36 37. Evidence

Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
36. OFFICIAL LANGUAGE
Asingan, Pangasinan covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.

352.3 The courts below described it as follows:
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 169454
Page 1 of 82
December 27, 2007
THE HEIRS OF MARCELINO DORONIO, NAMELY: REGINA AND

FLORA, BOTH SURNAMED DORONIO,Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF FORTUNATO DORONIO, NAMELY: TRINIDAD ROSALINA
DORONIO-BALMES, MODING DORONIO, FLORENTINA DORONIO,
AND ANICETA ALCANTARA-MANALO, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
For Our review on certiorari is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
reversing that2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, Anonas,
Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, in an action for reconveyance and damages.
The CA declared respondents as rightful owners of one-half of the
subject property and directed petitioners to execute a registerable
document conveying the same to respondents.
The Facts
Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante, now both deceased, were
the registered owners of a parcel of land located at Barangay Cabalitaan,
Un terreno (Lote 1018), situada en el municipio de Asingan, Linda por el

NE; con propriedad de Gabriel Bernardino; con el SE con propriedad de
Zacarias Najorda y Alejandro Najorda; por el SO con propriedad de
Geminiano Mendoza y por el NO con el camino para Villasis; midiendo
una extension superficial mil ciento cincuenta y dos metros cuadrados.4
The spouses had children but the records fail to disclose their number. It
is clear, however, that Marcelino Doronio and Fortunato Doronio, now
both deceased, were among them and that the parties in this case are
their heirs. Petitioners are the heirs of Marcelino Doronio, while
respondents are the heirs of Fortunato Doronio.
On April 24, 1919, a private deed of donation propter nuptias5 was
executed by spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante in favor of
Marcelino Doronio and the latters wife, Veronica Pico. One of the
properties subject of said deed of donation is the one that it described as
follows:
Fourth A piece of residential land located in the barrio of Cabalitian but
we did not measure it, the area is bounded on the north by Gabriel
Bernardino; on the east by Fortunato Doronio; on the south by
Geminiano Mendoza and on the west by a road to Villasis. Constructed
on said land is a house of light materials also a part of the dowry. Value
200.00.6
It appears that the property described in the deed of donation is the one
covered by OCT No. 352. However, there is a significant discrepancy with
respect to the identity of the owner of adjacent property at the eastern
side. Based on OCT No. 352, the adjacent owners are Zacarias Najorda
and Alejandro Najorda, whereas based on the deed of donation, the
owner of the adjacent property is Fortunato Doronio. Furthermore, said
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
deed of donation remained a private document as it was never

notarized.7
Both parties have been occupying the subject land for several
decades8 although they have different theories regarding its present
ownership. According to petitioners, they are now the owners of the
entire property in view of the private deed of donation propter nuptias
in favor of their predecessors, Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico.
Respondents, on the other hand, claim that only half of the property was
actually incorporated in the said deed of donation because it stated that
Fortunato Doronio, instead of Zacarias Najorda and Alejandro Najorda, is
the owner of the adjacent property at the eastern side. Respondents
posit that the donors respected and segregated the possession of
Fortunato Doronio of the eastern half of the land. They are the ones who
have been possessing said land occupied by their predecessor, Fortunato
Doronio.
Eager to obtain the entire property, the heirs of Marcelino Doronio and
Veronica Pico filed, on January 11, 1993, before the RTC in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan a petition "For the Registration of a Private Deed of
Donation"9 docketed as Petition Case No. U-920. No respondents were
named in the said petition10 although notices of hearing were posted on
the bulletin boards of Barangay Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan
and Lingayen.11
During the hearings, no one interposed an objection to the
petition.12 After the RTC ordered a general default,13the petition was
eventually granted on September 22, 1993. This led to the registration of
the deed of donation, cancellation of OCT No. 352 and issuance of a new
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 44481 in the names of Marcelino
Doronio and Veronica Pico.14 Thus, the entire property was titled in the
names of petitioners predecessors.
Page 2 of 82
On April 28, 1994, the heirs of Fortunato Doronio filed a pleading before
the RTC in the form of a petition in the same Petition Case No. U-920.
The petition was for the reconsideration of the decision of the RTC that
ordered the registration of the subject deed of donation. It was prayed in
the petition that an order be issued declaring null and void the
registration of the private deed of donation and that TCT No. 44481 be
cancelled. However, the petition was dismissed on May 13, 1994 on the
ground that the decision in Petition Case No. U-920 had already become
final as it was not appealed.
Determined to remain in their possessed property, respondent heirs of
Fortunato Doronio (as plaintiffs) filed an action for reconveyance and
damages with prayer for preliminary injunction15 against petitioner
heirs of Marcelino Doronio (as defendants) before the RTC, Branch 45,
Anonas, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan. Respondents contended, among
others, that the subject land is different from what was donated as the
descriptions of the property under OCT No. 352 and under the private
deed of donation were different. They posited that spouses Simeon
Doronio and Cornelia Gante intended to donate only one-half of the
property.
During the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated, among others,
that the property was originally covered by OCT No. 352 which was
cancelled by TCT No. 44481. They also agreed that the issues are: (1)
whether or not there was a variation in the description of the property
subject of the private deed of donation and OCT No. 352; (2) whether or
not respondents had acquired one-half of the property covered by OCT
No. 352 by acquisitive prescription; (3) whether or not the transfer of
the whole property covered by OCT No. 352 on the basis of the
registration of the private deed of donation notwithstanding the
discrepancy in the description is valid; (4) whether or not respondents
are entitled to damages; and (5) whether or not TCT No. 44481 is valid.16
RTC Decision
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
After due proceedings, the RTC ruled in favor of petitioner heirs of

Marcelino Doronio (defendants). It concluded that the parties admitted
the identity of the land which they all occupy;17 that a title once
registered under the torrens system cannot be defeated by adverse,
open and notorious possession or by prescription;18 that the deed of
donation in consideration of the marriage of the parents of petitioners is
valid, hence, it led to the eventual issuance of TCT No. 44481 in the
names of said parents;19 and that respondent heirs of Fortunato Doronio
(plaintiffs) are not entitled to damages as they are not the rightful
owners of the portion of the property they are claiming.20
Page 3 of 82
directed to execute a registerable document conveying the same to

appellants.
SO ORDERED.23
The appellate court determined that "(t)he intention to donate half of
the disputed property to appellees predecessors can be gleaned from
the disparity of technical descriptions appearing in the title (OCT No.
352) of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante and in the deed of
donation propter nuptias executed on April 24, 1919 in favor of
appellees predecessors."24
The RTC disposed of the case, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment
DISMISSING the herein Complaint filed by plaintiffs against defendants.21
Disagreeing with the judgment of the RTC, respondents appealed to the
CA. They argued that the trial court erred in not finding that
respondents predecessor-in-interest acquired one-half of the property
covered by OCT No. 352 by tradition and/or intestate succession; that
the deed of donation dated April 26, 1919 was null and void; that
assuming that the deed of donation was valid, only one-half of the
property was actually donated to Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico;
and that respondents acquired ownership of the other half portion of the
property by acquisitive prescription.22
CA Disposition
In a Decision dated January 26, 2005, the CA reversed the RTC decision
with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated June 28, 2002 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Declaring the appellants as rightful owners of one-half of
the property now covered by TCT No. 44481, the appellees are hereby
The CA based its conclusion on the disparity of the following technical

descriptions of the property under OCT No. 352 and the deed of
donation, to wit:
The court below described the property covered by OCT No. 352 as
follows:
"Un terreno (Lote 1018), situada en el municipio de Asingan, Linda por
el NE; con propriedad de Gabriel Bernardino; con el SE con propriedad
de Zacarias Najorda y Alejandro Najorda; por el SO con propriedad de
Geminiano Mendoza y por el NO con el camino para Villasis; midiendo
una extension superficial mil ciento cincuenta y dos metros cuadrados."
On the other hand, the property donated to appellees predecessors was
described in the deed of donation as:
"Fourth A piece of residential land located in the barrio of Cabalitian
but we did not measure it, the area is bounded on the north by Gabriel
Bernardino; on the east by Fortunato Doronio; on the south by
Geminiano Mendoza and on the west by a road to Villasis. Constructed
on said land is a house of light materials also a part of the dowry. Value
200.00."25 (Emphasis ours)
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
Taking note "that the boundaries of the lot donated to Marcelino

Doronio and Veronica Pico differ from the boundaries of the land owned
by spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante," the CA concluded that
spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante donated only half of the
property covered by OCT No. 352.26
Regarding the allegation of petitioners that OCT No. 352 is inadmissible
in evidence, the CA pointed out that, "while the OCT is written in the
Spanish language, this document already forms part of the records of
this case for failure of appellees to interpose a timely objection when it
was offered as evidence in the proceedings a quo. It is a well-settled rule
that any objection to the admissibility of such evidence not raised will be
considered waived and said evidence will have to form part of the
records of the case as competent and admitted evidence."27
The CA likewise ruled that the donation of the entire property in favor of
petitioners predecessors is invalid on the ground that it impairs the
legitime of respondents predecessor, Fortunato Doronio. On this aspect,
the CA reasoned out:
Moreover, We find the donation of the entire property in favor of
appellees predecessors invalid as it impairs the legitime of appellants
predecessor. Article 961 of the Civil Code is explicit. "In default of
testamentary heirs, the law vests the inheritance, x x x, in the legitimate
x x x relatives of the deceased, x x x." As Spouses Simeon Doronio and
Cornelia Gante died intestate, their property shall pass to their lawful
heirs, namely: Fortunato and Marcelino Doronio. Donating the entire
property to Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico and excluding another
heir, Fortunato, tantamounts to divesting the latter of his rightful share
in his parents inheritance. Besides, a persons prerogative to make
donations is subject to certain limitations, one of which is that he cannot
give by donation more than what he can give by will (Article 752, Civil
Code). If he does, so much of what is donated as exceeds what he can
Page 4 of 82
give by will is deemed inofficious and the donation is reducible to the

extent of such excess.28
Petitioners were not pleased with the decision of the CA. Hence, this
petition under Rule 45.
Issues
Petitioners now contend that the CA erred in:
1. DECLARING ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE
OF TITLE NO. 352 DESPITE OF LACK OF TRANSLATION
THEREOF.
2. (RULING THAT) ONLY HALF OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY
WAS DONATED TO THE PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST OF THE
HEREIN APPELLANTS.
3. (ITS) DECLARATION THAT THE DONATION PROPTER
NUPTIAS IS INNOFICIOUS, IS PREMATURE, AND THUS IT IS
ILLEGAL AND UNPROCEDURAL.29
Our Ruling
OCT No. 352 in Spanish Although Not
Translated into English or Filipino Is
Admissible For Lack of Timely Objection
Petitioners fault the CA for admitting OCT No. 352 in evidence on the
ground that it is written in Spanish language. They posit that
"(d)ocumentary evidence in an unofficial language shall not be admitted
as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English or
Filipino."30
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
The argument is untenable. The requirement that documents written in

an unofficial language must be accompanied with a translation in English
or Filipino as a prerequisite for its admission in evidence must be
insisted upon by the parties at the trial to enable the court, where a
translation has been impugned as incorrect, to decide the issue.31 Where
such document, not so accompanied with a translation in English or
Filipino, is offered in evidence and not objected to, either by the parties
or the court, it must be presumed that the language in which the
document is written is understood by all, and the document is
admissible in evidence.32
Moreover, Section 36, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence
provides:
SECTION 36. Objection. Objection to evidence offered orally must be
made immediately after the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral
examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor
shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days
after notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified. (Emphasis
ours)
Since petitioners did not object to the offer of said documentary
evidence on time, it is now too late in the day for them to question its
admissibility. The rule is that evidence not objected may be deemed
admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its
judgment.33 This is true even if by its nature, the evidence is inadmissible
and would have surely been rejected if it had been challenged at the
proper time.34
Page 5 of 82
As a matter of fact, instead of objecting, petitioners admitted the

contents of Exhibit "A," that is, OCT No. 352 in their comment35 on
respondents formal offer of documentary evidence. In the said
comment, petitioners alleged, among others, that "Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F
and G, are admitted but not for the purpose they are offered because
these exhibits being public and official documents are the best evidence
of that they contain and not for what a party would like it to
prove."36 Said evidence was admitted by the RTC.37 Once admitted
without objection, even though not admissible under an objection, We
are not inclined now to reject it.38 Consequently, the evidence that was
not objected to became property of the case, and all parties to the case
are considered amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects
resulting from the said evidence.39
Issues on Impairment of Legitime
Should Be Threshed Out in a Special
Proceeding, Not in Civil Action for
Reconveyance and Damages
On the other hand, petitioners are correct in alleging that the issue
regarding the impairment of legitime of Fortunato Doronio must be
resolved in an action for the settlement of estates of spouses Simeon
Doronio and Cornelia Gante. It may not be passed upon in an action for
reconveyance and damages. A probate court, in the exercise of its limited
jurisdiction, is the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of
impairment of legitime as well as other related matters involving the
settlement of estate.40
An action for reconveyance with damages is a civil action, whereas
matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as
advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of
a special proceeding. Special proceedings require the application of
specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.41
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
As explained by the Court in Natcher v. Court of Appeals:42

Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action
and special proceedings, in this wise:
x x x a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.
A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the
rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a
special civil action.
xxxx
c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right or a particular fact.
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction
between an action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal
demand of ones right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by
the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies
according to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding"
may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or
right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no
formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides.
In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an
application or motion.
Page 6 of 82
ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity,

and that special proceedings include those proceedings which are not
ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted according to
some special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without
summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are
characteristics of ordinary actions x x x. A special proceeding must
therefore be in the nature of a distinct and independent proceeding for
particular relief, such as may be instituted independently of a pending
action, by petition or motion upon notice.
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of
title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to
settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of
property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special
proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific
rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate
of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in
the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to
advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any
heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the
estate proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall be
binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law

expounds further:
While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may," it is
nevertheless clear that the same provision contemplates a probate court
when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings."
It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those

proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted according to the
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its
general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein

petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 71075 for reconveyance
and annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper
vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present
circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55, was not properly
constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of
advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife,
herein petitioner Natcher.
We likewise find merit in petitioners contention that before any
conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be
reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first.43 The net estate
of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable
obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the
deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation
would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the
legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only
then can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the
legitimes.44
Declaration of Validity of Donation
Can Be Challenged by an Interested
Party Not Impleaded in Petition for
Quieting of Title or Declaratory Relief
or Where There is No Res Judicata.
Moreover, This Court Can Consider
a Factual Matter or Unassigned Error
in the Interest of Substantial Justice.
Nevertheless, petitioners cannot preclude the determination of validity
of the deed of donation on the ground that (1) it has been impliedly
admitted by respondents; (2) it has already been determined with
finality by the RTC in Petition Case No. U-920; or (3) the only issue in an
action for reconveyance is who has a better right over the land.45
Page 7 of 82
The validity of the private deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of

petitioners predecessors was one of the issues in this case before the
lower courts. The pre-trial order46 of the RTC stated that one of the
issues before it is "(w)hether or not the transfer of the whole property
covered by OCT No. 352 on the basis of the private deed of donation
notwithstanding the discrepancy in the description is valid." Before the
CA, one of the errors assigned by respondents is that "THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PRIVATE DEED OF DONATION
DATED APRIL 26, 1919 WAS NULL AND VOID."47
The issue of the validity of donation is likewise brought to Us by
petitioners as they stated in their Memorandum48that one of the issues
to be resolved is regarding the alleged fact that "THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE DONATION INVALID." We
are thus poised to inspect the deed of donation and to determine its
validity.
We cannot agree with petitioners contention that respondents may no
longer question the validity of the deed of donation on the ground that
they already impliedly admitted it. Under the provisions of the Civil
Code, a void contract is inexistent from the beginning. The right to set up
the defense of its illegality cannot be waived.49 The right to set up the
nullity of a void or non-existent contract is not limited to the parties as in
the case of annullable or voidable contracts; it is extended to third
persons who are directly affected by the contract.50
Consequently, although respondents are not parties in the deed of
donation, they can set up its nullity because they are directly affected by
the same.51 The subject of the deed being the land they are occupying, its
enforcement will definitely affect them.
Petitioners cannot also use the finality of the RTC decision in Petition
Case No. U-92052 as a shield against the verification of the validity of the
deed of donation. According to petitioners, the said final decision is one
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
for quieting of title.53 In other words, it is a case for declaratory relief

under Rule 64 (now Rule 63) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected
by a statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance, may, before
breach or violation thereof, bring an action to determine any question of
construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a
declaration of his rights or duties thereunder.
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real
property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership
under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this rule.
SECTION 2. Parties. All persons shall be made parties who have or
claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration; and no
declaration shall, except as otherwise provided in these rules, prejudice
the rights of persons not parties to the action. (Emphasis ours)
However, respondents were not made parties in the said Petition Case
No. U-920.1wphi1 Worse, instead of issuing summons to interested
parties, the RTC merely allowed the posting of notices on the bulletin
boards of Barangay Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan and Lingayen,
Pangasinan. As pointed out by the CA, citing the ruling of the RTC:
x x x In the said case or Petition No. U-920, notices were posted on the
bulletin boards of barangay Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan and
Lingayen, Pangasinan, so that there was a notice to the whole world and
during the initial hearing and/or hearings, no one interposed objection
thereto.54
Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly
speaking, in personam, but being against the person in respect of the res,
these proceedings are characterized as quasi in rem.55 The judgment in
Page 8 of 82
such proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.56 Thus,

respondents are not bound by the decision in Petition Case No. U-920 as
they were not made parties in the said case.
The rules on quieting of title57 expressly provide that any declaration in
a suit to quiet title shall not prejudice persons who are not parties to the
action.
That respondents filed a subsequent pleading58 in the same Petition Case
No. U-920 after the decision there had become final did not change the
fact that said decision became final without their being impleaded in the
case. Said subsequent pleading was dismissed on the ground of finality
of the decision.59
Thus, the RTC totally failed to give respondents their day in court. As a
result, they cannot be bound by its orders. Generally accepted is the
principle that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is
a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered
by the court.60
Moreover, for the principle of res judicata to apply, the following must
be present: (1) a decision on the merits; (2) by a court of competent
jurisdiction; (3) the decision is final; and (4) the two actions involve
identical parties, subject matter and causes of action.61 The fourth
element is not present in this case. The parties are not identical because
respondents were not impleaded in Petition Case No. U-920. While the
subject matter may be the same property covered by OCT No. 352, the
causes of action are different. Petition Case No. U-920 is an action for
declaratory relief while the case below is for recovery of property.
We are not persuaded by petitioners posture that the only issue in this
action for reconveyance is who has a better right over the land; and that
the validity of the deed of donation is beside the point.62 It is precisely
the validity and enforceability of the deed of donation that is the
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
determining factor in resolving the issue of who has a better right over
the property. Moreover, notwithstanding procedural lapses as to the
appropriateness of the remedies prayed for in the petition filed before
Us, this Court can brush aside the technicalities in the interest of justice.
In some instances, this Court even suspended its own rules and excepted
a case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so
demanded.63
Moreover, although respondents did not directly raise the issue of
validity of the deed of donation at the commencement of the case before
the trial court, it was stipulated64 by the parties during the pre-trial
conference. In any event, this Court has authority to inquire into any
question necessary in arriving at a just decision of a case before
it.65 Though not specifically questioned by the parties, additional issues
may also be included, if deemed important for substantial justice to be
rendered.66
Furthermore, this Court has held that although a factual issue is not
squarely raised below, still in the interest of substantial justice, this
Court is not prevented from considering a pivotal factual matter. The
Supreme Court is clothed with ample authority to review palpable errors
not assigned as such if it finds that their consideration is necessary in
arriving at a just decision.67
A rudimentary doctrine on appealed cases is that this Court is clothed
with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as
errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary at
arriving at a just decision of the case.68 Also, an unassigned error closely
related to an error properly assigned or upon which the determination
of the question raised by the error properly assigned is dependent, will
be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to
assign it as an error.69
Page 9 of 82
Donation Propter Nuptias of Real

Property Made in a Private Instrument
Before the New Civil Code Took Effect
on August 30, 1950 is Void
We now focus on the crux of the petition, which is the validity of the
deed of donation.1avvphi1 It is settled that only laws existing at the time
of the execution of a contract are applicable to it and not the later
statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive
effect.70 Accordingly, the Old Civil Code applies in this case as the
donation propter nuptias was executed in 1919, while the New Civil
Code took effect only on August 30, 1950.
Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a
public instrument in which the property donated must be specifically
described.71 Article 1328 of the Old Civil Code provides that gifts propter
nuptias are governed by the rules established in Title 2 of Book 3 of the
same Code. Article 633 of that title provides that the gift of real property,
in order to be valid, must appear in a public document.72 It is settled that
a donation of real estate propter nuptias is void unless made by public
instrument.73
In the instant case, the donation propter nuptias did not become valid.
Neither did it create any right because it was not made in a public
instrument.74 Hence, it conveyed no title to the land in question to
petitioners predecessors.
Logically, then, the cancellation of OCT No. 352 and the issuance of a new
TCT No. 44481 in favor of petitioners predecessors have no legal basis.
The title to the subject property should, therefore, be restored to its
original owners under OCT No. 352.
Direct reconveyance to any of the parties is not possible as it has not yet
been determined in a proper proceeding who among the heirs of
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante is entitled to it. It is still

unproven whether or not the parties are the only ones entitled to the
properties of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante. As earlier
intimated, there are still things to be done before the legal share of all
the heirs can be properly adjudicated.75
Titled Property Cannot Be Acquired
By Another By Adverse Possession
or Extinctive Prescription
Likewise, the claim of respondents that they became owners of the
property by acquisitive prescription has no merit. Truth to tell,
respondents cannot successfully invoke the argument of extinctive
prescription. They cannot be deemed the owners by acquisitive
prescription of the portion of the property they have been possessing.
The reason is that the property was covered by OCT No. 352. A title once
registered under the torrens system cannot be defeated even by adverse,
open and notorious possession; neither can it be defeated by
prescription.76 It is notice to the whole world and as such all persons are
bound by it and no one can plead ignorance of the registration.77
The torrens system is intended to guarantee the integrity and
conclusiveness of the certificate of registration, but it cannot be used for
the perpetration of fraud against the real owner of the registered
land.78 The system merely confirms ownership and does not create it.
Certainly, it cannot be used to divest the lawful owner of his title for the
purpose of transferring it to another who has not acquired it by any of
the modes allowed or recognized by law. It cannot be used to protect a
usurper from the true owner, nor can it be used as a shield for the
commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at the
expense of another.79 Where such an illegal transfer is made, as in the
case at bar, the law presumes that no registration has been made and so
retains title in the real owner of the land.80
Page 10 of 82
Although We confirm here the invalidity of the deed of donation and of

its resulting TCT No. 44481, the controversy between the parties is yet
to be fully settled. The issues as to who truly are the present owners of
the property and what is the extent of their ownership remain
unresolved. The same may be properly threshed out in the settlement of
the estates of the registered owners of the property, namely: spouses
Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. A
new one is entered:
(1) Declaring the private deed of donation propter nuptias in
favor of petitioners predecessors NULL AND VOID; and
(2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to:
(a) CANCEL Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44481 in the
names of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico; and
(b) RESTORE Original Certificate of Title No. 352 in the
names of its original owners, spouses Simeon Doronio
and Cornelia Gante.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIAMARTINEZ

Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Records, pp. 344-356. Dated June 28, 2002 in Civil Case No. U6498. Penned by Judge Joven F. Costales.
2
ATTESTATION
Rollo, pp. 43-44, 48-49.
Id. at 48-49; Exhibits "A" & "7."
Id. at 48; Exhibit "D."
Id. at 49; Exhibits "D-4" & "6."
Id.; CA rollo, pp. 37-38.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 42-43; Exhibit "5."
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
Rollo, pp. 39-51. Dated January 26, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No.
76200 entitled "Heirs of Fortunato Doronio v. Heirs of Marcelino
1
Doronio, et al." Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso,

with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Amelita G.
Tolentino, concurring.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
Page 11 of 82
10
Id. at 45.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Civil Case No. U-6498.
16
Records, pp. 134-135.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
Page 12 of 82
17
CA rollo, p. 43; id. at 354.
18
Id. at 44-45; id at 354-356.
People v. Pansensoy, G.R. No. 140634, September 12, 2002,

388 SCRA 669, 689; People v. Barellano, G.R. No. 121204,
December 2, 1999, 319 SCRA 567, 590.
19
Id. at 45; id. at 355-356.
34
20
Id. at 46; id. at 356.
21
22
23
24
33
Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, G.R. No. 86062, June 6, 1990,

186 SCRA 385, 390.
35
Records, p. 188.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 189.
38
Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, supra.
Id.
Id. at 46-47; CA rollo, pp. 19-20.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 48; CA rollo, p. 100.
25
Id. at 48-49; id. at 100-101.
Quebral v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101941, January 25, 1996,

252 SCRA 353, 365.
26
Id.
40
27
Id. at 49-50; CA rollo, pp. 101-102.
28
Id. at 50; id. at 102.
39
29
Natcher v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133000, October 2, 2001,

366 SCRA 385, 394.
41
Id. at 392.
42
Supra at 391-392.
Id. at 13.
Natcher v. Court of Appeals, supra note 40, at 394;

Pagkatipunan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70722,
July 3, 1991, 198 SCRA 719, 729.
43
30
Id. at 24.
Francisco, V.J., The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines,

Vol. VII, Part II, 1991 ed., p. 389.
31
32
Id.
Id.; Mateo v. Lagua, G.R. No. L-26270, October 30, 1969, 29

SCRA 864, 870.
44
45
Rollo, p. 148.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
46
59
47
Rollo, pp. 46-47.
60
48
Id. at 144.
49
Civil Code, Art. 1409.
Page 13 of 82
Id.; CA rollo, p. 97.
Domingo v. Scheer, G.R. No. 154745, January 29, 2004, 421

SCRA 468, 483; Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 98310, October 24, 1996, 263 SCRA
490, 505-506.
Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114151, September
17, 1998, 295 SCRA 536, 554; Bernardo v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 105819, March 15, 1996, 255
SCRA 108, 118.
61
Manotok Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45038,

April 30, 1987, 149 SCRA 372, 377, citing Tolentino, Civil Code of
the Philippines, Vol. IV, 1973 ed., p. 604.
50
Arsenal v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-66696, July

14, 1986, 143 SCRA 40, 49, citing Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. IV, 1973 ed., p. 604.
51
Records, p. 14; Exhibit "C." Entitled "For the Registration of a

Private Deed of Donation The Heirs of Veronica Pico."
52
53
Rollo, p. 143.
54
Id. at 45; CA rollo, p. 97.
62
Rollo, p. 148.
Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, G.R.

No. 148571, September 24, 2002, 389 SCRA 623, 651; Fortich v.
Corona, G.R. No. 131457, April 24, 1998, 289 SCRA 624, 646;
Piczon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76378-81, September 24,
1990, 190 SCRA 31, 38.
63
64
Records, p. 134.
Serrano v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.

117040, May 4, 2000, 331 SCRA 331, 338, citing Korean Airlines
Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 114061 & 113842, August
3, 1994, 234 SCRA 717, 725; Vda. de Javellana v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-60129, July 29, 1983, 123 SCRA 799, 805.
65
Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,

G.R. No. L-67451, September 28, 1987, 154 SCRA 328, 348, citing
McDaniel v. McElvy, 108 So. 820 (1926).
55
Foster-Gallego v. Galang, G.R. No. 130228, July 27, 2004, 435

SCRA 275, 293; id.; Sandejas v. Robles, 81 Phil. 421, 424 (1948).
56
57
Rules of Court, Rule 64.
58
Rollo, p. 45; records, pp. 111-113.
Velarde v. Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357, April 28,

2004, 428 SCRA 283, 312.
66
Abra Valley College, Inc. v. Aquino, G.R. No. L-39086, June 15,
1988, 162 SCRA 106, 116; Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L56101, February 20, 1984, 127 SCRA 636, 645.
67
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
Page 14 of 82
68
Nordic Asia Limited v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111159, June

10, 2003, 403 SCRA 390, 396.
August 26, 1999, 313 SCRA 176, 183; Rosales v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 137566, February 28, 2001, 353 SCRA 179.
Id.; Sesbreo v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals, G.R. No.

106588, March 24, 1997, 270 SCRA 360, 370; Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 77425 &
77450, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 300; Soco v. Militante, G.R. No.
L-58961, June 28, 1983, 123 SCRA 160, 183; Ortigas, Jr. v.
Lufthansa German Airlines, G.R. No. L-28773, June 30, 1975, 64
SCRA 610, 633.
77
69
Brusas v. Court of Appeals, supra; Jacob v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. 92159, July 1, 1993, 224 SCRA 189, 193-194.
Francisco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130768, March 21,
2002, 379 SCRA 638, 646; Bayoca v. Nogales, G.R. No. 138210,
September 12, 2000, 340 SCRA 154, 169.
78
79
Valencia v. Locquiao, G.R. No. 122134, October 3, 2003, 412

SCRA 600, 611; Ortigas & Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
126102, December 4, 2000, 346 SCRA 748, 755; Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration v. Gonzales, G.R. No. L-34628,
July 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 172, 185.
Bayoca v. Nogales, supra.
70
71
Valencia v. Locquiao, supra at 610.
Id.; Velasquez v. Biala, 18 Phil. 231, 234-235 (1911); Camagay

v. Lagera, 7 Phil. 397 (1907).
72
Valencia v. Locquiao, supra; Solis v. Barroso, 53 Phil. 912, 914

(1928); Velasquez v. Biala, supra; Camagay v. Lagera, supra at
398.
73
74
Solis v. Barroso, supra note 73.
Pagkatipunan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 43,

at 732.
75
Ong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142056, April 19, 2001, 356
SCRA 768, 771; Brusas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126875,
76
Balangcad v. Justices of the Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84888,

February 12, 1992, 206 SCRA 169, 175.
80
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
37. OFFER OF EVIDENCE

SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 154115 November 29, 2005
PHILIP S. YU, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Second Division, and VIVECA LIM
YU, Respondents.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
This treats of the petition for review on certiorari of the Court of
Appeals Decision and Resolution in CA G.R. SP No. 66252 dated 30 April
20021 and 27 June 2002,2 respectively, which set aside the Order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City3 dated 10 May 2001, declaring
an application for insurance and an insurance policy as inadmissible
evidence.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
On 15 March 1994, Viveca Lim Yu (private respondent) brought against
her husband, Philip Sy Yu (petitioner), an action for legal separation and
dissolution of conjugal partnership on the grounds of marital infidelity
and physical abuse. The case was filed before the RTC of Pasig and
raffled to Branch 158, presided by Judge Jose R. Hernandez.
Page 15 of 82
During trial, private respondent moved for the issuance of a subpoena

duces tecum and ad testificandum4 to certain officers of Insular Life
Assurance Co. Ltd. to compel production of the insurance policy and
application of a person suspected to be petitioners illegitimate
child.5 The trial court denied the motion.6 It ruled that the insurance
contract is inadmissible evidence in view of Circular Letter No. 11-2000,
issued by the Insurance Commission which presumably prevents
insurance companies/agents from divulging confidential and privileged
information pertaining to insurance policies.7 It added that the
production of the application and insurance contract would violate
Article 2808 of the Civil Code and Section 5 of the Civil Registry
Law,9 both of which prohibit the unauthorized identification of the
parents of an illegitimate child.10 Private respondent sought
reconsideration of the Order, but the motion was denied by the trial
court.11
Aggrieved, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals, imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of Judge Hernandez in issuing the 10
May 2001Order.12 The Court of Appeals summarized the issues as
follows: (i) whether or not an insurance policy and its corresponding
application form can be admitted as evidence to prove a partys extramarital affairs in an action for legal separation; and (ii) whether or not a
trial court has the discretion to deny a partys motion to attach excluded
evidence to the record under Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.13
According to the Court of Appeals, private respondent was merely
seeking the production of the insurance application and contract, and
was not yet offering the same as part of her evidence. Thus, it declared
that petitioners objection to the admission of the documents was
premature, and the trial courts pronouncement that the documents are
inadmissible, precipitate.14 The contents of the insurance application and
insurance documents cannot be considered as privileged information,
the Court of Appeals added, in view of the opinion of the Insurance
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
Commissioner dated 4 April 2001 to the effect that Circular Letter

No.11-2000 "was never intended to be a legal impediment in complying
with lawful orders".15 Lastly, the Court of Appeals ruled that a trial court
does not have the discretion to deny a partys privilege to tender
excluded evidence, as this privilege allows said party to raise on appeal
the exclusion of such evidence.16 Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but to no avail.
In the present petition, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals
blundered in delving into errors of judgment supposedly committed by
the trial court as if the petition filed therein was an ordinary appeal and
not a special civil action. Further, he claims that the Court of Appeals
failed to show any specific instance of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court in issuing the assailed Order. Additionally, he posits
that private respondent had already mooted her petition before the
Court of Appeals when she filed her formal offer of rebuttal exhibits,
with tender of excluded evidence before the trial court.17
For her part, private respondent maintains that the details surrounding
the insurance policy are crucial to the issue of petitioners infidelity and
his financial capacity to provide support to her and their children.
Further, she argues that she had no choice but to make a tender of
excluded evidence considering that she was left to speculate on what the
insurance application and policy ruled out by the trial court would
contain.18
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to correct
errors of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction committed by a lower court.19 Where a respondent
does not have the legal power to determine the case and yet he does so,
he acts without jurisdiction; where, "being clothed with power to
determine the case, oversteps his authority as determined by law, he is
performing a function in excess of jurisdiction."20
Page 16 of 82
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals passed upon errors of

judgment, not errors of jurisdiction, since it delved into the propriety of
the denial of the subpoena duces tecum and subpoena ad
testificandum. The argument must fail.
While trial courts have the discretion to admit or exclude evidence, such
power is exercised only when the evidence has been formally
offered.21 For a long time, the Court has recognized that during the early
stages of the development of proof, it is impossible for a trial court judge
to know with certainty whether evidence is relevant or not, and thus the
practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality
should be avoided.22As well elucidated in the case of Prats & Co. v.
Phoenix Insurance Co.:23
Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat of the battle over
which he presides a judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in
judging of the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical connection is in
fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is erroneously
ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself
embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of the error
without returning the case for a new trial, a step which this court is
always very loath to take. On the other hand, the admission of proof in a
court of first instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality, or
relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much harm to either litigant,
because the trial judge is supposed to know the law; and it is its duty,
upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and
material from the irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is followed
and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this
court then has all the material before it necessary to make a correct
judgment.
In the instant case, the insurance application and the insurance policy
were yet to be presented in court, much less formally offered before it. In
fact, private respondent was merely asking for the issuance of subpoena
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
duces tecum and subpoena ad testificandum when the trial court issued
the assailed Order. Even assuming that the documents would eventually
be declared inadmissible, the trial court was not then in a position to
make a declaration to that effect at that point. Thus, it barred the
production of the subject documents prior to the assessment of its
probable worth. As observed by petitioners, the assailed Order was not a
mere ruling on the admissibility of evidence; it was, more importantly, a
ruling affecting the proper conduct of trial.24
Excess of jurisdiction refers to any act which although falling within the
general powers of the judge is not authorized and is consequently void
with respect to the particular case because the conditions under which
he was only authorized to exercise his general power in that case did not
exist and therefore, the judicial power was not legally exercised.25 Thus,
in declaring that the documents are irrelevant and inadmissible even
before they were formally offered, much less presented before it, the
trial court acted in excess of its discretion.
Anent the issue of whether the information contained in the documents
is privileged in nature, the same was clarified and settled by the
Insurance Commissioners opinion that the circular on which the trial
court based its ruling was not designed to obstruct lawful court
orders.26 Hence, there is no more impediment to presenting the
insurance application and policy.
Petitioner additionally claims that by virtue of private respondents
tender of excluded evidence, she has rendered moot her petition before
the Court of Appeals since the move evinced that she had another speedy
and adequate remedy under the law. The Court holds otherwise.
Section 40, Rule 132 provides:
Sec.40. Tender of excluded evidence.If documents or things offered in
evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may have the same
Page 17 of 82
attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral,

the offeror may state for the record the name and other personal
circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed
testimony.
It is thus apparent that before tender of excluded evidence is made, the
evidence must have been formally offered before the court. And before
formal offer of evidence is made, the evidence must have been identified
and presented before the court. While private respondent made a
"Tender of Excluded Evidence," such is not the tender contemplated by
the above-quoted rule, for obviously, the insurance policy and
application were not formally offered much less presented before the
trial court. At most, said "Tender of Excluded Evidence" was a
manifestation of an undisputed fact that the subject documents were
declared inadmissible by the trial court even before these were
presented during trial. It was not the kind of plain, speedy and adequate
remedy which private respondent could have resorted to instead of the
petition for certiorari she filed before the Court of Appeals. It did not in
any way render the said petition moot.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
The Decision dated 30 April 2002 and Resolutiondated 27 June 2002 are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
Associate Justice
Page 18 of 82
Chief Justice
Chairman
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Footnotes
Associate Justice Associate Justice
1Rollo,
pp. 36-45.
(On Leave)
2Id
at 48-50.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
3Id.
at 108-111.
4CA
Rollo, p. 47.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been in
5Rollo,
p. 171.
6Order
dated 10 May 2001, id. 108-111.
7Rollo,
p. 109.
REYNATO S. PUNO
8Art.
280. When the father or the mother makes the recognition

separately, he or she shall not reveal the name or the person
with whom he or she had the child; neither shall he or she state
any circumstance whereby the other person may be identified.
Associate Justice
Chairman, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
9Act
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
No. 3753, Section 5, fourth paragraph reads:
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be

signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only
the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be
permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the
father who refuses to acknowledge the child or to give therein
any information by which such father could be identified.
Law 126 Evidence

10Rollo,
Prof. Avena
p. 109.
11Id.
at 128.
12Id.
at 62-75.
24Rollo,
at 36.
14Id.
at 43 citing Rules 34- to 36 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
15CA
Rollo, p. 58.
16Rollo,
p. 45.
17Id.
at 30.
18Id.
at 262-264.
19Sec.
1, Rule 65, Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.
20Punzalan
v. Dela Pea, G.R. No. 158543, 21 July 2004, 434 SCRA
601, 609.
21Sec.
34, Rule 132, Revised Rules on Evidence:
Sec. 34. Offer of evidence.- The court shall consider no evidence

which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified.
22People
v. Yatco, et al. ,97 Phil. 940, 946 (1955) citing Prats &
Co. v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 52 Phil. 807 (1929).
2352
Phil. 807, 816-817 (1929).
p. 316.
25Broom
v. Douglas, 175 Ala. 268, 57 S 860; Tengco v. Jocson, 43

Phil 716 (1922).
26CA
13Id.
Page 19 of 82
Rollo, p. 58.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 152866
October 6, 2010
THE HEIRS OF ROMANA SAVES, namely: FIDELA ALMAIDA,

EMILIANO ALMAIDA, JESUS ALMAIDA, CATALINA ALMAIDA,
ALFREDO RAMOS, GINA RAMOS, LUZ ALMAIDA, ANITA ALMAIDA,
PETRA GENERAL, EDNA GENERAL, ESTHER ALMAIDA, DIONISIA
ALMAIDA, CORNELIA ALMAIDA, FELIMON ALMAIDA (represented
by SINFROSA ALMAIDA); The Heirs of RAFAELA SAVES, namely:
JULIANA DIZON, HILARIA DIZON, JOVENCIO DIZON, MAURA DIZON,
BABY DIZON & ULDARICO AMISTOSO (represented by ULDARICO
AMISTOSO); The Heirs of JANUARIA SAVES, namely: FELICIDAD
MARTINEZ, MARLOU MARTINEZ, ROWENA MARTINEZ, BABY LOU
MARTINEZ, BOBERT MARTINEZ, JERRY MARTINEZ (represented by
FELICIDAD MARTINEZ); The Heirs of MAXIMO SAVES, namely:
ELPIDIO AMIGO, CELESTINA DEMETRIA AMIGO, MEREN (daughter
of SEVERA SAVES), FRUTO ROSARIO (represented by ELPIDIO
AMIGO); The Heirs of BENEDICTA SAVES, namely: AUTEMIA JUCOM,
CATALINA JUCOM, DOLORES JUCOM, SERGIA JUCOM, BENEDICTA
JUCOM, JOSEFINA JUCOM, FLORDIVIDA REMETILLO, FELINA
REMETILLO and ANNA MARIE REMETILLO, (represented by
AUTEMIA JUCOM), Petitioners,
vs.
THE HEIRS OF ESCOLASTICO SAVES, namely: REMEDIOS SAVESADAMOS, LUZ SAVES-HERNANDEZ and DODONG SAVES, and
ENRIQUETA CHAVES-ABELLA, Respondents.
DECISION
Page 20 of 82
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court from the Decision1 promulgated on June 28, 2001 by the Court of
Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 51058, entitled "The Heirs of Romana Saves, et
al. v. The Heirs of Escolastico Saves, et al.," reversing the Decision2 dated
May 23, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City,
Branch 39 in Civil Case No. 7678, in favor of the petitioners.
The facts of this case as narrated in the assailed Court of Appeals
Decision are as follows:
Sometime on January 1921, several persons filed their respective claims
before the then, Court of First Instance of the province of Oriental
Negros for the titling of the respective lots they occupy, among them
were Severo Chaves and Benedicta Chaves, who filed their claim for Lot
No. 382, to be titled in their names, together with Escolastico Saves,
Maximo Saves, Romana Saves, Rafaela Saves, and Januaria Saves, in
Cadastral Case No. 15.
On April 22, 1921, a Decision was rendered by the court, adjudicating
several parcels of land to different claimants, among the lots adjudicated,
were as follows:
1. Lote No. 382 Se adjudica pro indiviso y en partes iguales a los
hermanos Benedicta Saves, Escolastico Saves, Romana Saves,
finado Rafaela Saves, Januaria Saves y Maximo Saves finado en la
proindiviso de una sixta parte cada uno. La parte que
corresponde a los difuntos Romana Saves y Maximo Saves
perteneceran a sus hijos respectivos;
2. Lote No. 383 Se adjudica con las mejores existentes en el a la
acciedad conyugal formada por Escolastico Saves y Gaudencia
Valencia;
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
3. Lote No. 386 Se adjudica con las mejoras ixistentes en el a la

acciedad conyugal formada por Escolastico Saves y Gaudencia
Valencia;
Also on April 22, 1921, Decree No. 177831 was issued by the United
States of America for the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Negros ordering the registration of Lot No. 382 in the names of
Benedicta Saves, Escolastica Saves, the sons of Romana Saves, deceased,
Rafaela Saves, Januaria Saves, and the sons of Maximo Saves, deceased.
Thereafter, Severo Saves died intestate, leaving his wife, Teresa Ramirez,
his four (4) surviving children, and the heirs of his two children who
predeceased him.
On June 21, 1941, Adelaida S. Martinez and Felicidad S. Martinez, who
were the heirs of Januaria Saves, who predeceased them, sold their 1/6
share in Lot No. 382 to a certain Gaudencia Valencia evidenced by a
public instrument, with Doc. No. 1029, Page 46, Book IV, Series of 1941,
of the notarial register, per allegation in a Motion for the Issuance of
Transfer Certificate of Title, filed by Gaudencia Valencia.
On June 30, 1941, a Deed of Sale was executed by the heirs of Romana
Saves, namely: Sinforosa Alimayda, Juan Alimayda, Vicente Alimayda,
Felimon Alimayda and Porferia Alimayda; the sole heir of Rafaela Saves,
Pablo Saves Dizon; and the sole heir of Escolastico Saves, Teodoro Saves,
their respective 1/6 share in Lot No. 382, or 3/6 of the property, to
Gaudencia Valencia.
On June 6, 1947, Benedicta Saves and Marcela Saves, the sole heir of
Maximo Saves, sold their respective 1/6 share in Lot No. 382, also to
Gaudencia Valencia, or 2/6 of the property, as embodied in a Deed of
Absolute Sale.
Page 21 of 82
Considering that all the 1/6 share, rights, and participation of each coowner in Lot No. 382 were already sold to Gaudencia Valencia, she
initiated the titling of the said property under her name in a Motion for
Issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title before the Court of First Instance
of Negros Oriental. Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 148
was issued by the Register of Deeds for Negros Oriental in the name of
Gaudencia Valencia.
Sometime in 1961, Gaudencia Valencia sold the entire property to
Enriqueta Chavez Abella, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 110 was
issued in the name of Enriqueta Chavez, who was married to Charles
Abella.1avvphi1
In 1979, Meleriana Saves, who was then residing in Cebu, wrote her
relatives in Negros Oriental, the herein appellees, asking them to verify
from the Register of Deeds information pertaining to Lot 382, as they
were among the heirs entitled to said property.
On March 17, 1981, a case for Reconveyance, Partition, and Damages
was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental by plaintiffsappellees, alleging, inter alia, that Lot No. 382 was fraudulently acquired
by Gaudencia Valencia, and that Gaudencia Valencia fictitiously sold the
lot to her grandchild Enriqueta Chaves Abella.
The complaint was amended twice by plaintiffs considering that the
original plaintiffs and defendants were all deceased.
The parties failed to arrive to an amicable settlement during the pre-trial
stage, but have agreed to exclude Lot 386 in the litigation and limited the
issues as to the ownership of lots 382 and 383, thus, trial
ensued.3 (Citations omitted.)
The trial court rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioners, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is

rendered
Page 22 of 82
Respondents appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals which

reversed and set aside the same in the herein assailed Court of Appeals
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
1. Dismissing defendants counterclaim;

2. Declaring the Deed of Sale and Deed of Absolute Sale null and
void ab initio; and being derived from a polluted source,
whatever documents Gaudencia Valencia executed in favor of
defendant Enriquita Chavez Abella in relation to Lot No. 382,
Dumaguete Cadastre and the issuance of TCT No. 110 covering
said lot, suffers the same legal infirmity that of a total nullity;
3. Ordering defendant Enriquita Chavez Abella to convey and
deliver unto the plaintiffs their shares of Lot No. 382, Dumaguete
Cadastre in the proportion of their respective rights and
interests thereto which they are entitled to participate and
succeed from the shares of their predecessors-in-interest who
are the original registered owners of the aforesaid lot; and after
which, the parties are ordered to effect physical division and
partition of the lot in question to avoid further animosity
between and among themselves;
4. Ordering defendant Enriquita Chavez Abella to pay
plaintiffs P6,000.00 as litigation expenses andP2,500.00 as
plaintiffs counsel court appearances as well as moral damages in
the sum of P120,000.00;
5. Dismissing plaintiffs claim of Lot No. 383, Dumaguete
Cadastre, for lack of merit, the same is originally titled in the
name of Escolastico Saves, married to Gaudencia Valencia; and
6. Defendant Enriquita Chavez Abella is ordered to pay the
costs.4 (Citations omitted.)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated, May 23, 1995

rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 39, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered, declaring
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 110 in the name of Enriqueta Chaves
Abella as valid and subsisting, and the complaint filed by the plaintiffs is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.5
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied by the
Court of Appeals in a Resolution6promulgated on March 7, 2002, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.7
Unperturbed by the adverse Court of Appeals Decision, petitioners come
before this Court and raise the following issues:
(a) Can the Court of Appeals, in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, consider as evidence exhibits not formally offered as
such by the defendants (now respondents) in the trial court?
(b) Are exhibits (Exhibits "7", "8" and "13") not formally offered
as evidence by the defendants in the trial court subject to judicial
notice by the Court of Appeals for the purpose of utilizing the
same as basis for the reversal of the trial courts decision?
(c) Is it legally correct to consider a rule of evidence simply as a
rule of procedure? x x x.8
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
Petitioners also put into issue the failure of the Court of Appeals to
consider respondent Enriquita Chaves-Abella (hereinafter "Abella") a
purchaser and registrant in bad faith9 and the reasonableness of its
declaration that, even if petitioners are indeed co-owners of Lot No. 382,
they are already barred due to the equitable principle of estoppel by
laches in asserting their rights over the same.10
Page 23 of 82
and considered by the trial court provided the following requirements

are present,viz: first, the same must have been duly identified by
testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have been
incorporated in the records of the case.16
In the case at bar, the records would show that the above requisites have
been satisfactorily complied with respect to Exhibit "7."
We find the instant petition to be without merit.

The first three issues propounded by petitioners can be summed up into
the question of whether or not the Court of Appeals can consider
evidence not formally offered in the trial court as basis for the herein
assailed Court of Appeals ruling.
Petitioners draw attention to the fact that respondents did not formally
offer Exhibits "7," "8" and "13" at the trial court proceedings. In
accordance with Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court,11 the
trial court did not consider them as evidence. Despite this, the Court of
Appeals allegedly utilized the same as basis for reversing and setting
aside the trial courts decision.
It is a basic procedural rule that the court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence
is offered must be specified.12 A formal offer is necessary because judges
are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only and
strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function
is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which
the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows
opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility.
Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required
to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court.13
However, in People v. Napat-a,14 citing People v. Mate,15 we relaxed the
foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted
With regard to Exhibit "7," which is a document entitled "Motion for the
Issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title" filed by Gaudencia Valencia
(hereinafter "Valencia") in the same trial court that led to the issuance of
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 148, the records would show that
it is the same document that petitioners witness Fruto Rosario
identified in his March 5, 1984 testimony and marked as petitionerplaintiffs Exhibit "I." He testified as follows:
Empleo Here is another document, Mr. Rosario, which appears to be a
motion for issuance of transfer certificate of title, dated March 9, 1948, in
3 pages. Will you please go over this certified true copy of the motion in
Cad. Case No. 1, GLRO Rec. No. 140, Lot 382, and find out if these are
among the documents which you have obtained in connection with your
verification?
A Yes, this is the one, these are among the documents.
Empleo We request that this certified true copy of the motion for
issuance of transfer certificate of title in Cad. Case No. 1, GLRO Rec. No.
140, Lot 382, be marked as Exhibit "I" for page one; "I-1" for page two
and "I-2" for page 3.
Appearing on Exh. I is a third paragraph, which states, "that Maximo
Saves, owner of 1/6 of Lot 382 is now dead, upon his death Marcela
Saves is the only heiress and successor of his rights and interest in and
over 1/6 portion of said lot." Do you understand that?
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
A Yes, Sir.
Page 24 of 82
Court That is why the motion and which resulted to a certificate of title
had only claim Marcela as a surviving heir of Maximo?
Q Is it true that Maximo Saves left only one heir named Marcela Saves?
A That is not so, Sir, because what about us the children of Severa?
A No, Sir, it is not true.
Court ORDER
Q Why is it not true?
A Because Maximo had two children, Sir.
The hour of noon having come, continuance of the direct examination of

fifth plaintiffs witness Fruto Rosario, as already scheduled, will be done
tomorrow at 10:30 a.m.17
Empleo We request that paragraph 3 be marked as Exhibit "I-3".

Court (to witness): Who died ahead Severa or Maximo?
A Maximo, Sir.
Court Who died ahead Marcela or Severa?
A Severa.
Court Did Severa die before 1948?
A No, Sir, because she died before the war; she died in 1940.
Court So, when this motion for issuance of certificate of title was filed on
March 10, 1948, Severa had already died?
A Yes, Sir.
Court And when this motion was filed on March 10, 1948, Marcela was
still alive?
A Yes.
Verily, Exhibit "7" was incorporated and made part of the records of this
case as a common exhibit of the parties.18That only plaintiffs were able
to formally offer the said motion as Exhibit "I" most certainly does not
mean that it can only be considered by the courts for the evidentiary
purpose offered by plaintiffs. It is well within the discretion of the courts
to determine whether an exhibit indeed serves the probative purpose
for which it is offered.
Likewise, Exhibit "13," which is TCT No. 11019 or the Torrens title that
was issued to respondent Abella after she bought Lot No. 382 from
Valencia, complies with the requirements enunciated in Napat-a and
Mate.
The records of the case bear out that Exhibit "13" was identified by
respondent Abella during the continuation of her direct examination on
March 15, 1988. This much was noted even by the trial court in its
Decision dated May 23, 1995, to wit:
During the continuation of the direct examination, witness Enriquita
Chavez Abella testified and identified the TCT No. 110 of Lot No. 382
registered in the name of Enriquita Chavez which priorly reserved and
now marked Exh. "13." x x x.20 (Emphasis supplied.)
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
Moreover, it cannot be denied that Exhibit "13" was included in the

records that was elevated to the Court of Appeals.21 In fact, the Court of
Appeals correctly noted Abellas testimony regarding this document in
resolving petitioners motion for reconsideration.22
It is likewise worth emphasizing that under the Revised Rules on
Evidence, an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course
of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof such
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it is made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.23
The existence of Exhibit "13" was not only known to petitioners but it
was expressly alleged in their Appellees Brief24 filed with the Court of
Appeals and their Petition for Review25 filed with this Court that Lot No.
382 is registered in the name of respondent Abella.
Indeed, petitioners did not merely acknowledge the existence of TCT No.
110 (respondents Exhibit "13"), but in fact relied upon it in order to put
forward their main theory that the sale from Valencia to respondent
Abella is fictitious or void because, according to petitioners, it appears
from the said title that respondent Abella was supposedly only nine
years old at the time of the transaction. Verily, it is inconsistent for
petitioners to claim that Exhibit "13" proves its theory and in the same
breath assail it as inadmissible.
Lastly, petitioners present objection to Exhibit "8" hardly deserves any
credit. Exhibit "8" is a rather innocuous document which has no bearing
on any of the significant issues in this case. Its existence was only
referred to in the second paragraph of page 7 of the RTC Decision
wherein it is identified as an "Order of the Hon. Court dated May 11,
1948."26 Though it never formed part of the records of this case upon
appeal, a careful perusal of the assailed Court of Appeals Decision would
reveal that Exhibit "8" was not in any way used or referred to by the
Court of Appeals in arriving at the aforementioned ruling.
Page 25 of 82
Anent the issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in failing to
consider that respondent Abella is a purchaser in bad faith, petitioner
insists that "for failing to exercise prudent (sic) and caution in buying
the property in question,"27 respondent Abella is a buyer in bad faith.
She did not investigate closely the basis of the ownership of Gaudencia
Valencia, her grandmother, over Lot No. 382 which a buyer in good faith
should have done under the circumstances. She did not even bother to
know the persons from whom her grandmother acquired the parcel in
question. 28
Respondents argue that the issue of good faith or bad faith of Enriquita
Chaves-Abella was not raised in the Complaint filed by petitioners in the
RTC. Petitioners original theory of the case is that the sale by Gaudencia
Valencia to Enriquita Chaves-Abella was fictitious because the latter was
only nine years old at the time of the sale. However, during trial, it was
clearly established by common evidence that Enriquita was already
married to Charles Abella when she bought the lot in 1961, and, as a
matter of fact, the purchase money was provided by her husband,
Charles. Confronted with the above situation which completely
destroyed their theory of the case, petitioners switched from their
"fictitious sale to a 9-year old" theory to an entirely different theory, to
wit: that Enriquita Chaves-Abella is a purchaser in bad faith.29
Despite this, the RTC declared that respondent Abella is a purchaser in
bad faith because "[s]he did not investigated (sic) closely the basis of the
ownership of Gaudencia Valencia over Lot No. 382 which a buyer in good
faith should have done under the circumstances."30
The Court of Appeals reversed the above finding and ruled that
respondent Abella is an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith
because the "[r]ecords reveal that appellant derived her title of Lot No.
382 from the title of Gaudencia Valencia, who sold the entire property to
the former. Appellant relied on the face of Transfer Certificate of Title
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
No. 148 in the name of Gaudencia Valencia, which was free from any
encumbrances or annotation."31
Page 26 of 82
property not until co-petitioner Meleriana Saves wrote her relatives, copetitioners in this case, about the possibility of having a claim to the
property. 35
We agree with the Court of Appeals ruling in this regard.

It is a well-settled doctrine that one who deals with property registered
under the Torrens system need not go beyond the same, but only has to
rely on the certificates of title. He is charged with notice only of such
burdens and claims as are annotated on the certificates.32
In the case at bar, TCT No. 110, which represented proof of respondent
Abellas ownership of Lot No. 382, did not contain any encumbrance or
annotation that was transferred from its title of origin - TCT No. 148. It
must be recalled that the plaintiffs called Abella as one of their witnesses
during the trial of this case. It is Abellas unrebutted testimony, elicited
as a hostile witness for the plaintiffs, that her predecessor-in-interests
(Valencias) title was clean when she (Abella) purchased the
property.33 To be sure, the burden to prove that Abella had notice of any
defect in the title of her predecessor lies with the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs
failed to substantiate their contention. On the contrary, their own
evidence tended to prove that Abella was a purchaser in good faith of the
property.
Likewise, there is no cogent reason or legal compulsion for respondent
Abella to inquire beyond Valencias title over the property at issue since
the latter had been in possession of Lot No. 382 prior to the sale. Settled
is the rule that a buyer of real property in possession of persons other
than the seller must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in
possession, for without such inquiry the buyer can hardly be regarded as
a buyer in good faith and cannot have any right over the property.34 As
pointed out by the assailed Court of Appeals Decision, Valencia had been
occupying the property prior to its sale to respondent Abella. Herein
petitioners were never in possession of the property from the very start,
nor did they have any idea that they were entitled to the fruits of the
Neither does the plaintiffs insistence that Exhibits "G" and "H" (the
deeds of sale executed in favor of Valencia) were void support their
theory that Abella is a purchaser in bad faith. To begin with, we agree
with the Court of Appeals ruling that the purported irregularities in
Exhibits "G" and "H" relied upon by the trial court hardly suffice to deem
the said contracts as null and void. There is no need to repeat the Court
of Appeals comprehensive and apt discussions on this point here. What
must be highlighted, however, is the fact that Abella had no participation
in the execution of Exhibits "G" and "H" which were signed by the parties
thereto when she was very young. Like any stranger to the said
transactions, it was reasonable for Abella to assume that these public
documents were what they purport to be on their face in the absence of
any circumstance to lead her to believe otherwise.
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property without notice that
some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays its
fair price before he has notice of the adverse claims and interest of
another person in the same property.36 Clearly, the factual circumstances
surrounding respondent Abellas acquisition of Lot No. 382 makes her an
innocent purchaser for value or a purchaser in good faith.
Finally, on the issue of whether or not petitioners, in the remote
possibility that they are co-owners of Lot No. 382, are barred from
asserting their claims over the same because of estoppel by laches,
petitioners argue that they are not guilty of unreasonable and
unexplained delay in asserting their rights, considering that they filed
the action within a reasonable time after their discovery of the allegedly
fictitious deeds of sale, which evinced Lot No. 382s transfer of
ownership to Valencia, in 1980. They maintain that the delay in the
discovery of the simulated and fictitious deeds was due to the fact that
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
Page 27 of 82
Escolastico Saves with spouse Valencia committed the acts

surreptitiously by taking advantage of the lack of education of plaintiffs
ascendants.37
ownership over the same to respondent Abella, that petitioners decided

to assert their alleged rights over the property in a proper action in
court.
Respondents counter petitioners claims by underscoring the fact that,

since the 1940s when their predecessors-in-interest sold their shares in
and over Lot No. 382 up to the filing of this case in 1981, petitioners had
never taken possession of Lot No. 382 nor did they file any claim adverse
to the ownership of Gaudencia Valencia. Since the sale of Lot No. 382 by
Valencia to respondent Abella in 1961 up to 1981 when this case was
filed, petitioners had continued to sleep on their professed rights. As
found by the Court of Appeals, "[p]laintiffs were never in possession of
the property from the very start, nor did they have any inkling that they
were entitled to the fruits of the property, not until one of the plaintiffs
wrote her relatives about the possibility of being heirs to the
property."38
Petitioners contend that the delay is attributable to the surreptitious

manner by which Valencia acquired Lot No. 382 from their
predecessors-in-interest but, on this point, petitioners evidence gravely
lacks credibility and weight as shown by the records. Instead, the
evidence thus presented by both parties, as found by the Court of
Appeals, would lean towards the conclusion that petitioners inaction for
the past so many years belies any present conviction on their part that
they have any existing interest over the property at all. Thus, even if we
grant that petitioners are co-owners of the property at issue, it is only
fair and reasonable for this Court to apply the equitable principle of
estoppel by laches against them in order to avoid an injustice to
respondent Abella who is the innocent purchaser for value in this case.40
On this issue, we again hold in favor of respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals, dated June 28, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 51058, is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and

unexplained length of time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it.39 In the
case at bar, plaintiffs, assuming that they or their predecessors-ininterest had rights over the land in question, obviously neglected to
exercise these rights by failing to assert any adverse claim over the
property or demand any share of its fruits for many years. Not unlike
their predecessors, petitioners never interposed any challenge to
Valencias continued possession under title of ownership over Lot No.
382 ever since the entire property was sold to her in 1947 which led to
the issuance of TCT No. 148 in her name. Likewise, petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest did not mount any opposition to the sale of Lot
No. 382 by Valencia to respondent Abella in 1961 which prompted the
issuance of TCT No. 110. It was not only until 1981, or 34 years from
Valencias acquisition of the entire lot and 20 years from the transfer of
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES*
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
Id. at 42.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 93.
Page 28 of 82
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
10
Id. at 102.
Offer of Evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which

has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified.
11
12
Sec. 34, Rule 132, Revised Rules of Court.
Heirs of Pedro Pasag v. Parocha, G.R. No. 155483, April 27,

2007, 522 SCRA 410, 416.
13
Footnotes
*
14
G.R. No. 84951, November 14, 1989, 179 SCRA 403.
15
191 Phil. 72 (1981).
Per Raffle dated September 27, 2010.
Rollo, pp. 17-25; penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez,

Jr. with Associate Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a
member of this Court) and Bienvenido L. Reyes, concurring.
1
Mato Vda. de Oate v. Court of Appeals, 320 Phil. 344, 350

(1995).
16
Id. at 26-39.
17
TSN, May 28, 1985, pp. 17-20.
Id. at 19-21.
18
Id. at 38-39.
19
Id. at 210.
Id. at 25.
20
Id. at 275; see also TSN, March 15, 1988, pp. 16-17.
Id. at 40-42.
21
Records, p. 210.
Law 126 Evidence

22
Prof. Avena
Rollo, p. 42.
Capangpangan v. People, G.R. No. 150251, November 23, 2007,

538 SCRA 279, 289, citing Sec. 4, Rule 129, Revised Rules of
Court.
Page 29 of 82
Chua v. Soriano, G.R. No. 150066, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 68,
78.
36
23
24
37
Rollo, p. 102.
38
Id. at 81-82.
CA rollo, p. 69.
25
Rollo, p. 9.
26
Id. at 32.
27
Id. at 101.
Pilapil v. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones, G.R. No. 150175,

February 5, 2007, 514 SCRA 197, 218;Regalado v. Go, G.R. No.
167988, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 616, 635; Republic v.
Unimex Micro-Electronics GmBH, G.R. Nos. 166309-10, March 9,
2007, 518 SCRA 19, 28; Caezo v. Rojas, G.R. No. 148788,
November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 242, 259.
28
TSN, March 15, 1988, p. 10.
40
29
Rollo, p. 79-80.
30
Id. at 37.
31
Id. at 80.
39
Barstowe Philippines Corporation v. Republic, G.R. No. 133110,

March 28, 2007, 519 SCRA 148, 189;Republic v. Mendoza, Sr., G.R.
No. 153726, March 28, 2007, 519 SCRA 203, 231.
32
33
TSN, February 5, 1985, p. 12.
Tanglao v. Parungao, G.R. No. 166913, October 5, 2007, 535

SCRA 123, 132.
34
35
Rollo, p. 22.
Estate of the Late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, G.R. No. 168661,

October 26, 2007, 537 SCRA 513, 530.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
G.R. No. 184843
Page 30 of 82

SUPREME COURT
Manila
By Adelaidas claim, Dycoco was indebted to her in the amount

of P250,000.00, payable in six months, to bear monthly interest rate of
five percent (5%), to secure which Dycoco executed the REM.
THIRD DIVISION
For Dycocos alleged failure to pay his obligation, Adelaida

extrajudicially foreclosed the REM and as no redemption was made
within the reglementary period, Dycocos TCT was cancelled and, in its
stead, TCT No. 243525 was issued in her name.
July 30, 2010
VIRGILIO DYCOCO, herein represented by his Attorneys-in-fact

CRISTINO C. GRAFILO, JOSE C. GRAFILO and ADOLFO C. GRAFILO,
and CRISTINO C. GRAFILO, JOSE C. GRAFILO and ADOLFO C. GRAFILO
for and in their own behalf, Petitioners,
vs.
ADELAIDA ORINA joined by her husband GERMAN R. ORINA as
represented by her Attorney-in-fact EVELYN M. SAGALONGOS and
for in the latter's own behalf, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On petition for review on certiorari is the November 29, 2007 Decision
of the Court of Appeals1 affirming the dismissal of the action for
annulment of real estate mortgage and transfer certificate of title with
damages.
Virgilio Dycoco (Dycoco) is alleged to have executed on October 9, 1995
a "Real Estate Mortgage with Special Power to Sell Mortgaged Property
without Judicial Proceedings" (REM) in favor of respondent Adelaida
Orina (Adelaida), covering a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila
and registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 105730 in
Dycocos name. The REM was notarized on even date by Notary Public
Arwin Juco Sinaguinan.
Dycocos attorneys-in-fact-brothers-in-law Cristino, Jose and Adolfo, all

surnamed Grafilo, who occupy the property covered by the REM as
caretakers/tenants, did not turn-over its possession to Adelaida, hence,
she, joined by her husband represented by her attorney-in-fact Evelyn
Sagalongos (Evelyn), filed a complaint for ejectment against them before
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.
Upon receiving notice of the complaint, Dycoco, represented by his
attorneys-in-fact, filed a complaint for annulment of the REM and
transfer certificate of title with damages, docketed as Civil Case No.
01100522, against Adelaida and her husband German Orina represented
by Evelyn before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
Dycocos attorneys-in-fact claimed that Dycocos signature on the REM
was forged, to prove which they presented various documents that
Dycoco was working in the United States of America as a licensed
physician on the alleged date of execution of the REM. They also
presented Dycocos U.S. Passport, personal checks, Special Power of
Attorney and Affidavit; and a Certification from the Clerk of Court of RTC
Manila that the office does not possess a copy of the REM, Notary Public
Sinaguinan having not submitted her notarial report for October 1995.
Herein respondents Adelaida et al., maintaining the due execution of the
REM, presented Evelyn who testified on a photocopy of the REM.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
By Decision of May 23, 2005, Branch 15 of the Manila RTC dismissed

Dycocos complaint, holding that:
Plaintiff, [Dycoco], through the testimony of their (sic) lone witness as
well as their (sic) documentary exhibits tried to show that it was not . . .
Dycoco who mortgaged the said property. Cristino Grafilo even testified
that their brother Miguel, admitted to having stole (sic) the title and
have (sic) it mortgaged. Plaintiffs (sic), however, failed to establish that
the mortgagor, (sic) defendant Adelaida Orina, knew it was not Virgilio
Dycoco who mortgaged the same.2 (underscoring supplied)
By the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts
dismissal of Dycocos complaint, it holding that albeit Dycocos
questioned signature appearing on the REM and the documentary
evidence presented by his attorneys-in-fact bear "striking differences,"
since Dycoco was not presented on the witness stand to establish the
genuineness, due execution and contents of the documentary evidence,
no probative value can be ascribed thereto.
In not crediting evidentiary weight on Dycocos U.S. passport showing
that he was not in the Philippines when the REM was executed, the
appellate court held:
. . . [T]he existence, genuineness, due execution and contents of Exhibit
"I" have not been properly established. Again, the identification made by
plaintiff-appellant Cristino Grafilo (sic) will not suffice since he is not
privy to its issuance and execution. The plaintiff-appellants (sic) should
have presented a person competent to testify to establish the
genuineness and contents of Exhibit "I" like an officer from the Bureau of
Immigration. But the plaintiff-appellants (sic) failed to do so. Thus, this
court finds the stance of plaintiff-appellants (sic) that Virgilio Dycoco
was out of the country at the time of the execution of the questioned
deed unsupported.3
Page 31 of 82
The motion for reconsideration of Dycocos attorneys-in-fact having

been denied by Resolution of October 3, 2008, the present petition for
review was filed.
A perusal of the REM which is, as stated earlier, a merely photocopy,
shows the incompleteness of the acknowledgment portion. It reads:
Republic of the Philippines )
City of Manila ) S.S.
BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the City of Manila, this 9th day of
October 1995, personally came and appeared ____________________ (sic)
with Res. Cert. No. : 12262297 C issued on 27 July 95 at Manila and Tax
Account No.: 110-783-724 known to me and to me known to be the same
person who executed the foregoing instrument which he acknowledged
before me as his free and voluntary act and deed.4
As the above-quoted acknowledgment shows, the name of the person
who personally appeared before the notary public is not stated.
Documents acknowledged before a notary public, except last wills and
testaments, are public documents.5 Since the subject REM was not
properly notarized, its public character does not hold.
Since the REM is not a public document, it is subject to the requirement
of proof for private documents under Section 20, Rule 132, which
provides:
Section 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document
offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or

handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is
claimed to be. (underscoring supplied)
It was thus incumbent upon Adelaida to prove that Dycocos signature is
genuine. As stated earlier, a mere photocopy of the REM was presented.
It is axiomatic that when the genuineness of signatures on a document is
sought to be proved or disproved through comparison of standard
signatures with the questioned signature, the original thereof must be
presented.6 Why respondents did not present the original, they did not
explain. Why they did not present Adelaida, who must have been present
at the execution of the REM as her purported signature appears thereon,
or the notary public, or any of the witnesses, neither did they explain.
Sec. 5 of Rule 130 which reads:
SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original
document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of the
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by
the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
Upon the other hand, Dycocos attorneys-in-fact presented his U.S.
passport documenting when he entered and exited from the Philippines,
as well as various documents showing his genuine signature. The
appellate court, although upholding the admissibility of Dycocos
documentary evidence, did not ascribe weight to it, however, upon the
justification that "[e]ven if . . . Cristino Grafilo was empowered to appear
for and on behalf of plaintiff-appellant Virgilio Dycoco in this case by
virtue of a Special Power of Attorney, the powers couched in said
document do not vest upon the former the power to testify on matters
[of] which he has no personal knowledge."7
Page 32 of 82
Contrary to the appellate courts stance, there was no necessity to

present Dycoco on the witness stand or to present the one who made the
entries on his U.S. passport. In respondents Comment/Opposition to
Dycocos formal offer of evidence, the passport was objected to as being
"immaterial, irrelevant and impertinent."8 Such comment is a virtual
admission of the authenticity of the entries in the passport.
But more important, one of the documents offered by Dycoco is a Special
Power of Attorney executed on June 2, 2000 in Illinois, U.S.A. showing his
signature, notarized and certified in accordance with Public Act No.
2103,9which effectively dispenses with the requirement of presenting
him on the witness stand.
Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and authenticated
in a foreign country shall be considered authentic if the acknowledgment
and authentication are made in accordance with the following
requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an
ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, charg
daffaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the United
States, acting within the country or place to which he is
accredited, or (2) a notary public or officer duly authorized by
law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or
documents in the place where the act is done.
(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the
person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to
him, and that he is the same person who executed it, and
acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The
certificate shall be under his official seal, if he is by law required
to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. In case the
acknowledgment is made before a notary public or an officer
mentioned in subdivision (2) of the preceding paragraph, the
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
certificate of the notary public or the officer taking the

acknowledgment shall be authenticated by an ambassador,
minister, secretary of legation, charg daffaires, consul,
vice-consul, or consular agent of the United States, acting
within the country or place to which he is accredited. The
officer making the authentication shall certify under his official
seal that the person who took the acknowledgment was at the
time duly authorized to act as notary public or that he was duly
exercising the functions of the office by virtue of which he
assumed to act, and that as such he had authority under the law
to take acknowledgment of instruments or documents in the
place where the acknowledgment was taken, and that his
signature and seal, if any, are genuine. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Evelyn insisted that Dycoco was present during the signing of the REM
on October 9, 1995:
ATTY. MERCADO:
Q: Madam Witness, when this document was prepared, were you
present?
WITNESS:
A: Yes sir.
Q: Are you a witness in the execution of this document?
A: Yes sir.
Q: On page 2 of this document, the (sic) appears a signature above the
type-written name Adelaida Orina, will you please inform the Honorable
Court whose signature is this?
Page 33 of 82
Q: Why do you know that it is the signature of Adelaida Orina?

A: Because she is included there.
Q: What do you mean by "kasama po siya"?
A: There were four of us at the office of the Notary Public.
Q: When you said four of you, whao (sic) are they?
A: Adelaida, Virgilio, two other witness (sic) and me.
Q: You are not four, you are five?
A: Yes sir.10 (underscoring supplied)
Evelyns testimony not only contradicts the entries in Dycocos U.S.
Passport, however, it appearing therein that Dycoco visited the
Philippines on April 2, 1990 and arrived in the United States on April 9
of the same year. Contrary to her claim, the REM does not reflect here as
one of the witnesses to its execution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated November 29, 2007 isREVERSED and SET
ASIDE.1avvphi1
Let a NEW judgment be entered declaring null and void the document
entitled "Real Estate Mortgage with Special Power to Sell Mortgaged
Property without Judicial Proceedings" purportedly signed by Virgilio
Dycoco in favor of Adelaida Orina.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Register of Deeds of Manila
for proper disposition.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
SO ORDERED.
Page 34 of 82
Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes with the

concurrence of Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas-Peralta and
Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., rollo, pp. 57-69.
1
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Id. at 211.
Id. at 67-68.
Records, p. 25.
Section 19, Rule 132, Rules of Court.
WE CONCUR:
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD*
Associate Justice
Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117609,

December 29, 1998, 300 SCRA 565.
6
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation
Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
Designated as Additional Member, per Special Order No. 843
(May 17, 2010), in view of the vacancy occasioned by the
retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno.
*
Rollo, p. 67.
Records, p. 146.
Otherwise known as An Act Providing For The

Acknowledgment And Authentication Of Instruments And
Documents Without The Philippine Islands.
9
10
TSN, June 25, 2002, pp. 7-8.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 185454
Page 35 of 82
Despite demand, Jianshe failed to pay its obligations. RCBC thus filed a
Complaint5 for Specific Perfomance with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment against Jianshe as principal and respondents as sureties,
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City on December 27,
2005. The case was raffled to Branch 132 and docketed as Civil Case No.
05-1146.6
March 23, 2011
STAR TWO (SPV-AMC), INC., Petitioner,

vs.
HOWARD KO, MIN MIN SEE KO, JIMMY ONG, and GRACE NG
ONG, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision1 dated October 15, 2008 and Resolution2 dated November 13,
2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 101417.
The facts of the case, as found by the CA, are as follows:
Jianshe Motorcycle Industries Philippines Corporation (Jianshe)
obtained various credit facilities or loan accommodations from Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) from 2003-2004 to finance its
importation of motorcycles, motorcycle parts, motorcycle accessories,
and other related goods. To secure the goods imported by Jianshe, RCBC
required it to execute trust receipts over these goods. Moreover, to
secure payment of all existing and future obligations of Jianshe to RCBC,
respondents Howard Ko, Jimmy Ong, Min Min See Ko, and Grace Ng Ong
executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement3 dated September 3, 2002,
with a limited liability of P50 M.4
In an Order7 dated January 11, 2006, the RTC directed the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment against all the properties of Jianshe and
respondents as may be sufficient to satisfy RCBCs principal claim
ofP25,636,339.40 conditioned upon the filing of the required bond. The
corresponding writ of preliminary attachment was thereafter issued.
On February 6, 2006, Howard Ko and Min Min See Ko filed a Motion to
Discharge Preliminary Attachment8 for having been improperly or
irregularly issued. RCBC, however, opposed the motion.9 On March 17,
2006, Howard Ko filed a Motion to Dismiss10 on the ground that RCBCs
claim had already been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise
extinguished. Min Min See Ko adopted Howard Kos motion.
On June 15, 2006, the RTC ordered the immediate discharge of the
attachment issued against Howard Ko and Min Min See Ko, but denied
Howard Kos Motion to Dismiss.11
Unsatisfied, Howard Ko and RCBC filed their respective Motions for
Reconsideration. Howard Ko likewise filed a Motion to Set Case for
Hearing for Reception of Evidence.12
In an Order13 dated December 13, 2006, the RTC granted Howard Kos
motion and accordingly dismissed the case against respondents, leaving
Jianshe as the only defendant. In dismissing the case, the trial court
stated that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Howard Ko paid
an amount more than the limit provided under the Comprehensive
Surety Agreement.14
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the case against respondents, RCBC filed a

Motion for Partial Reconsideration.15 It likewise filed a
Manifestation/Substitution of Parties,16 considering that it had sold,
transferred, and assigned all its rights and interests in the present case
to petitioner Star Two (SPV-AMC), Inc.
On August 31, 2007, the RTC denied RCBCs motion for reconsideration,
but granted the inclusion of petitioner as plaintiff in substitution of
RCBC.17
Petitioner thus elevated the matter to the CA through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.18 On October 15, 2008, the
CA rendered the assailed Decision19 denying petitioners petition. The CA
also denied its motion for reconsideration on November 13, 2008.
Hence, this petition raising the following errors:
THE HONORABLE COURT [OF] APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE PETITION AND AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT, CONSIDERING THAT:
1) THE TRIAL COURT ARBITRARILY AND WHIMSICALLY
CONSIDERED AND RELIED ON DOCUMENTS WHICH WERE NOT
DULY IDENTIFIED BY TESTIMONY OR OFFERED IN EVIDENCE;
2) IT HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED THAT RESPONDENT
HOWARD KO, AS SURETY OF JIANSHE, HAS PAID AMOUNTS
OVER THE P50 MILLION CAP UNDER THE COMPREHENSIVE
SURETY AGREEMENT; AND
3) SUPPOSED PAYMENTS OF HOWARD KO, AS STATED IN THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT, ONLY AMOUNT
TO P46,539,134.42, WHICH IS STILL BELOW THE P50 MILLION
CAP UNDER THE COMPREHENSIVE SURETY AGREEMENT.20
Page 36 of 82
The petition is without merit.

At the outset, we settle the procedural question raised by petitioner on
the admissibility of the documentary evidence presented by respondents
in support of the dismissal of the case against them. It is petitioners
postulation that the trial court should not have relied on the documents
presented by respondents as they were not formally offered in evidence.
We do not agree.
Indeed, courts cannot consider evidence which has not been formally
offered because parties are required to inform the courts of the purpose
of introducing their respective exhibits to assist the latter in ruling on
their admissibility in case an objection thereto is made. Without a formal
offer of evidence, courts are constrained to take no notice of the
evidence even if it has been marked and identified.21
This rule, however, admits of an exception, provided that the evidence
has been identified by testimony duly recorded and that it has been
incorporated in the records of the case.22
In this case, the subject pieces of evidence were presented in support of
respondents motion for reconsideration of the denial of their motion to
dismiss. A hearing was set for the reception of their evidence, but
petitioner failed to attend the same. The pieces of evidence were thus
identified, marked in evidence, and incorporated in the records of the
case. Clearly, the trial court correctly admitted and considered the
evidence of respondents warranting the dismissal of their case.
Now on the substantive aspect.
Respondents acted as sureties under the Comprehensive Surety
Agreement to secure the obligations of Jianshe to RCBC. A contract of
suretyship is an agreement whereby a party, called the surety,
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
guarantees the performance by another party, called the principal or

obligor, of an obligation or undertaking in favor of another party, called
the obligee.23 The surety agreement is an accessory contract; and the
surety becomes directly, primarily, and equally bound with the principal
as the original promissor although the former possesses no direct or
personal interest over the latters obligations and does not receive any
benefit therefrom.24
Pursuant to Article 2054 of the Civil Code that "a guarantor [or surety]
may bind himself for less, but not for more than the principal debtor,
both as regards the amount and the onerous nature of the conditions,"
respondents limited their liability to P50 M, which is less than Jianshes
liability to RCBC. Howard Ko complied with his obligations and made
payments to RCBC through the following modes:
First mode of payment: certificates of time deposit of Howard Ko and
Howard Ko and/or Harry Ko which were admitted by RCBC as applied
for the payment of Jianshes obligation.
Second mode of payment: official receipts and trust receipt debit advices
which were debited from Howard Kos current account (1-155-13110-1)
and savings account (1-155-30805-9) and applied as payment to
Jianshes obligation.
Third mode of payment: certificates of time deposit of Howard Ko which
were withdrawn upon maturity and deposited to Jianshes RCBC Savings
Account No. 1-166-30810-6. Thereafter, the said amounts were debited
by RCBC as payment to several trust receipts issued to [Jianshe].
Fourth mode of payment: certificates of time deposit of Harry Ko and Liu
Guo Xuan which were admitted as payment by RCBC. The proceeds of
these CTDs were borrowed by Howard Ko from Harry Ko and Liu Guo
Xuan to be applied as payment for Jianshes obligations.25
Page 37 of 82
These modes of payment were adequately explained by respondents and

supported by documentary evidence. We quote with approval the CAs
observations in this wise:
The evidence in favor of the [respondents] consisted of no less than
RCBC documents showing that said bank debited from their various
accounts the amounts which Jianshe owed RCBC under the trust
receipts. In the subject petition, the petitioner has not claimed that these
evidence were fabricated. It cannot say that, if present at the hearing or,
if there would be another hearing, it could prove that the RCBC
documents were false.1awphi1 It cannot because those were genuine
RCBC documents.
All it can say is that these were payments for "a different credit line" or
different "trust receipts" secured by the Comprehensive Surety
Agreement which remains unpaid.
Petitioner, however, could not even allege the specific "different credit
line" or other trust receipt. In the absence thereof, it could only mean
that the payments were for the Jianshe accounts.
Granting arguendo that the receipts and trust debit advices were for "a
different credit line" or different "trust receipts," it is immaterial as the
[respondents], as sureties, have already exceeded their liability cap
of P50 M.
Petitioner further argues that [respondent] Howard Kos claim of
overpayment is incredible because he would not have paid the alleged
amount of P89,656,002.67 as surety when his liability as such was
only P50 M. In this regard, suffice it to state that not all payments were
direct as some were debited by RCBC from the accounts of [Howard Ko].
So, he would not have known of the amounts he had paid in favor of
Jianshe at the time they were debited by RCBC.26
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
The Court notes that the pieces of evidence presented by respondents

were documents, such as official receipts, trust debit advices, and
passbooks, issued by no less than petitioner itself. Payments were made
by respondents through the active participation of RCBC, primarily by
debiting the subject amounts from respondents accounts with the bank.
Admittedly, it was Jianshe, as the principal, which owed RCBC. Nowhere
in petitioners pleadings was it claimed that respondents also owed the
bank aside from their obligation as surety to secure the principal
obligation of Jianshe. Undoubtedly, the debited amounts from Howard
Kos accounts were made to satisfy his obligation as surety. Petitioner
cannot now claim that the payments were made by Jianshe as principal
and not by respondents as sureties simply because the receipts were
issued in the name of Jianshe. As aptly observed by the CA, the issuance
of the receipts in the name of Jianshe was done only to indicate that it
was the principal obligor. The issuance of the receipts does not erase the
fact that various amounts were debited from the accounts of Howard Ko,
and certificates of time deposit in the name of Howard Ko were applied
as payment for Jianshes obligations.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
SO ORDERED.
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN*
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
In view of the foregoing, the CA did not err in sustaining the dismissal of
the case against respondents as the claim or demand set forth in the
complaint has been paid or otherwise extinguished.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. The Court of Appeals Decision dated October 15, 2008 and
Resolution dated November 13, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 101417 are
AFFIRMED.
Page 38 of 82
Footnotes
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose Catral

Mendoza per Raffle dated September 15, 2010.
*
Penned by Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza (now a

member of this Court), with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes,
Jr. and Sesinando E. Villon, concurring; rollo, pp. 29-55.
16
Id. at 362-365.
17
Id. at 366.
18
Id. at 367-398.
19
Supra note 1.
20
Rollo, p. 10.
Page 39 of 82
Id. at 57.
Id. at 59-60.
Heirs of Roque F. Tabuena v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 180557, September 26, 2008, 566 SCRA 557, 564.
21
Id. at 29-30.
Id. at 63-76.
Id. at 29.
Id.; Ramos v. Dizon, G.R. No. 137247, August 7, 2006, 498 SCRA
17, 31; Mato v. CA, 320 Phil. 344, 350 (1995).
22
23
7
Id. at 369.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 103-112.
Intra-Strata Assurance Corporation v. Republic, G.R. No.

156571, July 9, 2008, 557 SCRA 363, 369.
Id. at 113-123.
25
Rollo, pp. 42-43.
26
Rollo, p. 50.
24
10
Id. at 137-145.
11
Id. at 211-215.
12
Id. at 248-257.
13
Id. at 279-280.
14
Id. at 31.
15
Id. at 281-301.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena

SUPREME COURT
Manila
Page 40 of 82
(b) the CA Resolution4 dated July 23, 2008, denying the

subsequent Motion for Reconsideration5 thereof.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 183860
January 15, 2014
RODOLFO LABORTE and PHILIPPINE TOURISM

AUTHORITY, Petitioners,
vs.
PAGSANJAN TOURISM CONSUMERS COOPERATIVE and LELIZA S.
FABRICIO, WILLIAM BASCO, FELICIANO BASCO, FREDIE BASCO,
ROGER MORAL NIDA ABARQUEZ, FLORANTE MUNAR, MARY JAVIER,
MARIANO PELAGIO ALEX EQUIZ, ALEX PELAGIO ARNOLD OBIEN,
EDELMIRO ABAQUIN, ARCEDO MUNAR, LIBRADO MALIWANAG,
OSCAR LIWAG, OSCAR ABARQUEZ, JOEL BALAGUER, LIZARDO
MUNAR, ARMANDO PANCHACOLA, MANUEL SAYCO, EDWIN
MATIBAG, ARNEL VILLAGRACIA, RODOLFO LERON, ALFONSO
ABANILLA, SONNY LAVA, AND DENNIS BASCO, Respondents.
DECISION
Petitioner Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) is a government-owned

and controlled corporation that administers tourism zones as mandated
by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 564 and later amended by P.D. No.
1400. PTA used to operate the Philippine Gorge Tourist Zone (PGTZ)
Administration Complex (PTA Complex), a declared tourist zone in
Pagsanjan, Laguna.
Respondent Pagsanjan Tourism Consumers Cooperative (PTCC) is a
cooperative organized since 1988 under Republic Act No. 6938, or the
"Cooperative Code of the Philippines." The other individual respondents
are PTCC employees, consisting of restaurant staff and boatmen at the
PTA Complex.
In 1989, in order to help the PTCC as a cooperative, the PTA allowed it to
operate a restaurant business located at the main building of the PTA
Complex and the boat ride services to ferry guests and tourists to and
from the Pagsanjan Falls, paying a certain percentage of its earnings to
the PTA.6
REYES, J.:
Certiorari1
This Petition for Review on

under Rule 45 of the 1997
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure seeks to nullify and set aside:
(a) the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated May 29, 2008,
affirming the Decision3 dated May 29, 2002 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 28, Santa Cruz, Laguna in Civil Case No. SC3150; and
In 1993, the PTA implemented a reorganization and reshuffling in its top

level management. Herein petitioner Rodolfo Laborte (Laborte) was
designated as Area Manager, CALABARZON area with direct supervision
over the PTA Complex and other entities at the Southern Luzon.
On October 22, 1993, Laborte served a written notice upon the
respondents to cease the operations of the latters restaurant business
and boat ride services in view of the rehabilitation, facelifting and
upgrading project of the PTA Complex. Consequently, on November 9,
1993, the PTCC filed with the RTC, Branch 28, Santa Cruz, Laguna a
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
Complaint for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages with Temporary

Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction7 against Laborte,
docketed as Civil Case No. 3150. The PTCC also sought from the court the
award of moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.
It also prayed for the issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction
to prohibit Laborte from causing the PTCC to cease the operations of the
restaurant and boat ride services and from evicting the PTCCs
restaurant from the main building of the PTA Complex.8
In an Order dated November 11, 1993, the trial court issued the TRO
prayed for, prohibiting Laborte from (a) causing the PTCC to cease
operations; (b) doing the threatened act of closing the operation of the
PTCCs restaurant and other activities; (c) evicting the PTCCs restaurant
from the main building of the PTA Complex; and (d) demolishing the said
building. In the same Order, the trial court set the hearing on the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction on November 25, 1993.9
Opposing the issuance of the TRO, Laborte averred that the PTCC does
not own the restaurant facility as it was only tolerated to operate the
same by the PTA as a matter of lending support and assistance to the
cooperative in its formative years. It has neither been granted any
franchise nor concession to operate the restaurant nor any exclusive
franchise to handle the boating operations in the complex. Since the
PTCC had no contract, concession, or exclusive franchise to operate the
restaurant business and the boating services in the PTA Complex, no
existing right has been allegedly violated by the petitioners. The
respondents, therefore, had no right for the injunctive relief prayed for.10
On December 7, 1993, the PTCC filed with the trial court a Petition for
Contempt with Motion for Early Resolution. It alleged that Laborte and
his lawyers defied the TRO and proceeded to close the restaurant on
December 2, 1993. The PTCC also alleged that Laborte prohibited its
own boatmen from ferrying tourists and allowed another association of
boatmen to operate.11
Page 41 of 82
On December 13, 1993, Laborte filed his Answer with CounterClaim.12 He denied the PTCCs allegations of harassment, threat and
retaliation. He claimed (a) that his actions were upon the mandate of his
superiors and the PTAs rehabilitation programs in the area;13 (b) that
the PTA only tolerated the PTCCs operations;14 and (c) that the issuance
of a permanent injunction will violate the PTAs constitutional freedom
to operate a legitimate business enterprise and the legal requirement of
a public bidding for the operation of revenue-generating projects of
government entities involving private third parties.15
On March 14, 1994, the individual respondents, Fabricio et al., who are
employees and boatmen of the PTCC, filed a Complaint-in-Intervention
against Laborte.16 They stated that they were rendered jobless and were
deprived of their livelihood because Laborte failed to heed the trial
courts TRO. Thus, they prayed that the trial court order Laborte to pay
their unearned salaries, among others.17 Laborte opposed but the trial
court in an Order dated March 25, 1994 admitted the Complaint-inIntervention, finding the same to be well-founded.18
On April 4, 1994, the PTCC filed an Amended Complaint to include
petitioner PTA as defendant and the additional prayer for payment of
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) a month, representing the PTCCs
unrealized profits from November 1993 up to the actual resumption of
its restaurant and boat ride businesses.19 In return, the PTA filed its
Answer with Counterclaim,20 alleging, among others, that (1) the PTCC
has no cause of action against it since the PTA owned the restaurant and
the boat ride facilities within the Complex and that it never formally
entered into a contract with the PTCC to operate the same; (2) the PTA
did not violate the trial courts TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
since the PTA was not yet impleaded as defendant at that time; (3) the
physical rehabilitation of the PTA Complex, including the restaurant and
boat facilities therein, was part of its new marketing strategy; and (4)
the action had become moot and academic in view of the actual closure
of the PTCCs restaurant and boat service businesses.21
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
On May 29, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision finding for the
respondents, the dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and intervenors and against the defendants by ordering the defendants
jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff and intervenors the following
sums:
Page 42 of 82
Dissatisfied, Laborte and the PTA appealed to the CA.23 On May 29, 2008,
the CA promulgated its Decision, affirming the RTC Decision24 dated May
29, 2002. The petitioners seasonably filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,25but the said motion was also denied for lack of
merit.26
Hence, the petitioners filed the present petition, raising the following:
I
FOR THE PLAINTIFF

1. The sum of P1,475,760 representing the income which the
plaintiff failed to receive from December 1993 up to the present,
computed at P16,417.00 per month;
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING

DUE COURSE [TO] THE PETITIONERS APPEAL AND IN NOT SETTING
ASIDE AND REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT.
II
2. The sum of P230,000.00 as costs of restaurants (sic) facilities

unlawfully confiscated by the defendant from the plaintiff when
the restaurant was closed; and
3. The sum of P25,000.00 as attorney's fees.
FOR THE INTERVENORS:
The total sum of P3,971,760.00 representing the monthly salaries of the
8 intervenors who are employees of the restaurant business and take
home pay of 20 boatmen-intervenors for a period of seven (7) years up
to the present; and
Attorneys fees in the amount of P992,940.00 or 25% of the total claim of
the intervenors.
SO ORDERED.22
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING

THAT THE CLOSURE OF PTCC'S RESTAURANT AND BOAT RIDE
BUSINESS WAS NOT A VALID AND LAWFUL EXERCISE OF PTA'S
MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
PETITIONER LABORTE LIABLE BOTH IN HIS PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL
CAPACITY NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE OF PECULIAR AND
UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD RENDER THE DECISION
UNJUST AND INEQUITABLE, IN THAT:
A) PETITIONER LABORTE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTING
RESIDENT MANAGER OF PGTZ, MERELY COMPLIED IN GOOD
FAITH, WITH THE VALID AND LAWFUL ORDERS OF THE TOP
MANAGEMENT OF PTA TO NOTIFY RESPONDENT PTCC TO
CEASE BUSINESS OPERATIONS AT THE COMPLEX IN VIEW OF
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
THE INTENDED RENOVATION AND REPAIR OF THE

RESTAURANT FACILITY AT THE COMPLEX.
B) THE FAILURE OF ATTY. HERNANDO CABRERA, FORMER
COUNSEL OF PETITIONERS TO FILE THEIR FORMAL OFFER OF
EVIDENCE AND TO MAKE A MANIFESTATION BEFORE THE
TRIAL COURT THAT THEY WERE ADOPTING IN THE TRIAL
PROPER THE EVIDENCE THEY PRESENTED DURING THE
HEARING ON THE APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION IN CIVIL CASE NO. SC-3150 IS SO GROSS,
PALPABLE AND INEXCUSABLE, THEREBY RESULTING IN THE
VIOLATION OF THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF [THE]
PETITIONERS.27
There is merit in the petition.
Anent the procedural issue raised, both the trial court and the CA faulted
the petitioners for their failure to formally offer their evidence inspite of
the ample opportunity granted to do so.28 Thus, such lapse allegedly
militated against the petitioners whose assertions were otherwise
supported by sufficient evidence on record.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides the
general rule, to wit:
Sec. 34. Offer of Evidence. The Court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is
offered must be specified.
From the above provision, it is clear that the court considers the
evidence only when it is formally offered. The offer of evidence is
necessary because it is the duty of the trial court to base its findings of
fact and its judgment only and strictly on the evidence offered by the
parties. A piece of document will remain a scrap of paper without
Page 43 of 82
probative value unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for
the purpose or purposes for which it is offered.29 The formal offer of
evidence allows the parties the chance to object to the presentation of an
evidence which may not be admissible for the purpose it is being
offered.30
However, there are instances when the Court relaxed the foregoing rule
and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted. Citing People
v. Napat-a31 and People. v. Mate,32 the Court in Heirs of Romana Saves, et
al., v. Heirs of Escolastico Saves, et al.,33 enumerated the requirements
for the evidence to be considered despite failure to formally offer it,
namely: "first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony
duly recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the
records of the case."34 In People v. Vivencio De Roxas et al.,35 the Court
also considered exhibits which were not formally offered by the
prosecution but were repeatedly referred to in the course of the trial by
the counsel of the accused.36
In the instant case, the Court finds that the above requisites are
attendant to warrant the relaxation of the rule and admit the evidence of
the petitioners not formally offered. As can be seen in the records of the
case, the petitioners were able to present evidence that have been duly
identified by testimony duly recorded. To identify is to prove the identity
of a person or a thing.37 Identification means proof of identity; the
proving that a person, subject or article before the court is the very same
that he or it is alleged, charged or reputed to be.38
In support of his position, Laborte in his testimony presented and
identified the following: (a) the letter informing the Chairman of PTCC
about the decision of PTA main office regarding the repair works to be
conducted;39 (b) Office Order No. 1018-93 from a person named Mr.
Anota, relative to the suspension of the boat ride services at the
Complex;40 (c) a copy of the memorandum from the Technical Evaluation
Committee (TEC), referring to the conduct of the repair works at the
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
Complex;41 (d) the letter to PTCC informing it of the repair at the

Complex;42 (e) the certificates of availability of funds for the guesthouse
of the PTC Complex and for the repainting, repair works at the Pagsanjan
Administration Complex respectively;43 (f) the program of works dated
July 22, 1993 for the renovation of the Pagsanjan Complex and of the
swimming pool at the guesthouse respectively;44 (g) the program of
works referring to the repainting and repair works at the Complex dated
August 6, 1993;45 (h) a set of plans and specification of the projects
conducted at the Complex, particularly for the repairs and repainting of
the guesthouse shower room, the repair of the Pagsanjan Administration
Complex;46 (i) the office order relative to the directive to Mr. Francisco
Abalos of the PTA main office to close the restaurant facilities;47 (j) a
memorandum from Mr. Oscar Anota, Deputy General Manager for
Operation of the PTA, dated December 8, 1993 addressed to the security
office of the Pagsanjan Administration Complex, instructing the same not
to allow the entry of anything without the clearance from the main office
in Manila into the Pagsanjan Complex;48 and (k) the office order signed
by Eduardo Joaquin, General Manager of the PTA, relative to the posting
of bond in favor of herein petitioner Laborte by the PTA main office in
the amount of P10,000.00 to be deposited with the RTC, Branch 28, Sta.
Cruz, Laguna.49
Undeniably, these pertinent evidence were also found in the records of
the RTC, i.e. : (a) the letter informing the Chairman of PTCC about the
decision of PTA main office regarding the repair works to be
conducted;50 (b) Office Order No. 1018-93 from a person named Mr.
Anota, relative to the suspension of the boat ride services at the
Complex;51 (c) the letter to PTCC informing it of the repair at the
Complex;52 (d) the certificates of availability of funds for the guesthouse
of the PTC Complex and for the repainting, repair works at the Pagsanjan
Administration Complex respectively;53 (e) the program of works dated
July 22, 1993 for the renovation of the Pagsanjan Complex and of the
swimming pool at the guesthouse respectively;54 (f) the program of
works referring to the repainting and repair works at the Complex dated
Page 44 of 82
August 6, 1993;55 and (g) a memorandum from Mr. Oscar Anota, Deputy
General Manager for Operation of the PTA, dated December 8, 1993
addressed to the security office of the Pagsanjan Administration
Complex, instructing the same not to allow the entry of anything without
clearance from the main office in Manila into the Pagsanjan
Complex.56 In all these, the respondents had all the chance to object to
the documents which Laborte properly identified and marked and which
are found in the records of the trial court. Considering that no objections
were made by the respondents to the foregoing documents, the Court
sees no reason why these documents should not be admitted.
The Court notes the CAs ruling that the closure of the business is a
factual matter which need not be reviewed by the Court under Rule 45.
The Court has consistently held that as a general rule, a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers questions of law only.
The rule, however, admits of exceptions, subject to the following
exceptions, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misappreciation
of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making
its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record.57 After a careful review and based on the evidence
on record, the Court finds cogent reason to deviate from the general rule,
warranting a reversal of the decision of the CA.
In their petition, the petitioners assert that:
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
(1) the PTA is mandated to administer tourism zones and it has

adopted a comprehensive program and project to rehabilitate
and upgrade the facilities of the PTA Complex. To prove this, the
petitioners attached Annexes "H-2" to "H-4,"58 namely: (a)
Program Work/Scope of works of the repairs and rehabilitation
project for the PGTZ dated July 22, 1993;59 (b) Certificate of
Availability of Funds for the repairs and rehabilitation project for
PGTZ;60 and (c) Program of Work/Scope of Works for the repairs
and rehabilitation of the restaurant facility dated August 6,
1993;61
(2) The petitioners also claimed that bidding out to private
parties of the business operations in the PTA Complex is a legal
requirement and a mandate given to every revenue-generating
government entity like the PTA. Thus, since it is only exercising
its mandate and has acted in good faith, petitioner PTA believes
that it has not incurred any liability against respondents.62 Citing
Mendoza v. Rural Bank of Lucban,63 the petitioners argued that:
"[L]abor laws discourage interference in employers judgments
concerning the conduct of their business. The law must protect
not only the welfare of employees, but also the right of [the]
employers."64 In other words, the petitioners likened the
relationship between PTA and the respondents to that of an
employer and employee;
(3) The petitioners also reiterated that the PTCC is without
contract, concession or exclusive franchise to operate the
restaurant and boat ride service at the PTA Complex. They
insisted that the PTA temporarily authorized the PTCC to operate
the same in order to extend financial assistance to its PTA
employee-members who are members of the then fledging PTCC.
Thus, for the petitioners, the PTCC has no vested right to
continue operating the restaurant and boat ride services, and
therefore, not entitled to damages;65and
Page 45 of 82
(4) The petitioners also claimed to have informed the PTCC as

early as October 22, 1993 of the intention to rehabilitate and
upgrade the facilities of the PTA Complex and for the PTCC to
vacate the area by November 15, 1993. In fact, the deadline was
even extended for another twenty-one (21) days or until
December 6, 1993, to allow the PTCC sufficient time to pack its
goods, merchandise and appliances.66
The Court is persuaded.
The PTA is a government owned and controlled corporation which was
mandated to administer tourism zones. Based on this mandate, it was
the PTAs obligation to adopt a comprehensive program and project to
rehabilitate and upgrade the facilities of the PTA Complex as shown in
Annexes "H-2" to "H-4" of the petition. The Court finds that there was
indeed a renovation of the Pagsanjan Administration Complex which
was sanctioned by the PTA main office; and such renovation was done in
good faith in performance of its mandated duties as tourism
administrator. In the exercise of its management prerogative to
determine what is best for the said agency, the PTA had the right to
terminate at any moment the PTCCs operations of the restaurant and
the boat ride services since the PTCC has no contract, concession or
franchise from the PTA to operate the above-mentioned businesses. As
shown by the records, the operation of the restaurant and the boat ride
services was merely tolerated, in order to extend financial assistance to
its PTA employee-members who are members of the then fledging PTCC.
Except for receipts for rents paid by the PTCC to the PTA, the
respondents failed to show any contract, concession agreement or
franchise to operate the restaurant and boat ride services.1wphi1 In
fact, the PTCC initially did not implead the PTA in its Complaint since it
was well aware that there was no contract executed between the PTCC
and the PTA. While the PTCC has been operating the restaurant and boat
ride services for almost ten (10) years until its closure, the same was by
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
mere tolerance of the PTA.67 In the consolidated case of Phil. Ports

Authority v. Pier 8 Arrastre & Stevedoring Services, Inc.,68 the Court
upheld the authority of government agencies to terminate at any time
hold-over permits.69 Thus, considering that the PTCCs operation of the
restaurant and the boat ride services was by mere tolerance, the PTA
can, at any time, terminate such operation.
The CA ruled that "the closure of the restaurant and boat ride business
within the PTA Complex was tainted with bad faith on the part of [the]
defendants-appellants."70 It referred to the Sheriffs Report dated
January 19, 1994, which stated that no such repairs and rehabilitation
were actually undertaken. Further, the petitioners engaged the services
of a new restaurant operator (the New Selecta Restaurant) after the
closure of the restaurant per official receipts showing that the new
operator of the restaurant paid PTA commissions for its catering
services from March 1994 to April 1994.71
The Court disagrees. The records disclose that sufficient notice was
given by the PTA for the respondents to vacate the area. The Sheriffs
Report dated January 19, 1994, alleging that there were, in fact, no
repairs and rehabilitation undertaken in the area at the time of
inspection cannot be given weight. It must be noted that the RTC had
issued on November 11, 1993 a TRO enjoining the petitioners from
pursuing its actions. Thus, the absence of any business activity in the
premises is even proof of the petitioners compliance to the order of the
trial court. Furthermore, the Sheriffs Report was executed only about a
month after the announced construction or development; thus, it cannot
be expected that the petitioners would immediately go full-blast in the
implementation of the repair and renovation.
As to the alleged engagement of the services of a new restaurant
operator, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the engagement of
New Selecta Restaurant was temporary and due only to the requests of
the guests who needed catering services for the duration of their stay.
Page 46 of 82
The evidence offered by the respondents which were receipts issued to

New Selecta Restaurant on different dates even emphasize this
point.72 From the foregoing, the Court concludes that the engagement of
New Selecta Restaurant is not continuous but on contingency basis only.
With respect to Laborte's liability in his official and personal capacity,
the Court finds that Laborte was simply implementing the lawful order
of the PTA Management. As a general rule the officer cannot be held
personally liable with the corporation, whether civilly or otherwise, for
the consequences of his acts, if acted for and in behalf of the corporation,
within the scope of his authority and in good faith.73 Furthermore, the
Court also notes that the charges against petitioners Laborte and the
PTA for grave coercion and for the violation of R.A. 671374 have all been
dismissed.75 Thus, the Court finds no basis to hold petitioner Laborte
liable.
Likewise, the award of damages to the respondents and respondentsintervenors is without basis. Absent a contract between the PTCC and
the PTA, and considering further that the respondents were adequately
notified to properly vacate the PTA Complex, the Court finds no
justifiable reason to award any damages. Neither may the respondentsintervenors claim damages since the act directed against the PTCC was a
lawful exercise of the PTA's management prerogative. While it is true
that the exercise of management prerogative is a recognized right of a
corporate entity, it can not be gainsaid that the exercise of such right
must be tempered with justice, honesty, good faith76 and a careful regard
of other party's rights. In the instant case, there is ample evidence to
show that the petitioners were able to observe the same.
WHEREFORE, the petit10n is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 29,
2008 and the Resolution dated July 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals are
VACATED. The Amended Complaint and the Complaint-in-Intervention
filed by the Respondents in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Sta.
Cruz, Laguna in Civil Case No. SC-3150 are DISMISSED.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
SO ORDERED.
Page 47 of 82
Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, with

Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Marlene G. Sison,
concurring; id. at 42-61.
2
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
Id. at 178-184.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 63-85.
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Id. at 43-44, 14-15, 91; TSN, November 25, 1993, pp. 24-26,
TSN, June 6, 1996, pp. 12-14, and TSN, October 4, 1996, p. 17.
6
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Division.
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 12-37.
Id. at 91-96.
Id. at 94-95.
Id. at 97.
10
Id. at 107-110.
11
Id. at 45, 114.
12
Id. at 118-125.
13
Id. at 120-121.
14
Id. at 118-119, 122-123.
15
Id. at 123.
16
Id. at 128-133.
17
Id. at 128-131.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
18
Id. at 146.
35
116 Phil. 977 (1962).
19
Id. at 147-152.
36
Id. at 980-981.
20
Id. at 154-163.
37
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, 8th Edition, p. 761.
21
Id. at 157-158.
38
22
Id. at pp. 184.
Page 48 of 82
People v. Maximo Ramos y San Diego, 417 Phil. 807, 815

(2001).
23
Id. at 186-210.
TSN, August 28, 1998, pp. 45-47; records, pp. 402, 432; Folder
of Exhibits, Exhibit "C," p. 13.
24
Id. at 42-61.
40
TSN, August 28, 1998, p. 49; records, pp. 198, 429.
25
Id. at 63-85.
41
TSN, August 28, 1998, p. 54.
26
Id. at 86.
42
TSN, November 23, 1998, p. 2; records, pp. 38, 42.
27
Id. at 21-22.
43
TSN, November 23, 1998, pp. 3-4; records, pp. 47, 50.
28
Id. at 54.
44
TSN, November 23, 1998, p. 4; records, pp. 44-46.
45
TSN, November 23, 1998, pp. 4-5; records, pp. 48-49.
46
TSN, November 23, 1998, pp. 5-6.
47
TSN, November 23, 1998, pp. 7-8.
39
Westmont Investment Corporation v. Amos P. Francia, Jr., et

al., G.R. No. 194128, December 7, 2011, 661 SCRA 787, 800.
29
Ahag v. Cabiling, 18 Phil. 415 (1911); Chua v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. 88383, February 19, 1992, 206 SCRA 339, 346.
30
31
258-A Phil. 994 (1989).
48
32
191 Phil. 72 (1981).
49
TSN, November 23, 1998, pp. 9-10.
33
G.R. No. 152866, October 6, 2010, 632 SCRA 236.
50
34
Id. at 246.
TSN, August 28, 1998, pp. 45-47; records, pp. 402, 432; Folder
of Exhibits, Exhibit "C," p. 13.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
Page 49 of 82
51
TSN, August 28, 1998, p. 49; records, pp. 198, 429.
68
512 Phil. 74 (2005).
52
TSN, November 23, 1998, p. 2; records, pp. 38, 42.
69
Id. at 85-88.
53
70
Rollo, p. 53.
54
TSN, November 23, 1998, p. 4; records, pp. 44-46.
71
Id.
55
TSN, November 23, 1998, pp. 4-5; records, pp. 48-49.
72
Folder of Exhibits, Exhibits P, P-1 to P-3 , pp. 47-50.
56
73
Francisco v. Mejia, 415 Phil. 153, 166 (2001).
Vitarich Corporation v. Losin, G.R. No. 181560, November 15,

2010, 634 SCRA 671, 682.
57
An Act Establishing a Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards

for Public Officials and Employees.
74
58
Rollo, pp. 99-106.
75
Rollo, pp. 31-32; 213-220.
59
Id. at 99-102.
76
CIVIL CODE, Article 19.
60
Id. at 103-104.
61
Id. at 105-106.
62
Id. at 25-26.
Mendoza v. Rural Bank of Lucban, G.R. No. 155421, July 7,

2004, 433 SCRA 756.
63
64
Rollo, p. 26.
65
Id. at 26-28.
66
Id. at 25.
67
Id. at 52-53, 178.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 188881
April 21, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR., DOMINADOR R.
SANTIAGO, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA MARCOS, BIENVENIDO
R. TANTOCO, SR., GLICERIA R. TANTOCO, AND MARIA LOURDES
TANTOCO-PINEDA, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to
nullify the Sandiganbayan Resolution dated 3 June 2009 in Civil Case No.
0008.1 The Second Division of the graft court denied admission of
Exhibits "MMM" to "AAAAAAA" in the Formal Offer of Evidence filed by
petitioner Republic.2
Twenty four years ago, the Republic, through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), commenced a complaint3 for
"reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages" against
Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. (Tantoco ), Dominador R. Santiago (Santiago),
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda, R. Marcos, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr.,
Gliceria R. Tantoco, and Maria Lourdes Tantoco-Pineda. Instead of filing
an Answer, respondents Tantoco and Santiago filed a "Motion To Strike
Out Some Portions of the Complaint and For Bill of Particulars," which
were both denied for lack of bases.
Page 50 of 82
On 27 July 1989, Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a

pleading denominated "Interrogatories to Plaintiff." A month later, they
filed both an "Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff" and a Motion for
Production and Inspection of Documents. This time, the Sandiganbayan
admitted the Amended Interrogatories and granted the Motion for
Production and Inspection of Documents. When the PCGG elevated the
issue to the Supreme Court, this Court, through then Justice Andres R.
Narvasa, affirmed the Orders of the Sandiganbayan in this wise:
The Court finally finds that, contrary to the petitioner's theory, there is
good cause for the production and inspection of the documents subject
of the motion dated August 3, 1989. Some of the documents are,
according to the verification of the amended complaint, the basis of
several of the material allegations of said complaint. Others, admittedly,
are to be used in evidence by the plaintiff. It is matters such as these into
which inquiry is precisely allowed by the rules of discovery, to the end
that the parties may adequately prepare for pre-trial and trial. xxx.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without pronouncement as to
costs. The temporary restraining order issued on October 27, 1989 is
hereby LIFTED AND SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.4
Pre-trial commenced, and from 3 January to 14 July 1993, the PCGG
produced documents pre-marked as Exhibit "A" to "LLL" before Atty.
Renato T. Bocar and respondents counsel.5 On 10 September 1996, the
pre-trial was declared closed.6 On 23 and 25 September 1996, the
temporary markings of Exhibits "A" to "LLL," together with their submarkings, were adopted. However, over the objections of respondents
Tantoco and Santiago, the PCGG produced and caused the pre-marking
of additional documents, Exhibits "MMM" to "AAAAAAA."7
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
Tantoco and Santiago filed a "Motion under Rule 29 of the Rules of

Court," claiming that the additional documents were never produced at
the discovery proceedings and praying that petitioner be sanctioned for
contempt. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion on 17 February 1997
(First Resolution).8 Trial proceeded; however, new documents not
shown at discovery were still being marked. Tantoco and Santiago again
filed a "Motion to Ban Plaintiff From Offering Exhibits Not Earlier
Marked During the Discovery Proceedings," which the graft court denied
on 29 May 2002.9
Petitioner filed its Formal Offer of Evidence on 16 March 2007.10 On 15
January 2008, the Sandiganbayan ruled that with the exception of some
documents,11 "all Exhibits... are denied admission. The due execution and
authenticity of these documents remain challenged since the
prosecution failed to show otherwise."12 On petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan partly relented and admitted
Exhibits "MMM" to "AAAAAAA" (Second Resolution).13 As certified to by
the Chief Administrative Officer of the PCGG,14 Exhibits "MMM" to
"AAAAAAA" were turned over to its Legal Division and include the
following:
Exh. MMM
Memorandum for Hon. Teodoro

Pena, signed by Juan C. Tuvera
Xerox
NNN
Undated handwritten letter

purportedly written by Glecy R.
Tantoco
No remarks
whether
original or
photocopy
Letter to Ferdinand E. Marcos from

Bienvenido Tantoco with
handwritten marginal note dated 8
May 1982
No remarks
whether
original or
photocopy
Undated letter to "Mam" from
Xerox
OOO
PPP
Page 51 of 82
"Glecy"
QQQ
(missing)
(missing)
RRR
Proclamation No. 50 dated Dec. 15,

1986, signed by Pres. Corazon
Aquino
From APT
RRR
Complaint filed by RP thru Asset

Privatization Trust (APT) against
Rustan Investment & Management
Corporation
Xerox
SSS
Administrative Order No. 14 dated

Feb. 3, 1987 signed by Pres. Corazon
Aquino
From APT
SSS
Answer with Compulsory

Counterclaim filed by Rustan
Investment & Management
Corporation
Xerox
TTT
Contract dated Feb. 27, 1987 by and

between RP and DEBP
No remarks
whether
original or
photocopy
TTT
Order- Civil Case No. 89-5268, RP v.

Rustan Investment
From APT
UUU
Order- Civil Case No. 89-5268, RP v.

Rustan Investment
From APT
VVV
(missing)
(missing)
WWW
Eastern Inspection Bureau for Phil.

Eagle Mines, Inc. dated Oct. 18, 1989
From APT
Law 126 Evidence

XXX
Prof. Avena
Letter dated Dec. 20, 1990 for Asset

Privatization Trust from Dominador
R. Santiago
Xerox
Articles of Incorporation of Rustan

Investment &Management Corp.
dated Feb. 21, 1966
Xerox
YYY-23- YYYCertificate of Filing of Amended

33
Articles of Incorporation dated Nov.
20, 1981
Xerox
YYY- YYY- 22
NBI Questioned Documents Report

No. 729-1101 dated Jan. 21, 2002
Original
AAAA-1
Undated, handwritten note signed

by Ferdinand Marcos
Malacaang Lib
AAAA-2
Memo for the Pres. Dated 23 Jul 79

with handwritten markings
Malacaang Lib
AAAA-3
Handwritten note Office of the

President stationery paper
(undated)
Malacaang Lib

(undated)
Malacaang Lib

(undated)
Malacaang Lib

(undated)
Malacaang Lib
Malacaang Lib
AAAA-4
AAAA-5
AAAA-6
AAAA-7

(undated)
AAAA-8-11
Handwritten note dated Dec. 28,

1978 Office of the President
stationery paper
Malacaang Lib
AAAA-12-17

Malacaang Lib
AAAA-18
ZZZ
Page 52 of 82
Handwritten note dated Jan. 7, 1978 Malacaang Lib

Office of the President stationery
paper
AAAA-19-25

(undated)
Malacaang Lib
AAAA-27-29

(undated)
Malacaang Lib
AAAA-30-34

(undated)
Malacaang Lib
AAAA-35-41

(undated)
Malacaang Lib
BBBB-1a-1b
Microfilm of "Questioned"
documents
No remarks
whether
original or
photocopy
BBBB-2-7
documents
No remarks
whether
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena

original or
photocopy
BBBB-8-12
BBBB-13-20
BBBB-21-28
documents
documents
No remarks
whether
original or
photocopy
No remarks
whether
original or
photocopy
documents
No remarks
whether
original or
photocopy
documents
No remarks
whether
original or
photocopy
CCCC-1-11
Executive Summary of Phil. Eagle

Mines, Inc.
Xerox
DDDD-1-28
SEC Records of Phil. Eagle Mines,

Inc.
Xerox
EEEE-1-13
TSN Evelyn Singson
Xerox
FFFF-1-13
Affidavit of Evelyn R. Singson dated

Aug. 18, 1986
Xerox
SBTC (Security Bank and Trust

Company) bank documents/ credit
ticket/ certificate of
PCGG Lib
BBBB-29-33
GGGG-1-6
Page 53 of 82
deposit/telegraphic transfer/ telex/
money transfer
HHHH-1-9
SBTC debit tickets/ transmittal

documents/ telexes
PCGG Lib
IIII-1-5
SBTC debit tickets/ telexes/ wire

transfers
PCGG Lib
JJJJ-1-7
SBTC debit tickets/ wire transfers/

telexes/ transmittal letters
PCGG Lib
KKKK-1-4

documents/ Irving Trust documents
PCGG Lib
LLLL-1-4

PCGG Lib
MMMM-1-3

PCGG Lib
NNNN-1-3

PCGG Lib
OOOO-1-6

PCGG Lib
PPPP-1-2
SBTC money transfers/ telex
PCGG Lib
QQQQ-1-2
SBTC money transfers/ telex
PCGG Lib
RRRR-1-2
SBTC debit tickets/ money

transfers/ telex
PCGG Lib
SSSS- SSSS-2 SBTC debit tickets/ money transfer/

Irving Trust documents
TTTT-1-4
SBTC debit tickets/ money transfer/

telex/ Irving Trust documents
PCGG Lib
PCGG Lib
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
UUUU-1-4

telex/ Irving Trust documents
PCGG Lib
VVVV-1-5

telegraphic transfer/ Irving Trust
documents
PCGG Lib
WWWW-1-3
SBTC debit tickets/ telex/ Irving

Trust documents
PCGG Lib
XXXX-1-5

telegraphic transfer/ Irving Trust
documents
PCGG Lib

Irving Trust documents
PCGG Lib
ZZZZ to
ZZZZ-1
SBTC debit tickets/ telegraphic

transfer
PCGG Lib
AAAAA-1-3
SBTC debit tickets/ telex/

telegraphic transfer
BBBBB-1-16
Page 54 of 82
ticket/ telex
HHHHH-1-7
SBTC certificate of deposit/ debit &

credit ticket/ money transfer/ telex
PCGG Lib
IIIII-1-6
SBTC debit & credit tickets/ money

& wire transfers
PCGG Lib
JJJJJ-1-3
SBTC debit & credit tickets/ telex
PCGG Lib
KKKKK-1-4
SBTC credit ticket/ money transfer/

telex
PCGG Lib
LLLLL-1-4
SBTC Certificate of Deposit/ debit &

credit tickets/ telex
PCGG Lib
MMMMM-111
SBTC debit & credit tickets/

certificate of deposits/ telex
PCGG Lib
NNNNN-1-5
SBTC debit & credit tickets/ telex
PCGG Lib
PCGG Lib
OOOOO-1-6

PCGG Lib
SBTC credit ticket/ debit ticket/

money transfer/ telegraphic
transfer, etc.
PCGG Lib
PPPPP-1-2
SBTC credit ticket/ debit advise/

telegraphic transfer
PCGG Lib
QQQQQ-1-5
PCGG Lib

money transfer/ telegraphic
transfer, etc.
PCGG Lib

RRRRR-1-10

PCGG Lib
DDDDDDDDDD-1
SBTC debit tickets/ telegraphic

transfer
PCGG Lib
SSSSS-1-5

credit tickets/ telex/ debit advise
PCGG Lib
EEEEE-1-6

telex
PCGG Lib
TTTTT-1-28
Affidavit of Apolinario K. Medina

dated July 23, 1987
Xerox
FFFFF-1-5
SBTC document/ credit ticket/ debit
PCGG Lib
UUUUU-1-21
Affidavit of Dominador Pangilinan
Xerox
YYYY-1-3
CCCCC-1-10
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
dated July 24, 1987

VVVVV
Memo for Comm Ruben Carranza, Jr.

from Dir. Danilo R.V. Daniel dated
June 6, 2003
Xerox
Letter dated Dec. 8, 1982 to Gallery

Bleue from Richard Lynch (Hammer
Galleries), unsigned
Xerox
XXXXX to 1
Invoice dated Dec. 8, 1982 for

Gallery Bleue total $545,000.00
Xerox
YYYYY-1-2

Gallery Bleue total $545,000.00
signed by Mrs. Tantoco
Xerox
ZZZZZ
Letter dated Dec. 8, 1982 to Gallery

Bleue
Xerox
AAAAAA-1-3
Fe R. Gimenez- Bankers Trust

Check #485 dated Dec. 8, 1982 pay
to Hammer Galleries
Xerox
WWWWW-1
BBBBBB-1-2 Memo for Comm Ruben Carranza, Jr.

from Dir. Danilo
Xerox
CCCCCC-1-2
Knoedler-Modarco S.A. New York

for Gallery Bleue dated July 20,
1983
Xerox
DDDDDD-1-5
Citibank, N.A. debit advice for

$810,005.00
Xerox
EEEEEE-1-4
Citibank, N.A. cashiers check

#38865 dated Nov. 22, 1983 for
$810,000.00
Xerox
Page 55 of 82
FFFFFF-1-3
Letter dated Nov. 22,1983 to Mrs.

Tantoco from Peter Sansone of
Knoedler-Modarco
Xerox
GGGGGG-126
Declaration of Oscar M. Carino dated

June 23, 1987
Original
HHHHHH-12
Agreement between Leslie R.

Samuels and Gliceria R. Tantoco
Xerox
IIIIII to 1
Bankers Trust Company Check

#02002598 dated Sept. 3, 1981 for
$1,000,000.00
Xerox
JJJJJJ to 1
Letter dated Sept. 4, 1981 from Alan

Forster of Sothebys
Xerox
KKKKKK-1-3
Bankers Trust Check #02002282

dated Sept. 18, 1981 for
$4,950,000.00
Xerox
LLLLLL-1-2
Hammer Galleries Invoice dated

Dec. 9, 1982 for Gallery Bleue total
$323,000.00
Xerox
MMMMMM1-3
Bankers Trust Check #200 for

Hammer Galleries dated Dec. 20,
1982 for $323,000.00 issued by Fe
Gimenez
Xerox
NNNNNN-1-2
Hammer Galleries Commercial

Gallery Bleue
Xerox
OOOOOO-1
Bankers Trust Statement of Account
Xerox
PPPPPP-1-4
Credit Suisse/ Trinidad Foundation/

Debit Advice/ $480,015.79
Xerox
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
QQQQQQ-1-4
Credit Suisse/ Palmy Foundation/

Debit Advice/$700,006
Xerox
RRRRRR-1-3
Credit Suisse/ Palmy Foundation/

Debit Advice/$2,000,005.62
Xerox
SSSSSS
Certificate of the Swiss Authority

executing request for documents/
Peter Cossandy
Xerox
SSSSSS-1
Certificate of Authenticity of
Business Records/ Martin Grossman
Xerox
SSSSSS-2
List of documents numbered by the

Examining Magistrate/ Peter
Cossandy
Xerox
TTTTTT-110
Letter dated Feb. 3, 1984 for Mrs.

Gliceria Tantoco Re: Glockhurst
Corp.
Xerox
UUUUUU-1
Debit Advice for Php3,241,393.00
Xerox
VVVVVV-1-3
Traders Royal Bank Managers

Check #00671 dated July 28,1981
for Php3, 241,393.00
Xerox
WWWWWW1
Traders Royal Bank Debit Advise

for Php4,283,440.29
Xerox
XXXXXX-1-3
TRB Managers Check #001282 for

Php3,200,000.00
Xerox
YYYYYY-1-3
Letter from Rico Tantoco dated

5/6/82 to Fe
Xerox
ZZZZZZ-1-4
Status of Holdings in Phil. Eagle

Mines, Inc. (PEMI) grand total of
Xerox
Page 56 of 82
Php2,640,351.90
AAAAAAA- 1105
Affidavit of Rolando Gapud dated

Aug. 1, 1987 with annexes
PCGG Lib
Respondents, in turn, filed their Motion for Reconsideration, to which

the graft court issued the assailed Resolution, stating:
After a thorough review of the circumstances, this Court is convinced
that it is fair and just to grant defendants Motion under Rule 29 of the
Rules of Court filed on October 1, 1996 and to sanction the plaintiff for
its deliberate refusal and failure to comply with the directive of this
Court which was confirmed no less (sic) by the Supreme Court. The
plaintiff must be prevented from offering in evidence all the documents
that were not produced and exhibited at the time the plaintiff was under
a directive to do so, i.e. Exhibits "MMM" to "AAAAAAA" xxx. In arriving at
this conclusion, the Court is not unmindful of the fact that the exhibits
involved have not passed the test of admissibility in any event.15
Petitioner Republic now raises the sole issue of whether or not the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in excluding the
documents due to petitioners own failure to produce them at the pretrial.
We deny the petition.
After a careful scrutiny of the records, We find that in excluding Exhibits
"MMM" to "AAAAAAA," the Sandiganbayan properly exercised its
discretion over evidence formally offered by the prosecution. Nothing
therein shows that the court gravely exceeded its jurisdiction. For the
reviewing court to interfere with the exercise of discretion by the lower
court, the petitioner must show that the former's action was attended by
grave abuse of discretion, defined as a capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of power
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal

hostility, so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty, to a virtual refusal to perform the mandated duty, or to act at all in
contemplation of the law.16
Petitioner would have us reverse the Sandiganbayan solely because the
latter purportedly made contrary rulings in its earlier Resolutions. The
Republic invokes the First Resolution, specifically the graft courts view
that the exclusion of the Exhibits "would be too technical," since their
non-production "could be attributed to inadvertence rather than willful
disobedience." However, this First Resolution merely disposed of
respondents Motion to cite petitioner in contempt. It does not constitute
an irrevocable stamp of admissibility.
Petitioner conveniently disregards the basic rule of evidence, namely,
that the issue of the admissibility of documentary evidence arises only
upon formal offer thereof. This is why objection to the documentary
evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered, and not
earlier.17 Accordingly, the Court ruled in Interpacific Transit, Inc. v.
Aviles as follows:
x x x. The identification of the document before it is marked as an exhibit
does not constitute the formal offer of the document as evidence for the
party presenting it. Objection to the identification and marking of the
document is not equivalent to objection to the document when it is
formally offered in evidence. What really matters is the objection to the
document at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit.
xxxx
It would have been so simple for the defense to reiterate its former
objection, this time seasonably, when the formal offer of exhibits was
made. It is curious that it did not, especially so since the objections to the
formal offer of exhibits was made in writing. In fact, the defense filed no
Page 57 of 82
objection at all not only to the photocopies but to all the other exhibits of
the prosecution.18 (Emphases supplied)
Seasonable objection to the subject "Exhibits" can only be properly made
upon formal offer. The Sandiganbayan acknowledged that Tantoco and
Santiago had been consistent in reiterating their objections. The court
even clarified in its First Resolution that their "Motion Filed Under Rule
29," was but in pursuance of their continuing objection to the marking of
evidence not produced at discovery. Hence, nothing in the said
Resolution can be read as a ruling on its admissibility. Its dispositive
portion clearly states: "Under all these circumstances, there is no basis
for the Court to declare plaintiff in contempt of court and it would be too
much of a technicality to bar it from introducing the additional exhibits
in evidence."19
The Second Resolution, while issued after petitioner had submitted its
Formal Offer of Evidence, noted that all the documents contained therein
were photocopies.20 It stated that a mere certification from the Clerk of
Court that they "appear to be the original copy" would not suffice. The
Sandiganbayan still admitted them as evidence, yet the only reason cited
for doing so was liberality, viz: "There is nothing in the rules which
categorically prohibits the admission of additional documentary
evidence when called for as a case progress [sic]. What is clear is that it
is the Courts discretion to allow or disallow its reception."21 Thus, the
Sandiganbayan fittingly corrected itself when once and for all, it
excluded the photocopies in its latest Resolution.
This Court discusses the contents and implications of the two earlier
Resolutions, because petitioner simply has no other argument
supporting its claim to reverse the Sandiganbayan. For those documents
introduced in evidence as proof of their contents, the assailed Resolution
stated that petitioner has not made any effort whatsoever to explain why
it submitted mere photocopies. When the subject of inquiry is the
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
content of a document, submission of a certified true copy is justified

only in clearly delineated instances such as the following:
a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the
party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss
of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only
the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office.22
Nothing on record shows, and petitioner itself makes no claim, that the
Exhibits fall under any of the exceptions to the Best Evidence rule.
Secondary evidence of the contents of writings is admitted on the theory
that the original cannot be produced by the party who offers the
evidence within a reasonable time by the exercise of reasonable
diligence. Even then, the general rule is that secondary evidence is still
not admissible until the non-production of the primary evidence has
been sufficiently accounted for.23
The Separate Opinion concurs in our dismissal of the petition for failure
to show that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion.
However, it disagrees with the latters misapplication of the Best
Evidence Rule. While the Sandiganbayan provided several reasons for its
ultimate exclusion of the documents, it did not distinguish: 1) Which
particular documents are to be excluded for violation of the Best
Evidence Rule; and 2) Which of the remaining ones it has treated as
Page 58 of 82
private documents that lacked proper authentication. The detailed

analysis of each piece of evidence vis--vis the purpose for which they
were presented falls squarely under the purview and competence of the
trial court. The Supreme Court cannot substitute its own conclusions for
the factual determinations of the trial court. It is not the function of this
Court to examine, review or evaluate the evidence. Absent any showing
of grave abuse of discretion, as discussed above, this Court is then
constrained to uphold the reasons forwarded by the Sandiganbayan.
The authority of the trial court to control its own discovery processes
cannot be undermined. In this case, the Sandiganbayans exercise of this
power is neither whimsical nor oppressive. A writ of certiorari is
available only to review final judgments or decrees, and will be refused
where there has been no final judgment or order and the proceeding for
which the writ is sought is still pending and undetermined in the lower
tribunal. Pursuant to this rule, it has been held that certiorari will not lie
to review or correct discovery orders made prior to trial.24
As for the documentary evidence which are purportedly transmittal
letters, petitioner remains unable to prove their due execution and
authenticity. We subscribe to the view forwarded by the Sandiganbayan
in its Second Resolution, which we quote below:
The fact that the documents were certified as true copies of the original
by the PCGG does not enhance its admissibility. These documents have
remained private even if it is in the custody of the PCGG. What became
public are not the private documents (themselves) but the recording of it
in the PCGG. For, "while public records kept in the Philippines, of private
writings are also public documents...the public writing is not the writing
itself but the public record thereof. Stated otherwise, if a private writing
itself is inserted officially into a public record, its record, its recordation,
or its incorporation into the public record becomes a public document,
but that does not make the private writing itself a public document so as
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
to make it admissible without authentication."25 (Citation omitted,

emphasis supplied.)
Aside from lack of authentication and failure to present the originals of
these documents, what ultimately tipped the scales against petitioner in
the view of the graft court was the formers lack of forthrightness in
complying with the Supreme Court directive. The Sandiganbayan said:
Thereafter, it did not take long in the process of the presentation of
plaintiffs evidence before it became apparent that plaintiffs exhibits
consist mostly of documents which have not been exhibited during the
discovery proceedings despite the directive of this Court as confirmed by
the Supreme Court. Plaintiffs failure to offer a plausible explanation for
its concealment of the main bulk of its exhibits even when it was under a
directive to produce them and even as the defendants were consistently
objecting to the presentation of the concealed documents gives rise to a
reasonable [inference] that the plaintiff, at the very outset, had no
intention whatsoever of complying with the directive of this Court.26
Petitioner failed to obey the mandate of G.R. No. 90478, which remains
an important case on pre-trial and discovery measures to this day; the
rationale of these rules, especially on the production of documents, must
be constantly kept in mind by the bar:
The message is plain. It is the duty of each contending party to lay before
the court the facts in issue-fully and fairly; i.e., to present to the court all
the material and relevant facts known to him, suppressing or concealing
nothing, nor preventing another party, by clever and adroit
manipulation of the technical rules of pleading and evidence, from also
presenting all the facts within his knowledge.
Page 59 of 82
The truth is that "evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and learned
by the parties before the trial. Indeed, it is the purpose and policy of the
law that the parties - before the trial if not indeed even before the pretrial - should discover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to
the action, not only those known to them individually, but also those
known to adversaries; in other words, the desideratum is that civil trials
should not be carried on in the dark; and the Rules of Court make this
ideal possible through the deposition-discovery mechanism set forth in
Rules 24 to 29. xxx.
xxxx
x x x. (I)t is the precise purpose of discovery to ensure mutual
knowledge of all the relevant facts on the part of all parties even before
trial, this being deemed essential to proper litigation. This is why either
party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his
possession; and the stage at which disclosure of evidence is made is
advanced from the time of trial to the period preceding it.27 (Emphasis
supplied)
After failing to submit the documentary evidence during discovery,
when it was clearly ordered by both the Sandiganbayan and the
Supreme Court to do so, petitioner also repeatedly failed to prove the
due execution and authenticity of the documents. Having failed in its
belated attempts to assuage the Sandiganbayan through the submission
of secondary evidence, petitioner may not use the present forum to gain
relief under the guise of Rule 65.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the instant Petition for
lack of merit. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0008
(dated 3 June 2009) is AFFIRMED.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena

Chief Justice
Filed on 13 March 2007.
Docketed as Civil Case No. 0008.
Page 60 of 82
WE CONCUR:
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G. R. No. 90478, 21 November 1991,
204 SCRA 212, 232- 234.
4
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
With Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
Chief Justice
Footnotes
Rollo, pp. 25-27; Penned by Associate Justice Edilberto G.
Sandoval and concurred in by Associate Justices Teresita V. DiazBaldos and Samuel R. Martires.
1
Rollo, p. 159.
Id. at 160.
Id.
Sandiganbayan Resolution dated 17 February 1997; id. at 158165.

8
Sandiganbayan Resolution dated 29 May 2002; id. at 179-180.
10
Attached as Annex "G" to the Petition; id. at 74-113.
Exhibits "EEE" to "EEEE-15," "O," "S," "XX," "DDD," "RRR,"

"SSS," "TTT," "UUU," "DDDD-1" to "DDDD-28," "TTTT," to "TTTT3," "UUUUU" to "UUUUU-3," "AAAAAAA" to "AAAAAAA-9," "G,"
"II," "QQQ," "VVV," "AAAA," "AAAA-26," "III-1," "KKK-1," and
"LLL."
11
12
Rollo, pp. 213-215.
13
Id. at 56-58.
14
Id. at 45-54.
15
Id. at 24-27; Sandiganbayan Resolution dated 3 June 2009.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 755

(2003).
Page 61 of 82
17
264 Phil. 753 (1990).
Republic has not complied with the rules pertinent to the authentication
of private documents as a condition for their admission as judicial
evidence, and has not also satisfied the requirements for proving public
documents.
18
Id. at 759-760.
I CONCUR.
19
Rollo, p. 164.
20
Id. at 29.
21
Id. at 58.
However, I need to write this Opinion in order to clarify two points,

namely: (I) the application of the Best Evidence Rule; and (2) the
exclusion of evidence as a discovery sanction. To that extent, this
Separate Opinion may differ from the ponencia.
22
Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 3.
16
Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. Del Rosario,

490 Phil. 194, 204 (2005).
23
Northwest Airlines v. Cruz and Court of Appeals, 376 Phil. 96

(1999).
24
25
Rollo, p. 30.
26
Id. at 25-26.
27
Supra note 4 at 222-228.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
BERSAMIN, CJ:
The Court hereby affirms the Sandiganbayan' s assailed resolution
denying admission to Exhibits "MMM" to "AAAAAAA" of petitioner
Republic of the Philippines (Republic). There is no question that the
A brief narration of the antecedents is necessary.

The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), brought against the respondents in the
Sandiganbayan an action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages. During the proceedings in the action,
respondents Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago filed
a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents, praying that they
be allowed to examine and copy the following documents during pretrial, to wit:
1) The "official records and other evidence" on the basis of which
the verification of the amended complaint asserted that its
allegations were "true and correct;"
2) The documents listed in PCGGs Pre-Trial Brief as "intended to
be presented and ** marked as exhibits for the plaintiff;" and
3) "[T]he minutes of the meeting of the PCGG which chronicles
the discussion (if any) and the decision (of the Chairman and
members) to file the complaint [in this case]."
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
The Sandiganbayan granted the motion.
the request of Rustan

Investment and Management
Corp. for the extension of its
shipment of 9,000 cu.m logs
until the loading is completed
On November 21, 1991, this Court, in Republic v.

Sandiganbayan,1 affirmed the Sandiganbayans grant of the motion.
Accordingly, the PCGG produced during the pre-trial several documents
that were marked as Exhibits "A" to "LLL." The pre-trial was terminated
on September 10, 1996.
Thereafter, the PCGG produced and caused the pre-marking of additional
documents denominated as Exhibits "MMM" to "QQQ." Tantoco and
Santiago filed a Motion under Rule 29 of the Rules of Court, praying that
the Republic be sanctioned for contempt of court for not producing said
documents during the discovery proceedings. The Sandiganbayan
denied the motion of Tantoco and Santiago on February 17, 1997.
Later on, the Republic again submitted and caused the marking of
additional documents denominated as Exhibits "RRR" to "YYY" over the
objection of Tantoco and Santiago who filed a Motion to Ban Plaintiff
from Offering Exhibits Not Earlier Marked During the Discovery
Proceedings. Yet again, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion on May 29,
2002.
On March 16, 2007, the Republic finally filed its Formal Offer of
Evidence, under which Exhibits "MMM" to "AAAAAAA," the subjects of
the petition herein, were described and offered in evidence as follows:
EXHIBIT NO.
DESCRIPTION
MMM
Memorandum dated May 10,

1982 for Hon. Teodoro Pena,
Minister of Natural Resources
issued by Presidential Assistant,
Juan C. Tuvera, informing him
that the President had approved
PURPOSE
To show that the
Tantocos and/or
their corporations
were extended
undue and
unwarranted
Page 62 of 82
NNN
Undated handwritten letter of

Glecy R. Tantoco to "FE"
pertaining to the request as
mentioned in Exhibit "MMM"
OOO
Letter dated April 29, 1982

addressed to Pres. Ferdinand E.
Marcos from Bienvenido R.
Tantoco, Jr. as President of
Rustan Investment &
Management Corp. pertaining to
the request for extension as
stated in Exhibit "MMM"
PPP
Undated handwritten letter of

Glecy R. Tantoco to "MAM"
RRR
Complaint in Civil Case No. 895268 for Recovery of Deficiency

filed by the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, thru
its trustee, Asset Privatization
Trust (APT) against Rustan
Corp., in relation to its joint and
influence,
advantages and
concessions by
Ferdinand and
Imelda Marcos; To
show that the
Tantocos were close
associates of the
Marcoses
To show that a
complaint had been
filed by the
government against
Rustan Investment
and Management
Corporation, a
Tantoco
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
solidary obligation with the

Philippine Eagle Mines foreign
currency loans obtained from
DBP
SSS (two
documents
were marked
as Exhibit
SSS)
Answer with Compulsory

Counterclaim Civil Case No. 895268 - RP thru Asset
Privatization Trust v. Rustan
Corp.

corporation, for the
huge loans obtained
from the DBP; To
show that the
Tantocos and/or
their corporation,
because of their
close association
with Ferdinand and
Imelda Marcos,
were extended
undue and
unwarranted
advantages and
concessions, and
obtained huge loans
To show that Rustan
Investment and
Management
Corporation filed an
answer to the
complaint filed
against it for
recovery of
deficiency by reason
of its joint and
solidary obligation
with Philippine
Eagle Mines,
another Tantococontrolled
corporation
Page 63 of 82
Administrative Order No. 14
approving the identification and
transfer to the National
Government of certain assets
and liabilities of DBP and PNB,
promulgated by Pres. Corazon
C. Aquino on Feb. 3, 1987
(The Sandiganbayan took
judicial notice of AO 14 during
the September 11, 2001
hearing.)
SSS-1
List of Assets for Transfer from

DBP and PNB as of June 30,
1986
SSS-2
Summary of Assets for transfer

from PNB as of June 30, 1986
SSS-3
Schedule of Assets for transfer,

deposits with and due from
banks from PNB as of June 30,
1986
SSS-4
Schedule of Assets for transfer,

bank premises, furniture and
equipment from PNB as of June
30, 1986
SSS-5 to 7
Schedule of Assets for transferloans and loan related accounts,

as of June 30, 1986
SSS-8 to 10
DBP non-performing accounts

for transfer as of June 30, 1986
To show that an
Administrative
Order was issued by
President Aquino
approving the
identification and
transfer of certain
assets, liabilities,
deposits and
receivables to the
National
Government from
DBP to PNB
Law 126 Evidence

TTT
Prof. Avena
Contract between the

Government of the Republic of
the Philippines and DBP
regarding the transfer of the
latters assets and liabilities to
the National Government, in
accordance with Proclamation
No. 50, December 8, 1986, as
amended (The Sandiganbayan
took judicial notice of the Deed
of Transder during the
September 11, 2001 hearing.)
To show that the

DBP, by virtue and
in consideration of
the National
Governments
assumption of its
certain liabilities,
transferred its
assets, involving
receivables to the
government
UUU
Order dated June 4, 1996 of the

RTC of Makati City, Branch 62,
in Civil Case No. 89-5268,
declaring Philippine Eagle
Mining Corporation in default
for failure to answer within 60
days from the last publication
To show that the

Philippine Eagle
Mining Corporation
was declared in
default for failure to
file answer to the
complaint
WWW
Combined Credit and Property

Checkings dated 18 October
1989 conducted by Eastern
Inspection Bureau on Phil. Eagle
Mines, Inc.
To show that an
inspection and
investigation was
conducted against
PEMI showing that
the company was
controlled by
Tantocos
Letter of Dominado(r) R.
Santiago to Asset Privatization
Trust dated 20 Dec. 1990
offering to pay P5M to APT in
To show that Rustan

Investment and
Management Corp.
(RIMCO)
XXX
Page 64 of 82
exchange for the dropping of
the case against RIMCO
offered P5M to APT

in exchange for the
dropping of the case
against RIMCO
YYY to YYY22
Articles of Incorporation of
RIMCO; Treasurers Affidavit
signed by Gliceria Tantoco
dated 30 June 1965; By-Laws of
RIMCO; Certificate of Filing of
Certificate of Increase of Capital
Stock by RIMCO
To show that RIMCO

is a corporation
controlled by the
Tantocos, known
close
associates/dummies
of President Marcos
YYY 23 to
YYY 33 ZZZ
to ZZZ-1
Amended Articles of
Incorporation of RIMCO;
Questioned Documents Report
No. 729-1101 by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) as
requested by Hon. Manuel P.
Paras, Legal Director of PCGG,
the conclusion of which states
that the questioned
signatures/handwritings on one
hand and the standard sample
signatures/handwritings of
President Ferdinand E. Marcos
on the other hand, were written
by one and the same person
(using Exhibits "Q-1 and Q-2"
and "S-1 to S-40" as bases)
To show that
Bienvenido Tantoco
is a dummy of
President Ferdinand
Marcos; To show
that the marginal
notes/signatures
appearing in the
subject documents
were
written/signed by
Ferdinand Marcos
AAAA-1
Handwritten letter by President To show that

Ferdinand E. Marcos (undated) President Marcos
addressed to the Honorable
made notations and
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
Antonio Logarta thanking him

for testifying in "Malundasan"
cases which led to Pres. FMs
acquittal
AAAA-2
Handwritten notes on notepad

with letterhead of the Office of
the President of the Philippines,
Manila
BBBB to
BBBB-33
Microfilm of "questioned
documents"
DDDD-1 to
DDDD-28
EEEE to
EEEE-15
To show that the

subject documents
containing the
handwritten notes
of Pres. Marcos
were microfilmed
Executive Summary on PEMI
To show that PEMI

is a Tantococontrolled
corporation and had
been granted taxexemption by virtue
of P.D. No. 463
SEC Records of PEMI
To show that PEMI

is a Tantococontrolled
Corporation
TSN of the testimony of Evelyn

Singson
Page 65 of 82
letters to his close

associates
Typewritten note to President

FM with handwritten notes,
dated 23 July 1979
AAAA-3 to
AAA-41
CCCC to
CCCC-11
To show that Evelyn

Singson testified
with respect to the

correct dollar and
peso accounts of the
Marcoses at the
Security Bank and
Trust Company
FFFF to
FFFF-13
Affidavit dated 18 August 1986

of Evelyn R. Singson directly
linking the First Family to Peso
and Foreign Currency Savings
and Trust Accounts managed
and maintained by Rolando
Gapud, then President of
Security Bank and Trust
Company (SBTC)
To establish that the

affiant has personal
knowledge or aware
of the facts or
conditions relative
to the allegations
contained in her
affidavit
GGGG to
GGGG-6

Company (SBCTC) bank
documents/credit
ticket/certificate of
deposit/telegraphic
transfer/telex/money transfer
involving $4,300,000.00 to
Citibank N.A. 153 East Road
53rd St. New York to Account #
1086-9607 of Glockhurst Corp.
N.V.
To show the
existence of bank
transactions
involving the SBTC
secret bank account
of the Marcoses
with banks abroad
HHHH to
HHHH-9

Company (SBCTC) debit
tickets/transmittal
documents/telex
To prove that there

were regular bank
transactions,
withdrawals and
debits with respect
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
Page 66 of 82
to the secret bank

accounts of the
Marcoses
IIII to IIII-5
JJJJ to JJJJ-7
SBTC debit tickets/telexes/wire To prove that there

transfers
were regular bank
transactions,
withdrawals and
debits with respect
to the secret bank
accounts of the
Marcoses
SBTC debit tickets/wire
transfers telexes/transmittal
letters
KKKK to
SBTC debit tickets/transmittal
KKKK-4 LLLL documents/Irving Trust
to LLLL-4
Documents
documents/Irving Trust
Documents
MMMM to
MMMM-3

documents/Irving Trust
Documents
To prove that there

were regular bank
transactions,
withdrawals and
debits with respect
to the secret bank
accounts of the
Marcoses
To show that there
were bank
transactions
involving the secret
bank accounts of the
Marcoses at SBTC
with banks abroad
To show that there
were partial
withdrawals, debits,
and money transfer

Marcoses at SBTC
with banks abroad
NNNN to
SSSSS-5
SBTC debit and credit

tickets/certificate of
deposit/telex/wire, money, and
telegraphic transfers/debit
advise/Irving Trust Documents
To show that there

were bank
transactions
Marcoses at SBTC
with banks abroad
TTTTT to
TTTTT-16
Affidavit of Apolinario K.
Medina dated July 23, 1987,
with annexes
To show that
Apolinario K.
Medina under oath
freely and
voluntarily made
allegations in his
Sworn Statement;
knowledge or aware
of the facts or
conditions stated in
his affidavit.
TTTTT-17a
Withdrawal on July 28, 1981 by To show that

Rustan Investment & Mgt. in the RIMCO, a Tantocoamount ofP3,241,393.00
controlled
corporation, is a
conduit of
Ferdinand and
Imelda Marcos in
accumulating ill-
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena

gotten wealth
TTTTT-18 to Withdrawal on September 4,

TTTTT-18a 1981 by Philippine Eagle
amounting toP3,200,000.00
TTTTT-21 to Credit and debit tickets of

TTTTT-28 Traders Royal Bank
UUUUU to
UUUUU-16
Affidavit of Dominador
Pangilinan, former Acting
President and President of
Traders Royal Bank dated July
24, 2987
To show that PEMI,

a Tantococontrolled
corporation, is a
conduit of
Ferdinand and
Imelda Marcos in
accumulating illgotten wealth
To show that there
were money
transfers, credits,
debits involving
Marcoses secret
account at traders
Royal Bank with
several banks
abroad
To show that
Dominador
Pangilinan under
oath freely and
voluntarily made
allegations in his
Sworn Statement;
knowledge or aware
of the facts or
conditions
Page 67 of 82
UUUUU-17 to Withdrawals of P3,241,393.00

UUUUU-17a by Rustan Investment and
Management Corporation
To show that
RIMCO, a Tantococontrolled
corporation, served
as a conduit of
Ferdinand and
Imelda Marcos in
accumulating illgotten wealth
UUUUU-18 to Withdrawals of P3,200,000.00

UUUUU-18a by Philippine Eagle Mining
Corporation
To show that PEMI,

a Tantococontrolled
corporation, is a
dummy of
Ferdinand and
Imelda Marcos
UUUUU-19 to Part of Annexes of Affidavit of

UUUUU-21 Dominador Pangilinan
To show that the

knowledge or aware
of facts or
his affidavit
VVVVV to
VVVVV-1
Memorandum dated June 6,

2003 of Director Danilo R.V.
Daniel, PCGG Research and
Development Department to
PCGG Commissioners Ruben
Carranza, Jr. and Vyva M.
Aguirre
To show that as per

investigation of
PCGG and
interviews with the
witnesses, the
Tantocos and
Rustan Investment
Corp. were
beneficiaries of ill-
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena

gotten funds from
Marcos Trust
Account No. 76-128
in Traders Royal
Bank;
WWWWW to Letter of Richard Lynch,

WWWWW-1 Director of Hammer Galleries
dated December 8, 1982 to
Gallery Bleue, Rustans Makati
involving the invoice for the
purchase of 3 paintings by
Imelda Marcos
To show that the

purchase of
valuable paintings
by Imelda Marcos
was coursed
through Gallery
Bleue of Rustans
Makati; To show
that the Tantocos
and/or Rustans are
dummies of the
Marcoses
XXXXX to
XXXXX-1
Invoice for paintings amounting To show that the

to $545,000.00
purchase of
valuable paintings
by Imelda Marcos
was coursed
through Gallery
Bleue of Rustans
Makati
YYYYY to
YYYYY-2
Acknowledgment by Mrs.
Tantoco of Invoice for painting
"Hoosick Valley" amounting to
$70,000.00
ZZZZZ
To show that the

Tantocos knowingly
acted as dummies,
nominees and/or
agents of Ferdinand
Acknowledgment receipt for the
and Imelda Marcos
delivery of "Hoosick Valley"
Page 68 of 82
painting
in acquiring
valuable paintings
for the Marcoses
AAAAAA to Bankers Trust Company check

AAAAAAA-2 dated Dec. 15, 1982 for
$70,000.00 to Hammer Galleries
by Fe Gimenez under checking
account No. 001-34714415 for
the Grandma Moses painting
To show that
payment of
paintings from
Hammer Galleries
was through
Bankers trust Co.
Check #485
amounting to
$70,000.00 dated
12/15/82 issued by
Fe Gimenez,
personal secretary
of Imelda Marcos
BBBBBB to
BBBBBB-2
Memorandum dated 23 April

2003 of Director Danilo R.V.
Daniel, PCGG Research and
Development Department to
PCGG Commissioners Ruben
Carranza regarding paintings
ordered from Hammer Galleries
To show the manner

by which the
purchase of
valuable paintings
by the Marcoses
using ill-gotten
funds was
undertaken
CCCCCC to
CCCCCC-3
Knoedler-Madarco S.A. New

Yorks Advice/Invoice for
Gallery Bleue dated 20 July
1983 for the purchase of 5
paintings by President and Mrs.
Marcos amounting to
US$2,200,000.00
To show that
valuable paintings
sold to Gallery Bleue
in Rustans Makati
were for the benefit
of Ferdinand and
Imelda Marcos
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
DDDDDD to
DDDDDD-3
Citibank, N.A. Debit advice for

$810,005.00
To show that
payment to
Knoedler-Madarco
S.A. for valuable
paintings were paid
out of the funds of
Glockhourst
Corporation, an
account of Gliceria
Tantoco in Citibank
N.A. New York
EEEEEE to
EEEEEE-4
Citibank, N.A. Cashiers Check

No. 38865 for US$810,000.00
dated 22 November 1983
To show that the

Tantocos knowingly
acted as dummies,
nominees and/or
agents of Ferdinand
and Imelda Marcos
in acquiring
valuable paintings
for the Marcoses
FFFFFF to
FFFFFF-3
GGGGGG to
GGGGGG(1)2
Letter dated 22 November 1983

to Mrs. Tantoco from Peter
Sansone of Knoedler-Modarco
acknowledging receipt of check
payment of $810,000.00 for
"Madonna and Child" and "City
of Venice Adoring the Christ
Child" Paintings
To show that
Gliceria Tantoco is a
close associate,
dummy or agent of
the Marcoses
Declaration of Oscar M Carino

dated 23 June 1987 who
narrated the disbursements of
To show that the

disbursements from
the General Funds
Page 69 of 82
PNB-New York Branch of
various amounts to individuals
and corporations, for the
purchase of building at 730
Fifth Avenue, New York and the
purchase of the art collection of
Mr. Leslie Samuels amounting
to US$4,950,000.00
GGGGGG-12a Part of the declaration of Mr.

to GGGGGG- Carino which mentioned the
12b
participation of Mrs. Gliceria
Tantoco during a meeting with
Mr. Leslie Samuels for the
purchase of art works
HHHHHH to Agreement between Leslie R.
HHHHHH-2a Samuels and Gliceria Tantoco
for the purchase of paintings
and art works amounting to
US$5,950,000.00
IIIIII to IIIIII- Bankers Trust Company check
1
dated September 3, 1981 for
US$1,000,000.00 in favour of
of PNB New York

were done under
instructions from
Mrs. Fe Gimenez,
Imelda Marcos
herself, Roberto
Benedicto or his
secretary Betty
Rivera, and
Benjamin
Romualdez To show
that Oscar M. Carino
has personal
knowledge or aware
of the other facts or
his declaration
To show that the
Tantocos knowingly
acted as dummies,
nominees and/or
agents of Ferdinand
and Imelda Marcos
in acquiring
valuable paintings
for the Marcoses
To show that a
check was issued in
favour of Sotheby
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
Sotheby ParkeBenet, Inc.

ParkeBenet, Inc. To
show that the
Tantocos knowingly
acted as dummies,
nominees and/or
agents of Ferdinand
and Imelda Marcos
in acquiring
valuable paintings
for the Marcoses
JJJJJJ to JJJJJJ- Letter dated September 4, 1981

1
from Alan Forster of Sothebys
acknowledging receipt from
Gliceria Tantoco, Bankers Trust
Company check dated
September 3, 1981 amounting
to $1,000,000.00
To show that the

Tantocos knowingly
acted as dummies,
nominees and/or
agents of Ferdinand
and Imelda Marcos
in acquiring
valuable paintings
for the Marcoses
KKKKKK to
KKKKKK-3
To show that
payment for the
paintings ordered
from Mr. Samuels
was paid out of
funds from the bank
account in Bankers
Trust, New York
LLLLLL to
LLLLLL-2
Bankers Trust Check

#02002282 dated September
18, 1981 for $4,950,000.00
Hammer Galleries Invoice dated

December 9, 1982 for Gallery
Bleue of Rustans amounting to
US$323,000.00
To show that the

Tantocos knowingly
acted as dummies,
nominees and/or
Page 70 of 82
agents of Ferdinand
and Imelda Marcos
in acquiring
valuable paintings
for the Marcoses
MMMMMM Bankers Trust Check #0200 for

to
Hammer Galleries dated
MMMMMM-3 December 20, 1982 for
$323,000.00 issued by Fe
Gimenez
To show that
payment for the
paintings ordered
from Hammer
Galleries was paid
out of funds from
the bank account in
Bankers Trust, New
York
NNNNNN to
NNNNNN-3
Hammer Galleries Invoice dated To show that the

December 27, 1982 for Gallery Tantocos knowingly
Bleue of Rustans Makati
acted as dummies,
nominees and/or
agents of Ferdinand
and Imelda Marcos
in acquiring
valuable paintings
for the Marcoses
OOOOOO to
OOOOOO-1
Bankers Statement of Account
To show that some

Philippine Banks
where the Marcoses
had accounts
transacted with
Bankers Trust
Company
PPPPPP to
Credit Suisse/Palmy
To show that the
Law 126 Evidence

RRRRRR-3
SSSSSS to
SSSSSS-4
TTTTTT to
TTTTTT-10
Prof. Avena
Foundation/ Debit Advice for

different amounts

funds of foreign
foundations were
moved/diverted to
accounts of known
close
associates/cronies
of the Marcoses
Certificate of Authenticity of
Business Records issued by
Martin Grossman
To show that
several foreign
foundations were
set up whose funds
were later diverted
to accounts of
known close
associates/cronies
of the Marcoses
Letter dated February 3, 1984

for Mrs. Gliceria Tantoco Re:
Glockhurst Corp., N.V. Current
Account #10869607
To show that
Gliceria Tantoco
acted as dummy and
agent of the
Marcoses in the
management of
account #
10869607
UUUUUU to
UUUUUU-1
Debit Advice for P3,241,393.00
VVVVVV to
VVVVVV-3
Traders Royal Bank Managers

Check #000671 dated July 28,
1981 forP3,214,393.00
To show that a
Managers check
was issued by
Traders Royal Bank
from a secret bank
account of the
Marcoses from said
Page 71 of 82
bank in favor of
RIMCO
WWWWWW Traders Royal Bank Debit

to
Advise forP4,283,440.29
WWWWWW1
To show that the

amount was debited
from a secret bank
account of the
Marcoses from
Traders Royal Bank
in favor of RIMCO
XXXXXX to
XXXXXX-3
Traders Royal Check #001282

forP3,200,000
To show that a
check was issued
and debited to the
Marcoses known
trust account with
Traders Royal Bank
YYYYYY to
YYYYYY-3
Letter from Rico Tantoco dated

5/6/82 to Fe Gimenez re
Philippine Eagle Mines
To show that the

Tantocos are close
associates,
dummies, agents of
the Marcoses
ZZZZZZ to
ZZZZZZ-4
Status of Holdings in Philippine

Eagle Mines, Inc. (PEMI) with
grand total ofP2,640,351.90
To show that the

Tantocos are close
associates,
dummies, agents of
the Marcoses
AAAAAAA to Affidavit of Rolando Gapud

AAAAAAA- dated August 1, 1987 with
105
Annexes
To prove that
Rolando C. Gapud is
a crony, dummy,
nominee, agent or
trustee of the late
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena

Ferdinand Marcos
and Imelda Marcos
in several
companies or
entities; To prove
that President
Marcos and Imelda
took advantage of
their official
position for
personal gain or
benefit to the
prejudice and
damage of the
Filipino people.2
The respondents objected to the admission of the Republics exhibits

principally because of the lack of proper authentication in accordance
with Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
On January 15, 2008, the Sandiganbayan denied admission to the
Republics exhibits.3 The Sandiganbayan, noting that all the exhibits
were merely certified true copies of documents, applied the Best
Evidence Rule; and pointed out that the documents, most of which were
private writings, had not been properly authenticated.
Acting on the Republics motion for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan,
through its September 25, 2008 Resolution, modified its previous ruling
by admitting Exhibits "FF," "GG" to "GG-1," "HH" to "HH-1," "XX," "YY,"
"AAA," "BBB," "CCC," and Exhibits "MMM" to "AAAAAA;"4 held that the
Republic substantially complied with the order to produce the requested
documents; opined that the purpose for which discovery was sought was
already satisfactorily complied with; and refused to exclude the
Page 72 of 82
Republics exhibits solely on the ground that they had not been produced
during the discovery proceedings.
The respondents then sought reconsideration, and the Sandiganbayan
partly granted their motion for reconsideration through its Resolution of
June 3, 2009, thusly:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, defendants Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 23, 2008 is partly granted thus: Exhibits
"MMM" to "AAAAAAA" inclusive are hereby denied admission.
Inferentially and as a corollary incident defendants motion to prevent
the plaintiff from introducing those documents in evidence is considered
granted. however, Exhibits "FF", "GG", "GG-1", "HH", "XX", "YY", "ZZ",
"AAA", "BBB" and "CCC" are admitted but subject to the qualifications
hereinabove noted. Plaintiffs Motion to Present Original Documents
dated October 20, 2008 is hereby noted.
So ordered.
Issue
Did the Sandiganbayan, in denying admission in evidence to Exhibits
"MMM" to "AAAAAAA," commit grave abuse of discretion?
Submission
Although I CONCUR with the result reached by the ably-written ponencia
of the Chief Justice, I have to point out that in dealing with offers of
exhibits by the parties the trial courts must be ever aware of the specific
purpose or purposes for which the exhibits are offered. I hold that such
purpose or purposes determine the rules of admissibility that apply to
the exhibits.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
An exhibit that is offered may be a document, but its being a document

does not necessarily mean that its admission must always rest on the
rules on admissibility governing documentary evidence. The decisive
factor is the purpose or purposes of the offer.
Let me clarify.
A.
The Best Evidence Rule does not apply
when the subject of inquiry is not
the contents of a document
Under the Best Evidence Rule, the original document must be produced
whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry. The rule is
encapsulated in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as follows:
Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of
the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter
fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss
of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only
the general result of the whole; and
Page 73 of 82
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public

officer or is recorded in a public office.
Why the Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are
the subject of inquiry are suitably explained in Heirs of Margarita
Prodon v. Heirs of Maximo S. Alvarez,5 viz:
The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to ensure that the
exact contents of a writing are brought before the court, considering that
(a) the precision in presenting to the court the exact words of the
writing is of more than average importance, particularly as respects
operative or dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills and contracts,
because a slight variation in words may mean a great difference in
rights; (b) there is a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the human
process of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting; and (c) as
respects oral testimony purporting to give from memory the terms of a
writing, there is a special risk of error, greater than in the case of
attempts at describing other situations generally. The rule further acts as
an insurance against fraud. Verily, if a party is in the possession of the
best evidence and withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior evidence
in its place, the presumption naturally arises that the better evidence is
withheld for fraudulent purposes that its production would expose and
defeat. Lastly, the rule protects against misleading inferences resulting
from the intentional or unintentional introduction of selected portions of
a larger set of writings.
But the evils of mistransmission of critical facts, fraud, and misleading
inferences arise only when the issue relates to the terms of the writing.
Hence, the Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing
are in issue. When the evidence sought to be introduced concerns
external facts, such as the existence, execution or delivery of the writing,
without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be
invoked. In such a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even
without accounting for the original.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
Although the application of the Best Evidence Rule may be simple,

determining whether the contents or terms of a writing are the subject
of the inquiry, or whether a piece of evidence (other than the original
document) intends to prove the contents of a writing, is more difficult
than it seems. In Railroad Management Company LLC v. CFS Louisiana
Midstream Co.,6 the US Court of Appeals (Fifth Circuit), which was faced
with the complex task of determining whether to admit in evidence the
affidavits of certain witnesses that had been submitted in evidence
supposedly to prove the existence of an assignment agreement,
acknowledged the difficulty in applying the Best Evidence Rule
particularly because the party proffering the affidavits had contended
that they were not intended to "prove the content" of the document
(agreement), but only their "existence." It held that the affidavits were in
fact submitted to prove the contents of the agreement, and observed as
follows:
The purpose, flexibility, and fact-intensive nature of the application of
the best evidence rule persuade us that the following factors are
appropriately considered when distinguishing between whether it is the
content of the document or merely its existence that a witness intends to
testify concerning:
(a) the relative importance of content in the case, (b) the simplicity or
complexity of content and consequent risk of error in admitting a
testimonial account, (c) the strength of the proffered evidence and the
presence or absence of bias or self-interest on the part of the witnesses,
(d) the breadth of the margin for error within which mistake in a
testimonial account would not undermine the point to be proved, (e) the
presence or absence of the actual dispute as to content, (f) the ease or
difficulty of producing the writing, and (g) the reasons why the
proponent of other proof of its content does not have or offer the writing
itself.7
Page 74 of 82
Indeed, when the terms or contents of a writing must be proved to make

a case or put up a defense, the Best Evidence Rule is controlling.8 But
when the terms or contents are not in issue, and the matter to be proved
exists independently of the writing and can be satisfactorily established
by parol evidence (or other secondary evidence), the latter is equally
primary.9
Given the foregoing guidelines, the Best Evidence Rule is not controlling
in the case before the Sandiganbayan. None of the issues presented there
would be resolved only upon a consideration of the contents of any of
the affected exhibits. Specifically, the exhibits (including the letters and
memoranda) were presented to establish that either the Marcoses had
extended undue and unwarranted influence, advantage and concessions
to the respondents, or that the Marcoses had held a close relationship
financial or otherwise with their alleged cronies. But considering that
such facts were matters that could be competently inferred from the
mere existence and execution of the documents themselves, the Republic
did not need to present the documents to prove the particular
transactions or incidents detailed in the documents. Hence, the
production in court of the originals of the exhibits was neither crucial
nor decisive.
When what is sought to be proved is an external or collateral matter, the
original of the exhibit need not be produced in court in order to ensure
its trustworthiness for purposes of the case. Such trustworthiness is
already safeguarded by the rules on authentication and proof of
documents embodied in Section 19 to Section 33 of Rule 132, Rules of
Court. The court may safely rely on the documents thus authenticated
and proved even without producing their originals, for it was not their
terms or contents that were the subject of the inquiry.
B.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
Only a willful or bad-faith refusal to comply

with a discovery order should warrant the imposition
of a harsh sanction under Rule 29 of the Rules of Court,
like exclusion of evidence.
I have to stress that the Republics non-production of the documents
during the discovery proceeding merited their exclusion as evidence. To
me, their exclusion as evidence, a harsh sanction, should be applied only
in extreme cases of discovery abuse.
Page 75 of 82
(b) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support

or oppose designated claims or defenses or prohibiting him from
introducing in evidence designated documents or things or items
of testimony, or from introducing evidence of physical or mental
condition;
(c) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying
further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the
action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a
judgment by default against the disobedient party; and
The primary basis for sanctions to be prescribed on abuse of discovery

or a refusal to comply with discovery proceedings is Rule 29 of the Rules
of Court. With respect to the refusal to comply with an order to produce
and allow the inspection of a document issued under Rule 27 of the
Rules of Court, Section 3 of Rule 29 specifically provides as follows:
(d) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto,

an order directing the arrest of any party or agent of a party for
disobeying any of such orders except an order to submit to a
physical or mental examination.
Section 3. Other consequences. If any party or an officer or managing

agent of a party refuses to obey an order made under section 1 of this
Rule requiring him to answer designated questions, or an order under
Rule 27 to produce any document or other thing for inspection, copying,
or photographing or to permit it to be done, or to permit entry upon land
or other property or an order made under Rule 28 requiring him to
submit to a physical or mental examination, the court may make such
orders in regard to the refusal as are just, and among others the
following:
In other words, the sanctions may consist of: (a) regarding as

established the contents of the document sought to be produced; (b)
refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose claims or
defenses; (c) prohibiting the disobedient party from introducing
designated documents in evidence; (d) striking out pleadings or parts
thereof; (e) staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed; (f)
dismissing the action or any part thereof; (g) rendering judgment by
default against the disobedient party; and (h) directing the arrest of the
disobedient party.
(a) An order that the matters regarding which the questions

were asked, or the character or description of the thing or land,
or the contents of the paper, or the physical or mental condition
of the party, or any other designated facts shall be taken to be
established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the
claim of the party obtaining the order;
It is important to note, however, that the sanctions under Section 3 are

not exclusive. The courts retain the inherent power to impose sanctions
for abuse of the judicial process, including abuse of discovery.10 Section
5(c) of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court particularly grants a court the
power to "compel obedience to its judgments, orders and processes, and
to the lawful orders of a judge out of court, in a case pending therein." A
party who refuses to comply with the order to produce and allow the
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
inspection of documents may then be held in indirect contempt under

Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
The general purpose of the sanctions is to render the discovery process
effective. Sanctions serve an additional threefold purpose, namely: (1) to
ensure that a party will not be able to profit from its own failure to
comply with discovery; (2) to secure compliance with the particular
order at hand; and (3) to act as a general deterrent in the case and in
other litigations.11 In Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. Court of
Appeals,12 the Court has observed that the choice of what sanction to
impose upon the noncompliant party is within the courts sound
discretion, and that such discretion should be exercised having always in
mind the paramount and overriding interest of justice, "[f]or while the
modes of discovery are intended to attain the resolution of litigations
with great expediency, they are not contemplated, however, ultimately
to be causes of injustice. It behooves trial courts to examine well the
circumstances of each case and to make their considered determination
thereafter."13
In Solidbank Corporation v. Gateway Electronics Corporation,14 the trial
court penalized the respondent for not exerting diligent efforts to
comply with its order to produce certain documents by considering as
established the matters relating to the contents of the requested
documents.
The Court struck down the sanction primarily on the ground that the
respondents noncompliance with the court order had not been willful or
made in bad faith, observing thusly:
We hold that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the aforesaid Order. It is not fair to penalize Gateway for not
complying with the request of Solidbank for the production and
inspection of documents, considering that the documents sought were
not particularly described. Gateway and its officers can only be held
Page 76 of 82
liable for unjust refusal to comply with the modes of discovery if it is

shown that the documents sought to be produced were specifically
described, material to the action and in the possession, custody or
control of Gateway.
Neither can it be said that Gateway did not exert effort in complying with
the order for production and inspection of documents since it presented
the invoices representing the billings sent by Gateway to Alliance in
relation to the Back-end Services Agreement. Good faith effort to
produce the required documents must be accorded to Gateway, absent a
finding that it acted willfully, in bad faith or was at fault in failing to
produce the documents sought to be produced. (Bold emphasis
supplied)
The requirement of "willfulness" or "bad faith" as a condition for the
imposition of discovery sanction is particularly crucial when the
sanction to be imposed is harsh or prejudicial to the claim or defense of
the disobedient party, like the dismissal of the case, or, as in this
instance, the exclusion of evidence. Indeed, the exclusion of critical
evidence has been denominated as an "extreme" sanction not normally
to be imposed absent a showing of willful deception or flagrant
disregard of a court order.15
To conclude that the Republic lacked forthrightness in complying with
the order for the production of documents from the fact that, as stated in
the Sandiganbayans Resolution of June 3, 2009, the Republic had
"fail[ed] to offer a plausible explanation for its concealment of the main
bulk of its exhibits even when it was under a directive to produce them
xxx giv[ing] rise to a reasonable inference that the plaintiff, at the very
outset, had no intention whatsoever of complying with the directive of
the Court"16 is unwarranted. Bad faith or willfulness should not be
inferred from the mere failure of the Republic to render a plausible
explanation. Good faith should be presumed in favor of the Republic. The
respondents still carried the burden to show that the failure to produce
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
the documents during the discovery proceeding had been in bad faith or
willful. Absent such showing, the Republic should not be sanctioned with
exclusion of its evidence.
I express my concurrence with the earlier Resolution of February 17,
1997, whereby the Sandiganbayan declared:
The x x x requirement of "willfulness" is imposed under Section 3(b),
Rule 29 on Refusal to Make Discovery, Revised Rules of Court, which
provides that the Court may prohibit a party for refusing to comply with
a discovery order from introducing in evidence documents designated
therein. Thus, it has been held that under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of
Court Procedure from which the above cited Section 3, Rule 29 was
taken:
But such discretion [to make whatever disposition is just in the light of
the facts of the particular case] must be exercised in a judicious manner,
and relief under the rule is justified only in the exceptional case such as
where the recalcitrant party has acted in willful disregard of, or with
gross indifference to, an order of court requiring discovery or with such
deliberate callousness or negligence as to occasion an inability to comply
with the courts order. (Wembley, Inc. vs. Diplomat Tie Co. (DC Md) 216
F Supp. 565)
Absent proof of plaintiffs willful failure to comply with discovery order,
order precluding him from offering proof tending to contradict certain
defense would not be granted (Campbell vs. Johnson (DC NY) 101 F.
Supp. 705)
In this case, there is no evidence that the plaintiff willfully disobeyed or
disregarded the Resolution issued on August 25, 1989. Absent such
proof and consistently with good faith which is presumed, the nonproduction or non-marking of the additional exhibits at the discovery
proceedings could be attributed to inadvertence rather than willful
Page 77 of 82
disobedience, considering that the record from which Exhibits A to LLL

and submarkings were collated was voluminous or that the relevance
and importance of Exhibits MMM to QQQ and submarkings were
overlooked at that time and consequently omitted from being produced
or marked as evidence.
This observation gains greater cogency from the indisputed fact that
there was substantial compliance with the Resolution 152 documents
were produced as against 10 which were not made available or
temporarily marked. And the first four of the 10 were relatively
unimportant for being mere covering transmittal letter which Mr.
Tantoco and Atty. Santiago themselves branded as immaterial and
impertinent Anent the deposition (Exhibit QQQ), it could not have [been]
brought out at the discovery proceedings because it was yet inexistent at
the time. The documents (Exhibits QQQ-1 to QQQ-5) were submarked
for the reason that they were mentioned in the deposition (TSN,
September 25, 1996, 99. 18-19). (Emphasis supplied.)17
C.
To be admissible, private documents must be
authenticated; and public documents must be
proved in accordance with pertinent provisions
of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
The foregoing submissions notwithstanding, I humbly submit that the
Court rightly dismisses the petition for certiorari on the ground that the
Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to admit
the documents offered by the Republic. To me, the Sandiganbayan did
not abuse its discretion, least of all gravely, because the Republic did not
comply with the requirement of authentication of private documents as
a condition for their admission as evidence, and did not also satisfy the
requirement of presenting public documents as evidence.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
For purposes of their use as evidence in judicial proceedings, documents

are classified into private and public. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court so
specifies, viz:
Section 19. Classes of Documents. For the purpose of their
presentation evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last
wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents
required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private.
Properly classifying a document as public or private is crucial in
determining its admissibility as evidence. A public document is
admissible in evidence even without further proof of its due execution
and genuineness, but a private document must be properly
authenticated before it is admitted in evidence.18 In short, the party
offering the private document must first show, to the satisfaction of the
court, that it was duly executed by the person who is claimed to have
executed it.19
Patula v. People20 explains the need for authentication for private
documents but not of public documents, thus:
Page 78 of 82
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the

documents may be presented as evidence in court. A public document,
by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been
acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a
competent public official with the formalities required by law, or
because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is
self-authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be
presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any
other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without
the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which
some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official
or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities
prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the
manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as
evidence in court. The requirement of authentication of a private
document is excused only in four instances, specifically: (a) when the
document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court; (b) when the genuineness and authenticity of an
actionable document have not been specifically denied under oath by the
adverse party; (c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the
document have been admitted; or (d) when the document is not being
offered as genuine.21
The assailed documents, Exhibits "MMM" to "AAAAAAA," consisted of
both private and public documents. For the private documents, the
Republic should have duly authenticated them in accordance with
Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document
offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or

handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is
claimed to be.
Section 20 permits only two methods of authentication, namely: (a) by
testimony of a person who witnessed the execution of the document; or
(b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker of the document.
The documents categorized as private documents were composed of: (a)
private letters;22 (b) executive summary by a private entity;23 (c) credit
and property examination;24 (d) affidavits/statements made by certain
individuals;25(e) acknowledgment receipts/invoices issued by private
individuals;26 (f) checks and other bank/commercial documents;27 and
(g) agreement.28 The records do not show that the Republic proved the
authenticity of the private documents offered in evidence, however,
because no competent witnesses had testified having seen any of the
documents being executed, or because no evidence showed that the
signatures appearing on the documents (if signed) were those of the
purported signatories.
In some instances, like Exhibits "WWW" (Combined Credit and Property
Checkings dated 18 October 1989 by Eastern Inspection Bureau on Phil.
Eagle Mines, Inc.) and Exhibit "XXX" (Letter of Dominador Santiago to
Asset Privatization Trust dated 20 Dec. 1990), the Republic justified
their offer by stating that the original copies of said documents had been
presented during the hearing.29 But the presentation of the original
copies alone did not apparently satisfy the rule on authentication, or
exempt compliance with such rule. Indeed, authentication required
affirmative action an attestation by the party offering the document
that the latter was what it purported to be.
Page 79 of 82
As to the other private documents (e.g., Exhibit "WWWWW," Letter of

Richard Lynch, Director of Hammer Galleries dated December 8, 1982 to
Gallery Bleu, Rustans Makati), the Republic claimed that they had been
identified by witnesses during the trial. However, the witnesses who
supposedly testified on the documents did not appear to be competent
to identify and authenticate the documents in accordance with Rule 20,
supra, either because they did not witness the execution or signing of the
documents, or because they were not familiar with the signatures of the
makers.30 For instance, although Danilo Daniel testified on Exhibit
"WWWWW" in his capacity as the Director for Research and
Development of the PCGG, he was not shown to have been privy to the
making or execution of the exhibit.
As to the exhibits classified as public documents, I note that they did not
conform to the mode of proving public documents as delineated in
Sections 23, 24, 25, 27, 28 and 30, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Indeed,
those rules prescribed in lieu of authentication the form and
manner by which public documents could be offered as evidence in
judicial proceedings.
Public documents classified under Section 19(a) of Rule 132 must be
proved in accordance with Section 24 of the Rule, to wit:
Section 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents
referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,
with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which
the record is kept is in foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul,
or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept,
and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
Some of the exhibits that fell under this category of public documents
(a) Exhibit "MMM" (Memorandum issued by Presidential Assistant, Juan
C. Tuvera, to Hon. Teodoro Pea, Minister of Natural Resources); (b)
Exhibit "RRR" (Complaint in Civil Case No. 89-5268); (c) Exhibit "SSS"
(Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim in Civil Case No. 89-5268); (d)
Exhibit "EEEE" (TSN of the testimony of Evelyn Singson); (e) Exhibit
"VVVVV" (Memorandum dated June 6, 2003 of Director Danilo Daniel,
PCGG Research and Development Department, to the PCGG
Commissioners); and (f) Exhibit "BBBBBB" (Memorandum dated 23
April 2003 of Director Danilo Daniel, PCGG Research and Development
Department, to PCGG Commissioners) did not meet the requirement of
proof because they merely plain photocopies. Exhibit "ZZZ" (Questioned
Documents Report), although marked as "original," was inadmissible for
lacking the attestation required by Section 24.
Exhibit "UUU" (RTC Order dated June 4, 1996 in Civil Case No. 89-5268),
also a Section 19(a) document, was a certified true copy of the original.
However, the certification was made by Asset Privatization Trust, not by
the Regional Trial Court that had apparently issued the order and held
the legal custody of the document. It does not also appear that the
certification was written in accordance with the form of attestation
required by Section 25 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation
must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or
if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
I indicate at this point that in the hearing conducted on September 11,
2001 the Sandiganbayan already took judicial notice of matters that
were sought to be proved by Exhibit "SSS" (Administrative Order No.
14), and Exhibit "TTT" (Contract between the government and DBP
Page 80 of 82
regarding the transfer of the latters assets to the National Government),

both of which were Section 19(a) documents. As the consequence of the
taking of judicial notice, no further proof was necessary to establish the
matters such documents related to. Hence, discussing whether or not
said exhibits were admissible or not would serve no practical
purpose.1wphi1
The rest of the exhibits, which were public records of private documents
required by law to be entered therein, fell under Section 19(c) of Rule
132. As to them, Section 7 of Rule 132 states:
Section 27. Public record of a private document. An authorized public
record of a private document may be proved by the original record, or by
a copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an
appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody.
The exhibits falling under this category were Exhibit "YYY to Exhibit
YYY-33" (Articles of Incorporation of RIMCO, Treasurers Affidavit,
Certificate of Filing of Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock by RIMCO,
Amended Articles of Incorporation); and Exhibit "DDDD" (SEC Records
of PEMI). These exhibits, being mere photocopies not attested to by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, were inadmissible.
Finally, I hold that Exhibit "BBBB" (microfilm of "questioned
documents") was more correctly classified as "object" instead of
"documentary" evidence. This is evident from a reading of the purpose
of its offer in evidence, which was: "To show that the subject documents
containing the handwritten notes of Pres. Marcos were microfilmed."
But Exhibit "BBBB," its nature as object evidence notwithstanding, still
needed to be authenticated before admission in evidence. In its Motion
for Reconsideration dated February 4, 2008 filed in the Sandiganbayan,
the Republic had represented only that the original documents
(referring to the microfilmed documents) had been presented at the trial
by the Officer-in-Charge of the Malacafiang Presidential Library.31 The
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
Page 81 of 82
relevant microfilmed documents were not presented in court and

identified by the custodian.
10
Hence, Exhibit "BBB" should not be admitted in evidence
11
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition for certiorari in

accordance with the foregoing disquisition.
12
13
Id. at 93.
14
G.R. No. 164805, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 256, 271.
15
Steele v. Aramark Corp., 36 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 683 (2013).
16
Rollo, pp. 25-26.

Id. at 162-165.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Footnotes
See Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 67

Cal. L.Rev. 2 (1979), p. 268.
Litigation-Ending Sanctions: Alaska Courts Use of Rule 37, 2
Alaska Law Review 77, 81.
17
Rollo, pp. 87-101.
18
Id. at 213-215
Salas v. Sta. Mesa Market Corporation, G.R. No. 157766, July 12,
2007, 527 SCRA 465, 471.
19
Francisco, R.J., Basic Evidence, 1999 Edition, p. 277.
20
G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA 135.
21
Id. at 156-157.
Id. at 58.
G.R. No. 170604, September 2, 2013, 704 SCRA 465, 478-479.
428 F.3d. 214 (2005)
Exhibits "NNN," "OOO," "PPP," "XXX," "AAAA-41," "WWWWW"
"FFFFFF," "JJJJJJ," "TTTTTT," and "YYYYYY."
22
Id. at 218-219
E.g., Commonwealth v. Harris, 719 A.2d 1049, 1051 (1998);

Nelson v. State Bd. of Veterinary Med., 938 A.2d 1163.
8
Id.
23
Exhibit "CCCC."
24
Exhibit "WWW."
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
Exhibits "FFFF," "TTTTTT," "UUUUU," "GGGGGG," "AAAAAAA,"

and "ZZZZZZ."
25
Exhibits "XXXXX to ZZZZZ," "CCCCCC," "LLLLLL," and

"NNNNNN."
26
Exhibits "GGGG-SSSSS," "AAAAAA," "DDDDDD to EEEEEE,"

"IIIIII," "KKKKKK," "MMMMMM," "OOOOOO to SSSSSS," and
"UUUUUU to XXXXXX."
27
28
Exhibit "HHHHHH."
29
Exhibit "CCCC."
29
Rollo, p. 35.
30
Id. at 117 and 122.
31
Id. at 35.
Page 82 of 82

36 37. Evidence

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

36 37. Evidence

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Law 126 Evidence

36. OFFICIAL LANGUAGE

36. OFFICIAL LANGUAGE

Asingan, Pangasinan covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.

Republic of the Philippines

December 27, 2007

THE HEIRS OF MARCELINO DORONIO, NAMELY: REGINA AND

Un terreno (Lote 1018), situada en el municipio de Asingan, Linda por el

Law 126 Evidence

36. OFFICIAL LANGUAGE

deed of donation remained a private document as it was never

Law 126 Evidence

36. OFFICIAL LANGUAGE

After due proceedings, the RTC ruled in favor of petitioner heirs of

directed to execute a registerable document conveying the same to

The RTC disposed of the case, thus:

The CA based its conclusion on the disparity of the following technical

Law 126 Evidence

36. OFFICIAL LANGUAGE

Taking note "that the boundaries of the lot donated to Marcelino

give by will is deemed inofficious and the donation is reducible to the

Law 126 Evidence

36. OFFICIAL LANGUAGE

The argument is untenable. The requirement that documents written in

As a matter of fact, instead of objecting, petitioners admitted the

Law 126 Evidence

36. OFFICIAL LANGUAGE

As explained by the Court in Natcher v. Court of Appeals:42

ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity,

Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law

It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those

Law 126 Evidence

36. OFFICIAL LANGUAGE

resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein

The validity of the private deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of

Law 126 Evidence

36. OFFICIAL LANGUAGE

for quieting of title.53 In other words, it is a case for declaratory relief

such proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.56 Thus,

Law 126 Evidence

36. OFFICIAL LANGUAGE

Donation Propter Nuptias of Real

Law 126 Evidence

36. OFFICIAL LANGUAGE

spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante is entitled to it. It is still

Although We confirm here the invalidity of the deed of donation and of

Law 126 Evidence

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIAMARTINEZ

36. OFFICIAL LANGUAGE

Rollo, pp. 43-44, 48-49.

Id. at 48-49; Exhibits "A" & "7."

Id. at 48; Exhibit "D."

Id. at 49; Exhibits "D-4" & "6."

Id.; CA rollo, pp. 37-38.

Id. at 42-43; Exhibit "5."

Doronio, et al." Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso,

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Civil Case No. U-6498.

Records, pp. 134-135.

Law 126 Evidence

36. OFFICIAL LANGUAGE

CA rollo, p. 43; id. at 354.

Id. at 44-45; id at 354-356.

People v. Pansensoy, G.R. No. 140634, September 12, 2002,