admit the will to probate on the ground that
the attesting witnesses did not sign their respective names
in the presence of the testator. The case is now pending
on appeal.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge acted in excess of the

court's jurisdiction in appointing two special co-administratices of
the estate of the deceased Pablo Roxas?
Held: YES
It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the
prior or preferred right of certain persons to the
appointment of administrator under section 1, Rule 81, as
well as the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of
an executor or administrator under section 653 of Act No.
190, now section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection
or removal of special administrator.
As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special
administrator and the qualifications the appointee must
have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of
the person to be appointed, discretion which must be
sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice
or equity.
There is absolutely no reason for appointing two separate
administrators, specially if the estate to be settled is that
of a deceased husband as in the present case, for
according to articles 1422 and 1423 of the Civil Code, only
3D (2008-2009)
D-9
De GUZMAN v. ANGELES (162 SCRA 347)
Maria and Pedro Roxas renewed their petition for the

appointment of Maria Roxas as special administratrix or
special co-administratrix
Respondent judge rendered his resolution appointing the
petitioner Natividad as special administratrix only of all the
conjugal properties of the deceased, and Maria as special
administratrix of all capital or properties belonging
exclusively to the deceased.
Page
matter of the assignment were not under the jurisdiction of a

settlement court.

RULES 78 to 87
A: It may not be amiss to note that preference accorded by the

aforementioned provision of the ROC refers to the appointment
of a regular administrator not to the special administrator and
that the order appointing the latter lies within the discretion of
the Probate Court.
PIJUAN v. vda. de GURREA (18 SCRA 898)

Facts:
Maria Ruiz Vda. De Gurrea (Mrs. Gurrea) married Carlos Gurrea in
Spain. They had one child, Teodoro. Carlos abandoned Mrs.
Gurrea and went to the Philippines with their son Teodoro. Here
he lived maritally with Rizalina Perez. When Mrs. Gurrea came
over, Carlos refused to admit her to his residence so Mrs. Gurrea
stayed with Teodoro in Bacolod City.
Mrs. Gurrea then instituted a case for support and annulment of
some alleged donations of conjugal party in favor of Rizalina. In
due course, the court granted her a monthly alimony, pendente
lite, of P2,000, which was later reduced to P1,000.
Carlos Gurrea died, leaving a will in which he named Marcelo
Pijuan as executor, and disinherited Mrs. Gurrea and their son.
Pijuan instituted proceedings for the probate of the will, and he
was thereafter appointed special administrator of the estate.
3D (2008-2009)
D-10
Q: Is the preference accorded by Sec 6 of Rule 78 in the

appointment of an administrator applicable to the appointment
of a special administrator?
Page
after the dowry and parapherna of the wife and the debts,
charges, and obligations of the conjugal partnership have
been paid, the capital or exclusive property of the husband
may be liquidated and paid in so far as the inventoried
estate may reach
If two separate administrators are appointed as done in
the present case, in every action which one of them may
institute to recover properties or credit of the deceased,
the defendant may raise the question or set up the
defense that the plaintiff has no cause of action, because
the property or credit in issue belongs to the class which is
being administered by the other administrator, which can
not be done if the administrator of the entire estate is only
one.
As under the law only one general administrator may be
appointed to administer, liquidate and distribute the
estate of a deceased spouse, it clearly follows that only
one special administrator may be appointed to
administer temporarily said estate, because a special
administrator is but a temporary administrator who is
appointed to act in lieu of the general administrator
"When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration occasioned by an appeal from the
allowance or disallowance of will, or from any other cause,
the court may appoint a special administrator to collect
and take charge of the estate of the deceased until the
questions causing the delay are decided and executors or
administrators thereupon appointed," (sec. 1, Rule 81)

RULES 78 to 87
Issues:
1. Whether Mrs. Gurrea should be appointed as
administratrix of the estate.
2. Whether support previously awarded to Mrs. Gurrea
should be continued.
Held:
1. NO. None of the conditions stated in the Rules obtains in
the case at bar. Carlos Gurrea has left a will, so it cannot
be said that he has died intestate. Said document names
Pijuan as executor thereof, and it is not claimed that he is
incompetent therefor. He has not only not refused the
trust, but has also expressly accepted it by applying for his
appointment as executor, and, upon his appointment as
special administrator, has assumed the duties thereof. It
may not be amiss to note that the preference accorded by
the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court to the
surviving spouse refers to the appointment of a regular
administrator or administratrix, not to that of a special
TAN v. GO CHIONG LEE ((46 Phil 200)

FACTS:
During the lifetime of the deceased Go Bung Kiu (Kiu), defendant
Go Chiong Lee (Lee) was his encargado. In 1920, Kiu died and Lee
was appointed as special administrator of the estate, with Liok,
Changco, Manuel Go as sureties on his bond in the sum of
P30,000. Subsequently, Lees status changed to that of
administrator. Lee continued continued to discharge his duties as
administrator until he was relieved by Plaintiff Maximina Tan
(Tan). Lee filed 3 reports all in all covering the periods within
which he acted as the administrator. The committee on claims
rendered its report, admitting as proved, claims amounting to
P69,029.91. The court issued an order stating that administrator
Lee is ordered to pay out of the funds of the estate of deceased
Kiu to each of the persons mentioned in the report of the said
committee. Plaintiff Tan sought to recover from defendant Lee
3D (2008-2009)
D-11
The lower court denied both motions by Mrs. Gurrea.
administrator, and that order appointing the latter lies

within the discretion of the probate court, and is not
appealable.
2. YES. The lower court denied support to Mrs. Gurrea
because of absence of proof as regards the status, nature
or character of the property now under the custody of the
Special Administrator. Precisely, however, on account of
such lack of proof thereon, the Court is bound by law to
assume that the estate of the deceased consists of
property belonging to the conjugal partnership, one-half of
which belongs presumptively to Mrs. Gurrea, aside from
such part of the share of the deceased in said partnership
as may belong to her as one of the compulsory heirs.
Page
Mrs. Gurrea opposed the probate proceedings, saying that as

widow, she claims a right of preference under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of
the Revised Rules of Court. In the language of this provision, said
preference exists if no executor is named in the will or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to
give bond, or a person dies intestate. Mrs. Gurrea also moved
that in light of the suspension of the support and annulment case
by reason of Carloss death, support previously awarded to her
should be continued pending the final determination of the case.

RULES 78 to 87
and the latters sureties on four causes of action, amounts

totalling to P54,700.39. The trial court awarded the plaintiff the
sum of P42,849.08 but limiting the liability of the sureties to
P30,000. Defendants appealed.
whether the amicable settlement was binding: NO

whether the court could approve such an agreement: NO
court could not approve a settlement saddling upon the estate
debts it never owed
to give effect to the compromise as written would result in
great wrong and destroy every chance the minor children had to
participate in the inheritance of their father
whether the estate owed the plaintiffs the amount being
claimed: NO
3D (2008-2009)
D-12
LIZZARAGA HERMANOS v. ABADA (40 Phil 124)

FACTS:
Francisco Caponong died owing the plaintiffs Sociedad de
Lizarraga a sum of money
Seven years after the death of Francisco, plaintiffs filed a
suit against Felicisima personally and as administratrix of
Franciscos estate for the collection of money
ISSUE:
Page
Issue: Whether or not the defendant Lee and his sureties are
liable to pay the amount of P54,700.39 to plaintiff?
Held: No. The plaintiff shall only have and recover from the
defendants jointly and severally the amount of P6,375 with legal
interest from the date when the complaint was presented.
The standard of responsibility of the administrator is best
measured as in essence the responsibility of the bailee. Like any
bailee, he must pursue his discretion honestly and in good faith,
or he will become personally liable, to those who are interested in
the estate, for waste, conversion or embezzlement. But where an
administrator, entrusted with the carrying on of an estate, acts in
good faith and in accordance with the usual rules and methods
obtaining in such business, he will not be held liable for losses
incurred.
The supreme court found that the personal responsibility of the
former administrator Lee and the sureties on his bond for losses
incurred by the estate during his administration, has not been
proved.
Guardian of the minor children of Francisco asked

permnission to intervene wherein he alleged that the
estate of Francisco did not owe the plaintiffs anything
An amicable settlement wherein the defendants shall (1)
recognize the indebtedness of the estate (2) mortgage all
the property of Francisco and of Felicisima and (3)
mortgage the carabaos was reached
The settlement was approved by the court but was not
recorded in the registry of property up to the time of the
institution of the suit
Plaintiffs filed the present action (1) for failure of
defendants to pay 2 installments (2) for refusal of
defendants to mortgage the carabaos and (3) on the
allegation that defendants were about to transfer their
property to the prejudice of the plaintiffs
Attachment order was granted by the court; on appeal,
judge decided in favor of defendants and ordered plaintiffs
to pay damages

RULES 78 to 87
WARNER BARNES v. LUZON SURETY (95 Phil 924)

FACTS:
-Plaintiff, Warner, Barnes & Co., filed a complaint in the CFI
against defendant, Luzon Surety, for the recovery of P6000, plus
costs and P1500 for attorneys fees. The basis for the complaint
was a bond in the sum of P6000 filed by Agueda Gonzaga as
administratrix of the Interstate Estate of Aguedo Gonzaga in
Special Proceedings No. 452of the CFI of Negros Occidental.
-The complaint alleges that plaintiff had a duly approved claim
against the estate of P6,485.02; that administratrix violated the
ISSUE:
[1] W/N the lower court has jurisdiction to pass upon the liability
of defendant under the bond in question
[2] W/N plaintiff should first file a claim against the estate of the
deceased administratrix, in conformity with section 6 of Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court.
HELD:
[1] Defendant contends that the lower court had no jurisdiction to
pass upon its liability under the bond in question, because it is
only the probate court that can hold a surety accountable for any
breach by the administratrix of her duty.
-Court held that although the probate court has jurisdiction over
the forfeiture or enforcement of an administrators bond, the
same matter may be litigated in an ordinary civil action brought
before the Court of First Instance.
-Though nominally payable to the Rep. of the Phils, the bond is
expressly for the benefit of the heirs, legatees and creditors of the
Estate of the deceased Aguedo Gonzaga. There is no valid reason
why a creditor may not directly in his name enforce said bond in
so far as he is concerned.
[2] Defendant alleged that plaintiff should have first filed a claim
against the Estate of the deceased administratrix Agueda Gonzaga
3D (2008-2009)
D-13
whether the administratrix can mortgage estate properties

no mortgage can be placed by an administrator on the estate
of descendant, unless it is specifically authorized by statute (no
such statute in the Philippines)
the mortgage of the properties is foreign to the policy and
purpose of administration; it aims to close up, not to continue an
estate
conditions of her bond (i.e. failed to file inventory, failed to pay

approved claim of plaintiff, failed to render a true and just
account of her administration); and that defendant, as surety
failed to pay plaintiff notwithstanding the latters demand.
-CFI rendered a summary judgment sentencing the defendant to
pay plaintiff P6000, P900attys fees + costs.
Page
the estate owed the plaintiffs less than P13,000 when the
commissioners passed on their claim part of which has already
been paid
where the plaintiffs, originally holding a claim originally for less
than P13,000 let the administratrix have money and effects till
their claim grow to P68,000 they can not be permitted to charge
this amount as expense of administration (they may be allowed to
charge the same to the current revenue of the hacienda)
administration expenses would be the necessary expenses of
handling the property, of protecting it against destruction or
deterioration, and possibly producing a crop

RULES 78 to 87
Issue: Whether or not Wilson should be held liable for the loss in
the estate.
Held: Yes. When Wilson was appointed special administrator, he
never made any report or file any account of any kind until 1927.
Neither did he apply to or obtain an order from the court of any
nature during that period to settle the debts of Charles Rear,
which, at the time of his death amounted to P1,300.00. It was the
legal duty of Wilson to at one apply to the court for an order to
sell the property to pay the debts of the deceased and the
expenses of administration. If the property of the state had been
promptly sold, when it should have been, and sold for its
appraised value, all the debts of the deceased and the court costs
and expenses of administration would have been paid and the
estate would have a balance left, instead of going negative.
Instead of doing that, and without any order, he continued the
operation of the plantation and employment of a manager, the
net result of which was that all of the property of the estate was
consumed, lost or destroyed, leaving a deficit against the estate.
(other salient parts of the case might help)
When appointed, it is the legal duty of the administrator
to administer, settle, and close the administration in the
ordinary course of business, without any unnecessary
delay. Neither does he, in particular, without a specific
showing or an order of the court, have any legal right to
continue the operation of the business in which the
3D (2008-2009)
D-14
WILSON v. REAR (55 Phil 44)

Facts: Charles Rear was murdered by some Moros on his
plantation in Cotabato on July 14, 1925. J.J. Wilson qualified as
special administrator of the estate on November 17, 1925. Later,
the property of the estate was appraised at P20,800.00 of which
the commissioners filed an inventory and report, which was also
signed by Wilson. ON January 4, 1927, the commissioners made
and filed a report of claims against the estate but by reason of the
fact that it was claimed and alleged that the administrator did not
have any funds to pay, the court ordered the administrator to sell
a portion of the property. Later, a petition was made for authority
to sell all the property of the estate with a view of closing the
administration which was granted by the court. Public sale took
place and the property was sold for P7,600.00. Wilson filed his
final account which was approved by the court despite objections.
Pertinent objection is that Wilson was neglectful and imprudent

and he committed waste and should therefore be held liable.
Page
in conformity with Sec.6 of Rule 87 providing that where the

obligation of the decedent is joint and several with another
debtor, the claim shall be filed against the decedent as if he were
the only debtor, without prejudice to the right of the state to
recover contribution from the other debtor.
-Apart from the fact that this defense was not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer and was therefore waived, it
appears that even as the present complaint was filed, there were
no proceedings for the administration of her estate. Where there
are no proceedings for the administration of the estate of the
deceased administrator, the creditor may enforce his bond
against the surety which bound itself jointly and severally in the
case where the bond was filed.

RULES 78 to 87
Petitioner files suit for the payment of premiums from the

2nd year until 8 years later, when the respondent
petitioned the court to cancel the bonds since all the heirs
have received their inheritance
Issue: w/n the bonds were in effect from the 2 nd year onwards
considering the respondents failure to pay premium, and that the
court has approved the plan of partition as early as the 2nd year of
the administration of the estates
Held: yes
Ratio:
- The proper determination of the liability of the surety and
of the principal on the bond must depend primarily upon
the language of the bond itself.
- The bonds herein were required by Section 1 of Rule 81 of
the Rules of Court.
- While a bond is nonetheless a contract because it is
required by statute, said statutory bonds are construed in
the light of the statute creating the obligation secured and
the purposes for which the bond is required, as expressed
in the statute.
- The statute which requires the giving of a bond becomes a
part of the bond and imparts into the bond any conditions
prescribed by the statute.
- Section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court requires the
administrator/executor to put up a bond for the purpose
of indemnifying the creditors, heirs, legatees and the
estate. It is conditioned upon the faithful performance of
the administrator's trust.
3D (2008-2009)
D-15
LUZON SURETY v. QUEBRAL (127 SCRA 295)

Facts:
- petitioner Luzon Surety issued two administrator's bond in
the amount of P15,000.00 each, in behalf of the
defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar, as administrator in
2 testate proceedings
- In consideration of the suretyship, respondent Quebrar,
executed two indemnity agreements, agreeing jointly and
severally to pay petitioner P300 in advance as premium
thereof for every 12 months or fraction thereof, this ... or
any renewal or substitution thereof is in effect and to
indemnify plaintiff-appellee against any and all damages,
losses, costs, stamps taxes, penalties, charges and
expenses, whatsoever, including the 15% of the amount
involved in any litigation, for attomey's fees
- Respondent paid for the 1st year; however, for the
succeeding years, respondent failed to pay the premium
Page
deceased was engaged, or to eat up and absorb the assets

of the estate in the payment of operation expenses.
Exception when the continuing of the business is
necessary to settle the estate of the deceased.
The law does not impose upon the administrator a high
degree of care in the administration of an estate, but it
does impose upon him ordinary and usual care, for want
of which he is personally liable. In this case, the court said
Wilson should have wound up the estate within 8 months
from the date of his appointment.
In the end, Wilson was made liable for the loss in the amount of
P3,839,22.

RULES 78 to 87
retains jurisdiction of the estate, the bond contemplates a

continuing liability notwithstanding the non-renewal of
the bond by the defendants-appellants.
It must be remembered that the probate court possesses
an all-embracing power over the administrator's bond and
over the administration proceedings and it cannot be
devoid of legal authority to execute and make that bond
answerable for the every purpose for which it was filed.
The contention then of the defendants-appellants that
both the Administrator's Bonds and the Indemnity
Agreements ceased to have any force and effect, the
former since June 6, 1957 with the approval of the project
of partition and the latter since August 9, 1955 with the
non-payment of the stated premiums, is without merit.
Such construction of the said contracts entered into would
render futile the purpose for which they were made.
To allow the defendants-appellants to evade their liability
under the Indemnity Agreements by non-payment of the
premiums would ultimately lead to giving the
administrator the power to diminish or reduce and
altogether nullify his liability under the Administrator's
Bonds. As already stated, this is contrary to the intent and
purpose of the law in providing for the administrator's
bonds for the protection of the creditors, heirs, legatees,
and the estate.
COSME DE MENDOZA v. PACHECO (64 Phil 134)

FACTS:
-Manuel SORIANO was former administrator of the estate of
Baldomero Cosme.
3D (2008-2009)
D-16
Having in mind the purpose and intent of the law, the

surety is then liable under the administrator's bond, for as
long as the administrator has duties to do as such
administrator/executor.
Since the liability of the sureties is co-extensive with that
of the administrator and embraces the performance of
every duty he is called upon to perform in the course of
administration, it follows that the administrator is still duty
bound to respect the indemnity agreements entered into
by him in consideration of the suretyship
The contention of the defendants-appellants that the
administrator's bond ceased to be of legal force and effect
with the approval of the project of partition and statement
of accounts on June 6, 1957 is without merit.
The defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar did not cease
as administrator after June 6, 1957, for administration is
for the purpose of liquidation of the estate and
distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees.
And liquidation means the determination of all the assets
of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses. It
appears that there were still debts and expenses to be
paid after June 6, 1957.
An estate may be partitioned even before the termination
of the administration proceedings. Hence, the approval of
the project of partition did not necessarily terminate the
administration proceedings.
The sureties of an administration bond are liable only as a
rule, for matters occurring during the term covered by the
bond. And the term of a bond does not usually expire until
the administration has been closed and terminated in the
manner directed by law. Thus, as long as the probate court
Page
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to order the execution of
SORIANOs bond, given that the trial court was only sitting as
probate court.
RULING:
Yes, the CFI has jurisdiction.
It is true that the law does not say expressly or in so
many words that such court has power to execute the bond of
an administrator, but by necessary and logical implication, the
power is there as eloquently as if it were phrased in unequivocal
term.
It is thus clear that a CFI, exercising probate jurisdiction, is
empowered to require the filing of the administrator's bond, to fix
the amount thereof, and to hold it accountable for any breach of
the administrator's duty. Possessed, as it is, with an all-embracing
power over the administrator's bond and over administration
proceedings, a CFI in a probate proceeding cannot be devoid of
legal authority to execute and make that bond answerable for the
very purpose for which it was filed.
It should be observed that section 683 of the Code of Civil
Procedure provides that "Upon the settlement of the account of
an executor or administrator, trustee, or guardians, a person
liable as surety in respect to such amount may, upon application,
be admitted as a party to such accounting, and may have the right
to appeal as hereinafter provided." There is here afforded to a
person who may be held liable as surety in respect to an
administrator's account the right, upon application, to be
admitted as a party to their accounting, from which we may not
unreasonably infer that a surety, like the appellants in the case
before us, may be charged with liability upon the bond during the
process of accounting, that is, within the recognized confines of
probate proceedings, and not in an action apart and distinct from
such proceedings.
3D (2008-2009)
Page
-He filed a bond for P5,000, with Januario PACHECO and

Raymundo CORDERO as sureties.
-SORIANO'S account, upon approval, showed him indebted to the
estate in the sum of P23,603.21.
-Unable to turn said amount over to the estate upon demand of
the new administratix ROSARIO Cosme, the CFI ordered the
execution of SORIANOs bond after notice was served upon the
sureties.
-Sometime later, the CFI approved a settlement had between
ROSARIO and SORIANO, whereby SORIANO ceded certain real
properties to the estate, thereby reducing his indebtedness to the
estate from P23,603.21 to P5,000.
-Subsequently, ROSARIO had the public sale thereof to collect this
amount of P5,000.
-Separate motions to be discharged from the bond were filed by
PACHECO and CORDERO.
-Both motions were denied, as well as an MR therefor.
-This dismissal was appealed to the Supreme Court, but the SC
dismissed (according to the SC, the order for executing the bond
was made in 1932 and the motion for discharge was filed in 1933:
LATE!)
-Upon resumption of the case in the lower court, PACHECHO and
CORDERO filed a motion challenging, for the first time, the
jurisdiction of the trial court to issue the order for executing the
bond.
-CFI denied. Thus, the instant case.
D-17

RULES 78 to 87

RULES 78 to 87
GUSTILO v. SIAN (53 Phil 155)

FACTS:
1. GUSTILO was appointed administrator of the estate of his
deceased father. He filed his accounts (as administrator)
for the years 1923 to 1925.
2. The widow, along with other heirs, sought to remove
GUSTILO as administrator, alleging that he was negligent,
inefficient and self-serving, and that he falsely included in
the accounts exorbitant and illegal expenses.
3. GUSTILO subsequently filed a motion asking for a salary of
PhP3, 000 annually. He also presented therewith the
3D (2008-2009)
D-18
Justice Villareals Dissent

Chapter XXXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is
headed "Wills and the allowance thereof, and duties of
executors", contains no provision concerning the enforcement of
the liability of an executor or administrator on his bond and of
that of his sureties. According to Art. 1853 of the Civil Code, "the
guarantor may set up against the creditor all the defenses
available to the principal debtor and which may be inherent in the
debt; . . . ." In an administration bond the executor or
administrator stands in the place of the principal debtor; his
sureties may, therefore, set up all the defenses to which he may
be entitled, and which are inherent in the obligation. The
procedure by which such defenses may be set up is the ordinary
one established by the said Code of Civil Procedure by means of
an action in court wherein may contain general or special denial, a
special defense or a counterclaim. The said Code has not
established any special procedure by which an executor or
administrator with a mere notice to his sureties does not afford
them an adequate opportunity to set up the defenses which the
law guarantees to them. To enforce the liability of an
administrators and require them to file an adequate bond is
not only ultra vires but a violation of the constitutional inhibition
that no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty and property

without due process of law. "The usual method of enforcing the
liability on an administration bond is by an action brought on the
bond in a court of law, although in some jurisdictions other forms
of remedy are provided by statute, . . . ."
The only procedure by which the liability of an executor or
administrator and his sureties be enforced on their bond is,
therefore, by an ordinary action in court.
The failure of the sureties to appeal from the order of
summary execution issued by the court below on their bond after
a mere service of notice did not legalize said summary procedure
and the order of summary execution issued by the lower court,
which were otherwise illegal and ultra vires.
The order appealed from ordering the summary execution
of the bond filed by the sureties-appellants, together with the
former administrator Ramon Soriano, was issued not only in
excess of jurisdiction but without it, because it was not authorized
by law.
Page
We take the view that the execution of an administrator's

bond clearly stands upon a different footing and is as necessary a
part and incident of the administration proceeding as the filing of
such bond or the fixing of its amount. Particularly is this true in
the present case where Soriano's indebtedness to the sate in the
amount of P23,603.21, subsequently reduced to P5,000, is
conceded on all sides, and all that the trial court had to do was to
see that said amount was turned over to the estate.

RULES 78 to 87
6.
7.
ISSUE: Whether the decision approving the accounts filed by

GUSTILO was proper
RULING: No
1. The activities revealed in the case of GUSTILO, as
administrator, convinces the court that he is not a fit
person to be administrator of the estate and that he has
DEGALA v. CENIZA and UMIPIG (78 Phi 791)

Facts:
UMIPIG was appointed special administrator of the estate
of Placida Mina.
DEGALA is complaining claiming the UMIPIG should be
removed as special administrator for:
o Adverse interest; stranger to the estate, not being
a beneficiary in the will; failed to include some
property in the inventory; failed to pay taxes due
from the estate; failed to render accounting
Issue: w/n UMIPIG should be removed as special administrator
based on the claims?
Held: No. the removal of an administrator lies with the appointing
courts discretion.
Sufficiency of any ground for removal should be
determined by the appointing court.
Adverse interest: any interest of the previous
administrator (lawyer of UMIPIG) is exclusively personal,
UMIPIG can have nothing to do with it; not beneficiary:
can represent his father as trustee under the will; other
grounds: not willful omissions
3D (2008-2009)
D-19
5.
not in fact administered it so far with due regard to the

rights of other persons in interest.
2. GUSTILO should be removed and required to render his
accounts as administrator.
Page
4.
accounts for the years 1925-1926 and 1926-1927. In both

of these accounts, there appeared to be a deficit (around
PhP400 for the former and PhP3, 000 for the latter).
One of the creditors of the estate (Leocadia Majito)
opposed the accounts presented as well as the salary
sought to be granted. Later, Majito included in his
opposition the allegation that certain debts of the estate
were charged twice with no adequate vouchers.
Court of Iloilo (where the intestacy proceedings were held)
disapproved the accounts and ordered GUSTILO to file
amended accounts. Despite the extension of time granted
to him, GUSTILO failed to file these amended accounts.
Rather, GUSTILO presented the old accounts without
change.
Later on, another judge of the same court (other judge
was absent) reconsidered the disapproval of the previous
accounts. Two of the accounts filed by GUSTILO were then
approved. Creditors of the estate did not seem to receive
due notice of this approval.
A creditor, SIAN then filed a motion to reconsider the
approval of the accounts as well as for the removal of
GUSTILO as administrator and the forfeiture of his bond.
This motion was denied.

RULES 78 to 87
ADAPON v. MARALIT (69 Phil 383)

Facts:
On December 16, 1936, Pedro Adapon presented for probate the
last will and testament of his deceased father, Rudocindo Adapon
in the CFI of Batangas. The will was admitted to probate and
3D (2008-2009)
D-20
Held: It is the duty of the executor or administrator to present an

inventory of the real estate and of all the goods, chattels, rights,
and credits of the deceased which have come into his possession
or to this knowledge in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 668
of the Code of Civil Procedure and to manage them according to
Sec. 643 of the code of civil procedure; and in order that he may
have in his power and under his custody all such property, sec 702
of the aforesaid code authorizes him to bring such actions for the
purpose of obtaining possession thereof as he may deem
Page
CHUA TAN v. DEL ROSARIO (57 Phil 411)

Facts: Benedicta Santa Juana, as adminsitratrix of the intestate
estate of Chua Piaco, instituted a civil case against Lucita del
Rosario as adminsitratirx of the intestate estate of Chua Toco.
Said action was a petition for the rendering of an accounting of
certain funds alleged to have been delivered in trust by the late
Chua Piaco to his adopted son, the late Chua Toco. The CFI
dismissed the petition which was affirmed by the SC on appeal.
Subsequently, the presumptive heirs of the late Chua Piaco
instituted a 2nd petition against the same defendant Lucita del
Rosario, this time for partition between the same funds together
with its fruits which was allegedly delivered by Piaco to Toco in
trust. The heirs alleged that the sum of 20,000 which was
deposited in a bank bearing interest was not the exclusive
property of Toco but the exclusive property of Piaco and Toco,
Father and son.
The LC dismissed this 2nd petition on the ground of res
judicata as having been already decided by the SC in the civil case.
Issue: What is the duty of the administrator? WON the 2 nd
petition is barred by res judicata
necessary. Sec 643 of the aforesaid code in providing for the

appointment of an administrator where there is no will or the will
does not name an executor seeks to protect not only the estate of
the deceased but also the rights of the creditors in order that they
may be able to collect their credits, and of the heirs and legatees
in order that they may receive the portion of the inheritance or
legacy appertaining to them after all the debts and expenses
chargeable against the deceaseds estate have been paid. Under
the provisions of the law, therefore, the judicial administrator is
the legal representative not only of the estate or intestate estate,
but also of the creditors, and heirs and legatees inasmuch as he
represents their interest in the estate of the deceased.
A final judgment upon the meals rendered against the
judicial administratrix of an intestate estate (Chua Piaco), as such
in a case where she is a plaintiff and the administratrix of another
intestate estate (Chua Toco) as such, is the defendant, in which
she seeks to secure an accounting of funds alleged to have been
delivered in trust by the deceased to the other deceased,
constitutes res judicata in another case where the heirs of the
supposed trustee (Chua Toco) is defendant and in which the
partition of the same funds and the products thereof is sought
between the heirs of both, under the same allegation of trust, the
alleged trustee being the adopted son of the donor.

RULES 78 to 87
LC ruled that the allegations in the motion of the oppositor widow

is not sufficient to warrant the removal of the administrator. The
court however ordered the administrator to include certain
properties in the inventory, To this the administrator appeals,
contending that the court erred in ordering the inclusion of such
properties. Thus this case.
Issue:
WON the probate court could, upon petition of oppositor to
include certain properties in the inventory prepared by the
administrator, to some of which the said administrator had laid
claims of ownership determine the question of ownership and
thereby meet the issues as thus presented.
Held:
No. It is not seen how the probate court can determine the
respective merits of the conflicting claims made by the
MOORE & SONS MERCANTILE CO. v. WAGNER (50 Phil 128)

FACTS:
Widow of the deceased Samuel William Allen in the
settlement proceedings petitioned the court to require the
administrator of the estate to give her and her daughter
Avelina Allen an allowance of P80.
The special administrator appointed in the case objected
to the allowance of the widow upon the ground that the
estate is insolvent, in view of the claims presented and
approved by the committee on appraisal and claims.
Attorney P. J. Moore, in behalf of several creditors also
entered his opposition to said order.
There is no question that the estate is insolvent.
Notwithstanding this insolvent condition of the estate, the
lower court entered the order referred to of March 5,
3D (2008-2009)
D-21
The Administrator in his answer, claimed ownership over the

properties. Thus the oppositor Maralit, during the hearing moved
that in view of the claims of ownership made in the answer, the
administrator should be relieved of his duties and another be
appointed to act in his place.
administrator and the oppositor without necessarily declaring the

lawful ownerhip of the properties involved. Such a declaration is
necessary and inevitable and without it the probate court cannot
properly proceed and dispose of the petition submitted by the
oppositor. However under Sec 599 of the code of civil procedure,
the probate jurisdiction of the CFI only relates to matters having
to do with the settlement of estates and probates of wills of
deceased persons the appointment and removal of guardians and
trustees and the powers, duties and rights of guardians and
wears, trustees and cestuis que trust. As may have seen the law
does not extend the jurisdiction of a probate court to the
determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceeding.
Page
Pedro was appointed as administrator by the court. He then filed

an inventory of the property and assets of the estate. However
the surviving spouse of the deceased from a 2nd marriage, Felisa
Maralit, filed to the court to order the administrator to pay her a
monthly allowance of P50 as well as to include certain properties
to the inventory which was omitted from the inventory (1k cavans
of palay, credit in favor of deceased, carabaoes etc.)

RULES 78 to 87
HELD: NO
RATIO:
Article 1430 of the Civil Code provides that the surviving
spouse and his or her children shall be given an allowance
for their support out of the general estate, pending the
liquidation of the inventoried estate, and until their share
has been delivered to them, but it shall be deducted from
their portion in so far as it exceeds what they may have
been entitled to as fruits or income.
As to the question of granting allowance from an insolvent
estate, The SC of Spain had rendered a decision granting
allowance to the widow from the general inventoried
estate at the time of the death of the husband until the
delivery of her share.
Mr. Manresa, commenting on said article 1430 relative to
the said judgment of May 28, 1896, wisely observes "That
the support does not encumber the property of the
deceased spouse, but the general estate, and that by the
general estate or the inventoried estate is meant the
dowry or capital of the wife; wherefore, even if the
indebtedness exceed the residue of the estate, the wife
can always be allowed support as part payment of the
income of her property. In any case, the support is given
prior to the termination of the liquidation of the
SANTERO v. CFI CAVITE (153 SCRA 728)

FACTS:
Pablo Santero had 3 illegitimate children with Felixberta
Pacursa (Princesita, Federico and Winy) while he also had
4 illegitimate children with Anselma Diaz (Victor, Rodrigo,
Anselmina and Miguel).
A Motion For Allowance filed by Anselma (as guardian of
V,R,A,M) for support which included educational expenses,
3D (2008-2009)
D-22
ISSUE: Whether the order granting the allowance to the widow

and daughter valid?
partnership, and it does not seem logical to deny the same

before knowing exactly the result of the liquidation, just
because of the fear that the liabilities will exceed the
estate, or on the ground of estimates more or less
uncertain, and without any sufficient proof of its reality.
The judge or the administrator, as the case may be, must
grant the support referred to in article 1430, when the
same is requested, and if the creditors believe that they
are prejudiced by such an action, by separating from the
estate a part of its income, they can appeal to the court
therefrom, by satisfactorily proving that there is no
property or asset that may, in any case, be allotted to the
interested parties.
In this case, it appears from the record that the liabilities exceed
the assets of the estate of Samuel William Allen and that his
widow, by her own admission, had not contributed any property
to the marriage. Wherefore, it is unlawful, in the present case, to
grant the support, having the character of an advance payment to
be deducted from the respective share of each partner, when
there is no property to be partitioned, lacks the legal basis
provided by article 1430.
Page
1925, citing in its support article 1430 of the Civil Code and
section 684 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

RULES 78 to 87
Held: SC dismissed the petition for certiorari and upheld the

assailed order.
The controlling provision of law is not Rule 83, Sec. 3 of the New
Rules of Court but Arts. 290 and 188 of the Civil Code reading as
follows:
Art. 290. Support is everything that is indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing and medical attendance,
according tothe social position of the family.
Support also includes the education of the person entitled to
be supported until he completes his education or training for
some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of
majority.
Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall be
given to the surviving spouse and to the children during the
liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs
to them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted that
amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents
pertaining to them.
The fact that Anselma's children are of age, gainfully employed, or
married is of no moment and should not be regarded as the
determining factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188.
While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor
or incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil Code
gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without
3D (2008-2009)
D-23
said that the administrator of the estate of Pablo Santero

did not have sufficient funds to cover said allowance.
Page
clothing and medical necessities. The oppositors

contended that the wards for whom allowance is sought
are no longer schooling and have attained majority age so
that they are no longer under guardianship. They also
alleged that the administrator did not have sufficient funds
to cover the said allowance. Anselma admitted some of
her children are of age and not enrolled for the first
semester due to lack of funds but will be enrolled as soon
as they are given the requested allowances, citing Art. 290
of the Civil Code: Support also includes the education of
the person entitled to be supported until he completes his
education or training for some trade or vocation, even
beyond the age of majority. The court granted the motion
and the children were given an allowance.
Later, the children (V,R,A,M) filed another Motion for
Allowance to include an additional 3 children (Juanita,
Estelita and Pedrito). The court granted the motion.
Anselma clarified that in her previous motions, only the
last four minor children as represented by the mother,
Anselma Diaz were included in the motion for support and
her first three (3) children who were then of age should
have been included since all her children have the right to
receive allowance as advance payment of their shares in
the inheritance of Pablo Santero. But an Order was issued
by the court directing the administrator of the estate to
get back the allowance of the three additional recipients
or children of Anselma.
Felixberta's children (P,F,W) filed a petition for certiorari,
arguing that Anselma's children are not entitled to any
allowance since they have already attained majority age,
two are gainfully employed and one is married. They also

RULES 78 to 87
CONCEPCION JOCSON de HILADO v. NAVA (69 Phil 1)
SAN DIEGO v. NOMBRE (11 SCRA 165)
Issue 1: Whether or not the respondent judge acted in abuse of

discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction by allowing the special
administrator to withdraw the bank deposits standing in the name
of the decedent?
Held: Yes.
In the first place, said withdrawal is foreign to the powers
and duties of a special administrator. (Check Sec 2, Rule
80 for powers and duties)
3D (2008-2009)
D-24
JARODA v. CUSI JR. (28 SCRA 1008)

Facts:
An intestate proceeding was commenced by Antonio V. A.
Tan (private respondent in this case) for Carlos Abrilles
estate.
One of the properties left by Abrille was his 19% share in
the co-ownership known as Juna Subdivision.
Tan was appointed special administrator by the court.
Tan filed an ex-parte petition for the withdrawal of the
sums of P109,886.42 and P72,644.66 from PNB, which
sums were not listed in his petition for administration as
among the properties left by the deceased. He alleged
that these sums were deposited in the name of the
deceased but that they actually belong to, and were held
in trust for, the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision. The
court granted the petition.
Later, Tan executed, together with the other co-owners of
the Juna Subdivision, a power of attorney appointing
himself as attorney-in-fact to "sell (or) dispose upon terms
and conditions as he deems wise" the lots in the
subdivision. Only after this was he issued letters of
administration.
Now as a regular administrator, Tan filed a petition with
the respondent court, alleging that the deceased was the
manager of and a co-owner in the Juna Subdivision and
that he had been engaged in the business of selling the
lots, and praying for the approval by the court of the
power of attorney executed by him, in behalf of the
intestate estate, and appointing and authorizing himself to
sell the lots. The court granted the petition.
Petitioner Jaroda moved to nullify the two orders granted
by the court: 1. Allowing the withdrawals from PNB and 2.
Approving the power of attorney.
Page
distinction. Hence, Anselma's children (V,R,A,M) are entitled to

allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from
their father Pablo Santero. Since the provision of the Civil Code
(substantial law) gives the surviving spouse and to the children
the right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of
the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of
the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule. Be it noted however
that with respect to "spouse," the same must be the "legitimate
spouse" (not common-law spouses who are the mothers of the
children here).
In the second place, the order was issued without notice

to, and hearing of, the heirs of the deceased.
The withdrawal of the bank deposits may be viewed as a
taking of possession and charge of the credits of the
estate, but actually, said withdrawal is a waiver by the
special administrator of a prima facie exclusive right of the
intestate estate to the bank deposits in favor of the coowners of the Juna Subdivision, who were allegedly
claiming the same.
The bank deposits were in the name of the deceased;
they, therefore, belong prima facie to his estate after his
death. And until the contrary is shown by proper evidence
at the proper stage, when money claims may be filed in
the intestate proceedings, the special administrator is
without power to make the waiver or to hand over part of
the estate, or what appears to be a prima facie part of the
estate, to other persons on the ground that the estate is
not the owner thereof.
If even to sell for valuable consideration property of the
estate requires prior written notice of the application to
the heirs, legatees, or devisees under Rule 89 of the Rules
of Court, such notice is equally, if not more, indispensable
for disposing gratuitously of assets of the decedent in
favor of strangers. Admittedly, no such notice was given,
and without it the court's authority is invalid and
improper.
Issue 2: Whether or not the respondent judge acted in abuse of

discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction by approving the
power of attorney executed by Tan appointing and authorizing
himself to sell the lots?
Held: Yes, the order is void for want of notice and for approving
an improper contract or transaction.
Section 4 of Rule 89 of ROC requires "written notice to the
heirs, devisees, and legatees who are interested in the
estate to be sold" and, admittedly, administrator Tan did
not furnish such notice.
It is well settled that an executrix holds the property of her
testator's estate as a trustee
It is equally well settled that an executrix will not be
permitted to deal with herself as an individual in any
transaction concerning the trust property
Note that auto-contracts may be permissible but should
not be made to apply to administrators of a deceased
estate. A contrary ruling would open the door to fraud and
maladministration, and once the harm is done, it might be
too late to correct it.
In approving the power of attorney, the court allowed Tan
to be an agent or attorney-in-fact for two principals: the
court and the heirs of the deceased on the one hand, and
the majority co-owners of the subdivision on the other.
This dual agency of the respondent Tan rendered him
incapable of independent defense of the estate's interests
against those of the majority co-owners. It is highly
undesirable, if not improper, that a court officer and
administrator, in dealing with property under his
administration, should have to look to the wishes of
strangers as well as to those of the court that appointed
him.
A judicial administrator should be at all times subject to
the orders of the appointing Tribunal and of no one else.
3D (2008-2009)
Page
D-25

RULES 78 to 87

RULES 78 to 87
Q: What is the care required in the management of the estate by

the executor or administrator?
A: The law does not impose upon an executor or administrator a
high degree of care in the administration of the estate but an
ordinary and usual care for the want of which he is personally
liable.
Q: When is the property of the executor or administrator liable
for his debts?
A: In case of death of an executor or administrator who has
contracted debts, his own property which he left at death is
3D (2008-2009)
D-26
Q: What is the extent of the powers of an executor or

administrator?
A: An executor or administrator has all the powers necessary for
the administration of the estate and which powers he can
exercise without leave of court. The constitution of a lease over a
property of the estate is an act of administration and leave of
court is not required. Any interested party who desires to impugn
the same must do so in an ordinary civil action as the probate
court has no jurisdiction over the lessee. It has been broadly
stated that an administrator is not permitted to deal with himself
as an individual in any transaction concerning trust property. The
executor or administrator cannot buy property under his
Page
Q: What acts can the executor or administrator NOT perform

validly?
A:
1. Art 1491 (3) of the NCC prohibits the executor or
administrator to buy property under his administration.
2. He cannot borrow money even if it is for the benefit of the
estate.
3. Nor can he continue the business in which the deceased was
engaged in at the tome of his death without order of the court
as his duty is to settle the estate as soon as possible and not to
prolong his administration.
4. He has no authority to speculate with funds of the estate or
place them where they may not be withdrawn at once by
order of the court. This is true even if said funds would have
to be deposited in a low or no interest earning account
(current account) as compared to a high earning interest
account (fixed account).
administration nor can he borrow money without authority of the

court even if it is for the benefit of the estate. He has no
authority to speculate with funds of the estate or place them
where they may not be withdrawn at once by order of the court.
The deposit by an administrator of the funds of the estate in a
current account with a bank instead of a fixed account at a high
rate of interest, with a view to having such funds subject to
withdrawal at a moments notice is NOT improper and he is not
answerable for the low rate of interest thus obtained. An
administrator, without order of the court, has no authority to
continue the business in which the deceased was engaged in at
the time of his death. If he does so with the funds of the estate,
he is chargeable with all the losses incurred thereby without
allowing him to receive the benefits of any profits that he may
make. The administrator of a deceased spouse shall also
administer, liquidate, and distribute the community property,
because the estate of a decease spouse consists not only of the
exclusive properties of the decedent, but also of the assets of
the conjugal partnership, if any, which pertain to the deceased.

RULES 78 to 87
GARCIA v. ESCUDERO (43 Phil. 437)

Facts:
Verdejo died, leaving an open will wherein he named as heirs his
three sisters (Garcia, et al), and Escudero and Marasigan as
administrators.
Intestate proceedings were commenced in the justice of the
peace court of Dolores for the settlement of the deceaseds estate
undisposed of by will , and testamentary proceedings leading to
the settlement of the estate covered by his will were instituted in
the Court of First Instance of Tayabas by whose order said justice
of the peace delivered to administrator Escudero the properties
of the deceased, such as furniture, jewelry, cattle (1 black horse, 1
black mare, 5 female carabaos), coconut lands.
Garcia impugned the statement of accounts submitted by

Escudero, and the trial court ordered Escudero to be responsible
for such properties, i.e., that Escudero should pay for the items
which were not properly (based on the trial courts opinion)
accounted for.
Issue:
W/N the administrators (Escuderos) explanations were sufficient
to absolve him from liabilities over the properties under his
administration.
Held:
YES. The account rendered by defendant should be approved.
As to the first item: It was not shown that such properties were
destroyed by the negligence of Escudero.
As to the second item: Although no written evidence of the death
of such cattle was introduced in accordance with the laws then in
3D (2008-2009)
D-27
Q: What if a lease contract exceeds one year?

A: If the lease contract exceeds one year, the same is no longer
considered a mere act of administration and leave of court is
required. A view held however, that Art. 1878 of NCC on agency
should not apply to leases entered into by an executor under the
theory that they represent not only the estate but also the parties
interested therein, that they are required to file a bond, and that
their acts are subject to specific provisions of the law and orders
of the probate court, which circumstances are not true with
respect to agents. (look at San Diego v Nombre, 11 SCRA 165).
Garcia brought an action seeking to be declared as heirs; to have

the properties under Escudero delivered to them; and to order
Escudero to render an accounting of the properties in the latters
custody. The trial court granted these reliefs, but Escudero only
rendered an accounting and asked for stay of execution for the
other judgments. In his statement of accounts, he explained that:
1. Certain personal properties were destroyed by fire
(supported by evidence).
2. Cattle died due to rinderpest of 1898.
3. Coconut lands were seized by revolutionists during a
certain period.
4. He charged for Sundries for travelling expenses.
Page
directly liable for payments of such debts. The creditor may direct
his action against said executors or administrators heirs. For
until all the creditors of a deceased person have been paid, there
can be no net inheritance divisible among the heirs.

RULES 78 to 87
ISSUE:
Whether the court a quo committed the errors alleged by
Domingo in its order in question NO
HELD:
The first assignment of alleged error consists in that the
court erred in disapproving the record on appeal
presented by the appellant and in ordering the
amendment thereof by eliminating certain pleadings,
What section 779 of the code of Civil Procedure requires to be

transmitted to the court in case of an appeal from a decree or
order approving or disapproving the accounts of an administrator,
in accordance with the provisions of sec. 778, is a certified
transcript of the appeal, order, decree or judgment appealed from
and of the accounts embraced in the order, the inclusion of any
other order, decree or judgment from which no appeal has been
taken being unnecessary and superfluous.
The accounts partially disapproved from the appealed order are
those submitted by Domingo, which accounts appear in the
record on appeal, as amended by the order of the court. Thus, the
court a quo did not commit any error in ordering the elimination
from the record on appeal of the other pleadings, decrees, orders
or judgments not appealed from, which, according to Domingo,
are nothing more than evidence of the services rendered by him
and his attorney.
As regards the alleged error that the court a quo erred in
not submitting Domingo to an examination under oath
and in not holding a hearing on his accounts, records show
that upon calling for hearing the accounts of exadministrator Domingo, the latter appeared in his own
behalf and a certain Palarca opposed the approval thereof.
Under the heading PAYMENTS in Domingos alleged errors,
which include money advanced to attorney Bartolome D.
P400, Partial payment of the debt of deceased in favor of
Julian and also to Commissioner Gabriel, and expenses
3D (2008-2009)
D-28
NICOLAS v. NICOLAS (63 Phil 332)

FACTS:
What is involved in this case is the intestate estate of the
deceased Santiago Nicolas. Ex-administrator Domingo Nicolas
appealed from the order issued by the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac, which provided that the court approved the two accounts
submitted by Domingo with amendments and with a balance of
P726.01 in favor of the administration, which sum said Domingo
must turn over to the administrator Protasio Santos, through the
clerk of court. In case of non-compliance, the bond given by
Domingo will be attached to satisfy the payment due him.
orders, decrees and judgment in the record on appeal

alleges as a ground thereof that they constitute the best
evidence of the services rendered by him and his attorney.
Page
force on large cattle, the fact of the death of those animals was
proven by the testimony of Escudero based on personal
knowledge, and that such testimony was not timely objected to.
As to the third item: There was evidence proving such seizure, and
that it was also proved that there were no substantial produce
after possession was reverted to Escudero.
As to the fourth item: duly proven by evidence, not overthrown
by contrary evidence.

RULES 78 to 87
UY TIOCO v. IMPERIAL (53 Phil 802)

FACTS:
Respondent Panis, counsel for the administration of estate
of the deceased, before final settlement of the accounts,
moved for the allowance of attorneys fees in the sum of
P15,000
The judge, over the objection of the petitioner
administrator Uy Tioco, granted the same; Uy Tioco did
not appeal
ISSUES, HELD and RATIO:

Whether the orders were valid and final
court said that they need not be determined in the case at
hand, but they are appealable
there is no provision of law authorizing the lower court to
enforce the immediate execution of such orders in probate
proceedings after an appeal has been perfected
what is the character of liability for attorneys fees in
probate proceedings?
the attorney cannot hold the estate directly liable for his fees;
such fees are allowed to the executor or administrator
the services for which fees are claimed are supposed to have
been rendered to the executor or administrator to assist him in
the execution of his trust; thus, liability for the payment of
3D (2008-2009)
D-29
The law only authorizes the administrator to collect for his

services as such the sum of P4 for every day actually and
necessarily spent by him in the administration and care of the
estate of the deceased, not for every act or task he might
perform, as indicated by the great majority of the tasks performed
by him. Thus, P4 is reasonable. (18 days was granted to Domingo
to serve as administrator)
Almost 2 months later, Jacinto Yangco, in his capacity as

guardian ad litem of minors Pedro and Bruno Uy Tioco,
sons and only heirs of the deceased, presented a motion
for reconsideration on the ground that he was not notified
of the motion for allowance and the grant thereof; denied
Yangco gave notice of his intention to appeal
Meanwhile, Panis, through Wijangco, filed a motion for
execution of of the P15,000; he claims that since Bruno
Uy was already dead, his share will go to his father
(petitioner) who did not appeal the decision of the court
and consequently, only the share of Pedro Uy should be
withheld
Yangco objected but the judge ordered the payment of
of P15,000
Page
incurred during the anniversary of the deceased, the

supreme court ruled that the court a quo correctly
rejected them on the ground that they had not been
authorized by said court and because they had already
been discussed in Judge Ocampos order, from which no
appeal was taken. The item consisting in expenses
incurred by Domingo on the occasion of the anniversary of
the deceased cannot be considerd a part of the funeral
expenses nor as the erection of a mausoleum which forms
part of the sepulture of the deceased, because it bears no
relation to the funeral.

RULES 78 to 87
Issues:
[1] W/N the administrator of the estate is entitled to the
reimbursement of counsel fees.
[2]W/N the administrator is entitled to per diem compensation for
his services
Held:
[1] No. The fees being claimed by the administrator all relate to
services rendered for the benefit of the administrator himself and
for that of the other natural children of Justiniano Dacanay and
not for the benefit of the estate. In this case, the administrator
deliberately and knowingly resorted to falsified documents (i.e.
inventory) for the purpose of defrauding the legitimate heirs of
the deceased and through his own breach of trust, brought the
litigation for which he now demands reimbursement for counsel
fees.
-The estate cannot be held liable for the costs of counsel fees
arising out of litigation between the beneficiaries thereof among
themselves or in the protection of the interests of particular
persons, but an administrator may employ competent counsel on
questions which affect his duties as administrator and on which
he is in reasonable doubt, and reasonable expenses for such
services may be charged against the estate subject to the
approval of the court.
-An administrator who brings on litigation for the deliberate
purpose of defrauding the legitimate heirs and for his own benefit
is not entitled to reimbursement for counsel fees incurred in such
litigation.
3D (2008-2009)
D-30
DACANAY v. HERNANDEZ (53 Phil 824)

Facts:
-Justiniano Dacanay died, leaving only one legitimate child,
Bienvenida, and three acknowledged natural children,
Hermenigilda, Tirso, and Paulina. Bienvenida married Silverio and
died leaving three children.
-Deceased Justiniano left a will naming Tirso as the
executor/administrator. It greatly favored the natural children at
the expense of Bienvenida.
-Will was duly probated; Tirso qualified as administrator; various
schemes of partition were submitted by commissioners. Even
both parties, Tirso and Silverio, submitted their own plans of
partition but the Court found all of them unsatisfactory.
Therefore, Judge rendered own decision which provided for a
complete and apparently fair distribution of the estate.
-Tirso filed a motion for new trial on the ground that such decision
was contrary to law but was denied. Appeal was perfected but
Tirso filed a motion for reopening the case on the ground of newly
discovered evidencean inventory of property alleged to have
been donated to Bienvenida on occasion of her marriage. SC
granted motion and ordered remand of case to the CFI.
-CFI Judge found that inventory was genuine and directed
commissioners of partition. Several plans of partition were again
submitted, but the last one which was submitted by the estates
administrator pursuant to the parties stipulation in open court,
was approved by the court. The heirs of Bienvenida excepted to

such decision, hence this appeal.
Page
attorneys fees rests on the executor or administrator (if the fees

are beneficial to the estate, then executor or administrator is
entitled to reimbursement from the estate)

RULES 78 to 87
Issue: Whether or not Serquina is entitled to attorneys fees.
3D (2008-2009)
D-31
LACSON v. REYES (182 SCRA 729)

Facts: Ephraim Serquina petitioned the court for the probate of
the last will and testament of Carmelita Farlin, in his capacity as
counsel for the heirs and as executor under the will. Granted. He
then filed a motion for attorneys fees against the heirs, alleging
that the heirs have agreed to pay, as and for his legal services
rendered the sum of P68,000.00. The heirs denied the claim and
alleged that the sum agreed upon was only P7,000.00 which was
already paid. Lower court granted the motion.
ROSENSTOCK v. ELSER (48 Phil 708)

Facts:
- Upon the death of Henry W. Elser, petitioner C. W.
Rosenstock filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of
Manila for the probate of Elser's will, and that he,
Rosenstock be appointed as executor of the estate.
- Petitioner files a motion asking for a monthly allowance of
P1,000 considering that the work of administering the
above-entitled estate is such as to require an unusual
amount of time of the executor, owing to the size and
involved condition of the estate and all parties involved in
the case agreed that this amount was just a reasonable;
the court approves allowance.
- 2 years later, the widow of the deceased filed a petition
asking that the order for P1,000 allowance be revoked and
that the compensation of the executor should be based
upon the provisions of section 680 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
Page
[2]No. the prolongation of the settlement of the estate was due

entirely to the efforts of the administrator to defraud the
legitimate heirs, and the Court cannot allow him to profit by his
own fraud. Moreover, his services for the period in question
would have been unnecessary if he had not, by his fraudulent
acts, prevented the settlement of the estate.
-Where an administrator is acting as such for his own benefit and
not for that of the estate, he is in a position analogous to that of
bailee for his own sole benefit and is bound to exercise great care
and attention in the conservation of the property under
administration and will be held liable for losses. Per diem
compensation of an administrator can only be allowed for
necessary services, and where the prolongation of the settlement
of the estate is due entirely to the efforts of the administrator to
defraud the heirs, he is not entitled to compensation for the
services rendered in connection therewith.
Held: No. First, no docket fee was paid, hence, the court did not
acquire jurisdiction. Second, The Rules of Court provides that an
administrator or executor may be allowed fees for the necessary
expenses he has incurred as such, but he may not recover
attorneys fees from the estate. His compensation is fixed by the
rule but such a compensation is in the nature of executors or
administrators commissions, and never as attorneys fees. Where
the administrator is himself the counsel for the heirs, it the latter
who must pay therefore. Court ruled attorneys fees in the
amount of P15,000.00 can be recovered from the heirs and not
from the estate of Carmelita Farlin.

RULES 78 to 87
Although by mutual consent his compensation was fixed at

P1,0000 per month at the time of his appointment that
was not valid or binding contract continuous throughout
the whole administration of the estate.
It was always subject to change and the approval of the
court and to either an increase or decrease as conditions
might warrant
The original order and the last order were both made in
the court in which the probate proceedings were pending,
and all matters pertaining to the estate were peculiarly
within the knowledge and province of that court, by which
all orders were made and in which all accounts were filed.
That is to say from the date of the appointment of the
executor until the 2nd order was issued, the lower court
had before it all of the records orders and proceedings
growing out of the administration of the estate.
Based upon such records it found as a fact that under all of
the existing circumstances the fee of the executor from
June 1, 1925 should be P400 per month.
PHIL. TRUST CO. v. LUZON SURETY (2 SCRA 122)

Facts:
PICARD was appointed as administrator of the Intestate
Estate of James Burt; filed an administrators bond with
LUZON SURETY as his suretysubsequently dismissed and
replaced by Philippine Trust Co.
3D (2008-2009)
D-32
JOSON v. JOSON (2 SCRA 83)
Page
Court revokes the order and fixes the compensation of the

executor of P400 per month.
- From this order the widow appeals contending that the
trial court erred in failing to reduce the compensation of
the executor to the statutory amount allowed under
section 680.
Issue: w/n the courts erred in fixing the compensation contrary to
Sec. 680
Held: no
Ratio:
- The record speaks for itself. At the time of his
appointments all parties agreed that the executor should
have and receive P1,000 per month for his services.
- The order fixing the allowance at P1,000, among other
things recites the agreed facts, and is largely founded upon
that stipulation.
- The present order reducing the executor's fee to P400 per
month from which both parties have appealed was made
more than nineteen months after the original order was
made, Rosenstock had been acting as executor of the
estate for more than nineteen months and as such had
been administering the affairs of the estate with the
ultimate view of winding up may have existed for allowing
him a compensation of P1,000 per month at the time of
his appointment have ceased to exist.
- During that period all of the assets and liabilities of the
estate should have been legally ascertained and
determined.
- In other words the character and class of the work which
devolves upon the executor is of a very different type and
nature now than at the time of his appointment.
-

RULES 78 to 87
The whole hacienda was held in lease by Emilio Camon

long before the present intestate proceedings were
commenced
the administrator of the estate moved the court for an
order to direct Emilio Camon to pay the estate's twoforths share of the rentals on Hacienda Rosario for the
crop years 1948-1949 through 1960-1961, viz: on the sugar
land, P62,065.00; and on the rice land, P2,100.00.
Emilio Camon challenged the probate court's jurisdiction
over his person
The court ruled that the demand for rentals cannot be
made "by mere motion by the administrator but by
independent action."
Dela Cruz the administrator appealed
Issue:
Whether the demand for rentals against Camon may be decided
upon by the Probate Court?
Held: No. It must be decided in a separate action
The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental over the subject matter herein is beyond debate.
However, acting as a probate court, said court is primarily
concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of
the estate.
With the foregoing as parting point, let us look at the
administrator's claim for rentals allegedly due. The amount
demanded is not, by any means, liquidated. Conceivably, the
lessee may interpose defenses. Compromise, payment, statute of
limitations, lack of cause of action and the like, may be urged to
3D (2008-2009)
D-33
DELA CRUZ v. CAMON (16 SCRA 886)

Facts:
- Estate of Thomas Fallon and Anne Fallon Murphy was
owner of two-fourths (2/4) share pro-indiviso of Hacienda
Rosario in Negros Occidental.
Page
Court issued an order for PICARD to account for an

amount with the PNB as part of the inventory of the estate
of Burt. PICARD was found guilty of estafa for having
disbursed funds of the estate without authority.
Court ordered LUZON SURETY to show cause why the
administrators bond should not be confiscated.
Issue: w/n the probate court can order the confiscation of the
administrators bond?
Held: Yes. The probate court may have the bond executed in the
same probate proceeding.
A probate court is possessed with all-embracing power not
only in requiring but also in fixing the amount and
executing or forfeiting the administrators bond; execution
or forfeiture of the bond- necessary part and incident of
the administration proceedings
Surety is bound upon the terms of the bond of the
principal, as Picard failed to faithfully execute the orders
and decrees of court, the obligations remains in full force
and effect; surety- not entitled to notice in the settlement
of the accounts of the executor or administrator, privy to
the proceedings against his principal.

RULES 78 to 87
defeat the administrator's case and should be threshed out in a

full trial on the merits.
Also, Paula vs. Escay, et al., teaches us that: "When the
demand is in favor of the administrator and the party against
whom it is enforced is a third party, not under the court's
jurisdiction, the demand can not be by mere motion by the
administrator, but by an independent action against the third
person."6 The line drawn in the Escay case gives us a correct
perspective in the present. The demand is for money due
allegedly for rentals. Camon is a third person. Hence, the
administrator may not pull him against his will, by motion, into
the administration proceedings. We are fortified in our view by
the more recent pronouncement of this court7 that even "matters
affecting property under judicial administration" may not be
taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate
proceedings, if the "interests of third persons are prejudiced"
accompanied by their lawyers, only to discover that no

such petition had been filed; and that defendant Llemos
maliciously failed to appear in court, so that plaintiffs'
expenditure and trouble turned out to be in vain, causing
them mental anguish and undue embarrassment.
Before defendant can answer the complaint, he died. The
plaintiffs amended their compliant to include the heirs of
the deceased. The heirs filed a motion to dismiss which
was granted by the court on the ground that the legal
representative, and not the heirs, should have been made
the party defendant; and that anyway the action being for
recovery of money, testate or intestate proceedings
should be initiated and the claim filed therein.
ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in dismissing the
complaint?
HELD: NO
QUIRINO v. GOROSPE (169 SCRA 702)
3D (2008-2009)
Page
AGUAS v. LILEMOS (5 SCRA 959)

FACTS:
Francisco Salinas and spouses Felix and Maria Aguas filed a
compliant for recovery of damages from Hermogenes
Llemos averring that Hermogenes served them by
registered mail with a copy of a petition for a writ of
possession, with notice that the same would be submitted
to the said court of Samar on February 23, 1960 at 8: 00
a.m.; that in view of the copy and notice served, plaintiffs
proceeded to the court from their residence in Manila
Rule 87 provides for actions that are abated by death are:

(1) claims for funeral expenses and those for the last
sickness of the decedent; (2) judgments for money; and (3)
"all claims for money against the decedent, arising from
contract express or implied". None of these includes that
of the plaintiffs-appellants. It is not enough that the claim
against the deceased party be for money, but it must arise
from "contract express or implied" which according to
Leung Ben vs. O'Brien include all purely personal
obligations other than those which have their source in
delict or tort.
D-34
RATIO:

RULES 78 to 87
Held: SC dismissed the petition for certiorari and upheld the

assailed order.
Under Section 5 Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, actions that are
abated by death are:
(1) All claims for money against the decedent, arising from
contract, express or implied, whether the same be due,
not due or contingent;
(2) All claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last
3D (2008-2009)
D-35
MELGAR v. BUENVIAJE (179 SCRA 196)

Facts:
A passenger bus owned by the Felicidad Balla and driven
by Domingo Casin swerved to the left lane and collided
head-on with a Ford Fiera (a service jeep) owned by Mateo
Lim Relucio and driven by Ruben Lim Relucio coming from
the opposite direction. The bus swerved further to the left
this time colliding head-on with another passenger bus
owned by Benjamin Flores and driven by Fabian Prades.
Felicidad Balla and Domingo Casin died on the spot.
Drivers Ruben Lim Relucio and Fabian Prades also died.
The spouses Oscar Prades and Victoria Prades, the only
surviving forced heirs of Fabian Prades, filed a complaint
against the children of deceased Felicidad Balla for
damages. The spouses Prades alleged that Casin drove in
a reckless and imprudent manner which was the sole,
direct and proximate cause of the incident which resulted
to the death of Fabian Prades, and that the estate of
deceased Felicidad Balla should be held liable for damages,
since Felicidad Balla allowed her driver Casin to drive
recklessly and not observing the required diligence in the
selection and supervision of her employee, despite her
presence in the passenger bus.

Felicidad's children moved for the dismissal of the case on
the ground that the complaint states no cause of action
against them, arguing that it is entirely incorrect to hold
the children liable for the alleged negligence of their
deceased mother. They said what was proper was to sue
the estate of said deceased person inasmuch as the last
portion of Section 21 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court means
that the creditor should institute the proper intestate
proceedings wherein which he may be able to interpose
his claim. The court denied the motion to dismiss.
Important note: there were no intestate proceedings to
settle Felicidad's estate.
Felicidad's children filed a MR. The spouses Prades filed
their comment and motion to admit amended complaint
together with an amended complaint, amending the title
of the case naming as defendants the Estate of the late
Felicidad Balla as represented by the children named in
the original complaint. The court issued an order denying
the MR and admitting the amended complaint. Felicidad's
children then filed a petition for certiorari assailing the
denial of the MTD.
Page
Rule 88 on the other hand enumerates actions that survive

against a decedent's executors or administrators, and they
are: (1) actions to recover real and personal property from
the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and (3)
actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property. The present suit is one for damages under the
last class.

RULES 78 to 87
Under the circumstances the absence of an estate proceeding

may be avoided by requiring the heirs to take the place of the
deceased. Thus, in case of unreasonable delay in the appointment
of an executor or administrator of the estate or in case where the
heirs resort to an extrajudicial settlement of the estate, the court
may adopt the alternative of allowing the heirs of the deceased to
be substituted for the deceased.
The point of controversy is however on the fact that no estate

proceedings exist for the reason that her children had not filed
any proceedings for the settlement of her estate, claiming that
Felicidad Balla left no properties.
PAJARILLO v. IAC (176 SCRA 340)
Thus, while Felicidad's children may have correctly moved for the
dismissal of the case and the spouses Prades have forthwith
corrected the deficiency by filing an amended complaint, even
before the lower court could act on petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the denial of their motion to dismiss, the
action under Section 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which
allows the suit against the legal representative of the deceased,
BERNARDO v. CA (7 SCRA 367)

Facts:
Eusebio Capili died before his wife Hermogena Reyes. Eusebios
will was admitted to probate wherein he left his properties to his
wife and cousins. Hermogena Reyes then during the pendency of
the probate proceedings died intestate, thus she was substituted
by her collateral relatives as petitioned by Bernardo, the executor
of Eusebios estate.
3D (2008-2009)
D-36
The action can therefore be properly brought under Section 1,

Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, against an executor or
administrator. The rule provides:
Section 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought
against executor or administrator. No action upon a claim for
the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be
commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions
to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein,
from the state, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to
recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or
personal, may be commenced against him.
that is, the executor or administrator of his estate, would still be

futile, for the same reason that there appears to be no steps
taken towards the settlement of the estate of the late Felicidad
Balla, nor has an executor or administrator of the estate been
appointed. From the statement made by Felicidad's children that
"many persons die without leaving any asset at all", which
insinuates that the deceased left no assets, it is reasonable to
believe that Felicidad's children will not take any step to expedite
the early settlement of the estate, judicially or extrajudicially if
only to defeat the damage suit against the estate. (Note however
the deceased Balla apparently left the bus).
Page
sickness of the decedent; and

(3) Judgments for money against the decedent (Aguas v.
Llemos, 5 SCRA 959 [1962]).
It is evident that the case at bar is not among those enumerated.
Actions for damages caused by the tortious conduct of the
defendant survive the death of the latter.

RULES 78 to 87
Issue: Whether or not the probate court had jurisdiction to

determine that the properties belonged to the conjugal
partnership?
Held: YES
The Court consistently held that as a general rule, question as to
title of property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate
proceedings, except when one of the parties prays merely for the
inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which
case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question
without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. It
has also been held that when the parties interested are all heirs of
In this case the matter in controversy is the question of ownership

of certain properties involved whether they belong to the
conjugal partnerships or to the husband exclusively. This is a
matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which
necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to
determine the state of the decedent which is to be distributed
among the heirs including of course the widow represented by
her collateral relatives upon petition of the executor himself and
who have appeared voluntarily. There are no third parties whose
rights may be affected. Therefore the claim being asserted is one
belonging to an heir to the testator, and, consequently it complies
with the requirement of the exception that the parties interested
are all heirs claiming title under the testator.
3D (2008-2009)
D-37
The probate court issued an order declaring the donation as void

as it is prohibited by law and disapproved both projects of
partition. The court ordered the executor to file another project
partition dividing the property of Eusebio according to his will,
however noting that such properties were conjugal properties of
the deceased spouses.
The jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs of a deceased

person regarding the ownership of properties alleged to belong to
his estate, has been recognized to be vested in probate courts.
This is so because the purpose of an administration proceeding is
the liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among
the heirs and legatees. Liquidation means determination of all the
assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses.3
Thereafter, distribution is made of the decedent's liquidated
estate among the persons entitled to succeed him. The
proceeding is in the nature of an action of partition, in which each
party is required to bring into the mass whatever community
property he has in his possession.
Page
Bernardo then filed a project of partition in accordance with the

will of Eusebio which however was opposed by Hermogenas
relatives. They submitted their own project of partition claiming
that of the properties mentioned in the will of Eusebio should
be awarded to them as those properties did not belong to Eusebio
but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses. This was
questioned by Bernardo. He claimed that the properties
belonged exclusively to Eusebio and not to the conjugal
partnership because Hermogena donated to Eusebio her share of
such partnership.
the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate

court a question as to title to property, and when so submitted
said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon.
Provided that interests of third persons are not prejudiced.

RULES 78 to 87
Q: May the heirs attack the validity of a project of partition duly

approved by the court?
A: No. The court has stated that where a partition had not only
been approved and thus become a judgment of the court, but
distribution of the estate in pursuance of such partition had been
fully carried out and the heirs has received the property assigned
to them, they are precluded from subsequently attacking its
validity or any part of the partition (barred further litigation on
said title and operated to bring the property under the control
and supervision of the court for proper distribution in accordance
to the tenor of the partition). The parties cannot attack the
partition collaterally.
GUANCO v. NATIONAL BANK (54 Phil 244)

FACTS:
-Guanco obtained credits from PNB and as security pledged 250
shares of the capital stock of Binalbagan Estate and 6,196 shares
of capital stock of Hinigaran Sugar Plantation.
-After Guancos death, the administrator of his estate filed a
petition in the intestate proceedings asking that the CFI issue an
order requiring the manager of the bank to appear in court for
examination as regards the shares of the Binalbagan Estae under
section 709 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
-The Court ordered the manager of the bank to appear but he did
not, instead the attorney of the bank filed an answer and it was
asserted that the pledge of shares was still in force as security for
the debts of Guanco and the Hinigaran Estate.
3D (2008-2009)
D-38
Q: What is the reason behind the above rule?

A: The reason for this rule is stated by former Chief Justice Moran
as follows: An executor or administration who assumes trust,
takes possession of the property left by the decedent for the
purpose of paying debts. While his debts are undetermined and
unpaid, no residue may be settled for distribution among the
heirs and devisees. Consequently, before distribution is made or
before any residue is known, the heirs or devisees have no cause
of action against the executor or administration for recovery of
the property left by the deceased.
Q: Does the probate court have jurisdiction to pass upon

questions of ownership of real properties forming part of the
estate of the deceased?
A: No. Note the following rulings:
However, the ownership of the disputed parcel of land
cannot be said to be res judicata, for a probate court has no right
to determine with finality the ownership thereof. (Ortega v CA)
The case was instituted for the purpose of having Yap
declared owner of the parcel of land in Leyte, asserting her title as
against decedent Ortega himself. The subject matter being
beyond the jurisdiction of the CFI of Cebu sitting as a probate
court, it was proper that the issue of ownership of a specific
property was raised in a separate ordinary action. (Cuizon case)
Page
Q: When may an heir sue to recover his share?

A: Where there is an order of the court assigning a particular land
to an heir or devisee or when the time allowed for payment of
debts has expired, such or for the damaged done. In other words,
there must first be a partition of the estate and delivery of latter
to the heir.

RULES 78 to 87
HELD:
-YES. Section 709 only provides a proceeding for examining
persons suspected of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed
away property of the deceased or withholds information of
documentary evidence tending to disclose rights or claims of the
deceased to such property or to disclose the possession of his last
will and testament. The purpose of the proceeding is to elicit
evidence, and the section does not, in terms, authorize the court
to enforce delivery of possession, recourse must be had to any
ordinary action.
-The bank maintains that the pledge is still in force. It may have
documentary evidence to that effect, and it was not under
obligation to turn such evidence over to the court or to a third
party, on the strength of a citation under section 709. The
possession of the certificates of the shares in question is a part of
that evidence and it is obvious that if they are surrendered to the
administrator of the estate and possibly disposed of by him, the
bank will lose its hold on the shares as a pledge. The bank, hence,
is entitled to its day in court, and its rights can only be determined
in a corresponding action.
Issue: Whether or not the court can order Mina to appear in

court.
Whether or not the jewels can be included in the inventory.
Held: Yes. Section 709 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions
provides that the court may cite a suspected person to appear
before it, and may examine him on oath on the matter of the
complaint. However, the lower court also ordered the
administrator to pay to the clerk the sum of P160, with which to
redeem the jewel. This was done without permitting Mina to be
heard upon the question of her alleged ownership. Nothing in
Section 709 justifies the second order for it does not authorize the
court to take possession of the property, if any should be found in
3D (2008-2009)
D-39
ISSUE:
-W/N the court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the delivery
of the shares to the administrator in a proceeding under section
709 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
ALAFRIZ v. MINA (28 Phil 137)

Facts: Gregorion Navarro died. Upon a petition presented for that
purpose, Prospero Alafriz was appointed as administrator of the
estate. After qualifying as administrator, he presented a motion in
the CFI alleging that Pia Mina had in her possession a certain
document or paper or receipt for certain jewelry deposited by
Gregorio Navarro before his death as security for a loan. The court
issued a n order citing Pia Mina to appear in court and to deliver
to the clerk of the court the paper or document mentioned. Mina
presented her exception to the order alleging that she and her
mother were the real owners of the jewelry pawned. After the
document was delivered to the clerk, the court directed the clerk
to redeem the said jewelry and to keep it deposited in his office
until the final settlement of the estate. Mina presented a motion
asking that the jewelry be excluded from the inventory presented
by Alafriz.
Page
-Thereupon, the Court in the same proceedings and without any

trial, ordered the manager of the bank to deliver the said shares
to the administrator of the estate within 30 days from notice of
the order.

RULES 78 to 87
HEIRS OF GREGOIRE v. BAKER (51 Phil 75)

Facts:
- One J.H. Ankrom died; respondent Administrator included
in the estate a tract of land worth P60,000
- Petitioners Heirs of Gregoire filed a claim against the
estate of Ankrom for about P70,000, which was allowed
- Later on the respondent administrator discovers that
Ankrom had executed a mortgage on the property here in
question in favor of the Philippine Trust Company to
secure that company from liability on a note in the amount
of P20,000.00, of the same date, upon which it had made
itself contigently liable; Two days after this mortgage had
been executed Ankrom appears to have made an
assignment of all his interest in the mortgaged property to
one J. G. Jung, of Cincinnati, Ohio, for a purported
consideration of the sum of P1 and other good and
valuable considerations.
3D (2008-2009)
D-40
Yes, the jewels can be included. Placing them in the

inventory does not in any way deprive Mina of her property
therein. She is entitled to be heard upon the question of her
ownership, when that question is properly presented to the court.
It in no way prejudices the rights of Mina in her property.
In view of these conveyances by his intestate, the

administrator presented an amended inventory, omitting
therefrom the tract of 930 hectares with its improvements
thereon, the same being the land covered by the transfers
above mentioned.
- The courts initially ordered the inclusion of the land
considering that without it the estate would be insolvent,
but later on reversed
- Petitioners appeal, claiming that the assignment to Jung by
Ankrom of the equity of redemption of the latter in the
tract of land above mentioned was affected in fraud of
creditors, and that it was the duty of the administrator to
retain the possession of this tract of land and thereby
place upon Jung, or persons claiming under him, the
burden of instituting any action that may be necessary to
maintain the rights of the transferee under said
assignment.
Issue: w/n the contentions of the petitioners are correct; what is
the remedy of the creditors?
Held: yes
Ratio:
- The precise remedy open to the appellants in the
predicament above described is clearly pointed pout in
section 713 of our Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as
follows: When there is a deficiency of assets in the hands
of an executor or administrator to pay debts and
expenses, and when the deceased person made in his lifetime such fraudulent conveyance of such real or personal
estate or of a right or interest therein, as is stated in the
preceding section, any creditor of the estate may, by
license of the court, if the executor or administrator has
-
Page
the possession of the defendant or of the person cited. In the

present case, Mina was entitled to retain possession of the pawn
ticket, until the question of ownership of the jewels should be
determined in the proper way. The court had no right to deprive
her of her evidence relating to the property until the question of
ownership had been settled.

RULES 78 to 87
not commenced such action, commence and prosecute to

final judgment, in the name of the executor or
administrator, an action for the recovery of the same and
may recover for the benefit of the creditors, such real or
personal estate, or interest therein so conveyed. But such
action shall not be commenced until the creditor files in
court a bond with sufficient surety, to be approved by the
judge, conditioned to indemnify the executor or
administrator against the costs of such action. Such
creditor shall have a lien upon the judgment by him so
recovered for the costs incurred and such other expenses
as the court deems equitable.
The remedy of the appellants is, therefore, to indemnify
the administrator against costs and, by leave of court, to
institute an action in the name of the administrator to set
aside the assignment or other conveyance believed to
have been made in fraud of creditors.
Page
D-41
VELASQUEZ v. GEORGE (125 SCRA 456)
3D (2008-2009)

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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests

ISSUE: Whether questions of jurisdiction by reason of

BENEDICTO v. JAVELLANA (10 Phil 197)

VDA DE MANZANERO v. CFI of BATANGAS (61 Phil 850)

SANDOVAL v. SANTIAGO (83 Phil 784)

RULING: (Not for this case.)

CASIANO v. MALOTO (70 SCRA 232)

The niece and nephews executed an extra-judicial

case of balance of such products, it shall remain with

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests

The probate court then issued an order declaring the donation

Whether the court in intestate, special proceeding No. 1736

Bernardo then filed a project of partition in accordance with

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests

URIARTE v. CFI NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (33 SCRA 252)

Vicente Uriarte opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss

In this case the matter in controversy is the question of

Higinio Uriarte, nephew of the deceased, filed an opposition

determination in a separate action. It has also been held that

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests

In accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction,

2. Whether the Manila Court erred in not dismissing Special

Vicente Uriarte knew of the existence of a will

Vicente Uriarte likewise was served with notice of the

All these notwithstanding, it was only in1963 that he

While the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance over "all

will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace

To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the

whatever s/he pleases, with the condition that when the

51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests

(2) LINNIEs siblings (or representatives) are entitled to

- Both proceedings in LINNIEs and CHARLES estates

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests

ISSUE: Whether granting the demurrer was proper.

DOLAR v. ROMAN CATHOLIC (68 Phil 727)

- RAMON del Rosario (husband) died in 1895 and

Whatever law might be applicable the intestate of

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests

ALFONSO v. NATIVIDAD (6 Phil 240)

ISSUE: Distribution of the estate

f. As there are forced heirs (yeah!), the legacy

noted that the second project of partition was not

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests

CRUZ v. DE JESUS (52 Phil 870)

Sec 685 of Act No. 190 established two methods of liquidating

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests

DE LA RAMA v. DE LA RAMA (7 Phil 745)

he Court then concluded that the three documents were valid

When the marriage is dissolved by death of the wife, the

well as her participation in the conjugal partnership with him.

b) by ordinary proceeding for liquidation and partition

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests

In case it is necessary to sell any portion of said community

In the probate proceedings in the CFI of Tarlac, Maria Calma

inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts

The spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit were the

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Case Digests

Fausta Macasaquit, no complaint can be brought against him

5) Potenciano's children, Victor and Lourdes, intervened by